Freedom in the World 1999 - Algeria

1999 Scores

Status: Not Free
Freedom Rating: 5.5
Civil Liberties: 5
Political Rights: 6

Overview

Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a former foreign minister who had been out of the political scene for more than 20 years, was elected president on April 15, 1999. Although the military approved seven presidential candidates, it openly favored Bouteflika, making him the guaranteed winner well before the polls opened. His six opponents withdrew from the race on the eve of the election, charging vote-rigging and electoral fraud.

After a two-year informal truce negotiated between the army and the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the armed wing of the outlawed Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the AIS formally offered in June to end its war with the government and to fight alongside the army against more extreme Islamic militants. Bouteflika responded with an amnesty for Islamist rebels who renounce violence, excluding those convicted of rape or murder, and pardoned thousands of detainees, but stopped short of offering the FIS prospects for a return to politics. Parliament approved a draft amnesty law in July, and several hundred militants had surrendered by the end of 1999.

After a violent liberation struggle convinced France to abandon 130 years of colonial rule, Algeria achieved independence in 1962. The National Liberation Front (FLN) ruled as a virtual one-party regime until the political system was reformed in 1989. Antigovernment sentiment stemming from corruption, housing shortages, unemployment, and other severe economic and social problems boosted the FIS despite the party's avowed commitment to theocratic rule under Shari'a (Islamic law). The army canceled the second round of 1992 legislative elections in which the FIS had achieved a commanding lead and banned the party, setting off a civil conflict marked by often random violence that has claimed some 100,000 lives.

Accurate information about the conflict is difficult to obtain because of heavy official censorship and an Islamist campaign that has killed approximately 70 journalists and forced many into exile. While Islamist radical groups are primarily responsible for the massacres of men, women, and children that have characterized the conflict, government-backed militias have also apparently committed some mass killings. Human rights groups have charged government forces with thousands of disappearances, torture, and other excesses against alleged militants and their suspected supporters.

Throughout 1999, Bouteflika waged an aggressive campaign to shore up his legitimacy and to win the support of a public weary of seven years of violent civil conflict, high unemployment, and rampant corruption. In July, he announced that the government's peace agreement with the AIS would be put to a referendum. Although the measure had already passed into law, Bouteflika's apparent aim was to drum up enough domestic and international support to allow him to maneuver independently of military hardliners. Promising to resign if the peace plan was rejected by voters, Bouteflika appeared on television almost nightly, calling for national unity and peace in an intensive drive to overcome public indifference. Official figures put the turnout on September 17 at 85 percent, with 99 percent in support of the plan. However, most observers claim that official figures are inflated.

In August, Bouteflika launched a "war on corruption" by sacking nearly half the country's provincial governors. Calling corruption a "scourge worse than terrorism," he warned that the judiciary would also be targeted for its "abuse of influence, sloth, failure to execute justice, and human rights abuses." In September, Bouteflika announced the establishment of a committee to reform the judiciary.

Despite the slow reconstruction of representative institutions in Algeria, the army continues to dominate politics and Bouteflika's authority is limited. Changes in official policy reflect shifts in the balance of power among infighting military factions. Thus despite Bouteflika's professed determination to fight corruption and to restore peace, he faces a credibility problem. By October, repeated delays in forming a government led to speculation of army interference. An unnamed government official was quoted as saying that generals had vetoed Bouteflika's proposals for government candidates because they did not include individuals from Algeria's main political parties. Former finance minister Ahmed Benbitour was named prime minister in December.

Despite the peace deal between the government and the AIS, violence continued throughout 1999. The radical Armed Islamic Group (GIA) denounced the agreement and vowed to continue its armed campaign against the government. The frequency of violent incidents escalated prior to the presidential election and in the run up to the September referendum. Bombings, massacres at fake roadblocks, ambushes, and army retaliation took more than 300 lives between June and September alone. The commitment of the GIA and other armed radical elements to the use of force dims prospects for an end to the war in the near future.

Another threat to peace came in November with the assassination of Abdelqader Hachani, a senior FIS leader who had promoted dialogue with the government. The assassination highlighted frustrations within the FIS over the failure of authorities to allow the party to resume political activity, and preceded an escalation of violence. Jailed FIS leader Abassi Madani called for an end to political cooperation with Bouteflika. It remains to be seen how seriously this incident will weaken Bouteflika's efforts to lead his country out of nearly ten years of civil conflict.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

Algerians' right to choose their government freely in democratic elections has never been honored. The country has effectively been under martial law since the cancellation of the 1992 polls. April 1999 presidential elections were restricted to seven regime-approved candidates. Reports of irregularities included official intimidation of contenders' supporters, media favoritism of the military-backed candidate, padding of election rolls, and distribution of preprinted ballots. Bouteflika's six opponents finally withdrew from the campaign, refusing to participate in what they called a "charade." June 1997 legislative polls excluded the main Islamic opposition groups and were conducted under severe restrictions of freedom of expression and association. The 1996 constitution expanded presidential powers and banned Islamic-based parties. The continuing state of emergency and an antiterrorism decree give the regime almost unlimited power.

Both sides in the conflict commit serious human rights violations, and the rule of law is seldom respected. In October, Bouteflika publicly denounced the judiciary, saying that it "has not been able to protect the citizens against serious abuses. In fact, most of the time it supports the views of the powerful ... " The president then announced the formation of a national commission to reform the judiciary. No specific reforms have yet been announced.

The 1992 Antiterrorist Law suspends many due process safeguards. Security forces and pro-government militias are responsible for extrajudicial executions, torture, arbitrary arrest, detention without trial, and disappearances. Despite government claims that security forces are routinely brought to justice for human rights abuses, the authorities have not made such cases public. No independent investigation into the fate of some 3,000 people who disappeared since 1993 after having been abducted by security forces and state-armed militias has been initiated. The Algerian government has consistently denied access to human rights monitors from the UN and from international human rights groups.

Armed Islamist rebel forces routinely abduct and brutally murder men, women, and children, although government soldiers and pro-government militias are primary targets. In one incident prior to the presidential elections, 18 civilians had their throats cut at a fake roadblock set up by suspected Islamists. In another, pro-government militia members were killed by a bomb allegedly planted by the GIA. On several occasions, mass graves containing dozens of victims of Islamist militants have been found. In the second half of the year, killings by the GIA and the extremist Da'wa wal Djihad (Appeal and Struggle) reportedly numbered more than 400.

Press freedom is limited by government pressure and legal constraints as well as by the Islamist insurgency. Although violence against journalists has decreased in recent years, some 70 journalists have been killed by Islamists, and hundreds have fled the country. The government controls all broadcast media. The state of emergency restricts press freedom and deems undefined threats to the state or to public order punishable by law. A 1990 law requires speech to respect "individual dignity, the imperatives of foreign policy, and the national defense." "Reading committees" used to censor the private press were abolished in 1998, but the state monopoly on paper, printing, and advertising leaves private media vulnerable to financial pressure. In May, a state printing press suspended the independent Demain d'Algerie for alleged nonpayment of debts. In this precarious environment, self-censorship is rife.

Freedom of assembly is sharply limited. Official permission is required for public meetings, with the exception of legal opposition party meetings. However, public assemblies that do not support the government are rarely permitted. Authorities banned an April demonstration against alleged voter fraud in the presidential election and fired tear gas at protesters commemorating the 1998 murder of a popular Berber singer. Emergency legislation restricts freedom of association. Nongovernmental organizations must have licenses, and the interior ministry may deny a license to or dissolve any group regarded as a threat to public order. In July, the government banned a meeting of human rights groups in Algiers. Membership in the FIS is illegal.

According to the constitution, Islam is the state religion, and the law limits the practice of other faiths. However, small Christian and Jewish communities practice their faiths without government interference. Radical Muslims have killed and issued public threats against perceived "infidels," though extremists do not differentiate between religious and political killings. Berbers, who live mainly in the northeastern Kabylie region, have been targeted by radical Islamists for their liberal interpretation of Islam. The largest ethnic minority, Berbers have sought to maintain their cultural and linguistic identity in the face of the government's Arabization program. A 1998 law made Arabic the official language of Algeria and marginalized Tamazight, the native Berber language. The law requires that all official business, national broadcast media, communications equipment, and medical prescriptions use Arabic. The 1984 Family Code, based on Shari'a, discriminates against women in matters of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody.

Workers have the right to establish trade unions and to strike. About two-thirds of the labor force is unionized.