U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 1997 - Sierra Leone

At the close of 1996, an estimated 350,000 or more Sierra Leoneans were refugees, including 250,000 in Guinea, 100,000 in Liberia, and several thousand in other countries. An estimated 800,000 or more Sierra Leoneans were internally displaced. An estimated 15,000 Liberian refugees remained in Sierra Leone. During 1996, the political, military, and humanitarian environments in Sierra Leone changed dramatically, leaving Sierra Leoneans with real hope that a nearly six-year conflict was ending. As the year began, overland food shipments were suspended to much of the country, scores of civilians were newly maimed to discourage them from voting in scheduled elections, and rebels and leaders of the military government were barely discussing peace. The year ended, however, with a civilian government in power, a signed peace agreement in place, and tens of thousands of internally displaced persons returning home. USCR conducted two site visits to Sierra Leone during 1996, and in November issued a report based on its September/October site visit that included 14 policy recommendations to humanitarian agencies, governments, and the international diplomatic community. Causes of Displacement The widespread violence in Sierra Leone grew out of the civil war in neighboring Liberia. In 1991, an armed Sierra Leonean rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), accompanied by Liberians and West African mercenaries, attacked towns and villages in eastern Sierra Leone. Since that time, a rapidly expanded government army, backed by troops from West African states and, more recently, South Africa-based mercenaries, has battled the rebels. A significant portion of attacks against civilians during recent years have been attributed to renegade government soldiers and common bandits. Estimates of the number of people displaced in Sierra Leone have been inexact and often unverifiable. A UN funding appeal issued in September 1996 estimated that 1.6 million Sierra Leoneans were internally displaced. During its September site visit, USCR estimated that about one million persons were internally displaced. By year's end, the number of displaced persons had decreased further, and thousands more displaced persons were poised to return home. Elections and Violence During 1996, several new factors led to a November 30 peace accord between the government and RUF: the rebels became fatigued, weakened by the military successes of South African mercenaries and a newly enlarged civil defense force; the military government was willing to give up power; a new, civilian government took office; and neutral parties played a strong mediation role. The accord laid the groundwork for an end to hostilities and – potentially – the large-scale return to home areas of Sierra Leonean refugees and displaced persons. As 1996 began, attacks by rebels, bandits, and renegade government soldiers had effectively halted most traffic on major roads, preventing the overland delivery of food aid to hundreds of thousands of displaced persons and other war-affected populations. Food aid stocks were exhausted in many locations, and aid agencies reported increased mortality among children age five or younger. To combat the deteriorating humanitarian situation, WFP conducted a small airlift to the towns of Bo and Kenema to support therapeutic feeding centers there. On January 16, Brigadier General Julius Maada Bio overthrew Captain Valentine Strasser, head of Sierra Leone's military government. Bio gave assurances that elections slated for late February would proceed as scheduled. Later in the month, conditions along roads eased somewhat, as RUF announced a temporary cease-fire, again allowing overland movement of food aid. During the days leading up to elections, increased attacks against civilians were reported. Many included the amputation of fingers, hands, or arms – and even beheadings – apparently to discourage Sierra Leoneans from casting ballots. RUF leaders had previously demanded that elections be postponed, a demand that the military government had rejected. However, it was not clear if the attacks were committed by RUF rebels or by government soldiers, both of whom may have wanted to disrupt elections. Despite the pre-election violence and election-day attacks, an estimated 800,000 Sierra Leoneans cast ballots in the first round of voting, on February 26 and 27. On March 14, the day preceding the second round of voting, RUF and the outgoing military government agreed to a cease-fire, and the RUF leadership agreed to meet with the winner of the presidential balloting. In late April, the elected government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah began peace talks with RUF, and both sides agreed to extend the cease-fire. The cease-fire agreement greatly reduced tensions in the country, and the number of reported security incidents declined. However, sporadic attacks on civilians continued, sometimes attributed to rebels, sometimes to government soldiers masquerading as rebels. Despite these attacks, a small number of displaced persons did return to home areas, especially in Bonthe district. In late May, although the government and RUF had reached agreement on nearly all issues discussed, RUF suspended talks. The major unresolved issue was RUF's demand that foreign forces should leave Sierra Leone before RUF would disarm. Mid-Year Calm Throughout mid-1996, relative but incomplete calm settled over much of Sierra Leone. Roads were relatively free from attack, and areas in the south and east were increasingly accessible to aid workers. Some displaced persons in the camps near Bo began to visit home areas in the south, especially in Pujehun district. Elsewhere, however, in Kailahun district, in the northeast, few displaced persons risked returning home. In May, at least 800 Sierra Leoneans, primarily from the Segbwema and Daru areas, fled to Guinea, complaining of "rebel" attacks, forced labor, and forced porterage. Throughout the year, security incidents persisted in Kailahun district, an area that included some of the few "front lines" in the war, and where control of diamond mining remained an important factor in the conflict. RUF maintained clear control of only two sections of Sierra Leone: a large portion of Kailahun district, in the northeast, bordering Liberia and Guinea, and a smaller portion of Pujehun district, in the southeast, bordering Liberia. Throughout 1995, ICRC had repeatedly requested permission from Sierra Leone's military government to provide humanitarian assistance in the RUF-controlled areas, where an estimated 30,000 persons lived. The military government withheld such permission until early 1996, just prior to the transition to civilian rule. ICRC and WFP then began an assistance program in the RUF areas. ICRC transported food aid cross-border from Guinea to Kailahun district and by helicopter to RUF-controlled portions of Pujehun district. In July, the newly installed civilian government ordered ICRC to halt its cross-border operation, charging that food aid was falling into RUF's hands. Two weeks later, the government agreed to allow ICRC to resume assistance to populations in RUF-held areas, but required that government officials screen all aid. The danger of overland travel forced ICRC to use helicopters to transport food from government-held areas to RUF-held territory. Kamajoh Offensive Although mid-1996 brought relative security, the government apparently grew impatient with the stalemate in the negotiations, and ultimately sought ways to change the military situation. Senior members of the government supported the formation of an expanded civil defense force whose members, the Kamajohs, were part of a traditional secret society. During mid- and late 1996, thousands of Kamajohs were newly inducted and sent to their home areas to confront armed bands operating there. RUF called the recruitment and deployment of Kamajohs a violation of the cease-fire agreement; the government rejected that claim, saying that the Kamajohs were merely local people protecting their homes. At the time of the September 1996 USCR site visit, many internally displaced Sierra Leoneans were weighing their options, deciding if they should risk returning home prior to the signing of a peace agreement. Those who believed that Kamajoh activity had improved security in their home area often sent an adult male family member to survey the situation; other families returned together to home areas, but continued to visit their former camps to draw food rations, a practice tolerated by aid agencies that were hesitant to inject large amounts of food aid into areas that arguably were still unsafe. During the last third of the year, and especially during November, large numbers of Kamajohs, supported by South African mercenaries, overran several important RUF bases in the south and east, pushing some RUF fighters into Liberia, where hundreds reportedly surrendered to factional fighters there. Increasingly, the Kamajohs also came into conflict with the Sierra Leonean army, setting off a series of confrontations that killed scores – if not hundreds – of soldiers, Kamajohs, and civilians. In late November, some 2,000 Sierra Leoneans crossed from Liberia back into Sierra Leone, where most were registered by ICRC. Most were believed to be RUF combatants or camp followers who had fled into Liberia during the Kamajoh offensive. The military successes of the Kamajohs allowed tens of thousands of displaced persons to return to home areas in the south and east. Aid agencies – concerned that providing too much assistance to returnees might attract attacks from would-be looters – moved cautiously to assist those returning home. With RUF's military position greatly diminished, the RUF leadership finally agreed to peace terms, signing an accord with the government on November 30 in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire. Under terms of that agreement, representatives of the government and RUF were to form a Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, which would oversee the work of the various committees established by the agreement. The accord also called for the international community to create a Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG) to observe implementation. The agreement mandated that South African mercenaries depart the country within five weeks of the NMG's deployment, and that other foreign forces depart within three months after the NMG's deployment or six months after the signing of the accord, whichever is sooner. On December 2, USCR issued a statement praising the peace accord, but cautioning against the hasty return of uprooted Sierra Leoneans. "The international community should approach the coming months with caution," said the statement, "and continue to support refugees and internally displaced persons as they decide whether it is safe to return home." USCR warned that reform of the Sierra Leonean army, which had caused much of the displacement, was crucial to restoring normalcy to the country. Despite the peace agreement, security incidents continued in December, resulting in numerous civilian deaths. Many of those killed were trying to prevent armed bands from stealing food. In one incident, at least 50 civilians were reportedly kidnapped to act as food carriers. Repatriation to Sierra Leone During 1996, an estimated 20,000 Sierra Leonean refugees repatriated from Liberia, most following the deterioration of security in Liberia in April. Many returnees made their way to Zimmi, a government-controlled town in Pujehun district effectively surrounded by RUF fighters, where they were assisted by ICRC. Smaller numbers of refugees repatriated by ship from Monrovia to Freetown. It is likely that some Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea and Liberia repatriated following the signing of the peace accord in November. However, UNHCR, which had no regular presence outside Freetown, was unable to confirm reports of repatriation. Liberian Refugees About 13,500 Liberian refugees were known to be in Sierra Leone at year's end, according to UNHCR. Of these, some 2,500 lived at Jui, a camp outside Freetown, where they were assisted by UNHCR. UNHCR also assisted about 5,000 Liberians living in Freetown itself. Additional thousands of Liberians were reported to be living in Freetown, Bo, Kenema, and elsewhere, most without assistance, but UNHCR was unable to confirm many of those reports. At the time of USCR's September site visit, some 2,000 of the Liberians at Jui lived in tents pitched on cement platforms, while more than 400 others remained in abandoned warehouses that were considered to be temporary shelters. The government reportedly refused permission for UNHCR to construct more permanent housing, forcing the agency to rely on tents, which were in short supply. Following a resurgence of violence in Liberia's capital in April, the Sierra Leonean government indicated to UNHCR and foreign diplomats that it intended to enforce a non-entrée policy toward Liberians, citing security concerns. UNHCR reportedly offered to screen new arrivals on a nearby island, an offer the government rejected. However, the government did not apply the non-entrée policy consistently. It was likely that thousands of Liberians were able to enter Sierra Leone during the year, either by land or by sea. UNHCR reported that it was aware of at least 1,000 Liberians who entered Sierra Leone during 1996. On May 11, the government prevented 40 Liberians from disembarking the Victory Reefer in Freetown harbor, forcing the 40 to return to Monrovia. The government did allow Sierra Leoneans aboard the ship to disembark, as well as some Liberians with family ties to Sierra Leone. In all other known cases involving refugee-carrying ships, UNHCR reported that it was able to negotiate the entry of Liberian refugees into Sierra Leone. There were conflicting reports about whether Sierra Leonean soldiers prevented some Liberians from entering the country via the land border with Liberia. An estimated several thousand Liberians, as well a larger number of repatriating Sierra Leonean refugees, crossed into Sierra Leone in the months following the April fighting in Liberia. After entering Sierra Leone, most remained in Zimmi, where they were assisted by ICRC; others successfully made their way to Kenema, where they received limited assistance financed in part by UNHCR. At the time of the September USCR site visit, small numbers of Liberians were continuing to arrive in Sierra Leone, especially by boat or overland via Guinea. The government reportedly permitted such persons to enter, provided their numbers remained small and the individuals did not appear to pose a threat to security.