Nations in Transit - Turkmenistan (2006)

Capital: Ashgabat
Population: 5,200,000
Status: Not Free
PPP: $1,120
Private Sector as % of GNI: na
Life Expectancy: 63
Religious Groups: Muslim (89 percent), Eastern Orthodox (9 percent), other (2 percent)
Ethnic Groups: Turkmen (85 percent), Uzbek (5 percent), Russian (4 percent), other (6 percent)

NIT Ratings	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Electoral Process	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Civil Society	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Independent Media	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Judicial Framework and Independence	6.75	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Corruption	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.50	6.75
Governance	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	7.00	N/A	N/A
National Democratic Governance	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	7.00	7.00
Local Democratic Governance	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	7.00	7.00
Democracy Score	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	6.93	6.96

Executive Summary

Containing strong elements of personal rulership, despotism, and constitutional subversion, Turkmenistan has the only remaining neo-Stalinist regime in the world, along with North Korea. Following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the course of independent Turkmenistan's development has been determined by the arbitrary and highly authoritarian rule of the country's first and only president, Saparmurat Niyazov, who has been in power since 1985 and was granted a lifetime presidency in 1999. President Niyazov's official title is Saparmurat Turkmenbashi (Leader of the Turkmen) the Great, and he enjoys a lavish cult of personality unrivaled in the former Soviet Union and, indeed, most of the world. Niyazov has undertaken reforms aimed primarily at centralizing his own rule, allowing him to exercise power without restraint.

In 2005, the state intensified its campaign to inculcate an official ideology glorifying Turkmenistan and its leader through the promotion of the Ruhnama (a two-volume national code of spiritual conduct, ostensibly written by Niyazov), which is required reading in all schools. Ethnic minorities continued to be affected by discriminatory practices denying them access to most higher education and jobs in the public sector. Government authorities engaged in repression of the country's two largest religious communities: the majority Sunni Muslim and the Russian Orthodox. Communication with the outside world was further obstructed through the prohibition of the import and circulation of all foreign print media, including those produced in neighboring countries. Niyazov restructured the lucrative hydrocarbons sector to put it under his direct control, and regular purges of the upper echelons of government led to even greater job insecurity and a concomitant increase in corruption.

National Democratic Governance. Although the Constitution of Turkmenistan stipulates the formal existence of executive, legislative, and judicial branches, in practice only the executive branch exercises any real power. The presence of a fourth branch of power, the People's Council, which was granted the status of the country's supreme representative body, has displaced even the formal legislative authority of the country's Parliament. In addition to his lifetime presidency, President Niyazov acts as chairman of the People's Council with lifetime tenure. The Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, of which Niyazov is chairman, remains the only legally registered party. Turkmenistan is a police state in which the activities of its citizens are carefully monitored by hypertrophied security agencies and the president's private militia, whose members receive favorable treatment relative to the rest of the population. A major tool used to buttress the president's lavish personality cult and to create a pseudo-state ideology is the Ruhnama (Book of the Soul), which has been accorded the de facto status of a holy book on a par with the Koran. Turkmenistan's rating for national democratic governance remains unchanged at 7.00.

Electoral Process. Electoral officials in Turkmenistan engage widely in irregular procedures, such as stuffing ballot boxes and making door-to-door home visits during which voters are urged to cast their ballots. Pressure is exerted on all civil servants to vote, and failure to do so can lead to reprisals. Turkmenistan is the only country in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) formally to remove limits on an incumbent president's term in office. Although he is highly unlikely to step down from power voluntarily, since 2001 President Niyazov has proposed on several occasions that an election be held before 2010, ostensibly to pass on the presidency before he reaches the age of 70. In October 2005, the People's Council, a pseudo-representative organ headed by Niyazov himself, once again rejected the president's proposal to hold presidential elections in 2009, pleading with him to remain in power until his death. While no date for a presidential election was set, the same session of the People's Council passed a resolution setting dates for elections to village, district, city and regional councils as well as to Parliament in 2006-2008. . Although in theory the creation of elected councils at the district, city and regional levels (village councils have been in existence since 1992) should lead to greater local autonomy, in practice the authorities thoroughly stage-manage Turkmenistan's elections, which have little to no bearing on the democratization process. No opposition parties or movements are officially registered in the country. Unrelenting harassment by the authorities has driven the relatively small Turkmen opposition either firmly underground or into exile. Turkmenistan's rating for electoral process remains unchanged at 7.00.

Civil Society. Although civil society has never thrived in Turkmenistan, steady repression by government authorities since 2002 in particular has forced those independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that had managed to gain a foothold in the newly independent state to either dissolve or merge with pro-government public associations. The few "NGOs" allowed to operate in Turkmenistan are generally government sponsored, such as the veterans' and youth associations, and the women's union, which is dedicated to the memory of President Niyazov's mother. Given the generally draconian restrictions on civic activism, the decriminalization of unregistered NGO activity in November 2004 has not had a significant practical impact on civil society. That same year, the government also introduced legislation facilitating the registration of minority religious communities, which allowed nine such groups to acquire official registration in 2004-2005. Despite this minimal progress, many minority religious groups remain unregistered. More importantly, registration has not brought the promised benefits, as registered and unregistered groups alike continue to be subject to police raids, detentions, fines, and other forms of harrassment. Especially outside the capital city of Ashgabat, minority religious groups have been prohibited from meeting, throwing into question the very purpose of the registration process. In 2005, in an ominous development for civil society, governmental authorities clamped down further on the country's two largest religious communities: the majority Sunni Muslim and the Russian Orthodox. Several mosques were destroyed, and Islamic religious training was effectively eliminated owing to cutbacks at the Faculty of Muslim Theology at Magtymguly Turkmen State University, which remains the only official institution for training imams. In May, Niyazov sought to further isolate the Russian Orthodox Church by attempting to subordinate it directly to the patriarchate in Moscow rather than to the Central Asian diocese in Tashkent, as is currently the case. Turkmenistan's rating for civil society remains unchanged at 7.00.

Independent Media. All state media in Turkmenistan are devoted primarily to extolling the activities and achievements of the president and are devoid of independent information. In 2005, the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders ranked Turkmenistan 165th out of 167 nations – immediately above Eritrea and North Korea – in its annual worldwide Press Freedom Index. Foreign journalists are rarely allowed to enter the country, and those who do gain entry are closely monitored by the State Service for the Registration of Foreigners. Currently in Ashgabat there is only one accredited foreign correspondent, who works for the Russian news agency ITAR-TASS. In 2005, another ITAR-TASS correspondent was arrested, accused of espionage, and given a 15-year prison sentence before ultimately being deported to Russia. Although satellite dishes are in widespread use in the capital city, cable television is banned throughout the country. The country's sole Internet provider, Turkmen Telecom, strictly controls all access to the Internet. The monitoring of e-mail by the state, blocked access to a growing number of Web sites critical of government policy, and high fees have successfully restricted use of the Internet to a small number of organizations and individuals. In April 2005, the government took further steps to limit freedom of information and obstruct communication with the outside world by prohibiting the import and circulation of all foreign print media, including those produced in neighboring countries. Inhabitants of Turkmenistan received no information from government media on the regime changes that occurred in 2003-2005 in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, or on the seizure of government buildings by insurgents and the subsequent shootings of unarmed civilians by government troops in the Uzbek city of Andijan in May 2005. As a result, much of the population – particularly in rural regions – has remained ignorant of the momentous changes occurring in other post-Soviet states. Turkmenistan's rating for independent media stays the same at 7.00.

Local Democratic Governance. Currently, local government in Turkmenistan consists of largely decorative village councils (gengeshes) and presidentially appointed governors that lack independence from the central government in Ashgabat. In an ostensible move to decentralize government powers and responsibilites, the People's Council amended the Constitution in October 2005 to provide for the holding of direct elections to district, city, and regional councils in 2006-2007. The new legislation transferred the right to appoint regional, district, and city governors from the president to regional, district, and city councils, respectively, which will elect leaders from among their memberships in an open ballot by a simple majority vote. Although in a less authoritarian state this transfer of power might have been hailed as a major step toward the devolution of authority from the center to local organs of government, in Niyazov's Turkmenistan all candidates for election to official posts are rigorously vetted in a preelection screening process designed to weed out any potentially disloyal deputies. Drastic cuts in the important spheres of education, social security, and health care – including the closure of regional hospitals – have further undermined local government and have had serious repercussions for the rural population in particular. Tribal identities remain strong in Turkmenistan and continue to play an important role in Turkmen society and informal local politics. Turkmenistan's rating for local democratic governance stays the same at 7.00. The legislative changes providing for the election of regional, city, and district governors, while a positive development, will likely not in practice result in a significant devolution of power or authority to local governments.

Judicial Framework and Independence. The Office of the Prosecutor General dominates a legal system in which judges and lawyers play a marginal role. Although formally independent, the court system has no impact on the observance of human rights but rather acts as an important instrument of repression for the regime. Convictions are based on confessions that are sometimes extracted by forcible means, including the use of torture. Turkmen authorities have refused to grant the International Committee of the Red Cross unaccompanied access to prisons, despite a visit from the vice president of that body in June 2005 for the purpose of attempting to hash out an agreement. Ethnic minorities – and Turkmenistan's ethnic Uzbek population in particular – are affected by discriminatory practices denying them access to most higher education and jobs in the public sector. In December 2005, new legislation was promulgated requiring all Turkmen citizens wanting to leave the country to acquire a foreign travel passport in addition to an identification card for use inside the country. According to the new law, the state can refuse to issue a foreign travel passport when the departure of the applicant from the country is contrary to national security interests. In November 2005, the United Nations Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) approved a resolution asking the General Assembly to express to the Turkmen government "its grave concern at continuing and serious human rights violations." Turkmenistan's rating for judicial framework and independence remains unchanged at 7.00.

Corruption. The existence of patronage networks as the basis of power in Turkmenistan has inevitably given rise to a political culture of bribery, nepotism, and embezzlement. Niyazov regularly purges the upper echelons of his government to diminish the power bases of political elites and rid it of potential rivals. Before 2000, dismissed officials as a rule were not imprisoned or sent into exile. In recent years, however, the dizzying pace at which government officials are regularly replaced, coupled with an increased fear of arbitrary reprisal, has meant that newly appointed officials attempt to acquire perks and exploit the privileges of their offices in record time. As a consequence, corruption – particularly embezzlement and bribe taking – has been steadily on the rise. Drastic cuts in pensions, massive redundancies in government jobs, the introduction of fees for medical services, and the use of military conscripts as a source of free labor in various sectors of the economy have all indicated that the state has been having difficulty funding its huge public sector. Although President Niyazov has sought to pin the blame for budget shortfalls on his subordinates by accusing them of mass embezzlement, a more likely explanation is Niyazov's continued diversion of ever larger sums from gas, oil, and cotton revenues to a special presidential fund, a large part of which is used to finance prestige construction projects. On the pretext of eliminating corruption, Niyazov enacted legislation giving himself direct control over the country's oil and gas resources, a development that is likely to lead to an even greater siphoning off of export revenues to his special fund. President Niyazov's assumption of direct control over the country's oil and gas resources is likely to raise corruption levels even further, with the result that Turkmenistan's rating for corruption deteriorates from 6.50 to 6.75.

Outlook for 2006. Despite regular declarations that presidential elections should be held in 2010, President Niyazov is highly unlikely to give up power voluntarily or to allow a successor to emerge. Niyazov still appears to have sufficient coercive and administrative power to retain control of the state, although the removal of several of his most senior and longest-serving officials in recent years indicates that his concern about the possibility of a palace coup has been mounting. In view of the low level of politicization of Turkmenistan's population, a popular uprising is unlikely. Perhaps the most immediate threat to the current regime is the ill health of the president, who has suffered from cardiovascular problems since at least the early 1990s. Given the absence of an heir apparent, regime change in Turkmenistan, when it comes, could thrust the country into a conflict between disgruntled former officials and officials in the state apparatus attempting to hold on to power. Infighting among members of the latter group is likely to exacerbate political instability.

Electoral Process (Score: 7.00)

No opposition parties or movements are officially registered in Turkmenistan. Unrelenting harassment by the authorities has driven the relatively small Turkmen opposition either underground or into exile. In September 2003, following a two-day meeting in Prague, the Czech Republic, several members of Turkmenistan's opposition parties and movements issued a communiqué announcing their decision to form the Union of Democratic Forces of Turkmenistan (UDFT). The UDFT consists of four main groups: the Republican Party of Turkmenistan, the Vatan (Fatherland) Social Political Movement, the United Democratic Opposition of Turkmenistan, and the Revival Social Political Movement. Despite the UDFT's stated goal to work together to remove Niyazov from power, the opposition in exile remains small, weak, poor, and prone to internal division.

Independent Turkmenistan held its first direct presidential election in June 1992 under a new Constitution, although Niyazov had been popularly elected to the presidency by direct ballot only 20 months previously, in October 1990. According to official results, voter participation in 1992 was 99.8 percent, with 99 percent of all votes cast in favor of Niyazov. In January 1994, a nationwide referendum overwhelmingly prolonged Niyazov's presidential mandate until 2002, exempting him from another popular election in 1997, as required by the Constitution. Following months of speculation on the introduction of a "life presidency," the Parliament approved amendments to the Constitution at the end of December 1999 that removed the maximum two-term provision, thereby enabling Niyazov to retain his presidential post until his death. Turkmenistan therefore became the first country in the CIS to formally abandon both regularly scheduled presidential elections and popular referendums designed to extend the incumbent president's term in office.

The majority of the seats in the People's Council are distributed among parliamentary deputies and other governmental officials, with the result that the Turkmen population elects only a minority of its deputies. The most recent elections to the People's Council, as well as to local representative bodies, were held in April 2003 amid a near total absence of information about the candidates or their platforms. Electoral officials claimed a 99.8 percent voter turnout.

The first parliamentary elections in independent Turkmenistan took place in December 1994, when 49 candidates stood unopposed for the 50-member unicameral legislature (2 candidates contested the remaining seat). Parliamentary elections were again held in December 1999, with a declared participation of 98.9 percent of the country's electorate. Although 104 candidates stood for the 50 parliamentary seats, nearly all were members of Niyazov's ruling DPT and served the state in some official capacity. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) declined to send a monitoring mission on the grounds that "the legislative framework is inadequate for even a minimally democratic election."

In line with previous elections, the country's third parliamentary elections on December 19,2004, were widely regarded as a purely ceremonial exercise. Although 131 candidates vied for 50 seats, all had been approved by governmental authorities prior to the elections. Candidates initially were selected by district authorities and then vetted by regional authorities before being referred to the presidential administration for final approval. All candidates were members of Turkmenistan's sole registered political party, the DPT. As in the past, the Turkmen authorities did not invite international observers – including observers from other CIS countries – to monitor the parliamentary elections, asserting that national officials were capable of monitoring the event without outside help. The elections were thus monitored by some 200 national observers and employees from Turkmenistan's National Institute of Democracy and Human Rights, which is directly subordinated to the president, together with individuals from other organizations that had nominated candidates, such as the youth association and women's union.

During Turkmenistan's 14-year history of independent rule, electoral officials have declared near 100 percent voter turnout rates for all elections and referendums. To achieve such spectacularly high participation rates, electoral officials engage widely in irregular procedures, such as stuffing ballot boxes and making door-to-door home visits during which voters are urged to cast their ballots. Pressure is exerted on all civil servants to vote, and failure to do so can lead to reprisals. Despite these undemocratic tactics to encourage voting, unprecedented voter apathy resulted in a record low turnout of only 76.88 percent for the December 2004 parliamentary elections. Authorities attributed the low participation rate to unusually cold weather conditions.

Although he is highly unlikely to step down from power voluntarily, President Niyazov has proposed on several occasions since 2001 that presidential elections be held before 2010, ostensibly to pass on the presidency before he reaches the age of 70 in 2010. His proposals are invariably singled out by members of the People's Council, who in publicly staged protests plead with him to stay in office until the end of his lifetime. As in previous years, delegates at the October 2005 session overwhelmingly passed a resolution in favor of removing the issue of presidential elections from the agenda, with the president casting the only dissenting vote. Following Niyazov's protests that "nothing in this world is eternal" and "the fate of the nation cannot depend on one person," a compromise was reached to postpone the discussion of presidential elections until 2009. Despite this decision, Niyazov is certain to continue to raise the issue of presidential elections at regular intervals, as he appears to believe that his proposals to arrange for an orderly succession win him public relations points with the international community.

Although no date was set for a presidential election, the same session of the Halk Maslakhaty passed a resolution setting dates for elections to village-level councils (gengeshes); district, city and regional-level councils (Halk Maslakhaty); and to the parliament (Mejlis). Elections to gengeshes are scheduled for July 2006, elections to district- and city-level Halk Maslakhaty will be held in December 2006, and elections to regional-level Halk Maslakhaty will be held in December 2007. Elections to the Parliament are scheduled for December 2008. Additionally, the elections of people's representatives to the People's Council (one from each of the country's 60 districts) will be held in December 2008. Although in theory the creation of elected councils at the district, city and regional levels should lead to greater local autonomy, in practice the authorities thoroughly stage-manage Turkmenistan's elections, which have little to no bearing on the democratization process.

Civil Society (Score: 7.00)

Although civil society has never thrived in Turkmenistan, steady repression by government authorities since 2002 in particular has forced those independent NGOs that had managed to gain a foothold in the newly independent state to either dissolve or merge with pro-government public associations. According to Counterpart Consortium, a U.S. NGO supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development, in 2000 there were approximately 200 to 300 registered and unregistered NGOs in Turkmenistan. By the beginning of 2005, that number had dwindled to 91, according to official statistics released by the Ministry of Fairness. The vast majority either supported the government or received funding from the government. There are no independent trade unions, and the successor to the Soviet-era Federation of Trade Unions remains linked to the government. Other government-organized "NGOs" include the veterans' association, the youth association, the journalists union, and the Humanitarian Association of World Turkmen. The women's union, which is dedicated to the memory of President Niyazov's mother, is the only officially registered women's NGO.

Civil society in Turkmenistan was paralyzed by fallout from an attempted coup on November 25,2002, when former foreign minister Boris Shikhmuradov and his fellow oppositionists staged an effort to forcibly remove Niyazov from power as his motorcade was traveling through Ashgabat. Turkmen authorities immediately publicized the attack as a failed assassination plot, although the opposition has declared that Shikhmuradov's aim was to capture Niyazov and force him to renounce power rather than to assassinate him. Niyazov used the attempted coup to his advantage by incarcerating some of his major opponents, including Shikhmuradov, and implementing a series of new measures that curbed civil liberties even further. A new wave of repression and witch hunts was initiated in the aftermath of the armed endeavor, resulting in the arrest of at least 200 individuals with purported connections to the opposition, of whom approximately 60 were ultimately convicted for their alleged role in the coup attempt. Niyazov proposed to the People's Council that a new maximum penalty of life imprisonment with no possibility of pardon, amnesty, or parole be introduced for the crime of treason, which was very broadly defined as any crime against the state or the president. Independent civil society activists became frequent targets of detention and harassment, while Turkmenistan's government-sponsored "NGOs" were used as part of a propaganda campaign to demonstrate support for the president. Mass meetings were held and rallies staged, with participants calling for the "people's enemies" to be put to death.

Civil society activists were repressed further in November 2003 when an unprecedented presidential decree was signed into law requiring all NGOs to register or reregister with the Ministry of Fairness or face fines, corrective labor, and possible prison sentences with the confiscation of property. The law gave the authorities the right to exercise complete control over the funding and activities of NGOs, thereby effectively limiting the ability of foreign donors to provide financial aid and other assistance to civil society groups. As a result, many independent NGOs ceased to exist or began to operate under the safer label of 'initiative group.' In early 2004, the Dashoguz Ecological Club and the Ecological Club Catena – two of Turkmenistan's oldest operating NGOs – were stripped of their legal registration.

In a move apparently designed to assuage international criticism of Turkmenistan's human rights practices, the government published new legislation in November 2004 abolishing criminal penalties for activities undertaken by unregistered NGOs, thereby reversing the November 2003 legislation. However, the decriminalization of unregistered NGO activity has not had a significant practical impact on civil society given the generally draconian restrictions on civic activism.

As with political parties and public associations, all religious congregations must register with the Ministry of Fairness to gain legal status. Before 2004, the only religions that had managed to register successfully were Sunni Islam and Russian Orthodox Christianity, although they were still subject to tight government controls. In March 2004, President Niyazov issued a decree pledging to register all religious groups regardless of creed or number. The law was amended accordingly to reduce the number of adult citizens needed to register a religious community with the Ministry of Fairness from 500 to 5. As a result of these changes, four minority religious groups managed to gain registration in 2004: Seventh-day Adventists, Baha'is, Baptists, and Hare Krishnas. In 2005, five more Protestant churches were granted registration (the Greater Grace Church, the Church of Christ, the New Apostolic Church, and the Full Gospel Pentecostal Church in Ashgabat; and the Light of the East Pentecostal Church in Dashoguz).

Yet despite this minimal progress, many minority religious groups remain unregistered, such as the Catholic, Lutheran, Jehovah's Witness, Armenian Apostolic, and Jewish communities. More important, registration has not brought the promised benefits, as registered and unregistered groups alike continue to experience police raids, detentions, fines, and other forms of harrassment. Especially outside Ashgabat, minority religious groups have been prohibited from meeting, throwing into question the very purpose of the registration process.

Turkmen authorities eliminated criminal penalties for members of unregistered religious groups in May 2004. (In November 2003, Turkmenistan had tightened its Law on Religion and adopted amendments to the criminal code that imposed penalties of up to one year's imprisonment for unregistered religious activity, which had hitherto been considered an administrative offense.) According to the current law, congregations that are not registered with the Ministry of Fairness are prohibited from proselytizing, gathering publicly, and disseminating religious materials, and violators are subject to penalties under the administrative code. In practice, however, state agencies have continued to treat unregistered religious activity as a criminal offense, and some believers have been given long prison sentences or sent into internal exile.

In 2005, religious freedoms were further restricted in Turkmenistan despite the registration of a handful of minority religious groups and the freeing of some prisoners of conscience. In an ominous development for civil society, governmental authorities clamped down further on the country's two largest religious communities: the majority Sunni Muslim and the Russian Orthodox. Several mosques were destroyed, and Islamic religious training was effectively eliminated owing to cutbacks at the Faculty of Muslim Theology at Magtymguly Turkmen State University, which remains the only official institution for training imams. In May, Niyazov attempted to further isolate the Russian Orthodox Church by seeking to subordinate it directly to the Patriarchate in Moscow rather than to the Central Asian diocese in Tashkent, as is presently the case. Such a move would have eliminated what little authority the Central Asian diocese exerts over Turkmenistan's Orthodox Church, thereby giving President Niyazov even greater control. Russian Orthodox are prohibited from bringing religious literature into the country, and requests from Russian priests wanting to serve in Turkmenistan have been routinely turned down. As a 10-member coalition of NGOs based in the United States and Europe noted in a letter to the U.S. secretary of state, the government of Turkmenistan "no longer simply controls religion; it is actively trying to eliminate even state-controlled religions in order to establish a new religion based on the personality of the president."

Independent Media (Score: 7.00)

All media in Turkmenistan are devoted primarily to extolling the activities and achievements of the president and are devoid of independent information. In 2005, the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders ranked Turkmenistan 165th out of 167 nations – immediately above Eritrea and North Korea – in its annual worldwide Press Freedom Index. The president is the formal founder of the country's 23 registered newspapers and 14 registered journals and personally appoints all editors, who are answerable to him. The 4 state television channels and state radio function as mouthpieces for government propaganda.

Foreign journalists are rarely allowed to enter the country, and those who do gain entry are closely monitored by the State Service for the Registration of Foreigners. Currently in Ashgabat there is only one accredited foreign correspondent, who works for the Russian news agency ITAR-TASS. In 2005, another ITAR-TASS correspondent was arrested, accused of espionage, and given a 15-year prison sentence before ultimately being deported to Russia.

Cable television – which had provided access to Russian channels and acted as the country's main source of alternative information – was banned in July 2002 after Russian television broadcast footage of poverty in Turkmenistan. During the same month, Turkmenistan's Ministry of Communications halted the import of Russian newspapers and magazines, citing high airmail delivery rates. In July 2004, Turkmen authorities suspended the transmission of Russia's Radio Mayak, which was highly popular in Turkmenistan and acted as one of the last independent media sources in the country aside from a few foreign broadcasts on shortwave radio directed at Turkmen listeners. Satellite dishes are still tolerated and in widespread use in the capital city but are prohibitively expensive for the vast majority of the population.

All access to the Internet is strictly controlled by the country's sole Internet provider, Turkmen Telecom. The monitoring of e-mail by the state, blocked access to a growing number of Web sites critical of government policy, and high fees have successfully restricted use of the Internet to a small number of organizations and individuals. According to the International Crisis Group, it was estimated that in 2004 there were only some 8,000 Internet connections in the country, although the number of users was undoubtedly higher.

A major propaganda effort to improve Turkmenistan's international image was undertaken in October 2004 when the country launched a new multilingual satellite television service. TV4 Turkmenistan, initiated by President Niyazov at an estimated cost of US$12 million, broadcasts programs in Turkmen and six foreign languages: English, Russian, Chinese, French, Arabic, and Persian. According to Niyazov, the channel's purpose is to report on various aspects of life in Turkmenistan while focusing on the country's achievements.

In April 2005, the government took further steps to limit freedom of information and obstruct communication with the outside world by prohibiting the importation and circulation of all foreign print media, including those produced in neighboring countries. In the same month, Turkmenistan refused to extend the licenses of international shipping firms and express couriers, arguing that the state postal service is less costly and more reliable.

Inhabitants of Turkmenistan received no information from government media on the regime changes that occurred in 2003-2005 in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan or on the seizure of government buildings by insurgents and the subsequent shootings of unarmed civilians by government troops in the Uzbek city of Andijan in May 2005, with the result that much of the country's (particularly rural) population remained ignorant of the momentous changes occurring in other post-Soviet states.

Judicial Framework and Independence (Score: 7.00)

On May 18,1992, Turkmenistan's Parliament adopted a new Constitution – the first Central Asian state to enact such a document after the dissolution of the USSR. The Constitution guarantees in theory the protection of basic rights and liberties, equality under the law, and the separation of religion and state. Amendments have been made to the Constitution since its original adoption, including eliminating the two-term limit for the president, prohibiting citizens from Turkmenistan from holding dual citizenship, and redefining the status and function of the People's Council. In 2005, the Constitution was amended to provide for the election of regional, city, and district governors.

Unchanged since the Soviet era, the court system in Turkmenistan consists of a Supreme Court, 6 regional courts (including 1 for the city of Ashgabat), and, at the lowest level, 61 district and city courts. In addition, the Supreme Economic Court hears all commercial disputes and cases involving conflicts between state enterprises and ministries. Because all military courts were abolished in 1997, criminal offenses committed by military personnel are tried in civilian courts under the authority of the Office of the Prosecutor General. Although formally independent, the court system has no impact on the observance of human rights but rather acts as an important instrument of repression for the regime.

The president appoints all judges for five-year terms without legislative review. The Office of the Prosecutor General dominates a legal system in which judges and lawyers play a marginal role. As in the former Soviet Union, convictions are based on confessions that are sometimes extracted by forcible means, including the use of torture and psychotropic substances.

Despite its accession to a number of international human rights agreements, which theoretically take precedence over state law, Turkmenistan has perhaps the poorest human rights record of any former Soviet republic. In December 2002, widespread concern about human rights violations prompted 10 participating states of the OSCE to invoke for the first time in 10 years the so-called Moscow Mechanism, which provides for the establishment of a fact-finding mission of rapporteurs to investigate reported violations. The OSCE report, released in March 2003, was harshly critical of human rights practices in Turkmenistan, even calling for the UN General Assembly to reexamine its 1995 recognition of Turkmenistan's status as a neutral country. In addition to the OSCE, the European Parliament, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the UN General Assembly have all adopted separate resolutions condemning Niyazov's regime for its human rights violations. In November 2005, for the third consecutive year, the United Nations Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian, Cultural) approved a resolution asking the General Assembly to express to the Turkmen government "its grave concern about continuing and serious human rights violations."

Arbitrary arrest and detention remains a widespread practice in Turkmenistan, despite laws prohibiting it. Prison riots are a relatively common occurrence, apparently provoked by inhumane conditions. The Turkmen government has admitted to chronic overcrowding in cells, which has led to prisoners being stifled to death in extreme summer heat. Food and water remain in short supply, and prisoners are not generally provided with medical aid. Poor sanitary conditions have precipitated outbreaks of cholera, tuberculosis, and other infectious diseases. Human rights organizations have reported that inmates are routinely beaten and tortured. Turkmen authorities have refused to grant the International Committee of the Red Cross unaccompanied access to prisons, despite a visit from the vice president of that body in June 2005 for the purpose of attempting to hash out an agreement. In October 2005, under an annual amnesty mandated by a 1999 law and presidential decree, the government released an estimated 8,145 inmates – two-thirds of the prison population – causing the incidence of muggings and burglaries to rise markedly in the ensuing weeks. Although individuals convicted of serious crimes are theoretically ineligible for amnesty, those who can pay bribes – excluding political prisoners – are generally freed, regardless of the type of crime they were imprisoned for. Although the annual amnesties serve temporarily to relieve overcrowding, prisons quickly fill up again owing to the overall high number of arrests.

In 1999, Turkmenistan became the first CIS country to embark upon the establishment of a visa regime inside the territory of the former USSR, by withdrawing from the so-called Bishkek accord, which had established visa-free travel for citizens of the CIS. It also required its own citizens to obtain exit visas, often at considerable expense, to travel to foreign states, including neighboring CIS countries. Although the requirement for Turkmen citizens to obtain exit visas was temporarily suspended amid much publicity in January 2002, it was restored in March 2003 in the wake of the November 2002 attempted coup. However, in January 2004 the exit visa regime for citizens of Turkmenistan was again abolished, although in its stead the government implemented a number of unofficial measures to prevent free travel, such as the drawing up of an extensive "blacklist" of citizens who are prohibited from leaving the country, the arbitrary confiscation of passports, and the closure of border checkpoints. In March 2004, the president issued the Decree on the Improvement of Exit Procedures for the Citizens of Turkmenistan, after which it was reportedly somewhat easier for citizens to travel abroad. In December 2005, new legislation was promulgated requiring all Turkmen citizens wanting to leave the country to acquire a foreign travel passport in addition to an identification card for use inside the country. According to the new Law on Migration, the state can refuse to issue a foreign travel passport when the departure of the applicant from the country is deemed to go against national security interests.

In line with other post-Soviet states, Turkmenistan has accorded a de facto higher status to its titular population, ethnic Turkmen, and has legitimized the adoption of policies and practices that promote their specific interests. In 2000, Turkmen was introduced as the language of instruction in all the country's schools, including in regions where ethnic Uzbeks or Kazakhs are preponderant. Higher education and jobs in the public sector have been effectively closed to non-Turkmen. Senior state officials must be able to demonstrate ethnic purity by tracing their Turkmen ancestry back several generations. Members of ethnic minorities are not allowed to apply for positions in the judicial system, in law enforcement and security agencies, or in financial and military organizations. Job applicants are required to fill out a personal information form (maglumat), a practice that enables employers to deny jobs to non-Turkmen as well as to those with foreign qualifications or criminal records. In addition to fluency in Turkmen, knowledge of the Ruhnama is a requirement for work in the public sector, which remains the main supplier of jobs.

The president has attempted to eliminate the use of Russian as the main language of communication with either the outside world or among ethnic communities within the country. The Russian media are inaccessible, and Russian has been excluded from virtually all spheres of education. Although in 1991 Turkmenistan had nearly 1,500 Russian-language schools, in 2004 there was only 1, located in the Russian embassy in Ashgabat. Following the suspension of Russia's Radio Mayak in July 2004, the government mouthpiece, Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan, has remained the only Russian-language media source of information for the country's Russian-speaking population, which includes ethnic Armenians, Jews, and Ukrainians, among others.

These discriminatory practices have particularly affected ethnic Uzbeks. Since the end of 2002, several thousand people, primarily ethnic Uzbeks, have been forcibly relocated from the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan border areas to desert regions in northwestern Turkmenistan. This policy presumably serves the dual purpose of reducing irredentist sentiment among Uzbeks in Turkmenistan and increasing population density in scarcely populated regions of the country. Like Russian and Kazakh schools, schools with Uzbek as the primary language of instruction have been gradually forced to switch over to Turkmen. Moreover, by the end of 2004 virtually all ethnic Uzbeks in high- and middle-level administrative positions in Dashoguz velayat, located on the Uzbek-Turkmen border, had been removed from their positions. Even in areas of Turkmenistan where ethnic Uzbeks constitute the majority of the population, they no longer serve as district governors, farm chairmen, or school principals.

Corruption (Score: 6.75)

In its Corruptions Perceptions Index for 2005, Transparency International ranked Turkmenistan as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, giving it a score of 1.8 (with 10 "highly clean" and 0 "highly corrupt"). Of the 159 countries ranked in its index, only Chad and Bangladesh were perceived as more corrupt than Turkmenistan, both of which received scores of 1.7.

Rather than by the rule of law, the actual dispensation of power in Turkmenistan is determined by the vast machinery of patronage that has created local constituencies and regional alliances. Political elites have traditionally built up local power bases by allocating key posts and opportunities to their loyalists. These informal networks, which have survived the demise of the Soviet system, are frequently referred to as "clans," although they are based on patron-client relationships, often with links to extended families, rather than on actual blood ties. The existence of patronage networks as the basis of power has inevitably given rise to a political culture of bribery, nepotism, and embezzlement. Significantly, senior officials in the central government as well as regional governors have direct access to state revenues, which they use to buy the loyalty of subordinates.

Turkmenistan has continued to act as a transshipment point for illicit drugs from Afghanistan to Western Europe. It has been estimated by the international human rights group Turkmenistan Helsinki Foundation and other NGOs that Turkmenistan has the highest number of regular drug users per capita in the Central Asian region. In addition to drug smugglers, the narcotics trade is an important source of income for a large number of government officials, including employees of the security agencies and the border service.

Although the overall turnover rate of officials in Turkmenistan is extremely high, senior regional officials in particular tend to remain in their positions for very short periods, generally for less than a year. Given their brief tenure in office, hakims are inclined to give low priority to solving the problems of their respective regions, preferring instead to use their short time in power to amass personal economic benefits. Before 2000, dismissed officials as a rule were not imprisoned or sent into exile. In recent years, however, the dizzying pace at which governmental officials are regularly replaced, coupled with an increased fear of arbitrary reprisal, has meant that newly appointed officials attempt to acquire perks and exploit the privileges of their positions in record time. As a consequence, corruption, particularly embezzlement and bribe taking, has been steadily on the rise.

In recent years, drastic cuts in pensions , massive redundancies in government jobs, the introduction of fees for medical services, and the use of military conscripts as a source of free labor in various sectors of the economy have all indicated that the state has been having difficulty funding its huge public sector, despite official reports of record foreign trade surpluses. Although President Niyazov has sought to pin the blame for budget shortfalls on his subordinates by accusing them of mass embezzlement, a more likely explanation is the continued diversion by Niyazov of ever larger sums from gas, oil, and cotton revenues to a special presidential fund, which is located in European and other bank accounts. This foreign exchange reserve fund, which does not form part of the state budget and is under Niyazov's control, is estimated to be worth at least 60 percent of the country's gross domestic product, with export revenues providing its main source of inflow.

A significant portion of the foreign exchange reserve fund is used to subsidize prestige construction projects commissioned by the president. More than US$1 billion has been spent during Turkmenistan's independence on such projects, including a palace of congresses and arts, an independence park, two stadiums, a national museum, a series of luxury hotels, and a horse-racing center. The construction of a national theater of music and drama, a new library and exhibition center, a children's attraction park, an aquarium, a zoo, and even an ice palace and funicular railway are under way. The construction of Central Asia's largest mosque, located in Niyazov's hometown of Gipchak, is estimated to have cost US$86 million. Furthermore, Niyazov has undertaken the construction of a gigantic artificial lake in the Karakum Desert, with a planned capacity of twice that of Central Asia's entire reservoir.

In December 2005, President Niyazov undertook the restructuring of the country's lucrative hydrocarbons sector, on which Turkmenistan is dependent for the bulk of its export revenues. Even before that move, the dismissal of two of his most senior oil and gas officials earlier in the year (the first in May and the second in August), followed by the removal of a number of sector leaders from September onward, had already left that key area of the economy in a state of disarray. On the pretext of eliminating corruption, Niyazov announced that he would henceforth assume direct personal control over all of the country's natural gas exports, stating that "no contract will be valid without my signature." New legislation restricting the ability of the country's main oil and gas companies to sign contracts, explore for new fields, or enter into joint ventures without the president's authorization is likely to lead to a further increase in corruption by allowing for an even greater siphoning off of export revenues to Niyazov's special presidential fund.

Author

Annette Bohr is an associate fellow of the Russian and Eurasia Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London (Chatham House). She is the author or coauthor of numerous articles and two monographs on Central Asian politics, contemporary history, and ethnic and language policies.

Local Governance (Score: 7.00)

In a move purportedly intended to decentralize government powers and responsibilities, the People's Council amended the Constitution in October 2005 to provide for the holding of direct elections to district, city, and regional councils, although this seeming move toward democratization is unlikely to have a significant impact in practice. Currently, local government in Turkmenistan consists of largely decorative village councils and presidentially appointed governors that lack independence from the central government in Ashgabat. Executive power in Turkmenistan's five velayats and in the city of Ashgabat is vested in the hakims, who are appointed by the president to execute his instructions. Below the velayat level, the president also appoints the executive heads of the cities and districts (shakher hakims and etrap hakims, respectively), purportedly based on the recommendations of the respective velayat-level hakims. Regarding representative organs in the villages, the 1992 Constitution provided for the replacement of local soviets by councils (gengeshes), whose members are directly elected for five-year terms. The 528 gengeshes are administered by archins, who are elected from among their respective memberships. Some 5,500 deputies were elected to local gengeshes in April 2003 with little transparency and minimal media coverage and preelection campaigning.

In accordance with a resolution of the People's Council, elections to village-level gengeshes, district, city and regional level councils will be held in 2006-2007. District and city councils will each consist of 40 members, while regional councils will each consist of 80 members.

Perhaps more significant than the creation of new local bodies of power, the constitutional amendment transferred the right to appoint regional, district, and city hakims from the president to the regional, district, and city councils, respectively (the heads of the village councils – the archins – are already elected from among the membership of those councils), which will henceforth elect the governors from among their memberships in an open ballot by a simple majority vote. Although in a less totalitarian state this transfer of power might have been hailed as a major step toward the devolution of authority from the center to local organs of government, in Niyazov's Turkmenistan all candidates for election to official posts are carefully vetted in a preelection screening process designed to weed out any potentially disloyal deputies. Moreover, although the president no longer appoints regional governors, it is unclear whether or not he retains the right to dismiss them, since according to the new phrasing of the relevant constitutional article (Article 79), 'the hakims are representatives of the president of Turkmenistan, the head of state, in the regions, and are accountable to him.' (The new local bodies of power, by contrast, are accountable to the people.) If the president does indeed retain the power to dismiss the elected governors, then the new reform of local government will be rendered virtually meaningless.

Tribal identities remain strong in Turkmenistan and continue to play an important role in Turkmen society and informal local politics. The largest tribes are the Tekke in south-central Turkmenistan (Ahal Tekke and Mary Tekke), the Ersary near the region of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border, the Yomud in western and northeastern Turkmenistan, and the Saryks in the southernmost corner of the country. Unlike in parts of Africa, for example, where both formal and informal tribal associations have played a significant role in political mobilization and local governance, in Turkmenistan tribalism manifests itself primarily in social practices, such as the maintenance of preferential networks, endogamy, and the persistence of dialects.

However, the exit of the Russian nomenklatura following the collapse of the USSR led to a gradual resurgence of traditionally minded regional elites vying for their economic interests, which in turn prompted Niyazov to rely more and more on a policy of divide and rule with regard to tribal and regional politics. Although a sense of national identity is being promoted at the state level, hakims are often, although not always, members of the tribe that is dominant in their respective regions. A disproportionate number of influential positions in central and regional government tend to go to members of Niyazov's own tribe, the Ahal Tekke.

Since approximately 2000, the government has been engaged in the systematic dismantling of key areas of the public sector, effectively undermining local government in the important spheres of education, health care, and social security, with serious repercussions for the rural population in particular. The majority of children in Turkmenistan no longer have adequate access to education. In many rural schools, it is estimated that one-half of classroom time is allocated to the study of Niyazov's quasi-spiritual guide, the Ruhnama, and other writings devoted to furthering his personality cult. In addition, students must demonstrate knowledge of the Ruhnama in order to be admitted to higher educational establishments. Over 12,000 teachers have been made redundant through a 2000 presidential decree, including those with degrees from foreign universities, which are no longer recognized. Class sizes have increased and facilities have deteriorated as state funds earmarked for education have diminished. The number of student places in institutes of higher education has been reduced by nearly 75 percent, and primary and secondary education has been reduced from 11 to 9 years (a circumstance that complicates the entry of Turkmen students into foreign universities). Only those who have completed two years of work experience after leaving school are allowed to go on to higher education, and the term of higher education has been reduced to just two years. All correspondence and evening courses have been liquidated. The dismantling of the education system has put in doubt the ability of the next generation of Turkmen to compete successfully in the global market.

In addition to the education sector, health care services in Turkmenistan have been systematically undermined. In March 2004,15,000 health workers (including doctors, nurses, midwives, and medical attendants) were dismissed and replaced by untrained military conscripts. Additionally, the March "reforms" introduced user fees for specialist services that had previously been free of charge, making treatment unaffordable for many patients. In a portentous development that could initiate a public health crisis, in February 2005 President Niyazov announced a plan to close all hospitals outside Ashgabat. Claiming that regional hospitals are "not needed," he said that citizens in the country's regions will have access only to medical diagnostic centers – which require payment for services – to obtain prescriptions and general advice, while those in need of hospitalization or specialist care will be required to travel to Ashgabat. Hospital closures affect those in remote rural regions first and foremost, since both distance and the cost of travel will deprive many of the possibility to receive both emergency and specialist medical treatment.

National Governance (Score: 7.00)

Turkmenistan is a police state in which the activities of its citizens are carefully monitored by hypertrophied internal security agencies and the president's private militia, whose members receive favorable treatment relative to the rest of the population, such as higher salaries and privileged accommodation. The Ministry for National Security (MNB) has the responsibilities held by the Committee for State Security during the Soviet period – namely, to ensure that the regime remains in power through tight control of society and by discouraging dissent. The Ministry of Internal Affairs directs the criminal police, who work closely with the MNB on matters of national security. Both ministries have abused the rights of individuals and enforced the government's policy of repressing political opposition.

Since the coup attempt in November 2002 – when oppositionists led by Boris Shikhmuradov, a former long-serving foreign minister, sought forcibly to remove the president from power – Niyazov appears to have relied less on the MNB while devolving greater powers to his own security service, the Presidential Guard. Consisting of some 2,000 to 3,000 former security agents whose loyalty to the president has been tested over time, the Presidential Guard is not subordinated to any security service and carries out a wide range of functions on Niyazov's personal orders. Both the Presidential Guard and the MNB operate with impunity.

Although the Constitution of Turkmenistan stipulates the formal existence of executive, legislative, and judicial branches, in practice only the executive branch exercises any real power. The Parliament (Majlis) has been transformed into a presidential appendage, and presidential decree is the usual mode of legislation. All political parties must be registered with the Ministry of Justice (renamed the Ministry of Fairness in September 2003), thereby allowing the government to deny official status to groups that are critical of its policies. In December 1991, the Communist Party of Turkmenistan renamed itself the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT) and confirmed Niyazov as chairman, leaving the old Communist power structure essentially intact. Other than Niyazov's DPT and the pro-government National Revival Movement, no parties or movements are legally registered in the country. The Constitution proscribes the formation of parties with a religious or nationalist orientation (Article 28). However, since the government prevents all parties other than the DPT from registering and functioning, this ban is of little relevance. In April 2005, President Niyazov declared that a multiparty system – with a minimum of two parties in addition to Niyazov's DPT – would be in place by the time of the proposed presidential elections in 2009. However, any parties created under Niyazov's regime are highly likely to be pro-governmental 'pocket' parties.

During his reorganization of political structures in 1992, President Niyazov created the People's Council (Halk Maslakhaty) to recall the Turkmen "national tradition" of holding tribal assemblies in order to solve society's most pressing problems. According to a constitutional amendment and constitutional Law on the People's Council, which were passed by that same body in August 2003, the council was elevated to the status of a "permanently functioning supreme representative body of popular authority." The 2,507-member People's Council consists of the president, the members of Parliament, the chairman of the Supreme Court, the prosecutor general, the members of the Council of Ministers, the governors (hakims) of the five regions (velayats), and the hakim of the city of Ashgabat; people's representatives elected from each district; the chairpersons of officially recognized parties, the youth association, trade unions, and the women's union; the chairpersons of public organizations; representatives of the Council of Elders; the hakims of cities that are the administrative centers of the velayats and districts (etraps); and the heads of the municipal councils (archins) of the towns and villages that are the administrative centers of the districts.

The August 2003 law ascribed to the People's Council a number of legislative powers, including the passing of constitutional laws, thereby officially displacing the Parliament as the country's primary legislative body. The constitutional amendment confirmed the People's Council's hitherto de facto status as a fourth branch of power. In reality, proposals put forward by Niyazov at sessions of the People's Council are invariably adopted unanimously by that body, which acts to officially validate the president's policies. At the same time that the status of the People's Council was formally upgraded in August 2003, Niyazov was unanimously elected chairman of the People's Council, with a lifetime tenure. Since, according to the Constitution, the president of Turkmenistan is accountable to the chairman of the People's Council, Niyazov will remain ex officio head of state whether or not presidential elections are ultimately held.

Officials in Niyazov's regime are appointed based on their complete loyalty and subservience to the president rather than on a system of merits. Niyazov, who is also the prime minister, regularly purges the upper echelons of his government to diminish the power base of political elites and rid it of potential rivals. Since 2000, Niyazov's regular reshuffling of ministers and other high-level public sector officials has greatly accelerated in both intensity and scope, possibly reflecting an increasing inability to trust his officials as well as a growing sense of vulnerability.

According to the calculations of the opposition Republican Party of Turkmenistan (in exile), as of August 2005,58 deputy prime ministers had been dismissed in the 14-year history of independent Turkmenistan, of whom only 5 continued to work in civil service positions. The remaining 53 were either imprisoned, in exile, unemployed, or under house arrest. In the first half of 2005, in addition to a number of ministers, deputy ministers, and regional governors, the president dismissed two of his most senior officials, both of whom appeared to be his possible successors. In May, Yolly Gurbanmuradov, the deputy prime minister with responsibility for the lucrative oil and gas sector, was arrested and convicted of embezzlement and espionage. The long-serving Rejep Saparov, a deputy prime minister from 1992 to 2002 and head of the presidential administration until his dismissal in July 2005, was found guilty of corruption and sentenced to 20 years in prison.

As in most personalized dictatorships, Niyazov's style of rule is marked by his own idiosyncracies and a significant degree of interference in the private affairs of the country's citizens. Having outlawed in 2004, inter alia, the wearing of facial hair by young men and the use of makeup by television presenters, in August 2005 Niyazov banned recorded music and "lip synching" at weddings, funerals, and other cultural events in order to continue "the glorious musical traditions founded by our ancestors." Perhaps the most visible component of Niyazov's authoritarian regime is a highly developed personality cult. The president's portrait is ubiquitous throughout the country, and monuments to him have been erected in all cities and densely populated areas of the country. His name, the title Turkmenbashi, and his nickname ("Serdar," meaning "Supreme Chieftain") have been given to several thousand locales and objects, including at least two cities; several districts and villages; the country's main airport; a military institute; a multitude of farms, streets, and squares; a brand of vodka; and the country's highest mountain peak. Study of Niyazov's multivolumed writings has been introduced as mandatory in all educational establishments, and his cult of personality has been extended to include his deceased parents.

A major tool used to buttress this lavish personality cult and to create a pseudo-state ideology is the Ruhnama (Book of the Soul), a national code of spiritual conduct ostensibly written by Niyazov. Published in two volumes, the Ruhnama embodies Niyazov's personal reflections on Turkmen history and traditions as well as moral directives and has been accorded the de facto status of a holy book on a par with the Koran. Imams are required to display the Ruhnama in mosques and to quote from it in sermons, and the country's citizens are required to study and memorize its passages. Passages from the Ruhnama were inscribed alongside verses from the Koran on the marble walls of Central Asia's largest mosque, which was officially inaugurated in October 2004 in Niyazov's hometown of Gipchak, outside of Ashgabat. The Ruhnama has been published in more than 20 languages, including Zulu, as well as in a special Braille edition.

The Parliament's first act of business in January 2005 was to declare the Year of the Ruhnama, indicating that the government intended to intensify even further its campaign to inculcate an official ideology glorifying Turkmenistan and its leader. Citizens must pass a written examination on the Ruhnama – already a fundamental part of primary and secondary school curriculums – in order to gain a place at a university or institute of higher education qualify for government employment, or even receive a driver's license. Furthermore, according to the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting, as of December 1,2005, public sector employees must pass regular examinations on the country's spiritual code as a prerequisite for continued employment. The Ministry of Education in conjunction with a professional "Ruhnamist," who is present at most state institutions, carries out these tests.