UNHCR Written Observations in case C-97/24 (Request for a preliminary reference ruling by the High Court of Ireland lodged on 6 February 2024, in cases 2023/209 JR and 2023/541 JR, between : S.A. and R.J. Applicants in the Main Proceedings -and- THE MINISTER FOR CHILDREN, EQUALITY, DISABILITY, INTEGRATION AND YOUTH, IRELAND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Respondents in the Main Proceedings -and- UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES Intervener in the Main Proceedings)

6. UNHCR addresses the questions referred to this Court as follows: (1) Section B briefly outlines UNHCR’s mandate and experience supervising the treaty-based system of refugee protection established by the international community. (2) Section C sets out the key provisions of the RCD and highlights the settled case law of this Court addressing the minimum standards for material reception conditions that Member States must provide to applicants for international protection pursuant to these provisions. The section also identifies relevant principles of international human rights law relating to the minimum standards required of States in the provision of reception conditions. (3) Section D avers that force majeure, arising from the temporary exhaustion of a Member State’s housing capacities, cannot be available in defence to a claim for damages in respect of a failure to provide for the Applicants’ basic needs in breach of the RCD, as the availability of such a defence would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme. (4) Section E summarises the jurisprudential development of the test for determining whether a particular breach of EU law gives rise to a right to reparation (the “Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame test”). The section then outlines why, even aside from its inconsistency with the RCD’s legislative scheme, a purported defence of force majeure has no relevance to the application of the Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame test in this case or any other. (5) Section F addresses the possibility of a freestanding defence of force majeure. While there are a few cases in which force majeure has been contemplated as a freestanding concept in EU law, there does not appear to have been a single case before this Court in which such a form of force majeure has successfully been invoked in defence of a breach of EU law. In the absence of precedent, the concept has no role to play in the defence to a claim for damages in respect of a breach of EU law, especially where the claim relates to the breach of a mandatory obligation, such as Article 17 of the RCD, whose requirements derive from fundamental human rights protected under the Charter. (6) Section G formulates direct answers to the questions referred to the Court in this case.