El Salvador Armed Forces: Human Rights Abuses

The Salvadoran situation is "complex, with profound roots, that affect the structure of the state and the trauma of the society. The central problem is the Armed Forces, their relationship with civil authorities and the function of military authorities in society."

U.N. Secretary-General
Javier Perez de Cuellar
26 September 1990

1.   INTRODUCTION

1.0      General

For the last decade El Salvador has been fighting the "longest American-supported counter-insurgency campaign since the Vietnam War..." (Defence and Foreign Affairs Handbook 1989, 320; Central America NewsPak 8-21 Oct. 1990). The campaign is aimed at the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), which was established in 1980 "with the object of launching a `final offensive' against the government on the [Marxist-Leninist] theoretical basis of a strategy of `prolonged popular war' or `war of attrition'" (Degenhardt 1988, 89).

The past decade of civil war has left the country with 70,000 dead, of which an estimated 40,000 were death squad assassinations (Central America Newspak 10-23 Sept. 1990; Central America Newspak 16-29 July 1990, 1). Between 600,000 and 1.5 million people have left the country and another 510,000 have been displaced internally (Central America NewsPak 4-17 June 1990; Inter-Church Committee 1990, 18). There has been over US $4 billion worth of property damage and a large number of war-related socio-economic problems have emerged (Ibid.).

Another result of the civil war is the climate of terror omnipresent in El Salvador. Apparently no one outside the Armed Forces is immune from human rights abuses. At present, the only solution for many is to migrate to another country in order to seek peace and security, keeping in mind that if they return it would be to the same climate of terror and human rights abuses.

José Napoleón Duarte was elected President in 1984. His election marked the first time since 1944 that a directly elected civilian held the Presidency (Defence and Foreign Affairs Handbook 1989, 316). However, it is said that President Duarte was "only tolerated by the army" because of his ability to ensure economic and military aid from the United States (Ibid., 320).

On 20 March 1989, Alfredo Cristiani, leader of the ultra-right Alianza Republicana Nacional party (ARENA), became President. Founded by Roberto d'Aubuisson, the ARENA party is supported by the extreme-right sectors of Salvadoran society and is seen by many as "little more than a front for death squads" (Ibid., 319).

1.1       The Armed Forces "Raison d'être" and the Extent of U.S. Aid

In the early 1970s the Salvadoran Armed Forces were mainly concerned with possible international warfare, but at the beginning of the 1980s the FMLN became their primary focus (Aguilera 1989, 176). The FMLN is an umbrella organization composed of five paramilitary groups: the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES), the Central American Workers' Revolutionary Party (PRTC), and the Farabundo Martí Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) (Defence and Foreign Affairs Handbook 1989, 322).

The FMLN currently has 6,000 to 7,000 combatants within its ranks, which is far fewer than the 11,000 it had in the early 1980s (The Military Balance 1990-91 1990; Degenhardt 1988, 90). According to the U.S. State Department and Congress, the FMLN and the Armed Forces have reached a stalemate, with neither side capable of achieving a clear military victory (Central America Report 26 Oct. 1990; Inter-Church Committee 1990, 36).

Without U.S. assistance, El Salvador's government would have found itself in a precarious situation on many occasions. In November 1987, a study by the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus of the U.S. Congress reported that for the first time in the history of U.S. foreign aid, the level of U.S. aid to El Salvador in 1987 exceeded that country's own contribution to its budget (Inter-Church Committee Feb. 1990, 2). The scope of U.S. involvement in El Salvador was such that in the second half of the 1980s they reportedly had a contingency plan to commit combat troops to El Salvador (Aguilera 1989, 163). From 1980 to 1990 inclusive, U.S. military aid to El Salvador was estimated at close to US$1.02 billion out of a total U.S. package estimated at US$3.84 billion (Central America Report 26 Oct. 1990).

2.               THE ARMED FORCES

2.1      Constitutional Mandate and the Chain of Command

Article 157 of the Constitution of El Salvador establishes the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. In practice, however, the President must act in a way so as not to alienate the Armed Forces. Should he decide to act in any way against them, he likely would run the risk of being overthrown (Ibid.). Article 211 specifies that:the Armed Forces are established to protect the integrity of the territory and the sovereignty of the State, maintain peace, tranquillity and public safety, the guarantee of the constitutional rights, and the compliance of any other laws already in effect (Blaustein and Flanz 1984, 64).

The Armed Forces are responsible for control of all military and paramilitary forces in the country. The military encompasses the Army, Navy, Air Force and Reserves, while the paramilitary is made up of the National Guard, National Police, Treasury Police and Civil Defence.

The Salvadoran military chain of command is not straightforward but rather a complex system of consultations leading to consensus. This consensus is reached by and large within the Tandona - the graduating class of 1966 of El Salvador's military academy, the Escuela Militar Capitan Gerardo Barrios (Central America Report 26 Oct. 1990). Currently, 20 of the 47 graduates of that Class of '66 occupy senior positions in the military; 15 of them have been accused by the U.S. of commanding troops believed guilty of human rights abuses (Ibid.). In September 1990, Colonel Emilio Ponce, who had graduated at the top of the Tandona, was promoted from head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Minister of Defence. A recent congressional report on human rights violations in El Salvador reports that "the Tandona at times shows more loyalty to its members than to the rule of law, or even to the President" (Ibid.).

2.2       Recruitment

Article 215 of the Constitution states that military service is compulsory for all Savadorans from 18 to 30 years of age (Blaustein and Flanz 1984, 63). The Constitution provides for a special law to regulate the military service but none was promulgated (Americas Watch 1987, 108). Conscription is selective and the duration is two years for all military services (The Military Balance 1990-91 1990, 195). The documentation consulted makes no mention of women being conscripted.

Although volunteers are accepted, the military often has to force conscripts into its ranks in order to meet its needs. Every year between 12,000 and 20,000 Salvadorans, most of them youths from poor and rural families, are forcibly recruited (The New York Times 21 Apr. 1989, A3; The New York Times Magazine 10 Dec. 1989, 97). Wealthy Salvadorans often buy their way out of the military service and the military does not usually recruit in wealthy neighbourhoods (The New York Times 21 Apr. 1989, A3).

The Centre for Youth Protection in San Salvador points out that there are no provisions for conscientious objectors or alternative service and confirms that most recruitment is carried out in rural areas and in the poorer sections of the cities (The Centre for Youth Protection 1987).

Most of the recruits are 20 years of age or under although there are reported cases of recruits being as young as 14, 15 and 16 years of age (The New York Times 21 Apr. 1989, A3; Central America Newspak 16-29 July 1990). Some recruits are forcibly taken off buses or off the street and, according to a study on forced recruitment by the Canadian group Peace Brigades, some youths were also seized in their classrooms (The New York Times 21 Apr. 1989, A3).

President Cristiani has admitted that the present recruitment system is flawed and potentially divisive but has denied that the military has recently increased its recruiting as charged by the Roman Catholic Church (Central America NewsPak 16-29 July 1990).

Once forcibly recruited, a soldier must often make mandatory contributions of all kinds from his salary. These are decided arbitrarily by his commander (The New York Times Magazine 10 Dec. 1989, 95). Soldiers are also sometimes rented out by their commanders to guard coffee plantations, factories and bus lines (Ibid.).

The salary of a new recruit is usually US $80 a month and close to US $300 a month for a soldier with two years of field experience (The New York Times 21 Apr. 1989, A3). The military limits re-enlistment to 20 percent in order to cut down on the cost of maintaining experienced forces (Ibid.).

According to the Armed Forces, service in the Civil Defence is voluntary. However, in practice, many members are compelled to join and in some regions, families are ordered to pay a monthly fee for the service. According to reports, those who do not pay are required to join the Civil Defence and those who refuse to join are "tied up and detained" (Americas Watch 1987, 119).

2.3           Human Rights Abuses: the Armed Forces and the Death Squads

a) The Military

The Navy does not play a significant role in the war against the FMLN (Aguilera 1989, 177). It is not, however, immune to corruption. It has allegedly forced its way into the fishing industry with its own fishing fleet, and holds shares in many large export firms (The New York Times Magazine 10 Dec. 1989, 97).

The reserves, usually made up of former soldiers, are often called up to protect bridges and other targets of the FMLN in order to free active-duty soldiers for offensive operations (Los Angeles Times 16 Jan. 1988).

All levels of the Army and the Air Force are known to have corrupt elements within their ranks (The New York Times Magazine 10 Dec. 1989, 97). Apart from their forcible recruitment policies, the abuse of human rights by some of their members is also well-documented. According to Tutela Legal, the human rights office of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Salvador, the Air Force is allegedly guilty of repeated murder and torture of civilians (Americas Watch 1987, 28).      

The frequent abuses by the Army are better-documented. They range from the kidnapping of political detainees and other civilians to physical and psychological torture, assassination, rape, and illegal detention (Central America Report 14 Sept. 1990, 277; Americas Watch 1987, 27, 75-83).

The non-governmental Salvadoran Human Rights Commission (CDHES) claims that the Armed Forces killed 2,868 civilians between May 1989 and May 1990 (Central America Report 14 Sept. 1990, 277). Although these numbers cannot all be attributed to the Army, they indicate the magnitude of the abuses.

The Army considers religious workers and especially Jesuits to be Communists and rebel supporters (Central America NewsPak 27 Aug. - 9 Sept. 1990). It has been linked to the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero in 1980, the murder of four North American Catholic nuns also in 1980, and the recent assassination of six Jesuits considered to be El Salvador's most outstanding leftist intellectuals (Central America Report 26 Oct. 1990).

The Army and the Air Force are also accused of having launched an air and ground attack in September 1990 on a community of returned refugees in northern El Salvador (Central America NewsPak 4-17 June 1990). Leaders of the refugee organization, Christian Committee for the Displaced of El Salvador (CRIPDES), met in October 1990 with a United Nations special investigator to denounce the constant harassment suffered by repatriated communities, claiming that "over 150 people from these communities have been killed, wounded or captured so far this year as a result of Salvadoran army operations" (Central America Report 19 Oct. 1990).

It is claimed the Salvadoran military forces routinely torture and murder members of the armed opposition groups who are captured or wounded in combat (McClintock 1985, 339).

b) The Paramilitary

El Salvador's paramilitary force has four components: the National Guard, the National Police and the Treasury Police which together have a roster of 13,400, and the Civil Defence with 12,500 armed members (The Military Balance 1990-91 1990, 195-196). Although each is different in structure and operations, all ultimately fall under the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

According to the findings of a research team investigating U.S. assistance to the Salvadoran police in 1986, the two police forces and the National Guard have been accused of using psychological and/or physical torture to speed up the interrogation process. They reportedly differ from one another only in the type of torture they prefer (El Rescate Human Right Dept. 1986, 21). The report, which claims that the Treasury police have "an incredible reputation for human rights abuses," also claims physicians and psychologists are used on a regular basis to monitor and determine the threshold of pain of the victims (El Rescate Human Rights Dept. 1986, 23).

CDHES claims that the government para-military forces illegally detained

1,916 persons between May 1989 and May 1990 and reports 250 cases of disappeared persons for the same period (Central America Report 31 Aug. 1990). Article 11 of the Constitution guarantees the right to habeas corpus but, according to Amnesty International, it "has rarely been effective in preventing arbitrary arrests, torture and other human rights abuses" (Amnesty International, AI Index: AMR 29/27/90). In principle, a detainee must be brought before a judge within 72 hours of his arrest but that period can be increased to 15 days during a state of siege (Amnesty International, AI Index: AMR 29/27/90).

c) Death Squads

According to Amnesty International, the Salvadoran death squads are:simply used to shield the government from accountability for the torture, `disappearances' and extrajudicial executions committed in their name. The squads are allegedly made up of regular army and police agents, acting in uniform or plain clothes, under the orders of superior officers (Amnesty International, AI Index: AMR 29/21/88).

The death squads are allegedly responsible for close to 40,000 deaths since the beginning of the 1980s (Central America NewsPak 10-23 Sept. 1990, 3).

Victims of death squads come from all walks of life, such as trade unionists, members of cooperatives, teachers and academics, church officials, human rights workers, members of the judiciary involved in efforts to establish criminal responsibility for human rights violations, returned refugees and displaced persons, and released political prisoners (Amnesty International, AI Index: AMR 29/21/88). Often, the victims are suspected of opposing the government, or of having the potential to do so (Ibid.).

d) The Impunity of the Armed Forces

Under Salvadoran law, Armed Forces personnel can only be tried in military courts (Amnesty International, AI Index: AMR 29/21/88). Despite the deaths of thousands of people, no Salvadoran officer has ever been prosecuted for a human rights violation (Central America NewsPak 18 June-1 July 1990). Amnesty International suggests that the failure of military prosecutors to press charges against military and security personnel guilty of human rights abuses and of murder is inherent in El Salvador's military policy and leaves little doubt of official complicity (Amnesty International, AI Index: AMR 29/21/88).

The introduction to the U.S. Congress Dodd/Leahy Bill, which cuts by half and attaches conditions to the 1991 U.S. military aid to El Salvador, states that: "The principle stumbling block [to the negotiation process] is the armed forces. And the hard truth of the matter is this: there will be no peace, no justice, no democracy in El Salvador so long as the military and security forces can act with impunity" (Central America Report 26 Oct. 1990).

3.      CURRENT SITUATION

El Salvador is in a complex predicament. Its ultra-rightist Armed Forces see no reason to abandon their policy of impunity. The pressure applied by the U.S. Congress by withholding 50 percent of the US $85 million in military aid budgeted for 1991 may not have the desired effects for a number of reasons. According to a report published by Diario Latino on 30 October 1990, El Salvador has been "inundated" with weapons in anticipation of the budget cuts. US $100 million in equipment and supplies has come into the country in the last ten months (El Rescate Human Rights Dept. 1990). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also resumed aid for the first time since 1982 and will loan El Salvador US $50 million for economic development and external debt management (Central America Report 9 Nov. 1990, 340).

Some believe that one faction of ARENA, the "militaristic right" led by Roberto D'Aubuisson, has enough funds to compensate for the loss of US $42.5 million, "allowing the military to operate without the restrictions imposed by the U.S." (Central America Report 26 Oct. 1990). Over the last decade, the Armed Forces by themselves have become a powerful and far-reaching economic institution. They have amassed in their Social Security fund, the Social Provision Institute of the Armed Forces (IPSFA), over US $100 million, and plan to open an insurance company and the new "Bank of the Armed Forces" (The New York Times Magazine 10 Dec. 1989, 97). This action will alter the balance of power between soldiers and civilians permanently and before long El Salvador's Armed Forces could become self-sufficient. It would also neutralize any U.S. plans to "Lebanize" the conflict, meaning to treat El Salvador like Lebanon - "pulling out and waiting to see what happens" (Central America Newspak 22 Oct. 1990, 4). Such a scenario seems unlikely to affect the status quo at a time when "more power than ever rests with the military" (The New York Times Magazine 10 Dec. 1989, 97).

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