Religion and Conflict

 

1.   INTRODUCTION

The politicization of religion in Nigeria is a phenomenon that has been many years in the making. Since Nigeria gained independence from Britain in 1960, the issue of regional or ethnic power-sharing has become increasingly a struggle between Christians and Muslims (Hunwick Nov. 1992, 143).

Despite the secular nature of the Nigerian state, professed in the various constitutions under which the country has been governed since its independence, northern leaders have stressed Islam in order to maintain unity in the face of political, economic and social change (Bienen 1989, 171-172). Economic change, which brought with it the transformation of Nigeria's economy from agricultural dependence to a dependence on petroleum, resulted in the centralization of the country's resources. Many observers believe that religion was and continues to be manipulated to create and exacerbate conflict. This idea is seen by some as part of a wider strategy of the elite to acquire political influence and economic control over the country's resources (Journal of Modern African Studies 1991c, 127). Others have partially attributed the recent escalation of religious conflict to the machinations of opposition segments of the national elite. They argue that, in an attempt to challenge the status quo, disgruntled politicians may have taken advantage of popular discontent and frustration with prevailing socio-economic conditions which are the result of homegrown or IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes (Gambari 1992, 96-97).

Whatever the underlying reasons for the current religious crisis, certain government actions, particularly in recent years, have been perceived by Christians as furthering the Islamization of the country (Libération 13-14 Jan. 1990, 37). Most of the violence has occurred in the Muslim-dominated north, where it is reported that Christians are often denied educational privileges, public preaching is forbidden and churches have been destroyed by radical Muslims (Christianity Today 22 June 1992, 67).

Religious affiliation has sometimes served as a criterion for receiving government benefits (Hunwick Nov. 1992, 147). The government has also been accused of interfering in the religious conflict as a way to divert attention from other matters (Ransome-Kuti Mar. 1992, 11).

It is not always clear whether religious violence in Nigeria has been the cause of political involvement in religious affairs or its consequence. Some government critics have blamed the military for exacerbating the tension by failing to improve the economy (The Christian Science Monitor 30 July 1992, 24A). In the past, when violence has erupted and threatened the country's stability, President Ibrahim Babangida's military government has not hesitated to use force (Africa Watch Oct. 1991, 43). Babangida is now committed to hand over power on 27 August 1993 (presidential elections for the Third Republic take place on 12 June 1993) (West Africa 23-29 Nov. 1992, 2013), and it remains to be seen how the new civilian government will make religion part of domestic and foreign policy, and how it will react if it perceives that its own stability is threatened as a result of religious conflict.

1.1   Background

The Federal Republic of Nigeria is situated on the Atlantic coast of West Africa, bordered by the French-speaking republics of Benin to the west, Niger to the north, Chad to the northeast and Cameroon to the east. Although English is the country's official language, 1963 census figures (the most recent available) show that the most widely spoken languages are Hausa (20.9 percent), Yoruba (20.3 percent), Ibo (16.6 percent) and Fulani (8.6 percent) (Europa 1992 1992, 2074).

Census results from 1991 indicate that Nigeria's population is just over 88.5 million (Ibid., 2079), making Nigeria the most populous country in Africa. Over 250 ethnic groups have been identified in the country, of which the following 10 account for 80 percent of Nigeria's population: Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba, Ibo (or Igbo), Kanuri, Tiv, Edo, Nupe, Ibibio and Ijaw (Africa South of the Sahara 1991 1990, 772).

According to the 1963 data, 49 percent of the population (then totalling 55 million) was Muslim, 34 percent Christian and 17 percent animist. (Animists attribute a living soul to plants, inanimate objects, and natural phenomena.) While it is estimated that the number of animists has decreased dramatically as a result of conversion campaigns on the part of both Christians and Muslims, it is more difficult, if not impossible, to say which of the latter two groups has gained more converts in recent years (Hunwick Nov. 1992, 146). Some estimates put Christianity and Islam on an equal footing, evenly sharing 90 percent of the country's population (Africa News 8-21 June 1992, 8); others place Christianity ahead by a narrow margin (Nwankwor June 1989, 158); and some observers estimate that 50 to 55 percent of the population is Muslim, and only 35 percent Christian (Bienen 1989, 173). What is more certain is that Nigeria has one of the largest Muslim populations outside of the Middle East. Approximately 70 percent of the population in the former Northern Region and between 20 and 30 percent in the south, namely in the southwestern Yoruba-speaking states, follow the Islamic faith (Gambari 1992, 86-87). Although Christianity is the dominant religion in the southern regions, there are strong Christian minorities in the northern part of Nigeria as well. In the words of Ibrahim Gambari, author of "The Role of Religion in National Life: Reflections on Recent Experiences in Nigeria," "the religious divide in Nigeria ... is unbalanced regionally" (Ibid).

Most of the violent religious conflict in Nigeria has taken place in the northern part of the country, which is considered to be less developed economically than the south (Ibid., 97). Of equal importance is the fact that Nigerian unity has been disrupted due to intra-religious as well as inter-religious conflict. Groups exhibiting fundamentalist tendencies have emerged in both Islamic and Christian camps (Ohadike 1992, 104-113).

1.2 History

The roots of the religious conflict in Nigeria today can be traced as far back as 1947, the year the country was founded and a constitution was introduced establishing a federal system of government. According to The Europa World Year Book 1992, the federal arrangement was an attempt to reconcile regional and religious tensions, and to accommodate the interests of Nigeria's diverse ethnic groups: mainly the Ibo (in the east), the Yoruba (in the west) and the Hausa and Fulani (in the north). The Northern region, whose inhabitants were mainly Muslims, contained about one-half of Nigeria's total population (1992, 2074).

In the eyes of some, the "Richards" Constitution, as it became known, was also an attempt to quell demands for self-government and thereby delay the move towards independence from Britain (Africa South of the Sahara 1991 1990, 772).

Two issues in particular have contributed to a widespread belief on the part of Christians that Nigeria is increasingly becoming an Islamic state. The first is the 1977 Sharia debate (see section 1.2.2); the second, the 1986 issue over Nigeria's membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) (see section 1.2.3). Underlying both were much broader issues, including the spread of Saudi Arabian and Western cultural imperialism, as well as the resurgence of fundamentalist and reformist ideologies (Ohadike 1992, 119). The installation of an Islamic republic in Iran in 1979 and the rise of Muslim fundamentalism in a number of other countries have had an indirect impact on the religious situation in Nigeria. Not only has much Iranian Shiite literature been distributed in the country, but a number of Nigerian Muslim groups, particularly one of the splinter groups of the Muslim Students Society, have become more insistent on the implementation of Sharia law (Islamic law) in the country and on the establishment of an Islamic state (Hunwick Nov. 1992, 152). Although both the Sharia and the OIC debates reflected a crisis in the Nigerian state, the most serious manifestation of Christian resentment of perceived growing state domination by Muslims was the attempted 1990 intra-army coup (see section 1.2.4) (Ibid., 153).

1.2.1    The Nigerian Civil War

By the time independence was achieved on 1 October 1960, Nigeria was a federal state comprising three regions, North, West and East, with a government based on the British parliamentary system at both the federal and regional levels. A fourth region, the Midwest, was carved out of the Western region in 1963. During this first period of independent, civilian rule, politics at the centre were dominated by northern-based, Muslim-led parties, and federal control "was considered to be the key to economic development, jobs, and educational opportunity among the constituencies that voted the politicians into power" (Hunwick Nov. 1992, 146-147).

The First Republic (1960-1966) was marked by a struggle for political power between the regions, but the politics were never played in explicitly religious terms (Ibid., 147). In 1963, however, in an attempt to consolidate political power in the Northern Region, the then premier of northern Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello, launched a conversion campaign to Islamize the Christian and animist populations of the North and the Middle Belt (Ibrahim 1989, 78).

On 15 January 1966, in the context of an increasingly intense power-struggle between the regions, a number of junior army officers, primarily of Ibo ethnicity, assassinated Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a federal minister and the premiers of the Northern and Western Regions. The officers who perpetrated the coup insisted that their actions were provoked by government corruption and civilian attempts to politicize the army. Most of those killed, however, were non-Ibos (Africa South of the Sahara 1991 1990, 774).

Fearing Eastern, Ibo dominance of the political scene, northerners staged a counter-coup on 29 July 1966, killed the Ibo head of state, General Aguiyi-Ironsi, and replaced him with Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon. Gowon was a Christian from the plateau area of the Middle Belt, but his northern roots made him acceptable to the northern political elite. Although he initially restored some degree of discipline to the army, Gowon was unable to prevent the systematic massacre of Ibos in the north in September and October of 1966 by northern army elements (Ibid.). In an attempt to divert ethnic tension and diffuse regional political power in the federation, Gowon replaced the four regions with twelve states (Hunwick Nov. 1992, 148.). This was not enough. In May 1967, the military governor of the Eastern Region, Lieutenant-Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, mandated by the Ibo consultative assembly, declared the secession of the Eastern Region of Nigeria and proclaimed the independent Republic of Biafra (Africa South of the Sahara 1991 1990, 775) .

During the ensuing civil war, which lasted from July 1967 to January 1970, Biafran war propaganda tried to paint the invasion of the Nigerian federal army as an Islamic jihad against Christians (Hunwick Nov. 1992, 148). According to John Hunwick, author of "An African Case Study of Political Islam: Nigeria," however, the propaganda was misleading; the war was really about retaining a Nigerian federation--very much in the interest of the landlocked Muslim majority states and ethnic minorities in all areas--and federal control over the prime economic asset, oil, of which the former Eastern Region had an abundance (Nov. 1992, 148).

In the end, the Biafran secessionist forces were defeated.

Over time, Gowon's attempt to strengthen the federal system by dividing Nigeria's four regions into 12 states, coupled with similar moves establishing 19 states in 1976, helped only to accentuate ethnic differences (Bach 1989, 19). Not only did these attempts at reorganization weaken national unity, but they opened the door for the use of religion as a tool to form a political constituency transcending both ethnic and state boundaries (Hunwick Nov. 1992, 148).

1.2.2 Status of Sharia

In 1977, a series of debates was held in the newly created Constituent Assembly to discuss the creation of Sharia courts of appeal at the federal level. Sharia courts are confined to essentially personal matters (Ibid., 149) and are supposed to be used only on the agreement of both parties (Africa Watch Oct. 1991, 25). A Sharia court of appeal, similar to the one proposed in the Constituent Assembly, had existed in the Northern Region until 1967, before the division of the four regions into 12 states (Journal of Modern African Studies 1982, 411).

The proposal for such a federal court was met with a storm of protest. Christian members of the Assembly argued that such a court privileged Islamic law; Muslim members countered that denying Sharia rights at the federal level was tantamount to discrimination. In the end, a compromise was reached calling for three Federal Court of Appeal judges "versed in Islamic law" to decide on cases sent to the court by state Sharia courts of appeal (Hunwick Nov. 1992, 149).

The debate over the Sharia court reflected the split between northerners and southerners, and, with the exception of the Yoruba group, which has both Christian and Muslim adherents, the debate also reflected divisions between ethnic-religious communities (Bienen 1989, 172). As David Laitin, author of "The Sharia Debate and the Origins of Nigeria's Second Republic," noted, it also symbolically represented "the North exerting its influence on the constitution of the state to position itself against the economic and administrative power of the South" (Journal of Modern African Studies 1982, 413). Finally, the debate served northern political interests whose power bases had been threatened by the division of the country into a greater number of states. According to Jibrin Ibrahim, author of "The Politics of Religion in Nigeria: The Parameters of the 1987 Crisis in Kaduna State," since that debate in the late 1970s, the northern elite has "increasingly come to use religion as a tool to forge a new hegemonic coalition" (1989, 81).

Significantly, the debate over the status of Sharia was not laid to rest in 1977. The issue heated up once again in the Constituent Assembly inaugurated in May 1988 to discuss constitutional proposals for the Third Republic. The work of the Assembly became paralyzed as a result of the Sharia debates and continued only after Babangida ordered the Assembly to stop discussing the matter and announced that he would make the final decision (Journal of Modern African Studies 1991c, 131).

There is little doubt that the Sharia issue will once again resurface. In an interview with Christianity Today (22 June 1992, 67), Nigerian Anglican bishop Josiah Idowu-Fearon claimed that Nigerian Christians are being held subject to Sharia courts in both the Northern and Middle Belt regions. Other sources, however, have not been able to corroborate the matter. If the bishop is right, then it is only time before the Sharia issue reaches critical proportions once again.

1.2.3              Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)

In 1986, religious tensions escalated further when rumours surfaced that Nigeria went from observer status to full membership in the OIC, an international Muslim association. Without explicitly confirming the rumour, President Babangida established a special panel--the Advisory Council on Religious Affairs--which included both Muslims and Christians, to examine the implications of membership (Africa Watch Oct. 1991, 43).

The OIC issue motivated Christians in the country to suggest there was a conspiracy to turn Nigeria into an Islamic state (Ohadike 1992, 118). (Ohadike notes that there was some opposition to Nigeria's membership in the OIC on the part of Muslims in the country (1992, 118). The special panel's report was not released, and it was not until August 1991 that Babangida reportedly announced that Nigeria had suspended its membership in the OIC, following a recommendation of the Advisory Council on Religious Affairs (Africa Watch Oct. 1991, 43).

1.2.4                Intra-Army Coup

On 22 April 1990, a number of junior army officers attacked the presidential palace and seized the headquarters of the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria. The leader of the attempted coup, Major Gideon Orka, broadcast a message following the takeover of the radio station in which he claimed to be speaking on behalf of the people of the Middle Belt and Southern Regions of Nigeria. He stated that the predominantly Muslim states of Sokoto, Borno, Katsina, Kano and Bauchi would be "excised" from the federation. Within a matter of hours, however, the coup was suppressed, and 300 military personnel, including Orka, and over 30 civilians were arrested. Orka and 41 other prisoners were eventually executed, while a number of others received prison sentences (Africa South of the Sahara 1991 1990, 784). A number of Christian leaders were also arrested and detained after the unsuccessful coup, while two leaders of the Christian Association of Nigeria were charged with unlawful assembly after staging a march to a government house. Babangida cautioned religious leaders against the abuse of the constitutional right to free speech to engender negative sentiments. In August 1990, all religious meetings and texts were banned from state government buildings (Africa Watch Oct. 1991, 43).

There is much evidence to suggest that Orka and his supporters were convinced that both political power and economic resources were distributed unevenly in favour of Muslims in the north (Journal of Modern African Studies 1991c, 135). According to Julius Ihonvbere, author of "A Critical Evaluation of the Failed 1990 Coup in Nigeria," however, they underestimated the degree of linkage between northern and southern political and economic interests, and failed to recognize that the attempted coup would probably not be supported by a "corrupt and dependent" elite in the south (Journal of Modern African Studies 1991a, 624).

2.          RELIGIOUS CONFLICT

Although the incidence of both intra-religious and inter-religious conflict has been growing since the 1980s, it is the latter which has been more violent in recent years and, perhaps, more of a threat to the stability of the country. (The most notable incident of intra-religious, namely Intra- Islamic, violence occurred in 1980 in Kano following the preachings of a Cameroonian preacher by the name of Alhaji Muhammad Marwa, nicknamed Maitatsine by his followers.

Maitatsine's preachings were antagonistic to Muslims outside of his community (Hunwick 1992, 154). It is reported that at least 5,000 people, including Maitatsine, were killed in clashes with the police and army. Maitatsine disturbances recurred in Kaduna in 1982, Yola in 1984, Maiduguri in 1985 and Funtua in 1993 (Ibrahim 1989, 71-72; Reuters 22 Jan. 1993).)

2.1                Kaduna State (1987)

The first major outburst of inter-religious violence since the OIC debate took place in March 1987 in Kaduna state, following an address by Christian preacher Abubakar Bako to students of the Advanced Teachers College at Kafanchan. A quarrel erupted between members of the Fellowship of Christian Students and the Muslim Students Society following the alleged misrepresentation of the Qur'an by the preacher. In the ensuing violence that spread to the towns of Katsina, Funtua, Zaria, Kankia, Daura and Kaduna, it is reported that up to 19 people were killed, and 5 mosques and 152 churches were destroyed, along with a number of other buildings (Ibrahim 1989, 65-67). In the wake of the disturbances, the Kaduna government instituted a ban, reportedly still in effect, on all religious organizations on post-primary campuses (Country Reports 1991 1992, 295).

Jibrin Ibrahim has gone to great lengths to show that the crisis was the result not only of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the country, but of the manipulation of fundamentalist images over time by the northern elite (1989, 67-71). Significantly, the violence erupted in an area where it is reported that Christians are in the majority, yet political power is in the hands of the Muslim minority (Ibid.). The violence allegedly spread due to the failure of the government to react during the heat of the crisis and due to the role played by the pro-northern and pro-orthodox Islamic media of Kaduna state in emphasizing an "anti-Islamic reign of terror" in Kafanchan (Ibid., 68-69).

2.2       Katsina State (1991)

Religious rioting broke out again in April and May 1991. Following the publication of a cartoon of the Prophet Mohammed and Jesus Christ in the publication Fun Times--ironically a subsidiary of the government-owned Daily Times--a leading figure of the "fundamentalist" Islamic Movement of Nigeria, Mallam Yakubu Yahaya, and some of his followers, ransacked the offices of the Daily Times and set them ablaze. Approximately 10,000 Muslims demonstrated in the city of Katsina in support of Yahaya after the Christian governor of Katsina state, Colonel John Madaki, threatened him with arrest and summary execution if the group was caught creating trouble in the future (Africa Confidential 17 May 1991, 1, 2; Africa Events June 1991, 36; Africa Watch Oct. 1991, 44).

A demonstration which took place on 19 April turned violent when an effigy of Madaki was burnt in protest, and police arrived and fired tear-gas into the crowd. One police officer was reportedly beaten to death and 6 others were injured (Africa Watch Oct. 1991, 44). The government arrested over 150 people involved in the April riots and ordered a special military tribunal to try those involved in the violence (Africa Confidential 17 May 1991, 1). The arrests allegedly followed Shiite demands for the imposition of Sharia law (Libération 25 Apr. 1991, 48).

In the wake of the disturbances, at least 61 individuals out of the total arrested were released (BBC 27 Apr. 1991, 43). The government established a tribunal to investigate the events and to try those charged with rioting and criminal conspiracy. Yahaya was eventually sentenced to six months and 18 months on two counts of conspiracy and rioting respectively; 47 others were given prison sentences ranging from three to six months. Those sentenced alleged ill-treatment by the authorities (Africa Watch Oct 1991, 46).

2.3      Bauchi State (1991)

On 21 April 1991, only two days after the Katsina riot, further riots erupted in Tafawa Balewa, a predominantly Christian enclave in the mainly Muslim state of Bauchi (Africa Confidential 17 May 1991, 1-2). The spark that ignited the violence was a dispute between Muslims and Christians over the use of a municipal abattoir. Muslims in the town were opposed to Christians using the abattoir to slaughter pigs and dogs. Christians refused a local government proposal to slaughter their animals at a different location (EGLISI 17 June 1991, 237). According to the BBC, "some 48 people were killed in the ensuing battles between the Muslims of the town and the Christians" (23 Apr. 1991). The riots spread to the state capital of Bauchi on 22 April, when people, largely from the mostly Muslim quarter, were enraged by the sight of Muslim bodies in the morgue (Ibid.,). By 23 April 1991, after 160 people had been reportedly killed, the federal government called in the army to bring the situation under control, "ruthlessly if need be" (Africa Watch Oct. 1991, 45).

Numerous violations by the security forces were reported, and it has been suggested that, had the police acted promptly, the situation would not have deteriorated to such an extreme (Ibid.). There was even widespread suspicion that a new "private" army had participated (Africa Events June 1991, 38).

(Africa Watch notes that in 1989, Babangida announced that he was forming a National Guard which would be under his supervision, "in order to better control crime and terrorism." It is reported that rumours circulated at the time of the announcement that the National Guard was to be Babangida's "private army" (1991, 29). It is not clear whether this army is the same as the one mentioned in the Africa Events article.) By the time it was over, the official death toll indicated that 80 people had been killed as a result of the riots. Other reports, however, suggest that up to 1,000 may have died (Africa Watch Oct. 1991, 45).

Although the riots were sparked by the use of the abattoir, other issues may have contributed. Africa Watch has suggested that the riots may have resulted from a political argument over control of a district inhabited by rival ethnic groups (Ibid., 44). According to an article in Africa Events (June 1991, 38), the riots were probably provoked by the election of a Christian candidate as chairman of the Tafawa Balewa local government. The Sayawa, one of two tribal groupings in Bauchi state that are predominantly Christian, may have reasoned that

if they could elect a Christian as chairman, they were now of age and they could get rid of the Muslims in their midst. . . . The riot clearly sought to destroy this [economic] dominance, at least in the case of the Hausa-Fulani, almost completely (Ibid).

An article in Africa Confidential advances a different theory for the riots (17 May 1991, 2). According to diplomats in Lagos, many demonstrators had apparently been bribed to riot, pillage and kill. These bribes may have been paid to demonstrators by "old-breed" politicians who had not been allowed to contest the aforementioned elections due to government rules, or by "new-breed" politicians of the National Republican Convention (NRC) hoping to prompt a Christian exodus from the region (Ibid.). A much "simpler" analysis of the causes behind the conflict has been advanced by another observer, who points out that the control over cattle farming, and therefore slaughtering, is in the hands of the Muslim Hausa-Fulani. The perceived economic loss on the part of the Hausa-Fulani as a result of Christians using the abattoir to slaughter their own animals, may explain some of the anger and perhaps fear that resulted in the violence (Hunwick, 15 Dec. 1992).

2.4                Kano State (1991)

The third large-scale incident of religious violence in 1991 took place on 14 October, when riots broke out in the mainly Muslim city of Kano, the largest city in northern Nigeria. The riots followed a Muslim demonstration protesting the fact that permission had been granted for the visit of Reinhard Bonnke, a German Christian evangelist. A similar tour by a South African Muslim preacher had been banned earlier (Africa Research Bulletin 1-31 Oct. 1991, 10316).

In the ensuing violence, Muslims attacked the Sabom Gari neighbourhood of mainly Ibo Christian immigrants, destroying cars, markets, houses and a church. Although the government imposed a curfew on the first day, the army was not deployed until the second day of rioting. By that time, Christians had gone on the offensive with automatic and other weapons (Africa Watch 21 Apr. 1992, 25). At least one source has indicated that Muslims were caught "off guard" by well-organized Christian vigilante groups which were "waiting" for the attack (AFP 1 Feb. 1992). The Nigerian Tribune reportedly stated that 300 people were killed (Libération 17 Oct. 1991, 53). It is not clear how many of those killed were Muslim and how many were Christian. According to Africa Watch (21 Apr. 1992, 25), many people fled south in an exodus that continued for months.

( According to an officer with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva, the UNHCR was not aware of any large-scale displacement of people as a result of the conflict (15 Dec. 1992). The Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDHR) in Nigeria, while noting that some people did move either temporarily or permanently as a result of the conflict, could not indicate how many individuals or families may have been involved (CDHR 15 Dec. 1992).) Both Muslims and Christians have accused the authorities of doing nothing to prevent the situation after having been forewarned of the possibility that riots would take place (AFP 1 Feb. 1992).

2.5     Kaduna State (1992)

The worst "religious" fighting in 1992 took place in the northern state of Kaduna during the month of May. (At least two other incidents of religious violence have taken place in 1992. The first one occurred on 5 January 1992 in Katsina after a group of Islamic fundamentalists attempted to welcome the release from prison of their colleagues who had been arrested following the April 1991 riots in Katsina. By 8 January 1992, at least 10 people had died in clashes with the police and 263 were arrested (Africa Watch 21 Apr. 1992). The second incident occurred in Jalingo, capital of the northeastern state of Taraba. In a dispute which started over the use of a water reservoir by both Christian and Muslim students at a girls' school, 15 people were killed and about 60 buildings, including Churches and Mosques, were destroyed (AFP 15 Mar. 1992).) In the town of Zango-Kataf, a long-standing dispute over land between the predominantly Christian Kataf and Muslim Hausa ethnic groups erupted into "widespread killing" (The Washington Post 20 May 1992). Clashes broke out after Katafs allegedly destroyed yam plants belonging to the Hausas in the town of Ungwan-Rohongo. The incident took place only months after a similar incident between Katafs and Hausas over the relocation of a market in the same town (West Africa 31 May 1992).

Interestingly, both Aboucar Gumi, a founding leader of the fundamentalist Muslim Izala sect, and Peter Jatau, Kaduna's Roman Catholic Archbishop, reportedly indicated that the violence spread to Kaduna when the army brought Muslim bodies from Zango-Kataf (or Zangon-Kataf) to incite an angry Muslim response. Gumi argued further that the violence was sparked by lower-ranking persons in the army who do not wish the military government to hand over power to civilians (The Christian Science Monitor 28 May 1992). Combatants allegedly used automatic weapons, arrows and cutlasses (The Washington Post 20 May 1992). The violence also spread to the town of Zaria (Reuters 18 May 1992). Up to 400 people may have been killed, and 247 people were arrested (The Christian Science Monitor 28 May 1992). Once again, it is unclear how many of the dead were Christians and how many were Muslims.

Western diplomatic sources indicated after the conflict that, despite its religious manifestation, the principal issue was one of power. Although Zango-Kataf is a largely Christian community, political decision-making is dominated by Muslims, since the village is located in the traditional domain of the Muslim emir of Zaria, Alhaji Shehu Idris (Ibid.). It is also reported that, despite the fact that Christian Katafs have fought sporadic battles to have their superior numbers recognized in the political hierarchy, a Muslim has always been appointed to lead the community (Ibid.). According to The Washington Post (20 May 1992), analysts described the Kataf-Hausa clashes as "a struggle for political supremacy before legislative and presidential elections are held under the military government's program for transition to civilian rule." Allegedly, the fighting followed a voter registration drive conducted by the National Electoral Commission (Ibid.). (A similar conflict, but of much larger magnitude, erupted in the state of Taraba seven months earlier between the Tiv and Jukun, both groups largely Christian, leaving up to 5,000 dead (The Washington Post 20 May 1992).)

2.6  Katsina State (1993)

The worst fighting linked to religion since the May 1992 Zango-Kataf incident, took place in the northern town of Funtua, Katsina State in February 1993. Clashes erupted and continued for two days following a dispute between Maitatsine followers referred to as the Kalakato, and Muslim street traders known as the Almajiri (Reuters 22 Jan. 1993; Ibid., 23 Jan. 1993). The dispute allegedly started in response to a disagreement over doctrinal issues between members of the two groups and worsened when an Almajiri was reportedly held and "manhandled" by the Kalakato (Ibid.).

Up to 100 people, including 2 police officers, were killed in the clashes and many more were wounded (Reuters 22 Jan. 1993). Approximately 300 foreigners were deported to Niger by the government in connection with the riots (Xinhua 15 Feb. 1993). The deportations allegedly followed security reports indicating that foreigners were "fuelling religious riots in the country" (Ibid.).

3.              THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

A number of tools have been employed by the military government to try cases involving religious conflict and violence. The most notable of these is the 1987 decree on civil disturbances. A brief overview of the legal system in general will serve to put the human rights context into perspective.

The Constitution of Nigeria recognizes the following six superior courts: the Supreme Court of Nigeria; the Court of Appeal; the Federal High Court; the State High Court; the Sharia Court of Appeal of a State; and the Customary Court of Appeal of a State. As well, a number of Inferior Courts are also recognized by the constitution, including Area Courts (which exist only in northern states and in the Federal Capital Territory, Customary Courts (which exist only in southern states), and Magistrate Courts. All are vested with original criminal jurisdiction (Africa Watch Oct. 1991, 20, 21).

A study by the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, conducted in 1990, found that problems with the Nigerian legal system include police brutality, corruption of lawyers and judges, trial delays, the use of untrained personnel and abysmal prison conditions. Furthermore, the length of time that suspects are held in pre-trial detention is considered to be one of the major problems with the justice system in the country (Ibid.).

According to Country Reports 1991, under the 1989 Constitution of Nigeria, the criminally accused should stand trial within three months, however, "many detainees and prisoners [are] being held for protracted periods, sometimes years, without charge or trial" (1992, 288).

Not only has the military interfered directly in the appointment and dismissal of judges (Ibid. 19-20), but a number of special courts outside of the ordinary legal system have been used since 1984 to expedite the trial of certain offences under less rigorous procedures (Amnesty International Feb. 1989, 6). In an interview with an officer of the High Commission of Nigeria in Ottawa (10 Dec. 1992), the officer indicated that special tribunals are used in cases where a "speedy" trial is necessary due to the "seriousness" of the situation. Cases of such a nature might include instances where a large number of lives have been lost, or where the security of the state has been perceived to be threatened (Ibid.).

An article in the Constitutional Rights Journal notes that suspects appearing before these special tribunals are often "intimidated and cojoled [sic] into entering pleas of guilt" in the hope of receiving reduced sentences (Dec. 1990, 9). Furthermore, those individuals who refuse to plead guilty may find themselves in prison custody while the trial is adjourned, sometimes for several months. It is also reported that some proceedings take place without the presence of legal counsel for suspects (Ibid.).

Following the 1987 Kaduna riots, the government promulgated Decree No. 2, also known as the Civil Disturbances Decree. (This is not to be confused with State Security Decree No. 2 of 1984 on the detention of persons without trial. For more information on this decree please refer to Africa Watch Oct.1991, 14-17; Civil Liberties Organization Apr. 1991, 36-37.)

The decree established a special federal court--the Civil Disturbances Special Tribunal--with jurisdiction over a number of offences under the Criminal and Penal Codes, including the capital offences of treason and murder (Amnesty International Feb. 1989, 12). Other offences covered by the Decree include: unlawful assembly, demolition of buildings during riots, insults to a religion, disturbing religious worship, membership in unlawful societies, and arson (BBC Summary 2 Apr. 1987). The tribunal, chaired by a Supreme Court judge, convicted 75 people between June 1987 and January 1988. They were sentenced to terms of imprisonment, and, under the Decree, had no right to appeal (Amnesty International Feb. 1989, 12).

More recently, a retired army General and Christian leader of Kataf origin, Zamani Lekwot, was arrested following the February and May 1992 Zango-Kataf clashes. He was detained without trial under Decree No. 2 of 1984. Along with five other Christians of Kataf origin, Lekwot was brought to trial on four charges, including unlawful assembly with intent to subjugate the Hausa Community in Zango-Kataf (CDHR 16 Oct. 1992, 1; ISHR Nov. 1992, 3).

Although all detainees were released when no evidence was found linking them to the offences, they were rearrested and detained in Kaduna prisons. On 4 September 1992, the government prepared a new 22-count charge for offences ranging from unlawful assembly to disturbing the peace and culpable homicide, the latter of which is punishable by death. According to the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDHR), Lekwot was tried

for being a non-violent vocal leader of the Katafs and a minority Christian leader. [...] It is on record that while all the leaders and innocent Katafs were arrested and hurriedly hounded into detention, none of the Hausa Fulani, who engineered and ignited the riot, has been arrested (16 Oct. 1992, 1).

Despite efforts to halt the tribunal proceedings on the basis that, due to the Muslim composition of the tribunal, a fair trial cannot be guaranteed for the detainees, and that the charges are triable in regular courts, the Kaduna High Court refused to grant an injunction. The ruling was upheld by the Appeal Court on 20 November 1992 (CLO 2 Dec. 1992). Lekwot and five other persons were handed death sentences on 2 February 1993 (Africa Watch 3 Feb. 1993).

4.  FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

The current religious crisis in Nigeria has been traced to a number of often complex and intricately linked causes. The rise of religious fundamentalism, particularly that of Islam, coupled with the manipulation of religious sentiment by elements of the political and economic elite, as well as the involvement of local, regional and federal levels of the government in particular religious situations, have all contributed to the escalation of a conflict that, until the mid-1980s, had not really posed a threat to the stability of the nation. This is evinced not only by an increase in the number of inter-religious conflicts witnessed in recent years, but by the growing number of those killed, and by the introduction of more sophisticated, namely automatic, weapons. The government's reaction time following outbursts of violence, coupled with the subsequent crack-downs on religious leaders, have only helped to aggravate the situation. To some, such as the President of the Nigerian Civil Liberties Organization, it is no surprise that the presidential elections, originally scheduled for 5 December 1992, will now not take place until 12 June 1993 (The Christian Science Monitor 19 Nov. 1992).

In October 1989, in an attempt to create "a new social order," Babangida announced that two parties would be established by fiat, and that no other parties would be allowed to contest the forthcoming elections (Journal of Modern African Studies 1991b, 213). The parties, namely the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC), would be, in the words of Babangida, "a little to the left," and "a little to the right" respectively (Ibid., 228). (Ironically, the organizations were almost immediately nicknamed the Southern Democratic Party and the Northern Republican Convention respectively (Oyediran 1991, 232).)

Although there is evidence to show that both parties have managed to cut across religious, ethnic, and regional cleavages as Babangida had originally hoped (Ibid., 231), some analysts have been quick to point out that the government move to limit political competition to two parties may, in the long run, exacerbate these cleavages (Journal of Modern African Studies 1989, 22). If the parties do polarize and become vehicles for the expression of southern, primarily Christian, and northern, primarily Muslim, interests respectively, and cleavages are indeed exacerbated, the stability of the country may be threatened. Such a scenario might lead to the displacement of a large number of people, particularly in the north, where most of the violence has taken place so far.

While the Constitution of Nigeria entitles nationals to move freely throughout the country and take up residence wherever they wish (Country Reports 1991 1992, 295), in reality this is rendered impractical by the fact that persons not indigenous to their state of residence frequently experience difficulty in such things as finding employment and enrolling children in schools of their choice (Ibid., 298). Furthermore, despite the fact that ethnic and regional hiring quotas are used in employment for the public sector, it is reported that considerable pressure remains on individual government officials to favour their own religious or ethnic groups (Ibid.).

No matter what happens with the upcoming elections, it is clear that the prognosis for the future of the country is not, at least for the moment, very bright. One issue, in particular, will no doubt determine the extent to which individuals in the country allow themselves to be manipulated by the ruling elite, and by religious elements of a fundamentalist nature both inside and outside the country. It is of no small significance that the escalation of the violence coincided with a deterioration of the terms of trade of the Nigerian economy. The fall in world oil prices in the 1980s, a crippling external debt, rampant inflation fuelled by the devaluation of the country's currency, and the severe economic austerity measures of the IMF have all contributed to inter-religious, as well as other, antagonisms (Hunwick 1992, 4-5). Unless the Nigerian economy improves in the near future, and people are allowed to have the kind of economic freedom necessary to channel their energy and attention into more productive directions, religious conflict will not subside, and may very well escalate.

5. APPENDIX: MAP

See original

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