Update to the UNHCR CDR Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Iraq

 

PREFACE

Iraq has been an important source country of refugees and asylum-seekers over a number of years. This paper seeks to define the scope, destination, and causes of their flight.

In the first part, the paper provides a statistical overview of Iraqi refugees and asylum-seekers in Western European States, describing current trends in the number and origin of asylum requests as well as the results of their status determination. The data are derived from government statistics made available to UNHCR and are compiled by its Food and Statistical Unit. This is followed by an overview of the situation of Iraqi refugees in other countries in the Middle East, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and South West Asia.

The second part of the paper contains information regarding the conditions in the country of origin, which are often invoked by asylum-seekers when submitting their claim for refugee status. The Country Information Unit of UNHCR's Centre for Documentation and Research (CDR) conducts its work on the basis of publicly available information, analysis and comment, with all sources cited.

This paper was prepared at the time when northern Iraq was undergoing fresh turmoil and new flows of refugees had started.

1. IRAQI REFUGEES AND ASYLUM-SEEKERS IN EUROPE, 1991-1995

1.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a statistical overview of refugees and asylum-seekers in Western Europe in general and of Iraqi refugees and asylum-seekers in particular. It is based on official government statistics provided to UNHCR.

The following observations should be taken into consideration when comparing individual asylum statistics from different countries. Firstly, due to a lack of common standards for the compilation of such statistics, the scope for any detailed comparison is limited. For instance, data may refer to individuals or principal applicants (‘cases'), to those who submit a request for asylum or to those who are admitted into the asylum procedure. Persons who fled from the former Yugoslavia and benefit from temporary protection may be included or excluded. Even within countries, comparisons may be hampered due to changing counting practices over the years.

In this chapter, refugee recognition rates have been calculated by dividing the number of Convention status recognitions (‘Recognitions') by the total number of Convention status recognitions and negative decisions (‘Rejected'). While this allows to make comparisons between countries, it also means that the rates calculated here may differ from the ones provided by individual countries. Persons allowed to remain for humanitarian (i.e. non-Convention) reasons have been grouped together under one heading (‘Allowed').

1.2 Main conclusions

·         During 1991-1995, some 2.4 million applications for asylum were submitted;

·         During 1991-1995, some 212,000 asylum-seekers were granted asylum under the 1951 U.N. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 1,7 million requests were rejected, resulting in an overall Convention recognition rate of 11 per cent;

·         During 1991-1995, the number of persons allowed to remain for humanitarian reasons (208,000) was about the same as the number of Convention recognitions;

·         In 1995, some 320,000 asylum requests were submitted, almost the same number as in 1994;

·         In 1995, Convention status recognitions were at the same level as in 1994 (around 47,000); the number of cases rejected fell by 140,000 to some 231,000, and the number of persons allowed to remain for humanitarian reasons fell by almost 20,000 to some 37,500;

·         In 1995, 15,000 Iraqi nationals applied for asylum, the highest number in the past five year;

·         During 1991-1995, 2.3 per cent of all asylum applications were submitted by Iraqi nationals;

·         During 1991-1995, the recognition rate for Iraqi asylum-seekers was some 50 percent, almost five times higher than the European average (11%);

·         During 1991-1995, Germany received most Iraqi asylum-seekers (24%), followed by Sweden (21) and the Netherlands (18);

1.3 Overall trends in asylum applications

In 1995, some 320,000 persons applied for asylum in Europe, about the same number as in 1994 (319,000) (Table 1). The countries receiving the highest proportion of asylum-seekers in Europe are listed below:

Main receiving country	1993	1994	1995
Germany	59	40	52
United Kingdom (cases only)	4	10	14
Netherlands	6	16	9
Total	69	66	75

 

Germany remains the main recipient of asylum-seekers, accounting for half of all asylum applications submitted in Europe during 1995. The United Kingdom has experienced a significant increase in the number of asylum applications: its share increased from 4 per cent in 1993 to 14 per cent in 1995 (cases only). Together, the three leading receiving countries, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom accounted for 75 per cent of all asylum applications submitted in 1995.

In 1995, the main three receiving countries were followed by France, accounting for 6 per cent of all applications, Switzerland (5 per cent), Belgium (4), Sweden (3) Austria, Denmark and Spain (each 2) and Italy (1). Finland, Greece, Norway and Portugal each accounted for less than 0.5 per cent of the applications submitted during 1995.

1.4 Trends in Convention status recognition

In 1995, some 48,000 persons were granted Convention refugee status in Europe, slightly more than in 1994 (47,000). Almost 50 per cent of all persons recognized as refugee under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees were recognized by Germany (23,500), followed by the Netherlands (8,000 or 17%), Denmark (4,800 or 10%), France (4,500 or 9%), Switzerland (2,600 or 6%), Belgium (1,300 or 3%), the United Kingdom (1,200 or 3%, cases only) and Austria (1,000 or 2%) (see Table 1).

During 1991-1995, Convention recognition rates were relatively high in Belgium (30 per cent), France (22%) and the Netherlands (21%), i.e. at least double the overall rate for Europe (11 per cent). Conversely, relatively low Convention recognition rates were recorded in Finland (1 per cent), Greece (5%), Norway (2%) and Portugal (3%).

1.5 Trends in non-Convention recognitions

In 1995, some 38,000 persons were allowed to remain for humanitarian reasons. Non-Convention recognitions were concentrated in Denmark (38 per cent), the Netherlands (28), the United Kingdom (12), Germany (10) and Sweden (9).

1.6 Iraqi asylum applications

During 1991-1995, almost 55,000 Iraqi nationals applied for asylum in Europe. The following table shows the countries which received the highest proportion of Iraqi asylum-seekers:

Main receiving country	1993	1994	1995
Germany	13	21	46
Netherlands	33	29	16
Sweden	24	17	12
Total	70	67	74

 

It can be noted that, in 1995 three out of every four Iraqi asylum applications were lodged in Germany, the Netherlands or Sweden.

1.7 Convention recognitions of Iraqi asylum-seekers

Convention recognition rates of Iraqi nationals are high compared to that of other nationalities: during 1991-1995 Convention status was granted in 50 per cent of all decisions regarding Iraqi asylum claims compared to 11 per cent for all nationalities combined (see Tables 2 and 4). The overall recognition rate increased from around 40 per cent in 1993-1994 to 58 per cent in 1995.

During 1991-1995, some 16,000 Iraqi nationals were granted Convention status in Europe. Of these, Germany recognized 40 per cent, the Netherlands 24 per cent. Recognition rates for Iraqi asylum-seekers were highest in the United Kingdom and France (over 80 per cent).

1.8 Iraqi nationals allowed to remain for humanitarian reasons

The number of Iraqi asylum-seekers allowed to stay for humanitarian reasons (17,000 during 1991-1995) is about the same as the number of Convention recognitions (16,000). During 1991-1995, Sweden accounted for some 53 per cent of all non-Convention recognitions of Iraqi asylum-seekers, followed by the Netherlands (18%), Denmark (14%) and the United Kingdom (12%, cases only).

2. Iraqi Refugees and asylum seekers in the South West Asia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Middle East

Nearly 20 million Iraqis continue to suffer under the combined impact of a repressive government policies and a sixth consecutive year of economic sanctions. The Government of President Saddam Hussein continues to practice arbitrary arrests, torture, lack of due process, and the expanded use of the death penalty on a population suffering from critical shortages of food and medicine, high unemployment and hyper-inflation (Human Rights Watch, World Report 1996, 282). In 1995 approximately four million Iraqis were living abroad and Iraq continues to be a refugee-producing country (World Refugee Survey, 1996, 112, 115).

The following is an overview of the main countries of asylum for Iraqi refugees in South-West Asia and the Middle East, elaborating on the approximate numbers of refugees who fled to those countries as well as the main periods during which refugees left Iraq. A more detailed description of the political and/or economical circumstances provoking Iraqis to leave will be provided in Section 3 and 4 of this paper.

Iran

According to the World Refugee Survey ‘most of the Iraqis who were recognized as refugees, about 600,000, were living in Iran' (1996, 115). Three main groups of Iraqi refugees into Iran are:

·         A group of 70,000 Iraqis who were expelled from Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war from 1980 until 1988 because of their suspected Iranian origin. Most of these refugees have been living in Western Iran (World Refugee Survey, 1996, 115).

·         A group of 160,000 Iraqi Kurds, most of whom left Iraq in 1988 and in 1991 as a result of the suppression of the longstanding Kurdish rebellion and the failed Kurdish and Shi'ite uprisings. These refugees live in Western and Central Iran (World Refugee Survey, 1996, 115, The U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988, 1355).

·         A group of about 33,600 Iraqi Shi'ite refugees were living in camps in South-Western Iran, particularly in Khuzestan. Some of them arrived in 1991 at the time of the Gulf War and the failed Shi'ite uprising. Other Iraqi Shi'ites from the marshlands in South-Eastern Iraq arrived between 1993 and 1995, mostly by early 1994 when almost all had been forced from their homes as Saddam Hussein asserted his control of the area with massive drainage programmes, which rendered the marshes accesssible to the Iraqi army, and relentless military attacks (The Committee Against Repression and For Democratic Rights In Iraq, 1994, 135).

Furthermore, as a result of the recent Iraqi military actions in Iraqi Kurdistan (see Section 3.3), at the time of UNHCR/Tehran's press release of 22 September 1996, some 40,000 Iraqi refugees fled into the three Iranian provinces of West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan and Kermanshah.

Jordan

By some estimates, between one and two million Iraqis went to Jordan since the Gulf War to seek permission to enter countries such as Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. An undetermined number of Iraqis remain in Jordan. It is hard to determine any exact figure of Iraqi refugees in Jordan because of the large number of Iraqis transiting Jordan. Observers conservatively estimate 50,000, but some assessments quadruple that number (World Refugee Survey, 1996, 115). The UNHCR Food and Statistical Unit Report mentiones a number of 400 Iraqi refugees who were assisted by UNHCR in 1995 (31 December 1995, 29).

Saudi Arabia

About 13,200 Iraqi refugees remained in Rafha camp in Saudi Arabia in 1995 (Populations of Concern to UNHCR, December 1995); they represented the remainder of the 35,000 or more who fled to that country in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War and Shi'ite uprising (World Refugee Survey 1996, 115). In 1995, 4,430 persons were resettled in 10 countries and 520 repatriated voluntary (U.N. Economic and Social Council Report, 13 May 1996, 41)

Syria

According to the U.N. Economic and Social Council report of 13 May 1996, at the end of February 1996 the total Iraqi refugee population in Syria was 35,208. Several thousand Iraqis, most of them Christians of various denominations, remained at the El-Hol refugee camp in north-eastern Syria (World Refugee Survey 1996, 115).

Turkey

Several thousand Iraqi asylum seekers were reportedly living in Turkey in 1995 (World Refugee Survey, 1996, 115). According to the UNHCR Food and Statistical Unit report of 31 December 1995, 2,200 refugees were assisted by UNHCR in Turkey in 1995. Most Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers reportedly arrived either in 1988 or in 1991 (World Refugee Survey, 1994, 152).

Kuwait

The UNHCR Food and Statistical Unit report of 31 December 1995 lists Kuwait as host-country to 1,700 Iraqi refugees who were assisted by UNHCR in 1995.

Pakistan

In accordance to World Refugee Survey, some 1,200 Iraqi Kurds were residing in Pakistan at the beginning of 1996 (1996, 115). Iraqi Kurds entered Pakistan via Iran, where many had lived in refugee camps for some time. In 1989, UNHCR stopped resettling newly arrived Iraqi Kurds to third countries (except in cases of family reunion) because it believed that the prospect of resettlement to third countries was a major pull-factor for the Kurds to leave Iraq, and because it considered Iran to be a safe first asylum country (World Refugee Survey, 1995, 106).

Lebanon

Iraqi refugees in Lebanon totalled 1,165 registered refugees in 1995 (World Refugee Survey 1996, 115). They represented the largest group of non-Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

Russian Federation/Ukraine

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), with its porose borders, has served as a conduit for asylum seekers and irregular migrants seeking to get to Western European countries and North America. The UNHCR Food and Statistical Unit report of 31 December 1995 lists the Russian Federation as host-country to 400 Iraqi asylum-seekers who were assisted by UNHCR in 1995. This figure, however, consists only of the ‘most vulnerable' category of asylum-seekers, and the actual number of Iraqis in the Russian Federation is reported to be considerably higher. In Ukraine, for example, according to Government estimates provided to UNHCR, in the summer of 1996 there were thought to be approximately 400 Iraqis in the country.

Of the above mentioned countries of asylum only Iran, Turkey and the Russian Federation have ratified the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 and the 1967 Protocol. Turkey adopted a geographical limitation and it applies the Convention only to persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe (UNHCR/CDR, REFWORLD Databases, July 1996).

In order to prevent more Iraqis from leaving the country, in 1994 and 1995 various restrictive laws and regulations have been passed by the government of Iraq, such as exit-fees and taxes at a time of excessive inflation of the Iraqi Dinar and heavier restrictions on exit permits. Continuing human rights violations in Iraq make repatriation unlikely (World Refugee Survey, 1996, 115; Human Rights Watch, World Report 1996, 283).

3. Internal Situation in Iraq

Introduction

The Republic of Iraq is an Arab socialist republic and the Constitution regards social solidarity as the cornerstone of Iraqi society. Citizens must thereby fulfil all their obligations to society, while society must safeguard all the citizen's rights and freedoms. In accordance with the Constitution, the President of the Republic of Iraq is Head of State, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Prime Minister (International Commission of Jurists, February 1994, 39, 82).

The government of Iraq, with Saddam Hussein as President since 1979, derives its main source of support from two institutions, namely the army and the Ba'ath Party (the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party), plus their respective security forces and intelligence agencies. The Ba'ath party is ‘secular' in so far as it does not derive its ideology from the Islamic religion and does not seek to establish an Islamic religious regime. However, the party regards Islam as a cultural basis for Arab society (Ibid., 148). According to the Swiss Federal Office for Refugees, the regular army in Iraq consists of approximately 382,000 soldiers. In March 1995 Saddam Hussein founded an elite para-military unit, led by his son Uday, with as goal to fight against possible coups d état. For this unit a number of 15,000 students were recruited. The personal protection of Saddam Hussein is ensured by elite protection units, which are divided into three mutually controlling units, called ‘protection units'. The largest of these units is the so-called ‘Republican Guard' and is led by Saddam Hussein's son Qusay Hussein. The general office of the military intelligence service, the so-called ‘Istikhbarat' is directly responsible to the Office of the President of Iraq. The internal intelligence service is called the Mukhabarat (7 May 1996).

The judiciary in Iraq is not independent, since the Iraqi regime recognizes the existence of only one authority in society, which is exercised by the Revolutionary Command Council and subdivided into legislative, administrative and judicial functions (International Commission of Jurists, February 1994, 89).

3.1 Recent Political Developments

The central factors characterizing the present situation in Iraq are the grave human rights abuses (see Section 4) and the deteriorating economic situation (see Section 3.2). Human Rights Watch noted that at the end of 1995 there was little relief in sight on both fronts (World Report 1996, 282).

With continuing isolation enforced by economic sanctions, in place since August 1990 (see Section 3.2), and no improvement in the human rights situation, in late 1995 - early 1996 pressure for change appeared to be building up both from within and from outside the country (The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, 3rd quarter 1996, 4,5).

Inside the country, the deteriorating conditions have led to a rising economic discontent, a decay in order and an increase in corruption. A number of attempted coups d' état have been reported during 1995-1996 as well as assassination plots against Saddam Hussein, and defections of army-officers and high ranking officials.

Apart from many rumors of attempted coups d'état since 1991, some reports specifically mention attempts in June 1992, in mid - 1993, and in December 1994 (The Middle East Report, 1995, 17). Keesings Record of World Events, mentiones an attempted coup d'état in March 1995 reportedly organized by Maj.-Gen. (retd) Wafiq al-Samaraii, the head of Iraqi military intelligence during the Gulf War (1995, 40479). The Economist of 22 July 1995 mentioned a number of attempted coup d'états that have reportedly taken place since 1993, involving families and tribal groups previously regarded as loyal to the leadership.

There have also been reports in March 1995 that Ali Hassan al-Majid, the Defence Minister, and Saddam Hussein's eldest son Udai had survived assassination attempts in Baghdad. These reports claimed that Udai was seriously wounded in July 1996 (Keesings Record of World Events, 1995, 40479). The International Herald Tribune reported in its 27-28 July 1996 edition that Saddam Hussein had escaped an assassination attempt when he left one of his palaces .

The most important case of defection of high ranking government officials is the one in August 1995 when Lt. General Hussein Kamel Hassan Majeed, minister of minerals and industries and head of Iraq's weapons programme and his brother Saddam Hassan defected to Jordan with their wives (Human Rights Watch, World Report 1996, 284). One of the main reasons for these defections was said to be the growing influence of Udai Hussein, President Saddam Hussein's eldest son, and the latter's rivalry with Hussein Kamel (Le Monde, 1 September 1995). In February 1996, after a seven month exile the brothers returned to Iraq and were reportedly executed three days after their arrival by family members (World Refugee Survey 1996, 116 and The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, 3rd quarter 1996, 7 ; Le Monde, 27 February 1996).

In March 1996 Jordan granted asylum to a former chief of staff of the Iraqi Army who had defected to the opposition allegedly seeking to overthrow President Saddam Hussein (International Herald Tribune, 22 March 1996).

It appears that harsh conditions affecting the armed forces have prompted recruits to defy orders and, in an increasing number of cases, to defect (see Section 4.5) (Swiss Federal Office for Refugees 7 May 1996, 5, 9).

The above mentioned attempted coups d'état, assasination plots and defections were often followed by widescale executions, arrests and collective punishment. Security and intelligence measures were further tightened (Middle East Report, March-April 1995, 15). After the assassination plot against Saddam Hussein at the end of July 1996 described above, 122 senior army officers were alledgedly executed at the beginning of August 1996 (International Herald Tribune, 14 August 1996). As part of the effort to tighten the regime's control further, Saddam Hussein is said to be seeking to establish links with tribal chiefs. In recent month Saddam Hussein has undertaken several steps to revive the tribal structure, including tribal law which dates back to the time of the British mandate (The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, 3rd quarter 1996, 4,5).

The internal situation has been aggravated according to reports by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on Iraq (hereafter referred to as the Special Rapporteur) dating from 1995 describing that Iraqis who recently arrived in Lebanon testified to the ‘general breakdown in law and order. Some examples are bribery, corruption and thievery' (U.N. General Assembly, A/50/7348, November 1995, para. 38). Matters of corruption ranged from petty bribes to issues of life and death. This situation has resulted in a confused and thoroughly arbitrary system where it is said to be a regular occurrence that people are arrested, detained or even executed on mere suspicion or mistaken identity- without apology or consequence (Ibid.).

Even though the above described deteriorating conditions in Iraq have led Saddam Hussein to step up security and intelligence measures, it also inspired the regime to accept United Nations conditions for a ‘food-for-oil' agreement on 20 May 1996 under the terms of Security Council Resolution 986. The Iraqi-U.N. agreement allowed Iraq to export limited amounts of oil in return for food supplies and humanitarian goods under stringent U.N. supervision, with most of the proceeds directed at purchasing food and medicine. The recent military actions of the Iraqi army in Iraqi Kurdistan (see Section 3.3) on 31 August 1996 raises doubts however as to when the ‘food-for-oil' proposal might enter into effect (International Herald Tribune, 2 September 1996).

As far as external pressure is concerned, the U.S. Government was expected to resist a complete lifting of sanctions, even before the recent events, unless all U.N. resolutions were strictly complied with. It seeks to prove that all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction are destroyed, and that Iraq will provide all relevant information on its past and current chemical and biological weapons capabilities as well as comply with all other demands stipulated in U.N. Security Council Resolutions 687 and 688 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report on Iraq, 3rd quarter 1996, 5 and the U.N. Department of Public Information, 1996). In 1995 an increasing number of states, mainly in the Middle East, but also in Europe, expressed serious concerns about the repercussions of Iraqi economic sanctions on the welfare of Iraqi civilians. France and Russia, keenly interested in re-establishing trade relations with Iraq, favour an easing of sanctions (Human Rights Watch, World Report 1996, 285).

Another sign of mounting external pressure on Iraq is the fact that Arab leaders excluded Iraq from the first full-scale Arab summit since Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, which took place on 21 June 1996 in Cairo (The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report on Iraq, 3rd quarter 1996, 9). Iraq was not invited in view of the severe sensitivities which persisted in the region since Iraq invaded Kuwait (Reuters, 10 June 1996).

Pressure for change from the outside has led Saddam Hussein to take the step of allowing the United Nations access to industrial and military sites. After a team of U.N. weapons experts failed to obtain Iraq's approval for immediate access to three Republican Guard sites in and around the Iraqi capital in the middle of June 1996, the U.N. Security Council issued two statements and a resolution condemning Iraq and demanding immediate access (The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report on Iraq, 3rd quarter 1996, 15).

3.2 The Economic Situation

In the economic sphere, the Iraqi Republic pursues a nominally socialist policy. The State undertakes all planning, direction and guidance of the national economy. The system of a planned economy enables the political leaders to strenghten the control over the country through their domination of the economy, the direct management of public utilities and the control of petroleum revenues. The war with Iran depleted the state's financial reserves and Iraq began to borrow extensively from the Arab Gulf States and industialized countries. This situtation persuaded the Government to adopt a more liberal economic policy. In spite of this policy of liberalization however, the state remains largely in control of the economy and economic planning and Iraq remains totally dependent on petroleum, which provided (before the oil-embargo was imposed) 98% of its revenue (International Commission of Jurists, February 1994, 34-36).

The Economic Sanctions

The U.N. economic sanctions, in place since August 1990, are said to be placing increasingly severe pressure on Iraq's economy and society. Inflation reached ‘65,000%' at the end of 1995 and the Gross Domestic Product had shrunk to below 10% of its pre-1990 level (The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report on Iraq, 3rd quarter 1996, 16). Furthermore, the individual purchasing power of the population was virtually wiped out with the collapse of the Dinar (The Middle East Report, 1995, 15). The New York based Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) warns that the ‘food-for-oil' proposal of 20 May 1996 is unlikely to solve the ‘fundamental problems' of an economy devastated and a population impoverished by six years of sanctions (The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report on Iraq, 3rd quarter 1996, 16)

The Middle East Report quotes the translated version of two interesting views on the policy of sanctions (March-April 1995, 16). The first one is by the Iraqi Consulting Group, an expatriate group of economists and politicians, dated January 1995:

The policy of sanctions, in itself and without a comprehensive, complementary and tangible campaign to change the regime in Bagdad, harms the state of Iraq as a unified national and political entity, harms the Iraqi people, and does not necessarily lead to a change of regime. One cannot accept this collective punishment and siege of 18 million people, who are forgotten until further notice, without seeing any political developments that indicate serious intent to pressure and change the regime.

The second one is by the Iraqi opposition paper al-Wifaq, based in London:

The lifting of sanctions and restoration of the regime's international network could mean a huge catastrophe for Iraqis, who might find their bread with less difficulty but will continue to face horrors created by Saddam Hussein. When we state this, we are not calling for the continuation of sanctions and punitive measures - quite the opposite. But we do want to draw attention to the fact that the rulers of Baghdad exploit their international relations in their confrontation with the Iraqi people (January 15-21, 1994).

Several organisations have carried out research into the effects of the sanctions:

A mission conducted by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) during July and August 1995 describes the situation as follows:

The reduction in imports combined with the resultant decline in agricultural production has led to a serious reduction in the amount and quality of foods available for consumption by the population. This reduction in availability is aggravated by hyperinflation (also caused by the inability to generate foreign exchange), as many families do not have sufficient money to purchase the food which is available in the market place. In a parallel manner, without spare parts for pumps and other needed material for the water supply and sewage disposal system, impure water and sewage backups produce severe health risks for the population. The combination of decreased food availability and the occurrence of infectious disease results in increasing malnutrition especially in children (1995).

The Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) carried out a survey on the effect of sanctions on the civilian population, particularly in the fields of public health, nutrition and the economy. The researchers found that extreme shortages of food, medicine, equipment and spare parts were having devastating effects on public health, water, sanitation and electricity systems, causing high rates of infant mortality and malnutrition, estimating that over one million Iraqi children have died as a result of sanctions since they were imposed in 1990 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report on Iraq, 3rd quarter 1996, 16).

A 1995 report prepared jointly by the U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP) and the U.N. Centre for Human Settlement (UNCHS), warned that pollution was a major health hazard in Iraq stating that: ‘[W]aste-water treatment facilities have stopped to function in eight medium-size cities, no central treatment facilities exist in small towns [and] waste-water facilities serving the five million inhabitants of Baghdad run only at 30 per cent capacity' (Jordan Times, 15-16 June 1995).

The CESR - report mentioned above warns that a limited ‘food-for-oil' agreement will not solve the ‘fundamental problems' of an economy devastated and a population impoverished by six years of sanctions. The CESR critisizes the U.N. Security Council for not monitoring the effects of the sanctions on the Iraqi population. The deal may slow the present cycle of hunger and disease but not stop it.

With respect to the sanctions it proposes the following:

·         wholesale economic sanctions to be replaced by arms embargoes and diplomatic sanctions that would target only the regime

·         a partial lifting of sanctions based on Iraqi compliance with specific Gulf war ceasefire conditions; and

·         clarification of the steps the Iraqi government should take in order to be deemed to have complied with the terms of the resolutions under which sanctions were imposed.

With respect to the situation of the Iraqi economy, the governor of the Central Bank of Iraq said in an interview with Reuters, that the economy is in dire need of reform and that the economic reform process had already started. The measures taken in line with this reform include higher taxes, higher service charges, subsidy cuts, an increase in the role of the private sector in the economy and an opening up to foreign investments (The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report on Iraq, 3rd quarter 1996, 16).

In a speech at a cabinet session on 2 December 1995, President Saddam Hussein reportedly stressed the need to halt the deterioration of the economy and particularly the decline in the exchange rate of the Dinar (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 January 1996, quoting INA news agency (Baghdad), 31 December 1995). Two months earlier, in October 1995, he was reported to be planning to build ‘the largest mosque in the world' in Baghdad, which could accomodate 100,000 worshippers, at an estimated cost of US$ 250 to $300 million (The Independent, 10 October 1995).

3.3 The situation inside Iraqi Kurdistan

Following a failed Kurdish uprising in early 1991, at the time of the Gulf War, some 1.5 million Kurds sought temporary refuge in Iran and along the Turkish border (World Refugee Survey, 1996, 112). At the end of the 1991 Gulf War, the Kurds who had fled to the borders of Iran and Turkey were able to return to their homes in northern Iraq as a result of the adoption of Security Council Resolution 688 of 1991. The Resolution demanded that ‘Iraq end the repression of the Iraqi civilian population' (The U.N. Department of Public Information 1996, 40). In October 1991, after deadlock had been reached in autonomy talks with the Kurdistan Front, an alliance composed of 8 different Kurdish parties, the Government of Iraq withdrew its military forces from the three predominantly Kurdish northern governorates of Dohuk, Arbil and Sulaymaniya (Cook, H. 1995, 51). In northern Iraq the Kurds began to establish a de facto state with its own government. The international coalition maintained a no-fly-zone in northern Iraq covering most of the Kurdish controlled region. (Ibid., 1995, 49; Country Reports for 1994, 1995). After its withdrawal, the Government of Iraq terminated central government funding to the three governorates, reduced government ration deliveries, and imposed an economic embargo on the region (Keen, D., 1993, 31-32). This meant that the Kurds were subject to a double embargo, one imposed on Iraq by the United Nations and one imposed by Baghdad. Although the international community has provided aid, repeated requests from the Kurdish parliament and administration to exempt Iraqi Kurdistan from international economic sanctions have not been responded to (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 August 1992, quoting Voice of the People of Kurdistan, 8 August 1992).

The Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF), held elections in May 1992 that led to the formation of a parliament in June 1992 and the formation of a government in July, the Kurdistan Regional Government, with its seat in Arbil. In October 1992, this government declared its ultimate intention of becoming a federal state within a future post-Saddam Hussein, democratic, Iraq. The Kurds, living in the north of Iraq are however not recognized as a state, because their land is considered part of existing states. To create an independent Kurdistan would threaten the territorial integrity of these pre-existing states (Middle East Journal, Spring 1996, 240).

Apart from the problems the Kurds experienced with regard to their recognition as a state, both inside and outside of Iraq, they have also been involved in intra-Kurdish fighting. Fighting that began as minor disputes, eventually escalated into a renewal of what was essentially a dispute between Mas'ud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) for ultimate control over the Kurdish population and territory (Middle East Journal, Spring 1996, 231). After the IKF elections in May 1992 the KDP and PUK had split power equally between themselves in a coalition. By the end of 1992 the leaders of the two parties called for the unification of these two parties. This cooperation did not last long. The civil war which broke out in May 1994 in the Kurdish region of Iraq between the KDP and the PUK continued until the March 1995 cease-fire (Middle East Journal, Spring 1996, 226). Although the PUK adopted the same slogan as the old KDP, namely, ‘autonomy for Kurdistan, democracy for Iraq', it advocated Marxist principles and denounced the KDP as ‘reactionary' (Middle East Journal, Spring 1996, 229).

The U.S. Government sponsored peace talks between the KDP and the PUK in August 1995 (Keesing's Record of World Events 1995, 40702). Two meetings took place in Ireland. The first, on 10-11 August 1995 reportedly led to the KDP and PUK agreeing to the demilitarization of Arbil and to measures to ease the inter-party dispute over control of the region's finances (Voice of America, 11 August 1995). The second follow-up round of talks in Dublin from 12-15 September ended without agreement on implementation of this plan (Al-Hayat [London], 24 September 1995). Iran hosted a rival round of talks between the PUK and KDP in Teheran from; 5-9 October 1995, which, as stated in a joint communique, had "achieved tangible progress" on a range of issues similar to those discussed at the talks in Ireland (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 October 1995, quoting Voice of the People of Kurdistan [Sulaymaniya], 12 October 1995). A U.S. mission arrived in northern Iraq in mid-November and held further talks with the main Kurdish parties (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 November 1995, quoting Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan [Salah al-Din], 13 November 1995; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 November 1995, quoting Voice of the People of Kurdistan [Sulaymaniya], 18 November 1995).

Further problems inside Iraqi Kurdistan arose in March 1995 when some 35,000 Turkish troops backed by tanks, helicopters and fighter aircraft launched a major operation in northern Iraq in search of rebels of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) (Keesing's Record of World Events, March 1995, 40473 and Human Rights Watch, World Report 1996, 286). Troops did not begin to withdraw until mid-April. The Turkish military invaded northern Iraq again in July 1995 but withdrew soon afterwards.

According to the BBC, the Iranian news agency IRNA/Sanandaj reported on 28 July 1996 that military forces of the dissolved Kurdistan Democratic Party (of Iran) after crossing the Iraq-Iran border, attacked several border villages in western Iran.

On 17 August 1996 renewed fighting took place between the KDP and the PUK (Libération, 28 August 1996). On 31 August 1996, Iraqi troops intervened in the intra-Kurdish fighting to recapture the town of Arbil, the regional capital of the Kurdish enclave in which both PUK and KDP had a presence (International Herald Tribune, 2 September 1996). Iraqi National Congress' sources claimed that the KDP had appealed to Saddam Hussein to intervene in northern Iraq to advance against its rival, the PUK, which is backed by Iran (International Herald Tribune, 4 September 1996). Iraqi troops conducted house-to-house searches for those Kurdish leaders viewed as enemies or traitors and killed hundreds of people, according to aid workers (International Herald Tribune, 4 September 1996). According to Iraqi National Congress sources, at least 1,500 Iraqis, mostly Arabs, have been arrested in Arbil by Saddam Hussein's secret police and taken to prison in the city of Kirkuk (4 September 1996).

In retaliation against this incursion, U.S. forces attacked southern Iraq with cruise missiles and expanded the southern flight-exclusion zone in Iraq from the 32nd to the 33rd parallel (The Economist, 7-13 September 1996, 15). The U.S. strategy to attack targets in the south and not in the north was to bolster protection of primary Western interests in the area of the Persian Gulf in general and avoid getting involved in the guerilla war in mountainous northern Iraq. The U.S. government announced a hold on the planned ‘food-for-oil' agreement (International Herald Tribune, 4 September 1996).

4. Human Rights Situation

4.1 The International and National Legal Framework

The Constitution devotes 15 articles, out of a total of 70 articles, to the guarantee of a number of public rights and obligations specified in the Universal Declaration and the International Covenants adopted by the United Nations in 1966. However, the Constitution divests many of those articles of their substance and prevents their entry into force because some of the articles contain expressions such as ‘within the limits of the law', ‘in accordance with the provisions of the law' and ‘except where otherwise provided for by law' etc. (International Commission of Jurists, February 1994, 118).

The status of ratifications by Iraq of the major universal instruments on human rights is as follows:

Iraq is a state party to:

·         the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD65), since 14 January 1970;

·         the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR66), since 25 January 1971;

·         the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (PPCG48), since 20 January 1959;

·         the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR66), since 25 January 1971.

Iraq is not a state party to:

·         the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (CSR51);

·         the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (CSP54);

·         the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (CSR61);

·         the U.N. Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT84);

·         the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (PRW53)

In June 1994 a series of new decrees were passed in Iraq which impose punishments including the amputation of ears and hands, branding of foreheads and the use of the death penalty for crimes such as stealing, desertion from the military, smuggling antiquities, engaging in currency exchange, organizing prostitution and car theft. Iraq's mission to the U.N. claimed that these laws were in response to the increase in crime and deteriorating economic situation created by the U.N. sanctions (Human Rights Watch, World Report 1996, 282, U.N. Economic and Social Council report, 15 February 1995 and, Human Rights Watch, World Report 1996, 1995, 282).

In July 1995, the Revolutionary Command Council announced two general amnesties, allegedly ‘in part to cope with severe prison overcrowding' (Human Rights Watch, 1996, 283). The first, RCC Decree No. 61, dated 22 July 1995, ‘remits the remainder of the sentences of Iraqi prisoners and detainees, commutes death sentences to life imprisonment and pardons persons liable to the penalty of amputation of the hand or the auricle of the ear' (United Nations General Assembly, A/50/734, 8 November 1995). The second, Decree No 64, dated 30 July 1995, was said to grant ‘a general amnesty to Iraqis living in or outside Iraq in respect of the penalties imposed on them following their conviction for political reasons' (Ibid.). However, a number of conditions are attached to each amnesty decree. For example, in Decree No 61, a condition of remission of sentence is: ‘if [the detainee's] relatives undertake to ensure their good conduct, provided that the said undertaking is endorsed by a member of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party' (Ibid.). In both decrees a number of categories of offenders are not eligible for amnesty. One of these categories is espionage, which the Special Rapporteur noted is ‘a particularly important exclusion... because so many laws refer to 'espionage' and because the crime applies to a wide variety of behaviour'. According to the Special Rapporteur ‘it is clear that both (decrees) contain significant implicit and explicit conditions and exclusions which substantially reduce their importance and raise questions about their underlying aims'. The Special Rapporteur concluded that in the absence of great change in the legal and political order of Iraq, and in the absence of the abrogation of repressive laws quelling the freedoms of thought, information, expression, association and assembly through fear of arrest, imprisonment and other sanctions, Decrees No. 61 and 64 warrant virtually no confidence (U.N. Economic and Social Council, 4 September 1995).

The Special Rapporteur further pointed out that:

Testimony and reports have consistently indicated that persons who returned to Iraq in order to benefit from amnesties, or did so within the country, were, at a minimum, subject to regular surveillance and frequent interrogations thereafter. As such, they remained effectively penalized and without the enjoyment of genuine liberty which is implied by an ‘amnesty' decree. Certainly, they were not free to hold or express opinions contrary to the official doctrine, nor to associate freely in this regard. Indeed, in several reported cases, persons who returned or surrendered were subsequently arrested; sometimes they were convicted and sentenced for certain crimes, and sometimes they simply disappeared (U.N. Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1996/12, 4 September 1995).

Human Rights Watch reported that ‘some political prisoners were released in 1995 under the amnesty but most remained in prison'. Moreover, ‘because political opponents were required to register with the Iraqi government in order to qualify for the amnesty, there was legitimate scepticism about the government's real intentions. This would not be the first time that the government has used an amnesty as a trick to round up opponents. After the 1991 uprising in the south, Iraq issued an amnesty for which people had to apply. About 3,000 individuals who came forward and registered in Najaf were placed in trucks and have not been heard of since' (World Report 1996, 1995, 283).

4.2 Political Parties

In 1991 the Revolutionary Command Council adopted a law, the Political Party Act, that theoretically authorized the creation of political parties other than the ruling Ba'ath party which has been in power since 1968. In practice, political parties that do not support Saddam Hussein and the present government are prohibited (Country Reports On Human Rights Practices for 1994, U.S. Department of State, 1995, 1091, hereafter referred to as Country Reports). The Iraqi authorities' purpose in promulgating the Political Party Act was to give their Kurdish interlocutors and public opinion the impression that the regime was well-intentioned and open-minded with regard to other political tendencies. But the Act contained many clauses that enabled the government to interfere in the internal affairs of political parties and to monitor their activities closely (International Commission of Jurists, February 1994, 151).

The Political Party Act prohibits the establishment of a political party on an ‘atheistic, confessional, racial, regional or anti-Arab basis'. Furthermore, the Political Party Act designates Baghdad as the headquarters of all the political parties and each party is entitled to establish branches in other administrative units, provided that the Ministry of the Interior and the head of the administrative unit concerned are duly notified. This stipulation restricts the political parties in their freedom of action, since many parties would prefer to be based in other cities where they enjoy popular support. Political parties can receive donations in cash or in kind from parties, associations or persons abroad only with the consent of the Council of Ministers and anyone who acts contrary to this prohibition is liable to a penalty of life imprisonment and confiscation of the donations received. Political parties thus cannot establish any type of links with individuals or parties abroad without the consent and supervision of the Iraqi authorities (Ibid, 151,153).

Opposition political organizations are severely suppressed. Membership in certain political parties is specifically outlawed and is punishable by death (Ibid, 1091). For example, the Islamic Da'wa Party, established in 1957, is a political movement based on Islam and wants to establish an Islamic State in Iraq. The party has been persecuted at the hands of the Ba'ath regime and in 1980 the death penalty was prescribed for its members (Ibid, 138). Other illegal opposition groups operate from exile (R. East and T. Joseph, 1993, 129).

Some of the contending political parties are:

The Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party (BASP) - Hizb al-Ba'ath al-Arabi al-Ishtiraki

Founded in 1947 in Syria by Michel Aflaq, Ba'athist ideas were introduced to Iraq in 1949, but it remained a small political group until the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958. The Iraqi Ba'ath Party split with the Syrian Ba'ath Party in 1966 ((Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett, 90f). The party's three main aims are said to be ‘unity, freedom and socialism for the Arab nation' (Political Parties of the World, 1988, 288). It is said to be opposed to imperialism, Zionism and reaction, to support all liberation movements as well as socialist and progressive forces, and is said to have taken a leading part in the struggle for freedom for Palestine and in opposing the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty (Ibid.).

The Kurdistan Revolutionary Party (KRP)

Led by Sattar Taher Sharef (Secretary-General), it was founded in 1972 by a group of former members of the mainstream Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) who disagreed with KDP leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani. The KRP reportedly established a ‘provisional leadership', and in 1978 claimed to be the legitimate successor to Mullah Barzani's KDP. In 1974, a faction of the KRP joined the National Progressive Patriotic Front (NPPF) and in 1981 it allegedly pledged its support for the NPPF and the revolution headed by Saddam Hussein (Political Parties of the World, 1988, 289).

The Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI), comprising of six Shi'a parties. The SAIRI was formed in November 1982 when Shi'a opponents of the Sunni-based Saddam Hussein regime met in Iran. The Assembly is led by Ayatollah Mohammmed Bakr al-Hakim (R. East and T. Joseph, 1993, 129).

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) - Parti Dimukrati Kurdistan [Kurdish]/ al-Hizb al-Dimuqrati al-Kurdistani) [Arabic]. Also called Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK), it was founded in 1946 by Mullah Mustapha Barzani, and since 1979 has been led by his son, Mas'ud Barzani. The party sided with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war (Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, 1991, 161). It is described as the more tribal and conservative party, taking a moderate stance in its relations with the Government of Iraq and seeking autonomy for the Kurdish regions (International Human Rights Law Group, 1992). The Party is reportedly dominant in almost all of Iraqi Kurdistan, and is said to have control over the largest number of peshmerga (‘Forward to Death') guerrilla units (Ibid., Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, 1991, 161). At its Eleventh Congress in August 1993, the party was renamed the Unified Kurdistan Democratic Party (UKDP) (Parti Dimukrati Kurdistan - Yekgirtu [Kurdish] /al- Hizb al-Dimuqrati al-Kurdistani al-Muwahhad [Arabic]) after the Kurdish Unity Party merged with the KDP (Amnesty International, February 1995, 9).

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) - Yekieti Nishtimani Kurdistan [Kurdish] /al-Ittihad al-Watani al-Kurdistani [Arabic]

Jalal Talabani announced the formation of the PUK in Damascus in June 1976 (Entessar, 78). It was said to be a merger of the Socialist Movement of Kurdistan (al-Harakat al-Ishtirakiyya al-Kurdistaniyya) and the Association of Marxist-Leninists of Kurdistan (al-'Asaba al-Marxiyya al-Leniniyya al-Kurdistaniyya) and of Talabani's own personal followers (Ibid.). Jalal Talabani has remained the party's leader. It is said to be the KDP's main competitor and is described as a ‘more urban and left-wing party, with a stronger base of support in the eastern regions, where the Surani dialect is spoken'. (International Human Rights Law Group, 1992). In particular, it is said to draw support from the urban population of Sulaymaniya (Francke, 1994, 165). The PUK is described as supporting self-determination and equal partnership with ‘any Iraqi central government' but rejects negotiations with the present regime, believing that only ‘international guarantees will insure the safety of the Kurdish people' (IHRLG, 1992).

The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP)

Founded in 1934, this originally pro-Soviet party is currently led by Hamid Majid Musa (Secretary-General, elected on 6 December 1993) (Middle East Journal, Spring 1994, 346). Although admitted to the National Progressive Patriotic Front in 1973, the ICP's support of Kurdish autonomy brought on a period of repression following the failed Kurdish uprising in 1975 (Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, 1991, 158). By 1979 the ICP's leader, Aziz Mohammed (First Secretary) was forced to flee Iraq, and shortly thereafter the ICP left the NPPF (Ibid.). Moreover, the ICP is said to have sided with Iran in the war between the two countries (Ibid.), and membership in the ICP is considered a capital offense (Country Reports, 1994).

The Iraqi National Congress (INC)

Formed in June 1992 at a conference of Iraqi opposition groups and individuals in Vienna, convened by some members of JACIO (Francke, 172). It is said to be a coalition led by a three-member presidential council comprising Mas'oud Barzani of the KDP, a Sunni General, Hasan Mustafa al-Naquib, and a Shi'a cleric, Sayyid Mohammad Bahr al-Aloum; Ahmed Chalabi is the INC's Chief spokesman and head of the executive committee (Francke, 1994, 173). The INC's primary objective is said to be the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime and its replacement by a democratic system (Reuters, 26 October 1994). A second, larger conference was held in Salah al-Din, Iraqi Kurdistan in October 1992, attended by representatives from SAIRI, the Da'wa Party (which withdrew from membership in September 1993), smaller Islamist parties, the Iraqi Communist Party, and ‘increased Arab nationalist participation' (Francke, 173). The INC subsequently established an office in Iraqi Kurdistan (Ibid.) and has been instrumental in negotiating a series of ceasefires during hostilities between the KDP and PUK in northern Iraq in 1994 and 1995 (Reuters, 10 November 1994). After the Iraqi military actions in Iraqi Kurdistan on 31 August 1996, the INC received information from the Iraqi National Turkoman Party (INTP), a member of the INC, that a joint group of KDP and Iraqi secret police attacked the INTP radio, television and newspaper building in Arbil on 1 September (5 September 1996). The International Herald Tribune mentioned that about 100 INC members were reportedly executed after Arbil fell to Mr. Barzani's Iraqi-allied forces. Many others fled Arbil and surrounding towns into Zakho, near the Turkish border (19 September 1996).

4.3 General Respect for Human Rights

Human rights situation in Iraq

The U.N. Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution on 8 March 1995 which held the Government of Iraq responsible for ‘massive an extremely grave' violations of human rights. The Commission described the Iraqi regime as ‘an all-pervasive order of repression and oppression which is sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror' (Keesing's Record of World Events, 1995, 40480).

With regard to violations of human rights of specific ethnic and religious communities in Iraq, the Special Rapporteur noted that the driving motivation for most violations is political, i.e. the eradication of opposition (23 February 1994, 20). Iraq reportedly refused to admit any violations of human rights and has thwarted attempts to conduct on-site monitoring of the human rights situation. According to the U.S. Department of State, in 1994 the Government of Iraq operated an official human rights group which ‘routinely denie[d]' allegations of human rights violations and refused to cooperate in the investigation of alleged violations (Country Reports for 1994, 1995). Moreover, the Special Rapporteur ‘has since 1992 been refused permission by Iraq to conduct investigations' (Human Rights Watch, Country Report 1996, 285) and his recommendation, endorsed in December 1994 by the General Assembly, for the placing of human rights monitors throughout Iraq ‘to help in the independent verifications of reports on the human rights situation in Iraq', was reportedly rejected (Ibid.). Nevertheless, in February and again in November 1995, the Special Rapporteur submitted his findings, based on information sources available to him, to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 15 February 1995; U.N. General Assembly, 8 November 1995).

The Special Rapporteur considers in his report of March 1996 that the conclusions in his report to the Commission on Human Rights of February 1995 are still valid. With respect to the conclusions as to the facts, the Special Rapporteur has found no evidence of significant change in any area upon which he has reported. He continued to receive reports on violations of almost all human rights in Iraq (U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 4 March 1996).

Summary or arbitrary execution

The Special Rapporteur indicated that he continued receiving reports of arbitrary executions and that killings remained widespread throughout the country and allegedly involved all strata of the population, regardless of ethnicity, religion, language or geographical location, with hundreds of these executions reportedly occurring in detention (U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 23 February 1994).

In 1994, as in previous years, there were ‘numerous credible reports that the regime had executed a number of persons allegedly involved in plotting against Saddam Hussein, including some members of his family and tribe. High-ranking civilian, military, and tribal leaders were reported among those executed' (Country Reports, February 1995, 1085).

Amnesty International reports on 150 detainees who were allegedly executed in Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad over a two-day period in January 1995. Extrajudicial executions of suspected government opponents also continued to be reported. They included ‘several people poisoned with thallium believed to have been administered by Iraqi government agents operating in Kurdish-controlled territory. New information was also received about cases of thallium poisoning in southern Iraq at the end of 1994' (1996, 183).

In 1995, Human Rights Watch reported allegations made by recent Iraqi exiles to Iran that early in 1994, some 2,000 prisoners, mostly Shi'a, had been executed in Radwaniya camp (1994, 276).

Death penalty

The Special Rapporteur in past years noted the frequent use of the death penalty for such political offenses as ‘insulting' the President or the Ba'ath Party. His February 1995 report summarized several Revolutionary Command Council decrees that stipulate the death penalty for political and civil offenses (U.N. Economic and Social Council, 15 February 1995, 12, 13).

Decree No 115 of 25 August 1994 stipulates that the auricle of one ear shall be cut off any person evading to perform military service; deserting from military service; or sheltering or protecting anyone who has evaded or deserted from military service. The auricle of the other ear shall be cut off in the case of a second offence involving any of the crimes mentioned above. A horizontal line shall be tattoed on the forehead of every person whose ear has been cut off. Furthermore Decree No 115 broadened the application of the death penalty. It stated that ‘death by firing squad shall be the penalty for anyone who: (a) Has deserted from military service three times; (b) Has evaded military service and subsequently deserted twice; (c) Has three times protected or sheltered any deserter from or evader of military service' (Ibid., 25). In March 1996 Saddam Hussein ordered an end to the practice of cutting off the ears of deserters and draft evaders. The decision may have been linked to parliamentary elections that month (The Guardian, 18 March 1996). According to the Swiss Federal Office for Refugees, as far as is known the abolishment of ear amputations has not been officially adopted in the form of a Decree and therefore is not yet lawful (Irak: Militardienst, 7 May 1996, 13).

There are other examples when the death penalty is resorted to. For example, Decree No 95 of 27 July 1994 stipulates in paragraph I that ‘the death penalty shall be imposed on anyone who smuggles an automobile, a truck or any machinery or apparatus used for drilling, earth moving or any similar purpose outside Iraq or to a hostile body' (Human Rights Watch, 1995, 283). Decree No 114 of 25 August 1994 amended Decree 59, paragraph 2, which provides for execution if a robbery is committed by a person carrying a visible or hidden weapon or if the crime results in the death of a person. Decree 114 extends the provision for execution to include any theft perpetrated by an individual ‘affiliated with the Armed Forces, the Security Services, or a state employee'. The death penalty can be commuted to life imprisonment if the court finds the circumstances warrant mercy (Human Rights Watch/Middle East, June 1995).

Decree No 118 of 27 August 1994 established the death penalty for organizing prostitution (paragraph 1) stating that: ‘the death penalty shall be imposed on anyone who organizes a gang for the purposes of pandering, as defined in article 1 of the Anti-Prostitution Act No. 8 of 1988' (U.N. Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1995/56, 15 February 1995).

Enforced or involuntary disappearances

Many disappearances reportedly occurred in the early 1980s, when ‘Shi'a boys and men ‘accused' of [being of] ‘Iranian origin' were arrested and never heard of again . . . [and in] . . 1983, following an Iranian battle-victory in the Iran-Iraq war, when thousands of Kurdish Barzani tribesmen, suspected of collaboration with Iran, were reportedly rounded up and taken away to unknown destinations. However, most disappearances reportedly occurred during the ‘Anfal' campaign launched by the Government in the northern Kurdish region in 1988' (U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 23 February 1995)

Amnesty International writes in its Report 1996 that the cases of thousands of detainees who ‘disappeared' in previous years remained unresolved. Among them were over 100,000 Kurds who ‘disappeared' during the 1988 and 1989 ‘Anfal' operations; an estimated 625 Kuwaiti and other nationals arrested by Iraqi forces during the occupation of Kuwait in 1990 and 1991 and believed to be held in Iraq; and several thousand Shi'a Muslims arrested in the southern provinces of Basra, al-Nasirayya and al-'Amara in the aftermath of the March 1991 uprising' (1996, 183).

Arbitrary arrest and detention

Human Rights Watch reported in 1993 that between 5,000 to 10,000 detainees were being held in the Radwaniya military camp near Baghdad, most of whom had been arrested during the 1991 Kurdish uprising (World Report 1994, 298). It added, however, that the practice of maintaining secret prisons and temporary detention centres within the premises of security forces and other public buildings made it hard to estimate the number of political prisoners or their mental and physical condition (Ibid.).

Hundreds of suspected government opponents and their relatives were reported to have been arrested during 1995. In May, scores of people were arrested following demonstrations in al-Rammadi Province protesting the execution earlier that month of a senior military officer from the region. Over 40 people were arrested in May following an alleged assassination attempt against President Saddam Hussein near the town of Samarra' (Amnesty International, 1996, 182, 183).

Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment

As was mentioned in Section 4.1 (The International and National Legal Framework), in June 1994 a series of new decrees were passed in Iraq imposing severe punishments including the amputation of ears and hands, branding of foreheads and the use of the death penalty.

According to the Special Rapporteur, physical torture usually occurs at the hands of the security forces during the first period of detention, at the interrogation phase (UN Commission on Human Rights, 23 February 1994). He adds that psychological torture is equally utilized, in that ‘detainees have been often forced to watch the torture inflicted upon others . . . [or when they] . . . have had to watch the execution of other inmates . . . [or] . . . the torture of family members, including children, of suspected political opponents' (Ibid.).

In January 1995, the opposition Iraqi National Congress reportedly released a videotape recorded from Iraqi television ‘showing the mutilations inflicted on an Iraqi army deserter and a petty thief as punishment for their crimes'. The government's aim in showing the mutilations was said to be to deter potential deserters and thieves (Middle East International, 20 January 1995; Le Monde, 14 January 1995).

Freedom of movement

Human Rights Watch mentiones in its 1996 World Report that ‘in order to stem the flow of government employees to other countries the government enacted laws restricting their right to exit Iraq' (1995, 283). ‘Exit taxes on professionals were imposed to prevent them from easily leaving the country and another new law prevented state employees from taking better paying jobs in the private sector' (Ibid.). Iraqis who managed to flee to Jordan were still vulnerable to Iraqi intelligence agents who operated relatively freely and effectively there (Ibid.).

4.4 The Human Rights Situation in Iraqi Kurdistan

Human rights abuses in Iraqi Kurdistan can be divided into violations of various Kurdish parties against each other and the abuses of the Iraqi and other governments against the Kurds. Some of these abuses will be highlighted below:

In the context and aftermath of clashes between the KDP and the PUK the two main groups in Kurdistan were responsible for serious human rights abuses. Many fighters were taken prisoner by these opposition groups:

Most were later released in prisoner exchanges but some were reported to have been killed after capture or surrender. Unarmed civilians were detained on the basis of their affiliation. Some were held in unacknowledged places of detention and reportedly tortured. Many of those arrested were members of suspected sympathizers of the KDP who were arrested after PUK forces took control of the city of Arbil in January 1995. An unknown number of people were reported to have been executed after summary trial by a special court set up by the PUK in Arbil in January 1995. The court was set up ostensibly to deal with large numbers of people suspected of theft, extortion and other criminal offences. Its procedures were said to have been summary in the extreme, with defendants being tried in the absence of defence counsel (Amnesty International, 1996, 183, 184).

Amnesty International in its 1995 annual report highlights two factors leading to abuses: ‘the impunity enjoyed by the political parties' armed and special forces; and the active undermining of the judiciary and lack of respect for its independence by these political parties'(131).

The Kurds are also under constant threat of attack by Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish forces. Since 1992, Amnesty International stated, ‘scores of people have been assassinated' in Iraqi Kurdistan. ‘Many such killings have been attributed to the agents of both the Iraqi and Iranian governments operating in the region' (1996, 89).

4.5 Specific Groups at Risk

Many groups are at risk of human rights violations. The following groups are highlighted as ‘specific groups at risk' because of their political, religious and/or ethnic identity:

The Shi'a Moslems

The Shi'a in Iraq, concentrated in southern Iraq and comprising an estimated 55% of the total population, historically have been economically, politically and socially disadvantaged (Encyclopedia of the Third World, 1992, 892). The emergence of a politically activist Shi'ism and the coming to power of the ‘secular' Ba'ath party in 1968, ‘set the course for the confrontation which would come to a head with the Islamic revolution in Iran where the Sh'ia communities constitute approximately 90% of the population' (B. Stapleton, 1993, 5, 15).

The Shi'a opposition movement in Iraq, al-Da'wah, radicalised by the Iranian revolution, took up guerilla tactics against the regime. After a series of armed attacks by the Shi'a opposition in Baghdad in early 1980, Saddam Hussein unleashed ‘a wave of terror' against the Shi'a opposition. At the end of March 1980, the law of capital punishment was passed for anyone suspected of belonging to, or suporting, al-Da'wah (Idem., 18).

Inspired by Iran, the Shi'a took advantage of the confusion caused by Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War of 1991 and undertook a largescale rebellion. The central government crushed the uprising (Encyclopedia of the Third World, 1992, 892)and the repression of the Shi'a majority of Iraq has continued undiminished since then.

The Marsh Arabs

The Marsh Arabs, followers of Shi'ism live in the area of permanent lakes and marshes surrounding the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in south-east Iraq (B. Stapleton, 1993, 27). In 1988, at the end of the Iran-Iraq war, there were about half a million Marsh Arabs. When the Iran-Iraq war started in 1980, the support of the Marsh Arabs was important to the Iraqi government, as much of the fighting took place in and around the marshes. Saddam Hussein emphasized the bond of shared nationhood and played down sectarian differences (The Committee Against Repression and For Democratic Rights in Iraq, 1994, 135, 142).

Official attitudes towards the Marsh Arabs began to change after the suppression of the popular uprising in March 1991 in the wake of the Gulf War. By early 1994 almost all Marsh Arabs had been forced from their homes as Saddam Hussein asserted his control of the area with massive drainage programmes and continuous military attacks. Many were forcibly resettled on artificial waterways or on the dykes built to separtate one marsh region from another. Here their movements are closely supervised by the Iraqi army. Approximately two thirds of the Amarah and Hammar marshes - ‘representing the bulk of Iraq's traditional marshland' - have already been drained (Ibid., 1994, 135, 136).

According to B. Stapleton there are several interpretations as to the reasons Saddam Hussein had for draining the marshes:

•           The draining program may be seen as a method to facilitate government control over the population in the area.

•           For centuries, the remoteness and inacccessibility of the marshes has made the area a refuge for bandits and political rebels (for example the deserters during the Iran-Iraq war). Even though the presence of the resistence in the marshes has not been of the Marsh Arabs choosing it has led to consequences that are leading to their eradication as a discrete group.

•           The regime wants to exploit the substantial oil-fields believed to exist in the region (1994, 28, 29).

The Gulf War allies imposed a ‘no-fly zone' over southern Iraq in 1992. The U.S. Department of State has noted that while it deters aerial attacks on the marsh dwellers, it ‘does not prevent artillery attacks or the military's large-scale burning operations' (Country Reports, 1995). Military offensives in July 1994 on different marshland communities reportedly have resulted in the destruction of entire villages, and the exodus of marshland dwellers to Iran (Middle East International, 5 August 1994). In October 1994 another observer reported that ‘while the marshlands are drained, ground-to-ground missiles and Iraqi tanks continue to assault the remaining inhabitants' (The Times, 14 October 1994). Amnesty International reported that an unknown number of unarmed civilians were extrajudicially executed in the southern marshes region in 1994, while military and special forces continued to launch ‘deliberate and indiscriminate military attacks on civilian targets'.

Faili Kurds

In describing the Faili Kurds, the Special Rapporteur noted that this group ‘reflect in their persons the fault-lines of much of Iraqi society under Ba'ath rule: Arab versus Kurd; Sunni versus Shiah; and Iraq versus Iran' (U.N. Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1994/58, 23 February 1994). He added that the Faili Kurds ‘have suffered considerably since the beginning of Ba'athist rule because they were suspected of disloyalty by their non-Arab, Shi'a nature and their 'almost Iranian' geographic location' (Ibid.). Hundreds of thousands of Faili Kurds were reportedly expelled in mass waves during the 1970s and in April and May of 1980, with current repression taking the form of arbitrary arrests, detention and expulsion (Ibid.). In the early 1970s after the seizure of the Arab islands of Abu Musa, Tunb al-Sughra, and Tunb al-Kubra in the Straits of Hormuz 100,000 Shi'a Faili Kurds had their possessions confiscated and were forcibly expelled from Iraq to Iran (B. Stapleton, 1994, 18). It is estimated that 130,000 were uprooted by Iraqi deportation to Iran, before and in the early years of the Iraq-Iran war. They were expelled on the pretext that they were not Iraqi citizens although most had lived in Iraq for generations (G. Kreyenbroek and S. Sperl, 1992, 61).

The Turkomans

According to the Special Rapporteur, the most basic problem of the Iraqi Turkomans is the fact that their national identity, their civil and political rights are not recognized by the Constitution of Iraq. Thus their existence was ignored. Furthermore the northern part of Iraq where Kurds and Turkomans live together was defined as ‘Iraqi Kurdistan' since 1970. The Turkoman minority continues to be restricted in the use of their ‘language, cultural and proprietary rights', even in areas where they constitute the majority of the population (U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 23 February 1994). The Special Rapporteur adds that allegations that social engineering projects are aimed at altering the ethnic ratios in historically Turkoman regions is articulated in a variety of reports which claim that administrative boundaries were changed in 1974 to divide Turkoman concentrations and that since the mid-1970s, Arabs enjoyed special incentives and rights encouraging them to move to historically Turkoman areas including the oil-rich cities of Kirkuk and Mosul (Ibid., 18). The main party of the Turkomans, the Iraqi National Turkoman Party, boycotted the 1992 elections for the Iraqi Kurdish parliament. The Turkomans would like the autonomous region in northern Iraq to be extended southwards to include the oil-rich Kirkuk region and other areas mainly populated by Turkomans (Reuters, 2 September 1996).

As was mentioned in Section 4.2, according to information by the Iraqi National Turkoman Party (INTP), at the beginning of September 1996, at the time of the Iraqi invasion in northern Iraq, a joint group of KDP and Iraqi secret police attacked the INTP's radio, television and newspaper building in Arbil. The offices of the Turkoman Students Union and the Turkoman Women's Union were attacked as well. On 4 September a total of 250 INTP members had been rounded up by the Mukhabarat (secret police) of which 25 have been executed (Iraqi National Congress, London, 5 September 1996).

Shi'a Turkomans

With specific reference to the Shi'a Turkomans, the Special Rapporteur indicated that repression by the Government of Iraq takes the form of internal deportations from areas of Shi'a concentration such as particular quarters of Kirkuk, Dakhu, Tuz Khurmatu and other Shi'a Turkoman villages (U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 23 February 1994). By the end of 1993 a large number of families in Kirkuk allegedly received deportation notifications (Ibid.). The Special Rapporteur added that in the so-called ‘District 90' of Kirkuk, four mosques (al-Haj Rousan, al-Kahya, al-Afandi and al-Thaqlayn) were reportedly demolished, most of the 25,000 Shi'a population appear to have been relocated to other areas, while many Shi'a Turkoman youths ‘have been arbitrarily arrested and detained' (Ibid.).

The Kurds

The Kurds constitute the largest ethnic minority and comprise at least 15% of the population and live in the northern mountains where they retain their tribal organisation (Encyclopedia of the Third World, 1992, 891).

In 1970, the Ba'ath Party, anxious to secure its precarious hold on power, did offer the Kurds a considerable measure of self-rule, far greater than that allowed in neighboring Syria, Iran or Turkey. But the regime defined the Kurdistan Autonomous Region in such a way as deliberately to exclude the vast oil wealth that lies beneath the fringes of the Kurdish lands. The Autonomous Region, rejected by the Kurds and imposed unilaterally by Baghdad in 1974, comprised the three northern governorates of Erbil (sic), Sulaimaniyeh and Dohuk. This was only half the territory that the Kurds considered rightfullly theirs. Even so, the Autonomous Region had real economic significancce, since it accounted for fully half the agricultural output of a largely desert country that is sorely deficient in domestic food production frontiers (Human Rights Watch/Middle East, 1993, 5,6,7).

In the mid and late 1970s, the Iraqi regime again moved against the Kurds, forcibly evacuating at least a quarter of a million people from Iraq's borders with Iran and Turkey, destroying their villages to create a safety zone along these sensitive frontiers (Human Rights Watch/Middle East, 1993, 6).

Focusing on Iraq's northern oil-rich city of Kirkuk, the most important source of dispute between Kurds and the government since the early 1970's, the Iraqi authorities maintained a policy of ‘Arabization' in order to displace the resident Kurds and establish Arabs as the city's majority. The Kurdish leadership has argued that Kirkuk be placed in the Autonomous Region under Kurdish control. Since 1991, the government has expelled Kurdish families from the city and seized their homes and property (Human Rights Watch, World Report 1996, 284).

The region of Kurdistan enjoyed relative stability from 1975 to 1980. However, following the outbreak of the war between Iraq and Iran, the situation in the region became disturbed and the Baghdad Government accused some Kurdish factions of engaging in acts of subversion detrimental to national security and of facilitating the occupation of some Iraqi territory by Iranian forces. On the pretext of liberating that occupied territory, Iraqi forces bombarded Kurdish areas and used chemical weapons, as happened in Halabja in March 1988 (International Commission of Jurists, February 1994, 147). Over five thousand Kurdish civilians were killed in Halabja and thousands more severely injured in late August and early September 1988, following the cease-fire of the Iran-Iraq war (B. Stapleton, 1993, 1).

The campaign against the Kurds of northern Iraq in 1988 has been referred to as ‘Anfal' campaign. Anfal - ‘the Spoils'- is the name of the eighth sura (verse) of the Koran. It is also the name given by the Iraqi Government to a series of military actions against the Kurds which lasted from 23 February until 6 September 1988 (Middle East Watch, 1993, 3). By the estimate of Middle East Watch, in the seven consecutive Anfal campaigns, at least 50,000 and possibly as many as 100,000 persons, many of them women and children were killed (Ibid., xiv). The Commitee Against Repression And For Democratic Rights In Iraq mentiones that between 180,000 and 200,000 Kurdish villagers perished (1994, 131, 134). World Refugee Survey in its turn states that as a result of the Anfal campaign, approximately 4,000 Kurdish villages were destroyed and 800,000 people were forced out of their homes and into government-controlled housing centres (1996, 112). Following a failed Kurdish uprising in early 1991, some 1,5 million sought refuge in Iran and along the Turkish border (Ibid.).

Christian communities

The two main Christian communities in Iraq are the Nestorian Assyrians belonging to the Eastern Orthodox Church, and the Chaldeans, of the 'Uniate' Church which is in union with the Church of Rome. Many Assyrians live in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq, although earlier in the century significant numbers moved to the central regions, including Baghdad. The Chaldean community is mainly concentrated in the central areas of the country, particularly in Baghdad (Gulf Information Project, January 1994; Country Reports for 1988, 1989, 1355).

Many Assyrians living in northern Iraq suffered along with the Kurds in the Anfal operations of 1988. Homes and churches were destroyed and many people were deported from their home areas or killed. Assyrians became refugees along with the Kurds in 1988 and 1991 (Ibid.) Saddam Hussein is said at times to have courted Iraq's Christian leaders, and while he allegedly destroyed numerous Christian villages in the north, he also reportedly restored churches and monasteries elsewhere in exchange for their loyalty and silence (Assyrian Democratic Organisation (ADO)/Droit de l'homme sans frontières, 1994). Christians have been appointed to senior positions in the government and the Ba'ath Party, most notably the Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz. However, it is reported that ‘in common with most communities, they have felt the threat of political repression as well as pressure of attempts by the regime to coopt them' (Gulf Information Project, January 1994).

The Special Rapporteur indicates that while Revolution Command Council Decree No 251 of April 1972 ‘granted cultural rights to Iraqi citizens who spoke the Syriac language and clarified that the Iraqi minorities referred to in the Constitution included Assyrians, Chaldeans and other Syriacs', the census forms for 1977 and 1987 reportedly provided only for ‘Arab' or ‘Kurd' identity, thus forcing most Assyrians to identify themselves as ‘Arabs'. Decrees No 251 and No 440 of June 1972, granting cultural rights to the Assyrian community were said to have been ‘barely implemented at the time of their promulgation and were followed, after 1974, with a programme of discrimination, repression and strict Government control'. For example, public instruction in the Syriac language reportedly never took place, and the government is said to have instituted a policy requiring all schools to ‘provide instruction in the Quran as part of a programme of developing national identity and allegiance' (U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 23 February 1994).

Christians in Iraq are reported to have been under pressure since the Gulf war because it is perceived that they have closer ties with the West. As a consequence, tens of thousands of Christians have tried to leave the country. In the North, tensions do exist between Kurds (mostly Sunni Muslim) and Assyrians, particularly over property disputes in villages destroyed in the Anfal Campaign and now being rebuilt (Gulf Information Project, January 1994). However, the current Kurdish political leadership has taken a fairly liberal attitude to the Assyrians (Ibid.). Five seats in the Kurdish parliament elected in May 1992, were given to the Christian minority, four of which were taken by the Assyrian Democratic Movement (Gunter, M.M., 1993, 299).

Military Deserters

Persons who are away for longer than 15 days from their military unit, are considered as deserters. The majority of deserters from the Iraqi army fled during the Iran-Iraq war or during the Kurdish and Shi'ite uprisings in northern and southern Iraq in March 1991. The majority of Iraqi army deserters flee into Iran where the so-called ‘High Committee of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq' has its own army consisting of approximately 6000 Shi'ites (Swiss Federal Office For Refugees, 7 May 1996, 5, 9). Der Tagesspiegel reports that the Iraqi's had formed special execution-commando's to stop the deserters (10 February 1991).

Deserters also flee to Iraqi Kurdistan. Since the drainage of the southern marshes they are no longer the main haven for deserters (Middle East Report, March/April 1995, 12).

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