Sri Lanka: Internal Flight Alternatives

 

1.   INTRODUCTION

With the renewal of hostilities between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the government of Sri Lanka in June 1990, the Sri Lankan refugee crisis, ongoing since the communal anti-Tamil riots of July 1983, was prolonged even further. The south Indian state of Tamil Nadu, a traditional haven for Tamils fleeing Sri Lanka, was inundated with a reported 120,000 new arrivals by late 1990 (USCR Oct. 1991, 30). At the same time, estimates of internally displaced persons in Sri Lanka were topping one million (JRS Feb. 1991, 24). In August 1991, according to figures quoted by the U.S. Committee for Refugees, the number of internally displaced persons had dropped to 644,000, but still accounted for 1 out of every 5 persons living in the north or east (Oct. 1991, 18). Some 25,000 Sri Lankans claimed refugee status in European countries in 1991 (BRC Mar. 1992a); in Canada, by July 1992, there were more new refugee claims made by Sri Lankans than by nationals of any other country (IRB-CRDD 31 July 1992).

Yet in August 1992 the government of India, in concert with the government of Sri Lanka and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), re-started a programme of returning displaced Tamils to Sri Lanka, a programme that had been suspended in May 1992 after UNHCR had raised concerns over possible cases of forced return (BRC Aug. 1992a, 2; Xinhua 1 Oct. 1992; BBC Summary 5 Oct. 1992). Some European countries, including Switzerland, have also announced programmes to return Sri Lankan refugee claimants (BRC June 1992c, 4), and a great deal of focus has been put on the question of internal flight alternatives. Are there relatively safe places in the south and centre of Sri Lanka for Tamils fleeing the violence in the north and east?

In order to address the question of internal flight alternatives, this Paper will first examine the current situations in the north, east, centre and south, and in the capital, Colombo; discussions of the particular situations in relief camps in various parts of the country will follow; finally, the Paper will end with a discussion of the returns from India and an assessment of the future possibilities for peace in Sri Lanka.

2.       SITUATIONS BY REGION

2.1     The North

By all accounts, the north of Sri Lanka, including the districts of Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu and Mannar, and to some extent Vavuniya, comprises the main battleground for an active war between the LTTE and government and pro-government forces. Following the land-mine explosion on Kayts Island west of Jaffna on 8 August 1992 which killed six of Sri Lanka's most senior military officers, along with four other soldiers (BRC Aug. 1992b, 1), the Sri Lankan army launched a major military offensive in the north, "Operation Earthquake," which reportedly met with heavy LTTE resistance, and counter-attacks in the east (Ibid.; AFP 9 Sept. 1992; Ibid. 21 Sept. 1992). "Operation Chess" followed in mid-September, reportedly reflecting the government's hardened resolve to defeat the LTTE militarily (BRC Sept. 1992a, 1).

Much of Jaffna Peninsula is still controlled by the LTTE, but has been under a protracted military siege since June 1990, which at times has included significant shelling of civilian areas (BRC June 1992b, 1; JRS Feb. 1991, 8-9; Country Reports 1991 1595). Conditions of life there have been called "pre-industrial" (The Globe and Mail 29 Feb. 1992); according to the British Refugee Council,

Jaffna town's Medical Officer of Health says every home is now a mini refugee camp with 65,000 swelling the 140,000 peacetime population. Over 7,000 houses have been destroyed in the town since the June 1990 war, there is no water or electricity and respiratory and gastro intestinal illnesses are rampant. Two years of enforced malnutrition means mothers and children are increasingly vulnerable and the trauma of daily bombing and destruction has triggered a six-fold increase in psychiatric disorders (Aug. 1992b, 1).

Reportedly, since the army's "Operation Earthquake," some 80,000 displaced persons fleeing Mathagal in August 1992 "are said to be begging in the streets of Jaffna town" (Ibid. Sept. 1992c, 3).

The government maintains a long list of restricted items which are not allowed to be brought into Jaffna, including soap, fertilizers, batteries, fuel, and medicines such as painkillers and antibiotics (CHRM Jan. 1992, 5-6; BRC Apr. 1992a, 2). The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) has been supplying dry food rations, but stocks and prices fluctuate considerably (BRC Feb. 1992a, 1; Ibid. June 1992b, 1; JRS Feb. 1991, 9). The pro-government Tamil paramilitary group People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) reportedly controls the "lucrative" checkpoint at Vavuniya between LTTE-held territory in the north and government-held territory in the south (Bush 14 Oct. 1992); tolls are levied on the estimated 2,000 people a day who travel between the two camps (CHRM Jan. 1992, 5-6). Many are reportedly harassed by the military, and there is a widespread assumption of corruption (Ibid.; The Globe and Mail 29 Feb. 1992). According to Marion Botsford Fraser, however,

Checkpoint harassment is the benign side of army interaction with civilians. In the centre of Vavuniya there are what are called vigilante camps from which, one witness said, you hear Tamil victims screaming every night (The Globe and Mail 29 Feb. 1992).

The LTTE also is said to tax all travellers passing through their own border checkpoints: an application reportedly costs Rs 100 (CDN$3), while permission to leave, if granted, will cost a further two gold sovereigns (CDN$300). If an entire family decides to leave, they reportedly must surrender all papers regarding property to the LTTE (India Today 15 Oct. 1991, 99).

Since June 1990 instability in the north has made human rights monitoring there extremely difficult. During recent visits to Sri Lanka, Amnesty International, the UN Working Group on Forced or Involuntary Disappearances, and the Canadian Human Rights Mission to Sri Lanka were all unable to visit Jaffna peninsula and other areas controlled by the LTTE (Amnesty International Sept. 1991, 29; Nations Unies 8 Jan. 1992, 1; CHRM Jan. 1992, 4). Nevertheless, many sources have indicated that LTTE rule over the north involves serious violations of human rights (Asia Watch 21 Oct. 1992; UTHR 28 Aug. 1991; Amnesty International Sept. 1991, 29). Non-Tamils are particularly at risk: in October 1990 some 30,000 Muslims fled the Mannar area after an LTTE ultimatum (BRC Feb. 1992b, 2; Amnesty International Sept. 1991, 31), and LTTE attacks on Muslims and Sinhalese in areas outside the north have been common in recent years (The Globe and Mail 16 Oct. 92; Los Angeles Times 9 Nov. 1992).

Several sources indicate that the LTTE often use extortion to gain funds and services from Tamils and others in the north and elsewhere. An LTTE minimum tax of two gold sovereigns (about CDN$300) per family has been reported, with those unable to pay allegedly facing imprisonment or being told to send a son or daughter to the LTTE army instead (Los Angeles Times 20 Jan. 1992; UTHR 28 Aug. 1991, 74). Malcolm Rodgers of the Sri Lanka Project based at the British Refugee Council states that Tamils returning from abroad are at particular risk of extortion, since there is a perception among the LTTE and government security forces that people who have been abroad will have saved a great deal of money (22 Oct. 1992). LTTE "tax collectors" have also been reported active in Colombo (BRC Feb. 1992c, 3) and Batticaloa, where, according to the British Refugee Council,

Kidnapping and extortion remain the centre of LTTE fundraising activities. School principals who allowed students to participate in Army-controlled Independence Day celebrations on 4 February have been branded collaborators and ordered to pay LTTE Rs 50,000 ($1,250) (Feb. 1992a, 3).

The British Refugee Council has also carried reports from Colombo newspapers regarding a compulsory tax of US$60 per month extracted by the LTTE from Tamil refugee claimants in Germany and other European countries (Mar. 1992b, 4; Ibid. June 1992c, 4).

According to several reports, the LTTE is particularly harsh with prisoners. Most of the Sinhalese and Muslim police officers captured during the surprise LTTE raids on police stations in June 1990 were summarily executed (Amnesty International Sept. 1991, 7); bodies of over 300 of them were found in 1991 (Country Reports 1991, 1594). The University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) wrote in August 1991 that the Fort at Jaffna was currently housing LTTE prisoners, who, according to their source,

were LTTE cadre who wanted to leave the organisation and had given notice. Their punishment was to spend a year on one meal a day demolishing the Fort stone by stone. They are allowed visitors once a month. After a year, they could leave. A prisoner told a visitor, "This thing is so torturous that it would have been easier to join the Black Tiger suicide unit" (81).

Amnesty International has expressed concern over consistent reports of LTTE cadres in the Jaffna area carrying out arbitrary arrests of people suspected of cooperating with the military, rival Tamil groups, or with the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) when they were in Sri Lanka, as well as arrests of those who refuse to pay contributions to the LTTE, or who criticize the LTTE or get into personal feuds with LTTE members (2Sept. 1991, 29). Country Reports 1991 cites unverified estimates that the LTTE is holding up to 4,000 political prisoners in the north (1992, 1593), a figure also reportedly used by the Sri Lankan news agency Lankapuvath (Xinhua 13 Sept. 1992) and the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) (BRC Apr. 1992b, 4).

The LTTE has also been accused of a wide variety of other human rights abuses in recent years in the north, including the use of torture, extrajudicial executions, "disappearances," and forced recruitment of young people (Amnesty International Sept. 1991, 28-29; UTHR 28 Aug. 1991, 72-74; Nations Unies 8 Jan. 1992, 8).

2.2       The East

The eastern region of the country, which includes most notably the districts of Amparai, Batticaloa, Polonnaruwa and Trincomalee, are said to be only partly controlled by the government of Sri Lanka, and are still greatly affected by the on-going armed conflict (UNHCR 9 July 1992; Bush 9 Oct. 1992). In recent years, civilians in these areas have faced human rights abuses from a variety of sources, including the LTTE, the Sri Lankan army, pro-government Tamil paramilitary groups, and Muslim and Sinhalese Home Guards. Amnesty International cancelled its planned trip to Batticaloa in June 1991 because of security reasons (Amnesty International Sept. 1991, 2-3). A unique situation has reportedly developed in this region: effective control in many areas is said to fluctuate between the army or pro-army security forces and the LTTE according to the day of the week or, in many cases, the time of day or night (Bush 9 Oct. 1992). Thus, the British Refugee Council reports that "Batticaloa town under tight security is regularly penetrated by lone LTTE gunmen and no-one except the Tigers moves after dark, including Army patrols" (Feb. 1992a, 3), and that

Trincomalee remains a city under siege with what passes for normalcy shrouded behind a maze of barbed wire and checkpoints. Around the city is a 30-mile band of "partially cleared" areas routinely punctured by LTTE night raids. In hot spots, relief agencies are prevented from transporting more than one day's food at a time to prevent provisions falling into the guerrillas' hands. Travel is banned during Army operations meaning people may go a week or ten days without dry rations. Beyond the cleared areas are a band of dense jungles hiding Tiger bases and the corridor to the north (April 1992c, 3).

On certain major roads in the region, the army is only able to provide protection for a few days out of the week; on the other days, the roads are reportedly left to the Tigers (Bush 9 Oct. 1992; BRC July 1992, 3).

Amnesty International has reported on the government practice of arming Sinhalese and Muslim Home Guards along the borders with Tamil areas, and contends that

new "death squads" have appeared in the east, believed to be drawn from or associated with the security forces, which pursue the same tactics as those which operated against the JVP [Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna] in the south (Sept. 1991, 15).

"Disappearances" are also continuing in the east at an alarming rate: over 3,000 people have reportedly disappeared in the custody of government forces since June 1990 (Ibid., 17; CHRM Jan. 1992, 9). The UN Working Group on Forced or Involuntary Disappearances reports that many of those who disappeared in the east or north are young Tamils, but that over all the disappeared come from all professions and walks of life (Nations Unies 8 Jan. 1992, 24). The majority of the disappearances can be attributed to the military or police, or to the Muslim Home Guards (Ibid., 25).

One major factor exacerbating conditions in the east is the deepening cycles of violence between Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese.

The recent massacre by the LTTE of some 160 people, Muslims and Sinhalese, from four villages in Polonnaruwa District (The Globe and Mail 16 Oct. 1992), is only the latest example. Amnesty International estimates that hundreds of Muslims and Sinhalese have been killed by the LTTE since June 1990, particularly those living in villages bordering Tamil areas in the north and east (Sept. 1991, 31). These sorts of attacks have often engendered reprisals from such groups as Muslim Home Guards or security forces. This was the case in April 1992 when an attack by the LTTE on a Muslim village in Polonnaruwa District was met only hours later by similar attacks on two nearby Tamil villages by Muslim Home Guards and security forces; in total over 130 people were killed (Ibid. June 1992, 1).

The military contends that the LTTE is deliberately attacking civilians in the east to divert military attention from the north (Reuters 15 May 1992). Tamils have charged that Muslim Home Guards have indiscriminately attacked innocent Tamils in revenge for LTTE attacks (Ibid.), and that Sinhalese settlers are taking over areas in the east where Tamils have fled (BRC Aug. 1992c, 3). Muslims, meanwhile, have charged that the Tamils are using their own version of "ethnic cleansing" to drive them out of the east and north, areas claimed as the Tamil homeland (Los Angeles Times 9 Nov. 1992; Inter Press Service 4 May 1992).

The instability caused by continuing ethnic tensions in the east has large social and economic costs: much of the area's farmland goes uncultivated as residents flee or because of army efforts to prevent the crop from going to the LTTE; the region has large numbers of internally displaced people; and malnutrition is becoming chronic, reportedly affecting over one-third of patients recently admitted to Batticaloa hospital (BRC June 1992d, 3).

Recent government initiatives to relocate displaced people in the east and to create "model villages" of ethnic harmony reportedly also have not been going well. Relief agencies contend that the displaced, many of whom are Tamils, are being forced back into unsafe areas to effectively act as buffers between the LTTE and the military (BRC June 1992e, 2); also, that model ethnic villages like Kuchchaveli in Trincomalee will not work because

Moving in the Muslims first means the Tamils fear to return. Kuchchaveli is no model village, relief workers say but a virtual battle zone and the scene of several large-scale LTTE ambushes (Ibid.).

2.3      The Centre

There are far fewer current reports of serious human rights violations from the central districts such as Kandy, Nuwara Eliya, Badulla and Ratnapura, than from the north and east. UNHCR has stated that notwithstanding the "changing mosaic of safe or unsafe areas" in Sri Lanka, the central districts can be said to not generally be affected by the armed conflict (9 July 1992). The Canadian Human Rights Mission to Sri Lanka, however, reports that in central districts

Workers, and particularly young people, are experiencing increased army and police harassment, and human rights violations occur on and around the tea estates. A climate of fear exists as a result of young men being detained without explanation (Jan. 1992, 10).

In February 1992 the British Refugee Council reported that police were implementing special security measures to protect the plantation areas of Moneragala District from LTTE infiltration, and that Tamil youths were being abducted in Nuwara Eliya District "despite police checkpoints in the area" (Feb. 1992d, 3). Allegations of disappearances of Tamils following arrest or detention by security forces continue to be made, and plantation workers periodically go on strike to protest the situation (Ibid. May 1992a, 3).

The central districts are traditional areas for Estate or Plantation Tamils, a group quite socially distinct from Sri Lankan Tamils, who tend to live in the east and north. These distinctions are often forgotten or glossed over in outside analyses (The Round Table July 1992, 319). Estate Tamils are descendants of labourers recruited largely from Tamil Nadu in southern India to work on the plantations opened up by the British in the nineteenth century (JRS Feb. 1991, 1). Although both groups speak Tamil and follow the Hindu religion, the Estate Tamils generally are from lower castes than Sri Lankan Tamils, are poorer and have less education; the majority continue to work as labourers on plantations, although a small but significant group has prospered as workers, traders and business people in urban areas such as Colombo and towns in the Central Province (The Round Table July 1992, 319-321). Estate Tamils have faced significant problems establishing Sri Lankan nationality, and although important steps have been taken in recent years to extend nationality to those still stateless, continuing bureaucratic hitches have reportedly left an estimated 168,000 Estate Tamils without nationality (Country Reports 1991 1992, 1600).

During the severe anti-Tamil riots of 1983, according to Oddvar Hollup, who has studied the effects of anti-Tamil violence particularly on Estate Tamils, most of the violence and destruction in central Sri Lanka, "affected the urban middle-class Estate Tamils engaged in trade in the towns and bazaars. The towns closest to Sinhalese villages were badly hit, while areas far away from the Sinhalese population were not touched" (The Round Table July 1992, 329). Many of the Estate Tamils who fled north as a result of the 1983 anti-Tamil riots "were ... exploited, looked down upon and ill treated as casual agricultural workers by the Sri Lanka Tamils" because of the caste differences between the two groups (Ibid. 320; Bush 14 Oct. 1992). Estate Tamils have not traditionally identified with or supported the cause of an independent Tamil nation in the northeast; yet they have at times suffered anti-Tamil violence because many Sinhalese do not make the distinction between Estate and Sri Lankan Tamils (The Round Table July 1992, 334).

According to a representative of the Sri Lanka Resource Centre in Oslo, Norway, an analysis of the suitability of the central region for an internal flight alternative for Tamils now fleeing the north and east clearly must take these caste differences into account (20 Oct. 1992). Traditionally there is very little contact between Sri Lankan and Estate Tamils (The Round Table July 1992, 319). As Oddvar Hollup writes, "Estate Tamils neither can nor wish to go live in the north or east, where they have no jobs, trade, property or land" (Ibid., 320); the reverse is also true according to some sources, that Sri Lankan Tamils fleeing the north or east would have great difficulty settling in the central region, where they lack these same vital connections (Bush 14 Oct. 1992; SLRC 20 Oct. 1992). UNHCR has stated that a valid threshold for the establishment of an internal flight alternative in the central districts "should take into account such factors as the presence of close relatives and/or the duration of previous residence and/or past employment in these areas" (9 July 1992).

2.4        The South

From 1987 to 1990 the southern Sri Lankan districts were considered among the most dangerous areas in the country because of the violence associated with the Sinhalese JVP uprising (Current History Mar. 1992, 128; Asia Watch 31 May 1992, 6). More recently, UNHCR included the south with the central districts as areas "not generally affected by the armed conflict" (9 July 1992), and reports of human rights violations logged by several groups have been far less numerous for the south than for the east and north. The Canadian Human Rights Mission to Sri Lanka, however, reports that although the conflict is definitely centred in the north and east, "fear in the south is everywhere," and human rights violations are continuing (Jan. 1992, 14). During its visit in January 1992, a small art exhibit of representations of human rights violations in Matara District was destroyed by a gang of masked men, an event which emphasized for the Mission "the lack of free expression and the underlying fear of the gun" (Ibid.). Although the south was the location of reportedly tens of thousands of disappearances during the JVP crisis (Asia Watch 31 May 1992, 6; Current History Mar. 1992, 128-129), more recently sources indicate that the numbers of disappearances have dropped off considerably (Asia Watch 21 Oct. 1992; Country Reports 1991 1992, 1591).

Reporting on those detained in the wake of the JVP uprising is the recently created Human Rights Task Force, which is reportedly monitoring the welfare of some 5,865 detainees in five camps and nine rehabilitation centres. Charges against 2,000 JVP detainees were reportedly dismissed by the Attorney-General earlier this year, although the individuals remain in custody under emergency laws, while "another 7,000 detainees have been released and officially rehabilitated" (BRC June 1992f, 4). Human rights NGOs have reportedly charged that another 5,000 individuals are being unofficially detained in police stations, and that in the south "detainees disappear before and after release but in reduced numbers as the JVP threat evaporates" (Ibid.).

Violent incidents at detention camps are periodically reported: in June 1992, for instance, police are said to have opened fire to control a clash between JVP and other inmates at the Boosa detention camp: one person was killed and 100 were injured (Ibid.). The Human Rights Task Force has also reportedly stated that many of the over 3,500 missing persons reported to them had been traced to detention camps, but that a "disconcertingly large" number had still not been accounted for, and that although the use of torture in detention had been reduced, there is still a risk of torture "especially at the initial lock-up" (SLRC Sept. 1992b, 7).

Emergency regulations and the Prevention of Terrorism Act give security forces the power to detain suspects without charge for periods of three months at a time up to 18 months, or to prohibit someone through indefinite detention from acting against national security or public order (Asia Watch 31 May 1992, 38). Asia Watch reports that when asked

why the emergency regulations could not now be lifted in the South since the situation there was so much improved, Ranil Wickremasinghe, Minister of Industry and Cabinet Spokesman, said that there were still security problems there .... He added, however, that the regulations were not generally enforced -- they were only used in relation to terrorist activities (Ibid., 39).

The most notorious emergency regulation, 55 FF, which allowed the police to dispose of bodies without inquiry or autopsy, was repealed in February 1990, although Amnesty International maintains that remaining emergency regulations still allow security forces to secretly dispose of bodies (Amnesty International 1991, 211; Nations Unies 8 Jan. 1992, 16-17). The Canadian Human Rights Mission to Sri Lanka reports that lawyers they had spoken to indicated that a "psychosis of fear" was resulting in far fewer people willing to legally challenge human rights abuses because of widespread threats to all involved, and that "for the first time in memory, counsel have begun routinely to caution potential clients in human rights cases that they should hesitate before taking their complaints to court" (CHRM Jan. 1992, 19).

In 1992 there have been reports of rumoured JVP revivals, and arrests of JVP suspects in the south continue, although on a smaller scale than in previous years (BRC Sept. 1992e, 4; Xinhua 2 Oct. 1992; AFP 23 Aug. 1992). Most recently a number of people were reportedly arrested in Tangalle in early October 1992 in connection with the JVP, and ten JVP members escaped from a detention camp in September 1992 (BRC Sept. 1992e, 4).

Several sources indicate that outside Colombo, the population of the south is to a large degree Sinhalese, and that the extreme ethnic tensions which continue in the country make resettlement there problematic for displaced Tamils who have no connections to the area (Bush 14 Oct. 1992; SLRC 20 Oct. 1992). As with the central districts, UNHCR has stated that personal connections, such as family, previous residence and employment are important considerations in determining the viability of the south as an internal flight alternative for any given individual (9 July 1992).

2.5      Colombo

Colombo, the capital, remains a destination of choice for many Tamils fleeing violence in the east and north. Not only is the city a relative "island of calm" (Asia Watch 21 Oct. 1992) in the war-torn country, but there is an established Tamil community there which already has provided refuge and support for many displaced Tamils (Rodgers 22 Oct. 1992; JRS Feb. 1991, 7; SLRC 20 Oct. 1992). Although severely affected by the 1983 anti-Tamil riots, which forced many Tamils to flee to the north, Colombo has not experienced the same level of disturbances since then (Rodgers 22 Oct. 1992). The Colombo area also includes some 14-16 camps for those displaced by the violence. These camps officially house 11,000-12,000 displaced Tamils (Ibid.). However, Kenneth Bush, a PhD candidate at Cornell specializing in Sri Lankan conflict, relates that

these numbers are considerably underestimated because        the government stopped registering displaced peoples in November 1990. One [h]uman rights worker estimated that there were between 16-17,000 displaced Tamils in camps around Colombo with the average camp holding 600-1,000 "inmates" (4 Nov. 1992, 7).

Sources indicate that among displaced Tamils, generally those with strong connections in Colombo -- family, friends, access to employment, etc. -- are in a relatively more secure situation than those without these connections (UNHCR 22 Oct. 1992; Rodgers 22 Oct. 1992). According to UNHCR, although

it is practically impossible to give a precise group definition of whom among the Tamils can be considered safe outside the civil strife area..., it would... appear that, first of all, members of Tamil families who have been living for a long period in Colombo are among the least vulnerable. There are currently some 250,000 Tamils living in Colombo. Concerning Tamils originating from the North and East, who have been living in Colombo for longer periods with relatives or supported by them, they should also be able to return to Colombo unless they have been the subject of individually targetted detention and arrest, i.e. routine checking of ID documents would therefore not be sufficient proof in itself to argue against return (25 Nov. 1991).

Sources indicate that there are strict registration laws which are closely enforced in Colombo: since 1991, all Sri Lankans wishing to stay outside their normal locality have been required to register at the local police station and provide a letter of reference from the police station of their old neighbourhood -- a document which could prove difficult to obtain if one has been forced to leave quickly (Bush 4 Nov. 1992, 8; Ibid. 9 Oct. 1992; SLRC 20 Oct. 1992). Landlords in Colombo are reportedly required to make sure that their tenants are registered with the police (Bush 4 Nov. 1992, 8; Ibid. 9 Oct. 1992), as are friends and relatives providing shelter for new arrivals (BRC Apr. 1992d, 3). Those who are stopped by security forces and are unable to justify their presence in a given location are reportedly likely to be arrested, especially if they are Tamil (CHRM Jan. 1992, 30; Bush 4 Nov. 1992, 9).

Reports indicate that Tamils -- both long-term residents and those who are newly arrived -- are periodically rounded up in Colombo in cordon and search operations, which often are an official response to suspected LTTE operations in the city (Bush 4 Nov. 1992, 9; Rodgers 22 Oct. 1992). The British Refugee Council reported one such cordon and search operation in April 1992, for instance, following a car bomb blast in the city: "over 50 bewildered new arrivals were arrested" and subsequently released, and another 18 Tamils were arrested later in the month in connection with the blast (Apr. 1992d). Such cordon and search operations can be fairly frequent, according to some sources, depending on political tensions in the capital (Rodgers 22 Oct. 1992; SLRC 20 Oct. 1992; Bush 4 Nov. 1992, 9). Kenneth Bush, whose most recent Sri Lanka field work took place in May and June of 1992, reports that entire Tamil neighbourhoods have, at times, been cordoned off with all residents rounded up and detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, often leaving no one on the outside to exert pressure for their release (4 Nov. 1992, 9; Ibid. 9 Oct. 1992). The British Refugee Council reported that in Colombo "around 300 young Tamils are arrested every week as LTTE suspects" (Aug. 1992d, 2). Often police raids target cheap hotels and hostels known to be used by young Tamils and newly arrived Tamils who have no relatives or friends to stay with in the city (Rodgers 22 Oct. 1992). Most recently, police reportedly rounded up about 300 "rebel suspects" in Colombo and its suburbs at the end of September 1992, following the LTTE killing of a high-ranking police officer (Xinhua 27 Sept. 1992).

As discussed above in subsection 2.4 The South, individuals arrested under emergency regulations or the Prevention of Terrorism Act can be detained without charge for long periods of time. According to Country Reports 1991, confessions often figure heavily in these cases, and although those convicted have the right of appeal, "In practice... most people held under these acts are never formally charged and therefore do not enter the appeals process" (1594). One human rights worker reported to Kenneth Bush that in Colombo "the typical minimum detention is 90 days," and that beatings "are routine matters of course" (4 Nov. 1992, 9). A local human rights organization only managed to secure the release of a detained employee after ten days of concerted effort; moreover, "The process is even more protracted for an intimidated ordinary citizen. The bureaucratic and political obstacles to gaining release are formidable" (Ibid.). It has also been reported that many of those detained by the government are held in expanded police stations rather than prisons, since the police stations are not subject to monitoring by human rights groups (Ibid.)

Malcolm Rodgers of the Sri Lanka Project based at the British Refugee Council reports that corruption is an important element in the ongoing round-ups and detentions of Tamils in the Colombo area. In an interview with the DIRB he cited one typical case of a young Tamil male from Jaffna who had fled to Colombo to stay with relatives, and was subsequently picked up by police in a round-up. The family lawyer, after making inquiries, was told that a payment of Rs 30,000 (CDN$1,000) would secure the young man's release. The young man was kept in prison for two to three weeks until the payment was made, and then he was released by the courts (22 Oct. 1992). As mentioned above in subsection 2.1 The North, the LTTE and security forces are both reportedly agents of extortion in Colombo for Tamils who have returned from living in western countries, where they will have been expected to earn a great deal of money (Ibid.).

Colombo is also reportedly a centre for illegal operations providing "asylum kits" for Tamils who wish to seek asylum outside the country. The British Refugee Council reports a standard price for forged papers to be Rs 400,000-600,000 (US$10,000-US$15,000) (Mar. 1992a, 4; Ibid. Feb. 1992c, 3), but that these operations often strand their "clients" in "Bangkok or Nairobi hotel rooms or on the Yugoslav border," in an effort to extort more money from their families (BRC Mar. 1992, 4; Ibid. Feb. 1992c, 3; Ibid. June 1992c, 4).

3.       RELIEF CAMPS

3.1      Camps in Colombo

Relief camps in the Colombo area have at least partially come under the control of the pro-government Tamil paramilitary group Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP), a splinter group of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) (Bush 4 Nov. 1992, 8; Rodgers 22 Oct. 1992; USCR Oct. 1991, 28). Sources indicate that the EPDP have been associated with numerous human rights abuses (Ibid.). According to Kenneth Bush,

By all accounts, the EPDP maintains oppressively tight control within the camps. It suppresses all "political talk" and has been known to kidnap and murder individuals to enforce its control. In a recent case, a Colombo-based Human Rights group was actively involved in negotiating the release of a boy who had been kidnapped from a camp by the EPDP. The boy eventually reappeared on the East coast in Batticaloa, an area where the EPDP are militarily active.... [H]e was described as having been "hollowed out" psychologically, emotionally and spiritually as a result of the torture (4 Nov. 1992, 8).

Conditions in the Colombo camps are said to be deplorable in other ways as well. As reported above, official registrations at the camps stopped in November 1990, which means that people newly arriving do not qualify for food rations (USCR Oct. 1991, 28). In practice, the rations for registered inmates are divided to feed the whole group (Rodgers 22 Oct. 1992); however, a 50 percent reduction in food aid to all Sri Lankan camps announced by the government in August 1992 due to budgetary restraints has meant that serious food shortages threaten (BRC Aug. 1992a, 2). In September 1992 the government announced that it would restore food aid, but only beginning in January 1993 (Ibid. Sept. 1992b, 2).

For the most part, Tamils who seek refuge in the camps around Colombo are said to have exhausted all other resources, and landed there out of desperate need (Rodgers 22 Oct. 1992; JRS Feb. 1991, 9). Visiting one of the Colombo camps, Saraswathy Hall, in late 1990, the Jesuit Refugee Service found it "an oppressive place where about 600 people were living confined inside a small hall with no yard"; there were reportedly only two toilets for the entire camp (Feb. 1991, 7-9). The Canadian Human Rights Mission to Sri Lanka also visited Colombo camps and reported,

The camps suffer from over-crowding and health problems, such as respiratory tract infections, scabies and fungal infections, and nutritional deficiencies. In many of the camps, many families must live together in one room. The Modera Refugee Camp, for example, has 364 people living in a community hall the size of a small gymnasium.... Very few people are able to work because, as Tamils, they have language difficulties. The lack of privacy, anxiety about the future and the traumatization of 18 months spent in these conditions should not be underestimated (Jan. 1992, 31).

Kenneth Bush reports that displaced Tamils face many disincentives that keep them from leaving the Colombo camps, including the strict control exercised by the EPDP and a heavy tax, possibly as high as 50 percent, reportedly levied by the EPDP on outside earnings (4 Nov. 1992, 8).

According to the Jesuit Refugee Service, people that they met in Colombo "did not seem to be aware of the presence of the refugee camps in their midst," a fact which they attribute to the strict censorship and media control exercised by the government (JRS Feb. 1991, 8). It could also point to the apparently contradictory nature of Colombo as a possible safe haven for some and area of little protection for others.

3.2                Camps in the East

According to Government Agent figures reported in September 1992, Batticaloa District welfare centres shelter some 10,500 people, with about 66,000 finding refuge within the community (BRC Sept. 1992d, 3), a significant drop from previous years (USCR Oct. 1991, 29; JRS Feb. 1991, 12). In May 1992 Amparai District camps were reportedly sheltering about 20,500 displaced persons, with another 10,500 living with friends and relatives in the district (BRC May 1992b, 3), while in March 1992 about 30,000 people were reportedly in relief camps in Trincomalee District, with another 75,000 displaced with family and friends (Ibid. Mar. 1992b, 3).

Rations and security remain the principle concerns raised by critics of the eastern camps. The Jesuit Refugee Service, which visited the area in late 1990, found that malnutrition was especially affecting the health of the young (Feb. 1991, 13). The U.S. Committee for Refugees stated in their October 1991 report that delivery and distribution of rations have been hampered by continuing violence and uncertainty in the area (29); other sources note that the government recently cut the funding for emergency food rations by 50 percent (BRC Aug. 1992a, 2; Rodgers 22 Oct. 1992), although the government has reportedly announced that rations will be restored in January 1993 (BRC Sept. 1992b, 2).

Sources indicate that the security of those who have fled to relief camps in the east remains an issue. In an area where disappearances since June 1990 have reportedly numbered over 3,000 (Amnesty International Sept. 1991, 17; CHRM Jan. 1992, 9), disappearances from camps continue to be reported (Inter Press Service 14 Aug. 1992). Most recently, some 16 people from the Karaitivu refugee camp reportedly disappeared after going to work (BRC Sept. 1992d, 3). As well, according to the British Refugee Council, people from the camps are being forced back into unsafe buffer zones between the LTTE and the army in order to protect army troops (Ibid. June 1992e). The U.S. Committee for Refugees states that most residents of welfare centres in Batticaloa have been pressured to leave, and that, "for the moment, in the east, where people gather, danger gathers. Bring people together for safety, in other words, and one invites suspicion, army round-ups, and violence" (Oct. 1991, 29).

3.3                Camps in the North

UNHCR is currently operating three Open Relief Centres, and several sub-centres, on Mannar Island, in the north, which mainly offer shelter, food and relative protection to people displaced from civil violence or returning from southern India (Inter Press Service 21 Sept. 1992; USCR Oct. 1991, 22-25). Madhu, the largest of the centres, reportedly contains some 29,000 residents (Inter Press Service 21 Sept. 1992), while the other two, Pesalai and Palampiddy, shelter far fewer (Ibid.; USCR Oct. 1991, 24). Assisting UNHCR are a number of NGOs, including Medecins sans frontières, Save the Children Fund (UK) and CARE International (USCR Oct. 1991, 24).

The Open Relief Centres have been defined as "temporary place[s] where displaced persons on the move can freely enter or leave and obtain essential relief assistance in a relatively safe environment" (Ibid.). No formal agreement has been worked out with the LTTE or government regarding the status or security of these centres, however, and UNHCR has not been able to guarantee the protection of residents, although the government and the LTTE have both for the most part not interfered with the centres (Ibid.; Inter Press Service 21 Sept. 1992). However, there have been exceptions. Residents at the Pesalai Open Relief Centre were subject to round-ups and detention by the Sri Lankan army on at least two occasions, in late 1990 and early 1991, and in February 1991 the Madhu Centre was nearly shut down to make way for a planned army offensive (USCR Oct. 1991, 24). Other violations by the army have also been reported (Ibid., 25): in June 1992, for example, a young male was shot dead near the Pesalai Centre; he had reportedly been branded a spy by the LTTE (BRC June 1992a, 2). However, according to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, "the protection available to displaced persons in the ORCs [Open Relief Centres] still is substantially better than anything else to be found in the northeast" (USCR Oct. 1991, 25).

The Mannar relief centres received many of the Tamils returning from southern India as part of the repatriations earlier in 1992, and some reports indicate that the centres were not able to safely handle so many people. Cholera broke out in Pesalai in May 1992, killing two children and forcing hundreds of others to seek hospital treatment; the outbreak was reportedly caused by "insanitary conditions in refugee camps and lack of basic amenities" (BRC May 1992c, 3). The British Refugee Council also reported in June 1992 that the army was pressuring returnees from India to vacate the Sunny Village refugee camp and return to their former homes to "stabilise the Army's foothold on the mainland" (June 1992g, 3).

Many of the Muslims who fled Mannar District following the 1990 ultimatum by the LTTE went to relief camps in Puttalam District, north of Colombo (Ibid. June 1992h, 3; USCR Oct. 1991, 28). Conditions there are said to be particularly poor for the estimated 40,000 Muslims in the camps (SLRC 20 Oct. 1992; BRC June 1992h, 3). The British Refugee Council has also reported that the government is pressuring displaced Muslims to leave the camps and return to their former homes by withholding or cutting rations (Feb. 1992b, 2; Ibid. June 1992h, 3).

4.              REPATRIATIONS FROM INDIA

In January 1992 India, which is not signatory to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (UN Apr. 1991, 7), began a controversial programme of returning Sri Lankan Tamils. By May, when the programme was suspended after UNHCR had protested possible cases of forcible return, some 23,000 Sri Lankan Tamils had been returned (BRC June 1992a, 2). In August 1992 the Indian repatriation programme began again, with the participation of UNHCR, and plans have been announced to repatriate the remaining 88,000 Tamils in south India (Ibid. Aug. 1992a, 2; Xinhua 1 Oct. 1992; BBC Summary 5 Oct. 1992).

For many years a safe haven for Tamils fleeing violence in Sri Lanka, the state of Tamil Nadu in southern India was also the site for the May 1991 assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, for which the Indian government has blamed the LTTE (Asiaweek 14 Feb. 1992). Pressure for the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees in India reportedly began to build soon after the death of the former Indian Prime Minister (The Times 27 Feb. 1992; The Independent 21 Jan. 1992; USCR Oct. 1991, 32-33). As well, after Gandhi's death, new registrations of Sri Lankans in schools or universities were reportedly suspended (The Times 27 Feb. 1992; BRC Sept. 1992b, 2), registration of all Sri Lankans outside the relief camps began (USCR. Oct. 1991, 33), and the LTTE was formally banned (BRC May 1992d, 1). According to Christopher Thomas of The Times,

[Sri Lankan] refugees are blamed for a host of ills. They are accused of taking scarce jobs, of kidnapping, bank robberies and encouraging drug-taking among students.

The government gives free food to 113,000 refugees housed in camps, plus 150 rupees (Pounds 3.30) a month to each adult and up to 90 rupees per child. Many refugees also receive remittances from relatives abroad, making them far better off than most local Tamils. This adds to the resentment (27 Feb. 1992).

Reports on what has happened to those who returned to Sri Lanka from southern India earlier in 1992 are scarce. However, UNHCR has indicated that the majority of those who arrived beginning in January 1992 have returned to their home areas, although about 9,000 have remained in camps. Although UNHCR is unable to say what percentage are staying with family and friends, as opposed to resettling in their own homes, they do estimate that the overwhelming majority are still dependent on dry rations and do not have a regular income (22 Oct. 1992). According to the British Refugee Council, "Only 500 of the 5,000 recently arrived refugees have been able to go back to their homes and those returning to LTTE-controlled areas must sign a paper saying that the government is not responsible for their safety" (Sept. 1992b, 2). The government of Sri Lanka and UNHCR are reportedly building accommodation facilities for new arrivals from southern India in various parts of the country, including Trincomalee (Xinhua 18 Oct. 1992; SLRC Sept. 1992a, 1). The British Refugee Council had earlier reported that UNHCR was planning to transfer new arrivals from Trincomalee to other sites in Vavuniya and Mannar Island because the facilities in Trincomalee were "lacking" (Sept. 1992b, 2). There have also been reports that returnees from Tamil Nadu had not received the full monetary assistance promised by the government of India (SLRC 20 Oct. 1992; BRC June 1992a, 2).

5.           FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

Several sources indicate that the outlook for a negotiated peace in Sri Lanka remains dim (Los Angeles Times 9 Nov. 1992; Bush 4 Nov. 1992, 11-12; Sri Lanka Information Monitor Sept. 1992, 10). A recent effort by an all-party committee to create a consensus on a negotiated settlement has reportedly failed (Inter Press Service 31 Oct. 1992), and outstanding problems remain considerable: protracted ethnic tensions between Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims, the government's continuing reliance on a military solution to the issue of Tamil nationalism, the intransigence of the LTTE, which has proven its willingness to use extreme measures to achieve its aims, and an overall climate of violence and terror which has in the last decade visited every part of the island. Perhaps most disturbingly, the use of massacres of civilians, apparently by all combat groups in the north and east, continues (Los Angeles Times 9 Nov. 1992; Bush 4 Nov. 1992, 6-7). Of particular interest will be the response of the LTTE to building pressures -- considering their recent loss of support from Tamil Nadu and the ongoing military siege and blockade of Jaffna -- and the repatriations from India which, with UNHCR involvement, could provide the clearest indication of whether certain regions within Sri Lanka can be considered safe for affected groups.

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