Cross-Border Migration in the Russian Far East

  • Author: Galina S. Vitkovskaya
  • Document source:
  • Date:
    1 October 1997


The destiny of the Far East region of Russia[1][1] is an increasingly frequent topic of discussion among scholars and politicians, expressing their concern and alarm on the issue. In the light of the market transformation of the Russian economy, the relative openness of its border with China, and the weakening of ties between the Russian Far East and Moscow, the movement of people in Siberia and the Far East has been radically transformed. Previously closed and tightly controlled by Moscow, Russia's Far East now has a relatively open border with China. It also faces fundamental imbalances in the distribution of population and resources - Russia is resource rich and population poor, while China is the opposite.

Economic ties in the border regions have begun to develop very quickly, with commodity circulation grown to six times the 1989 level, while during the same time the overall commodity circulation between Russia and China increased only 1.8 times. These regions now account for 85 per cent of all Russian-Chinese trade, in comparison with 22 per cent in 1989 and 1.5 per cent in 1986. Approximately 800 firms in the Russian Far East are registered as either Chinese owned or Russian-Chinese joint ventures. Labour immigration of Chinese into Russia is growing at a similarly swift rate.

The rapid development of Russian-Chinese interaction in the border zone and the massive migration pressure from China have given rise to serious apprehension in Russia. The growing penetration of Chinese migrants and Chinese capital into the Russian Far East and further, to the Ural regions of Russia, is causing concern, leading journalists, experts and politicians to claim that Russia is in danger of losing her influence in the region, or even that the geopolitical balance will break and that there is a real threat of territorial expansion of China.

The objective circumstances behind such apprehensions are the following:

•              the great difference in the demographic potential on opposite sides of the border;

•              high unemployment in China;

•              the weakening of ties between the Far East and other regions of Russia, and the growing economic dependence of the Russian Far East on China. The fear of becoming isolated from the rest of the country coupled with the fear of mass penetration of Chinese immigrants is generating alarmist reactions in the Far East, even when these are against Russia's best interests;

•              emigration from the Far East to European Russia and to Ukraine, which has reduced the total population of the region, including in the border areas;

•              the absence in Russia of the demographic and economic resources necessary if any significant population resettlement to the eastern regions is to take place.

These circumstances suggest the inevitability of a massive Chinese expansion into Russia. The new and acute socio-political situation demands an effective, research-based policy of interaction and collaboration with China - especially in the border regions - in order to prevent the development of a region of large-scale conflict. Migration policy is one of the most important parts of the overall politics of partnership, inasmuch as its overall success largely depends on it.

Unfortunately, there is a lack of necessary information on the actual situation in the border regions. Such information is essential to the formulation of appropriate migration policies. Not even basic estimates of the size of the Chinese presence in Siberia and the Far East are available. For this reason, the Moscow Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace with financial support of the Ford Foundation and the MacArthur Foundation carried out a large-scale scientific survey in the Far East and Eastern Siberia during 1996-1997.[2][2] Local researchers participated in the survey. The results of the survey are used in this paper.


2.1     Size of Population

The low population density was and remains one of the most significant factors contributing to the strategic vulnerability of the Russian Far East. What is more, during recent years the impact of this factor has increased perceptibly.

In the Tsar's Russia and then during the Soviet time the State exerted great efforts in order to achieve "demographic reclamation" of the region. As a result of this there was until lately, if not rapid, at least comparatively steady population growth in the Far East. According to data from the national population censuses the number of inhabitants of the Far East had grown from 1.6 million in 1926 to 4.6 million in 1959, 6.8 million in 1979 and 7.9 million in 1989. The peak level of 8.1 million was reached in 1991.[3][3] But even this all time maximum did not reduce the concern of the Russian leadership over the situation in the region, since it represented only about 5 per cent of the total population of Russia, but over 36 per cent of its territory. Population density in the region in 1991 was only 1.3 per km square, compared with 8.7 for Russia as a whole.[4][4]

After 1991 the actual size of the population in the Far East region started to decrease, to 8.0 million at the beginning of 1992, 7.9 million in 1993, 7.8 million in 1994, 7.6 million in 1995, 7.5 million in 1996 and 7.4 million at the beginning of 1997,[5][5] thus falling below the level reached at the beginning of perestroika, 7.6 million at 1 January 1986.[6][6] Between 1991 and 1997 the population of the Far East was reduced by just under 9 percent, as against an average 0.4 per cent decline of the total population of Russia. In terms of population reduction, the Far East region is far ahead of the rest of Russia, even compared with other regions with declining populations, such as the North and North West regions.[7][7]

Within the region the changes in population have been very unevenly spread, both as between different territories and in terms of individual towns and villages.

The biggest fall in number of population has taken place in the North in the Magadan region, where the population was reduced by 36 per cent between 1991 and 1997. The smallest fall in population was registered in Primorsky kray (3 per cent), Khabarovsk kray (4 per cent) and Amur oblast (4 per cent), i.e. in the southern areas of the region, situated near the border. During the same period the population decrease in Camchatka oblast was 15 per cent, in Sakhalin oblast 12 per cent, and in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 8 per cent.[8][8]

The decrease is most pronounced among the urban population of the Far East region as is common for the entire Russia. This may be explained not only by negative natural growth but also by a decrease in the number of settlements with the administrative status of towns. During 1991-1992 many of these settlements were reclassified to rural settlement status, in the hope of receiving land and state subsidies. Another reason is the change of balance in the migration flows between urban and rural settlements. The migration-based increase in towns is no longer the result of a migration-based decrease in the rural population. Now it is fed more by the influx of migrants from other republics of the former USSR.

Before the beginning of the 1990s the Far East region was characterized by high natural population growth, compared with the Russian average. Then it started to come down drastically: from 7.3 per 1,000 in 1990, to 5.1 in 1991 and 2.2 in 1992, and from 1993 turning negative, with a figure of -2.4 in 1995, indicating a natural decrease of population: in 1993 the number of deaths exceeded the number of births by 10,200 (92,500 and 82,300 respectively), in 1994 by 15,100 (97,700 deaths and 82,600 births), and in 1995 by 17,900 (95,200 deaths and 77,300 births).[9][9]

2.2     Migration Trends

Migration to the Far East, which on average was responsible for 30 per cent of the increase of population in the region, actually ceased by the beginning of the 1990s. From this period the migration outflow has become the main factor behind the reduction in the population of the Far East. The first time a negative migration balance was registered was in 1991 (a net loss of 24,100 people in comparison with a net gain of 25,200 in 1990). Then the outflow started to grow rapidly, reaching net losses of 102,600 in 1993 and 116,000 in 1994, and thereafter diminishing again to net losses of 82,700 in 1995 and 56,700 in 1996.[10][10] The overall population decrease in the Far East region is continuing, though slightly less rapidly. Northern areas such as Magadan oblast, the Chukotka Autonomous Area and the northern part of Khabarovsk kray as well as Sakhalin oblast are suffering the largest losses from migration, part of which is accounted for by population movements to the southern areas of the Far East region, situated near the border.

It is interesting to mention that while over the last years the Far East has had a negative migration balance within the framework of the Russian internal migration exchange, it has had a small positive balance of external migration, amounting to 6,200 persons in 1994, to 6,500 in 1995 and 3,800 in 1996.[11][11] However, this positive net migration balance occurred only in the exchange with the "new abroad" (with the exception of Belarus and Ukraine), while in the population flows between the region and countries of the "old abroad" the balance remains negative. The spontaneous influx of immigrants from the countries of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, which is taking place outside of the framework of any settlement programme, has created hopes among many people for positive changes in the dynamics of the demographic situation of the region. But this influx was very small from the beginning and is now rapidly diminishing. For instance, the positive balance of net migration with Kazakstan was 5,800 persons in 1994, 4,200 in 1995 and 1,900 in 1996. During the same years the balance with Uzbekistan was 3,300, 3,000 and 1,200 respectively, and with Armenia 1,300, 800 and 500. The balance with Kyrgyzstan was 2,500 in 1993, 1,500 in 1994, 500 in 1995 and 20 in 1996; with Tajikistan for the same years 1,300, 900, 900 and 600, and with Georgia 700, 600, 600, and 300.[12][12]

Thus the Chinese immigration is developing against an unfavourable local demographic background.

2.3     Reasons for Population Outflow from the Region

The hard climatic conditions and remoteness from the central regions of Russia always were the traditional factors leading to a population outflow from the Far East. Notwithstanding the completion of special programmes for the development of the economy of the region (in the 1930s, and in 1967, 1972 and 1987), improvement of transport and communications with other parts of the country, availability of various privileges for settlers and inhabitants of the Far East, application of territorial weighting to salaries, quartering of large army contingents in the region and other measures to increase the size of the population, only a small and decreasing part of those arriving actually settled in the region: 15 per cent during the period 1971-1975 and only 5.7 per cent during 1986-1990.[13][13] The scale of the return movement was considerable also during the time before the Soviet era, notwithstanding sizeable privileges granted to settlers. For instance, of 6,166 workers and craftsmen arriving in the region in 1915 from other parts of Russia 61 per cent left during the same year.[14][14]

Nevertheless the acute aggravation of the economic situation and the fall in living standards experienced by the inhabitants of the region after 1991 have become the main reason for the migration outflow. The Far East was always one of the most militarized regions of the USSR. A considerable part of the economy of the region has been working to satisfy the needs of the 1.5 million-strong Army and the Pacific Fleet. With the exception of fishing and gold mining all other branches of the economy, including agriculture, did not generate enough even for the region's own needs. The supply of necessary commodities to the region was arranged on the basis of import of food and practically all kinds of raw materials.

Demilitarization, which started under President Mikhail Gorbachev and continued after 1991, led to a considerable reduction in the armed forces stationed in the region and stagnation of the enterprises of the military industrial complex (MIC). In the Far East military district alone the number of servicemen was reduced to one sixth of previous numbers. This pattern was repeated in the border guards and the forces of the Ministry of the Interior, as well as the separate armies and corps attached to the Ministry for Emergency Situations and to law enforcement bodies.[15][15] This has not only led to a large outflow of servicemen and specialists from within the MIC, but also caused heavy damage for other branches of the economy of the region and resulted in a surplus of labour.

Former leaders of the country spared no efforts to create in the Far East a complex economy, comprising all levels of the industrial system. For this reason enterprises such as the Amurstal steel production plant in the city of Komsomolsk-na-Amure (which manufactured rolled steel from local scrap metal and cast iron imported from other regions, using coking coal imported from other regions), machine-building factories in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok and many others were built here. But the efficiency of the economy was based on huge state subsidies to cover the cost of electric energy, coal, railway transportation etc. More than half of the financial needs of the region were subsidized by the state. These subsidies were gradually abolished during the years of "perestroika" and reforms. Then in 1994 the government of the Russian Federation cancelled even those minimal privileges that were still applicable in the Far East territories. In addition a decision taken in March 1993 and providing for the transfer to the funds of the Far East regions of the full amount of customs duties arising from the export of oil, gas and refinery products, was cancelled in May 1994. The abolition of these privileges has led to the termination of projects for the development of the energy system, transport, food supply and social services, because these projects had been financed through external economic privileges.

The Far East has therefore lost its main sources of supply and its main markets in the European part of Russia because of the enormous increase in transport costs. The overall energy availability has also deteriorated due to the sharp increase in the price of fuel. This has also resulted in food prices in the region becoming two to three times higher than in the central parts of Russia. Taking into consideration that the region was never capable of supplying more than about a third of its food supply requirements, it becomes clear that provision of food to the inhabitants of the region was soon threatened with serious crisis.

As a result, the relative advantages of the Far East in the Russian economy have been lost, while the drawbacks of its economy structure have become fully evident. Already in 1994 a third to one half of all enterprises in the region had become unprofitable and all of its ten administrative sub-regions had been registered as areas in economic depression. In January 1994 the Government of the Russian Federation commissioned the executive bodies of the Far East territories to develop a draft development programme for the region, paying particular attention to the business activities of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region.[16][16] But this work has been stopped because of lack of resources not only for implementation of such a programme, but even for its drafting.

It is therefore no surprise that the Far East region, since 1992, has suffered a number of crises: in 1992 there was a food crisis softened partially only by barter exchange with China, then during the two following winters there were energy crises, which were repeated with new force in the summer of 1996 and again in 1997 and necessitated special Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation.[17][17]

The administrations of the sub-regions of the Far East are pursuing different ways of overcoming the difficulties created by the restructuring of Russian society due to the absence of regional cohesion and sub-regional division of labour, and moreover due to competition inside the region. The northern areas and Magadan oblast are in the most desperate situation, while the economy of Sakhalin is also in difficulties. At the same time Primorsky kray has started to move to a degree of stabilization and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) may be regarded as a relatively stable area.

The weakness of the links between the Far East members of the Russian Federation and the competitive relations established between them act to block the flow of population from the most depressed northern parts of the region to the improving southern parts, and therefore serve to promote increased population losses for the entire region. The competition between the territories of the Far East sometimes takes such acute forms that, for example, the authorities of Sakhalin were forced to deploy its own guards on the trains bringing coal to Sakhalin, because they fear possible "requisition" actions on the part of the authorities of Khabarovsk kray. Similar conflicts are taking place over the distribution of aircraft fuel arriving at Khabarovsk airport but intended for the needs of the whole Far East region.[18][18]

Unemployment has become a considerable problem for the Far East. It is especially high in small towns and settlements and in the areas which have high concentrations of enterprises of the military industrial complex. For example, in 1995 the level of unemployment in the northern districts of Khabarovsk kray reached 20 per cent.[19][19] According to Goscomstat data the level of officially registered unemployment in the Far East region during the period January-April 1997 was 3.8 per cent, and in the most economically developed Primorsky and Khabarovsk kray 4.7 per cent and 5.1 per cent respectively, compared to 3.5 per cent as the average for the whole country. The highest level registered during the same period was in the Koryak Autonomous Area (7.6 per cent).[20][20] In addition a significant number of employees in the Far East were forced to take unpaid vacations. The average for the region was 8.6 per cent, compared to an average of 6.9 per cent for the whole of Russia, and with considerably higher figures in some sub-regions: 9.8 per cent in Primorsky kray, 9.9 per cent in Khabarovsk kray, 10.4 per cent the Jewish Autonomous Region, and 17.1 per cent in Amur oblast.[21][21] The low level of the officially registered unemployment in the latter two territories (2 per cent and 3.7 per cent respectively) is therefore more than compensated for by hidden forms of the same unemployment.

It should be recognized that a part of the population managed to adjust themselves to the new situation, mainly through using the opportunity of regular shuttle visits to China. However, this has not made it possible to overcome the main reason behind the emerging desire for migration, i.e. the absence of confidence in the future.

2.4     What Future?

Migration statistics for the last few years show that the size of the population outflow from the Far East is likely to be reduced in the near future. It appears that the section of the population, which has managed more or less to adapt to the economic situation in the region, now seems to predominate among those living in the region. This group also includes natives of the Far East, who express patriotic feelings towards their "Small Motherland" and who call themselves "aboriginal". Other reasons for the reduction in the migration outflow include the very high cost of moving for potential migrants who do not have the resources for such expenses including high transport charges, the undeveloped housing market in the country, and also restrictions on freedom of movement due to the continuation of the institution of propiska (registration) in many regions of Russia in spite of the federal law adopted in 1993.

It is unlikely that there will be a further reduction in the number of servicemen in the region. The opposite seems in fact more likely. Military authorities in the frontier territories are concerned that the army is not fully up to recruitment levels, which makes the Far East region unable to fulfil its part of the state defence programme. For instance, according to the corps commander in Borze of the Baykal military district, Major-General E. Abrashin, his corps which covers 300 kilometers of the Chinese-Russian border is lacking a quarter of its complement of officers, i.e. more than 1,300.[22][22]

However, even though the migration-related losses of population are showing a decrease, this is not in itself sufficient to create an optimistic prognosis for the demographic and labour potential of the Far East region. The region has always been considered as having inadequate labour resources, and migration inflow used to satisfy its labour force requirements. The ending of the period of artificial isolation from the neighbouring countries of the Asia-Pacific region is creating new conditions for independent development in the Far East, and the border regions are beginning to make use of such conditions. The depression is likely to be overcome and some districts have identified the way out of the crisis. If they are successful, the surplus in the labour force generated by the depression will be absorbed and the region will again look for additional labour resources. An inflow of labour migrants seems to be the only realistic source of such additional resources.

2.5     Migration Pressure from China

According to different estimates, which compare different territories, the population density of territories near the border in the Far East regions is ten to fifteen times lower than in the neighbouring Chinese provinces. Thus, in the most densely populated Primorsky kray the population density is 13.5 per square km, while on the other side of the border, in North-Eastern China, the density is 58 per square km (or 110 million people on an area of 1.9 million square km),[23][23] i.e. 4.3 times higher. However, with the exception of small border sections in Khabarovsk and Blagoveshiansk regions, the population density in the border territory does not exceed 5 per km square,[24][24] i.e. 11.6 times less than in North-Eastern China. The population of the three largest cities in the Far East, Vlasivistik, Khabarovsk and Blagoveshiansk, in total is half that of the population of Kharbin in China.[25][25]

However, it would be difficult to argue that there is demographic pressure of China on the Far East of Russia on the basis of a simple comparison of population densities. The discrepancy between the resource potential and the size of the population in China is the key factor, as well as tension on the labour market and the low income level of the population. Calculated per capita, the amount of arable land is 3.3 times lower in China than the world average, and nearly 10 times lower than in the former USSR.[26][26] For each person employed in the agricultural sector in the Chinese border areas there are only 0.8 hectares of arable land, while land on the Russian side is often uncultivated and sparsely populated. The hidden unemployment in towns is estimated at 15 to 20 per cent, totalling more than the population of Russia. In the north-eastern part of China alone, which is adjacent to the Russian Far East, there are about 7 to 8 million unemployed people (according to Chinese estimates),[27][27] which is equal to the population of the entire Far East region. The possibilities of Chinese migration to Western countries have to a great extent been exhausted. Their further expansion into the South-Western Asian regions is limited as these regions are already overpopulated and competition on the labour market is very severe.[28][28] For these reasons many experts now believe that a migration influx of Chinese to Russia is not only possible but inevitable.


3.1     Size of the Chinese Population in the Russian Far East

Unfortunately, precise statistical data on the number of Chinese in the Russian Federation is not available, as it is difficult to estimate the significant share of illegal and shuttle migration flows from China. Different data ara used in which the maximum estimate is 2 million people, a figure often used by mass media.[29][29] The Carnegie Moscow Center carried out a survey in 1996-1997, which showed that the number of Chinese in the Far East region is overestimated by mass media and by those political leaders who gamble on the "Chinese card". A wide range of competent experts interviewed during the survey estimates the number of Chinese in Primorsky and Khabarovsk kray and in Amur oblast to lie within the limits of 30,000 to 70,000 people for each of the above-mentioned regions, including shuttle merchants from China. This estimate is confirmed by visual observations by sociologists participating in the survey.

Thus, according to expert data, the total number of Chinese in the Far East does not exceed 3 per cent of the population in the region, while it was 10 to 15 per cent in 1910.[30][30] Inflated estimates of the scale of the Chinese presence in Russia are sometimes the result of sincere fear, but more often they are used for their populist appeal and for blackmailing the federal power. There was genuine fear at the beginning of 1990, caused by the drive and energy of the Chinese who rushed to Russia as soon as the borders were opened. According to data provided by Amur oblast administration, 6,233 foreign citizens crossed the Russian-Chinese border in 1988, the greater part of them Chinese, while the figure for 1992 was 287,215. But these numbers include short business trips, tourism, etc. as well as genuine immigration. The estimated number of Chinese immigrants in the Far East during that period is considerably smaller. According to an estimate provided by the Director of the Institute for Economic Research of the Far East branch of the Russian Academy of Science, P.A. Minakir, the number of immigrants during 1992-1995 did not exceed 50,000-80,000 people, including some 10,000-15,000 legal contract workers, and some 10,000-12,000 people with permission to study in the region for up to one year. It is hard to believe that the number of illegal aliens far exceeded these numbers. At any rate, during operations carried out by the militia and border patrol in Primorsky and Khabarovsk kray and Amur oblast, no more than 5,000-6,000 illegal immigrants were deported from each of these territories.[31][31]

The number of Chinese immigrants in the Far East region in 1993 totalled some 100,000 people, according to the joint estimate carried out by the Director of the Demographic Centre of the Moscow Institute for Socio-Political Studies of the Russian Academy of Science, L.L. Rybakovsky, and an official from the administration of Khabarovsk kray, V.V. Mindogulov.[32][32]

Prohibitive import duties were imposed in 1993, border controls became tougher and immigration control at border crossing posts was introduced. This all served to reduce the number of Chinese immigrants.

On the other hand, special arrangements for attracting foreign workers on the basis of licences were made. There are no official data on the activity of Chinese workers in Russia before 1994. Different publications give figures ranging from 10,000 in 1990 to 17,000-18,000 in 1992-1993. According to the data of the local administration of Khabarovsk kray, there were 707 Chinese workers living in the kray in 1991, 1,175 in 1992 and 1,560 in 1993. The largest concentrations of Chinese workers in 1993 were in Chita oblast, totalling some 10,000 individuals.[33][33] Following the adoption on 16 December 1993 of the decree of the Russian president "On attracting and using foreign labour force in the Russian Federation", more precise calculations were carried out. The Federal Migration Service, by the middle of April 1994, had issued 251 permits in order to attract 15,000 Chinese workers, including 8,500 workers for the Far East. In total, the number of Chinese workers in 1994 was estimated at 20,301,[34][34] in 1995 at 26,528,[35][35] and in 1996 at 24,043.[36][36] The quotas established by the licences are higher than the real number of Chinese workers recruited. Thus, for Primorsky kray the quota of Chinese workers is drt at 15,000 individuals, while the total number of foreign workers in the kray including Chinese was 13,500 in 1996.[37][37]

3.2     Demographic and Social Composition[38][38]

The Carnegie Moscow Center investigation interviewed a sample of 244 Chinese immigrants, 49 per cent male and 51 per cent female. The survey was carried out in markets, high schools, agricultural, industrial and transport enterprises, and in hotels.

Two thirds of the sample are young people below the age of 30 (including 17 per cent below 20), 25 per cent are aged from 30 to 40, and very few, only 7 per cent, are above 50 years of age. The age distribution considerably predetermined family status: 58 per cent are not married, 64 per cent do not have children, while among those with children 73 per cent have only one child.

The Chinese migrants turned out to be relatively well educated people: 35 per cent had graduated from high school, 17 per cent have medium special education and 48 per cent had graduated from secondary school.

The data received on the education level corresponds to the distribution of responses to the question about special qualifications, with 57 per cent of the Chinese migrants having special qualifications at the level of high or medium specialist educational institutions. Of these 18 per cent are economists, 7 per cent are teachers, 7 per cent engineers and 3 per cent translators. Physicians, lawyers, journalists, librarians, managers, marketing experts and other professions comprise 19 per cent, while builders and highly skilled workers make up 10 per cent. The proportion of the sample who are peasants turned out to be only 3 per cent. The question about specialization was not answered by 17 per cent, including 60 per cent of those under 30 years of age, 67 per cent of those who have only secondary education, and 75 per cent of those who previously in China had been employed in agriculture or studying or unemployed. Most probably these are people who do not have any specialization. In addition 40 per cent openly stated that they did not have any speciality. One may assume that among the latter a large part is represented by peasants, because 16 per cent of those polled are inhabitants of rural areas. However, the overwhelming majority of the Chinese migrants (84 per cent) are urban residents.

3.3     Migration Geography

The data collected by the Carnegie Moscow Center investigation shows that the majority of rural Chinese immigrants originated from the north-east province of Hailongjang near the border (12 per cent of all those surveyed), while a much smaller number are from Inner Mongolia (3 per cent of total sample) and only a few come from the more distant provinces of Hebei and Zhejiang (1 per cent).

Among urban as well as rural immigrants the majority (79 per cent) are natives of Hailongjang province - the cities of Kharbin, Khaylar, Aikhoy/Khaikhe, Tsicicar, Manjouria, Nigniya, Shouagnyashang and Mudangtszyang. Of these 44 per cent come from Kharbin, 10 per cent from Khaylar and 10 per cent from Aikhoy/Khaikhe. The second significant source of Chinese migrants to the Far East of Russia is the province of Jilin, which borders Hailongjang. The cities of Jilin and Changchung provide 8 per cent of the urban migrants. The third and fourth places are occupied by the province of Inner Mongolia (6 per cent) and the province of Lyaoning (3 per cent) which border Jilin. These four north-east Chinese provinces together, Hailongjang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia and Lyaoning, are supplying about 96 per cent of the Chinese migrants to the Far East regions of Russia.

Apart from the location where the survey took place, many of those interviewed had visited towns in Eastern Siberia such as Chita or Zaboykalye of Chita oblast (27 per cent), Irkutsk, Angarsk or Ussolye-Sibirskoyen of Irkutsk oblast (22 per cent) and Ulan-Ude of Buratiya (20 per cent). Generally smaller numbers had visited territories of the Far East closer to the border, such as the towns of Khabarovsk or Chegdomyn of Khabarovsky kray (20 per cent), Blagoveshansk, Brlogorsk or Svobodniy of Amur oblast (11 per cent) and Vladivostok or Ussuriysk of Prymorsky kray (10 per cent), and a few had also visited Yakutsk in Sakha Republic.

Chinese migrants are now developing contacts with more remote regions of Russia. Nearly 10 per cent had visited towns in Western Siberia such as Novossibirsk, Tumen or Omsk, while 3 per cent had been to Yekaterinburg or Chelyabinsk in the Ural region, and some had reached the Volga region. Considerable numbers had been to Moscow (13 per cent) or St. Petersburg (6 per cent).

The high mobility of the Chinese in Russia has been typical for them since the beginning of the twentieth century, which saw Chinese immigration and settlement across the territory from the city of Murmansk to the Black Sea.[39][39] For this reason the issue of Chinese migration should be regarded not only as a local concern for the Far East, but as an issue relevant to the whole of the region from the Urals to the Pacific ocean, and in fact as affecting the entire Russia.

3.4     Reasons for Immigration

The goals of Chinese migrants in coming to Russia can be clearly deduced from the kinds of activities they practise here, with 46 per cent of those polled engaged in trade, 40 per cent occupied by study or training, and 14 per cent working on a contract basis (3 per cent as translators or teachers, 5 per cent working in different companies and enterprises, 4 per cent engaged in construction work, with only 2 per cent working in agriculture). It is interesting to note that no one mentioned tourism, although 45 per cent had entered the country with tourist visa.

The majority (79 per cent) had come to work in Russia because they believe it more profitable than in China, while only 15 per cent are here because they had not found work in China. Thus one may assume that the main factor behind the Chinese immigration is not unemployment but the low level of earnings in China.

Two thirds of those polled (68 per cent) would like to have their own business in Russia. Again the most popular direction is trade, with 72 per cent of those who dream of business wishing to have a shop or a trading company, while 15 per cent would like to have a small production enterprise, and 11 per cent would like to have a restaurant or a hotel. The remainder (2 per cent) do not know exactly what kind of business they would prefer.

The preference for the types of business mentioned above, predominantly for trade, is being further confirmed by answers given to other questions in the course of the poll. Only 25 per cent would wish to acquire land on long term lease, contrary to existing alarmist images of a general Chinese aspiration to conquer the Far East lands. Only 11 per cent would like to be workers in Russia. The preference expressed by Chinese migrants for the hotel or trading business is on the one hand traditional for them, as we can see from world experience, but on the other hand it is based on objective reasons. The situation in Russia is not favourable at the moment for setting up joint ventures and making investments. Although quite a large number of Chinese or joint Chinese-Russian ventures are being registered, only a small proportion of them are working in reality. Some experts regard those enterprises that have been registered but are not operative, as well as working but unprofitable enterprises, to be serving as a form of intelligence agents or "billeting party" of Chinese business.

Less than a quarter (23 per cent) of Chinese migrants wish to settle in Russia permanently. A similar proportion would like their children to live in Russia, and of these 36 per cent are identical to those who would themselves like to settle permanently. On the one hand this information does not suggest a massive aspiration on the part of the Chinese migrant to settle in the Russian territories. On the other hand the evaluation of this information depends considerably on the scale of the Chinese immigration, which is at present not very sizeable. But it should be taken into account that Chinese extended families are large, and after settling in Russia immigrants are likely to try to settle their relatives as well, as we can see from the experience of some Western countries.

3.5     Immigration Channels

With the aim of acquiring the opportunity to work or trade in Russia the Chinese use any possibilities: tourism, training, business trips, short term contracts. The most widely used channel for Chinese migrants to enter the Far East is the tourist one, which was used by 45 per cent of those surveyed. The second route is that of studying (31 per cent), although in the case of the Chinese migrants in the European part of Russia the majority used this channel.[40][40] Other kinds of visa were used by 25 per cent of those questioned, formally most often with service goals.

The overwhelming majority of those who arrived with tourist visas are engaged in trade, mainly shuttle trade.

According to the information of experts, the majority of those Chinese migrants who came for study or training do not in fact show themselves in their institutes, or else they give up their studies shortly after arrival in order to start trading or other business.

3.6     Accommodation and Employment

Most frequently the Chinese migrants stay in hotels (38 per cent of the poll) or in rented accommodation. According to the expert information, arranging accommodation for Chinese migrants has become a sometimes legal, sometimes not very legal (using borrowed identities), but always very profitable sphere of activity of some relatively well-to-do Chinese businessmen. They are in charge of most of the bookings of hotels and private flats to say nothing about the special Chinese hostels that are used by 12 per cent of those interviewed people. The rent is fixed for a housing unit as a whole, which is the reason why small traders and workers as a rule live in very crowded conditions, perhaps 20 to 30 living together in one flat. It is not very surprising that their living conditions do not comply with any sanitary standards. But the Chinese migrants do not complain about such conditions. A considerable part of the migrants covered by the Carnegie Moscow Center survey (35 per cent) stay in student hostels, 4 per cent more than those who travelled to Russia via the study channel. Leasing student hostel accommodation to the migrants is done not only by local authorities but also by some of the Chinese "students" who have moved into business. Only 4 per cent have bought a house or private flat and about 2 per cent are living with relatives. The possibilities for permanent settlement for Chinese migrants are modest for the time being.

As for the possibility of finding employment as hired workers, there are few among local people who wish to do unskilled work in the construction industry or agriculture notwithstanding the economic crisis and the high level of unemployment.[41][41] Managers of enterprises in these sectors are therefore eager to employ Chinese migrants for such jobs. The investigation by the Carnegie Moscow Center shows that employers are dealing with Chinese team-leaders, who in turn determine the working conditions of their labourers. The latter are working practically all daylight hours, with no days off, and with no possibility of seeing their families during the whole contract term, which is usually 10 months. Family members can only come as tourists, paying the price of a tourist trip. Contracts are subject to annual renewal, thus involving considerable additional expenses. The earnings of Chinese immigrant labourers are one - two times lower than those of Russian workers with the same qualifications, doing the same work.[42][42] A vast majority (86 per cent) of hired workers tactfully characterize their wages as "not very high", while only 14 per cent find the level of pay satisfactory. Among those who are engaged in trade 40 per cent are satisfied with their earnings, and among those who have come "to study" 36 per cent are satisfied. Furthermore, the Chinese labour migrants working under contract get paid only on return to China. Some team-leaders do not give any money at all to their workers, forcing them to earn on the side with private work in their free time, mainly working nights. More normally some symbolic sums of money are given to Chinese workers. For example, in October 1996 in one of the construction enterprises of Vladivostok the sum paid was 75,000 roubles (about US$ 18) a month.

Many local administrators and heads of enterprises are satisfied with this situation: cheap labour and no responsibility. The exploitation of the Chinese labour force in the form of far from civilized conditions of work serves to explain the low proportion of hired workers among the Chinese migrants and the fact that the quota for bringing licensed workers from China is not fully utilized. The Chinese migrants prefer other kinds of activities in Russia.

3.7     Relations with the Local Population

According to local polls, two thirds of the inhabitants of the Far East region are positive about the development of relations with China, but ideas like that of establishing temporary Chinese settlements in rural areas are opposed by a third of the population.[43][43] It is practically impossible to get any information on attitudes to illegal Chinese migrants.

The investigation carried out by the Carnegie Moscow Center shows a negative attitude on the part of local inhabitants towards the arrival of Chinese migrants. Of 1,086 local individuals interviewed, 59 per cent believe that their town was spoiled by the presence of Chinese migrants, while 26 per cent are of the opposite opinion, that it gained, and 15 per cent see both positive and negative sides.

The most frequently advanced negative statement - put forward by 25 per cent of those who believe the Chinese presence to have a bad effect on the region, or 15 per cent of the whole sample - is the opinion that the Chinese are spreading poor hygienic conditions and bring danger of an epidemic. A more general feeling of horror at the large number of Chinese migrants and the lack of any control over them was expressed by 20 per cent (12 per cent of the whole sample), while 12 per cent (7.2 per cent of the whole sample) were dissatisfied with the low quality of goods import by the Chinese. Nevertheless 80 per cent of all those polled admitted that they buy Chinese goods and only 20 per cent avoid doing so. Of those who were against the Chinese presence 14 per cent (9 per cent of the whole sample) advance an argument that could be described as typical of Soviet mentality, "they are making a fortune at our expense". However, only 10 per cent (6 per cent of the whole sample) fear competition with the Chinese.

Popular attitudes towards the Chinese migrants are to a considerable extent the result of official policy regarding them and of the current state of the Russian market in labour and goods. The conditions under which the Chinese migrants are compelled to work and live when on Russian territory are really far below even elementary sanitary standards. At the same time the absence of any locally manufactured goods that could compete with the Chinese goods opens the way to low quality imports.

The attitudes of the younger generation differ somewhat from those of public opinion at large. Only on the issue of the dangers from insanitary living conditions do they agree fully, with 16 per cent of 1,182 students questioned believing that the Chinese migrants bring filth and epidemics to the region. However, young people are much less scared by the large number of the Chinese and the lack of any control over them. Only 4 per cent of students, i.e. a third of the proportion among the total population, consider this as a threat for the region. The proportion fearing the Chinese as competitors is only half as high among the students as in the general sample. Moreover, while in the general poll only two persons said that the presence of the Chinese was widening the possibilities for cultural contacts, among the students there were 24 persons who expressed such an opinion. In spite of the low numbers involved this fact might be considered as very encouraging.

It is interesting that hardly anyone opposing the Chinese presence explained his rejection by reference to their criminal behaviour. During the general population poll only two persons mentioned that the Chinese trade with forbidden goods, and two mentioned the "defiant behaviour" of the Chinese migrants. Among students there were 46 persons (4 per cent) who pointed out that the arrival of the Chinese is leading to a growth in crime.

It must be admitted that there are grounds to regard the Chinese presence as a crime promoting factor. Many experts say the Chinese considerably stimulate crimes among the Russians like rackets and corruption. According to information from the Ministry of the Interior, a new kind of crime has recently been developing among Russian citizens, namely stealing the passports of Chinese tourists and later selling them to those who had stayed in Russia illegally beyond the validity of their visa and who could not return to China with their defective documents. During 1996, in the Zabaikalsky border guard district, there were 1.5 times as many people detained with other people's passports as had been the case in in 1995.[44][44]

Generally speaking, most of the discontent of the local population with the arrival of the Chinese is based on rather abstract fears, related to some possible future circumstance, but not proved by their personal experience. This suggests some influence from leaders of public opinion, above all from mass media and politicians. Even in the case of the more realistic concerns that could be based on personal experience, e.g. dissatisfaction with low quality goods, it is clear that there are two sides. A total of 25 per cent of those polled (70 per cent of those who believe that their town has benefited from the Chinese presence and 60 per cent of those who see both advantages and drawbacks) do not hesitate to praise the Chinese for supplying diversified and cheap goods to the region. The fear of the growth of Chinese competition also has another side, with 4 per cent of those questioned regarding it as a positive factor in economic development.

Nevertheless the tolerance even among the part of the population that is relatively friendly towards the Chinese migrants is limited to permitting them to trade and using them as a cheap labour force. A large majority (79 per cent) of local people questioned believe the Chinese should be allowed to trade in Russia and only 19 per cent are against it, while opinion for and against permission for the Chinese to work in Russia was equally divided. On the other hand only 31 per cent would allow them to start their own enterprises here, while 65 per cent are against it, and there is almost unanimous opposition to Chinese migrants receiving permission to buy or build dwellings in Russia (83 per cent against and 12 per cent in favour) or being able to lease land under long term contracts (82 per cent against and 13 per cent in favour).

The majority of the local population has a strongly negative attitude to the possibility of marriage between their close relatives and Chinese: 81 per cent of those polled responded "on no account" and only 12 per cent considered such marriages normal, with 7 per cent indifferent. However, the young generation demonstrates a different approach to life even here. Only 49 per cent of students questioned rejected the idea of marriage between their relatives and Chinese, while 33 per cent believed it to be normal and 18 per cent were indifferent.

It is clear that any steps that might lead the Chinese to take root in Russian territory would be rejected by the local population. The shadow of "the Chinese threat" is a burden on people's consciousness, with 74 per cent of the population questioned believing this to be a real threat to Russia and only 20 per cent denying its possibility.

Such a frame of mind among the Russian population is stimulated by the idea of "the yellow peril" which was re-awakened at the beginning of the twentieth century and is still alive now. The then prime minister, P.A.Stolypin, speaking in the Duma in 1908, stressed that as the Far East region shared a border with a densely populated state, it would never become empty. Foreigners would penetrate there if Russians did not manage to so first. If this were to happen he believed that those outlying regions would remain Russian only in name.[45][45] As the Chinese community had always been isolated it generated ideas about the existence of an entire system of secret societies. Chinese migrants were widely regarded as "intelligence agents" and even an "advance army" of the neighbouring country.[46][46] Though 90 years have passed, the same arguments are used by those who are now creating an image of "the yellow peril".

3.8     Federal and Local Policy

When the "iron curtain" was removed it provoked a kind of euphoria and led to an initial lack of migration control. Many Chinese citizens entered and stayed on in Russia without registering any documents. Chinese who crossed the frontier without any difficulties began to settle not only in the Far East but also in Siberia and in Central Russia. They began to develop empty agricultural land and to set up agricultural settlements near towns in the Far East and Siberia. As the process was spontaneous and unregulated it led to violations of law. Thus, more than 20,000 citizens of China became proprietors of land and estate in Primorsky kray. Often they purchased property not directly but through agents.[47][47] The reaction of the Russian migration service was drastic. Instead of finding ways to legalize the Chinese migration and developing different categories of resident permits suitable for Russia, as well as creating conditions for buying or leasing houses and other property and land, and a system of free employment, the Russian migration service moved straight from a policy of "open borders" to the opposite one of strict limitations on entry.

Some measures strengthening the control of immigration to Russia were taken in 1993. A presidential decree was adopted in December, providing for immigration control to be introduced for the first time at the border migration admission posts.[48][48] The appropriate bodies of the Federal migration service of Russia were commissioned to implement the decree. The Russian Government adopted some other decrees in September 1994 such as "On Immigration Control" and "On Measures Preventing Uncontrolled External Migration".[49][49] These decrees provided for immigration control posts to be set up in the towns of Primorsky kray, in Vladivostok seaport and airport, in the town of Nakhodka, in the railway station of Grodekovo and in Poltavka on the highway that crosses the border. The immigration authorities are charged with controlling the entry of foreign citizens and stateless persons into Russian territory as well as with taking measures to prevent uncontrolled migration, dealing with deportation of foreigners and working with asylum seekers.

After the Russian Prime Minister, V. Chernomyrdin, visited the Far East at the beginning of 1994, the Russian Government unilaterally cancelled the "open border" policy and imposed a visa regime regulating the entry of Chinese in January 1994. To obtain visa a payment of 150 dollars was required. In addition quotas for Chinese workers were fixed. A consular agreement with China was signed in January 1994, which provided free entry to China and to Russia only for those having diplomatic and official passports. Those who had regular passports could not freely travel between China and Russia. Together with stricter rules regulating border crossing introduced in March 1994, new customs duties and excise duties were imposed. This had a negative impact on economic relations in the border areas and favoured the rise of shuttle trade. Thus, federal policy opted for the road of strict control, limitations on immigration, and limitations on the rights of Chinese migrants on Russian territory.

At the same time, there is a process of regionalization of migration policy, in a situation where regions are acquiring significant independence. Regional local authorities rather than migration services have the final word in determining the implementation of visa requirements and requirements for propiska (residence permit). These two factors greatly influence the fate of shuttle traders who come to Russia with tourist visas and who constitute the majority of the Chinese migrants in Russia. The most favourable conditions have been created for them in Khabarovsk kray. Tourist visa are issued for a month's term and can be extended in order to enable traders to sell their goods and not to run the danger of deportation and the imposition of fines. In Amur oblast visa are issued for a term of two weeks, while in Primorsky kray the term is three days only. As it is not possible for them to sell their goods within such short time periods, traders regularly violate their fixed visa terms. This creates a large number of illegal migrants, revealed by regular militia (police) raids. Fines on migrants overstaying their visa period have become an additional source of finance for local budgets and bribes have become a way of filling the pockets of some officials and local militciamen.

The result of such a policy is that while the authorities are anxious that they might be losing real power over the territory because of the Chinese expansion, their anxiety is self-fulfilling as the number of illegal migrants is increasing and migrants are pushed into illegal business, thus creating precisely the conditions in which the state loses control over the situation and has no reliable information. Such a policy leads to the restoration of the initial situation with Russia suffering more serious economic losses than China. Import from China has fallen to a quarter of that of 1993.[50][50] But trade with China used to be a "life-buoy" for the Far East in a period of the economic crisis.[51][51] More than 90 per cent of commodity circulation in Amur oblast was dependent on China in 1993, and 65 per cent in Khabarovsky kray.[52][52]

3.9     The Possibility of a New "Stolypin Policy"

Because of Russia's vital interest in keeping a Russian majority amont the population of the border regions of the Far East and Eastern Siberia, various programmes and projects have been devised in order to generate a large-scale migration flow to these regions. The deputy director of the Institute for the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences estimates that 2.5 to 3 million people could settle in the Far East in the near future as a result of such programmes.[53][53] Like many others advocating such ideas, he appeals to the successful historical experience of Stolypin's policy, carried out at the beginning of the twentieth century. It is true that Stolypin facilitated the migration process and carried out the so called "Stolypin land reform", which resulted in an increase in number of migrants to the Far East from 4,200 in 1901-1905 to 14,000 in 1906-1910.[54][54] However, present conditions differ greatly from those in the past. At the moment it seems clear that Russia does not have the demographic and economic resources to carry out significant programmes of population resettlement to the eastern regions. When migrants settled in the eastern regions of the country at the end of nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, this was a solution to the problem of agricultural overpopulation in the western regions. In the current perspective, though, a population surplus is not a pressing problem for the European part of Russia, which is rather facing the prospect of underpopulation.

In 1985 the authors of a study providing a forecast of population size in Siberia for the year 2000 showed that migration flows to Siberia were likely to decrease as the labour force balance in the European part of Russia was very delicate.[55][55] This conclusion has been confirmed by the latest scientific research. According to the prognosis of the Demographic Center, a favourable combination of age-groups reaching and leaving able-bodied age will provide an increase in the labour force in Russia up to 2005, at the expense of the populations of North Caucasus and the Volga region. Thereafter no such combination of circumstances will prevent the natural decrease in the population of working age, and there will be a real collapse after 2006, when according to the prognoses of demographers, a natural decrease in the number of people able to work will begin in Russia, which will amount to 3.2 million people for the period 2005-2010 and 5.2 million for 2010-2015, and which will have reached a cumulative decrease of almost 25 per cent by 2041.[56][56]

With such a decrease, the chances of finding work in the more attractive arable western and southern regions of Russia will improve. As soon as a steady rise in production starts in Russia and the investment process goes ahead, a severe shortage of labour will become apparent. This process will affect even the European part of the country, not to mention that the Far East is not able to compete with other regions in attracting migrants not only from Russia but from the countries of "new abroad". Moreover, such a situation may create the necessary preconditions for migration from the eastern regions of Russia to the European part.

Sociological researches confirm such a prognosis. A poll of experts on regional preferences on the labour market showed that the chances of the Far East and Eastern Siberia were estimated as very low in comparison with Central Russia, which was considered to have a good chance.[57][57] Another competitor with the Far East for labour migration that could appear in the future is Ukraine, which might attract Russians when it creates favourable employment conditions.

Russian official bodies place their hopes in the possibility of settling immigrants from the countries of the "near abroad" in the eastern regions. This possibility lacks any scientific basis. It is clear that the Far East must not count on any large-scale migration of population from the regions of Russia or from the "new abroad". Even now, although the situation on the labour market in the European part of Russia is not very favourable, the majority of migrants, both internal and external, come there. As for the eastern regions, the net migration flow from CIS countries during the period 1994-1996 was distributed as follows: Western Siberia received 215,000 people, Eastern Siberia 64,000, the southern areas of the Far East 22,000 and its northern territories 4,000. Immigration even to the most favoured territories of the Far East region is therefore only a tenth of that to Western Siberian areas, not to mention the European part of the country. Moreover, among those who have come to the Far East only 54 per cent are wanting to settle permanently and only 32 per cent believe that their children and grand-children will live there, according to the Moscow Carnegie Center's survey.

The overall economic situation in Russia does not permit the realization of any large-scale population resettlement programme. But even if two to three million people managed to resettle, as Stolypin's followers imagine, this would not have any influence on the main factor behind the Chinese migration - the constant difference in demographic potential on the two sides of the Russian-Chinese border.


Russian policy therefore faces the inevitability of Chinese immigration because of the following factors:

•              severe demographic deficit and in the near future a deficit of labour potential in the eastern regions of the country;

•              the impossibility of making good this deficit from internal internal sources (including migration from CIS countries);

•              the removal of the "iron curtain" and beginning of the process of inclusion of the Far East regions in the sphere of cooperation of the Asia-Pacific countries, while these regions move away and try to separate from the Russian centre;

•              the enormous demographic pressure of the Chinese border provinces.

The restrictive concept of regulating the Chinese migration does not appear to be successful in the present situation. Its main effect will probably be to help change the ratio of legal and illegal immigration in favour of the illegal one. Furthermore, in so far as Russia has implemented some measures limiting Chinese immigration this has had negative consequences for the Far East region and damaged local budgets, labour markets and trade. The administrative and border protection forces will inevitably start showing signs of collapse under the dual strain of migration pressure from China and pressure of the economic interests of the Far East.

It is therefore necessary to change from a policy of pulling away to a policy of civilized adaptation the Chinese immigration, and to find mutually acceptable and mutually safe ways of coexistence. It is also very important to overcome the intolerance of the local inhabitants towards ethnic aliens, which was formed during the isolationist period of the "iron curtain". A very simple truth that has been proved by world experience should be brought into the social consciousness: an influx of migrants is good for a state and not a disaster, if the process is controlled by law and not spontaneous or criminal. The numerous "Chinatowns" in the USA have not destroyed the territorial integrity of the country and did not lead to the formation of "national autonomies". According to the statements of some analysts, even if Chinese population grows in the border regions of the Far East, no isolated territorial districts will appear. The border demarcation is over and both parties, Russia and China, are interested in the development of good inter-state relations and in preserving stability.[58][58]


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[1][1] The Far East region of Russia currently includes 10 subjects of the Russian Federation: the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Primorsky and Khabarovsk krays, Amur, Camchatka, Magadan and Sakhalin oblasts, the Jewish Autonomous Region and Chukotka Autonomous okrug. There is also a further ethnic-territorial entity located in the Camchatka oblast, Koryak Autonomous okrug. This division has been in force since 1992. Earlier the Jewish Autonomous Region was part of Khabarovsk kray and Chukotka Autonomous okrug was part of Magadan oblast.

[2][2] The Carnegie Moscow Center survey samples included 244 Chinese migrants, 1,086 local inhabitants, 1,182 students and 466 resettlers from the CIS countries. In addition more than 100 personal interviews were carried out with officials from local administrations, migration services, employment services and migration control departments as well as with directors of joint ventures connected with housing construction, with uiversity professors and journalists. The survey was carried out in three regions of the Far East, namely Khabarovsky and Primorsky kray and Amur oblast, and in three regions of Eastern Siberia, namely Chita oblast, which has a border with China, and Irkutsk oblast and the Buriatiya Republic, which are close to the Russian-Chinese border.

[3][3] Goscomstat. Chislennost, sostav I dvizheniye naseleniya Rossiyskioy Federatsii (Moscow, 1992), p. 12

[4][4] Ibid., pp. 4, 6

[5][5] Goscomstat. Chislennost I migratsiya naseleniya Rossiyskioy Federatsii (Moscow, 1993 - 1997)

[6][6] Goscomstat, Chislennost, sostav I dvizheniye naseleniya Rossiyskioy Federatsii (Moscow, 1992), p. 12  

[7][7]  A.G. Vishnevsky (ed.), Naseleniye Rossii (Moscow: Institut narodokhozaystvennogo prognosirovaniya RAN, Tsentr demografii I ecologii cheloveka, 1997), p. 16

[8][8] Goscomstat. Chislennost I migratsiya naseleniya Rossiyskioy Federatsii (Moscow, 1993 - 1997)

[9][9] Goscomstat, Demograficheskiy Ezhegodnic (Moscow, 1991 - 1996)

[10][10] Goscomstat, Chislennost, sostav I dvizheniye naseleniya Rossiyskioy Federatsii (Moscow, 1992); Goscomstat, Chislennost I migratsiya naseleniya Rossiyskioy Federatsii (Moscow, 1993 - 1997)

[11][11]  Goscomstat, Chislennost I migratsiya naseleniya Rossiyskioy Federatsii (Moscow, 1995 - 1997)

[12][12] Ibid.

[13][13] P.A. Minakir (ed.), Dalniy Vostok Rossii: economicheskoye obozreniye (Moscow: Ecopros, 1993), Vol. I, p. 29

[14][14] V.V. Trubin, "Migratsionnaya situatsiya na Dalnem Vostoke I politika Rossii" in Istoricheskiy opyt migratsionnoy politiki Rossii (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 1996), p. 74

[15][15] Rossiyskaya Gazeta [Moscow], Hamid Gabdulin, "Kray Dalnevostochniy armiya nashenskaya", 12 August 1997. The article is an interview with the Governor of Khabarovsk kray, Victor Ishayev.

[16][16] Russian Federation, "On Measures to Intensify the Efficiency of Russian/Japanese Trading and Economic ties" (No NR 70-R), 22 January 1994 in Code of Laws of the President and Government of the Russian Federation (No 5, Article 398), 31 January 1994

[17][17] Russian Federation, President, "Decree on the Responsibility of Officials ... in Primorsky Kray" (No 1168), 14 August 1996, Rossiskaya Gazeta, 16 August 1996 and "Decree on Additional Rights and Obligations ... in Primorsky Kray" (No 550), 4 June 1997 in Code of laws of the Russian Federation (No 23), Article 2669), 9 June 1997

[18][18] L. Smirnyagin, "Dalniy Vostok" in Rossiyskiye regiony posle vyborov 1996 (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1997)

[19][19] Vladimir Portyakov, "Migratsoinnaya situatsiya na Dalnem Vostoke I politika Rossii" in Migratsionnaya situatsiya na Dalnem Vostoke Rossii (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 1996), p. 44

[20][20] Russian Federation, Ministry of Labour and Social Development, Department of Complex Problems of Employment, "General Indices of Activity of State Employment Service's Bodies in January-April 1997". Statistical Bulletin, No 4 (1997), pp. 9-10

[21][21] Goscomstat, Movement of Employees, Part-Time Employment and Performed Labour Time for January-March 1997 (Moscow, 1997), pp. 13-16

[22][22] Zabaikalsky Rabochiy, "Na rossiysko-kitayskoy granitse", 4 February 1997

[23][23] Portnyakov, p. 51

[24][24] P.A. Minakir (ed.), Dalniy Vostok Rossii: economicheskoye obozreniye (Moscow: Ecopros, 1993), Vol 2, "Kartographicheskoye prilozheniye"

[25][25] Z.A. Zayonchkovskaya, "Kitayskaya immigratsiya cherez prizmu rynka truda", Rossiyskiy Demograficheskiy zhurnal, No 3 (1997)

[26][26] Ibid.

[27][27] V.G. Gelbras, "Rossiya I Kitay: voprosy sobiraniya geoeconomicheskykh prostranstv", Police, No 6 (1995), p. 45

[28][28] Zayonchkovskaya

[29][29] See Izvestiya [Moscow], Tarasov, "Sibir tolko dlya russkikh?", 2 November 1993; Izvestiya [Vladivostok], 19 February 1994

[30][30] A.G. Larin, "Retrospectiva: kitaytsy v Rossii", Migratsiya, No 1 (1997), p. 22

[31][31] P. A. Minakir, "Chinese Immigration in the Russian Far East: Regional, National, and International Dimensions" in Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin (eds.), Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Migration (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), p. 94

[32][32] L.L. Rybakovskiy, O.D. Zakharova, V.V. Mindogulov, Nelegalnaya migratsiya v prygranychnykh rayonakh Dalneva Vostoka: istoriya, sovremennost I posledstviya (Moscow: Institut socialno-politicheskikh issledovaniy RAN, 1994), p. 19

[33][33] Delovaya Sibir, 28 May - 3 June 1993

[34][34] Rossiyskaya Gazeta [Moscow], Yuriy Prokofief, "Trudoustroystvo sagranichnoy rabochey sily: prioritetnoye pravo gosudarstva", 16 September 1995

[35][35] Informatsionny bulleten Federalnoy Migratsionnoy Sluzhby [Moscow], No 1 (1996), p. 50

[36][36] Informatsionny bulleten Federalnoy Migratsionnoy Sluzhby [Moscow], No 1 (1997), p. 53

[37][37] Ibid., p. 52

[38][38] Information on the social and demographic composition of the Chinese immigration into Russia is mainly drawn from special surveys, in particular the survey undertaken by the Carnegie Moscow Center, already referred to.

[39][39] G.A. Larin, p. 23

[40][40] International Organization for Migration, Migration Information Program, Transit migration in the Russian Federation (Budapest, 1995), p. 49

[41][41] Vash vybor [Moscow], "Kto I zachem budet zhit na Dalnem Vostoke Rossii", No 1 (1995), p. 19

[42][42] Ibid.

[43][43] V.V. Mindogulov, "Chto dumayut zhitely Dalneva Vostoka o Rossiysko-Kitayskikh pogranychnykh otnosheniyakh?", Sociology investigations, No 10 (1995), p. 117

[44][44] Zabaikalsky Rabochy, A. Ivanovsky, "Passport dlya nelegala: grazhdane KNR b Rossii podkladivayut drug drugu svinyu", 31 January 1997

[45][45] P.A. Stolypin, Nam nuzhna velikaya Rossiya: Sbornik rechey I vystupleniy (Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1993)

[46][46] G.A. Larin, p. 22

[47][47] Michael Nosov, "Rossiyskiy Dalniy  Vostok I Kitay" in Migratsionnaya situatsiya na Dalnem Vostoke I politika Rossii (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 1996), p. 25

[48][48] Russian Federation, President, "Decree on Measures for Implementing Immigration Control" (No 2145), 16 December 1993, Rossiyiskaya Gazeta (No 240), 30 December 1993

[49][49] Russian Federation, President, "Resolution of the Government on Approval of Regulations on Immigration Control" (No 1020) and "Resolution of the Government on Measures Preventing and Reducing Uncontrolled External Migration" (No 1021), 8 September 1994, Rossiyskaya Gazeta (No 178), 17 September 1994

[50][50] Z.A. Zayonchkovskaya

[51][51] P.A. Minakir

[52][52] Russian Far East Update [Moscow], Vol. 4 (1994), p. 6

[53][53] V.S. Myasnikov, "Dalniy Vostok Rossii: migratsionnaya politika", Migratsiya, No 1 (1996), p. 19

[54][54] N.Turchaninov and A.Domrachev, Itogy pereselencheskogo dvizheniya za vremya s 1910 po 1914 gody vkluchitelno (Petrograd, 1916)

[55][55] N.M. Arsentieva, F.M. Borodkin, V.A. Kalmyk et al., Analiz I prognoz naseleniya I trudovylh resursov Sibiry do 2000 goda (Novosibirsk: Institut economiky I organizatsii promyshlennovo proizvodstva RAN, 1985)

[56][56]  Vishnevsky, p. 138

[57][57] O.I. Shkaratan and N.E. Tykhonova, "Zanyatost v Rossii: socialnoye rassloyeniye na rynke truda", Mir Rossii, No 1 (1996), pp. 116, 144

[58][58]  M.G. Nosov, p. 23

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