UNHCR CDR Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan

Author: Centre for Documentation and Research
Document source:

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Date:
1 June 1997

Preface

Afghanistan has been an important source country of refugees and asylum-seekers over a number of years. This paper seeks to define the scope, destination, and causes of their flight.

In the first part, the paper provides a statistical overview of refugees and asylum seekers from Afghanistan in Western European States, describing current trends in the number and origin of asylum requests as well as the results of their status determination. The data are derived from government statistics made available to UNHCR and which are compiled by its Food and Statistical Unit. This is followed by an overview of the situation of Afghan refugees in other countries in the Middle East, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and South West Asia.

The second part of the paper contains information regarding the conditions in the country of origin, which are often invoked by asylum-seekers when submitting their claim for refugee status. The Country Information Unit of UNHCR's Centre for Documentation and Research (CDR) conducts its work on the basis of publicly available information, analysis and comment, with all sources cited.

1. Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan

1.1 Refugees and Asylum seekers from Afghanistan in Europe and north america, 1991-1995: A statistical overview

Total number of asylum applications and decisions: all nationalities (Table 1)

During 1990-1995, some 3.7 million applications for asylum were submitted in Europe (75%) and North America (25%). The leading receiving countries were Germany (1.5 million applications) and the United States (674,000);

During 1990-1995, some 363,000 asylum-seekers were granted refugee status under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 241,000 in Europe (66%) and some 123,000 in North America. Countries which granted refugee status to the largest number of asylum-seekers were Germany (93,000), Canada (87,000) and France (61,000);

During 1990-1995, an additional 224,000 persons were granted humanitarian status in Europe. Sweden granted humanitarian status to almost half of these (48%).

Share of asylum countries of the total number of asylum applications and decisions (Table 2)

Some 75% of all applications were submitted in three countries: Germany (52), United Kingdom (14, cases only) and the Netherlands (9);

Whereas Germany has been the main recipient of asylum-seekers for years, accounting for half of all asylum applications submitted in Europe, the United Kingdom experienced a significant increase in the number of asylum applications: its share increased from 4 per cent in 1993 to 14 per cent in 1995 (cases only);

In 1995, the main three receiving countries were followed by France, accounting for 6 per cent of all applications, Switzerland (5 per cent), Belgium (4), Sweden (3) Austria, Denmark and Spain (each 2) and Italy (1). Finland, Greece, Norway and Portugal each accounted for less than 0.5 per cent of the applications submitted during 1995;

In North America, the United States received some 80% of all applications during 1990-1995. In the period 1993-1995, this percentage was even higher: between 85 and 90%.

Total number of asylum applications and decisions: Afghanistan (Table 3)

In Europe, during 1990-1995, some 53,000 Afghan nationals applied for asylum in Europe;

During 1990-1995, some 11,000 Afghan asylum-seekers were granted Convention status in Europe, mostly in Germany (7,300) and the Netherlands (1,800);

During 1990-1995, an additional 5,000 Afghan asylum-seekers were granted humanitarian status, of which 1,800 by Germany, 1,600 by the Netherlands and 800 by the United Kingdom (cases only).

Share of asylum countries in total number of asylum applications and decisions: Afghanistan (Table 4)

During 1990-1995, some 90% of all Afghan asylum-seekers in Europe applied for asylum in Germany (75%) and the Netherlands (14);

During 1990-1995, 69% of all Afghans granted Convention status in Europe were granted asylum in Germany, another 18% in the Netherlands.

Share of country of origin in total number of asylum applications and decisions: Afghanistan (Table 5)

During 1990-1995, some 2 per cent of all asylum applications submitted in Europe were submitted by Afghan nationals. In North America this was less than one half per cent;

Countries which received more than the European average of Afghan applications (%) included the Netherlands (4%) and Germany (3%);

During 1990-1995, 4% of all persons granted Convention status in Europe were Afghan nationals. In Germany and the Netherlands these percentages were 8 and 6 respectively.

Convention recognition rates: all nationalities

During 1990-1995, some 11% of all refugee status determination decisions (mostly in first instance) in Europe resulted in the granting of Convention refugee status, compared to 46% in North America;

Countries with the highest Convention recognition rates included Canada (65%), Belgium (31%) and the United States (27%);

In Europe, during 1990-1995, 25% of all Afghan asylum-seekers were granted Convention refugee status, more than double the European average (11%). In 1991, almost half of all decisions on Afghan applications resulted in a positive decision;

In North America, some 80 per cent of all Afghan asylum-seekers were recognized as refugees.

1.2 Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan in South West Asia, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Middle East

After the December 1979 Soviet invasion, Afghanistan became the world's leading refugee-producing country. In 1996 the refugee population from Afghanistan remained the largest in the world, standing at 2,628,550, as compared to that from Bosnia and Herzegovina numbering 1,006,450. The number of internally displaced in Afghanistan reached 1,200,000 as of 31 December 1996 (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1997, 5,6). After the Soviet occupation, the former Islamic territory was under the control of what was perceived by the majority of the population as non-believers'. However, while some Afghans left their country for religious reasons, the vast majority of Afghan refugees from rural areas fled a highly insecure environment, as a result of physical attacks on their villages, homes, farms and flocks. Those from urban areas spoke of political persecution, arrests, and for males, fear of being conscripted into the Soviet-supported government forces. Desertion from government forces was another reason for the flight into exile. The factional fighting after the fall of the Soviet-backed government in 1992 has led to a further displacement of hundreds of thousands of people (Rubin, B., 1996, 2-3).

The following tables give an overview of the number of refugees and asylum seekers from Afghanistan in South-West Asia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Middle East as of December 1996 (Table A) as well as the number of returnees in 1995 and 1996 (Table B):

Table A

1996
Iran	1,400,000
Pakistan	1,200,000
India	18,600
Russian Federation	20,000
Uzbekistan	3,000
Tajikistan	2,200
Kazakhstan	2,000
Turkmenistan	2,000
Lebanon	600
Saudi Arabia	150

Source: Refugees and Asylum Seekers Worldwide, World Refugee Survey 1997, U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1997, 5

Table B

1995	Assisted	Spontaneous	1996	Assisted	Spontaneous
Iran	92,000	103,000	Iran	8,367	---
Pakistan	76,900	76,400	Pakistan	101,000	20,000

Sources: Major repatriations of refugees, organized or spontaneous, from Afghanistan during 1995, UNHCR Food and Statistical Unit, July 1996, 31; Refugees and Asylum Seekers Worldwide, World Refugee Survey 1997, U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1997, 13

Iran and Pakistan are the major asylum countries for Afghan refugees. At the height of the war between the Soviet-backed regime and the opposition during the 1980s, about 2 million Afghan refugees lived in Iran. Some have returned after the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989 and the fall of the Soviet-supported government of Mohammed Najibullah in April 1992 (Rubin, B., 1996, 1-2). As of December 1996, 1.4 million refugees remained in Iran (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1997, 5). In Pakistan, about 3.5 million Afghan refugees took refuge as a result of the war in the 1980s. The vast majority of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan were Pathans/Pashtuns from Eastern Afghanistan. There were Pashtuns on both sides of the ideological divide. Many mujahedin (Islamic resistance) fighters were Pashtun and former President M. Najibullah and others in his Marxist-Leninist oriented Government were Pashtuns (Minority Rights Group, 1992, 312). Although a significant number of refugees returned to Afghanistan in the same period as refugees from Iran returned, thousands of Afghans again fled to Pakistan in 1992 and 1993 when fighting erupted among former mujahedin groups and the previous government's army, mainly in Kabul (Rubin, B., 1996, 1-2). Between May 1992 and mid-January 1994, Pakistan registered 84,000 new refugees (Afghanistan Info, January 1994, 6). The renewed fighting among Afghan factions which erupted in 1 January 1994, in particular in Kabul, again forced thousands of people to flee. The Taliban's takeover of Kabul in September 1996 produced 15,000 refugees entering into Pakistan at the end of 1996, although a significant number of people have been internally displaced (U.S. Department of State, Country Reports for 1996, January 1997). UNHCR estimated at the end of 1996 that 1.2 million Afghans remained in Pakistan (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1997, 5).

Since 1992 new flows of refugees to India, to the former Soviet republics (mainly Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan), as well as to Europe have taken place. Officials and sympathizers of the Najibullah regime have fled the country (Rubin, B., 1996, 1-2). After the Taliban's capture of the capital Kabul in September 1996, the renewed and intensified fighting, particularly in northern Afghanistan, caused fear for a possible new influx of refugees to the Central Asian Republics (The Economist, 17 May 1997, 70). On the other hand, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Sadako Ogata, during a recent mission to Central Asia was quoted as saying on 26 May 1997 that "there is no sign of a large movement of refugees from Afghanistan" (The Times, 27 May 1997).

In addition, an estimated 2-3 million people were internally displaced at the height of the war during the 1980s. The population of Kabul grew from about 600,000 to over 2 million. Since 1992 new rounds of fighting among former mujahedin groups and portions of the previous regime's armed forces, mainly in Kabul, has produced 500,000 internally displaced persons who fled Kabul. As a result of the Taliban's capture of Kabul in September 1996, as many as 250,000 residents fled Kabul, with some attempting to go to Pakistan as in the past, but with an increasing number fleeing northward. In November 1996, as fighting between forces under the command of General Abdul Rashid Dostum and the Taliban intensified in the north-west along the front line near Herat, 50,000 people fled from the area, with Pashtun nomads fleeing to Taliban-controlled Herat and others moving in the opposite direction, including a movement of Afghan Turkmen to Turkmenistan (Rubin, B., December 1996, 1, 2).

2. Country background information

Population movements across the border of Afghanistan, and internal displacements make it difficult to obtain reliable population figures. One estimate of the population in Afghanistan in mid-1993 was 17,080,000 (Europa Publications Limited, 1996, 67). Considerable variation in the types of terrain, and obstacles imposed by high mountains and deserts, account for the country's marked ethnic and cultural differences (Ibid., 52). Afghanistan is still largely a tribal society, divided into many tribes, clans and smaller groups (Minority Rights Group, 1992, 311-312).

The Pashtuns (also called Pathans) are the largest single ethnic group constituting some 40 % of the population (Jawad, N., February 1992, 2). They are predominantly Sunni Muslims and live mainly in the centre, south and east of the country (Europa Publications Limited, 1996, 52). Pashtuns make up the great majority of the refugees in Pakistan. The Pashtun tribal population of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) still has much in common in culture, language and traditions with their fellow Pashtu-speakers across the Duran Line in Afghanistan (Hyman, A., January 1987, 87). The British-drawn Duran Line of 1893 demarcated the border of modern-day Pakistan and Afghanistan with little or no thought to the Pashtun people who lived on either side (Mayotte, J., 1992, 132). There is a long tradition of mobility among the Pashtuns who live in the NWFP and those of Eastern Afghanistan. Most important are the nomads - kuchis or powindahs as they are respectively known in Afghanistan and Pakistan - some 60,000 of whom were accustomed to moving annually with their herds between summer pastures in Afghanistan and winter pastures in Pakistan. Others were merchants or businessmen, with interests in Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad in Afghanistan and Peshawar in Pakistan, who moved regularly between the two countries (Male, B., 1981, 39).

The Tajiks are the second largest group, whose language is Persian. Most of them are Sunni Muslims, but Shi'a Muslim Tajiks are also found in the West of the country (around and in the city of Herat), and in Kabul. The Panjsheris are a sub-group of Tajiks who also practise Sunni Islam, and speak a language known as Panjeri, a dialect of Dari (Jawad, N., February 1992). The Hazaras are of Eastern Turkic origin and followers of the Shi'a Muslim confession using Farsi as their lingua franca. The Uzbeks and Turkomans are followers of the Sunni Muslim tradition and are ethnically and linguistically Turkic. Other Afghan Turkic groups include the Kypchak, Kazakh, Aimaq, Wakhi and Kirghiz. The Nuristanis live in the middle of the Hindu Kush mountain range in four valleys, with each valley having its own district language/dialect - Kati, Waigali, Ashkun and Parsun (Jawad, N., February 1992). The Baluchis and Brahuis practise Sunni Islam and their languages are Brahui and Baluchi (Jawad, N., February 1992).

The official religion of Afghanistan is Islam. Muslims comprise 99 per cent of the population, approximately 80 per cent of them Sunni and the remainder Shi'a followers (Europa Publications Limited, 1996, 74). The Shi'a minority is concentrated in central and western Afghanistan (Hyman, A., January 1987, 80). The role of Islam within Afghanistan differs according to the traditional culture of each ethnic group. The Pashtuns, for instance, believe they are more Pashtun than Muslim' and have their own code of conduct, Pashtunwali (or Pukhtunwali) (Jawad, N., February 1992). According to an estimate, the Ismailis, a Muslim minority group that split from the Shi'a in 765, consist of two percent of the total Muslim population in Afghanistan (Encyclopedia of the Third World, 1992, 2). Other minorities in Afghanistan include Hindus, Sikhs and Jews (Europa Publications Limited, 1996, 74). The country's Hidu and Sikh population, which once numbered about 50,000, continued to shrink as its members emigrated or take refuge abroad (Swiss Federal Office for Refugees, February 1996).

Since 1936 Pashtu, an Indo-European language, spoken by the Pashtuns, and Dari, a dialect of Farsi/Persian, mainly spoken by the Tajiks, Farsis, Hazaras and Aimaq, have been the official languages of the country, using an augmented Arabic script (Swiss Federal Office for Refugees, February 1996). In addition to this, since 1978 a multitude of languages, used by the ethnic minorities such as the Uzbeks, Turkomans, Baluchis, Nuristanis, and Pashai have been officially recognized (Ibid.).

Afghanistan has long been a country in turmoil. For decades, Islamic movements, communists and tribal warriors have struggled for control of a nation that is geographically and ethnically fragmented. The conflict in Afghanistan has continued to have an international dimension, both from political and economic perspectives. Pakistan feared that an exclusively non-Pashtun government of President B. Rabbani would lead Afghanistan's Pashtuns to revive the demand for Pashtunistan (Rubin, B., 1996, 28). Pakistan's policy change in 1994-95 towards its support for the Taliban also resulted from economic considerations. As Iran started busily signing joint ventures with Central Asian countries, Pakistan hoped that the Taliban would restore order and reopen roads, and provide it with the opportunity to expand markets to Central Asia (The Economist, 5 October 1996, 20; L'Hebdo, 10 October 1996, 38). Pakistan has also supported an U.S.-Saudi Arabian plan to build an oil-and-gas pipeline which brings oil from Turkmenistan and gas from Northern Afghanistan to Pakistan (The Economist, 5 October 1996, 20). Russian Briefing observed that since the

The U.S. is keen to offset Iranian influence on the spread of terrorism and expansion of markets in the region (Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 October 1996, 17). Iran considers itself the protector of the Shi'a Hazaras from the Taliban who are Sunni and militarily anti-Shi'a (Ibid.). The government of Iran has recognized B. Rabbani as the president of Afghanistan and diplomatic relations have been maintained through the Iranian consulate in Taloquan, in the Tajik-controlled north-east of Afghanistan, and not through Kabul, which was captured by the Taliban militia (The Economist, 17 May 1997, 70).

Russia had backed B. Rabbani's government in Kabul and feared that a Pakistani backed Pashtun movement such as the Taliban would be expansionist, threatening Russia's interests in Central-Asian countries. Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov had clandestinely supported his fellow Uzbek, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, with tanks, aircraft and technical personnel, with an expectation that Uzbek dominated provinces in northern Afghanistan would provide a buffer against the spread of fundamentalism from Afghanistan. Tajikistan, racked by civil war and with a government backed by Russian troops, has been sympathetic to fellow Tajiks led by President B. Rabbani. Many Afghan Tajiks also support the idea of a greater Tajikistan - merging Tajik areas of Afghanistan with Tajikistan (The Economist, 17 May 1997, 70).

2.1 The Rise of Communist and Islamic Movements

At the initial phase of the Cold War, King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan, and his Prime Minister, Lt-Gen. Muhammad Daoud chose to be willing beneficiaries from both East and West (Mayotte, J., 1992, 136). The Soviet Union built an international airport in Kabul and the United States did the same in Kandahar (Bowers, C., June/July 1994). Until the mid-1970, the U.S. and U.S.S.R competed for influence over a regime they both supported rather than backing political factions seeking to replace it. In 1973, however, Prime Minister Daoud overthrew his cousin King Zahir Shah in a coup d'état, abolished the monarchy, and proclaimed himself President. Both superpowers and regional states feared that the abolition of the monarchy without the institutionalization of an alternative political system could provoke a future succession crisis. The tension between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R over Afghanistan increased, affecting foreign powers' attitudes toward domestic political forces in Afghanistan. Both the U.S.S.R and Pakistan, the latter with U.S. support, increased their aid to Communist and Islamic movements challenging the Afghan regime (Rubin, B., February 1996, 10).

The following overview of major political parties, movements and militias and their regional power structures is derived from B. Rubin's research as found in "Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis" (February 1996) and The Political Parties of Asia and the Pacific (1992) unless otherwise noted. The description of parties, movements and militias includes subsequent developments following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in February 1989:

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)

PDPA was founded in 1965. In 1967 the party split into two factions: Khalq (the People), led by Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, and Parcham (the Banner), led by Babrak Karmal. While Parcham was mostly supported by the middle and upper ranks of the urban elite, many of whom were Persian speakers, the group also included many Pashtuns mostly either urbanized or of relatively high social status, while Khalq recruited from the newly educated of rural background, mainly tribal Pashtuns from more humble backgrounds. Many of the leaders of both groups had studied or received military training in the U.S.S.R, and the Soviet Union put pressure on the factions to reunite in 1977.

The Watan (Homeland) Party

The former PDPA changed its name in 1988. Under M. Najibullah who had been President from 1987 to 1992, the party continued to be riven by factional and increasingly, ethnic conflicts. President M. Najibullah balanced the Pashtun-dominated officer corps of the army with a Presidential Guard recruited from Kabul and largely non-Pashtun militias in north Afghanistan. However, such balancing was possible only as long as he remained the conduit for Soviet aid flows. When these flows ceased during 1991 and 1992, the party and army dissolved.

 Jamiat-i Islami (Islamic Society)

After 1965, an Islamic movement gained influence among students and professors at Kabul University. In 1973, the movement formed a leadership shura (council). Burhanuddin Rabbani, a lecturer at the sharia (Islamic law) faculty of Kabul University, was chosen as chairman of the council, which selected the name for the movement. The deputy head was another lecturer, Abdul Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf and the main student leader was Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. These three men came to lead the three main Sunni Islamist parties.

The Jamiat-i Islami is a predominately Tajik Islamist party which developed a strong ethnic character as the dominant party in the Persian speaking areas of northeastern and western Afghanistan. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, some non-Pashtun Parchamis sought to secure their future by allying with this party. Several key government figures (notably Tajik army officers and intelligence officers) also joined them. At first B. Rabbani received some financial and material support from the Government of Saudi Arabia, but this appears to have ended in 1993.

In the North-East, a mountainous area east of the Salang highway that links Kabul to the USSR, B. Rabbani's military commander Ahmad Shah Massoud built the most sophisticated military-political organization, the Supervisory Council of the North (SCN-Shura-yi Nazar-i Shamali). The SCN coordinated Jamiat commanders in about five provinces and also created region-wide forces which developed into Massoud's Islamic Army (Urdu-yi Islami). The SCN oversaw a regional administration from its base in Taloquan, centre of Takhar province, which Commander Massoud captured after the Soviet troops withdrew in mid-1988. The area includes sources of precious stones (emeralds and lapis lazuli) and the opium-growing area of Badakhshan.

 Hizb-i Islami (Islamic Party)

The Hizb-i Islami led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar was founded in 1979, with the aim to create a strict Islamic state in Afghanistan. Hizb was the most radical, predominantly Pashtun, Islamist party, which had received direct support from Pakistan's military and intelligence services, as well as by the Pakistani Islamist Party, the Jamaat-i Islami before the Taliban's emergence. Despite little territory under their control, it had forces in all Sunni areas and had relatively well-organized militias based in the refugee areas in Pakistan. G. Hikmatyar also received support from other Arab countries. After its defeat at the hands of the Taliban in February 1995, this movement ceased to be a major military power.

 Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami (National Islamic Movement)

The Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami was founded by General Abdul Rashid Dostum. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the government's non-Pashtun militias in the north centred in the city of Mazar-i Sharif, constituted themselves into a new organization, the Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami. Junbish included many former Parchamis. A large number of fighters forming part of this organization (the numbers vary between 15,000 and 160,000) have had a reputation of being the best equipped of Afghanistan. General Dostum received support from Uzbekistan and from Russia. He had formed an alliance with G. Hikmatyar in 1994 and was part of the alliance formed against B. Rabbani, the Supreme Coordination Council' (Swiss Federal Office for Refugees, February 1996). In May 1997, he was defeated by his own Commander, Abdul Malik who defected to the Taliban, and fled the country.

 Hizb-i Wahdat (The Unity Party)

In 1988, Iran united eight Shi'a parties (all but Harakat-i Islami) into Hizb-i Wahdat. In 1993, Wahdat split into factions allied respectively with Jamiat and Hizb. In January 1996, Iran announced it had once again reunited the factions and reconciled them under President B. Rabbani. Commander Massoud crushed its forces in Kabul in a February 1995 offensive after its ally, Hizb-i Islam, had been defeated by the Taliban. Hizb-i Wahdat effectively controls Central Afghanistan. Hazarajat remained under the control of Hizb-i Wahdat, though initially the Jamiat government and later the Taliban contested their power in the town of Bamiyan.

2.2 From the 1978 Revolution to the Fall of President M. Najibullah (1978-1992)

Political opposition to the government of M. Daoud culminated in leftist anti-Government demonstrations in Kabul in April 1978. In response, President Daoud arrested seven leaders of the PDPA, which had been reunited under the leadership of M. Taraki of the Khalq faction since 1977 (Amnesty International, 1995, 11; Mayotte, J., 1992, 135, 138). On 27 April 1978, the commanders of military and air force units in the Kabul area staged a coup d'état, which became known as the Great Saur Revolution, named for the month of the Afghan calendar in which it took place. President Daoud and his family were killed (Europa Publications Limited, 1996, 54).

After the Revolution, the Republic of Afghanistan was renamed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), and power was vested in a Revolutionary Council, with the PDPA allowed as the only political party. M. Taraki became President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister (Europa Publications Limited, 1996, 54). The DRA Government proclaimed socialist reform in favour of landless peasants, but these policies failed as the land reform and adult literacy campaigns caused widespread opposition. The opposition caused an armed insurrection in almost all provinces, and led to the flight of thousands of refugees to Pakistan and Iran, and to great economic dislocation. In 1979, President M. Taraki was overthrown and subsequently murdered by H. Amin, his Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose power had steadily increased over the preceding months (Ibid.).

President H. Amin, who failed either to win the support of the opposition or to suppress them, and the flight of refugees from Afghanistan increased rapidly. The Government of Afghanistan accused Pakistan, Iran, the U.S., Egypt, the People's Republic of China, and other countries of aiding the opposition. The Soviet Union, who had continued to pressure for the adoption of more moderate policies and the formation of a broad-based government in Afghanistan, invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 and overthrew and killed Khalqi leader H. Amin (Europa Publications Limited, 1996, 54, 55). The Soviet Union installed the leader of the opposing (Parcham) faction, B. Karmal, as President of the country and General-Secretary of the PDPA. B. Karmal's disciple, M. Najibullah, became Director-General of the secret police, known as KHAD (Khademat-e Ittela'at Dowlat - State Information Services) (Rubin, B., January 1992, 2).

The major problem for the Karmal regime was the continuing civil war in Afghanistan. The anti-Government guerrilla forces, the mujahedin, despite being fragmented among local groups and many organizations operating from Afghan refugee communities in Pakistan and Iran, deprived the Government of authority over large areas of the countryside. The guerrilla groups were poorly armed at first, but in 1984-1985 they began to receive increased support from outside (Europa Publications Limited, 1996, 55). Significant financial and military supplies came primarily from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the U.S. and the People's Republic of China (Amnesty International, 1995, 11). The mujahedin movement called upon people to wage an Islamic struggle (jihad) against unbelieving' rulers, to form a national resistance against foreign invaders, and to defend personal and tribal honor (Rubin, B., January 1992, 2).

In May 1986, M. Najibullah, was appointed General-Secretary of the PDPA, in place of B. Karmal. In November 1986, M. Najibullah was elected President of Afghanistan and a new Constitution was adopted (Europa Publications Limited, 1996, 55). Some of the innovations incorporated into the Constitution were a multi-party political system, freedom of expression, and an Islamic legal system presided over by an independent judiciary. All of these measures, however, were largely outweighed by the broad powers of the president, who commanded a military and police apparatus under the complete control of the Homeland Party (Hizb-i Watan), as the PDPA became known in 1988 (Rubin, B., January 1992, 2).

Following the 14 April 1988 agreement between Afghanistan, Pakistan, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., the departure of Soviet forces commenced in mid-1988 and was completed in 1989 (Palmer, R.R. & Colton, J., 1008). However, the supply of arms to both sides (the U.S. and Pakistan to the mujahedin and the Soviet Union to the regime in power) was not halted and violent conflict continued (Europa Publications Limited, 1996, 56). Under pressure from their U.S., Pakistani, and Saudi Arabian supporters, the Sunni groups chose an Afghanistan Interim Government-in-exile (AIG) at a shura (council) held in Pakistan in 1989 as the last Soviet troops were departing (Rubin, B., January 1992, 3). With the help of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and of the Pakistani military intelligence, new military campaigns were launched by the mujahedin in the latter half of 1990. As the civil war continued, ethnic divisions prevailed, within both the army and groups of the mujahedin, between the majority Pashtuns and minority ethnic groups such as the Uzbeks and the Tajiks. On 16 April 1992 President M. Najibullah was forced to resign by his own party following the capture of the strategically-important Bagram air-base and the nearby town of Charikar, by forces of Jamiat-i Islami, the most moderate and predominantly Tajik Islamist party (Europa Publications Limited, 1996, 56).

2.3 The Establishment of a Mujahedin Government and the Beginning of the New Phase of Civil War (1992-1994)

After the fall of President M. Najibullah, four main armed groups with different ethnic characteristics and foreign support initially fought for power in Kabul. The leader of the weakest party, Sebghatullah Mojaddedi, a conservative traditionalist religious leader, was chosen as president (Rubin, B., January 1992, 3). On 28 June 1992 S. Mojaddedi surrendered power to the so-called Leadership Council, which immediately offered B. Rabbani the presidency of the country and the concomitant responsibility of the Interim Council of Ministers for four months (Europa Publications Limited, 1996, 56). After the so-called Islamabad Accord of March 1993, Afghanistan was formally ruled by President B. Rabbani from Jamiat-i Islami. The post of Prime Minister went to the leader of Hizb-i Islami, G. Hikhmatyar (Thomsen, T., & Winding, S., 9 November 1993, 3).

Renewed intense fighting broke out on 1 January 1994, when Prime Minister G. Hikmatyar, in a new alliance with Uzbek General Dostum (who headed his own National Islamic Movement in northern Afghanistan) attempted to force President B. Rabbani from office (Amnesty International, 11 April 1994, 1). The fighting over control of territory and political authority in Afghanistan intensified between the Jamiat-i Islami, led by President B. Rabbani and his Commander Massoud, and the alliance between the northern General Dostum and G. Hikmatyar referred to as the Supreme Coordination Council, with the backing of the Hizb-i Wahdat (Rubin, B., February 1996, 31).

In the meantime, the United Nations' efforts to promote a broad-based government acceptable to the various factions had continued and the U.N. peace envoy, former Tunesian Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Mestiri, finalized a proposal for transfer of power to a broad-based interim administration by the end of February 1994. However, this plan had to be postponed due to the absence of political will of major powers and political developments, particularly the emergence of a new political grouping, the Taliban (Rubin, B., 1996, 31). The term of office of President B. Rabbani, came to an end on 28 December 1994, but he remained president, pending the outcome of the U.N.-sponsored peace negotiations (U.S. Department of State, February 1996).

2.4 The Emergence of The Taliban

The Taliban ("the Seekers") was formed in 1994 by a group of graduates of Pakistani Islamic colleges (madrassas) on the border with Afghanistan, run by the fundamentalist Jamiat-e-Ulema. The Taliban are mostly Pashtuns from Kandahar in Southern Afghanistan and are led by a mullah (a village-level religious leader), whose name is Mohammad Omar (The Economist, 5 October 1996, 19). The Taliban advocated an Islamic Revolution' in Afghanistan, proclaiming that the unity of Afghanistan should be re-established in the framework of Sharia (Islamic law) and without the mujahedin (Swiss Committee for Support of the Afghan People, February 1995, 8). Their fighting ranks are mostly filled with former veterans of the war against Soviet forces. Encouraged by those Afghans who felt hostility to the local warlords, the Taliban induced armed men to desert their leaders and join them. They gained, at least to some extent, the support from the civilian population who had been frustrated by civil and ethnic strife in the country since 1992 (Ibid.).

In November 1994 the Taliban captured the city of Kandahar in Southern Afghanistan from mujahedin commanders and moved north-eastwards to the provinces of Helmand, Khost and Wardak. Their most significant advance was the capture on 14 February 1995 of the headquarters of G. Hikmatyar's Hizb-i Islami in Charasyab, south of Kabul (Amnesty International, November 1996, 3). In early March 1995, Taliban forces entered the Karte Seh district in western Kabul and disarmed Hezb-i Wahdat militia who had been in control of the area. The Taliban's presence there brought them face to face with President B. Rabbani's government forces. The attacks by Government troops led by Commander Massoud in Karte Seh on 10 March 1995 involved artillery, jet fighters and helicopter gunships and also fierce house-to-house fighting. The Taliban were pushed out of the area to Charasyab withdrawing further south to Maidan Shahr. Heavy fighting continued between government and Taliban forces over the control of the city which reportedly resulted in a high number of civilian casualties (Ibid.). As of February 1995, the Taliban had taken control of nine of Afghanistan's 30 provinces (The Economist, October 1996, 20).

On 5 September 1995, the Taliban captured the city of Herat from the forces of the governor, Ismael Khan, who was allied to the government of President B. Rabbani. (Rubin, B., 1996, 27). Following a warning to diplomats, members of humanitarian organizations and all foreigners based in Kabul to leave by 15 September 1995, the Taliban forces threatened to bombard Kabul on 20 October if the forces of President B. Rabbani did not surrender within four days. As the Hezb-i Islami leader, G. Hikmatyar resumed the post of prime minister in a peace pact with President B. Rabbani, the fighting in Kabul broke out and the city became a target of indiscriminate bombing on almost a daily basis which caused the loss of countless civilian lives. Deadly rocket attacks on Kabul reached their peak in June 1996. On 11 September 1996 the Taliban captured Jalalabad, the eastern city bordering Pakistan and on 27 September 1996 they captured Kabul. Their first act was to execute and publicly hang former President M. Najibullah, who since the fall of his Soviet-backed government in April 1992 had sought shelter in a UN compound (Ibid.).

As of the beginning of June 1997, the Taliban effectively control two-thirds of the country (International Herald Tribune, 2 June 1997). At the national level, the Taliban have established an interim six member ruling council and a Council of Ministers (Europa Publication Limited, 1996, 72). During their offensive, the Taliban set up a shura (assembly) in towns under their control, made up of the most senior Taliban members in the area plus any former enemies they have reached agreement with and any religious or tribal figures important enough to warrant inclusion. Each shura makes laws and collects taxes locally (The Economist, 5 October 1996, 19-21). According to the Special Rapporteur for the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, departments of a number of ministries exist in each province but the implementation of policies is generally characterized by inconsistency since there is no efficient administrative structure (United Nations, February 1997).

The Taliban have applied a strict interpretation of Sharia, enforcement of which is administered by the "Department for Promoting Virtue and Preventing Vice" or "religious police" (Reuters, 10 May 1997). The Taliban's edicts include banning women from working or going out of their home unaccompanied by male relatives, banning girls from going to school, ordering men to grow beards and pray in the mosque five times a day. They also banned music, photography, and children's games such as kite flying. In towns under Taliban control, the shuras are both the accuser and judge. Reports by the press and by human rights organizations indicate that the edicts imposed by the Taliban were arbitrarily enforced to different degrees in different parts of the country. Punishments included severe beating and possible execution (Amnesty International, November 1996, 4; Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 October 1996; The Times, 5 October 1996). The Special Rapporteur for the United Nations Commission on Human Rights also noted that the religious police is empowered to carry out beatings of offenders on the spot and house-to-house searches for forbidden items (United Nations, February 1997).

3. New Political Alignments after the Taliban's Capture of Kabul, and Recent Developments (September 1996-May 1997)

The capture of Kabul by the Taliban on 26 September 1996 quickly realigned political forces within Afghanistan and the region (Rubin, B., December 1996, 1). The non-Pashtun forces allied again as they did in the North Alliance of 1992. This time, however, after the defeat of the Tajik Commander Massoud, the Alliance was clearly under the leadership of the Uzbek General Dostum (Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 October 1996). The country was effectively partitioned between areas controlled by Pashtun and non-Pashtun forces, as the Taliban now controlled all the predominantly Pashtun areas of the country (as well as Herat and Kabul), while non-Pashtun organizations controlled the areas bordering on the Central Asian republics whose populations are ethnically non-Pashtun, such as Uzbeks and Tajiks (Rubin, B., December 1996, 1).

The principal areas of military contention have been the areas north of Kabul up to the Salang Pass, and the Northwest corner of the country near Qal-e-Naw. To the north of Kabul, the forces of the ousted government were pushed out of the towns of Charikar and Jebul Siraj and the front-line reached the village of Gulbahar at the mouth of Panjshir Valley, the stronghold of Commander A.S. Massoud. In the week of 14-20 October 1996 forces of General Dostum joined Commander Massoud's front line and fought their way to Kabul in a counter-attack. As a result of this counter-attack, the Taliban lost the strategic military air base at Bagram (The Guardian, 22 October 1996; International Herald Tribune, 25 October 1996). A second front line was opened in the North-West where the Taliban held territory bordering the area controlled by General Dostum (Amnesty International, November 1996, 4).

To the north of Kabul, the city of Charikar and Bagram military airbase were recaptured by the Taliban in early 1997 (Reuters, 17 January 1997). Taliban militias reportedly pushed further North and captured three districts in Kapisa Province in north-eastern Afghanistan, previously under the control of Commander Massoud's troops, pushing toward the Salang Pass to within 20 kilometres of the Soviet-built tunnel that leads through the Hindu Kush mountain range into provinces held by General Dostum (International Herald Tribune, 24 January 1997). The opposition reportedly gave up much of the territory without a fight (International Herald Tribune, 28 January 1997). In May 1997, however, the Taliban was reportedly pushed out of Jebul Siraj, a strategic town north of Kabul by forces of Commander A.S. Massoud (International Herald Tribune, 31 May-1 June 1997).

In the North-West, the fighting between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance intensified throughout late 1996 and early 1997 as the Taliban launched an offensive from Herat, which it had captured already in September 1995 (International Herald Tribune, 28 January 1997). The Taliban were pushed back but held the last pass before Herat. Fleeing intense fighting in Badghis province, as many as 50,000 people arrived in Herat and Qal'e-e-Naw, both under Taliban control. Most were from the Morghab region of Badghis Province and "virtually all" were ethnic Pashtuns (Reuters, 15 November 1996). At the peak of the displacement in late January 1997, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan was quoted as saying that as many as four children were dying each day because of cold and hunger in the Sang-i-Atash area in the North-Western province of Badghis (International Herald Tribune, 28 January 1997).

In central Afghanistan, unconfirmed reports indicate that the Taliban have captured the Hazara-inhabited districts of Shekali and Sorkhi Parsa in Parwan province from the Hizb-i Wahdat (Reuters, 2 February 1997). In May 1997, the Taliban reportedly captured the Shiber Pass in central Afghanistan that leads to the opposition-held city of Bamyan and commands a strategic route to the north, although a spokesman for the opposition Hezb-i-Wahdat group denied the claim (Voice of America, 20 May 1997).

In the North, residents of Mazar-i Sharif, the northern Afghan capital controlled by General Dostum, were threatened in January 1997 when the Taliban opened its offensive north of Kabul, but three months later the city appeared to have withstood any attacks. Forces loyal to General Dostum destroyed parts of the Salang highway (the Salang tunnel north of Kabul, nearly three kilometres long, is the main route to the northern provinces and beyond to Central Asia), blocking direct access north of Kabul, and his Shi'a Muslim allies managed to block a Taliban attempt to bypass the crucial road link (International Herald Tribune, 9 May 1997). Mazar-i Sharif provided a potent symbol of defiance for the Taliban movement. General Dostum's spokesman, Mohammed Yousif, was quoted as saying that "General Dostum's fiefdom was the last refuge for intellectual Afghans, hundreds of whom fled here from Kabul when the capital was seized by the Taliban in September 1996" (Ibid.). In contrast to the areas under Taliban control, women here were unfettered by the veil and could mix with men at offices and schools. The city boasted more foreign diplomatic missions than Kabul, and alcohol, films, music, pictures of living creatures and even gambling are permitted (Ibid.).

However, in late May 1997, the situation swiftly changed as the fragile coalition linking General Dostum with former government forces of President B. Rabbani, G. Hikmatyar's Hezb-i-Islam and the mainly Shi'a Hizb-i-Wahdat fell apart following the defection on 19 May 1997 of General Dostum's senior commander, Abdul Malik. On 24 May 1997, Mazar-i Sharif was captured by the fighters loyal to Commander Malik and placed under the full control of ethnic Uzbek fighters who had until a week before been part of the northern alliance opposing the Taliban. The towns of Kunduz, Baghlan and Samangan east of Mazar were announced as under Taliban control. General Dostum fled to Turkey (Reuters, 25 May 1997). The Taliban gathered 2,500 of its soldiers in Mazar-i Sharif a day after their new allies took the city. General Dostum's army, estimated to be 40,000 to 60,000 strong was reported to have been integrated into the Taliban forces (International Herald Tribune, 26 May 1997).

The Taliban's brief control of the North swiftly ended on 28 May 1997, when the Taliban was defeated in the city of Mazar-i Sharif by Uzbek soldiers who broke the new alliance with the Taliban, through an 18-hour battle which left more than 100 people dead (International Herald Tribune, 30 May 1997). At the same time, Commander Massoud's resistance continued in the North-East as he launched his surprise attack on the Taliban on 25 May 1997 after one of his senior commanders, General Bashir Salangi, defected to the Taliban and gave its troops permission to move up the mountain road. Commander Massoud who is fighting from north-eastern strongholds in Takhar and Badakshan provinces, apparently had moved reinforcements into the area the same day (The Washington Post, 26 May 1997).

4. The Human Rights Situation

4.1 The International and National Legal Framework

As of the beginning of June 1997, the Taliban regime has not been accorded international recognition from the international community except the Governments of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Reuters, 12 June 1997). Former President B. Rabbani, relocated to Takhar in the North, claims that he has remained the head of the legitimate Government of Afghanistan. His delegation retained Afghanistan's seat at the United Nations after the General Assembly deferred a decision on Afghanistan's credentials (U.S. Department of State, January 1997).

The status of ratification by Afghanistan as a state party to the major universal instruments on human rights is as follows:

the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (PPCG), since 22 March 1956;

the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (PRW); since 16 November 1966

the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), since 6 July 1983;

the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR), since 24 January 1983;

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), since 22 January 1983;

the U.N. Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT), since 1 April 1987;

Afghanistan is not a state party to:

the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (CSR);

the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (CSP);

the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (CSR);

In October 1996, the Special Rapporteur for the United Nations Commission on Human Rights noted that although Afghanistan over the years had signed a number of international human rights treaties, the Taliban regime recognizes only the validity of Islamic law. It does not accept the notion of secular law, nor binding international human rights norms (United Nations, 11 October 1996). On 4 March 1997, the United Nations General Assembly called on the Taliban leadership to ensure respect for women's rights, such as the right of women to work and the right of girls to attend school (United Nations, 4 March 1997).

Since May 1992 after the mujahedin took power, Sharia law has been introduced in the entire country. Laws and decisions contrary to the Sharia have since been abrogated. As a result, jurisprudence is meagre, the execution of the law is rare and the country does not have an uniform judical system (Swiss Federal Office for Refugees, February 1996). According to Amnesty International, the judicial system is virtually non-existent in most parts of the country and leaders of armed factions sentence prisoners to execution, stoning to death or whipping with no legal safeguards (11 February 1995, 5). In different regions jurisprudence is primarily influenced by tribal law or by judicial conceptions of local leaders (Swiss Federal Office for Refugees, February 1996).

Areas presently controlled by the Taliban apply a strict interpretation of Sharia (Swiss Federal Office for Refugees, February 1996). The Taliban have established the Department for Promoting Virtue and Preventing Vice and any person acting against Islamic rules is reportedly given punishment frequently involving beatings by religious police (Reuters, 10 May 1997; 13 March 1997). General Dostum had previously established a form of administration in the North-Central provinces under his control, including customs collection at border points, but law and order in these areas is enforced by local military commanders. The ethnic Tajik-majority areas of the North-East continued to be controlled by commanders loyal to A.S. Massoud (U.S. Department of State, Country Report for 1996, January 1997).

4.2 General Respect for Human Rights

The U.S. Department of State made the following conclusion on the human rights situation in Afghanistan in its annual country report for 1996:

Serious human rights violations continued to occur and citizens were precluded from changing their government peacefully. Political killings, torture, rape, arbitrary detention, looting, abductions and kidnappings for ransom were committed by armed units, local commanders, and rogue individuals. Prison conditions were poor. Various factions infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Summary justice was common ... both Taliban and anti-Taliban forces were responsible for the indiscriminate bombardment of civilian areas, particularly Kabul. Civil war conditions and the unfettered actions of competing factions effectively limited the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, and movement. There was widespread discrimination against women and girls. (Country Reports for 1996, January 1997).

According to Amnesty International, thousands of women have been physically restricted to their homes under Taliban edicts which ban women from going to work or leaving home unaccompanied by a close male relative. Girls are restricted from going to school at the risk of physical assault by Taliban guards (or "religious police") if they leave home without a reason acceptable to them. Scores of women have been beaten in the streets for not wearing a burqa (a garment that includes a cloth mesh for the eyes), or exposing their ankles. In some areas, children have been brutally slapped for playing with their toys in the street. Hundreds of men, possibly over one thousand, have been taken prisoner and continue to be held in arbitrary detention, while dozens of men have been beaten in the streets to make them attend Friday prayers in the mosque (November 1996, 1-2).

The Special Rapporteur for the United Nations Commission on Human Rights reported that the Taliban instituted Islamic courts and enforced the application of Islamic punishments, such as public executions and amputations of one hand and one foot. The Special Rapporteur also indicated that those who violate Taliban's edicts are often subjected to beatings on the spot (United Nations, February 1997). However, the imposition of Taliban control in rural areas resulted in reduced incidents of rape, kidnapping and forced marriage (U.S. Department of State, Country Reports for 1996, January 1997).

Summary or Arbitrary Execution

According to Amnesty International, scores of non-combatants have been deliberately and arbitrarily killed by Taliban guards. They include non-Pashtun civilian men whom the Taliban have suspected of anti-Taliban activity, captured soldiers or those who have surrendered to the Taliban as well as civilians killed in retaliation for real or alleged opposition to the Taliban. When the Taliban captured Herat in September 1995, scores of soldiers of Ismael Khan's army who had given up their weapons were reportedly arrested and later killed. Some ordinary people were also reportedly arrested and killed on suspicion of being supporters of the ousted Ismael Khan administration. At least 30 men were taken from Herat prison in July 1996 and executed by Taliban militias.

After the Taliban capture of Kabul, according to Amnesty International, deliberate and arbitrary killings of non-combatants have taken place. When the Taliban position in the north of Kabul came under attack on 10 October 1996 from surrounding villages, the Taliban reportedly took retaliatory measures against villagers, rounding them up, killing several of those whom they described as residents collaborating with Taliban rivals (November 1996, 16-19). The U.S. Department of State observed that political and other extrajudicial killings in which combatants sought to kill rival commanders and their sympathizers have also taken place in other areas of the country. However, the perpetrators of these killings and their motives were difficult to identify as political motives are often entwined with family and tribal feuds, battles over the drug trade, and personal vendettas (Country Reports for 1996, January 1997).

The Death Penalty

According to Amnesty International, dozens of prisoners have been executed, amputated and in several cases stoned to death since the Taliban takeover. The organization reported the arbitrariness of convictions, sentences and releases witnessed by several former prisoners from Kandahar. The moulavi (religious official) presiding over the court had often only a vague knowledge of Sharia and imposed sentences arbitrarily (November 1996, 24).

Public executions reportedly take place in Taliban controlled areas. In one case, people were ordered to congregate in Herat's football stadium, where a convicted person was killed after some 30 minutes of strangulation (Ibid.). The U.S. Department of State reported that a couple convicted of adultery by a Taliban court was stoned to death in a public place in Kandahar in July 1996 (Country Reports for 1996, January 1997).

Disappearances

Thousands of people have reportedly disappeared' in different parts of Afghanistan since April 1992, after they had been abducted by armed guards belonging to the various armed political groups (Amnesty International, 11 February 1995, 6). There were unconfirmed reports of girls and young women being kidnapped by local commanders in the South-East, Jalalabad, Kabul and other areas before these areas came under Taliban control. Observing the situation in the country during 1996, the U.S. Department of State stated that the strict security enforced by the Taliban in areas under their control has resulted in a decrease in such crimes as abductions, kidnappings or hostage-taking for ransom (Country Reports for 1996, January 1997).

Arbitrary Arrest and Detention

With the absence of formal law enforcement institutions in both Taliban and non-Taliban-controlled areas, the practice related to arrest and detention varied depending on the locality, local commanders, and other authorities (U.S. Department of State, Country Reports for 1996, January 1997).

Following the Taliban's capture of Kabul, the International Committee of the Red Cross confirmed that 2,000 detainees it had previously visited in the capital had all been released (U.S. Department of State, Country Reports for 1996, January 1997). However, the Taliban reportedly began to detain new prisoners. According to Amnesty International, the Taliban have not only taken prisoners of war but have detained hundreds of people, including children and women, on the basis of their ethnic origin, non-respect of religious decrees or because they sympathized or were suspected of sympathzing with opponents of the Taliban (November 1996, 19). Six men who were arrested by the Taliban in Charasyab when the area briefly came under their control in early 1995, were reportedly taken to Kandahar and held for about eight months in metal containers in despicable sanitary conditions. In early 1996, dozens of people were reportedly arrested in Herat and Farah provinces for their assumed sympathies for or support of former governor Ismael Khan. Also, in the first few days after the Taliban entered Kabul in September 1996, their armed militia detained hundreds, possibly over 1,000 civilians during house to house searches throughout the city. They were being held for allegedly sympathising with ousted President B. Rabbani (November 1996, 19-21).

Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment

Although torture does not appear to be a routine practice in most areas, it has reportedly been used by different groups against political opponents and prisoners of war. For example, some of Commander Massoud's officers in the north reportedly used torture routinely to extract information from and break the will of prisoners and political opponents (U.S. Department of State, Country Reports for 1996, January 1997).

Amnesty International observed that beating during house searches is systematic. Everyone suspected of possessing arms was severely beaten with wire cables, wooden sticks or rifle butts. In January 1996 alone, at least 50 to 60 people were beaten in Herat and Farah provinces during such searches. People were also sometimes rounded up and beaten in retaliation for real or assumed acts of insubordination to Taliban control. In early 1996, over a dozen residents in Herat were reportedly beaten to punish them for anti-Taliban slogans on the walls of their houses (November 1996, 21).

Freedom of Movement

The U.S. Department of State observed that although in principle citizens have the right to travel freely both inside and outside the country, their ability to travel within the country has been hampered by warfare, millions of land mines, a road network in a state of disrepair, and limited domestic air service, complicated by factional threats to air traffic. Despite these obstacles many people continued to travel relatively freely with buses plying routes in most parts of the country (Country Reports for 1996, January 1997).

Since the civil war started, armed roadblocks have been erected throughout the country stopping travellers and demanding money. Rahimullah Yusufzai, a journalist from Peshawar in Pakistan, counted 42 such checkpoints' on the three-hour drive from Spin Buldak to Kandahar in 1996. However, with the arrival of the Taliban, many roads have been reopened and security conditions have apparently improved (The Economist, 5 October 1996, 19).

4.3 Specific Groups at Risk

Certain groups of the population which were and are now likely to run a particular risk of attacks and persecution include members of specific ethnic, religious or political groups in areas controlled by warlords hostile to them, educated Afghan women, secular-minded individuals, Afghan academics and other professionals, officials of the former governments and journalists covering the political crisis. Unarmed civilians belonging to, or suspected of belonging to, rival political or ethnic groups have been a target of human rights violations (Amnesty International, 11 February 1995, 2).

At the same time, even though at the end of May 1997 the Taliban is said to have conquered most of the country, the following account still seems to apply today:

It is not possible to give an exhaustive account of the groups that risk persecution, precisely because alliances and conflicts are changing and seem to arise across ethnic, political, social and clan barriers and are not perceived to follow any regular and predictable pattern (Thomsen, T., & Winding, S., 9 November 1993, 7).

Women

Afghan tradition has imposed limits on women's activities beyond the home, particularly in the Pashtun areas of the South. Under the Communist regime of the 1980s, a growing number of women, particularly in urban areas, worked outside the home in non-traditional roles. This trend was reversed when an Islamic government was installed in 1992. However, in Northern Afghanistan and pre-Taliban controlled Kabul, women were allowed to work and girls attended school (U.S. Department of State, Country Reports for 1996, January 1997).

The principal role of women in the past 18 years of war has been to function as symbols of legitimization for political groups led by men (Rubin, B., December 1996, 7). Women who assumed an extrovert, Western life-style, as well as educated women, were regarded as potential opponents of Islamic principles, especially by fundamentalist mujahedin parties, and they were therefore particularly exposed to attacks. These women often belonged to the well-educated middle and upper classes in Kabul (Thomsen, T., & Winding, S., 9 November 1993, 8). At times, however, women emerged in the public spheres at moments of crisis. Schoolgirls and teachers led some of the most militant demonstrations in Kabul against the Soviet occupation in 1980-1981 (Rubin, B., December 1996, 7). When G. Hikmatyar announced a series of measures to curb women's rights, women in Kabul demonstrated in the streets in July 1996. The extreme measures taken by the Taliban to curb women's rights led a few women to stage demonstrations against the Taliban in Kabul (Ibid.; Reuters, 22 October 1996; 23 October 1996).

As described earlier, women have been subjected to strict controls particularly in Taliban-controlled areas. Representatives of the Taliban have stated that women are allowed to work in medical services, subject to certain restrictions. Cars carrying women to and from work have been stopped, the drivers harassed and the women ordered home. There is a significant difference between what is decreed officially and what happens in reality. In some occasions, women have been beaten by the Taliban in pubic on the spot (The Economist, 8 March 1997, 70). Taliban leaders have pronounced scant reasons for their restrictions other than stating that the bans would be lifted when security returns. However, even in South-Western Afghanistan where their control has been uncontested for nearly three years -such as in Kandahar- these restrictions have remained in place. In a few areas, young girls between the ages of four and nine are reportedly allowed to attend school (Amnesty International, November 1996, 12).

The impact of the Taliban restrictions on women is most acutely felt in cities such as Herat and Kabul where there are significant numbers of educated and professional women, compared with the countryside where women have traditionally been excluded from public life. Kabul University, which has closed since the Taliban took over, reportedly had about 8,000 women students while thousands of professional women worked in different capacities in the city. In Herat about 3,000 women reportedly lost their jobs after the Taliban took control in September 1995 (Amnesty International, November 1996, 12).

Non-Pashtun Ethnic Minorities

B. Rubin has observed that despite the ethnic tone of the war, in which each major military force is drawn predominantly or exclusively from one ethnic group, there have been few if any cases of forced displacement on ethnic grounds in Afghanistan (February 1996, 3). The city of Kunduz continues to have a mixed Tajik-Pashtun-Uzbek population despite having been controlled by different ethnically-based militias. The largely ethnic-Tajik Kabulis fled to the mainly Pashtun province of Nangarhar (around Jalalabad). The same author points out that, in contrast to the situation in the Balkans, where ethnic and religious differences coincide, in Afghanistan the ethno-linguistic groups share a common religion which preaches the unity of all believers. The main exception seems to have been the fighting between various Sunni (Tajik and Pashtun) and Shi'a (mainly Hazara) militias in Kabul, where some neighbourhoods were ethnically cleansed (Ibid., 4).

According to Amnesty International, however, after the capture of the Persian-speaking region of Herat by the Taliban in September 1995, non-Pashtun army officers were detained and ill-treated in Taliban custody (November 1996, 23). The Far Eastern Economic Review also reported that a significant Turkoman population in Western Afghanistan has historically been victimised by the Pashtuns (10 October 1996, 18). According to Amnesty International, there have been persistent reports of persecution on Panjsheris, a sub-group of Tajiks (November 1996, 17).

As the Taliban captured Kabul and the fighting intensified in North-Western Afghanistan, the displacement increasingly led to ethnic separation with Pashtun nomads fleeing to Taliban-controlled Herat, and others fleeing in the opposite direction, including a movement of Afghan Turkmen to Turkmenistan (Rubin, B., December 1996, 2). When the Taliban captured the city of Charikar in January 1997, the city was evacuated by its soldiers because they believed that most of the 100,000 residents of the city were loyal to Commander A.S. Massoud and many in Charikar are ethnic Tajiks (International Herald Tribune, 18-19 January 1997).

Shi'a Muslims

The Shi'a (about 15 % of the population), mostly belonging to the Hazara ethnic group, occupied the bottom of the social hierarchy in Afghanistan (Rubin, B., February 1996, 9). Concentrated in Central and Western Afghanistan, the Shi'a have long maintained religious links with Iran, where their ulema studied at the famous seminaries in Qum and Mashad (Hyman, A., January 1987, 80).

The Taliban, predominantly Sunni Pashtuns, perceive the Shi'a Hazaras as a threat. One Shi'a leader, Abdul Ali Mazari, has already been executed by the Taliban (The Economist, 5 October 1996, 20). In early September 1995, following the capture of Nimruz province, Taliban militias ordered Shi'a residents to leave their homes within three days. Several residents were reportedly severely beaten, when forced to migrate to Hazarajat. Others were threatened and reportedly fled to Iran (Amnesty International, November 1996, 23).

The Ismailis, a Muslim minority group that split from the Shi'a in 765, have been regarded as "non-Muslims" by radical elements of the Muslim population, as Ismailis believe that their spiritual leader, Karim Agha Khan, is a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammad (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, April 1994). The U.S. Department of State reported in 1996 that Ismaili women were not allowed to leave to attend Ismaili religious services (Country Reports for 1996, January 1997).

5. Prospects

When the Taliban briefly took control of northern Afghanistan forcing General Dostum to flee the country, some observers saw the event as the last step towards near total control of the country by the Taliban. However, the Taliban militias were driven out of most of northern Afghanistan after its alliance with Uzbek commander Abdul Malik soured on 28 May 1997. It was reported that in the city of Mazar-i Sharif at least 300 Taliban soldiers were killed and 3,000 were captured by Commander Malik's forces, among those captured were the Taliban's Foreign Minister Mohammed Ghoul and the Herat governor Abdul Razzak (The Washington Post Service, 26 May 1997).

The fighting between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance has since been intensified as Commander Massoud and Shi'a Muslim militia have started a renewed fighting against the Taliban from their strongholds. Shi'a Muslim militia control the central city of Bamiyan and are holding the Shebar Pass in the Hindu Kush mountains, while Commander A.S. Massoud holds part of the North-East, including Panjshir Valley (International Herald Tribune, 26 May 1997; Reuters, 25 May 1997). Following heavy fighting between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, the town of Pul-e-Khumri, about 180 kilometres north of Kabul, fell to the opposition forces on 10 June 1997 (Washington Post Service, 11 June 1997; International Herald Tribune, 3 June 1997).

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan was quoted as saying that even without the Northern provinces the Taliban is now qualified for international recognition as it still controls 22 of Afghanistan's 32 provinces and the capital Kabul (Reuters, 12 June 1997). However, the importance of the North was described by an Afghanistan expert, interviewed by the newspaper L'Hebdo, who stressed that Kabul, the South and the East of the country can not survive without the North, where there is gas, petrol, cotton culture and rice and the breeding of sheep (3 October 1996, 42).

The United Nations Special Envoy, Mr. Holl, in an interview with the Asahi Newspaper, observed that "as a new alliance of Commander A. Malik, A.S. Massoud and Shi'a Muslims has been established against the Taliban and the fighting in the north is likely to be intensified, the mediation process has become much more difficult" (30 May 1997, unofficial translation). A U.S. Department of State official corroborated this assessment by stating that "neither the Taliban nor any other individual group in Afghanistan is going to be able to control the whole country over time" (Time, 9 June 1997).

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Far Eastern Economic Review,	"Hanging Fire", 10 October 1996
The Guardian,	"Agencies bite bullet in Kabul", 7 October 1996
___,	"Afghan rivals battle for heights north of Kabul", 22 October 1996
L'Hebdo,	"Les Talibans ont gagné Kaboul, pas la guerre", 3 October 1996 (unofficial translation)
Hyman, A.,	"The Afghan politics of exile", Third World Quarterly, Vol.9 No.1, London, Third World Foundation, January 1987
International Herald Tribune,	"Taliban orders Iran to shut its embassy", 3 June 1997
___,	"Another shift in loyalties foils Taliban's takeover", 2 June 1997
___,	"Losses by Taliban reported", 31 May-1 June 1997
___,	"Taliban troops counterattack", 30 May 1997
___,	"Taliban closes in on control of country", 26 May 1997
___,	"Afghan warlord profits by defiance", 9 May 1997
___,	"Taliban plans to destroy art", 18 April 1997
___,	"Taliban offers a conditional truce: deal would include prisoner exchange, but not power-sharing", 28 January 1997
___,	"Taliban advances to contested Pass", 24 January 1997
___,	"Front Static Near Kabul As Taliban Holds Passes", 25 October 1996
___,	"Nation defined by war: Afghans face unending conflict", 25 October 1996
___,	"Kabul Reaps a Whirlwind as the World Watches", 5-6 October 1996
Jawad, N.,	Afghanistan - A Nation of minorities, Minority Rights Group, London, U.K., February 1992
Male, B.,	"A Tiger By The Tail: Pakistan And The Afghan Refugees: Refugees: Four Political Case-Studies", The Australian National University, Canberra, 1981
Mayotte, J.,	Disposable people; The Plight of Refugees, New York, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, 1992
Minority Rights Group, World Directory of Minorities, Longman Group U.K. Limited, Essex, U.K., 1992
Newsweek,	"Peace or Persecution?", 14 October 1996
Palmer, R.R. & Colton, J.,	"A History Of The Modern World Since 1815", New York, McGraw-Hill Inc., 1992 Political Parties of Asia and the Pacific, Longman Group UK Limited, U.K., 1992
Political Parties of the World,	Longman Group U.K. Limited, 1988
Reuters,	"Pakistan plans neighbors' Afghan peace meeting, 12 June 1997
___,	"Afghanistan's Taliban said routing opposition", 25 May 1997
___,	"Afghan Taliban tightens grips, Dostum flees", 25 May 1997
___,	"Afghan jailed for selling ice-cream to women", 10 May 1997
___,	"Taliban punish men and women for breaking rules", 13 March 1997
___,	"Afghanistan's Taliban claim gains against Shi'ites", 2 February 1997
___,	"Taliban claim new advances in Afghanistan", 17 January 1997
___,	"U.N. says fears ethnic persecution in Afghan Northwest", 15 November 1996
___,	"Afghan women demonstrate against Taliban", 23 October 1996
___,	"Afghan woman appeals to Taliban to ease strictures", 22 October 1996
___,	"U.S. is sending an Envoy to Taliban in Afghanistan", 1 October 1996
Rubin, B.R.,	"Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis, Update March-November 1996", WriteNet, U.K., December 1996
___,	"Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis", Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol.15, No.2., February 1996
___,	The Fragmentation Of Afghanistan, New Haven, London, Yale University Press, 1995
___,	Afghanistan: An Action Memorandum, Columbia University, U.S.A., January 15-17, 1992
Swiss Committee for Support of the Afghan People,	"Wer sind die Taliban", Afghanistan Info. No. 36., February 1995 (unofficial translation)
___,	"Refugies Afghans", Afghanistan Info. No 34., December 1993-January 1994 (unofficial translation)
___,	"Refugies et Personnes Deplacees: Quellques Chiffres", Afghanistan Info. No. 35., September 1994 (unofficial translation)
Swiss Federal Office for Refugees,	Country Information Paper: Afghanistan, Zurich. Switzerland, February 1996 (unofficial translation)
Thomsen, T., & Winding, S.,	Afghanistan: The Security Situation And Human Rights Conditions In Afghanistan, Danish Refugee Council Background Note 9, November 1993
Time,	"Into the massacre rode the Taliban", Vol. 149, No.23, 9 June 1997
The Times,	"Najibullah had hours to save himself from killers", 5 October 1996
Tribune de Genève,	"Les Kaboulis revent de jours meilleurs malgré l'ordre islamique imposé", 7 October 1996 (unofficial translation)
United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, Fifty-first session, Agenda item 110 ©, A/RES/51/108, 4 March 1997
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___,	"Afghan fighting", 20 May 1997
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___,	"U.N. rushing food to Afghanistan", 22 May 1997

Statistical Tables

Table 1 Asylum applications and decisions (origin: all nationalities)

Country	Status	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total
Austria	Applications	22,790	27,310	16,240	4,750	5,080	5,920	82,090
	Conv. status	860	2,470	2,290	1,200	680	990	8,490
	Rejections	11,780	17,220	21,200	14,200	8,340	6,630	79,370
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	Applications	12,960	15,170	17,650	26,880	14,350	11,420	98,430
	Conv. status	680	600	760	1,040	1,510	1,300	5,890
	Rejections	1,150	1,680	2,010	2,520	3,270	2,750	13,380
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Denmark	Applications	5,290	4,610	13,880	14,350	6,650	5,100	49,880
	Conv. status	710	990	750	650	540	4,810	8,450
	Rejections	0	0	0	0	0	3,500	3,500
	Humanitarian	1,400	1,980	2,020	2,090	1,360	14,110	22,960
Finland	Applications	2,730	2,140	3,630	2,020	840	850	12,210
	Conv. status	20	20	10	10	20	0	80
	Rejections	330	630	1,340	1,440	490	270	4,500
	Humanitarian	140	1,700	560	2,070	300	220	4,990
France	Applications	53,070	46,540	26,910	27,570	26,040	20,170	200,300
	Conv. status	13,540	15,980	10,810	9,910	6,210	4,530	60,980
	Rejections	74,510	65,780	27,580	25,580	23,810	24,430	241,690
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Germany	Applications	193,060	256,110	438,190	322,610	127,210	166,950	1,504,130
	Conv. status	6,520	11,600	9,190	16,400	25,580	23,470	92,760
	Rejections	116,270	128,820	163,640	347,990	238,390	114,380	1,109,490
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	3,630	3,630
Greece	Applications	6,170	2,670	1,850	810	1,300	1,310	14,110
	Conv. status	170	120	60	40	90	200	680
	Rejections	2,330	5,210	1,740	710	670	1,050	11,710
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	Applications	3,170	24,450	2,490	1,530	1,430	1,750	34,820
	Conv. status	820	1,200	340	130	300	280	3,070
	Rejections	560	22,590	6,620	1,300	1,390	1,430	33,890
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	Applications	21,210	21,620	17,460	35,400	52,570	29,260	177,520
	Conv. status	690	780	4,820	10,340	6,650	7,980	31,260
	Rejections	9,000	14,540	20,330	15,780	32,150	32,160	123,960
	Humanitarian	860	1,920	6,890	4,660	12,690	10,520	37,540
Norway	Applications	3,960	4,570	5,240	12,880	3,380	1,460	31,490
	Conv. status	110	100	60	50	20	30	370
	Rejections	2,060	2,260	2,880	4,690	2,960	1,410	16,260
	Humanitarian	1,220	1,640	1,040	470	1,770	910	7,050
Portugal	Applications	80	240	690	2,090	730	330	4,160
	Conv. status	40	10	20	40	10	10	130
	Rejections	50	50	0	600	1,700	550	2,950
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	40	30	70
Spain	Applications	8,650	8,140	11,710	12,250	12,000	5,680	58,430
	Conv. status	490	310	540	1,290	630	460	3,720
	Rejections	0	5,480	10,590	16,250	12,210	6,080	50,610
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	230	230
Sweden	Applications	29,350	27,350	84,020	37,580	18,640	9,050	205,990
	Conv. status	2,170	1,400	620	1,050	790	150	6,180
	Rejections	0	0	0	41,420	10,300	5,570	57,290
	Humanitarian	9,220	15,510	8,780	34,720	36,560	3,540	108,330
Switzerland	Applications	35,840	41,560	18,130	24,110	16,130	17,020	152,790
	Conv. status	570	880	1,540	3,830	2,940	2,650	12,410
	Rejections	11,150	28,480	30,130	18,700	18,740	13,460	120,660
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom	Applications	26,200	44,820	24,630	22,350	32,830	43,930	194,760
	(cases) Conv. status	910	490	1,120	1,590	840	1,280	6,230
	Rejections	690	3,360	18,460	10,690	12,650	17,700	63,550
	Humanitarian	2,370	2,190	15,330	11,130	3,650	4,390	39,060
Canada	Applications	36,740	32,350	37,750	20,290	22,010	26,070	175,210
	Conv. status	10,710	19,430	17,440	14,100	15,220	9,610	86,510
	Rejections	3,840	8,870	11,070	11,450	6,440	4,100	45,770
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United States	Applications	73,640	56,310	103,960	143,120	147,610	148,890	673,530
	(cases) Conv. status	4,170	2,110	3,910	5,010	8,250	12,680	36,130
	Rejections	24,160 4,170	6,510	17,980	29,180	13,850	95,850
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Europe	Applications	424,530	527,300	682,720	547,180	319,180	320,200	2,821,110
	Conv. status	28,300	36,950	32,930	47,570	46,810	48,140	240,700
	Rejections	229,880	296,100	306,520	501,870	367,070	231,370	1,932,810
	Humanitarian	15,210	24,940	34,620	55,140	56,370	37,580	223,860
Total North America	Applications	110,380	88,660	141,710	163,410	169,620	174,960	848,740
	Conv. status	14,880	21,540	21,350	19,110	23,470	22,290	122,640 /
	Rejections	28,000	13,040	17,580	29,430	35,620	17,950	141,620
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Grand total	Applications	534,910	615,960	824,430	710,590	488,800	495,160	3,669,850
	Conv. status	43,180	58,490	54,280	66,680	70,280	70,430	363,340
	Rejections	257,880	309,140	324,100	531,300	402,690	249,320	2,074,430
	Humanitarian	15,210	24,940	34,620	55,140	56,370	37,580	223,860

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 16-Jun-97

Table 2: Share of asylum countries in total number of asylum applications and decisions (origin: all nationalities)

Country	Status	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total
Austria	Applications	5.4%	5.2%	2.4%	0.9%	1.6%	1.8%	2.9%
	Conv. status	3.0%	6.7%	7.0%	2.5%	1.5%	2.1%	3.5%
	Rejections	5.1%	5.8%	6.9%	2.8%	2.3%	2.9%	4.1%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Belgium	Applications	3.1%	2.9%	2.6%	4.9%	4.5%	3.6%	3.5%
	Conv. status	2.4%	1.6%	2.3%	2.2%	3.2%	2.7%	2.4%
	Rejections	0.5%	0.6%	0.7%	0.5%	0.9%	1.2%	0.7%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Denmark	Applications	1.2%	0.9%	2.0%	2.6%	2.1%	1.6%	1.8%
	Conv. status	2.5%	2.7%	2.3%	1.4%	1.2%	10.0%	3.5%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%	0.2%
	Humanitarian	9.2%	7.9%	5.8%	3.8%	2.4%	37.5%	10.3%
Finland	Applications	0.6%	0.4%	0.5%	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%
	Conv. status	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%	0.3%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%
	Humanitarian	0.9%	6.8%	1.6%	3.8%	0.5%	0.6%	2.2%
France	Applications	12.5%	8.8%	3.9%	5.0%	8.2%	6.3%	7.1%
	Conv. status	47.8%	43.2%	32.8%	20.8%	13.3%	9.4%	25.3%
	Rejections	32.4%	22.2%	9.0%	5.1%	6.5%	10.6%	12.5%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Germany	Applications	45.5%	48.6%	64.2%	59.0%	39.9%	52.1%	53.3%
	Conv. status	23.0%	31.4%	27.9%	34.5%	54.6%	48.8%	38.5%
	Rejections	50.6%	43.5%	53.4%	69.3%	64.9%	49.4%	57.4%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.7%	1.6%
Greece	Applications	1.5%	0.5%	0.3%	0.1%	0.4%	0.4%	0.5%
	Conv. status	0.6%	0.3%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%	0.3%
	Rejections	1.0%	1.8%	0.6%	0.1%	0.2%	0.5%	0.6%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Italy	Applications	0.7%	4.6%	0.4%	0.3%	0.4%	0.5%	1.2%
	Conv. status	2.9%	3.2%	1.0%	0.3%	0.6%	0.6%	1.3%
	Rejections	0.2%	7.6%	2.2%	0.3%	0.4%	0.6%	1.8%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Netherlands	Applications	5.0%	4.1%	2.6%	6.5%	16.5%	9.1%	6.3%
	Conv. status	2.4%	2.1%	14.6%	21.7%	14.2%	16.6%	13.0%
	Rejections	3.9%	4.9%	6.6%	3.1%	8.8%	13.9%	6.4%
	Humanitarian	5.7%	7.7%	19.9%	8.5%	22.5%	28.0%	16.8%
Norway	Applications	0.9%	0.9%	0.8%	2.4%	1.1%	0.5%	1.1%
	Conv. status	0.4%	0.3%	0.2%	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.2%
	Rejections	0.9%	0.8%	0.9%	0.9%	0.8%	0.6%	0.8%
	Humanitarian	8.0%	6.6%	3.0%	0.9%	3.1%	2.4%	3.1%
Portugal	Applications	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.4%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%
	Conv. status	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.5%	0.2%	0.2%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%
Spain	Applications	2.0%	1.5%	1.7%	2.2%	3.8%	1.8%	2.1%
	Conv. status	1.7%	0.8%	1.6%	2.7%	1.3%	1.0%	1.5%
	Rejections	0.0%	1.9%	3.5%	3.2%	3.3%	2.6%	2.6%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%	0.1%
Sweden	Applications	6.9%	5.2%	12.3%	6.9%	5.8%	2.8%	7.3%
	Conv. status	7.7%	3.8%	1.9%	2.2%	1.7%	0.3%	2.6%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	8.3%	2.8%	2.4%	3.0%
	Humanitarian	60.6%	62.2%	25.4%	63.0%	64.9%	9.4%	48.4%
Switzerland	Applications	8.4%	7.9%	2.7%	4.4%	5.1%	5.3%	5.4%
	Conv. status	2.0%	2.4%	4.7%	8.1%	6.3%	5.5%	5.2%
	Rejections	4.9%	9.6%	9.8%	3.7%	5.1%	5.8%	6.2%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
United Kingdom	Applications	6.2%	8.5%	3.6%	4.1%	10.3%	13.7%	6.9%
	Conv. status	3.2%	1.3%	3.4%	3.3%	1.8%	2.7%	2.6%
	Rejections	0.3%	1.1%	6.0%	2.1%	3.4%	7.7%	3.3%
	Humanitarian	15.6%	8.8%	44.3%	20.2%	6.5%	11.7%	17.4%
Total Europe	Applications	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Conv. status	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Rejections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Humanitarian	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Canada	Applications	33.3%	36.5%	26.6%	12.4%	13.0%	14.9%	20.6%
	Conv. status	72.0%	90.2%	81.7%	73.8%	64.8%	43.1%	70.5%
	Rejections	13.7%	68.0%	63.0%	38.9%	18.1%	22.8%	32.3%
	Humanitarian	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
United States	Applications	66.7%	63.5%	73.4%	87.6%	87.0%	85.1%	79.4%
	Conv. status	28.0%	9.8%	18.3%	26.2%	35.2%	56.9%	29.5%
	Rejections	86.3%	32.0%	37.0%	61.1%	81.9%	77.2%	67.7%
	Humanitarian	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
Total North America	Applications	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Conv. status	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Rejections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Humanitarian	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 16-Jun-97

Table 3: Total number of asylum applications and decisions (origin: Afghanistan)

Country	Status	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total
Austria	Applications	90	80	80	140	180	140	710
	Conv. status	20	60	40	10	20	10	160
	Rejections	40	60	50	110	190	200	650
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	Applications	20	40	20	70	60	80	290
	Conv. status	10	10	10	20	40	20	110
	Rejections	0	10	0	0	10	10	30
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Denmark	Applications	50	80	130	170	180	270	880
	Conv. status	10	0	0	20	20	50	100
	Rejections	0	0	0	0	0	70	70
	Humanitarian	30	50	40	90	70	70	350
Finland	Applications	0	0	10	0	10	0	20
	Conv. status	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rejections	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	10	10	20
France	Applications	130	100	110	80	110	100	630
	Conv. Status	180	100	70	70	90	90	600
	Rejections	60	40	50	30	10	40	230
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Germany	Applications	7,350	7,340	6,350	5,510	5,640	7,720	39,910
	Conv. status	220	1,530	1,270	1,160	2,230	930	7,340
	Rejections	1,390	1,730	2,300	6,040	10,370	4,630	26,460
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	1,770	1,770
Greece	Applications	10	10	10	10	10	10	60
	Conv. status	0 0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rejections	0	10	0	10	10	0	30
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	Applications	10	0	10	0	10	20	50
	Conv. status	0	0	10	0	10	10	30
	Rejections	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	Applications	570	300	350	1,500	2,530	1,910	7,160
	Conv. status	30	20	120	320	480	900	1,870
	Rejections	340	240	260	350	1,040	1,200	3,430
	Humanitarian	10	10	200	70	570	710	1,570
Norway	Applications	20	10	20	30	10	10	100
	Conv. status	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rejections	0	0	0	20	0	20	40
	Humanitarian	10	10	10	0	0	10	40
Portugal	Applications	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Conv. status	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rejections	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	Applications	0	0	0	30	0	10	40
	Conv. status	0	0	0	50	10	0	60
	Rejections	0	0	0	20	0	10	30
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sweden	Applications	170	70	110	60	300	320	1,030
	Conv. status	50	40	0	40	40	10	180
	Rejections	0	0	0	0	0	20	20
	Humanitarian	50	100	30	80	130	10	400
Switzerland	Applications	230	230	280	130	170	110	1,150
	Conv. status	30	30	20	40	50	10	180
	Rejections	10	20	60	250	240	170	750
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom	Applications	210	200	0	0	0	580	990
	(cases) Conv. status	20	10	0	0	0	20	50
	Rejections	10	0	0	0	0	20	30
	Humanitarian	50	50	0	0	0	700	800
Canada	Applications	180	240	280	300	560	470	2,030
	Conv. status	60	140	180	190	360	370	1,300
	Rejections	10	30	60	70	40	50	260
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United States(cases)	Applications	220	280	300	220	0	170	1,190
	Conv. status	20	40	50	40	0	180	330
	Rejections	30	20	20	70	0	40	180
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Europe	Applications	8,860	8,460	7,480	7,730	9,210	11,280	53,020
	Conv. status	570	1,800	1,540	1,730	2,990	2,050	10,680
	Rejections	1,850	2,110	2,720	6,830	11,870	6,390	31,770
	Humanitarian	150	220	280	240	780	3,280	4,950
Total North America	Applications	400	520	580	520	560	640	3,220
	Conv. status	80	180	230	230	360	550	1,630
	Rejections	40	50	80	140	40	90	440
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Grand total	Applications	9,260	8,980	8,060	8,250	9,770	11,920	56,240
	Conv. status	650	1,980	1,770	1,960	3,350	2,600	12,310
	Rejections	1,890	2,160	2,800	6,970	11,910	6,480	32,210
	Humanitarian	150	220	280	240	780	3,280	4,950

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 16-Jun-97

Table 4: Share of asylum countries in total number of asylum applications and decisions (origin: Afghanistan)

Country	Status	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total
Austria	Applications	1.0%	0.9%	1.1%	1.8%	2.0%	1.2%	1.3%
	Conv. status	3.5%	3.3%	2.6%	0.6%	0.7%	0.5%	1.5%
	Rejections	2.2%	2.8%	1.8%	1.6%	1.6%	3.1%	2.0%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Belgium	Applications	0.2%	0.5%	0.3%	0.9%	0.7%	0.7%	0.5%
	Conv. status	1.8%	0.6%	0.6%	1.2%	1.3%	1.0%	1.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.2%	0.1%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Denmark	Applications	0.6%	0.9%	1.7%	2.2%	2.0%	2.4%	1.7%
	Conv. status	1.8%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%	0.7%	2.4%	0.9%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	0.2%
	Humanitarian	20.0%	22.7%	14.3%	37.5%	9.0%	2.1%	7.1%
Finland	Applications	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.3%	0.3%	0.4%
France	Applications	1.5%	1.2%	1.5%	1.0%	1.2%	0.9%	1.2%
	Conv. status	31.6%	5.6%	4.5%	4.0%	3.0%	4.4%	5.6%
	Rejections	3.2%	1.9%	1.8%	0.4%	0.1%	0.6%	0.7%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Germany	Applications	83.0%	86.8%	84.9%	71.3%	61.2%	68.4%	75.3%
	Conv. status	38.6%	85.0%	82.5%	67.1%	74.6%	45.4%	68.7%
	Rejections	75.1%	82.0%	84.6%	88.4%	87.4%	72.5%	83.3%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	54.0%	35.8%
Greece	Applications	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.5%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Italy	Applications	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.2%	0.1%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%	0.0%	0.3%	0.5%	0.3%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Netherlands	Applications	6.4%	3.5%	4.7%	19.4%	27.5%	16.9%	13.5%
	Conv. status	5.3%	1.1%	7.8%	18.5%	16.1%	43.9%	17.5%
	Rejections	18.4%	11.4%	9.6%	5.1%	8.8%	18.8%	10.8%
	Humanitarian	6.7%	4.5%	71.4%	29.2%	73.1%	21.6%	31.7%
Norway	Applications	0.2%	0.1%	0.3%	0.4%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.0%	0.3%	0.1%
	Humanitarian	6.7%	4.5%	3.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.8%
Portugal	Applications	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Spain	Applications	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	0.3%	0.0%	0.6%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.0%	0.2%	0.1%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Sweden	Applications	1.9%	0.8%	1.5%	0.8%	3.3%	2.8%	1.9%
.	Conv. status	8.8%	2.2%	0.0%	2.3%	1.3%	0.5%	1.7%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.1%
	Humanitarian	33.3%	45.5%	10.7%	33.3%	16.7%	0.3%	8.1%
Switzerland	Applications	2.6%	2.7%	3.7%	1.7%	1.8%	1.0%	2.2%
	Conv. status	5.3%	1.7%	1.3%	2.3%	1.7%	0.5%	1.7%
	Rejections	0.5%	0.9%	2.2%	3.7%	2.0%	2.7%	2.4%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
United Kingdom	Applications	2.4%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.1%	1.9%
	Conv. status	3.5%	0.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	0.5%
	Rejections	0.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.1%
	Humanitarian	33.3%	22.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	21.3%	16.2%
Total Europe	Applications	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Conv. status	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Rejections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Humanitarian	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Canada	Applications	45.0%	46.2%	48.3%	57.7%	100.0%	73.4%	63.0%
	Conv. status	75.0%	77.8%	78.3%	82.6%	100.0%	67.3%	79.8%
	Rejections	25.0%	60.0%	75.0%	50.0%	100.0%	55.6%	59.1%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
United States	Applications	55.0%	53.8%	51.7%	42.3%	0.0%	26.6%	37.0%
	Conv. status	25.0%	22.2%	21.7%	17.4%	0.0%	32.7%	20.2%
	Rejections	75.0%	40.0%	25.0%	50.0%	0.0%	44.4%	40.9%
	Humanitarian	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
Total North	Applications	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
America	Conv. status	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Rejections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Humanitarian	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 16-Jun-97

Table 5. Share of country of origin in total number of asylum applications and decisions (origin: Afghanistan)

Country	Status	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total
Austria	Applications	0.4%	0.3%	0.5%	2.9%	3.5%	2.4%	0.9%
	Conv. status	2.3%	2.4%	1.7%	0.8%	2.9%	1.0%	1.9%
	Rejections	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	0.8%	2.3%	3.0%	0.8%
	Humanitarian	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
Belgium	Applications	0.2%	0.3%	0.1%	0.3%	0.4%	0.7%	0.3%
	Conv. status	1.5%	1.7%	1.3%	1.9%	2.6%	1.5%	1.9%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.4%	0.2%
	Humanitarian	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
Denmark	Applications	0.9%	1.7%	0.9%	1.2%	2.7%	5.3%	1.8%
	Conv. status	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	3.1%	3.7%	1.0%	1.2%
	Rejections	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	2.0%	2.0%
	Humanitarian	2.1%	2.5%	2.0%	4.3%	5.1%	0.5%	1.5%
Finland	Applications	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.0%	1.2%	0.0%	0.2%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	4.5%	0.4%
France	Applications	0.2%	0.2%	0.4%	0.3%	0.4%	0.5%	0.3%
	Conv. status	1.3%	0.6%	0.6%	0.7%	1.4%	2.0%	1.0%
	Rejections	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.1%	0.0%	0.2%	0.1%
	Humanitarian	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
Germany	Applications	3.8%	2.9%	1.4%	1.7%	4.4%	4.6%	2.7%
	Conv. status	3.4%	13.2%	13.8%	7.1%	8.7%	4.0%	7.9%
	Rejections	1.2%	1.3%	1.4%	1.7%	4.4%	4.0%	2.4%
	Humanitarian	ERR	ERR	RR	ERR	ERR	48.8%	48.8%
Greece	Applications	0.2%	0.4%	0.5%	1.2%	0.8%	0.8%	0.4%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	1.4%	1.5%	0.0%	0.3%
	Humanitarian	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
Italy	Applications	0.3%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.7%	1.1%	0.1%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	0.0%	3.3%	3.6%	1.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Humanitarian	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
Netherlands	Applications	2.7%	1.4%	2.0%	4.2%	4.8%	6.5%	4.0%
	Conv. status	4.3%	2.6%	2.5%	3.1%	7.2%	11.3%	6.0%
	Rejections	3.8%	1.7%	1.3%	2.2%	3.2%	3.7%	2.8%
	Humanitarian	1.2%	0.5%	2.9%	1.5%	4.5%	6.7%	4.2%
Norway	Applications	0.5%	0.2%	0.4%	0.2%	0.3%	0.7%	0.3%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	1.4%	0.2%
	Humanitarian	0.8%	0.6%	1.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	0.6%
Portugal	Applications	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	ERR	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Humanitarian	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Spain	Applications	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.2%	0.1%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.9%	1.6%	0.0%	1.6%
	Rejections	ERR	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.2%	0.1%
	Humanitarian	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.0%	0.0%
Sweden	Applications	0.6%	0.3%	0.1%	0.2%	1.6%	3.5%	0.5%
	Conv. status	2.3%	2.9%	0.0%	3.8%	5.1%	6.7%	2.9%
	Rejections	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%
	Humanitarian	0.5%	0.6%	0.3%	0.2%	0.4%	0.3%	0.4%
Switzerland	Applications	0.6%	0.6%	1.5%	0.5%	1.1%	0.6%	0.8%
	Conv. status	5.3%	3.4%	1.3%	1.0%	1.7%	0.4%	1.5%
	Rejections	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	0.6%
	Humanitarian	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
United Kingdom(cases)	Applications	0.8%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.3%	0.5%
	Conv. status	2.2%	2.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.8%
	Rejections	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
	Humanitarian	2.1%	2.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	15.9%	2.0%
Canada	Applications	0.5%	0.7%	0.7%	1.5%	2.5%	1.8%	1.2%
	Conv. status	0.6%	0.7%	1.0%	1.3%	2.4%	3.9%	1.5%
	Rejections	0.3%	0.3%	0.5%	0.6%	0.6%	1.2%	0.6%
	Humanitarian	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
United States(cases)	Applications	0.3%	0.5%	0.3%	0.2%	0.0%	0.1%	0.2%
	Conv. status	0.5%	1.9%	1.3%	0.8%	0.0%	1.4%	0.9%
	Rejections	0.1%	0.5%	0.3%	0.4%	0.0%	0.3%	0.2%
	Humanitarian	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
Total Europe	Applications	2.1%	1.6%	1.1%	1.4%	2.9%	3.5%	1.9%
	Conv. status	2.0%	4.9%	4.7%	3.6%	6.4%	4.3%	4.4%
	Rejections	0.8%	0.7%	0.9%	1.4%	3.2%	2.8%	1.6%
	Humanitarian	1.0%	0.9%	0.8%	0.4%	1.4%	8.7%	2.2%
Total North	Applications	0.4%	0.6%	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%
America	Conv. status	0.5%	0.8%	1.1%	1.2%	1.5%	2.5%	1.3%
	Rejections	0.1%	0.4%	0.5%	0.5%	0.1%	0.5%	0.3%
	Humanitarian	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
Grand total	Applications	1.7%	1.5%	1.0%	1.2%	2.0%	2.4%	1.5%
	Conv. status	1.5%	3.4%	3.3%	2.9%	4.8%	3.7%	3.4%
	Rejections	0.7%	0.7%	0.9%	1.3%	3.0%	2.6%	1.6%
	Humanitarian	1.0%	0.9%	0.8%	0.4%	1.4%	8.7%	2.2%

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 16-Jun-97

Table 6a: 1951 UN Convention recognition rates (Origin: All nationalities)

Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total
Austria	7%	13%	10%	8%	8%	13%	10%
Belgium	37%	26%	27%	29%	32%	32%	31%
Denmark	- -	-	-	-	58% -
Finland	6%	3%	1%	1%	4%	0%	2%
France	15%	20%	28%	28%	21%	16%	20%
Germany	5% 8%	5%	5%	10%	17%	8%
Greece	7%	2%	3%	5%	12%	16%	5%
Italy	59%	5%	5%	9%	18%	16%	8%
Netherlands	7%	5%	19%	40%	17%	20%	20%
Norway	5%	4%	2%	1%	1%	2%	2%
Portugal	44%	17%	100%	6%	1%	2%	4%
Spain	-	5%	5%	7%	5%	7%	7%
Sweden	-	-	-	2%	7%	3%	-
Switzerland	5%	3%	5%	17%	14%	16%	9%
United Kingdom	57%	13%	6%	13%	6%	7%	9%
Canada	74%	69%	61%	55%	70%	70%	65%
United States	15%	34%	38%	22%	22%	48%	27%
Europe 11%	11%	10%	9%	11%	17%	11%
North America	35%	62%	55%	39%	40%	55%	46%
Grand total	14%	16%	14%	11%	15%	22%	15%

Table 6b: 1951 UN Convention recognition rates (Origin:Afghanistan)

Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total
Austria	33%	50%	44%	8%	10%	5%	20%
Belgium	100%	50%	100%	100%	80%	67%	79%
Denmark	-	-	-	-	-	42%	-
Finland	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
France	75%	71%	58%	70%	90%	69%	72%
Germany	14%	47%	36%	16%	18%	17%	22%
Greece	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Italy	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	100%	100%
Netherlands	8%	8%	32%	48%	32%	43%	35%
Norway	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Portugal	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Spain	0%	0%	0%	71%	100%	0%	67%
Sweden	-	-	-	100%	100%	33%	-
Switzerland	75%	60%	25%	14%	17%	6%	19%
United Kingdom	67%	100%	0%	0%	0%	50%	63%
Canada	86%	82%	75%	73%	90%	88%	83%
United States	40%	67%	71%	36%	0%	82%	65%
Europe	24%	46%	36%	20%	20%	24%	25%
North America	67%	78%	74%	62%	90%	86%	79%
Grand total	26%	48%	39%	22%	22%	29%	28%

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 16-Jun-97

In this section

Author

Centre for Documentation and Research

Title

UNHCR CDR Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan

Document source

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Date

1 June 1997

Document number

Document type

Country Reports

Additional document information

Collection

Research & Reports

Country

Afghanistan

Comments:

This information paper was prepared in the Country Research and Analysis Unit of UNHCR's Centre for Documentation and Research on the basis of publicly available information, analysis and comment, in collaboration with Regional Bureau Responsible for Somalia and the UNHCR Statistical Unit. All sources are cited. This paper is not, and does not, purport to be, fully exhaustive with regard to conditions in the country surveyed, or conclusive as to the merits of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

UNHCR CDR Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan

Preface

1. Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan

1.1 Refugees and Asylum seekers from Afghanistan in Europe and north america, 1991-1995: A statistical overview

1.2 Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan in South West Asia, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Middle East

2. Country background information

2.1 The Rise of Communist and Islamic Movements

2.2 From the 1978 Revolution to the Fall of President M. Najibullah (1978-1992)

2.3 The Establishment of a Mujahedin Government and the Beginning of the New Phase of Civil War (1992-1994)

2.4 The Emergence of The Taliban

3. New Political Alignments after the Taliban's Capture of Kabul, and Recent Developments (September 1996-May 1997)

4. The Human Rights Situation

4.1 The International and National Legal Framework

4.2 General Respect for Human Rights

Summary or Arbitrary Execution

The Death Penalty

Disappearances

Arbitrary Arrest and Detention

Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment

Freedom of Movement

4.3 Specific Groups at Risk

Women

Non-Pashtun Ethnic Minorities

Shi'a Muslims

5. Prospects

Bibliography

Statistical Tables

Table 1 Asylum applications and decisions (origin: all nationalities)

Table 2: Share of asylum countries in total number of asylum applications and decisions (origin: all nationalities)

Table 3: Total number of asylum applications and decisions (origin: Afghanistan)

Table 4: Share of asylum countries in total number of asylum applications and decisions (origin: Afghanistan)

Table 5. Share of country of origin in total number of asylum applications and decisions (origin: Afghanistan)

Table 6a: 1951 UN Convention recognition rates (Origin: All nationalities)

Table 6b: 1951 UN Convention recognition rates (Origin:Afghanistan)

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