Situation Analysis: Sierra Leone

The Conakry Accord

The initial euphoria and relief that greeted the signing of the Conakry Accord gave way to anxiety and concern in November as key deadlines were missed and follow-up meetings postponed. Despite Johnny Paul Koroma's speech to the nation at the beginning of the month trumpeting his government's commitment to the peace accord, the caveats were almost immediate. In his first public reaction to the October 23 signing of the accord, Koroma said there were still "disgruntled elements" bent on creating unrest but promised they would be "dealt with according to the law of our land". Still, Koroma's foreign minister, Alimamy Paolo Bangura said that signing the agreement was only a first step and that "bottlenecks" would need to be addressed during on-going negotiations. The anticipated bottlenecks came as no surprise. They are:

1. The timetable for demobilisation of all armed elements within the country, and indeed the definition of armed elements - the junta believing that the army, as a constitutional body, should not qualify as an armed element

2. The release of RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh, still detained in Nigeria with no clear timetable for his release or even his participation in the peace process, which was implied in the Conakry accord

3. The dominance of Nigerian forces within ECOMOG, and the ratio of Nigerian troops in any peacekeeping/demob activities

Although posturing, back-tracking and accusations by both sides temporarily diverted the process and postponed the first follow-up meeting, the AFRC and ECOMOG officials were able to reach consensus on several points when they met on November 11 at the Orugu Bridge near Jui. Both sides agreed on the re-opening of the port; joint patrols at specified checkpoints; and several other practicalities. None of which were implemented by month-end. They also agreed that the three unresolved issues listed above would be referred to the Committee of Five (foreign ministers from Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Ghana and Liberia) for discussion and resolution within "several weeks". This timetable proved to be unrealistic and the C-5 meeting that was scheduled to take place in Freetown on November 20 was postponed one week, until both sides ostensibly agreed on the location. The junta had insisted that the meeting take place in Freetown in order to allow the C-5 to witness firsthand the relative peace and stability of the capital and dispel the notion that anarchy reigned with "dead bodies littering the streets". The C-5 insisted on meeting at the ECOMOG base at Jui, where they felt they could better guarantee security. In the end, both sides got their way. The November 27 meeting opened at Jui, but was then diverted through Freetown to the Cape Sierra Hotel, where the junta said they had inadvertently left some key documents necessary for the meeting. Although ECOMOG force commander, Maj. Gen. Victor Malu declined to join the motorcade, most of the contingent did, including ECOWAS Secretary-General Kuyateh and UK and US military representation. The contingent was greeted by cheering crowds and "spontaneous" pro-AFRC demonstrations throughout Freetown. Most importantly, Francis Okello, the new Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, was present at the meeting and joined the motorcade through Freetown. This marks the first UN contact with the junta in the six months since they seized power. Additionally, Kuyateh and Okella went to State House where they paid a courtesy call to Johnny Paul Koromah after their impromptu tour of Freetown. Although the UN was quick to assert that this did not mark a formal recognition of the junta, it could be an important bridge-building step. Victor Malu was said to be annoyed about the motorcade, the courtesy call on Koromah, and the fact that the three committees -- disarmament; humanitarian supplies; cease-fire violations -- formed at the meeting on November 11th had yet to meet. The three key issues or "bottlenecks" listed above went unresolved at the meeting on the 27th -- and are still outstanding -- increasing concern over the timetable outlined in the Conakry Accord, as demobilisation is scheduled to take place throughout December.

Child Soldiers / Disarmament

Registration for the demobilisation of child soldiers began on schedule on November 17 using local district organisations throughout the country. The child soldiers were scheduled to be disarmed first, prior to the demobilisation of other armed factions in December. Although some boy soldiers have been disarmed, it has not taken place on a large scale. In Freetown, the AFRC was said to be clearing combatants from two of the luxury hotels the RUF had converted into their barracks, primarily for child soldiers. But the logistics of demobilisation, particularly of child combatants, remains complex. First, the RUF component of the People's Army are adamant that they will not disarm without the active participation of Foday Sankoh, nor will they hand their guns to Nigerians, who they claim have been "actively fighting" the AFRC since they shelled Aberdeen on June 2. Second, most of the child soldiers have nowhere to go, with many unable to return to their homes because of forced initiations where they were made to kill, or traumatically amputate, a person in their village. Others have been orphaned through the course of the war. Indeed, in Makeni, there are approximately 200 boy soldiers who have been demobilized but have nowhere to go, and they remain stuck in Teko Barracks. With resources almost non-existent, schools not in session, and a civilian population wary and intolerant of armed factions -- especially the random and extreme violence perpetrated by the rebels over the past six years -- it is difficult to imagine what a realistic next step can be. Without a massive influx of resources, a sustainable plan of diversion and a realistic plan of development, there will be little to occupy these child soldiers. United Nations sanctions dictate that aid can only resume after the return of ousted President Kabbah, so UNDP participation is effectively a non-option during this most crucial period, and indeed until at least April, at which time President Kabbah is scheduled to return. The Catholic missions have played a leading role in the demobilisation process so far, and the 65 POWs that were exchanged at Jui the last week of November were handed back to Archbishop Beguzzi. But without a broad-reaching plan for the re-integration of all armed factions, and an acknowledgment of -- and realistic plan to deal with -- the grievances of the army, it is nearly impossible to see how demobilisation can prevent a resurgence of violence.

The Kamajohs

Meanwhile, the kamajohs -- seen by many observers as the "new" rebels -- are exhibiting new hostilities. Specifically, several humanitarian agencies have been harassed in the Southeast around Bo and Pujehun, with one agency having several cars commandeered by armed kamajohs. Incidences of harassment and the deliberate limiting of access show a hostility toward NGOs that is newly present among the kamajohs. Continued divisions within the kamajoh movement are emerging, with a split evident between the chiefdom-based kamajohs and the newly emerged, less traditional kamajohs that have tenuous connections to specific chiefdoms. Even within these two camps, loyalties are confused and uncertain. Some of the traditional hunters are loyal to Kamajoh Chief Sam Hinga Norman, some have other loyalties, and some are maintaining the original kamajoh mandate of self-defense: willing to attack only as a means to protect their village. Among the non-chiefdom based kamajohs, there is evidence of recent recruitment of child-kamajohs. Kamajoh offensives led to continued instability in the South-east area of the country throughout November, with most of the southern province inaccessible at the start of the month due to main roads being cut off (Bo-Pujehun, Bo-Sumbaya). Toward the middle of the month, the army -- who have until now existed peacefully with the kamajohs throughout the Pujehun area -- started to clear the Bo-Pujehun highway, opening it up within a week and forcing the kamajohs to pull back from the area. Freetown papers reported that the newly armed kamajohs were being re-supplied not by the Nigerians, as many believed, but by Israeli diamond dealers active in the mineral rich South-east.

Counter-Coup Plot

On November 16, Steve Bio -- former NPRC strongman and relative of Julius Maada Bio -- and Col. Gibril Massaquoi -- long-time spokesperson for Sankoh in Abidjan -- were arrested due to vague accusations of "plotting against the AFRC". The exact nature of the charges were unclear, but rumours abounded of "clandestine movements in the provinces" and of trying to discourage cooperation with the peace plan and incite a counter-coup. Other military figures were rumoured to have been picked up, but no names were released. The matter seemed to fade as quickly as it emerged, and there has been no elaboration of the issue since the arrests. Several days before the alleged coup-plot was revealed, there were rumours that looting-related executions would take place on Lumley Beach. Certainly with the Western Area Security Patrol (WASP) force in effect, the AFRC is making intense efforts to appear, if not in control of their RUF brethren and other armed elements within city, then at least at a healthy distance from any involvement in the on-going looting and armed robberies that have been commonplace in Freetown in the six months since the coup. However, stories emerged of questionable behaviour on the part of several Honourables (the corporals and sergeants who instigated the coup and now sit on the "Supreme Council") and AFRC officials, specifically related to economic matters in the provinces, where they are said to be muscling in on the diamond trade. Despite some appearances of a willingness to move down a path toward democracy, the AFRC continue to actively squash freedom of the press. Several Freetown journalists and editors who had been critical of the regime were arrested and detained in November and then released without being charged. Adding to the climate of fear and intimidation were rumours, printed mostly in the Nigerian press, of Ukrainian and Russian mercenaries arriving in Freetown to assist the AFRC in a potential assault against ECOMOG.

"Pa Alpha"

The ECOMOG Alpha Jet that provoked terror in the Freetown population during the bombing raids in October made several passes over Freetown mid-month. These were not expected, nor explained and public reaction demonstrated that the population is still nervous. Some anti-aircraft shots were fired in retaliation, but it is rumoured top AFRC officials immediately gave a cease-fire order. Observers perceive this as a willingness of the AFRC to stay committed to the peace process, with the variable component still RUF hard-liners.

Humanitarian Aid

Although the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS exempt humanitarian aid, the reality is different. The free movement of humanitarian aid has been impacted by a cumbersome process instituted following the signing of the Conakry Accord. Indeed, the November 14 deadline for the resumption of humanitarian aid was missed because ECOMOG failed to give security clearance.

Economy/Practicalities

After almost two months without city power, the National Power Authority (NPA) came to light after required lubricants for the main power station were brought in by traders from Guinea. There are said to be enough lubricants to provide for rotating power supplies for six weeks. The petrol situation is much less promising, and kerosene supplies are dire. Queues as long as 300 people form when petrol does go on sale. Black market prices have reached 10,000 Le per gallon, up from an official price of 3,000 Le. Public transportation has been impacted severely, resulting in reduced road traffic and massively inflated prices for increasingly rare taxis.

Recommendations/Action Points

There are two areas where ICG board advocacy could add value to the peace process: 1. Keep the peace process moving and all parties interested With an ambitious (is it realistic?) timeline for the restoration of democracy, full-time attention must be paid to the peace process to ensure momentum is not lost, and side-tracking is not perceived as failure and a sign that the entire process should be abandoned. The C-5 ministers have full agendas at home and lack time to keep this process moving forward. A guarantor, or mediator, is needed to ensure that what is both possible and desired -- the restoration of democracy to a country whose people desperately want it -- becomes a reality. Disillusionment, endless committees, the perception of failure or lack of commitment from either side, must not be allowed to cloud a clear agenda for peace. Can a mediator be recruited -- without sidelining the regional efforts of ECOWAS -- to take ownership of the peace process and move it forward, working with all sides? 2. Develop and facilitate a realistic plan for child soldiers and the demob process There are estimates of as high as 10,000 child-soldiers in Sierra Leone, most with little education, and all impacted deeply by the cycle of violence -- committed, witnessed, and suffered -- that has taken place for the past six years (for many of these boys, six years is half their lives and all they remember). This cycle will continue for generations unless big-thinking and far-reaching reform takes place. This requires vision, commitment, and money. Without a solid plan -- and financing -- for the reform and re-integration of these armed children, peace in this country will never be a reality. ICG Freetown, 3 December 1997