El Salvador: The National Civilian Police (PNC)

 

GLOSSARY

ANIS      National Association of Indigenous Salvadorans (Asociación Nacional Indigena Salvadorena)

ANSP     National Public Security Academy (Academia Nacional de Seguridad Publica)

ARENA Nationalist Republican Alliance Party (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista)

CODEHUCA         Commission for the Defense of Human Rights in Central America

DIC         Criminal Investigations Division (Division de Investigacion Criminal)

DICO      Department for the Investigation of Organized Crime (Departamento de Investigacion del Crimen Organizado)

FMLN    Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberation Nacional)

FURODA               Roberto D'Aubuisson Nationalist Force (Fuerza Nacionalista Roberto D'Aubuisson)

ICITAP Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program, US Department of Justice International

Joint Group           Joint Group for the Investigation of Illegal Armed Groups with Political Motivation in El Salvador (Grupo Conjunto)

MINUSAL             United Nations Mission in El Salvador

ONUSAL               United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador

ONUV    United Nations Office of Verification

PDDH     Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (Procuradoria para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos)

PN           National Police

PNC        National Civilian Police (Policia Nacional Civil)

SIU         Special Investigative Unit (Comisión de Investigación de Hechos Delictivos, also known as the Commission for Investigation of Criminal Acts)

Sombra Negra                Black Shadow death squad

UEA       Executive Anti-Narcotics Unit (Unidad Ejecutiva Antinarcóticos)

WOLA                    Washington Office on Latin America

MAP: EL SALVADOR

See original

1. INTRODUCTION

The 1992 Peace Accords between the government of El Salvador and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) ended 12 years of civil war[1]1. One of the major provisions of the accords was the disbanding of the military-run police system. The old National Police, National Guard, Treasury Police, and Customs Police, all associated with human rights violations, were replaced by a new civilian-controlled organization called the National Civilian Police (PNC), which began operations in March 1993 (WOLA Jan. 1996, iii, 1; Country Reports 1997 1998).

This paper examines the performance of the PNC to date, with an emphasis on reports of the PNC's progress and problems in 1996 and 1997. The paper includes an examination of the force's struggles with internal discipline and human rights violations, a discussion of the role of the National Public Security Academy (ANSP), and coverage of judicial issues in the context of El Salvador's post-war crime wave.

2. PNC BACKGROUND, FORMATION AND STRUCTURE

2.1 Formation

The PNC was rapidly assembled after the signing of the 1992 Peace Accords, and was designed to be an honest, efficient replacement police force, effective in using investigative skills rather than the brutality and intimidation that had characterized the methods of its predecessors (WOLA Jan. 1996, iii; CIP June 1996). The force was to be composed of one-fifth former National Police (PN), one-fifth former FMLN guerrillas, and three-fifths civilians not involved in the conflict (WOLA Jan. 1996, 6; CIP June 1996; Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook 1996 1996, 178-79). In practice, the number of former PN agents was increased (WOLA Jan. 1996, 6; Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook 1996 1996, 179), and the FMLN did not fill its quota because many of its members were not able to pass the education requirements[2]2 (ibid.). In the face of a post-war crime wave[3]3, however, the government and the FMLN renegotiated the terms of the PNC formation to allow members of the Treasury Police and National Guard to qualify for PNC membership, while FMLN candidates were allowed to bypass the educational standards (ibid.; WOLA Jan. 1996, 14-15).

According to various sources, it was not long before factions of former security forces personnel emerged within the PNC, allegedly bent on re-creating the old police culture of violence, impunity and intimidation (WOLA Jan. 1996, ii, 16-17; CIP June 1996; Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook 1996 1996, 179). In the fall of 1993, in what the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) describes as "a major set-back for the PNC," two special law enforcement units made up of military personnel were transferred to the PNC (WOLA Jan. 1996, 14-15). These were the Special Investigative Unit (SIU—Comisión de Investigación de Hechos Delictivos, also known as the Commission for Investigation of Criminal Acts) and the Executive Anti-Narcotics Unit (UEA—Unidad Ejecutiva Antinarcóticos) (ibid.). A January 1996 report on the PNC by WOLA outlines cases of former UEA and SIU personnel actively interfering with police investigations, including those of the 1993 murders of FMLN leaders Oscar Grimaldi and Francisco Velis (ibid. 14-16). WOLA reports that after being ordered to attend the newly created National Public Security Academy (ANSP) to undergo training, most of the members of the old units resigned, although many were redirected to other parts of the security bureaucracy (ibid. 16).

Many of the top early appointments to the PNC were of individuals closely linked to the old security forces (WOLA Jan. 1996, 16-20; CIP June 1996; UN 23 Oct. 1995). According to the WOLA report, in early 1996 "in the top 10 or 12 posts of the PNC, ex-Armed Forces personnel predominated.... Former security forces personnel occupied well over half of the most prestigious and influential positions after July 1995" (Jan. 1996, 19). Among the worst of these appointments, according to WOLA, was that of Oscar Peña Durán as deputy director of operations in September 1993. Peña was forced to resign in May 1994 under UN and US pressure after having built his own network of former colleagues who, among other things, spied on ex-FMLN PNC members and stopped UN monitors from inspecting the work of his department (ibid., 16-17). Kelly Josh, a WOLA affiliate in San Salvador, stated in February 1998 that, in general, the PNC leadership still places somewhat more trust in ex-PN people than ex-FMLN (26 and 27 Feb. 1998). Now, however, according to Josh, the issue of one's past affiliation has slipped somewhat into the background as the PNC becomes a more cohesive unit (ibid.).

Juan Gonzalez, director of the US Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP) in San Salvador, points to some key managerial changes in 1997 which he believes indicate the organization is moving in the right direction (29 Jan. 1998). In early 1997 the PNC replaced Deputy Director of Operations Rolando Garcia with Renzo Martinez, and in October 1997 the PNC hired Maritza Duran as deputy director of administration (ibid.). According to Gonzalez, both Martinez and Duran are committed to instituting meaningful changes in the PNC, and the difference they have brought to the organization "is like night and day" (ibid.). One of Martinez's promising initiatives, according to Josh, is the on-going effort to get PNC members out of barracks and into their own homes (26 and 27 Feb. 1998). Almost all PNC members still live in barracks, isolated from the community. According to Josh, getting police out of barracks will better integrate them and help with social problems found within the force such as alcoholism and use of prostitutes (ibid.).

From an initial force of 5,700 agents and officers, the PNC now numbers over 15,000, most graduates of the ANSP, which is an autonomous body under the Ministry of Public Security (ibid.; El Diario de Hoy 24 Dec. 1997; La Nación 26 Nov. 1997; Josh 26 and 27 Feb. 1998). The PNC budget for 1997 was US$155.7 million (La Nación 26 Nov. 1997). Salaries account for about 95 per cent of this budget, a fact that worries Gonzalez (29 Jan. 1998). Gonzalez believes that any future expansion of the PNC without an increase in funding will weaken the force's effectiveness, since little money will be left over for equipment and other costs (ibid.). In 1997 the ANSP graduated an average of 305 basic level agents every six weeks, for a yearly total of 2,446 (Josh 26 and 27 Feb. 1998). Josh states that authorities are split on the question of future PNC growth: the police chief has stated that he would like the academy to graduate fewer officers and do a better job with the training, but both the minister of public security and the director of the ANSP want the ANSP to keep graduation rates high (ibid.). Josh states that the ANSP budget would be cut significantly if the number of recruits drops off (ibid.).

2.2 International Involvement

The first UN group set up to monitor agreements between the government of El Salvador and the FMLN was the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), which began operations in May 1991 (UN 10 May 1996). It had a staff of 1,200 military and civilian personnel, and was replaced in April 1995 by the scaled-down United Nations Mission in El Salvador (MINUSAL), which in May 1996 was itself replaced by the further reduced United Nations Office of Verification (ONUV) (UN 10 May 1996; ibid. UN 16 Dec. 1996; Latinamerica Press 9 May 1996; AI 1997). In turn, the ONUV office was closed in July 1997, with verification duties now being performed from UN headquarters in Geneva (Country Reports 1997 1998). Country Reports 1997 states that this diminishing UN involvement in verification "reflected international acknowledgment of the continued progress in implementing the Peace Accords" (ibid.). However, in his October 1997 report on El Salvador, the UN secretary-general states that despite large-scale international aid and the participation of over 130 Salvadoran NGOs in various aspects of the peace process, many projects have suffered from insufficient resources, lack of continuity, the late arrival of funds, slow decision-making, and uncoordinated efforts (6 Oct. 1997, 5).

Both the PNC and ANSP have benefited from substantial foreign aid, including technical and financial assistance, either channeled through the United Nations or coming as direct aid from such countries as the United States, France, Spain, Chile, Mexico, Norway, and Sweden, and from the European Union (UN 6 Oct. 1997, 4-5, 10-11; La Nación 26 Nov. 1997; Country Reports 1997 1998; WOLA Jan. 1996. 5-7; Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook 1996 1996, 169-70; El Diario de Hoy 12 Dec. 1997). As well, in recent years international aid has gone to strengthen the National Public Security Council, which acts as a liaison between the PNC and ANSP, and the office of the Inspector General, which was created to police the new force[4]4 (Gonzalez 29 Jan. 1998; UN 6 Oct. 1997, 10).

The US provides training and technical assistance to the PNC and ANSP through ICITAP, which has provided close to US$30 million in aid since 1992 (Gonzalez 29 Jan. 1998; US Dept. of State 1996). The early focus was on training as well as providing equipment and helping in the effort to establish the ANSP (ibid.). With the PNC, ICITAP concentrates its efforts on aiding the Criminal Investigations Division (DIC), the arm of the police that investigates crimes. Assistance is also given to the Inspector General (ibid.). ICITAP is actively handing over the training function to Salvadoran trainers, and according to Gonzalez, is focusing on helping with curriculum and instructor development in the ANSP and providing assistance to the PNC to strengthen areas of institutional weakness (ibid.). Josh reports that WOLA has also been very supportive of the PNC, and is working now on a police-community relations seminar to improve relations based in part on models from the US (26 and 27 Feb. 1998).

As well, El Salvador has been chosen as the site of the Central American Institute for Advanced Police Studies, which will help integrate police work across the region to address common problems such as money laundering, vehicle theft, and drug and arms trafficking (Gonzalez 29 Jan. 1998). The institute, currently in the functional design stage, is based on an agreement by the six Central American countries (ibid.). According to Gonzalez, there are two ICITAP consultants—an American and an Argentine—providing support. It is expected that the institute will help forge both personal and institutional links across the region (ibid.).

2.3 National Public Security Academy (ANSP)

The ANSP began operations six months after the signing of the 1992 Peace Accords (WOLA Jan. 1996, 13). According to WOLA, the Salvadoran military actively hindered the establishment of the academy:

The military refused to hand over the existing Public Security Academy to be used as a site for the new ANSP. Instead, it moved the military academy there. It refused to hand over any other suitable military bases for the ANSP. When the Defense Ministry finally relinquished a police technical school building in Santa Tecla, it first stripped the building of doors, windows, lockers, even light bulbs. The swampy, sweltering army base eventually used for the ANSP campus was only available because it was registered to the Treasury Ministry rather than Defense (Jan. 1996, 11, 12).[5]5

        The Police Career Law, which came into effect in July 1996, regulates the number and qualifications of applicants to the ANSP (Central America Report 15 Aug. 1996). Regular applicants must be between 18 and 22 years of age and have at least a high school education, while applicants for the executive level need a university degree and must be under 28 years of age (ibid.). Although the ANSP has instituted a process to screen candidates, according to Josh, it is relatively ineffective given the large numbers of recruits, so some ex-criminals and gang members do become part of the police force (Josh 26 and 27 Feb. 1998). Josh adds that ANSP professors are not effective in screening out inappropriate candidates, and that after graduation there is no examination or further screening process before graduates routinely become members of the PNC (ibid.).

ANSP training for regular recruits includes about five months of theoretical training and three months of field work (Josh 26 and 27 Feb. 1998). Josh considers the ANSP the best police academy in Central America, although somewhat lacking in the more practical aspects of training (ibid.). The classroom work includes human rights training, but according to Gonzalez this training is currently not very effective (29 Jan. 1998). In an internal poll 60 per cent of PNC members said the ANSP human rights training was unrealistic, although 62 per cent said that the ANSP is a good place to inculcate human rights values (El Diario de Hoy 31 Dec. 1997b; see also LCHR July 1997, 95). In addition, 68 per cent said that the theoretical knowledge they gained at the ANSP was insufficient to prepare them for their work (ibid.). According to Josh, PNC members have been weak in learning proper procedures and following them under pressure (26 and 27 Feb. 1998).

Gonzalez states that the ANSP, with assistance from ICITAP, is now graduating its own trainers, and is training executives to take on the work of identifying areas of institutional weakness and implementing solutions (29 Jan. 1998). Josh contends, however, that although specially trained, most ANSP training officers have very little practical experience themselves; she points out that those with more than a few years as police officers are probably from the old PN and usually do not have good habits to teach new recruits (26 and 27 Feb. 1998).

Poor communications between the autonomous ANSP and the PNC have hampered the efficiency of both groups in the past, but in early 1997 a PNC-ANSP liaison committee was set up by the National Public Security Council to encourage the two institutions to work together so that Academy training would better meet the current needs of the PNC (Gonzalez 29 Jan. 1998; Josh 26 and 27 Feb. 1998). According to Josh, unfortunately this committee has so far not been able to improve PNC-ANSP communications to any great extent (26 and 27 Feb. 1998).

2.4 Ranks and Deployment

The Police Career Law provides for promotion by merit, with at least two years of prior duty for basic officer positions, and three years for mid- and executive-level positions. The law also creates a Board of Entry and Promotion to oversee selection and promotion (Central America Report 15 Aug. 1996). The ranks are as follows:

basic level—officer, corporal, sergeant; executive level—subinspector, inspector, chief inspector; superior level—subcommissioner, commissioner, commissioner general, subdirector general, director general (Central America Report 15 Aug. 1996).

El Diario de Hoy reported on 24 December 1997 that the PNC had in total 18 police stations, 67 sub-stations and 252 posts operating throughout the country. Under the Plan Guardian, instituted in March 1995 in response to rising crime in rural areas, the PNC shares rural patrolling duties with the military in areas without a strong PNC presence (WOLA Jan. 1996, 12; Central America Report 14 Mar. 1996; Gonzalez 29 Jan. 1998). Reports indicate that the PNC has begun widening its deployment in rural areas (El Diario de Hoy 26 Nov. 1997; La Nación 26 Nov. 1997); although, most areas are still covered by joint patrols (Josh 26 and 27 Feb. 1998). The Plan Guardian has been criticized as an attempt to remilitarize the country (Central America Report 14 Mar. 1996) and for blurring lines of authority between military and civilian forces (WOLA Jan. 1996, 12). Juan Gonzalez comments that on a political level in El Salvador it is very difficult to oppose the Plan Guardian since there does not seem to be a better solution given rampant violent crime[6]6 (29 Jan. 1998; see also Central America Report 14 Mar. 1996). Gonzalez contends, however, that since 1992 the number of troops in El Salvador has dropped from 63,000 to 14,000[7]7, which he believes is indicative of a country moving away from, rather than toward, militarization (ibid.).

In November 1997 La Nación reported that the PNC had opened 47 rural posts in 5 departments at a cost of US$6.8 million. Forty-four other rural posts had already been established in the late 1980s under the old system (26 Nov. 1997). Other press reports indicate the PNC plans to open a hundred or more new rural posts in early 1998 (Central America Update 22-28 Nov. 1997; Latin America Regional Report 28 Oct. 1997). Although there were plans to make the new rural police a force separate from the PNC, rural police have, according to Josh, formed a division within the PNC, although they wear different uniforms (26 and 27 Feb. 1998).

3. PNC PERFORMANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

3.1 Investigations Capacity

Within the PNC, criminal investigations are covered by the Criminal Investigations Division (DIC), a group that has been criticized for inefficiency and corruption (WOLA Jan. 1996, 14-17; CIP June 1996; UN 23 Oct. 1995; Central America Report 15 Aug. 1996; AI Dec. 1996a; Notisur 23 Feb. 1996). The Department for the Investigation of Organized Crime (DICO), meant to be an elite group untainted by corruption and with no involvement in the civil war, was trained at the ANSP and began operations in February 1995 under the direction of the DIC (WOLA Jan. 1996, 17-18). WOLA reported in January 1996, however, that DICO's early work was undermined by the open hostilities of DIC agents, and the new unit eventually had to be switched to the direct supervision of PNC director Rodrigo Avila (ibid., 18).

Sources indicate that the PNC remains weak at investigating crimes (El Diario de Hoy 8 Jan. 1998a; ibid. 17 Dec. 1997; ibid. 15 Dec. 1997; LCHR July 1997, 86; Josh 26 and 27 Feb. 1998). According to Josh, the DIC now has about 300 detectives, a small force in view of the extremely high crime rate in the country (26 and 27 Feb. 1998). El Diario de Hoy reported on 17 December 1997 that the PNC had admitted that a number of crimes had not been solved because PNC agents had failed to secure the crime scene and evidence had been lost or damaged. The PNC has announced it will analyze the crime scene work of its agents in an effort to improve (El Diario de Hoy 8 Jan. 1998a). Country Reports 1997 describes the PNC as "understaffed, only minimally trained, and short on practical experience." Other sources indicate it can be difficult to separate errors caused by inefficiency and lapses due to corruption (Notisur 23 Feb. 1996; The Washington Post 13 Oct. 1996). For example, The Washington Post reported on 13 October 1996 that

Several senior policemen have been linked to organized crime, and little progress has been made in purging the force of criminal elements. Even the few successes have been fleeting. In August [1996], when police raided a restaurant where regional drug lords were meeting, they did not have enough manpower to seal the exits effectively and everyone escaped.

More recently, in January 1998 several municipal authorities denounced the PNC for not having made any arrests in a document forgery case six months after the municipal authorities had handed over evidence of the ring (El Diario de Hoy 14 Jan. 1998a; ibid. 14 Jan. 1998b). A year previously the PNC had arrested the mayors of three municipalities in San Miguel and La Union departments, along with a former mayor and several town employees—all members of the ruling Nationalist Republican Alliance Party (ARENA)—and charged them with falsifying documents (Notisur 23 Feb. 1996). However, all suspects were soon released after it was found the PNC had committed procedural errors during the arrests and investigation (ibid.). Thus, what originally appeared to be a blow against impunity later seemed to show either police bungling or corruption (ibid.).

A December 1997 survey of PNC members in key posts in various municipalities reveals that in several areas PNC members believe they have inadequate equipment, face a lack of cooperation from local residents, and are unable to cope with the large number of cases reported—some 35,000 annually in Santa Ana, for example (El Diario de Hoy 15 Dec. 1997). Despite police and judicial reforms many victims choose not to report crimes and many witnesses refuse to testify for fear of reprisals from criminals (El Diario de Hoy 17 Dec. 1997; Latinamerica Press 11 Sept. 1997).

However, in January 1998 ICITAP consultants finished an assessment of the weaknesses and strengths of the DIC and, according to Juan Gonzalez, to their surprise found that overall the DIC was doing a good job (29 Jan. 1998). The only problems ICITAP's two consultants found were some lack of supervision and an ineffective exchange of information between levels of the PNC, both of which the consultants believe can easily be corrected (ibid.). The consultants inspected investigations at random and found that the investigations could, with very little help, stand up to the standards of the new Criminal Procedures Code[8]8. ICITAP plans to continue to provide personal, on-site consultants in an effort to improve the DIC's investigative capacities (ibid.).

According to Josh, in the face of high crime rates, the PNC's primary role is to prevent crimes through patrolling (26 and 27 Feb. 1998), although PNC patrolling methods are very weak, according to Gonzalez (29 Jan. 1998). With ICITAP help, however, the PNC is introducing new daily reporting procedures designed to help the beat officers to become more involved with their community, and to improve accountability (ibid.).

Since its inception, PNC casualties have been very high, a reflection both of agents' inexperience and the high rate of violence in Salvadoran society (WOLA Jan. 1996, ii-iii; 13; US Dept. of State 1996; La Nación 26 Nov. 1997). In October 1997 the PNC announced that since 1993, 219 agents had been killed and 400 others wounded in the course of duty (La Nación 26 Nov. 1997).

3.2 Human Rights

3.2.1 Overview

In the last few years the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (PDDH) has consistently named the PNC as a major human rights violator (WOLA Jan. 1996. 2; Central America Report 3 Oct. 1996; Country Reports 1997 1998; LCHR July 1997, 93, 95; El Diario de Hoy 11 Dec. 1997; ibid. 31 Dec. 1997c). Of 4,701 human rights complaints accepted by the Human Rights Ombudsman from January to November 1997, 2,405, or 46.6 per cent were against PNC members[9]9 (Proceso 24 Dec. 1997, see also Country Reports 1997 1998; El Diario de Hoy 11 Dec. 1997). PNC violations were for the most part either due to excessive use of force or undue delays in bringing accused persons to trial (ibid.). The Inspector Generals' office investigated 229 cases of complaints against the PNC in the first half of 1997, indicating an increase in complaints to that office over the previous year (Country Reports 1997 1998). An internal poll of 1,529 agents conducted by the PNC in December 1997 found that 70 per cent of agents rigorously respect human rights, but the remaining 30 per cent do not know how to respect human rights (El Diario de Hoy 31 Dec. 1997b). Other findings: 43 per cent did not know that under no circumstances are they allowed to pressure a person to give information about a crime; 60 per cent stated that the human rights training they received at the ANSP was unrealistic; and 15 per cent of agents did not know how to conduct a household visit when there were indications that stolen goods were in the residence (ibid.).

3.2.2 Extrajudicial Killings and Death Squads

         Country Reports 1997 states that there were no "confirmed" cases of extrajudicial killings in 1997, echoing a similar contention in the previous year's report, which had been strongly criticized by the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights (Country Reports 1997 1998; Country Reports 1996 1997; LCHR July 1997, 88). Nonetheless, Country Reports 1997 does give details of several killings involving PNC members, some of which were still unresolved at the end of 1997. In October 1996, for example, police shot and killed former FMLN member Francisco Manzanares (ibid.; AI 1997; LCHR July 1997, 89). By the end of 1997 four PNC members were being held in the case, including Jose Santo Arevalo, who was formally charged with the killing; according to Country Reports 1997, by December 1997 "the case was under active investigation in preparation for trial" (ibid.). Country Reports 1997 also reports that due to insufficient evidence, in December 1997 charges were dropped against two PNC members suspected of the March 1996 killing of four gang members in Santa Ana (see also Reuters 4 June 1997). However, an investigation continues into the February 1997 killing of two FMLN activists in Nejapa in which two PNC agents have been implicated (ibid.). Most recently, on 24 December 1997 in San Marcos, drunken PNC members reportedly fired on civilians, killing one and hospitalizing four others (El Diario de Hoy 31 Dec. 1997c).

             The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions reported that the PNC killed several members of the National Association of Indigenous Salvadorans (ANIS) in 1995 and 1996 in questionable circumstances (UN 23 Dec. 1996; see also LCHR July 1997, 96-97). ANIS has been involved in a lingering land dispute, and ANIS members have received death threats, apparently from paramilitary personnel (ibid.; AI 1997; LCHR July 1997, 96-97). Country Reports 1997 states that ANIS claims of government harassment are unproved (1998).

Since the Peace Accords, several sources have pointed to a resurgence of operations by vigilante death squads, many targeting criminals and gang members, and some apparently having the involvement of PNC members (WOLA Jan. 1996, 3, 18; Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook 1996 1996, 179; LCHR July 1997, 89, 97; UPI 4 Mar. 1996; IPS 2 Jan. 1996; AI Dec. 1996a; Reuters 4 June 1997; The Washington Post 13 Oct. 1996). The killings of several FMLN and ARENA members in 1992 and 1993 prompted the formation of the UN-assisted Joint Group for the Investigation of Illegal Armed Groups with Political Motivation in El Salvador (Grupo Conjunto) (WOLA Jan. 1996, 11; AI Dec. 1996a). In its 1994 report (its most recent report) the Joint Group found that the same organizational structures that allow for planning and carrying out political assassinations can be easily turned to criminal strikes for financial gain, and that such groups, many made up of a mixture of former security forces and civilians, operate in El Salvador (WOLA Jan. 1996, 11; see also FDCH 25 June 1997; Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook 1996 1996, 177; AI Dec. 1996a). Estimates of the number of death squad killings in 1997 vary: the PDDH reported 33 for the entire year, while Tutela Legal counted 40 in the first half of 1997 (Proceso 24 Dec. 1997; Reuters 4 June 1997).

Among the death squads with alleged PNC connections is the Sombra Negra or Black Shadow group. Amnesty International reported in December 1996 that

Sombra Negra (Black Shadow) appeared in December 1994 in Milagro de la Paz, San Miguel, purportedly to combat crime and act as a social clean-up squad. Although the exact origin and membership of the group are unknown, Amnesty International suspects that members included former soldiers with some tacit support from the PNC. By April 1995, 17 people had been murdered by the group, allegedly all of them criminals. The group justified its actions claiming that "the laws of the country were not working," that "the PNC did not have sufficient resources to combat crime" and that "too many crimes were committed in El Salvador daily." All its victims had been extrajudicially executed with shots in the back of the head using weapons such as assault rifles and machine guns (1996a).

In July 1995, some 16[10]10 alleged Black Shadow members were arrested, four of whom were PNC members (ibid.; Country Reports 1997 1998; Reuters 4 June 1997; WOLA Jan. 1996, 3). Amnesty International stated that after the arrests "Public prosecutors involved in the case reported to have received death threats and that their hotel had been sprayed with bullets" (1996a). Despite the large number of arrests, by April 1997 all the suspects had been released and the charges were dropped (Country Reports 1997 1998; Reuters 4 June 1997). Three more PNC officers were arrested in 1997 in connection with death squad killings of criminals and youth gang members in San Salvador and Santa Ana (Reuters 4 June 1997). PNC director Rodrigo Avila categorized the arrest of the officers as "an isolated case," but the Roman Catholic archbishop's human rights office Tutela Legal claimed the three were Black Shadow members (ibid.). According to Josh, there are no more recent reports of the group being reactivated, at least under this name (26 and 27 Feb. 1998).

A 13 October 1996 Washington Post article reported the existence in El Salvador of "at least six sophisticated armed groups with extensive intelligence networks, responding to different political masters. While most are controlled by the far right, which is opposed to the peace process, the extreme left has at least one armed group." The article used the example of the kidnapping of the son of Paul Suster, a close friend of former president and ARENA member Alfredo Cristiani, to argue that armed groups are able to target even those with powerful connections in El Salvador (The Washington Post 13 Oct. 1996).

A distinguishing feature of the armed groups is the use of unregistered cars with tinted windows, similar to death squad vehicles from the civil war (ibid.). Besides criminals and gang members, vigilante death squads have been reported to target homosexuals and street children, both groups which have also reportedly received brutal treatment from the PNC (LCHR July 1997, 97-98; Reuters 17 July 1996; UN 23 Dec. 1996; The Washington Post 17 Dec. 1996).[11]11

        In the summer of 1996 a new group, the Roberto D'Aubuisson Nationalist Force (FURODA), issued a series of death threats against prominent human rights workers, left-wing political and religious leaders, editors and journalists (LCHR July 1997, 91-92; AI Dec. 1996a; IPS 28 July 1996; ibid. 30 June 1996; Latin America Weekly Report 5 Sept. 1996). Roberto D'Abuisson, the founder of the right-wing ARENA party, was associated with death squad activity in the 1980s, and died of cancer in 1992 (AI Dec. 1996a). The FURODA death threats, which were widely publicized, targeted individuals for criticizing ARENA government officials (AI Dec. 1996a; IPS 28 July 1996; ibid. 30 June 1996). According to the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights, the investigation of the FURODA death threats "has been characterized by independent organizations as incomplete, slow and half-hearted" (July 1997, 92).

3.2.3 Torture, Disappearances, Excessive Force

A number of sources claim that the PNC continues to rely on the use of excessive force, sometimes to the extent of torture (Country Reports 1997 1998; AI 1997; El Diario de Hoy 31 Dec. 1997a; ibid. 31 Dec. 1997c). In December 1997, for example, two PNC officers were arrested and charged with burning nearly a third of detainee Ambrosio Perez's body in January 1997 in an effort to get information about an alleged arms cache[12]12 (ibid.; El Diario de Hoy 31 Dec. 1997a). In his December 1996 report, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment summarized cases it had received against the PNC:

Carlos Ulises Bonilla, arrested on 2 November 1995 by the Civil National Police of the canton of Pavana, jurisdiction of San Alejo, La Unión, accused of ill-treating his concubine; the police had reportedly tied him to a tree and beaten him repeatedly, producing a rupture in the small intestine. Hector José Vásquez Orantes and Edgardo Armando Alvarado Mejia, arrested on 21 January 1996 for drunkenness by the Civil National Police in the municipality of Tepecoyo, La Libertad, were reportedly taken to police premises and violently beaten, as a result of which Mr. Vásquez Orantes had had to be operated for intestinal injuries (UN 20 Dec. 1996).

Amnesty International's annual report covering the events of 1996 also states that "there were many allegations of torture and ill-treatment by the PNC" and mentions two cases of beatings from early in the year (AI 1997).

Reports from 1997 and 1998 are limited, however, several reports from 1995 and 1996 strongly criticized the PNC for the use of excessive force, a practice which, according to PDDH statistics, accounted for many violations on the part of the PNC (WOLA Jan. 1996, 2; UN 23 Dec. 1996; IPS 2 Jan. 1996; CISPES 15 Apr. 1996; Proceso 24 Dec. 1997). For example, the January 1996 WOLA report documents a number of cases in 1995 of PNC members using excessive force to break up demonstrations, strikes and protests; WOLA criticizes the PNC leadership for choosing "to use baton-wielding riot police, tear-gas, and rubber bullets in situations where the doctrine of the PNC would call for patience and negotiations" (Jan. 1996, 2; see also IPS 2 Jan. 1996). In April 1996 CISPES reported the excessive use of force by the PNC in evicting 156 families from the community "Neuvo Amanecer 26 de Diciembre" in Illopango (15 Apr. 1996). The families had been uprooted during the war and had settled in the area (ibid.). Police used tear-gas and "brute force," injuring children most seriously (ibid.). The community was evicted at the request of the land owner Jaime Hernandez. CISPES also charges that the PNC illegally arrested community members (ibid.). More recently, in October 1997 the PNC anti-riot squad subdued striking Ministry of Health workers in San Salvador with pepper spray, which brought complaints of the use of unnecessary force by the union (AFP 2 Oct. 1997; Proceso 8 Oct. 1997). Police officials, however, said the pepper spray was used only after police themselves were attacked, and, according to police officials, there were no reports of injuries or arrests (Proceso 8 Oct. 1997).

The Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights reports that homosexuals and street children receive particularly rough treatment from the PNC:

Police often round up gay men and transvestites from local bars, jailing them without cause. There they are typically subjected to sexual, physical and verbal abuse from the police. There is no recourse for these individuals as the police and the judicial system typically do not address their claims, and provide no relief or protection (July 1997, 97, 98; see also ICCHRLA Apr. 1996, AI Dec. 1996b).

Regarding street children, the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights reports that "A youth who spoke out about abuses at a 1996 forum in San Salvador entitled ‘Youth Confronting Violence,' at which members of the PNC were present, was later beaten by police, then murdered by a private citizen" (July 1997, 98; see also UN 23 Dec. 1996). Country Reports 1997 states that PNC members deny charges of brutality against street children, but the PNC has "accepted PDDH human rights training for those police units that have the most contact with juveniles" (1998).

On 13 December 1996 the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances reported "that not a single new case of disappearance has been recorded since 1992" in El Salvador (see also Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook 1996 1996, 181, Country Reports 1997 1998). However, there were nearly 2,300 outstanding cases, most from 1980-83, and the Working Group called on the government of El Salvador to make greater efforts to clear up these cases (UN 13 Dec. 1996). In contrast, the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights reports 101 cases of disappearances registered with the PDDH in 1996 (July 1997, 87), an increase over 1995, but Country Reports 1997 reports only 8 cases of disappearances, "none of which involved serious allegations of political motivation," registered with the PDDH for the first half of 1997 (1998). Country Reports 1997 states, "Kidnapping for profit affects all levels of society and has become a common occurrence throughout the country" (ibid.).

3.3 "Irregular" or "Parallel" Structures

Many sources indicate that the PNC has had serious problems with "irregular" or "parallel" structures—unofficial units operating under uncertain authority within the PNC (WOLA Jan. 1996, iv, vii, 22; CIP June 1996; LCHR July 1997, 93-94; Central America Report 28 Aug. 1997, 5; Miami Herald 8 Nov. 1997; Proceso 18 June 1997). WOLA reported in January 1996, for example, on the "shadowy" activities of such groups as the Analysis Unit, made up of former police force members reporting directly to Public Security Minister Hugo Barrera, and later dissolved under UN pressure (WOLA Jan. 1996, 21; Central America Report 28 Aug. 1997). The WOLA report also describes the activities of several other irregular units operating within the PNC, including an anti-kidnapping unit assembled and paid for by private individuals (ibid. 21-22). WOLA's Kelly Josh states that since the January 1996 report it has become more difficult to obtain information on internal problems such as irregular units within the PNC since the police often close ranks on issues now, while in earlier years information leaks were common (26 and 27 Feb. 1998). However, Josh indicates that unregulated irregular units remain a concern (ibid.).

In August 1997 the PDDH complained about the activities of Victor Rivera, also known as "Commissar Zacarias," who was reportedly instrumental in setting up the Analysis Unit (Central America Report 28 Aug. 1997, 5). According to the PDDH, Rivera often hid or twisted the truth concerning cases he was investigating, including the 1995 assassination of medical student Adriano Vilanova. In the PDDH account Vilanova was killed by police, but Rivera tried to convince the parents that their son died after being hit by a car (ibid.). The Miami Herald reported that inspectors sent to shut down Rivera's illegal operation in March 1997 "found 82 grenades and 40 bomb detonators in a captain's office. He claimed the weapons were seized in raids, but the inspectors said the seizures were never officially reported" (8 Nov. 1997).

3.4 Accountability and Public Perception

Lack of effective internal discipline has been an ongoing area of concern regarding the PNC (WOLA Jan. 1996, 3, 14; FDCH 25 June 1997; CIP June 1996; UN 23 Oct. 1995; Central America Report 2 May 1996; LCHR July 1997, 94; Country Reports 1997 1998; Josh 26 and 27 Feb. 1998). WOLA reports that the PNC spent its first year of operations without an internal discipline system, and that initially "the slowness of disciplinary action helped foster a culture of impunity within the new force" (Jan. 1996, 3, 23).

The PNC's internal accountability system includes several offices: the Inspector General's office, which is mandated to investigate all aspects of police functioning; the PNC Control Unit, which evaluates procedures, discipline and organization; the PNC Disciplinary Investigations Unit, which investigates violations of PNC laws and regulations by PNC members; the Disciplinary Tribunal, which adjudicates cases; and the Appeals Tribunal, which hears appeals (WOLA Jan. 1996, 23; Gonzalez 29 Jan. 1998). According to Juan Gonzalez, ultimately the PDDH is also part of this accountability system, as is the PNC personnel department, which keeps all personal records (29 Jan. 1998).

In July 1997 the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights reported a general lack of cooperation, to the point of antagonism, between the PDDH, the PNC, the Ministry of Public Security and other government groups (93-94). According to Gonzalez, ICITAP is helping to get the various offices involved in this system to communicate better and work together, and that as a result they are beginning to function as a system rather than as "islands unto themselves" (ibid.). Josh maintains that the PNC and the Inspector General's Office get along well, but that the Inspector General is doing a poor job of policing the police (26 and 27 Feb. 1998). This assessment is shared by Proceso, which in an 18 June 1997 editorial complained that the Inspector General "seems to have disappeared from the face of the earth." The worst relations, according to Josh, are between the PDDH and the Ministry of Public Security (ibid.). Nevertheless, the two groups have been able to agree on their respective roles and procedures in the event of social disturbances such as riots or strikes, and the Ministry has taken seriously its duty to provide protection for the Ombudsman in the face of threats (ibid.).

The PDDH has established a tradition of being vocal on human rights abuses, but is limited in its investigative capacity and has few resources (Country Reports 1997 1998; Proceso 18 June 1997). Between 1996 and 1997 the PDDH absorbed a 10 per cent budget cut, and in December 1997 requested a 37 per cent increase, to 36.9 million colones (US$4.2 million) (El Diarioa de Hoy 18 Dec. 1997).

In general, Josh characterizes the PNC internal controls system as "slow and overwhelmed with cases" (ibid.). She explains that early on, commanding officers failed to discipline staff, so all cases ended up with the internal control system. Now commanding officers can discipline up to the misdemeanor level, but this has meant that some serious infractions are simply being pursued as misdemeanors because it would take forever to get them through the formal disciplinary system (ibid.).

Yet in the last few years many PNC members have been arrested and tried for crimes, and several have been convicted (Gonzalez 29 Jan. 1998). According to Country Reports 1997,

From January through September [1997], the PNC internal affairs division processed 925 complaints against police for administrative violations (such as drinking on duty, improper use of police equipment and vehicles, stealing from police funds, etc.) and criminal abuses. The division found police at fault in 368 cases and administratively disciplined (with temporary suspension or fines) 212 police officers for violation of PNC regulations; fired agents in 92 cases for serious violations or minor criminal abuses; and jailed 64 agents for serious criminal acts (1998).

In April 1997 PNC officer Tomas Coronado received a suspended sentence for having killed a demonstrator with a rubber bullet in November 1995; he was put on two years' probation, dismissed from the PNC, is barred from working for the government or holding public office and must pay the victim's family US$2,860 (Country Reports 1997 1998). In December 1997 PNC member Narciso Escamilla Acosta was convicted of homicide and sentenced to 11 years in prison after shooting 16-year-old Wiliam Antonio Gaytan following a car chase (ibid.). Also, in January 1998 the Supreme Court denied an appeal by ex-DIC agent Ascencio de Jesús Chávez Campos, who had been convicted of homicide and extortion after his arrest in June 1997 (El Diario de Hoy 8 Jan. 1998b). Chávez killed Welmer Caranza on 24 May 1996 in Acajutla; the extortion concerned a businessman in Sonsonate (ibid.). Chávez's lawyers had argued in his appeal that he had been denied a fair trial (ibid.).

Until 1997 PNC members accused of crimes were routinely held in police jails, often at the same stations where they worked; however, according to Josh, several were allowed to escape, so now police under arrest are held in a separate section of one of the penitentiaries (26 and 27 Feb. 1998). Josh states that trials of police officers are not expedited, and the wait in the clogged judicial system can be up to three years, the same as for other prisoners (ibid.). Josh also explained that it is very difficult for a civilian to track a case against a PNC member: the arrest is usually reported in newspapers, but the PNC internal control system does not issue follow-up reports, so it can be difficult to know if an officer has been sanctioned or released (ibid.). According to the PDDH, there is no effective system for guaranteeing the safety of witnesses against police officers, although the PNC has taken initiatives in some instances (PDDH 11 Feb. 1998).[13]13

        Gonzalez contends that arrests of PNC members by PNC members are an indication that the PNC is functioning much better than the old police forces, which were commonly involved in crime but which never policed themselves (29 Jan. 1998). Several other sources also indicate that despite problems, the PNC remains a much more honest and respected force than the groups it replaced (ibid.; WOLA Jan. 1996, 2; CIP June 1996; Central America Report 15 Aug. 1996; Country Reports 1997 1998). According to Country Reports 1997,

Despite the volume of human rights complaints, public opinion polls gave the PNC relatively high marks amidst general dissatisfaction with government institutions as a whole. The IG [Inspector General] conducted a nationwide poll in March [1997] in which 63 per cent of the respondents gave the PNC good to excellent marks for its respect of human rights, and 68 per cent gave good to excellent marks for the PNC's everyday treatment of citizens. A July [1997] poll taken by the Catholic University found that 40 per cent of respondents had "some" or "a lot" of confidence in the PNC (1998).

4. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

4.1 Crime

Since the end of the civil war and the formation of the PNC, El Salvador has experienced extremely high rates of violent crime (WOLA Jan. 1996, ii; 9; CIP June 1996; Central America Report 14 Mar. 1996; The Washington Post 16 Mar. 1996; Latinamerica Press 11 Sept. 1997). The demobilization of former combatants has been named as a root cause of the violence (The Washington Post 16 Mar. 1996; WOLA Jan. 1996, 9; Miami Herald 4 Aug. 1997). As the January 1996 WOLA report explains,

Tens of thousands of former combatants with few other skills had been unceremoniously dumped into the general workforce. Since military weapons were easier to find than good jobs, many resorted to armed robbery. Organized crime increased as well, as death squad structures involving military personnel and civilians—which had always mixed criminal activity with political violence—decentralized and increased their lucrative activities (9).

The murder rate in El Salvador in 1994-1995 was 114 per 100,000 people, tying it with South Africa as the most homicidal country in the world,[14]14 and commentators note that as many people or more are being killed during the peace as had been killed during the war (The Washington Post 16 Mar. 1996; The Miami Herald 4 Aug. 1997; IPS 2 Jan. 1996; Latinamerica Press 20 June 1996; Dallas Morning News 1 Dec. 1997; Central America Report 18 Sept. 1997, 8). In August 1997 the Jesuit-run Central American University in San Salvador released the findings of a survey of San Salvador residents indicating that one-fifth of the city's residents were victims of a violent crime in the previous year, and a further one-fifth had been threatened with extortion (Latinamerica Press 11 Sept. 1997; UPI 27 Aug. 1997; Central America Report 18 Sept. 1997, 8). Santa Ana and Usulután have also been reported as areas hit hard by violent crime (The Washington Post 16 Mar. 1996; Central America Report 14 Mar. 1996). Central America Report reported in March 1996 that

In Usulután, some 50 known armed bands are carrying out assaults, kidnappings, extortion and rapes in a crime wave which has led numerous Usultecans to abandon their homes and close their businesses. The gangs even have lists of local residents who have families living abroad, and demand protection money from them in return for leaving their Usulután relatives alone (14 Mar. 1996; see also The Washington Post 16 Mar. 1996; Central America Report 15 Aug. 1996).

According to Central America Report, in Santa Ana in 1996 local gangs targeted police, murdering three in one month (14 Mar. 1996). The gangs are well-armed: a weapons exchange programme run by the police in Santa Ana, for example, netted 28 anti-tank guns in one day according to The Miami Herald (4 Aug. 1997). Kelly Josh reports that kidnapping was common throughout the eastern areas of Usulután, San Miguel and San Vincente, but now seems to have come under control (26 and 27 Feb. 1998). The head of the Criminal Investigative Division (DIC) claims the kidnappings have been reduced because the DIC has become more effective, a claim Josh estimates could be true (ibid.). Josh states that many of the early kidnappings were unsophisticated, with kidnappers taking advantage of a general fear among people (ibid.).

Youth gangs have been bolstered by the arrival of some 4,000 Salvadorans deported from the US since 1993 for having criminal records; many are youths with criminal gang experience from Los Angeles (The New York Times 10 Aug. 1997; The Miami Herald 4 Aug. 1997; Central America Report 3 Oct. 1996; Infomundi Dec. 1996). In San Salvador there are some 34 youth gangs, or "maras," with 3,000 members in total; police arrested 1,600 people for gang activity in the first three months of 1996 (Central America Report 3 Oct. 1996; see also Central America Report 11 Apr. 1996). The two most famous gangs are the Salvatruchas and 18 Street Gang, which signed a peace accord in San Martin, on the outskirts of San Salvador, in April 1996 after a concerted effort involving churches and community groups (Josh 26 and 27 Feb. 1998; UPI 9 Apr. 1996; Central America Report 11 Apr. 1996). According to Josh, the truce has held for the most part, but pertains only to this one small community, and not the rest of the capital or the country (ibid.). In August 1997 The New York Times reported that in Quezaltepeque, only 15 km north of the capital, the bitter rivalry between the two groups continued, with seven people killed due to gang violence from January to August 1997 (10 Aug. 1997).

Infomundi reports that the Salvatruchas are "so famous that there is a long waiting list, formed in many cases by teenagers, almost kids" (Dec. 1996). Other gangs include Crazy, Mau-Mau and White Fence, and the crime wave they are contributing to extends to "even the most remote peasant villages," according to The New York Times (10 Aug. 1997). Josh explains that the gangs, which sprouted after the end of the civil war, were not initially violent, but their adoption of the trappings of US street gang culture—tattoos, rap music, and distinctive clothes, for example—alienated other parts of Salvadoran society (ibid.). The gangs grew quickly because there is little for youth to do in El Salvador: youth unemployment is high, and the majority of schools across the country still only sit for half the day (ibid.). According to Josh, although the gangs are dominated by a culture of machismo, many girls are members as well as boys, and the gangs are becoming the recruiting material for organized crime (ibid.).

The PNC is reportedly ill-equipped to combat heavily-armed gangs (El Diario de Hoy 15 Dec. 1997; Central America Report 14 Mar. 1996), which have been involved in armed assaults, rapes, and murders, especially of other gang members (Josh 26 and 27 Feb. 1998). According to Josh, the PNC has tried different tactics against gang violence, but has been largely unsuccessful (ibid.). For example the police have tried wholesale harassing and arresting gang members, but often the arrests were made without much evidence so the cases were quickly thrown out, and the harassment increased resentment from the gang members (ibid.).

4.2 Judicial Issues

In March 1996, largely in an effort to combat crime, the government passed the controversial Emergency Law Against Common and Organized Crime (Latin America Weekly Report 4 Apr. 1996; Excelsior 31 Mar. 1996; Latinamerica Press 20 June 1996; CIP June 1996; Central America Report 27 Feb. 1997, 6-7). Among its provisions was the extension of maximum prison sentences for a range of serious crimes including murder, kidnapping, extortion, rape and corruption, without eligibility for parole or a reduced sentence, and a provision to allow prison sentences for minors aged 14 to 18 who commit serious crimes (Latinamerica Press 20 June 1996; CIP June 1996; Latin American Weekly Report 4 Apr. 1996). The Emergency Law threatened to increase the Salvadoran prison population beyond what the facilities were designed for and beyond the ability of the endemically slow judicial system to cope; some three-quarters of Salvadoran prisoners are awaiting trial or sentencing (LCHR July 1997, 96; Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook 1996 1996, 183; Country Reports 1997 1998; CIP June 1996; Central America Report 11 Apr. 1996; In These Times 11 Nov. 1996). In February 1997 the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional several provisions of the Emergency Law, including the provision extending maximum sentences beyond 30 years and the provision to allow courts to treat minors accused of serious crimes as adults (Country Reports 1997 1998; Central America Report 27 Feb. 1997, 6-7).

In November 1996 the government revised the Penal Code to allow in court extrajudicial confessions, which have a long association in El Salvador with the use of torture (AI 1997; FDCH 25 June 1997). The use of such confessions had been disallowed as a result of the 1992 Peace Accords, but according to the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights, their courtroom use continued in practice nevertheless (July 1997, 95-96; FDCH 25 June 1997).

Perhaps the most far-reaching judicial reform facing El Salvador is the new Criminal Procedures Code, which is set for implementation at the end of April 1998 (Gonzalez 29 Jan. 1998; La Prensa Gráfica 23 May 1997, 4; Country Reports 1997 1998). El Diario de Hoy reported on 6 January 1998 that the implementation, originally scheduled for January 1998, was delayed after pressure from a number of judicial offices, including the Minister of Justice, the Supreme Court and the Attorney General, to allow time to revise several other laws to conform to the new code. Central America Report, however, raises two other primary considerations: the government lacks the US$34 million required for the changeover, and it remains reluctant to shift control of investigations from the PNC to the prosecutor's office (8 Jan. 1998).

The new Criminal Procedures Code will fundamentally change El Salvador's judicial processes from an "inquisitorial" to an "accusatorial" system (Gonzalez 29 Jan. 1998), and will, according to Country Reports 1997, "entail a massive reeducation effort for professionals in the judicial sector" (1998). In an inquisitorial system the judge has a prosecuting role, while an accusatorial system involves accusations by a prosecutor with an impartial judge or jury reaching a verdict (ibid.; Country Reports 1997 1998). According to Gonzalez, the current system is based heavily on the written word: interviews are conducted and written up, the investigation is submitted in writing to the prosecutor and judge, and usually the judge, who has helped lead the investigation, will simply read the file and make a decision (ibid.; see also Central America Report 8 Jan. 1998). Under the new Criminal Procedures Code, the prosecutor will take over the judge's role of helping to guide the police investigation, and investigators, who used to simply submit a written report, will now be asked to testify at the trial and be subject to cross-examination (ibid.). The move to oral trials is expected to speed up the justice system by prompting judges to keep to a set trial schedule; under the written system, files could linger with a judge indefinitely (Josh 26 and 27 Feb. 1998; Central America Report 8 Jan. 1998). According to Josh, the new Code will not be applied to old cases, only to new cases, so for a time a dual system will be in effect (ibid.).

NOTES ON SELECTED SOURCES

Gonzalez, Juan. 29 January 1998. Director, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), San Salvador. Telephone interview.

Juan Gonzalez, who has worked with the PNC for a number of years, sees ICITAP primarily as an "institution builder" whose goal is to "work itself out of a job" as the PNC becomes more self-reliant and effective. While critical of a number of aspects of PNC and ANSP performance, Gonzalez also sees many improvements in the PNC in recent years, and affirms that the PNC is generally respected within Salvadoran society.

Josh, Kelly. Affiliate, Washington Office on Latin America, San Salvador. 26 and 27 February 1998. Telephone interviews.

Kelly Josh, a WOLA affiliate in San Salvador, has been observing the workings of the PNC for five years. WOLA is currently working on a police-community relations seminar to improve relations based in part on models from the US. WOLA's main project now in El Salvador, however, is working with local civil society organizations to improve their ability to advocate their policies and views regarding judicial and police issues to the government (Josh 26 and 27 Feb. 1998).

Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights (LCHR). July 1997. Critique: Review of the US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996. New York: LCHR, and Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1997. 1998. United States Department of State. [Internet] (http://www.state.gov/) [Accessed 30 Jan. 1998].

The Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights (LCHR) annually critiques selected country reports from the US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. In the 1980s the LCHR severely criticized a number of the State Department's El Salvador reports as being politically biased. For three years after the 1992 Peace Accords the LCHR deliberately did not report on El Salvador, but their critique of the El Salvador country report for 1996 is extremely critical. According to LCHR, the report, "makes painfully clear that accurate human rights reporting on El Salvador is no higher a priority today than it was in the years of extensive US government involvement in that country's internal conflict" (July 1997, 85). Specifically, the LCHR report criticizes the US Department of State for ignoring the findings of the PDDH and other human rights groups, and for treating the PNC too lightly. The 1997 version of Country Reports does discuss the findings of the PDDH and other groups, and is in general much more critical of PNC performance than the 1996 report.

Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and Hemisphere Initiatives. January 1996. William Stanley. Protectors or Perpetrators? The Institutional Crisis of the Salvadoran Civilian Police. Washington, D.C.: WOLA and Hemisphere Initiatives.

This comprehensive report, written by William Stanley, details a long list of problem areas encountered in the initial years of PNC development, including "excessive violence and increasing incidents of human rights abuse; an inability to investigate and prosecute prominent suspects; infiltration by persons opposed to the doctrine and mission of the new force; lack of internal discipline; and extreme defensiveness to outside criticism" (WOLA Jan. 1996, ii). The report also outlines the PNC's considerable achievments, as well, stressing that the creation of the PNC "remains one of the most far-reaching reforms undertaken in recent decades of police or military forces in Latin America" (ibid., 3).

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El Diario de Hoy [San Salvador]. 26 November 1997. Jaime García and Carlos Torres. "Despliegan la policia rural en interior de pais." [Internet] (http://www.elsalvador.com) [Accessed 2 Jan. 1998]

Excelsior [Mexico City]. 31 March 1996. "Eight Salvadoran Agents Implicated in the Killing of 5 People Captured." (Central America Newspak [Austin], 1-14 Apr. 1996, Vol. 11, No. 5, p. 3)

Federal Document Clearinghouse Congressional Testimony (FDCH). 25 June 1997. "Testimony June 25, 1997 Cynthia J. Arnson Senior Program Associate, Latin American Program, The Woodrow Wilson Center, House International Relations, Western Hemisphere, Situation in Central America." (NEXIS)

Gonzalez, Juan. 29 January 1998. Director, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), San Salvador. Telephone interview.

Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook 1996. 1996. Edited by Peter Baehr et al. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.

Infomundi. December 1996. Lola Delgado. Central American Street Children. (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica). [Internet] (http://med.unex.es/medmund/) [Accessed 27 Jan. 1998]

In These Times. 11 November 1996. Mario Murillo. "Beating Swords into Leg Irons." (NEXIS)

Inter Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America (ICCHRLA). April 1996. Violence Unveiled: Repression Against Lesbians and Gay Men in Latin America. Toronto: ICCHRLA.

Inter Press Service (IPS). 28 July 1996. Juan José Dalton. "Death Squad Threatens San Pablo Forum." (Central America Newspak [Austin], 22 July - 4 Aug. 1996, Vol. 11, No. 13, p. 3)

Inter Press Service (IPS). 30 June 1996. Juan José Dalton. "Spector of Terrorism Reawakens." (Central America Newspak [Austin], 24 June - 7 July 1996, Vol. 11, No. 11, p. 3)

Inter Press Service (IPS). 2 January 1996. Juan José Dalton. "Police Forces Come Under Fire." (Central America Newspak [Austin], 25 Dec. 1995 - 7 Jan. 1996, Vol. 10, No. 24, p. 4)

Josh, Kelly. Affiliate, Washington Office on Latin America, San Salvador. 26 and 27 February 1998. Telephone interview.

Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 31 October 1996. "El Salvador."

Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 5 September 1996. "Death Threats." (NEXIS)

Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 4 April 1996. "Tough Emergency Law in El Salvador." (NEXIS)

Latinamerica Press. 11 September 1997. "Violence Consumes Country."

Latinamerica Press. 20 June 1996. "El Salvador: Trying to Solve the Crime Problem."

Latinamerica Press. 9 May 1996. "El Salvador: UN Mission Stays Put."

Latin America Regional Report [London]. 28 October 1997. "Random Killings Spread Alarm; Government Promises More Police in Rural Areas." (NEXIS)

Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights (LCHR). July 1997. Critique: Review of the US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996. New York: LCHR.

Miami Herald. 8 November 1997. Juan O. Tamayo. "Left-Right Distrust Festers in 'Pacific' El Salvador." (Central America Newspak [Austin], 10-23 Nov. 1997, Vol. 12, No. 21, pp. 6-7)

Miami Herald. 4 August 1997. Glenn Garvin. "Civil War Over, But Violence Goes On." (Central America Newspak [Austin], 4-17 Aug. 1997, Vol. 12, No. 14, pp. 3-4)

La Nación [Santiago]. 26 November 1997. "Policía Salvadoreña Combate Delincuencia en Areas Rurales." [Internet] (http://www.nacion.co.cr) [Accessed 2 January 1998]

La Nación [Santiago]. 16 October 1997. "CODEHUCA Denuncia Ejecuciones Extrajudicales en El Salvador y Guatemala." [Internet] (http://www.nacion.co.cr) [Accessed 2 January 1998]

The New York Times. 10 August 1997. Larry Rohter. "In US Deportation Policy, a Pandora's Box." (NEXIS)

La Prensa Gráfica [San Salvador]. 23 May 1997. "Judges Admit Judicial 'Purification' Proceeded Too Slowly." (Central America Newspak [Austin], 26 May - 8 June 1997, Vol. 12, No. 9, p. 4)

Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (PDDH—Procuradoria para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos), International Relations Department, San Salvador. 11 February 1998. Fax received by the Research Directorate.

Proceso [Mexico City]. 24 December 1997. "Los derechos humanos en 1997." [Internet] (http://www.uca.sv/publica/proceso) [Accessed 13 Mar. 1998]

Proceso [Mexico City]. 8 October 1997. "News Briefs: Protests." (DIRB Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 4 Nov. 1997, Vol. 14, No. 17)

Proceso [Mexico City]. 18 June 1997. "What's Happening in the PNC?" (DIRB Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 15 July 1997, Vol. 14, No. 1)

Reuters. 4 June 1997. BC Cycle. "In El Salvador, Death Squads Again Draw Fire." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 17 July 1996. BC Cycle. "Salvadoran Street Children Want Killings Probed." (NEXIS)

United Nations. 16 December 1997. (GA/AB/3130). "Fifth Committee Approves $138 Million for UNAVEM, Recommends $10.6 Millions for Operations in Guatemala, El Salvador and Afghanistan." [Internet] (http://www.un.org) [Accessed 15 Jan. 1998]

United Nations. 6 October 1997. (A/52/433). Assistance á la reconstruction et au développement d'El Salvador: Rapport du Secrétaire général.

United Nations. 23 December 1996. (E/CN.4/1997/60/Add.1). Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in an Part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial, and Other Dependent Countries and Territories: Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1996/74: Addendum: Country Situations. [Internet] (http://193.135.156/) [Accessed 15 Dec. 1997]

United Nations. Economic and Social Council. 20 December 1996. (E/CN.4/1997/7/Add.1). Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/37. Addendum: Summary of Cases Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received. [Internet] (http://193.135.156.15/) [Accessed 15 Dec. 1997]

United Nations. Economic and Social Council. 13 December 1996. (E/CN.4/1997/34). Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment: Question of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances: Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. [Internet] (http://193.135.156.15) [Accessed 5 Dec. 1997]

United Nations. 10 May 1996. (GA/9073). "General Assembly Estanlishes United Nations Office of Verification in El Salvador." [Internet] (http://www.un.org) [Accessed 15 Jan. 1998]

United Nations. General Assembly. 23 October 1995. (A/50/455). Assistance for the Reconstruction and Development of El Salvador: Report of the Secretary-General. [Internet] (gopher://gopher.un.org) [Accessed 16 Dec. 1997]

United Press International (UPI). 27 August 1997. BC Cycle. "El Salvador Seen as Most Violent." (NEXIS)

United Press International (UPI). 9 April 1996. Rina Guadalupe Serrano. "Salvadoran Youth Gangs Sign Peace Pact." (NEXIS)

United Press International (UPI). 4 March 1996. BC Cycle. "Report: Salvador Rights Abuse Persists." (NEXIS)

United States Department of State. Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. 1996. "El Salvador." Background Notes. [Internet] (http://www.state.gov) [Accessed 2 Jan. 1998]

Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and Hemisphere Initiatives. January 1996. William Stanley. Protectors or Perpetrators? The Institutional Crisis of the Salvadoran Civilian Police. Washington, D.C.: WOLA and Hemisphere Initiatives.

The Washington Post. 17 December 1996. William Branigin. "Gays' Cases Help to Expand Immigration Rights; More Than 60 Homosexuals Claiming Persecution Have Been Granted Asylum in US " (NEXIS)

The Washington Post. 13 October 1996. "Death Squads Flex Muscle Again." (Central America Newspak [Austin], 14-27 Oct. 1996, Vol. 11, No. 9, pp. 4-5)

The Washington Post. 16 March 1996. Douglas Farah. "Killing in Salvadoran Crime Wave Outpaces Deaths During Civil War." (NEXIS)

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[1]1            For background information on the Peace Accords see the April 1994 Research Directorate publication El Salvador: Impact of the 1992 Peace Accords.

[2]2            For information on the education standards see section 2.3 National Public Security Academy (ANSP).

[3]3            See section 4.1 Crime.

[4]4            For information on the police accountability system, please see section 3.4 Accountability and Public Perception.

[5]5.           The WOLA report states further that "The military also refused to hand over police posts around the country for use by the PNC, and withheld vehicles, radio equipment, and weapons that could have made the National Police more effective during the transition" (Jan. 1996, 12).

[6]6            For information on crime in El Salvador, please see section 4.1 Crime.

[7]7.           Reports on the size of the Salvadoran military vary. A Central America Update report from 13 February 1998 puts the number at just over 20,000 soldiers, while a 1997 estimate from the Center for International Policy stated the Salvadoran armed forces has 30,500 personnel (CIP 1997).

[8]8.           For information on the new Criminal Procedures Code, please see section 4.2 Judicial Issues.

[9]9            The PDDH accepted only about one-third of the nearly 14,000 human rights complaints registered with it between January and November 1997 (Proceso 24 Dec. 1997).

[10]10.        There is some disagreement among sources about the number of original arrests. According to Country Reports 1997 (1998) nine "original" Black Shadow suspects were arrested in July 1995, although Amnesty International (Dec. 1996) and Tutela Legal (see Reuters 4 June 1997) reported that 16 alleged group members were arrested at that time.

[11]11         For information on PNC treatment of homosexuals and street children, please see section 3.2.3 Torture, Disappearances, Excessive Force.

[12]12         There is disagreement among the sources as to where the incident took place. According to Country Reports 1997, the burning was "at the El Espino plantation on the outskirts of San Salvador" (1998), but El Diario de Hoy places the incident in Isla San Sebatián, Jucuarán, Usulután department (31 Dec. 1997a).

[13]13         For more information on protection programmes available to citizens who have implicated police or military personnel in current criminal activity, please see Response to Information Request SLV28706.E of 12 February 1998 available at Regional Documentation Centres.

[14]14         In comparison, the 1994 murder rate for Colombia was 65 per 100,000, for the US 11 per 100,000, and for Sweden 4 per 100,000 (The Washington Post 16 Mar. 1996).