S.A., R.J. v Minister for Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth, C-97/24

In its judgment, the Court recalls that the Member States are required, under the directive, to guarantee applicants for international protection material reception conditions which ensure an adequate standard of living, whether through housing, financial aid, vouchers, or a combination of the three. Those conditions must cover basic needs, including appropriate accommodation, and safeguard the physical and mental health of the persons concerned. 

Thus, a Member State which fails to provide an applicant who does not have sufficient means with those material conditions, even temporarily, is manifestly and gravely exceeding its discretion with regard to the application of the directive. Such a failure is therefore capable of constituting a sufficiently serious infringement of EU law, triggering the liability of the Member State concerned. Communications Directorate Press and Information Unit curia.europa.eu 

Although EU law establishes a strictly delineated derogation system enabling the modalities for reception to be adjusted in the event of temporary exhaustion of the housing capacity normally available for applicants for international protection, the application of that system requires that the situation be exceptional, duly justified, and limited in time. That system applies, inter alia, when a mass, unforeseeable influx of third-country nationals entails temporary saturation of reception capacity. However, even in this scenario, the directive provides that the Member States must in any event cover the basic needs of the persons concerned, in accordance with the obligation to respect human dignity enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 

In those circumstances, the Court considers that it cannot be accepted that a Member State may plead the event which triggers the derogation system, that is to say, the temporary exhaustion of the housing capacity normally available for applicants for international protection, in order to evade its obligation to cover the basic needs of the persons concerned, including where that exhaustion is the result of a significant and sudden influx of third-country nationals seeking temporary or international protection. Similarly, pleading the occurrence of such an event does not enable it to be established that a failure to fulfil the obligations laid down by the directive is not sufficiently serious to be capable of giving rise to a right to compensation. An interpretation to the contrary would deprive that system of its practical effect and would compromise the effective judicial protection of applicants. 

Nor is there any element permitting the conclusion, in this instance, that Ireland was objectively prevented from fulfilling its obligations – either by providing applicants with housing outside the system normally provided for accommodating them, as the case may be by taking advantage of the derogation system provided for by the directive, or by granting them financial allowances or vouchers.