Kosovo Briefing

Introduction

It is almost a cliché to say that Kosovo is a time bomb, a powder keg about to explode. In the last few months, new events in this province of Serbia, namely the public appearance of a Kosovo armed resistance group, have attracted the outside world's attention, mostly in the form of declarations and statements. The simmering conflict is now changing its nature although the long-announced explosion, the "second Bosnia" seems improbable in the short run. If there is no external intervention the most likely scenario is the continuation of apartheid-like repression by the Serbian security forces, a low-intensity guerrilla war waged by ethnic Albanians and an increasing death toll on both sides. The level of violence is rising but it still appears to be a series of separate attacks rather than any kind of organised campaign. The one common feature is the location of the troubles, almost exclusively in the Drenica region, the triangle formed by the municipalities of Srbica (Skenderaj), Klina (Kline) and Glogovac (Gllogovc) in the centre of Kosovo. Since the first public appearance of the Kosovo Liberation Army in November 1997, until 1 February 1998 there have been nine instances of ethnically-motivated violence reported. The extent to which these reports are exhaustive is difficult to evaluate because usually only the media on the victims' side report the event. Reports from different sources often agree on little more than the time and the place of some incident. The events of 22 January 1998 are a good example of this discrepancy. According to the Belgrade press, an armed attack against the police station in Srbica and a shooting on the Klina-Srbica road which resulted in the death of a Serbian member of a municipal council by "unidentified persons" (both blamed on the Kosovo Liberation Army) provoked a Serbian police raid the Albanian village Donji Prekaz. According to Albanian sources in Kosovo, it was an unprovoked Serbian show of force in which one Albanian man died and two Albanian women were wounded. According to Serbian police sources there were no clashes in Donji Prekaz, but perhaps there was an internal Albanian "clash between local bands". So much for establishing facts about violence in Kosovo. However, rising tension can easily turn into a confrontation. The funerals of the two men, victims of the violence of 22 January, (a Serbian and an Albanian), took place almost at the same time and within less than 50 kilometres of each other. It was reported that 10,000 Serbs and Montenegrins and 20,000 Albanians attended the respective funerals. If the two, highly-emotional crowds had come into contact, it may have been difficult to avoid large-scale violence. Politically the situation is a total stalemate with both sides firmly digging in on their uncompromising positions. The ethnic Albanians want the recognition of their self-declared independence and nothing less is acceptable to them, while the Serbian and Yugoslav authorities refuse to listen to any such proposition and explicitly say that they are ready to speak about anything but independence. So the ethnic Albanians maintain- with increasing efforts-their shadow state and their parallel education and health systems, and try to ignore Serbia and Yugoslavia as much as they can, while Serbian authorities increase the police presence in the vulnerable parts of Kosovo and set up checkpoints and weapon searches. With minimal leverage over the Belgrade authorities, the international community can do little more than express "concern" and "deep concern" over the situation, and warn that it is "watching it carefully" and "monitoring it closely". But basically the outside world has been engaged in hand-wringing, since there seems to be no way of forcing a Serbia-Kosovo dialogue on Belgrade. Foreign officials repeat that the status quo is unacceptable, but with hopes for peaceful resolution being minimal, the status quo may be preferable to some violent alternative. The key to the resolution of the Kosovo problem lies in Belgrade. Even so, if a realistic middle way is to be found between the total domination currently practised by Belgrade and the total independence demanded by the Kosovo Albanians there will have to be concessions on both sides, including some tempering of the ethnic Albanians' demands for independence. The International Crisis Group has developed extensive expertise in peace-building in the Balkans over the past two years monitoring implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian experience suggests that the international community can have a major impact if it has the requisite will. The right amount of pressure exerted over the parties to a conflict and an even-handed, firm response to their grievances can bear fruit even in such a complicated environment as Kosovo.

Origin of the Conflict

The tensions in Kosovo have a long history, but the current troubles began in March 1989 when the province was forcibly stripped of its autonomy. Belgrade has been running it ever since in ways reminiscent of apartheid with the aid of a massive police and military presence. For almost nine years there has been a cold war in Kosovo between two entirely separated communities cohabiting the same soil: the Serbs who constitute less than 10 percent of the total population and the 1,935,000 Kosovo Albanians (known as Kosovars) who make up 90 percent of the population. The difference between the two groups is cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious (Serbs are mostly Orthodox, Albanians mostly Muslim). If the birth rate of the Kosovars remains at 23.1 birth per 1000 (the highest in Europe with 52,000 living newborns a year), Serbs will become an ethnic minority in Serbia by the year 2020. Already today in Serbia, Serbs account for fewer than 50 percent of live births. Seventy percent of Kosovo's Albanian population is below the age of 30. The Serbian authorities in Belgrade, and most of the Serbian opposition have little if any respect for Kosovars' minority rights while the Kosovars dispute the term "minority", pointing out that in the Kosovo province they are an overwhelming majority. The record of human rights violations in Kosovo is appalling. The international community has concentrated its attention on this area both because it is the most undisputedly negative aspect of Serbia's grip on Kosovo and because it is the one item over which international interference has traditionally been judged as acceptable. The 1997 US Departement of State Human Rights Report for Serbia-Montenegro (the US does not recognise the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia") stated it bluntly: "Political violence, including killings by police, resulted mostly from efforts by Serbian authorities to suppress and intimidate ethnic minority groups." And later: "Torture and other cruel forms of punishment, which are prohibited by law, continue to be a problem, particularly in Kosovo directed against ethnic Albanians." While the repression by Serbian security forces against Kosovars is dreadful, it seems to be indiscriminate, aimed at people because of their ethnicity and not necessarily because of any concrete activity or opinion.

Political Situation in Kosovo

In the summer of 1990 Kosovars proclaimed a "Declaration of Independence", then in September 1991 they held a referendum for independence and finally in May 1992 organised semi-clandestine elections for president and a parliament, won by the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, it's chairman. The Kosovar Parliament was prevented by the Serbian police from meeting so its inaugural session has never taken place. Nevertheless, some parliamentary commissions work and part of the government was formed, although five of the six ministers live outside the former Yugoslavia. Political life in Kosovo consists mostly of the activity (statements, declarations and meetings) of more than 20 political parties. The leading party of Kosovars, Dr. Rugova's LDK, holds enormous power in the province since it controls the three-percent tax which every Kosovar from the Diaspora contributes to fund Kosovo's parallel institutions. In the last two years, however, there has been a growing rift between LDK and the government-in-exile led by Prime Minister Bujar Bukoshi. In June 1997, Bukoshi declared that Dr. Rugova's policy of peaceful resistance to the regime has brought the Kosovo Albanians' movement to a dead end and yielded no positive results. The second largest ethnic Albanian party is the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo or PPK, led by former long-time political prisoner Adem Demaci, which has the discreet backing of Prime Minister Bukoshi. Because many PPK officials advocate civil disobedience and active resistance, the PPK is seen as more active and resolute although until recently it had not translated its declarations and statements into constructive actions. In January 1998, the PPK called on the Kosovars to turn off their lights for five minutes and to stand still in the street for one minute at precise moments in order to demonstrate a collective protest against the police actions of the Serbian regime. The Serbs from Kosovo have their own party, the Serb Resistance Movement led by Momcilo Trajkovic and opposed to the regime in Belgrade. At the beginning of 1998, an organisation of Kosovo Serbs called Bozur, supportive of Yugoslav president Milosevic, renewed its activity after many years of silence. All-Serb parties (Socialist, Radical and Renewal Movement) are also active, but with few members, they do not have much importance for overall Kosovo Serb political life.

Parallel Life in Kosovo

Ever since the 1990 Declaration of Independence, the Kosovars have sought to reject Serb and Yugoslav rule by trying to live as if they were indeed in an independent state. This is not entirely possible because Kosovars have to put up with many of the key elements of the Yugoslav state: they use Yugoslav passports and Yugoslav currency, services such as the post-office and telephone company and of course the police and the army are Yugoslav too. Most symbolically on Yugoslav state holidays the Yugoslav flag is displayed all over Kosovo and the only occasion when Kosovars can display the Albanian flag, (which they consider theirs), is during weddings. In the euphoria of their Declaration of Independence the Kosovars decided to set up teaching facilities and clinics entirely separate from the Serbian institutions. At the time the systems appeared to be temporary measures, aimed at out-waiting the Serbian wave of repression and discrimination in employment. Now, after seven years, it is obvious that the system is not viable and that although the Kosovars are making an admirable effort to make it as efficient as possible, neither education nor health services are satisfactory. At the end of the twentieth century, scientists cannot learn in garages without having the opportunity to carry out even the most simple experiments.

Education and health care

After the Serbian government unified the school curriculum all over Serbia, (in effect outlawing teaching in the Albanian language), Kosovar teachers voiced their opposition and mounted a campaign of industrial action. The Serbian authorities responded to the protests by firing striking teachers and sending in the police to bar Kosovar pupils and students from school and university premises. The upshot of the dispute was Kosovo's parallel education system, originally conceived as a way for teachers to continue delivering classes while they waited to be readmitted to school premises. More than six years on, most primary and good part of secondary schools are accessible for Kosovar children to learn according to Kosovar curriculum in the Albanian language, although in a limited way, (i.e. only certain parts and only at certain times of the day). University students have, however, never been allowed to enter the university buildings. They study in alternative premises: mosques, garages, private apartments. This year's graduating medicine students will be the first to have studied entirely in the parallel system. A similar parallel system, entirely funded by the three-percent tax from the Kosovar Diaspora and contributions from local Kosovars, operates in the health sector. It was set up at the same time as the education system and for similar reasons: Kosovar doctors lost their jobs and Kosovars did not trust the Serbian doctors so they looked for doctors of their own ethnicity. The system comprises the Mother Teresa health centre which caters for 57,000 families and 92 small clinics all over Kosovo. They provide basic medical assistance and drugs to the population free of charge. Only as a last resort do Kosovars turn to state (i.e. Serbian) doctors or hospitals. International organisations sometimes manage to conduct vaccine campaigns approved by the Serbian state but under a neutral foreign banner. Kosovars are extremely proud of their parallel health and education systems and indeed they have set up an impressive system, given the very adverse conditions. But neither education nor health are adequate for the needs of the Kosovar population and future generations may ultimately be at a serious disadvantage unless conditions improve. Primary and secondary schools suffer from a shortage of premises and the cost of education has to be partly covered by parents. Instruction at all levels is carried out with very few teaching aids, even in science subjects. The diplomas issued by the Pristina University are not recognised internationally which is a source of much grief among the Kosovars. In September 1996, after negotiations mediated by the Vatican-based organisation Sant'Edigio, an agreement was signed (separately) by then president of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic and the Kosovar leader Dr. Rugova. Very short, general and with no deadline or measures of implementation, this "Rome agreement" was supposed to be implemented by a special mixed commission known as "3+3," because of the number of participants on both sides. The 3+3 commission met several times, but registered no progress, mostly because the Serbian side interpreted the agreement as meaning that Kosovar students would be reintegrated into the Serbian education system, whereas the Kosovo side saw the agreement as allowing Kosovar students to return to all school premises without conditions. The major wave of anti-government street protests in Belgrade which started in November 1996 disrupted discussions on implementation of the agreement.

Economy

The unemployment rate among Kosovars is extremely high (estimated at 70 percent). According to Kosovo sources the number of unemployed has climbed by 130,000 since 1990. Whatever work exists is in the service sector, commerce, international organisations and in the black market (cigarettes, alcohol, probably some weapons). According to the Kosovar Pristina Economic Institute, in 1996 money earned in jobs on a regular basis accounted for ten percent of the total income of Kosovars whereas in 1988 it accounted for 49 percent. Emigration is often seen as the only way to earn money and it is estimated that between 1990 and 1995 some 350,000 Kosovars left. Some European countries have signed accords with Yugoslavia regarding the return of Kosovar migrants, a move that is decried both by the Kosovars abroad, who consider themselves political refugees, and by local Serbs who think that returning Kosovars will tilt the demographic balance even further towards ethnic Albanians.

Media

Kosovo has a considerable Albanian-language print media: the clearly pro-LDK daily Bujku (with a print-run of 8,000), the independent daily Koha Ditore (which was launched in April 1997 and reached a circulation of 27,000 by the end of that year) and the weekly Zeri being the main titles. There is no censorship for those publications and considering the fate of media in the rest of Serbia, the press in Kosovo is relatively well-off and of good quality, although very pre-occupied with Kosovo-related issues. However, there is no news-carrying local radio station in Albanian-only Albanian-language services of foreign broadcasters (BBC, Voice of America and Deutsche Welle)-and no independent television. Satellite antennas are astonishingly popular among Kosovars who use them to watch a two-hour programme prepared in and broadcast from Tirana with a small segment dedicated to Kosovo issues with a clear pro-Albanian slant. In Pristina people also watch other satellite programmes in foreign languages.

Recent Events

Political life

The policy of LDK and Dr. Rugova is directed mainly at holding the line on non-violent resistance and maintaining the Kosovars' parallel life while waiting for the international community to intervene. Dr. Rugova calls for an international protectorate and for negotiations with Belgrade under foreign mediation. This request presents the international community with a dilemma: since it accepts that Kosovo is a part of Serbia, any international involvement must first be accepted by Belgrade and the matter is strictly speaking an internal one, although questions of human rights violations and minority rights put it within the possible scope of outside involvement. Any other treatment of Kosovo, may be seen as recognising its independence, with obviously far-reaching consequences. Most countries do not accept the notion that they cannot address the Kosovo issue, but lack the leverage to force Serbia to start negotiations or even to stop human rights violations in Kosovo. There are ample signs in Kosovo that the population is growing tired of the passivity of its leaders, and there is dissent within LDK. The propaganda campaign being waged by LDK (self-congratulatory weekly press conferences by Dr. Rugova and upbeat articles in the daily Bujku) is irritating the impatient Kosovars and may be counterproductive. While public support for the strategy of non-violence has prevented much bloodshed to date, many Kosovars feel that it has not advanced their case for independence. An apartheid atmosphere still prevails in the province, with repression by Serbian police, appalling human rights violations and trials of ethnic Albanians that have little to do with law or justice. These are all perfect conditions for a guerrilla-like organisation to recruit new enthusiasts. The main opposition party in Kosovo, the PPK may also gain some new members from among the dissidents in the LDK ranks. Another reason for internal discontent is the fact that both the president and the parliament have had their mandates extended by the decree of Dr. Rugova (respectively twice and three times) without new elections. Elections are currently scheduled for 22 March 1998, but it remains to be seen whether they will actually take place. The LDK would probably still be victorious since it is the best organised structure, but it will certainly have less than the 76.4 percent share of the vote it took in 1992. The likelihood of elections taking place on 22 March has been strengthened in recent months by the student demonstrations and the growing activity and apparent boldness of the Kosovo Liberation Army since both developments question the mandate of LDK and Dr. Rugova as the undisputed leaders of the Kosovars.

Students' movement

The Kosovo Students' Independent Union have been threatening to take over the university buildings ever since the Rome agreement was signed in September 1996. The first demonstrations-protest walks on the main street of Pristina-started in August 1997. On 1 October 1997, against Dr. Rugova's wishes, the students held a peaceful demonstration in Pristina (observed by 13 diplomats who came from Belgrade) and in three other towns. The main demonstration was attended by some 20,000 students, some of whom were assaulted by the Serbian police. There were two more demonstrations: on 27 October, which passed without incident, and on 30 December, which was again violently repressed by the police. There is no reason to think that anyone other then the students and faculty members are organising these demonstrations. They are obviously the result of frustration with the non-implementation of the Rome agreement on education. The poor public relations work of the Students' Union (scheduling the demonstrations on days when it is very unlikely to get international media attention, thus wasting good opportunities for exposure) would suggest that this is a spontaneous movement.

Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK)

The first mention of the existence of the Kosovo Liberation Army, known under it's Albanian acronym UCK, goes back to February 1996. For almost two years UCK appeared to be a mythical group, mostly mentioned at the trials of Kosovars accused of terrorism and since evidence in these trials was dubious so were the references to UCK. In November 1997, however, at a funeral of a Kosovar who died in crossfire between Serb police and UCK, three UCK members appeared in public for the first time. Two of them took off their masks, one addressed the crowd saying that "the UCK is the only force which is fighting for the liberation and national unity of Kosovo". The 20,000-strong crowd cheered them and shouted "UCK! UCK!". The three men eventually left the funeral by car, undisturbed; witnesses say that they are from the region. There are some reports of UCK fundraising and recruitment abroad, with advertisements reportedly placed in the Scandinavian press. In statements issued in early December 1997, UCK claimed responsibility for several recent terrorist attacks, although at least one such incident, a plane crash, appeared to be an accident rather than the result of terrorism. Some of the acts that have been blamed on (and/or claimed by) UCK could even have been staged by the Serb authorities, but the idea that "finally someone stood up in our name" may be taking root. LDK leader Dr. Rugova refuses to recognise the existence of UCK. His deputy Fehmi Agani made a statement acknowledging that it exists and is a result of the radicalisation of Kosovars due to the occupation by Serbia and the international community's inaction. Adem Demaci, chairman of the PPK, acknowledged that UCK is a reality and made public in December 1997 an open letter to UCK in which he appealed for a three months' moratorium on violent actions to give the Serbian regime another chance to reconsider its attitude towards Kosovo and to allow the international community, especially the United States, to open a dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. Given the events of mid-January 1998, (the killing of a Serbian municipal council member), it seems the appeal for a moratorium had no effect. There is no unanimity among observers and actors on the scene about what the public appearance of UCK means but it has at least shown that LDK is not alone on the political scene. As of early 1998, UCK was still an enigma. The organisation's size remains unknown and it is still far from clear whether it is an organised "army" or a loose group of Kosovars carrying weapons. Either way, the impatient and idle Kosovar youth is very likely to find the idea of a guerrilla movement more attractive then the eternal waiting for Western intervention to deliver independence and economic recovery to Kosovo. In the first few weeks of 1998 there have been some signs that the pressure for renewed negotiations to find a political solution to the crisis may be building and broadening: the Serbs from Kosovo demanded from the Serbian authorities that they open a dialogue with Kosovars and, suprisingly, the Yugoslav army called for a political rather than a military solution.

International Community's Position

The international community has consistently voiced its concern over the Kosovo issue, especially the human rights situation. One of several conditions for lifting the outer wall of sanctions against Yugoslavia is that the Belgrade government restores the province's autonomy and ensures equality between the different ethnic groups in Kosovo. The final document of the Bonn Peace Implementation Council's conference held in December 1997, presented the most united international stance on Kosovo to date. It said that the Council "takes note with increasing concern of escalating ethnic tensions (...) in Kosovo and other areas. This has the potential further to destabilise the region. The Council calls upon those concerned to refrain from activities that might exacerbate existing difficulties and the strive for mutually acceptable solutions through responsible dialogue." This statement was the only mention of Kosovo in Bonn, yet it provoked the Yugoslav delegation to storm out of the meeting ostensibly on the ground that the Council was interfering in an internal Yugoslav matter. In January 1998, the International Helsinki Federation called for a "Dayton 2" meeting on the future of Kosovo. US and German diplomats visiting Yugoslavia have called for a dialogue. A spokesperson of the French Foreign Ministry has repeated the same message. The OSCE sent an unofficial mission of Polish, Danish and Norwegian ambassadors to Belgrade which was not received by the Serbian authorities in Kosovo. Meanwhile, the OSCE's special envoy to Kosovo, Max van der Stoel has yet to be granted a visa by the Yugoslav government. Over the past year four major private conferences on Kosovo were held (in New York, Vienna, Ulcin and Athens), none of which had any representation of the two sides to the dispute. The US decided in December 1997 to maintain the "outer wall of sanctions" until the end of 1998. This means that the US will continue to block Yugoslavia's entry into the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the United Nations, the OSCE and other international organisations and institutions. The "outer wall of sanctions" will remain in place until the authorities in Belgrade meet the following demands:

• co-operation with The Hague war crimes tribunal and the fulfilment of the other articles of the Dayton peace agreement;

• securing autonomy and full equality for the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo;

• the completion of the division of assets among the successor states of the former Yugoslavia;

• democratisation in Serbia based on OSCE recommendations; and

• official recognition of the presidential elections in Montenegro. (This demand was added to the list in December 1997 and by extending the list even further, the US government made this weapon even less flexible as a tool to solve the Kosovo issue.)

The status quo will not last. The impatience of the Kosovars and the fear of the Serbs living in Kosovo of a possible wave of terrorism can only increase tensions. The risk is that a series of tit-for-tat incidents could bring the simmering conflict to a boiling point, despite the stated non-violent character of the Kosovars' strategy to obtain independence and the preference for peaceful solutions declared by the Kosovo Serbs.

Proposed Solutions

Theoretically, the options for the status of Kosovo range from the province gaining total independence to maintaining the status quo. In practice, however, the scope for common ground is severely restricted as long as Kosovar leaders maintain that independence is the only solution acceptable to the people of Kosovo. Broad options:

1. Independence: granting full independence to Kosovo would require a redrawing of international borders, contrary to the international community's approach to the region. Adding to Serb concerns is the prospect of an independent Kosovo merging with Albania to form a Greater Albania.

2. Administrative reforms: Some Serbian politicians (Dobrica Cosic), academics (Alexandar Despic) and ad hoc expert groups have proposed administrative changes that would divide Kosovo into two regions. According to some proposals, such a regionalisation might be part of a larger administrative reform to be implemented across the whole of Yugoslavia. Reactions in Serbia and in Kosovo have until now been negative.

3. The "third republic" option: Granting Kosovo the status of "third republic" within rump Yugoslavia (alongside Serbia and Montenegro) is another potential solution, one with the advantage of not changing the external borders of the country, while granting Kosovo equal status with Serbia. This solution may become acceptable to the parties as a middle ground, although until now all sides (Serbs from Belgrade, Serbs from Kosovo and Kosovars) have rejected it, the secretary general of LDK simply saying that it is unacceptable.

4. Autonomy: Autonomy within rump Yugoslavia (with greater prerogatives than the ones lost in 1989) is sometimes mentioned by outside observers as another option, but it has found no favour with the Kosovar leadership. An LDK vice-chairman said "The offer of autonomy is no offer at all. It has been outdated for a long time, and, moreover, it would not guarantee the respect of Kosovo Albanians' civic and national rights."

5. An international protectorate: this temporary solution is constantly called for by Dr. Rugova, but it is very unlikely that the international community would be willing to engage in another scenario similar to Bosnia. It is also unlikely that the Belgrade authorities would accept any foreign presence, no matter how temporary, or other form of intervention of this nature in what they consider their internal affairs.

ICG Recommendations

Clearly there is no magic solution. A combination of confidence-building measures and promotion of dialogue and negotiations are obvious steps, but major pressure will have to be applied to Serbia if Belgrade is to act to end human rights violations in Kosovo and accept international involvement in solving the Kosovo problem. The possibilities of exercising such pressure through international bodies-be they political (such as OSCE, High commissioner for Minorities, UN Sub-commission on Human Rights) or financial (such as the World Bank or IMF)-is limited because the "outer wall of sanctions" excludes FRY from all these organisations. The status of FRY at the UN is a so-called "empty seat solution" even though UN humanitarian agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF) are operating in FRY. For pressure to be effectively applied through international institutions, the conditions on which the "outer wall of sanctions" is dependent would have to be broken into separate items, instead of being presented always as a package.

ICG proposes the following further recommendations:

Negotiations

The collapse of the Rome agreement on education had a profoundly negative effect on the prospects for a solution in Kosovo. It undermined confidence in the very idea of negotiation, with both sides accusing each other of not being a worthy partner. There are now efforts to revive the Rome agreement and the prospects of its implementation may be better because of the combined effect of students' demonstrations and the coming in the open of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK). If the education agreement remains unimplemented, it will be difficult to rebuild trust in the negotiating process but it can be done. Secret negotiations should be encouraged, with no media attention, no intermediaries that would like to use the event for their own promotion. This would have to be something along the lines of the Oslo Peace Process. For the participants such a modus operandi would reduce the risk of being blamed in the event that the negotiations fail, and make it easier to present and sell concessions as part of a broader package. A non-governmental organisation or a very neutral government should prepare the logistics and some minimal procedural matters.

Increased contacts

All kinds of contacts between the two ethnic communities should be encouraged. Diplomats should practice parallel diplomacy by inviting Albanians and Serbs together to events, and strengthen their Kosovo desks by bringing in people with the knowledge of Albanian. (The USIS office in Pristina and the political desk of the British Embassy are seen by the Kosovars as the best informed diplomatic missions). Non-government organisations and UN agencies should continue to explore every avenue that can bring people of the two communities together.

Support for education and health service

The parallel systems of education and health service set up by Kosovo Albanians are clearly not satisfactory. The Kosovars are making the best out of adverse circumstances and their effort is admirable. All of the dozen non-governmental organisations operating from Pristina and dealing with health, nutrition, education and construction direct their efforts and funds to supporting services that benefit mainly the Kosovo Albanians. Given the demographics and the discrimination practised by the Serbian regime, this is the right policy and should be continued. Direct financial assistance to the parallel Kosovo education and health systems would, however, contribute to further isolating the two communities and would reinforce the Kosovars belief that their parallel system is sustainable, which it is not. Instead, the international community should use the instrument of aid conditionality-the attachment of tough conditions to the granting of financial assistance-to create links between the two systems and benefit both. For example, funding could be used to renovate schools and health institutions on the condition that they are used by both communities.

Media

The group of journalists around the independent Pristina daily Koha Ditore offers the most balanced source of information for the Albanian-speaking population of Kosovo. They should be supported in their efforts to obtain a licence and create their own television and/or radio station. It is necessary to have the most influential media in the most professional hands. There is a surprisingly high number of satellite dishes in Kosovo, so the audience for any satellite broadcast would be significant. To offer Kosovars world news broadcast in their language may bring them a reality check. They may understand that there are other urgent priorities on the international scene, other nations suffering. This may not be a consolation, but it may at least help Kosovars realise that they need to take their fate into their own hands and come up with more realistic demands and expectations. A major international news provider, such as for CNN, could be asked to donate the right to rebroadcast news programmes on the satellite link used by Tirana TV. (Some East European countries have a CNN-translated news service and it is always a popular broadcast).

Serbian and Yugoslav Elections

The overwhelming majority of Kosovars do not vote in Serbian and Yugoslav elections because they consider that they take place in a "foreign country". While this strictly-observed boycott shows discipline and unity, there may be advantages for Kosovars in switching tactics. Diplomats and NGOs should suggest to Kosovars that they may gain more than they may lose by participating in the vote. There are examples of other nations in Eastern Europe where transition was made easier because there was compromise on all sides; the first semi-democratic elections in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, for instance, resulted from deals struck with "the enemy", they were neither free nor fair but the opposition accepted them because nothing else was achievable at the time. There are many advantages of voting, even in the absence of independence:

• elected does not mean sitting, elected seats may be used to paralyse the work of the parliament and prevent radicals from taking all 36 Kosovo seats in the elections so easily;

• · by being in the Parliament the Kosovar delegates could gain something, play other parties one against the other and at the same time force Belgrade to woo them with concessions, negotiations and possibly substantive agreements;

• by having all their delegates elected (which would probably be the case) the Kosovars could show their strength and unity;

• this would bring precious experience and exposure to Kosovar politicians.

Kosovar parallel elections

In spite of the more or less open disapproval of the United States, Kosovar elections should proceed as planned for 22 March 1998, if only to reconfirm the mandate of LDK and Dr. Rugova. The electoral campaign would be an opportunity for the Kosovars to become involved in a peaceful political process and make political and patriotic statements without reaching out to violence. Students Positioned between two more extreme political alternatives (the passivity of the LDK or the violence of the UCK), the Kosovar students' movement may provide the best basis on which to build an effective, moderate opposition capable of putting forward a credible and peaceful plan of action. Kosovar students should be encouraged to increase their contacts and take advice from students in Eastern Europe more than in the West. The modus operandi, the concrete actions undertaken by young people under totalitarian regimes are more likely to provide useful examples for the Kosovars than the more distant experiences of students in Western societies. They should also be encouraged to get in touch and collaborate with students from Belgrade. The Union of Students desperately needs help with public relations. It makes contradictory statements, schedules demonstrations for days when media coverage will be minimal and issues lengthy declarations that are written in incomprehensible English. The Union also suffers from too much bureaucracy. Unless it becomes a more effective vehicle of mobilisation, there is a risk that the Union will turn into a younger version of the political parties in the sense of expecting too much from the international community and doing too little. Kosovo, 17 February, 1998