1998 Scores

Status: Not Free
Freedom Rating: 7.0
Civil Liberties: 7
Political Rights: 7

Overview

In 1998, the government in Serbia launched a massive counteroffensive against the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in this overwhelmingly ethnic-Albanian enclave within Serbia, burning scores of villages, massacring civilians, and driving more than 250,000 civilians from their homes.

A last-minute deal between U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in October averted NATO air strikes and led to a pullback of Serb forces. But before year's end, as 2,000 unarmed monitors moved in to consolidate the cease-fire, the KLA had moved back into regions it had controlled in the summer, and violence continued.

For Serbs, Kosovo is the historic cradle of the Serbian medieval state and culture. It was the site of the Battle of Kosovo Fields in 1389 between Serbian Prince Lazar and the Turks, which solidified Ottoman control over the Serbs for the next 500 years. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic rose to power in 1987 over the issue of Kosovo's status. Central to his platform was the subjugation of the then-autonomous Yugoslav province (established by the 1974 constitution) to Serbian authority. Persecution by ethnic Albanians caused some 50,000 Serb and Montenegrin residents to flee Kosovo after the 1980 death of Yugoslav strongman Josip Broz "Tito."

In 1989-1990, Milosevic abolished the provincial government and legislature and introduced a series of amendments to the Serbian constitution that effectively removed the legal basis for Kosovo's autonomy. Albanians elected a shadow president, Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), and a 130-member parliament in 1992 to underscore the illegitimacy of Serb rule. Bujar Bukoshi, based in Bonn, was named prime minister whose key task is to raise funds from the large Albanian diaspora in Europe.

Since the Serb takeover, hundreds of thousands of Albanians lost their jobs, and over 200,000 left for other parts of Europe and the United States. Serbs were placed in control of hospitals, universities, businesses, schools, and government. While Albanian resistance has officially been nonviolent, several Serbian policemen and militiamen were murdered in the last six years.

In 1996, President Milosevic and President Rugova signed an agreement for the return of ethnic Albanians to schools and the university, thus ending the parallel school system set up by Albanians after the abolition of the region's autonomy. But by the end of 1997, the agreement had not been implemented, largely because of resistance from Serb academics and nationalist leaders in Kosovo. Some 200 schools continued to operate in private homes.

In 1997, the KLA, a shadowy group armed with Chinese-made weapons, launched a string of attacks on Serb police stations and Albanians seen to be collaborating with the state. The attacks increasingly undermined President Rugova, whose adherence to passive resistance and civil disobedience came under increased criticism from opposition parties and members of the shadow government. Among the critics is Adem Demaci, a highly respected former political prisoner and head of the Kosovo Human Rights Council and a leader of the Parliamentary Party (PPK), an LDK rival. The United States and Europe have proposed a new federation that would give Kosovo, the Muslim Sandjak region, and Vojvodina a constitutional status equal to that of Serbia and Montenegro, but without the right to secede from Yugoslavia. Both Serbia and the Kosovars have rejected the plan.

In 1998, the violent crackdown delayed elections for the president of Kosovo. Though President Rugova remained at his post, support for KLA militants grew after the Serb counteroffensive.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

Kosovars cannot change democratically the de jure government imposed by Serbia. The Parliamentary Party and the Social Democrats are technically outlawed, while the LDK and its leaders have been targets of harassment and detention. Kosovo's democratically elected legislature and government were forced underground after the 1992 elections, which were not recognized by Serbia.

Albanian TV and radio have been abolished. A Belgrade-based conglomerate took over the newspaper, Rilindja. The weekly Zeri continues to be published. The Serb crackdown led to the temporary shutdown of Albanian-language papers. Serb authorities have closed mosques and have harassed Albanian-Muslim clergy and believers. The Serb Orthodox Church gets government support. Over the last ten years, Albanian monuments have been destroyed, streets have received Serbian names, and signs in Cyrillic have replaced those in the Latin script. Serbian has supplanted Albanian as the official language. Since 1991, some 8,000 Albanian teachers have been dismissed. In 1993, Serb authorities shut down all Albanian-language secondary schools, denying schooling to an estimated 63,000 children. The crackdown shut all 58 Albanian-language secondary schools and 21 of the 350-odd Albanian-language primary schools. A network of clandestine, underground schools have been established in Albanian households.

The Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo (BSPK), an outlawed Albanian-language confederation, has been the subject of repression for refusing to affiliate with the official Serbian unions or sign collective agreements approved by these unions.

There is no independent judiciary, as courts and judges are appointed by Belgrade. The fighting in 1998 led to the massacre of hundreds of civilians, and a policy of "ethnic cleansing" forced some 250,000 ethnic Albanians to flee.

The economy is largely controlled by ethnic Albanians and is buttressed by remittances from ethnic Albanians abroad. Organized crime has engaged in gun-running and drug-trafficking. In addition to these factors, normal economic activity has been disrupted by the Serb crackdown.

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