Islamism, the State and Armed Conflict

 

MAP

  See original

GLOSSARY

AIS Islamic Salvation Army (Armée islamique du salut)

FFS Socialist Forces Front (Front des forces socialistes)

FIS          Islamic Salvation Front (Front islamique du salut)

FLN        National Liberation Front (Front de libération nationale)

GIA         Armed Islamic Group (Groupe islamique armée)

HCE        High State Committee (Haut comité d'état)

MIA       Armed Islamic Movement (Mouvement islamique armée)

OJAL      Organization of Young Free Algerians (Organisation des jeunes Algériens libres)

RCD        Rally for Culture and Democracy (Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie)

MCB       Berber Cultural Movement

1.    INTRODUCTION

The current undeclared civil war between Islamists and the military-run government in Algeria, which erupted in early 1992, has cost the lives of over 30,000 people, and forced thousands to flee the country (UNHCR 31 Oct. 1994; BBC Summary 30 Dec. 1994; Middle East International 7 Oct. 1994a, 11; Le Nouvel Observateur 19-25 Jan. 1995, 7; Foreign Report 8 Dec. 1994, 2). The escalating political violence is characterized by arbitrary attacks on the civilian population by armed Islamist groups, on the one hand and, on the other, by the indiscriminate attempts by government security forces to root out Islamist elements (The Independent 14 Nov. 1994; AI Oct. 1994, 1, 6-7; Entelis 27 Mar. 1995). The atmosphere of chaos has also fostered the spread of criminal activity and delinquency (ibid.; Index on Censorship Sept.-Oct. 1994, 149). The widespread violence has produced a prevailing sense of fear and insecurity (Arabies June 1993, 11; L'État du Monde 1994, 203), and, increasingly, distrust, as even family members sympathizing with different factions or views fear one another (Le Nouvel Observateur 19-25 Jan. 1995, 10).

In religious terms, Algeria has an apparently homogeneous population - 99 per cent of citizens are Sunni Muslims and 1 per cent are Christian or Jewish (Civil Society Jan. 1995, 10). This paper will examine the divisions which have resulted from the rise of radical Islamism and of armed conflict within the society, not simply between Islamists and the state, but also within both the Islamist movement and the state (Index on Censorship Sept.-Oct. 1994, 156; Entelis 1994, 237). Some Islamists promote a political solution, while others feel only a violent solution is possible (ibid.). Similarly, the state includes "eradicators", who categorically oppose discussions with the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and promote a military solution, and "conciliators", who favour political dialogue with the FIS (ibid.; Middle East Report July-Aug. 1994, 25-26).

2.    BACKGROUND

The term "Islamism" refers to an essentially political Islamic movement which aims to bring the political, economic, social and cultural spheres in line with Islamic laws (AI Oct. 1994, 1; Lamchichi 1989, 45; Burgat 1988, 29). It does not reject modernity, in which it is rooted, but, instead, seeks to adapt it to a reformist interpretation of Islamic thought (Lamchichi 1989, 43, 51).Present-day Islamism in Algeria is rooted in periodic resistance in the name of Islam against French colonization during the 19th century (Vatin 1981, 268). With the birth in 1931 of the reformist Islamic Ulema Association, led by Abdelhamid Ben Badis, a national cultural identity based on Islamic allegiance emerged (Botiveau and Frégosi. 1991, 21-22; Lamchichi 1989, 146; Entelis 28 Sept. 1994, 13).

The alliance between the Islamic Ulema Association and the nationalist National Liberation Front (FLN) party in 1956, during the liberation war against France, marked the beginning of a complex relationship between Islam and politics in Algeria, one in which religious and nationalist sentiments have become closely intertwined (Burgat 1988, 144-46; Vatin 1981, 259-260). The FLN, the victor in Algeria's intense eight-year war of liberation which culminated in independence in 1962, ruled Algeria until January 1992. According to one source, immediately after independence, the FLN government

integrated Islam's religious institutions, coopted its clerical class by requiring state-approved certification, and screened (and sometimes even composed) Friday mosque sermons. All this was administered by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, through which the state supervised and controlled the expression of Islamist thought (Current History Jan. 1995, 14).

In the following years, the government saw its mandate to create a modern, socialist nation-state tempered by traditionalist Islamic resistance from both inside and outside the party (Vatin 1981, 261; Burgat 1988, 143-44, 150; Lamchichi 1989, 152).

        Although initially playing the role of preserver of traditional Islamic values and counsellor to the state, the reformist Islamic movement later sought to influence more substantially the direction of the state. Its impact is reflected in a number of national legal documents, such as the 1976 National Charter, which declares Islam the state religion (Lamchichi 1989, 149-150). Moreover, the Islamists' political influence is evident in the 1970s' introduction of state arabization policies, which would require the use of Arabic throughout society, notably in the field of education where Arab schooling replaced French schooling at all levels (Rouadjia 1990, 119). However, some professions, including medicine and journalism, and the economic and technical sectors closely linked with the world market, remain dominated by French speakers and access to them requires knowledge of French (ibid., 131-32; Arabies June 1993, 15; Focus on Africa Oct.-Dec. 1994; Burgat 1988, 155). The rapid construction of mosques throughout the country and the adoption of the Family Code in 1984 are other examples of the Islamist influence on government policies (ibid.; Lamchichi 1989, 152). The Family Code, considered retrograde by many Algerian feminists, for example, states that women cannot choose their husbands but can only marry a man chosen by a male member of their family, sanctions polygamy, favours men in divorce cases, and allows men to repudiate their wives seemingly arbitrarily (Women Living Under Muslim Laws Dec. 1988-May 1989, 32; Women's Movements of the World 1988, 3; Islam and Islamic Groups 1992, 11; Cheriet 1992, 193, 195).

Although its arabization policies and the naming of Islam as the state religion were aimed at creating national cohesion and consolidating state control (Vatin 1981, 261; La Presse 15 Oct. 1988), the government inadvertently sowed the seeds of Islamism by its concomitant failure to provide educational opportunities and work for the new generation of arabized youth - 75 per cent of Algeria's population is under 30; only about 3.3 per cent who enter primary school make it to university, and 58 per cent of those aged 18 to 25 years are unemployed (Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1992, 11; Le Nouvel Observateur 19-25 Jan. 1995, 28; Rouadjia 1990, 131; Lamchichi 1989, 158; Revue des Droits de l'Homme Jan. 1993, 153). This provided the Islamist movement with the opportunity to manipulate youth disillusionment and Islamic values to develop an alternative political program (L'État du Maghreb 1991, 386; Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1995a, 15; Lamchichi 1989, 158). In the 1980s, many young Algerians increasingly began frequenting mosques to hear the powerful voices of imams (leaders of prayers in a mosque) promising a better future for those who joined the Islamist movement (Rouadjia 1990, 133-34). The mosques, many of which had slipped out of government control, became the only places where people could debate political issues and criticize the government publicly (ibid.; L'Express International 21 Oct. 1988, 22; Entelis 27 Mar. 1995). At the same time, the Islamists consolidated their popular base by providing the basic food, housing and education needs of a growing, poor population, increasingly neglected by *** the state (Rouadjia 1990, 139; Médias France Intercontinents 3 July 1990; Middle East Report Nov.-Dec. 1992, 13).

At the same time as the the Islamists were assuming the role of providers of social welfare, a violent strand of Islamism was emerging in the 1980s. The Armed Islamic Movement (MIA), created by Mustafa Bouyali in 1981, reflected some Islamists' belief that only a radical alternative could effectively counter economic deprivation and state power over Islam (Entelis 27 Mar. 1995). The MIA carried out a number of attacks against the government in the Larbaa region until Bouyali was killed by government security forces in 1987 (Entelis 28 Sept. 1994, 14; Islam and Islamic Groups 1992, 11; Middle East International 9 July 1993, 18). Other leaders were jailed. They were released from prison in 1989 when the government initiated major political reforms (Entelis 27 Mar. 1995). These people reorganized to form the present MIA (see section 3.4) (ibid.).

In October 1988 youth riots, sparked by dramatic price increases for basic goods, swept through Algeria's main cities (L'Express International 21 Oct. 1988, 22; Peuples méditerranéens July-Dec. 1990a, 10, 17). During the riots, which expressed general discontent with government corruption and mismanagement (ibid.; The Middle East Sept. 1989, 25), public buildings, the FLN headquarters, state enterprises, and luxury stores were targeted because they represented the power of a state deemed unjust and immoral (ibid., 23; Peuples méditerranéens July-Dec. 1990a, 17; L'Express International 21 Oct. 1988, 22; Le Monde 6 Oct. 1988). Despite their non-religious basis, the riots were adroitly exploited by the Islamist movement to mobilize the masses in its favour (The Middle East Sept. 1989, 23; Botiveau and Frégosi. 1991, 29; Entelis 28 Sept. 1994, 15; L'Événement du jeudi 13-19 Oct. 1988, 8; Le Monde 11 Oct. 1988a). The security forces' response to the riots resulted in between 200 and 500 civilian deaths and further alienated citizens from the state (La Presse 15 Oct. 1988; Peuples méditerranéens July-Dec. 1990a, 11; MEW Feb. 1992, 11). Professor John P. Entelis of Fordham University, appearing before the Congressional Sub-Committee on Africa, testified that the riots served as a catalyst for the politicization of Islam in Algeria (Entelis 28 Sept. 1994, 14; Current History Jan. 1995, 14).

In 1989, in an attempt to reestablish its credibility after the riots, the ruling FLN, led by President Chadli Benjedid, made constitutional changes that, among other things, paved the way for economic liberalization and multiparty elections, and guaranteed the right to freedom of expression and association (L'État du Maghreb 1991, 386; New York Times 28 Dec. 1991; MEW Jan. 1994, 12). Several political parties emerged, including the FIS (Entelis 1994, 229). In the June 1990 local elections, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) gained control of 854 out of 1,541 municipal councils and 32 out of 48 provincial assemblies (wilaya) (ibid., 13; Civil Society Jan. 1995, 11). Three months after the elections, the Christian Science Monitor reported there was no major public dissatisfaction with local FIS rule (The Christian Science Monitor 26 Sept. 1990). The FIS appeared to be addressing the problems of housing and unemployment, and did not seem anxious to *** uniformly apply the sharia (ibid.; Middle East Report Nov.-Dec. 1992, 13-14). In some municipalities under its control, and where local circumstances permitted, the FIS imposed gender segregation at beaches, schools, cultural centres, and recreation halls, and prohibited "decadent" music, cinemas, public dancing, and the sale of alcohol (MEW Feb. 1992, 14; Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1995b, 12).

In another major electoral victory, the FIS won 189 out of a total of 430 seats in the first round of national elections held in December 1991 (L'État du Monde 1993, 223; MEW Feb. 1992, 2; New York Times 28 Dec. 1991). According to one source, the result of this election, during which nearly half of eligible voters abstained (L'État du Monde 1993, 223), did not necessarily reflect strong religious conviction, but rather a sense that the FIS "would develop and modernize the country, and above all endow the political leadership with moral behaviour" (Middle East Report Mar.-Apr. 1992, 37).

Unable to accept an imminent FIS-led government, and, in response to calls from several democratic parties, human rights organizations and women's groups, the security forces pressured President Chadli to resign, and cancelled the second round of national elections on 12 January 1992 (Women Living Under Muslim Laws Jan. 1992; MEW Jan. 1994, 14-15; Index on Censorship Sept.-Oct. 1994, 148). On 16 January 1992, a military-backed, five-member transitional High State Committee (HCE), took over the country's leadership (MEW Jan. 1994, 15; L'État du Monde 1993, 224). It is currently led by Liamine Zeroual (ibid.).

The first month of the HCE's mandate was marked by growing clashes between Islamists and government security forces as the latter attempted to enforce new decrees prohibiting public gatherings near mosques and arrested several imams (MEW Feb. 1992, 7, 11). The government imposed a state of emergency on 9 February 1992 (see section 5.1) and banned the FIS in March 1992 (see section 3.1) (AI Mar. 1993, 3; MEW Jan. 1994, 17; L'État du Monde 1993, 224).

Several sources indicate that it was the interruption of the democratic process that led to the "radicalization" of Islam and propelled the conflict in Algeria into its most violent phase yet (Current History Jan. 1995, 16; Impact International Jan. 1995, 10; MEW Jan. 1994, 16; Civil Society Jan. 1995, 14; Middle East Report July-Aug. 1994, 24).

3. MAIN ISLAMIST GROUPS

The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), Hamas and En-Nahdha represent the political and ideological component of the Islamist movement, while the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) represent the movement's armed militants. Two of the guerrilla groups, the AIS and the MIA, are apparently armed wings of the FIS (Entelis 27 Mar. 1995). John P. Entelis, Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Middle East Studies Program at Fordham University, Bronx, New York, points out that it is not clear whether the AIS and the MIA remain separate groups or have merged as one movement (ibid.). However, they are presented below as separate groups as available sources do not provide clear information on their relationship with the FIS, and they appear to have acted independently of one another. All guerrilla groups appear to be regionally divided with power decentralized (La lettre de Justice et Paix Jan. 1995; Le Nouvel Observateur 19-25 Jan. 1995, 20), although information on the links between the different elements is unavailable.

3.1 Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)

The first Islamic political party in Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Front, was founded as an umbrella organization of Islamist groups on 10 March 1989 (Médias France Intercontinents 3 July 1990). Following the imposition of the state of emergency (see section 5.1), the FIS was outlawed on 4 March 1992 for its activities against the state (Entelis 27 Mar. 1995; L'État du Monde 1993, 224). Despite its shortlived existence as a legal political party, the FIS remains the dominant Islamist movement in Algeria, claiming to have between three and six million members (Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1992, 12; Botiveau and Frégosi. 1991, 32; Entelis 28 Sept. 1994, 13). The FIS is led by a 14-member consultative council, which includes its two principal founders and spokesmen, Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhadj (Botiveau and Frégosi. 1991, 32), both of whom were arrested on 30 June 1991, charged with conspiring to overthrow the government (New York Times 28 Dec. 1991; MEW Jan. 1994, 13), and moved to house arrest in September 1994

There is little information on the extent of the house arrest. According to a 10 April 1995 Time report, during the fighting between government forces and the GIA in late March, the two leaders "were mysteriously moved from prisons in the Sahara Desert back to house arrest on the outskirts of Algiers" (Time 10 Apr. 1995a, 26; The Economist 11 Nov. 1994). Another FIS leader, Abdelkader Hashani, was jailed on 23 January 1992. Other leaders are in exile (Islam and Islamic Groups 1992, 14; L'État du Monde 1993, 224).

The dispersement of its leadership has prevented the FIS from expressing a unified stance on specific issues (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 19 Jan. 1995, 2; Middle East International 17 Dec. 1993, 11). Generally, the group aims to establish an Islamic state based on the sharia (Islam and Islamic Groups 1992, 14; New York Times 31 Dec. 1991). It is not clear, however, what the FIS position is on the controversial houdoud aspects of sharia, which outline punishments for crimes such as sanctioning the amputation of a thief's hand (MEW Feb. 1992, 15). In its 1991 political platform, the FIS outlined its objectives, which include: educational and media reform according to Islamic principles; higher education for women; remuneration for women who stay home and raise children; and government accountability (Islam and Islamic Groups 1992, 14; Peuples méditerranéens July-Dec. 1990b, 43). FIS aims also include job creation, improved housing, and development (ibid.; Middle East Report Mar.-Apr. 1992, 37-38). The FIS appears unfavourable to democracy and multipartism, but in favour of free enterprise (Peuples méditerranéens July-Dec. 1990b, 46; The Ottawa Citizen 3 Jan. 1992, A13; Cheriet 1992, 202; New York Times 31 Dec. 1991).

As the main opposition group in Algeria, the FIS fosters unity by appealing to the Algerian people's common Islamic religious and cultural identity (Botiveau and Frégosi. 1991, 32). The group has cultivated its image as the only legitimate representative of Islam and the people or umma (community of believers) (ibid.; Cheriet 1992, 180). Its legitimacy is strengthened by exposing the flaws of the more secular FLN and other political parties, which are portrayed as having betrayed both Islam and the people (Botiveau and Frégosi. 1991, 32; L'État du Maghreb 1991, 386).

All elements of Algerian society are represented in the FIS, although the group's popular support base lies with the urban, poor, unemployed, and disillusioned youth (Burgat 1988, 169; New York Times 28 Dec. 1991; Middle East Report Nov.-Dec. 1992, 13). Financial support comes from local charitable organizations and individual contributions (ibid.; Entelis 27 Mar. 1995).

The FIS demands that all women wear the hidjab (headscarf) and promotes strict segregation between the sexes that effectively relegates women to the home (MEW Feb. 1992, 14). For this reason, many Algerian women's groups are vehemently opposed to the FIS although it does have female supporters (ibid.; Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1995b, 10; Monde Arabe Maghreb-Machrek Apr.-June 1994, 106), preferring the moderate gains achievable by wearing the veil in a predominantly Islamic society to the less accessible goals set by Western-type feminism (MEW Feb. 1992, 108; Cheriet 1992, 207). Sources report that, for some Islamist women, wearing the veil both commands respect from men and protects against sexual harassment (ibid., 204-205; Middle East Report Nov.-Dec. 1992, 15; Monde Arabe Maghreb-Machrek Apr.-June 1994, 108). Moreover, the FIS allows women who wear the veil into mosques under its control to debate issues of societal interest and has created women's "cells", or study groups, in these mosques. Viewed in the context of nearly three decades of authoritarian, one-party rule, under which women were not free to organize or publicly express their opinions, some women, thus, feel the FIS is empowering them (Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1995b, 13; Entelis 27 Mar. 1995; World Press Review Jan. 1995). Figures on the number of women active in the militant Islamist groups are unavailable. However, one observer states the Islamist women's movement is "widespread", although women are not likely to be found among Islamist fighters (Journalist 30 Mar. 1995). Professor Entelis notes that some Westernized, secular women in Algeria also supported the FIS in the June 1990 local elections. Their vote for the FIS had little to do with FIS policies with respect to women, which were not so different from existing FLN policies [ The FLN government, while promoting women's education, offered limited work opportunities. Some sources report only 4-5 per cent of Algerian women work (Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1995a, 13; AFP 7 Mar. 1995); another source puts the figure at 10-15 per cent (Country Reports 1993 1994, 1154). ], but rather was based on the desire for change and the belief that the FIS, unlike the ruling party, represented honesty and hope for the future (Entelis 27 Mar. 1995).

3.2 Movement of the Islamic Society (Hamas)

The Hamas party, created in December 1990 and led by Shaikh Mahfouz Nahnah, is a moderate Islamist group that seeks to establish an Islamic state based on a "reformist interpretation" of the Koran. The group promotes respect for human rights, including women's rights in the workplace, and democracy (Islam and Islamic Groups 1992, 14; Botiveau and Frégosi. 1991, 38, 42). A rival of the FIS, Hamas condemns violence and intolerance in the name of religion (ibid.; Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 21 Jan. 1995, 2). Some sources suggest the group is being used by the state as a counterweight to the FIS (Entelis 28 Sept. 1994, 16; Cheriet 1992, 211). The party did not win any seats in the first round of the national elections in December 1991 (Islam and Islamic Groups 1992, 12).

3.3 Movement of the Islamic Renaissance (En-Nahda)

En-Nahda was originally founded in the 1970s as a clandestine Islamic education association at the University of Constantine. Led by Abdallah Djaballa, En-Nahda emerged in 1990 as a moderate Islamist party, which promotes the creation of an Islamic state based on the sharia, political pluralism, private enterprise, and public ownership of natural resources (Botiveau and Frégosi. 1991, 44; Islam and Islamic Groups 1992, 14). It has been suggested that, like Hamas, En-Nahda may not be fully independent of the state (Entelis 28 Sept. 1994, 16). En-Nahdha also did not win any seats in the first round of the December 1991 general election (Islam and Islamic Groups 1992, 12).

3.4 Armed Islamic Movement (MIA)

 The Armed Islamic Movement was created in 1992 by Said Mekhloufi and Abdelkader Chebouti, both former army officers who defected to Bouyali's armed Islamist group of the same name in the 1980s (Entelis 28 Sept. 1994, 18). The FIS' "unofficial" armed wing, the MIA is a resurgence of the previous MIA (ibid., 18-19; Libération 23 Feb. 1994; Middle East Report July-Aug. 1994, 24). This revival appears to be a direct consequence of the FIS' failure on the political front (Libération 23 Feb. 1994; Entelis 28 Sept. 1994, 19). The group is reported to have around 1,000 fighters, who target mainly security forces personnel and low level civil servants (Middle East International 9 July 1993, 18; Middle East Report July-Aug. 1994, 24). Middle East Report states the group's objective appears to be to pressure the government "to readmit the substance of radical Islamism to the political process" (Middle East International 9 July 1993, 25).

3.5 Islamic Salvation Army (AIS)

 The Islamic Salvation Army was created as the fighting wing of the FIS in the summer of 1994, reportedly to counterbalance and ultimately control the GIA (see below) (Index on Censorship Sept.-Oct. 1994, 156). The AIS is reported to have 3,000 fighters in the east, 2,000 in the west, and 900 in central Algeria (L'Express International 5 Jan. 1995, 11). One source claims that, despite being in "close contact" with FIS leaders, the AIS "operates with great autonomy and does not necessarily take orders from civilians" (Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1995c, 5). The AIS, which has claimed responsibility for burning schools and killing civilians (L'Express International; Courrier international 13-19 Oct. 1994, 10-11), says it is willing to begin discussions with the state (Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1995c, 5).

3.6 Armed Islamic Group (GIA)

 The GIA was founded in 1989 as an umbrella organization made up of at least four regional groupings active in Algiers and surrounding areas (Middle East Report July-Aug. 1994, 25; Entelis 28 Sept. 1994, 20). The group is currently led by Djamel Zitouni, also called Abou Abd al-Rahman Amine, who rules over nine regional chiefs or emirs (L'Express International 5 Jan. 1995, 11). The GIA claims to be involved in a jihad (holy war) against government security forces, and seeks to overthrow the current regime and set up a radical Islamic state in Algeria (Entelis 28 Sept. 1994, 21; Middle East Times 24 Dec. 1994). The GIA is reported to include former FIS leaders (IPS 23 Sept. 1994; Middle East International 7 Oct. 1994b, 10), and Algerian mujahidin (guerrilla fighters) who fought in the war in Afghanistan (Middle East International 6 Jan. 1995; Foreign Report 8 Dec. 1994, 3; Middle East Report July-Aug. 1994, 25). According to L'Express International, the group has an estimated 2,000 fighters in the east, slightly more in the west, and 4,000 in the central region (L'Express International 5 Jan. 1995, 11), whereas Professor Entelis estimates that the GIA has around 10,000 members altogether (Entelis 27 Mar. 1995). The GIA is allegedly responsible for killing numerous civilians (L'Express International 5 Jan. 1995, 11; AI Oct. 1994, 14; Entelis 28 Sept. 1994, 19), and has rejected all negotiations with the government (Index on Censorship Sept.-Oct. 1994, 156). On 26 August 1994, the group reportedly announced the creation of a "caliphate" (Muslim) government in exile in the United Kingdom (EIU 4th Quarter 1994, 10; L'Express International 5 Jan. 1995, 11).

Information on the relationships between the GIA and the FIS and between the GIA and the other armed Islamist groups is limited and sometimes contradictory. The GIA, identified by one source as "a bitter rival of the FIS" (Middle East International 9 Sept. 1994, 12), claims to be independent of the FIS and has reportedly "denounced and threatened FIS leaders in exile" (ibid.; Entelis 28 Sept. 1994, 19). For its part, the FIS has denied involvement in GIA killings of civilians, yet did not publicly condemn the violence until armed Islamists issued threats to some European embassies in December 1994 (see section 4.5) (AFP 5 Jan. 1995). Until then the FIS had said that those killed by armed Islamists were supporters of government policy and, therefore, "not innocent" (AI Oct. 1994, 14). In response to questions regarding FIS relations with the GIA, in an interview with Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, FIS spokesman Kemal Qammazi stated, "there are no fundamental differences between us" (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 19 Jan. 1995, 2). Another source reports that, while the government has stated that the GIA is supported by the FIS, the FIS has countered that the GIA is an "army-supported 'death squad'" organized to divide the Islamist movement (Entelis 28 Sept. 1994, 20).

A report in Libération indicates possible links between the GIA and the MIA, claiming that representatives of the two groups held clandestine meetings in January 1994 (Libération 23 Feb. 1994, 11). However, Professor Entelis says the GIA disputes the MIA's military command, adding that "a violent confrontation between the FIS-MIA and GIA seems almost inevitable" (Entelis 28 Sept. 1994, 19-20). Reportedly, the GIA and the AIS "enjoy good relations in the field and frequently cooperate with one another" (Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1995c, 5; see also Courrier international 13-19 Oct. 1994, 10). A December 1994 GIA statement announced the creation of an alliance between the GIA and the AIS, reportedly approved by the FIS (Middle East Times 24 Dec. 1994). However, Le Monde states the document declaring the alliance was "false" (Le Monde 21 Dec. 1994).

4. MAIN GROUPS AT RISK OF ARMED ISLAMIST ATTACKS

In this section, references are made to specific Islamist groups wherever possible. However, most sources do not make such distinctions and refer only to "Islamist groups" when describing events.

4.1 General

Islamist groups exercise varying degrees of control on daily life throughout the country, with some areas in the north, such as Chlef and Blida, particularly affected (Libération 23 Feb. 1994). Islamism in Islamist strongholds is manifested, among other ways, in pressure on record shop owners to close their shops or face death (AI Oct. 1994, 17) and in bans on selling newspapers, playing games in coffeshops, and consuming alcohol in public (Libération 23 Feb. 1994). In some areas, Islamist groups have ordered bus owners to segregate male and female passengers (ibid.; ibid. 28 April 1994).

In August 1994, the GIA ordered that all high schools and universities close their doors. Elementary schools could stay open only on the condition that: boys and girls be separated; physical education for girls, as well as music and French teaching for all students, be abolished; and female personnel and students past the age of puberty wear the hidjab (HRW 1994, 257; Libération 13 Dec. 1994b, 8). Schools defied the ban and, in response, between early summer and early October 1994 armed Islamist groups burned over 600 schools and killed many educators (HRW 1994, 257; The Middle East Feb. 1995, 8; EIU 4th Quarter 1994, 8). On 8 December 1994, Islamists killed a 17-year-old girl and injured nine students near Zidane High School in Boufarik (UPI 9 Dec. 1994).

According to several human rights organizations, a number of groups which are considered to pose a threat to the Islamist cause are particularly at risk of harassment, violence, kidnapping and death at the hands of armed Islamist groups. Those threatened include members of the security forces and their families, journalists and other media personnel, civil servants, foreigners, women, lawyers, intellectuals, artists, human rights activists and teachers (AI Oct. 1994, 13, 16; Country Reports 1993 1994, 1148; HRW 1994, 256-257; MEW Jan. 1994, 51; The Middle East Feb. 1995, 6).

4.2 Army and Police Personnel

 Young army conscripts have had their throats slit by armed Islamist militants to discourage others from carrying out their obligatory military service (Index on Censorship Sept.-Oct. 1994, 140; The Middle East Mar. 1994, 17); this has led to many desertions, sometimes of whole units (see section 5.1) (ibid.; L'Express International 5 Jan. 1995, 11-12). Moreover, armed Islamists have set up false checkpoints which, according to one source, "have cost the lives of many army and police officers. Believing they were dealing with colleagues, they had shown their identity badges, only to be decapitated ..." (Index on Censorship Sept.-Oct. 1994, 139).

4.3 Media Personnel

 Article 19 notes that 25 journalists were assassinated between May 1993 and November 1994 (10 Nov. 1994, 1-2). Tahar Djaout, writer and editor of a weekly French publication, Ruptures, was the first journalist to be killed by suspected armed Islamists (Reporters sans frontières 1994, 14). The 3 December 1994 assassination of journalist Said Mekbel, director of Le Matin, raised the number of journalists killed over a two-year period to 27 (The Middle East Feb. 1995, 5; La Presse 9 Dec. 1994; Le Devoir 9 Dec. 1994; Libération 18 Dec. 1994; Le Monde 21 Dec. 1994; Le Point 10 Dec. 1994). It is estimated that 250 of the 800 journalists once employed in Algiers have left the country (Time 10 Apr. 1995, 27) and those who remain live in fear (ibid.). Assassinations of journalists continue as evidenced by the killing of three in one week in January 1995 (Internet 14 Jan. 1995), and the 27 March 1995 killing of Mohamed Abderrahmani, director of the pro-government daily newspaper El-Moudjahid (La Presse 29 Mar. 1995, E8; Time 10 Apr. 1995b, 27). On 22 January 1995, the GIA ordered all radio and television journalists to stop work or face death (see section 5.5) (AFP 22 Jan. 1995). Reportedly, Islamists have a "hit list" containing 140 journalists' names (Index on Censorship Sept.-Oct. 1994, 143; Time 10 Apr. 1995).

4.4 Civil Servants

 Civil servants, notably tax collectors and state-appointed leaders, especially those who took over the positions of elected FIS mayors in 1992 (see section 5.1), are also at risk of attacks by armed Islamists (AI Oct. 1994, 13; MEW Jan. 1994, 55; France Inter Radio Network 9 Feb. 1995). For example, on 2 February 1994, acting on the basis that Islam forbids tax collection, the GIA ordered tax collectors to stop their work beginning on 17 February 1994 (Libération 23 Feb. 1994). It also advised them to leave their jobs. Many civil servants heeded the Islamist warning and dropped their work. Several tax offices in and around Algiers were closed to the public and the authorities removed the regional tax director for Algiers and one of his local directors (ibid.). On 13 February 1995, the director of the national theatre, Azeddine Medjoubi, as well as a student leader, a school director, a political activist and a civil servant in the foreign affairs ministry were assassinated (AFP 15 Feb. 1995).

4.5 Foreigners

 Approximately 75 foreigners, including 25 French citizens, have been killed in Algeria since September 1993. The GIA has claimed responsibility for the majority of the deaths (AFP 27 Dec. 1994; AFP 26 Dec. 1994). In a late December 1994 incident, four European priests, including three French and one Belgian, were killed, allegedly by the GIA. The killing was apparently a reprisal against the 26 December 1994 killing by French army commandos of four GIA militants who had hijacked an Air France Airbus (AFP 27 Dec. 1994; Civil Society Jan. 1995, 13; Middle East International 6 Jan. 1995). Armed Islamist groups have reportedly warned the British, German and French governments to close their embassies in Algeria (ibid.; AFP 5 Jan. 1995). Some sources state that militants kill foreigners in a bid to alienate Algeria internationally and further discredit the state by portraying it "as a weak entity unable to protect its foreign guests or its citizens" (Civil Society Jan. 1995, 13; Arabies June 1993, 12-13). The French are especially targeted because their government provides financial and military support to the Algerian Armed Forces (Impact International Jan. 1995, 7-8; Middle East International 6 Jan. 1995; L'Express International 6 Jan. 1995, 12). Attacks and threats against foreigners led around 6,000 French citizens living in Algeria to return to France in 1994 (EIU Country Report 4th Quarter 1994, 11).

4.6 Women

 Women who defy the Islamic dress code, which includes the hidjab, are viewed by some Islamists as un-Islamic and, therefore, subject to threats and harassment (AI Oct. 1994, 13; United Nations 20 Dec. 1994, 11; Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1995b, 11) or even death - a 17-year-old girl was killed by suspected armed Islamists on 28 February 1994 in Blida reportedly for leaving her head uncovered (Ibid., 12; AI Oct. 1994, 17; United Nations 20 Dec. 1994, 11). Two others were killed in the Blida region in early November 1994, apparently after refusing a "temporary marriage" or "pleasure marriage"

[The "pleasure marriage," a Shiite practice rejected by orthodox Muslims, is an unofficial marriage that may last anywhere from a few hours to several months (AFP 7 Nov. 1994).] with members of armed Islamist groups (AFP 7 Nov. 1994; The Independent 14 Nov. 1994); such marriages imposed on young women by Islamist militants are not unusual (AFP 7 Nov. 1994; Le Nouvel Observateur 19-25 Jan. 1995, 31).

As noted by one source, other women face a "double threat" as women and as professionals (FLW Women Mar. 1995, 1). Like their male colleagues, women professionals, including journalists, teachers, lawyers and human rights activists, are targeted by armed Islamists if they criticize the FIS or other Islamist groups or if they are believed to support the government (The Globe and Mail 13 Feb. 1995; AFP 15 Feb. 1995). Fatma-Zohra Ourais, a French teacher who campaigned independently in the December 1991 national election, was killed by Islamists on 11 February 1995 (ibid.) . Nabila Djahnine, the president of an Algerian women's group, Cry of Women, was assassinated by suspected armed Islamists in Tizi Ouzou, Kabylia on 15 February 1995 (The Globe and Mail 16 Feb. 1995; AFP 7 Mar. 1995; ibid. 15 Feb. 1995). Furthermore, the wives and children of both targeted professionals and security forces personnel have suffered attacks by armed groups (AI Oct. 1994, 16). It is estimated that around 215 women were deliberately killed and numerous were raped by armed Islamists in 1993 and 1994 (Le Nouvel Observateur 19-25 Jan. 1995, 31; La Presse 23 Dec. 1994). By early March 1995, the total of women killed was reported to have risen to nearly 300 (AFP 7 Mar. 1995). In addition, Islamists have attacked a number of women, including a 15-year-old girl, since they reportedly set a 9 March 1995 deadline for the release of female Islamists from prison (The Independent 14 Mar. 1995). A 27 March 1995 Time report claims that the GIA killed nine young women when the deadline was not met and in revenge "for a mock trial held by Algerian feminists in which they symbolically sentenced Islamist leaders to death" (Time 27 Mar. 199512; AFP 7 Mar. 1995).

4.7 Other Groups at Risk

Intellectuals, writers, artists, trade unionists, lawyers and political and human rights activists, whom armed Islamist groups accuse of supporting the cancellation of the January 1992 national elections, criticizing the Islamist movement, collaborating with the government, or representing the political establishment are also targeted (AI Oct. 1994, 13; Le Monde 19 May 1994; Le Nouvel Observateur 19-25 Jan. 1995, 40; FLW Women Mar. 1995, 1). For example, paediatrician Djilali Belkhenchir, a member of the Committee for the Safeguard of Algeria (Comité de sauvegarde de l'Algérie), which called on the government to cancel the 1992 elections, was killed by Islamists on 10 October 1993 at the Bir Traria Hospital where he worked. Belkhenchir was also vice-president of the Algerian Committee Against Torture (AI 25 Oct. 1994, 15; ibid. 1994, 57). Another doctor, Mahfoud Boucebci, a psychiatry professor, was killed on 15 June 1993 outside the hospital where he worked in Algiers' Kouba district (ibid.). The president of the Algerian League for Human Rights (LADH), Youcef Fathallah, was killed by suspected armed Islamists in June 1994 (HRW 1994, 289), and Belgacem Aziz, a member of the Ettahadi party, was killed in Algiers on 17 December 1994; the Ettahadi party is comprised of former Algerian communist party members, who promote the banning of all Islamist parties (Reuters 20 Dec. 1994). Armed Islamist groups have also targeted lawyers and magistrates suspected of working in the special courts (see section 5.2) (AI Oct. 1994, 13; Index on Censorship Sept.-Oct. 1994, 167). State prosecutor Chaib Mohamed Arezki had his throat slit by Islamists in October 1994 near Tigzirt raising the death toll of senior court officials to over 20 (Reuters 23 Oct. 1994).

5. STATE RESPONSE TO ISLAMISM

5.1 State of Emergency

On 9 February 1992, following the cancellation of the January 1992 general election and in response to clashes between armed Islamists and government security forces, the High State Committee declared a year-long state of emergency. With hostilities continuing, the state of emergency was extended indefinitely in February 1993 (MEW Jan. 1994, 17; AI Mar. 1993, 2). In addition, the government imposed an 11:30 p.m.-4:30 a.m. indefinite curfew in the northern central region on 5 December 1992 (MEW Jan. 1994, 23; Country Reports 1993 1994, 1152; L'État du Monde 1994, 200).

State of emergency regulations, among other things, permit: the detention of anyone whose actions are considered "dangerous to the public order, public security, or the proper functioning of public services"; the banning of demonstrations which could lead to public disorder; the closure of meeting halls; and the suspension and dissolution of local assemblies or governments if they, "by conduct or statements, block or impede the legal actions of the public authorities" (MEW Jan. 1994, 17-18; AI Mar. 1993, 3; Country Reports 1993 1994, 1150). By the end of 1992, in accordance with state of emergency regulations, the government had dissolved most municipal councils and provincial assemblies run by the FIS and had appointed new officials in their place (MEW Jan. 1994, 18). These persons have been targeted by armed Islamists (see section 4.4) (ibid.).

        According to Amnesty International, the emergency laws and accompanying decrees have effectively suspended citizens' rights guaranteed in Algeria's Constitution as well as protection provided by international human rights covenants to which Algeria is a party (AI Oct. 1994, 22).

        State of emergency regulations permit civilians accused of violating state security to be tried in military courts (MEW Jan. 1994, 17-18; AI Mar. 1993, 3; Country Reports 1993 1994, 1150). In 1993, most civilians accused of political violence were tried in special courts (see section 5.2.1); however, in one notable case, human rights lawyer Brahim Taouti, who has defended jailed FIS leaders, including Ali Belhadj, was tried in Blida military court. Taouti was sentenced to three years imprisonment on 3 May 1993 for allegedly distributing a FIS statement promoting the armed Islamist struggle (MEW 11 May 1993, 1; Country Reports 1993 1994, 1150).

The government has mobilized the National Popular Army, made up of 140,000 men, more than half of whom are conscripts, the special forces which operate in the capital region, the gendarmerie and the police to fight the Islamists (AI Jan. 1994, 1; Libération 13 Dec. 1994a, 10; Le Monde 11 Oct. 1988b; Foreign Report 8 Dec. 1994, 1; Entelis 27 Mar. 1995; Arabies June 1993, 17; Le Nouvel Observateur 19-25 Jan. 1995, 23). However, there were reportedly over 1,700 desertions from the military in the first half of 1994, with some soldiers defecting to the Islamist movement (Entelis 27 Mar. 1995; BBC Summary 30 Dec. 1994). Professor Entelis believes that, although difficult to ascertain, army deserters and/or conscientious objectors would receive no "objective treatment," given the state of emergency situation and lack of the rule of law in Algeria today (Entelis 27 Mar. 1995).

For more information on the government treatment of conscientious objectors and army deserters and penalties for resigning from the police, please see the following DIRB Responses to Information Requests: DZA18833.E, DZA16694.E, DZA16933.E, and DZA16678.E, which are available at Regional Documentation Centres.

5.2 Legal Sanctions

The Anti-terrorist decree (Legislative Decree 92-03) issued in October 1992 permits incommunicado detention for "terrorist" suspects for up to 12 days instead of the 48 hours allowed under the constitution and lowers the age limit for responsibility for "terrorist" crimes to 16 years (Country Reports 1993 1994, 1149; MEW Jan. 1994, 7; International Children's Rights Monitor 2nd & 3rd Quarters 1994, 29). Many detainees are held beyond the 12-day limit (AI 1994, 55). Human rights sources have expressed concern that prolonged incommunicado detention is conducive to torture and ill-treatment (MEW Jan. 1994, 27). Further, it may allow enough time for torture marks to disappear before detainees are seen by a doctor, lawyer, or family members (ibid.).

        Under the anti-terrorist decree, convicted leaders of groups involved in "subversive" or "terrorist" acts face life imprisonment and members of such groups face 10 to 20-year sentences. Such acts, according to human rights sources, are so broadly defined that people exercising their right to freedom of expression and association could be convicted of involvement in "subversion" or "terrorism" (MEW Jan. 1994, 26; AI Oct. 1993, 4). The decree was amended on 7 April 1993 by adding the funding of terrorist groups as an offence (MEW Jan. 1994, 25).

5.2.1 Special Courts

Individuals charged with subversion or terrorism are tried in special courts established by the Anti-terrorist decree (ibid., 22). These courts began hearing cases on 3 January 1993 (Country Reports 1993 1994, 1150). Under the decree, the pre-trial procedures of the special courts are governed by the Code of Penal Procedure, which contains safeguards for detainees. However, according to Middle East Watch, these safeguards are often violated (MEW Jan. 1994, 29). For example, although detainees have the right to a lawyer when they first appear in the special courts, many attend the hearing without one as lawyers are either not informed or informed too late of the date of the hearing. Moreover, the special courts permit judges to use confessions extracted under torture as evidence (ibid.; AI Feb. 1994, 19). Other human rights concerns with respect to these special courts include: the requirement that the anonymity of judges be preserved, which can affect the independence and impartiality of the judiciary; limits on public access to trials which, if judges so decide, may be conducted in camera; retroactivity of special court jurisdiction which allows cases of subversion or terrorism that began before January 1993 to be transferred to the special courts; limits on the right of appeal - defendants must choose one of two avenues when challenging their verdicts: cancellation of the verdict by the Supreme Court and a reexamination of the case before different judges in a special court, or an application for clemency from the HCE; strict deadlines for the processing of cases, which could limit a fair inquiry; and violations of the right of defence, including a provision that all defence lawyers must be approved by the special court (MEW Jan. 1994, 30-33). Index on Censorship adds, "the authorities have also harassed, suspended and imprisoned lawyers for criticising procedures in the special courts, defending Islamists or appealing their sentences in higher courts" (Index on Censorship Sept.-Oct. 1994, 167).

Government figures indicate that 85 per cent of the defendants in special courts receive a prison sentence and 12 per cent receive the death penalty (Country Reports 1993 1994, 1150). At least 10,194 people were tried in special courts between February 1993 and June 1994, including 3,400 in the first half of 1994 (AI Oct. 1994, 23). In 1993, more than 300 suspected Islamists tried in special courts were sentenced to death, most in absentia; twenty-six of them were executed, including twenty who had been convicted in special courts and six in military courts (MEW Jan. 1994, 21, 23; Country Reports 1993 1994, 1150). By June 1994, the number of death sentences had risen to 1,127, including 964 in absentia (AI Oct. 1994, 23). In 1993, more than 100 received life sentences, and hundreds more received sentences of up to 20 years (MEW Jan. 1994, 21). By June 1994, 6,507 had received prison terms (AI Oct. 1994, 23). Amnesty International states that Algerian special courts "violate the most fundamental right of all, the right to life, by sentencing people to death after trials which are unfair at every stage of the proceedings" (AI Oct. 1993, 1). The organization believes that "executions after unfair trials are summary or arbitrary executions" (ibid., 2). Reportedly, the Algerian Justice Minister announced in January 1995 that special courts could soon be abolished (Radio Algiers Network 6 Jan. 1995).

5.3 Human Rights Violations by Security Forces

Several sources report that serious human rights violations, including extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrest, detention without trial, and torture, have been committed by government security forces against suspected members or sympathizers of the Islamist opposition since the conflict erupted in early 1992 (AI Oct. 1994, 1; Country Reports 1993 1994, 1147; HRW 1994, 258). Such actions, in addition to violations of freedom of expression, the right to a fair trial, freedom of association and religion have occurred in the context of the government-declared state of emergency, and related special laws enacted by the government (Committee to Protect Journalists 1992, 209; Country Reports 1993 1994, 1147; Reporters sans frontières 1993, 21).

        Government figures for 1992 report that around 9,000 suspected FIS supporters were arrested and detained in remote camps in the Sahara desert (AI Mar. 1993, 3). According to Middle East Watch:

Those detained ranged from prominent activists who had been elected to public office to suspected sympathizers who were rounded up in the streets apparently on the basis of their appearance (many Islamists wear beards and loose-fitting white tunics). The vast majority had no prior police record and, following their detention, were never charged or brought to trial (MEW Jan. 1994, 18).

By the end of 1993 the number of suspects held in these camps had reportedly fallen to between 800 and 1,000 and six out of eight camps had closed (i bid., 19; Country Reports 1993 1994, 1149).

Several sources state that torture in police and gendarmerie stations and military security centres is widespread in Algeria (HRW 1994, 258; AI Oct. 1994, 19; Country Reports 1993 1994, 1148). The most common torture method involves inserting a cloth soaked in dirty water and chemicals into the victim's mouth (ibid., 1149; AI Oct. 1994, 19).

        Amnesty International indicates that the security forces killed about 300 Islamists in the first year of the state of emergency, and that they also killed civilians for not stopping at police checkpoints, breaking the curfew, participating in demonstrations and during raids on Islamist hideouts (AI Mar. 1993, 10). The organization reports "a pattern of extrajudicial executions carried out by members of the security forces as an alternative to arrest or in retaliation for ambushes and attacks by armed groups on security forces and civilians" (AI Oct. 1994, 9). For example, on 16 August 1994, the security forces reportedly killed around 20 people during questioning in Cherarba, an Algiers suburb, in connection with an armed attack on two army vehicles the same day (ibid., 11-12). In December 1994, during five days of raids throughout Algeria, the security forces killed 61 armed Islamists (Reuters 29 Dec. 1994). In another incident, the security forces killed at least 96 detainees and four prison guards during a 22-23 February 1995 mutiny at Serkadj Prison (AI Mar. 1995).

        According to some sources, the actions taken by security forces against the Islamists and their suspected sympathizers have contributed to the escalation of violence by politicizing Algeria's poor youth who swell the ranks of and radicalize the Islamist movement (Entelis 28 Sept. 1994, 21-23; The Middle East Mar. 1994, 16). The Middle East and Human Rights Watch report that security forces personnel allegedly involved in human rights violations do so with impunity (ibid.; HRW 1994, 258).

        Another human rights concern related to the military crackdown on the Islamist movement is the situation of Tunisians who have sought asylum in Algeria fearing persecution in Tunisia as Islamists (AI 16 Feb. 1994). Three were forcibly returned to Tunisia on 8 July 1993, one of whom was arrested and reportedly tortured in a Tunisian jail. The Algerian government has since forcibly returned other Tunisian asylum-seekers, recognized as refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (AI 2 Mar. 1994; ibid. 21 Mar. 1994).

5.4 Anti-Islamist Armed Groups

There are reports that government security forces support anti-Islamist armed groups or death squads responsible for issuing and carrying out numerous death threats against suspected Islamists (Index on Censorship Sept.-Oct. 1994, 138; HRW 1994, 258; The Middle East Mar. 1994, 17; Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1995b, 12; AI 25 Oct. 1994, 17; Foreign Report 8 Dec. 1994, 2). One such group, the Organization of Young Free Algerians (OJAL) began operating in the fall of 1993 and, by the end of 1993, had reportedly created a number of "regional commandos" to eradicate "terrorism" and its supporters (AI 25 Oct. 1994, 17). Foreign Report states members of the OJAL "kidnap and murder friends and relations of known FIS members. Frequently clad in guerrilla combat gear, they arrive at the homes of their victims during the curfew. The bodies are found on the street the following morning" (Foreign Report 8 Dec. 1994, 3). The OJAL responded to the February 1994 Islamist killing of the young girl who did not wear the hidjab, by stating it would kill "20 veiled women and 20 bearded Islamists for every woman killed for not wearing the veil" (AI Oct. 1994, 17; Libération 30 Mar. 1994). On 29 March, two high-school students wearing the veil were killed near Algiers, apparently by the OJAL (ibid.; AI 25 Oct. 1994, 17; Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1995b, 12). Reportedly, the OJAL has issued death threats to several Islamists, some of whom were later arrested by the security forces (AI 25 Oct. 17-18). By October 1994, the government had not condemned OJAL actions (ibid., 18).

5.5 Limitations on Freedom of Expression

        The Information Law introduced in April 1990 restricts the right to freedom of expression guaranteed in the Algerian Constitution (Article 19 10 Nov. 1994, 2; MEW Jan. 1994, 44). Under this law, for example, anyone who publishes or spreads "false or misleading information capable of harming national order or state security" may be punished by five to ten years in prison (ibid.). The Information Law reflects similar provisions found in the Penal Code (ibi d., 44-45). In January 1992, 12 journalists were arrested for publishing articles critical of the state or for printing a FIS statement promoting army disobedience. In the same month, the FIS publication, al-Mounquidh, was confiscated (MEW Feb. 1992, 9-11). There have been increasing restrictions on freedom of expression under state of emergency rule (Committee to Protect Journalists 1992, 209; AI Mar. 1993, 14; Reporters sans frontières 1993, 21; ibid. 1994, 14). Several publications were suspended in 1992 and 1993, including El-Watan, a French daily newspaper, six of whose employees were also detained (Country Reports 1993 1994, 1151). The government also retains control over radio and television (ibid.; MEW Jan. 1994, 6), which give uneven coverage of political violence, focusing on the actions of the Islamist movement (Arabies June 1993, 14).

        Under an inter-ministerial decree issued to the media in June 1994 all reporting of state security issues must be based on press releases emanating from the Interior Ministry, which has set up a "communications cell" to manage such information (Article 19 10 Nov. 1994, 3). In addition, only information produced in the state-controlled national news agency, Algérie Presse Service (APS), or publicized in government press conferences can be used by the media (ibid.; Le Monde 21 Dec. 1994). Censorship recommendations accompanying the decree state that political violence by armed Islamists should be reported on the inside pages of newspapers, and only terms deemed appropriate by the Interior Ministry can be used to describe political violence and related issues (Article 19 10 Nov. 1994, 3). Editors who violate the decree may be prosecuted or have their publications suspended (ibid., 4). According to some sources, the decree puts those who follow it at greater risk of political violence - Islamist militants can accuse them of siding with the government and target them with attacks (Article 19 10 Nov. 1994, 4; Libération 18 Nov. 1994).

6. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The current conflict between Islamists and government security forces has had repercussions on Algeria's indigenous population and in the international arena, and raises questions about Algeria's political future.

6.1 The Berbers

 Algeria's indigenous people, the Berbers, comprise approximately 17 to 25 per cent of Algeria's population (IWGIA Newsletter Apr./May/June 1993, 15; The Economist 21 Oct. 1994). The Kabyles, the dominant Berber group in Algeria, inhabit the Kabylia region in the north, which has been less affected by the conflict than other parts of the country (ibid.). Although arabized to a certain extent, the Berbers have maintained their distinct cultural identity, partly through the creation of the Berber Cultural Movement (MCB) in the 1970s (Le Nouvel Observateur 19-25 Jan. 1995, 25). Through the MCB, many are engaged in an active struggle for the recognition of Tamazight (Berber language) as a national and official language and for its introduction in the schools (ibid.; Jeune Afrique 12-18 Jan. 1995, 24).

Sporadic armed Islamist incursions into Kabylia - during one of which the popular singer and member of the MCB, Matoub Lounes, was abducted by the GIA and held hostage for a week in September 1994 (EIU 4th Quarter 1994, 11; Libération 26 Nov. 1994; Middle East International 7 Oct. 1994b, 10) - have led one Berber political leader, Said Saadi of the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), to organize local self-defence groups (Libération 8 Feb. 1994; Focus on Africa Oct.-Dec. 1994; Radio France International 8 Feb. 1995). These groups, found in several Berber villages, reportedly have received arms from the government (Middle East Times 31 Dec. 1994; EIU 4th Quarter 1994, 11). If the conflict persists, according to The Economist, the Berbers may be tempted to separate from Algeria (The Economist 21 Oct. 1994). A number of Berbers, however, support the FIS, especially lower-class Kabyles in Algiers, and there are reportedly Berbers among GIA leaders (Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1995c, 7; L'Express International 13 Oct. 1994; Libération 8 Feb. 1994).

The two main Berber political parties, the RCD and the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) led by Ait Ahmed, disagree over whether to enter into negotiations with the FIS: the RCD apparently rejects the idea while the FFS is in favour of it. However, both parties oppose creating an Islamic republic in Algeria (Libération 8 Feb. 1994).

6.2 International Dimension

 France, which fears a large-scale influx of refugees from Algeria, is firmly opposed to an Islamist government in Algeria and provides arms and support to the Algerian military in its fight against armed Islamist groups (Impact International Jan. 1995, 8; L'Express International 5 Jan. 1995; Index on Censorship Sept.-Oct. 1994, 156; Arabies Jan. 1995, 64-65; Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1995c, 4). Reportedly, France backed the 11 January 1992 military coup (Impact International Jan. 1995, 7; Index on Censorship Sept.-Oct. 1994, 160).

Unlike France, the United States has condemned the Algerian government's decision to cancel the 1992 elections and favours a return to democracy, which it believes would guarantee social stability (Jeune Afrique 12-18 Jan. 1995, 22-23).

Some sources report the view that Algeria's Islamist movement is not nationalist, but part of an international movement that seeks to create an "Islamic nation" supported by Iran, Sudan and Saudi Arabia (Le Devoir 18 Dec. 1994; La Presse Nov. 1994; Impact International Jan. 1995, 9). Jeune Afrique claims that, in meetings with the French government, Sudan promised, in exchange for French aid, not to help the FIS, except to provide moral support (Jeune Afrique 12-18 Jan. 1995, 24). Libération reports the existence of an Islamist network of arms traffickers in Europe with purchases of arms destined to Algeria made in Eastern Europe and transit points in Germany, Switzerland, France, Spain and Morocco (Libération 4 Jan. 1995).

6.3 Algeria's Political Future

 Opinions vary on how Islamists would rule Algeria if in power. Arun Kapil, a Visiting Scholar at the Institut Maghreb-Europe (University of Paris) states that, "the future of Algeria is Islamist;" the issue is whether moderate or extremist Islamism will prevail (Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1995c, 7). As evidence of the Islamists' moderate propensities, Index on Censorship points out that, during the FIS' existence as a legal political party between February 1989 and February 1992, "the vast majority of Islamists demonstrated comprehensively their willingness to operate within the framework of the pluralist constitution" (Index on Censorship Sept.-Oct. 1994, 159). It also states that if the FIS were allowed to participate in new elections, and assuming the FLN vote did not change, it would win no more than a slim majority of seats. There would then "be enough of a balance in the resulting national assembly to block any moves to replace the pluralist constitution with a totalitarian theocratic one" (ibid., 158-159). While Middle East Report believes that a FIS victory would likely not change the 1989 constitutional guarantees of civil rights and political pluralism, it states the FIS "would hold a commanding majority in any elected parliament" (Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1995c, 6). Le Nouvel Observateur presents a contrasting view that Islamists would establish a totalitarian regime which would destroy fundamental rights (Le Nouvel Observateur 19-25 Jan. 1995, 14).

Whatever the outcome of a future election, observers agree that a continued hardline approach to Islamism in Algeria will only cause further bloodshed (Foreign Report 8 Dec. 1994, 3; The Economist 11 Nov. 1994; Journalist 30 Mar. 1995).

The Economist says that attempts at negotiation between the government and FIS leaders Madani and Belhadj in October 1994 failed because the government could not meet the FIS' preconditions for future talks (The Economist 11 Nov. 1994). These preconditions included the release of all FIS members in prison, relegalization of the FIS, an end to the state of emergency, a general amnesty, a halt to judicial and police proceedings against Islamists, and an end to army repression (Entelis 28 Sept. 1994, 25; EIU 4th Quarter 1994, 9; Civil Society Jan. 1995, 14).

Discussions among representatives of various Algerian opposition groups, including the FIS, the FLN, the FFS, Hamas, and En-Nahdha, as well as former president Ahmed Ben Bella were held in Rome on 21-22 November 1994 and, again, between 8 and 13 January 1995 (La Presse 21 Nov. 1994.; The Muslim World 3 Dec. 1994, 4; Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1995c, 6; Le Nouvel Observateur 19-25 Jan. 1995, 19). These talks culminated in the signing of the Rome agreement or peace proposal by eight opposition parties, including the FIS, the FLN, and the FFS. The agreement condemns violence against civilians; calls for a ceasefire, lifting the state of emergency, legalizing the FIS and freeing its jailed members; and outlines the necessary steps for national dialogue, the restoration of democratic elections, and respect for civil rights (Le Monde Diplomatique Mar. 1995, 7; Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1995c, 6; Le Nouvel Observateur 19-25 Jan. 1995, 19; AFP 16 Jan. 1995; Mideast Mirror 27 Jan. 1995, 9; The Economist 14 Jan. 1995, 41; Libération 15 Jan. 1995, 15).

The Rome meetings are considered a positive move toward uniting the opposition (Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1995c, 7; Journalist 30 Mar. 1995). However, the government's absence at the table and rejection of the Rome peace proposal, as well as refusal to allow the FIS to participate in the presidential election scheduled for July 1995, indicate that peace in Algeria is not yet at hand (La Presse 18 Jan. 1995; Arabies Jan. 1995, 64-65; IHT 23 Jan. 1995; Le Monde 20 Jan. 1995).

In late March 1995, government troops ambushed a group of militants which "was apparently planning a congress ... to unite splinter rebel factions under [GIA] command" (Time 10 Apr. 1995, 26). The offensive, which lasted ten days, reportedly resulted in the deaths of "hundreds of Islamists and dozens of soldiers" (ibid.).

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         Arabies [Paris]. January 1995. Mustapha Benchenane. "L'Algérie va-t-elle imploser?"

         Arabies [Paris]. June 1993. No. 78. Jean Dabaghy. "Algérie: Les maux pour le dire."

         Article 19. 10 November 1994. No. 38. "Secret Decree: New Attack on the Media in Algeria." London: The International Centre Against Censorship.

        BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 30 December 1994. "Parisian Paper Publishes Secret Algerian Report on Death Toll." (NEXIS)

Botiveau, M.B. and F. Frégosi. 1991. L'Algérie par ses islamistes. Paris: Éditions Karthala.

        Burgat, François. 1988. L'Islamisme au Maghreb: La voix du sud. Paris: Éditions Karthala.

        Cheriet, Boutheina. 1992. "Islamism and Feminism: Algeria's `Rites of Passage' to Democracy." State and Society in Algeria. Edited by John P. Entelis and Phillip C. Naylor. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press.

         The Christian Science Monitor [Boston]. 26 September 1990. Howard LaFranchi. "Algeria Takes Islamicists in Stride."

         Civil Society [Cairo]. January 1995. Vol. 4, No. 37. Aymen M. Khalifa. "Algeria: Crisis of State."

        Committee to Protect Journalists. 1992. Attacks on the Press 1992. New York: Committee to Protect Journalists.

         Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993. 1994. United States Department of State. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

         Courrier International. 13-19 October 1994. No. 206. Zaki Chihab. "Avec les guerriers du FIS."

         Current History [Philadelphia]. January 1995. Vol. 94, No. 588. John P. Entelis. "Political Islam in Algeria: The Nonviolent Dimension."

         Le Devoir [Montréal]. 18 December 1994. François Brousseau. "L'Algérie, ventre mou d'un complot mondial."

         Le Devoir [Montréal]. 9 December 1994. Clément Trudel. "Algérie: Le peuple est prisonnier de deux forces d'oppression."

         The Economist [London]. 14 January 1995. "Algeria: A Whisper from the Cloisters."

         The Economist [London]. 11 November 1994. "Algeria: Violence."

         The Economist [London]. 21 October 1994. "Algeria: Man Alive."

        The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Country Report. 4th Quarter 1994. "Algeria." London: The Economist Intelligence Unit.

        Entelis, John P. Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Middle East Studies Program at Fordham University, Bronx, New York. 27 March 1995. Telephone interview.

Entelis, John P. 28 September 1994. Prepared Testimony of John P. Entelis, Fordham University Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Washington: Federal News Service.

        Entelis, John P. 1994. "Islam, Democracy, and the State: The Reemergence of Authoritarian Politics in Algeria." Islamism and Securalism in North Africa. Edited by John Ruedy. New York: St. Martin's Press.

         L'État du Maghreb. 1991. Edited by Camille and Yves Lacoste. Paris: Éditions la découverte.

         L'État du Monde édition 1994. 1994. Montréal: Éditions du Boréal.

         L'État du Monde édition 1993. 1993. Montréal: Éditions du Boréal.

         L'Événement du jeudi [Paris]. 13-19 October 1988. "Algérie: la deuxième révolution."

         L'Express International [Paris]. 5 January 1995. "L'hécatombe à huis clos."

         L'Express International [Paris]. 13 October 1994. "Obscénité."

         L'Express International [Paris]. 21 October 1988. "Algérie: la faillite sanglante."

         FLW Women [Brussels]. March 1995. No. 1. "Ghania Oukazi: A Woman Journalist in Algeria."

         Focus on Africa [United Kingdom]. October-December 1994. Heba Saleh. "Algeria/Morocco: The Berbers." (African News Bulletin (ANB) [Brussels]. 1 Nov. 1994. No. 267, p. 1-3)

         Foreign Report [London]. 8 December 1994. "From Bad to Worse in Algeria."

        France Inter Radio Network [Paris, in French]. 9 February 1995. "Civil Servants, Mayor Assassinated." (FBIS-NES-95-027, 9 Feb. 1995, p. 18)

France Inter Radio Network [Paris, in French]. 8 February 1995. "Islamists Attack RCD Leader's Home Village in Kabylie." (FBIS-NES-95-027, 9 Feb. 1995, p. 18)

France Inter Radio Network [Paris, in French]. 6 January 1995. "FIS Candidates Banned From Presidential Election." (FBIS-NES-95-004, 6 Jan. 1995, 13)

         The Globe and Mail [Toronto]. 16 February 1995. "Algerian Feminist Leader Killed."

         The Globe and Mail [Toronto]. 13 February 1995. "Islamic Militants Kill Algerian Teacher."

         The Globe and Mail [Toronto]. 1 July 1992. "Algerian Committee Seeking New Leader: Fundamentalists Still Top Suspects in Monday's Killing of Boudiaf."

         The Globe and Mail [Toronto]. 30 June 1992. "Algerian Leader Killed by Gunman in Police Uniform: Muslim Fundamentalists Suspected in Assassination of Boudiaf."

        Human Rights Watch (HRW). 1994. Human Rights Watch World Report 1995. New York: Human Rights Watch.

         Impact International [London]. January 1995. Vol. 25, No. 1. Mustapha Harrachi. "Algeria: The 33-Year War of Independence."

         The Independent. 14 March 1995. "Algerian Girl Has Throat Slit." (NEXIS)

         The Independent. 14 November 1994. Robert Fisk. "When all the leaders are dead." (African              News Bulletin (ANB) [Brussels]. 15 Dec. 1994. No. 269, p. 6)

         Index on Censorship [London]. September-October 1994. No. 4/5.

         International Children's Rights Monitor. 2nd and 3rd Quarters 1994. Vol. 11, Nos. 2/3. "Summary and Arbitrary Executions: Child Victims in 32 Countries: Algeria."

         International Herald Tribune (IHT) [Paris]. 23 January 1995. Youssef M. Ibrahim. "Radical Groups Reject Algeria Peace Accord." (NEXIS)

         International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) Newsletter. April/May/June 1993. No. 2. Kusyel Tissas. "Truly Indigenous: the Berbers of North Africa."

        Internet. 14 January 1995. "US Journalists Deplore 31st Slaying of Journalist in Algeria." (Human Rights Gopher)

Inter Press Service (IPS). 23 September 1994. Cherif Cordani. "Algeria-Politics: Power Sharing Touted as Best Hope for Peace." (NEXIS)

         Islam and Islamic Groups: A Worldwide Reference Guide. 1992. Edited by Farzana Shaikh. Essex: Longman Group.

         Jeune Afrique [Paris]. 12-18 January 1995. Paul-Marie de la Gorce. "Algérie. Le regard des autres."

        Journalist, formerly with El-Moudjahid, Algiers, presently living in Ottawa. 30 March 1995. Telephone interview.

        Lamchichi, Abderrahim. 1989. Islam et contestation au Maghreb. Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan.

         La lettre de Justice et Paix [Paris]. January 1995. No. 18. Guy Aimard. "La situation en Algérie."

         Libération [Paris]. 15 January 1995. "Six jours d'âpres négociations ont débouché sur un compromis."

         Libération [Paris]. 4 January 1995. "Les trafics d'armes vers l'Algérie inquiètent les polices d'Europe."

         Libération [Paris]. 18 December 1994. "La police algérienne aurait abattu l'assassin du journaliste Sai Mekbel."

         Libération [Paris]. 13 December 1994a. "Alger renforce l'efficacité de la conscription."

         Libération [Paris]. 13 December 1994b. "L'école algérienne minée par la terreur."

         Libération [Paris]. 26 November 1994. Jeannette Colombel. "Algérie: Sous le signe de la Résistance." (African News Bulletin (ANB) [Brussels]. 15 Dec. 1994. No. 270, p. 1)

         Libération [Paris]. 18 November 1994. José Garçon. "A Alger, le pouvoir fait taire la presse." (African News Bulletin (ANB) [Brussels]. 1 Dec. 1994. No. 269, p. 5)

         Libération [Paris]. 28 April 1994. Gilles Millet. "Algérie: Entre voile et treillis, Blida sous influences." (African News Bulletin (ANB) [Brussels]. 15 May 1994. No. 258, p. 14-15)

         Libération [Paris]. 30 March 1994. Gilles Millet. "Algérie: Razika et Naima, lycéennes, abattues près d'Alger." (African News Bulletin (ANB) [Brussels]. 15 April 1994. No. 256, p. 9-10)

         Libération [Paris]. 23 February 1994. Gilles Millet. "Algérie: La `libération' idéologique islamiste a commencé." (African News Bulletin (ANB) [Brussels]. 15 March 1994. No. 254, p. 11)

         Libération [Paris]. 8 February 1994. Gilles Millet. "Algérie: L'exception kabyle dans le chaos algérien." (African News Bulletin (ANB) [Brussels]. 1 March 1994. No. 253, p. 8)

         Medias France Intercontinents. 3 July 1990. Djilali Benchikh. "Les partis en Algérie."

         The Middle East [London]. February 1995. "Journalists in the Front Line."

         The Middle East [London]. March 1994. "Algeria: Army Thrust into the Front Line."

         The Middle East [London]. September 1989. "Algeria Stumbles on the Road to Reform."

         Middle East International [London]. 6 January 1995. George Joffe. "The GIA Attacks France."

         Middle East International [London]. 7 October 1994a. No. 485. Francis Ghiles. "The Magnitude of the Cost."

         Middle East International [London]. 7 October 1994b. No. 485. Alfred Hermida. "GIA and FIS Move Closer."

         Middle East International [London]. 9 September 1994. No. 483. Alfred Hermida. "Talk of a Truce."

         Middle East International [London]. 17 December 1993. No. 465. Alfred Hermida. "Killing Foreigners."

         Middle East International [London]. 9 July 1993. No. 454. Francis Ghiles. "Algeria Locked in a Vicious Cycle of Violence."

         Middle East Report [Washington, DC]. January-February 1995a. Vol. 25, No. 1. Meriem Vergès. "'I am living in a foreign country here': A Conversation with an Algerian 'Hittiste'."

         Middle East Report [Washington, DC]. January/February 1995b. Vol. 25, No. 1. Susan Slyomovics. "`Hassiba Ben Bouali, If You Could See Our Algeria': Women and Public Space in Algeria."

         Middle East Report [Washington, DC]. January/February 1995c. Vol. 25, No. 1. Arun Kapil. "Algeria's Crisis Intensifies: The Search for a 'Civic Pact'."

         Middle East Report [Washington, DC]. July/August 1994. Vol. 24, No. 4. Hugh Roberts. "Algeria Between Eradicators and Conciliators."

         Middle East Report [Washington, DC]. November/December 1992. Vol. 22, No. 6. "Taking Up Space in Tlemcen: The Islamist Occupation of Urban Algeria: An Interview with Rabia Bekkar."

         Middle East Report [Washington, DC]. March/April 1992. Vol. 22, No. 2. Lahouari Addi. "Algeria's Democracy Between the Islamists and the Elite."

         Middle East Report [Washington, DC]. January/February 1992. Vol. 22, No. 1. Boutheina Cheriet. "The Resilience of Algerian Populism."

         Middle East Times [Cairo]. 31 December 1994. Amer Ouali. "Berber Villagers Defend Themselves."

         Middle East Times [Cairo]. 24 December 1994. "Radical Algerian Groups Claim War Coalition."

        Middle East Watch (MEW). January 1994. Human Rights Abuses in Algeria: No One is Spared. New York: Middle East Watch.

        Middle East Watch (MEW). February 1992. Human Rights in Algeria Since the Halt of the Electoral Process. Vol. 4, No. 2. New York: Middle East Watch.

        Middle East Watch (MEW) and Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. 11 May 1993. Algeria: Lawyer Brahim Taouti, Active in Human Rights, Gets 3-Year Sentence; Two U.S.-Based Rights Groups Urge his Release. New York: Middle East Watch and Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.

         Mideast Mirror [London]. 27 January 1995. Vol. 9, No. 19. "Algeria: Zeroual Seen Quashing Opposition Hopes."

         Le Monde [Paris]. 20 January 1995. Catherine Simon. "Le gouvernement algérien rejette la plate-forme de l'opposition."

         Le Monde [Paris]. 21 December 1994. Catherine Simon. "Guerre à huis clos en Algérie. Le pouvoir et les islamistes sont engagés dans une bataille sanglante, à l'abri du regard des médias."

         Le Monde [Paris]. 19 May 1994. Catherine Simon. "Algérie: La culture foudroyée." (African News Bulletin (ANB) [Brussels]. 15 June 1994. No. 260, p. 14-15)

         Le Monde [Paris]. 11 October 1988a. Frédéric Fritscher. "Le chef de l'État algérien joue son va-tout en s'adressant à la nation."

         Le Monde [Paris]. 11 October 1988b. "Une armée à majorité de conscrits mais d'importantes forces de sécurité."

         Le Monde [Paris]. 6 October 1988. Frédéric Fritscher. "Algérie: sur fond de mots d'ordre de grève, Violentes manifestations à Alger."

         Monde Arabe Maghreb-Machrek [Paris]. April-June 1994. No. 144. Laetitia Bucaille. "L'engagement islamiste des femmes en Algérie."

         Le Monde Diplomatique [Paris]. March 1995. "La plate-forme de Rome."

         Le Monde Diplomatique [Paris]. October 1994. Lyes Si Zoubir. "A son tour, la Kabylie dans l'engrenage de la guerre."

         The Muslim World [Hartford, Conn.]. 3 December 1994. Vol. 32, No. 23. "Algeria Peace Moot in Rome."

         New York Times. 31 December 1991. Youssef M. Ibrahim. "In Algeria, Clear Plans to Lay Down Islamic Law."

         New York Times. 28 December 1991. Youssef M. Ibrahim. "Islamic Movement Wins lgeria Vote by Wide Plurality."

         Le Nouvel Observateur [Paris]. 19-25 January 1995. "Algérie: Le dossier terrible."

         The Ottawa Citizen. 3 January 1992. John Hay. "Winning Party in Algeria Hostile to Democracy."

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         Peuples méditerranéens [Paris]. July-December 1990b. No. 52-53. Lahouari Addi. "De la permanence du populisme algerien."

         Le Point [Paris]. 10 December 1994. "Portrait: Le dernier matin de Said Mekbel."

         La Presse [Montréal]. 29 March 1995. "Algérie: les journalistes refusent de `plier': imposant dispositif de sécurité aux funérailles du directeur du El Moudjahid."

         La Presse [Montréal]. 18 January 1995. "Alger ne tient pas compte de l'appel de Rome et prépare le scrutin présidentiel."

         La Presse [Montréal]. 23 December 1994. "Algérie: 211 femmes assassinées en 16 mois."

         La Presse [Montréal]. 9 December 1994. Gilles Toupin. "Algérie: des démocrates pris entre deux feux."

         La Presse [Montréal]. 21 November 1994. Gilles Toupin. "Coup d'épée romaine dans l'eau."

         La Presse [Montréal]. November 1994. Éric Clément. "Les intégristes musulmans ont-ils une tête de pont au Canada?"

         La Presse [Montréal]. 15 October 1988. Louis B. Robitaille. "Le `modèle algérien' craque d'un seul coup."

        Radio Algiers Network [Algiers, in Arabic]. 6 January 1995. "Justice Minister: Special Courts May Be Abolished." (FBIS-NES-95-004, 6 Jan. 1995, p. 13)

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        Reuters. 29 December 1994. "Algerian Forces Kill 61 Muslim Guerrillas." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 20 December 1994. "Algerian Forces Kill 16 Rebels, Activist Slain." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 23 October 1994. "Algerian Prosecutor Kidnapped, Throat Slit." (NEXIS)

         Revue des Droits de L'Homme [Algiers]. January 1993. No. 2. Text by Rezag Bara, President of the National Human Rights Monitoring Body (Observatoire National des Droits de L'Homme), presented to a conference in Madrid on human rights and democratization in the Arab World, 25 April 1992.

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         Time [New York]. 10 April 1995b. Laura Marlowe. "Forgetting Journalists."

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