The North

1.   INTRODUCTION

On 18 May 1991, the Somali National Movement (SNM), taking advantage of the chaos which followed the capture of Mogadishu by the "rebels" of the United Somali Congress (USC), declared an independent Republic of Somaliland (The Indian Ocean Newsletter 25 May 1991; Africa Confidential 14 June 1991). Although its leaders "have been criss-crossing the Arab world, Europe and Africa in search of international recognition," to date no country has indicated a desire to establish permanent diplomatic relations with the new republic, which has even been described as a "phantom nation" (Jeune Afrique 28 May-3 June 1992). Furthermore, United Nations documents normally refer to the North of Somalia rather than to the Republic of Somaliland (Ryle 1992, 20).

Formerly a British colony, the North of Somalia occupies an area of 176,120 square kilometres (Jeune Afrique 28 May-3 June 1992, 14) and is made up of five regions: Awdal, Waqoyi Galbeed, Togdheer, Sanaag and Sool. Five clans have traditionally inhabited these regions: the Warsengele and Dulbahante (Darood), the Isaaq, the Gadabursi and the Issa. The population of this new state, the capital of which is Hargeisa, is estimated to be under two million (Jeune Afrique 16-22 Apr. 1992). To this population must be added the thousands of refugees or expatriates who are originally from the region and have returned from neighbouring countries (Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the Gulf states) (Jeune Afrique 28 May-3 June 1992). The "national" flag of the new state is composed of a green circle on a white background, surrounded by the inscription, in Arabic, "There is no God but God and Mohammed is the prophet of God" (Ibid.).

Despite the disastrous state of the economy and the social dislocation, which are largely a result of the civil war, some observers have described the situation in the North as "relatively calm" and "more peaceful and harmonious than elsewhere in the country" (PHR Spring 1992, 7). But is this really the case today? To better understand the situation, a brief review of the historical background is in order.

2.      THE NORTH UNDER SIAD BARRE

Three major reasons demonstrate why the clans in the North, particularly the Isaaq, rose up against the Siad Barre regime: the refugee problem, the deterioration of the economic situation and the government's human rights record.

Immediately following what is known as the Ogaden war, the North experienced a massive influx of Ethiopian refugees, the vast majority of whom were ethnic Somalis (primarily of the Ogaden clan). The scarcity of available sites, particularly sites with adequate water supplies, prompted the authorities to concentrate the refugees in camps located near existing built-up areas or along communication routes. This situation created considerable friction between the local populace and the refugees. As a result of the international aid provided to them, the refugees are in fact better off than the local herdsmen, who have been hard hit by the drought. Tensions between the two clans also increased when the government created a militia composed almost exclusively of refugees from the Ogaden clan. Officially, the militia was formed to fight the Ethiopian enemy alongside the Western Somali Liberation Front; in effect, it conducted clan vendettas against the local populace. The consequences of this situation were particularly difficult for the Isaaq, who were greatly angered by the intrusive presence of refugees of another clan affiliation in a region which they claimed as their own.

The second reason for the uprising against the Siad Barre regime was the deterioration of the national economy, particularly in the North. A letter from Isaaq elders, delivered to President Siad Barre in March 1982, pointed to the lack of major economic projects in the region. The letter stated that, unlike in the south, there had been virtually no industrialization in the North (the only project under way at that point was a cement factory in Berbera). In 1983, the economy of the region suffered a serious blow from the sudden closing of the Saudi market for Somali cattle exports, which accounted for 80 percent of Somalia's export income and which were shipped largely through the port at Berbera. The marked economic disparity between the North and the south resulted from a concentration of power in Mogadishu, in the former Italian colony, and the clan favouritism shown by the Siad Barre government toward his own Marehan clan and native region south of Mogadishu.

The third reason is the government's human rights record. For example, in 1981, a group of intellectuals in Hargeisa attempted to renovate the city's hospital as a community self-help project, with the support of a German NGO; they were sentenced to lengthy prison terms. The solidarity exhibited for this group by the entire population of the city, and particularly by students who demonstrated in the streets of Hargeisa during their trial in February 1982, was forcibly suppressed by the military police. Five people were killed during the demonstration and hundreds of others were arrested. Many subsequently gave their support to the SNM rebels. After peace accords were signed by Presidents Mengistu and Siad Barre in April 1988, the SNM took action and launched a massive attack on the cities of Burao and Hargeisa. The government responded with mass executions, heavy artillery bombardment and aerial bombings. The refugees who were attempting to flee the combat by heading for the Ethiopian border were not spared from the bombing. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) counted 400,000 Somali refugees in Ethiopia following these events.

The SNM was itself involved in numerous human rights violations and committed atrocities, as evidenced by massacres of non-Isaaq families. The targeted populations did not forget the toll taken. According to Gersony's report, the SNM "killed unarmed civilians in individual instances which together may have resulted in the deaths of at least several hundred or more persons." These killings occurred "when neither resistance to these actions nor danger to the SNM was present" (Gersony Aug. 1989, 60-65).

3.  CURRENT SITUATION

In February 1991 the SNM (Isaaq) army conducted "mopping-up operations" in the Awdal region that took the lives of more than 130 people and forced hundreds of thousands of others into exile (Radio of the Somali National Movement 5 Feb. 1991; Africa Research Bulletin 1-28 Feb. 1991, 10026; INCS-UK Apr. 1991, 71-72). In March 1991, fighting occurred between the SNM and the Gadabursi near the Ethiopian border, and conflicts erupted between the SNM and the Issa near the Djibouti border (New African May 1991, 12). In April 1991, a conference of the northern communities, organized by the SNM, resulted in the appointment of a constituent assembly comprised of 45 Isaaq, 35 Darood, 20 Gadabursi and 5 Issa. The official goal of the assembly is to draw up a constitution, form a government and organize elections to be held in 1993 (The Indian Ocean Newsletter 25 May 1991). The SNM announced that Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, known as Abdirahman Tour, had been appointed president of the North (Africa Research Bulletin 1-31 May 1991, 10142), and also announced the formation of a new government composed of two Dulbahante, two Gadabursi, one Warsengele and thirteen Isaaq (The Indian Ocean Newsletter 8 June 1991; Le Monde 8 June 1991). Another source, however, reports that there is one member of the Issa clan in this government (Africa Confidential 14 June 1991). Since shortly after the declaration of independence of the North in May 1991 the situation, which had been somewhat promising when the new state was formed, has steadily deteriorated.

The current situation in the North may be summarized in two words: anarchy and insecurity. Inter-clan conflicts are no longer limited to Mogadishu and the south of the country (Le Monde 13 Feb. 1992). The North, where leaders had formerly boasted of stability, is now experiencing the same situation, as journalist Marc Yared asserts. Yared has observed that "Somaliland has been sucked up in turn, like the rest of Somalia, into the spiral of violence ... " (Jeune Afrique 16-22 Apr. 1922).

3.1               Fighting Between Clans

Many observers predicted a war between the Isaaq and the other clans in the North, namely the Warsengele, the Issa, the Gadabursi and the Dulbahante. These clans were reluctant to support the secession of the North, particularly because, in the eyes of the Isaaq, they had been associated with the Siad Barre regime (The Indian Ocean Newsletter 22 June 1991; Africa Events June 1991).

Instead, war erupted among the various Isaaq clans. In January 1992, following violent clan fighting between the Habar Jelo and the Habar Yunis in Burao, several dozen people were killed, and a number of others were forced into exile (Le Monde 13 Feb. 1992; The Indian Ocean Newsletter 25 Jan. 1992). This fighting began after the firing of Minister of Defence Mohamed Ali Kahin, who had apparently been preparing a military coup to overthrow the current president. The struggle between the two men arose out of the fact that the head of state, Abdirahman Ali Tour, had given precedence to civilians at the expense of former guerrilla fighters. According to Kahin, it was inconceivable that the number of military representatives in the Abdirahman Ali Tour government be limited to two (Jeune Afrique 16-22 Apr. 1992). A source "close to the official representation bureau of Somaliland in Europe" and quoted by The Indian Ocean Newsletter reports, however, that the friction resulted from an attack led by dissident members of the military against the Burao garrison (25 Jan. 1992). Kahin is a member of the Habar Jelo clan, like the former president of the SNM, Mohamed Silanyo. Silanyo recently criticized President Abdirahman Ali Tour for his overly hasty proclamation of the North's secession (Ibid; Jeune Afrique 28 May-3 June 1992). The opposition also accuses the head of state of "dictatorial tendencies, corruption and clan favouritism," as the former minister of water and minerals asserts:

There are no collective cabinet decisions. There hasn't been a single law that has been signed. He (Tour) is hardly in the office, but this is where the buck stops (Inter Press Service 16 Mar. 1992).

At the end of March 1992, fighting broke out in Borama and, a few days later, spread to Berbera, the North's principal port and sole generator of government revenue. Berbera is under the control of the Issa Moussa. The fighting involved the army of the current president and the forces of General Abdillahi Ibrahim, also known as Dheega Weine (Big Ears), who is very close to Kahin, the former minister of defence (Ibid; Jeune Afrique 28 May-3 June 1992; Africa Confidential 3 Apr. 1992). These conflicts are the logical consequences of the spirit, structure and objectives of this movement.

According to the UNHCR, 90 percent of the population (70,000) has left Berbera for neighbouring towns or villages (UNHCR 29 May 1992, 6). The Vice-President and Minister of Defence stated in March 1992

We have given negotiations every chance, so now we have full public backing to enforce the full thrust of the law. ... No matter what the casualties are going to be, every government is entitled to use legitimate force. Either they (the rebels) put down their arms and surrender or they'll be run over (IPS 16 Mar. 1992).

Following this declaration, women and children demonstrated against the war in the streets of Hargeisa (Ibid.).

3.2              The Failure of the Government

In May 1991, after the declaration of independence, the SNM set up a provisional government to govern the country until free, multi-party elections are held within at least two years (Le Monde 21 May 1991; AP 21 May 1991). Apart from the president and vice-president, this government, composed of seventeen ministries, was dominated by the Isaaq (Le Monde 8 June 1991). Recent information indicates that several ministers of the government have been fired, including two Dulbahante and one Gadabursi (The Indian Ocean Newsletter 29 Feb. 1992). Since Kahin's departure, Hassan Issa Djama (of the Issaq-Habar Gerhajis-Arab clan) has held the offices of both vice-president and minister of defence (Ibid.; Jeune Afrique 16-22 Apr. 1992).

As a result of numerous of cabinet shuffles, struggles between different factions of the ruling class, and the failure of the North to gain international recognition, the government has been unable to establish a judicial system and police force. In short, it has failed to put an effective administrative structure in place and to bring about national reconstruction (Gilkes July 1992, 52). Although the Shari'a was officially adopted in June 1991, customary law is still in the hands of the elders of the various clans and sub-clans; the law remains outside of government control and unaffected by all attempts at homogenization (The Indian Ocean Newsletter 1 June 1991; AL-HAYAH 27 June 1991). The reconstruction effort in the North, one of the priorities of the new government, has, to date, been fruitless, and the government has so far been unable to establish a health and education system (Gilkes July 1992, 52). In the urban centres where many nomads displaced by the conflict have taken refuge, potable water is in short supply, and the government has been unable to manage the scarce water resources (Ibid.). Electricity, which was sabotaged in the 1988 war, has still not been restored (PHR Spring 1992, 8). Road conditions remain deplorable, and insecurity reigns on these routes due to the presence of rebel forces, looting, and the danger presented by mines (UNHCR 29 May 1992, 6). Although foreign experts have embarked on the enormous task of removing the mines, a large number of civilians still fall victim to the mines, and humanitarian organizations must now use boats or airplanes to get aid to its destination (Jeune Afrique 16-22 Apr. 1992). A recent shift in control of Berbera has, however, blocked aid destined for certain regions (The Globe and Mail 17 August 1992). Former SNM guerrilla fighters are now soldiers, unpaid and still armed, who add to the spectre of looting, disorder, anarchy and unemployment (PHR Spring 1992, 8).

3.3      General Climate of Insecurity

Since 28 March 1992, the UNHCR has suspended its activities in the North due to "a total breakdown of law and order in the area" (UNHCR 29 May 1992, 6). No international airline company has flown to Berbera or Hargeisa--the only international airports in the North--since May 1988 (COSTI 25 Aug. 1992; Former Director, Somali Ministry of Education 24 Aug. 1992).

In March 1992, the Hargeisa offices of the Red Crescent were looted in a night attack, and a staff member was killed (The Indian Ocean Newsletter 28 Mar. 1992, 4). Also in Hargeisa, several United Nations vehicles were stolen or damaged (UNHCR 29 May 1992, 6), and all medical supplies and office equipment of the French NGO Médecins Sans Frontières in Burao were stolen (Ibid.).

According to a recent Amnesty International report, the human rights situation in Somalia is catastrophic. More fighting has erupted in the North since the inter-clan conflicts of January 1992 which led to friction among the Isaaq sub-clans and to conflicts between the SNM and the other non-Isaaq clans (Amnesty International 5 Aug. 1992, 7).

In addition, the UNHCR has suspended its programme to repatriate Somali refugees to the North because of the instability that reigns in the region. The programme had initially been planned for February 1992 (UNHCR 10 Aug. 1992). As one NGO worker in the North recently stated, "when the ministers bring their own families back to live here from abroad - then we will begin to have confidence in the government" (Ryle Jan. 1992, 33).

4.  FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

Future prospects for the North remain sombre. The newly-created Republic of Somaliland remains unrecognized by the international community, and anarchy and insecurity prevail. Clan politics and socio-economic conditions are basically the same as those of southern Somalia: the same catalysts are present, although they are not yet as intense as in the south, where the cycle of inter-clan violence has grown to frightening proportions. Social prospects for the North depend on a number of factors. First, clan favouritism exhibited by the government of Abdirahman Tour has created discontent both among rival clans and sub-clans and among the leaders who have been ousted from power, particularly former SNM guerrilla fighters who have argued for a greater military presence within the government (Gilkes July 1992, 54). The proclamation of the secession of the North was not unanimous (Current History May 1992, 233). Some non-Isaaq clans still resent the Isaaq for the devastation the region has experienced since 1988 and for the SNM's unilateral take-over in 1991. As well, "while there is no ideologically based opposition to the administration in Somaliland, its domination by the Isaaq-supported SNM has led to resistance from some members of non-Isaaq clans" (Ibid.).

Second, the failure of the government to create a functioning state in the North, despite having been in power for over a year, creates a risk that popular discontent, which is already at a high level, will intensify. Despite the official existence of a government, almost none of the structures that exist in most states have been established: the judicial system, public administration, the educational system, health care services, the police force and the national army are nascent or still absent (The Indian Ocean Newsletter 14 Mar. 1992; Gilkes 1992, 53). The government is, therefore, unable to exercise real control over its territory, let alone to provide effective protection for its citizens. As well, it is likely that deplorable road conditions and the lack of basic commodities will fan popular resentment against the government.

In a press release dated 27 July 1992, Amnesty International stated that the present situation in Somalia is disastrous. Individuals are targeted for deliberate massacre simply because they are members of another clan . Amnesty International added that, given the conditions that currently prevail, it opposes all deportations to Somalia (27 July 1992).

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