Political Opposition

 

GLOSSARY

ADFSIN Association for the Defense of Freedom and Sovereignty of the Iranian Nation

BKO       Babak Khorramdin Organization

KDPI      Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran

LDDHI   Ligue pour la défense des droits de l'homme en Iran

LMI        Liberation Movement of Iran

MNR      Movement of National Resistance

NCR        National Council of Resistance

NLA       National Liberation Army of Iran

PMOI     People's Mujaheddin Organization of Iran

VIK         Voice of Iranian Kordestan

1.   INTRODUCTION

In 1978-79 an alliance of diverse political factions, including liberals, leftists and Islamic fundamentalists, successfully carried out an uprising against Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, and replaced the monarchist state with an Islamic regime under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (Amuzegar 1991, 14-15; Europa 1992 1992, 1417). In the months following the uprising a provisional government was put in place, and Khomeini and his clerically dominated Revolutionary Council appointed Mehdi Bazargan, leader of the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI), prime minister. Bazargan's cabinet was dominated by "relatively secular liberals," including LMI members and sympathizers, members of the National Front and several independents. Other groups that had supported the revolution, including leftists and nationalists like the newly formed National Democratic Front (NDF), were excluded (Chehabi 1990, 253-57, 261; Keddie 1986, 11).

In November 1979 Bazargan and his government resigned and a more radical phase of the revolution began. Fundamentalist forces became increasingly dominant in government, gradually eliminating all other anti-Shah groups (Revolutionary and Dissident Movements 1988, 163). The 1980-88 war with Iraq facilitated the fundamentalists' consolidation of power; the war was used to discredit dissenters as traitors and strengthen the theocracy through "thorough desecularization of society" (Amnesty International Dec. 1990, 3; Hooglund 1986, 24). By late 1983 the LMI was the only remaining legal opposition party in Iran (Chehabi 1990, 278; Keddie 1986, 11; Revolutionary and Dissident Movements 1988, 163). Aside from Kurdish groups and to a lesser extent the Mujaheddin, there is no longer an effectively organized opposition to the government, either inside or outside the country (Hicks 23 Mar. 1993; Hooglund 30 Mar. 1993).

Although most opposition groups were forced into exile in the early 1980s, many still carry on activities, ranging from military operations to illicit broadcasting, within Iran. This paper provides a survey of political opposition to the Islamic regime in Tehran. It focuses on the most significant opposition groups, organized under the following headings: radical, ethnic, monarchist and liberal/nationalist.

2. THE RADICAL OPPOSITION

In the 1950s and early 1960s, Iran was confronted with a rapidly deteriorating economic climate. The Shah responded to the situation with the so-called White Revolution, which included an ambitious land reform program. Although the power of landlords as a class was largely eliminated, the program did not succeed in providing sufficient job opportunities for the peasantry as a whole. As a result large numbers of peasants migrated to the cities, where they became a "substantial portion of the urban poor and furnished the last stage of the 1977-79 [Islamic] revolution with one of its most valuable assets" (Siavoshi 1990, 29).

The year 1963 was a watershed in recent Iranian history. Not only did the Shah deprive himself of support from the landlords, he also alienated the middle class and the Islamic clergy. The dissatisfaction of the religious community, coupled with public grievances sparked by the economic and political crises, led to the 1963 uprising. Hundreds of protesters were killed when the Iranian army was ordered to crack down (Chehabi 1990, 184; Siavoshi 1990, 23).

The severity of the repression--about 70 publications were closed down, for example--effectively abolished political life in Iran and gave rise to a more radical and militant opposition (Chehabi 1990, 185). The post-1963 era saw the emergence of various radical Islamic and Marxist groups, the most important of which were the Mujaheddin and the Fedayin (Siavoshi 1990, 41). Most of the radical Islamic opposition and the communist parties participated in the Islamic Revolution and supported Bazargan's provisional government. However, political and ideological differences with Khomeini had become apparent as early as 1980, and the subsequent repression forced these groups into opposition (Hooglund 1986, 18-21).

2.1          The People's Mujaheddin Organization of Iran

The People's Mujaheddin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also referred to as the Mojaheddin-e Khalq organization, is considered to be a well organized and effective opposition force (La Presse 22 Feb. 1992). Now under the leadership of Masud Rajavi, the PMOI was founded in 1965 by six former members of the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI) (Chehabi 1990, 211). The ideology of the Mujaheddin, based on Islam, emphasizes the necessity of social change and incorporates many Marxist ideas (Sarraf 1990, 181; Hooglund 1986, 19).

There is no doubt that the Mujaheddin was instrumental in overthrowing the Shah and in consolidating the revolution (Sarraf 1990, 182). However, the PMOI withdrew its initial support for the new Islamic regime and began to support President Bani Sadr in early June 1981. After Bani Sadr's dismissal on 21 June 1981, the government began a "rigorous campaign" against all political opposition and the PMOI leadership was forced into exile in France (Revolutionary and Dissident Movements 1988, 165). The Mujaheddin were subjected to mass arrests and summary executions; between 7,000 and 8,000 people are believed to have been killed in 1981 and 1982 (Hooglund 1986, 21; Sarraf 1990, 186). In response the Mujaheddin initiated a national campaign of armed rebellion against the Islamic regime, claiming responsibility for the assassinations of many nationally and locally prominent clergy in 1982 (Revolutionary and Dissident Movements 1988, 165). In June 1986, as a preliminary step toward improving Franco-Iranian relations, the French government closed down the Mujaheddin's headquarters in Paris. Unable to find refuge elsewhere in Europe, Rajavi and his followers moved to Iraq (Abrahamian 1989, 258).

Nevertheless, the Mujaheddin has been able to establish many branches in Europe and North America, and from these the group manages a public relations campaign aimed at influencing western politicians and governments. The PMOI also operates an Iraqi-based radio and TV station, the Mojahed Voice (Seda-ye Mojahed), and publishes a weekly newspaper, Mojahed.

The National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA), the armed wing of the PMOI, was established in Iraq in 1987 (Ibid., 260; Al-Majallah 13-19 Jan. 1993). Estimates of the size of the membership vary greatly; one estimate puts it at 40,000 (La Presse 22 Feb. 1992), while another estimates 7,000 (Abrahamian 1989, 260). The exiled Mujaheddin have had only one major military encounter with the Iranian army. In July 1988, at the very end of the war with Iraq, Mujaheddin forces briefly held the Iranian towns of Kerand and Islamabad Gharb. In a matter of days, however, they were driven back into Iraq by Iranian troops. As a result of this incursion at least 2,500 political prisoners were executed in Iran, not all of them linked to the PMOI (Amnesty International 1 Oct. 1992, 1).

There are reports of continued minor military engagements between the Iranian regime and the Mujaheddin. For example, on 5 April 1992 Iranian aircraft bombed a PMOI base in Ashraf, near Baghdad, in retaliation for a raid by the Mujaheddin on two villages in western Iran (Los Angeles Times 6 Apr. 1992). The Mujaheddin and its sympathizers reacted with demonstrations and attacks against Iranian diplomatic missions in Europe and North America. Demonstrators used "sticks, sledgehammers and a ladder" to tear down the emblem above the main entrance to the Iranian embassy in Ottawa (AFP 6 Apr. 1992). In autumn 1992 the Mujaheddin claimed responsibility for a series of bombings and arsons in Tehran and other cities. These included the 27 August and 10 October bombings of the Behecht-e-Zahra cemetery south of Tehran (AFP 15 Oct. 1992), and the October bombing of the revolutionary guard garrison at Qasr-e Firuzeh (Keyhan 22 Oct. 1992).

Popular support for the Mujaheddin has declined in Iran (Hicks 23 Mar. 1993). Relations between Iran and Iraq have had an important impact on PMOI operations, and Iraq's support for the Mujaheddin has fluctuated with the level of hostility between the two regimes. During the Iran-Iraq war the Mujaheddin were strongly supported by the Iraqis, but after the war Baghdad ordered the PMOI to cease its military operations (Sarraf 1990, 192; Whitley 22 Mar. 1993); during the 1991 Gulf War, however, the Iraqis "revived" the PMOI's military operations (Middle East International 5 Apr. 1991, 16).

Regardless of its actual political or military strength, the PMOI remains a major target of the Iranian regime. For example, Amnesty International reports that in late April 1992, at least 40 alleged members or sympathizers of the PMOI were executed in Tehran (Amnesty International 1 Oct. 1992, 4).

2.2  The National Council of Resistance

Sometime after the failed uprising of June 1981, former Iranian president Bani Sadr and the leader of the Mujaheddin, Masud Rajavi, announced they would return to Iran from Paris to replace the Islamic Republic with a democratic Islamic republic. Shortly after this announcement they formed the National Council of Resistance (NCR) (Abrahamian 1989, 243).

Initially the NCR was a broad coalition, including the Mujaheddin, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), the National Democratic Front, the Hoviyat Group (an offshoot of the minority Fedayin) and several small leftist groups. The National Front and the main Marxist organizations were never part of the NCR. In 1984 a number of groups left the NCR, among them the liberals under Bani Sadr and the KDPI (Ibid., 246-47). Now firmly under the control of the Mujaheddin, the NCR currently numbers about 200. Although the Mujaheddin view the NCR as the backbone of the political alternative to the regime in Tehran (Al-Majallah 13-19 Jan. 1993), others view it simply as a PMOI front organization (Hooglund 30 Mar. 1993). The March 1993 killing of its representative in Italy indicates that the NCR is still a target of the Iranian regime (The New York Times 19 Mar. 1993, 12).

2.3               The Communist Opposition

The Iranian communist opposition groups still in existence have offices in Europe and North America, but only occasionally are they reported to be involved in the armed struggle (Hooglund 30 Mar. 1993). In general the communist/leftist opposition is insignificant, either as an alternative or as a threat to the Islamic regime (Ibid. 19 Mar. 1993). Nevertheless, it is important to mention such groups as the Tudeh Party, the Fedayin, Rah-e Kargar (Worker's Road), Peykar and Sarbedaran. In a letter to the UN Commission on Human Rights, the Paris-based Iranian refugee organization, Ligue pour la défense des droits de l'homme en Iran (LDDHI), reported that a member of Sarbedaran, Kamran Mansour Mogadam, was killed in Suleymanieh in Iraqi Kurdestan in 1992 (LDDHI 31 July 1992).

3.           ETHNIC OPPOSITION AND RESISTANCE

After the Islamic Revolution, opposition groups from Iran's ethnic minorities, including the Arabs, Turkomans, Baluch, Kurds and Qashqa'is, called for greater regional autonomy (IRBDC Jan. 1989, 30). In almost all cases the Iranian authorities have successfully quelled this opposition, the Kurds being the only major exception (Ibid., 30-31).

3.1                The Kurdish Resistance

There are approximately 1.5 to 4 million Kurds in Iran. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims, unlike the leadership of the Iranian regime, which is composed of Shiites. The Kurds live in the west of the country, primarily in the province of Kurdestan, which borders the Iraqi and Turkish Kurdish regions (The Economist Intelligence Unit 1988, 12). Iranian Kurds were demanding political autonomy from the central government even before the reign of the late Shah (Ibid.). The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) is the largest and best organized of the Kurdish opposition groups. From its bases in Iraq the KDPI engages in armed resistance against the Islamic regime in Tehran, and according to one spokesman the military activities of its mobile units cover most of Iranian Kurdestan, "especially the central region" (Le Monde 18 Mar. 1993; Le Figaro 3-4 Oct. 1992). The KDPI's radio station, the Voice of Iranian Kordestan (VIK), regularly reports on KDPI military operations. On 30 August 1992, for example, VIK reported on the clashes in the Mahabad area (VIK 30 Aug. 1992), and in spring 1993 reported extensively on Iranian artillery bombardments of Kurdish strongholds inside Iraq (Ibid. 30 May 1993).

Despite its military operations, KDPI deputy general secretary Mostafa Hejri has not completely excluded the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the Iranian authorities on the question of Kurdish autonomy (Avanti 10 Nov. 1992, 20). However, since the assassination of former KDPI general secretary Sadiq Sharifkandeh in Berlin in 1992, the effectiveness of negotiation as a means of achieving autonomy has been questioned by Abdallah Hassan Zadeh, a member of the KDPI political bureau (Al-Hayah 22 Oct. 1992).

On 13 March 1993 Iran launched air strikes against KDPI headquarters in Iraqi Kurdestan, near the Iranian border. These were the first such air strikes since the KDPI set up headquarters in Iraq in 1988, and the first since western coalition forces created the special zone for protection of the Iraqi Kurds north of the 36th parallel (Le Monde 18 Mar. 1993, 6). Kamal Davoudi, a KDPI representative in Europe, suggests this attack might be evidence of recent coordination between Syria, Iran and Turkey on the Kurdish issue (Ibid.).

In addition to the KDPI, the Kurdish opposition includes two smaller groups, Komala and the KDPI Revolutionary Command; the latter group split from the KDPI in the late 1980s (Whitley 22 Mar. 1993). Both groups are engaged in military operations. Komala (or Komaleh), established in 1969, is a Marxist organization which merged with the Union of Communist Fighters in 1983 to form the Communist Party of Iran (Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 1989, 63). Also known as the Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan, Komala is primarily active in the Sanandadj region (AFP 7 Nov. 1992). On 7 November 1992, Iran's Information and Security Minister announced the arrest of Abdollah Bagheri, a Komala official. According to Amnesty International, Bagheri was no longer a member of Komala at the time of his arrest (3 Dec. 1992). Iranian authorities have stated that Bagheri will be charged with undertaking terrorist attacks (Ibid. 12 Mar. 1993). As well, two members of Komala were reportedly executed in Sanandaj in June and August 1992 (Ibid. 7 Dec. 1992).

3.2     Other Ethnic Resistance

Revolts by Iran's other ethnic minorities, such as the Baluch, the Turkomans and some tribes in the Zagros region, were put down by Tehran in 1979 and 1980 (IRBDC Jan. 1989, 30). Amnesty International reports intermittent opposition in Baluchistan. Resistance is organized along tribal lines, and not all Baluchi tribes oppose the regime in Tehran. Groups such as the Baluch National Movement and the United Baluch Organization are seeking a greater degree of autonomy for the province (Amnesty International 11 May 1993). In October 1991 Amnesty International received reports of "scores" of arrests and public executions of more than 20 people in Zahedan (1992, 145). According to Baluchi sources quoted in the 1992 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Iran, these death sentences and executions were carried out for political reasons and occurred within one week of arrest (United Nations 2 Jan. 1992, 21). Another source reports that because Iran is a major conduit for drugs moving from Afghanistan and Pakistan, official reporting about the fighting in Baluchistan is clouded by references to the "war against drugs," a war which reportedly "has led to thousands of summary executions" since September 1990 (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1992, 159).

4.                THE MONARCHIST OPPOSITION

The revolution of 1978-79 not only overthrew the Shah's regime, it also forced into exile supporters of the monarchy such as the late Shapur Bakhtiar and his Movement of National Resistance. The Organization of Kaviyani Banner (Kaviyani Flag or Derafsh Kaviani) is the most prominent organized monarchist opposition to the Islamic regime in Tehran. More recently, the Babak Khorramdin Organization has claimed responsibility for armed attacks within Iran.

4.1    Organization of Kaviyani Banner

The Organization of Kaviyani Banner is the most active monarchist group. In 1992 it changed its name to the Organization for Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties for Iran (l'Organisation pour les droits de l'homme et les libertés en Iran) (LDDHI 13 Dec. 1992). The group describes itself as a national underground organization aiming to establish parliamentary democracy in Iran (BBC Summary 30 Sept. 1991). It emerged from the late Ali Amini's defunct Iranian Salvation Front, and is led by Manoucher Gandji, a former minister under the Shah. Although not involved in the armed struggle (Whitley 22 Mar. 1993), the group claims to have an extensive network of resistance cells in the country and distributes audiotapes and videotapes within Iran (BBC Summary 30 Sept. 1991).

The organization's main operation reportedly consists of broadcasts from its radio station, Voice of Kaviyani Banner of Iran. The studios are located in Paris, where the group is headquartered, and transmission takes place from Cairo (Whitley 22 Mar. 1993). From its mobile stations inside Iran, the Voice of Kaviyani Banner regularly broadcasts radio programmes about the group's operations. On 3 November 1991, for example, the radio reported on the group's distribution in Tehran of videotapes about the late Dr. Cyrus Elahi, a former organization cadre (BBC Summary 5 Nov. 1991). Despite few indications of "strong" support for this group within Iran, many people have been arrested for their alleged involvement with the broadcasts (Hooglund 30 Mar. 1993).

The World Organization of Solidarity with Iranian Youths and the World Organization of Solidarity with Iranian Women are both affiliates of the Organization of Kaviyani Banner (Whitley 22 Mar. 1993). The second group puts out a regular bulletin on women's rights in Iran. No additional information is currently available on either of these organizations.

4.2             Movement of National Resistance

The Movement of National Resistance (MNR) is a Paris-based monarchist group established by the late Shahpur Bakhtiar, the last prime minister under the Shah. In June 1980 the group was involved in a failed coup attempt against the new Islamic regime (Abidi 1989, 117). Although no longer very active (Hooglund 19 Mar. 1993), the MNR has called for peaceful demonstrations to demand free elections (United Nations 13 Feb. 1991, 41). Audiotapes of Bakhtiar's speeches are still distributed inside the country (Whitley 22 Mar. 1993).

4.3       Babak Khorramdin Organization

Little information is available on the Babak Khorramdin Organization (BKO), a monarchist and strongly anti-clerical group (Hooglund 30 Mar. 1993). The group has claimed responsibility for an attempt to kill President Rafsanjani in February 1993, on the eve of the 14th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution (The Independent 13 Feb. 1993). The group also claimed responsibility for the "execution" of five Revolutionary Guards several days later (Middle East International 19 Feb. 1993, 13), and was mentioned in connection with attacks on the police station in Tajrish in September 1991 (Keyhan 17 Sept. 1992).

5.          THE LIBERAL/NATIONALIST OPPOSITION

The 1951 government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq has been described as "the embodiment of the Iranian struggle for independence and democracy," but his liberal, democratic and popular politics ended with the 19 August 1953 coup d'etat. From 1953 until the popular uprising of 1963, there was a gradual shift toward the personal dictatorship of the Shah (Siavoshi 1990, 21). During the 1960s the reformist opposition to the Shah was led by the secular liberal National Front and the liberal, religiously oriented Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI) (Ibid., 38). The LMI played an important role in the Islamic revolution and is currently the only opposition party that is more or less tolerated by the Islamic regime (Whitley 22 Mar. 1993).

5.1        Liberation Movement of Iran

The Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI), Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran, was established in 1961. Also known as the Freedom Movement, this moderate Islamic group is led by Mehdi Bazargan, who was the Islamic regime's first prime minister in 1979. The LMI has repeatedly declared that it does not oppose the Islamic Republic and has pledged to abide by the constitution (News from Middle East Watch 3 Sept. 1991, 2). The fundamental difference between Bazargan's group and the Islamic regime in Tehran is that the LMI supports constitutional rule by political parties within an Islamic framework, but it does not agree with a role for clerics in government (Chehabi 1990, 298). Although the LMI "loyally supported" Iran's war effort in the beginning, ending the war with Iraq had become the major focus of its activity as early as 1982 (Ibid., 299). Although most exiled opposition groups have little sympathy for the LMI, Bazargan does get some support from former president Bani Sadr (Ibid., 301).

Torn by internal strife, the LMI did not run candidates under its own name in the 1980 parliamentary elections, although Bazargan and other prominent LMI members did run successfully for office (Ibid., 285). The LMI boycotted the next two elections after party offices were ransacked by Islamic fundamentalists and the party's newspaper was closed (United Nations 2 Jan. 1992, 30), and the group announced it would also boycott the 10 April 1992 election (UPI 23 Feb. 1992).

In 1990 Bazargan and at least 65 other "prominent" Iranians signed an open letter to President Rafsanjani criticizing government policy and calling for greater civil liberties. The petition was organized largely by the LMI and its affiliate, the Association for the Defence of Freedom and the Sovereignty of the Iranian Nation (ADFSIN). In June 1990, 25 of the signatories were taken into custody, and 14 months later 9 of the 25 received prison terms ranging from six months to three years (United Nations 2 Jan. 1992, 31; Ibid. 13 Feb. 1991, 83; News from Middle East Watch 3 Sept. 1991, 1; Ibid. 29 June 1990, 1-2; Reuters 23 Sept. 1991). The LMI issued a similar open letter to the Iranian government in August 1991 (BBC Summary 20 Aug. 1991), but in this case no evidence of any arrests could be found. On 13 April 1992 the people arrested in 1991 were pardoned and released as part of a general amnesty (Ibid. 15 Apr. 1992).

Although the Iranian constitution does not ban political parties, both the LMI and the ADFSIN were unsuccessful in their applications for registration under the Political Parties Act of 1981, an act which legalizes peaceful political opposition. On 14 June 1990 the Office of Tehran's Revolutionary Prosecutor ordered the ADSFIN to "dissolve" itself, and in May 1991, more than two years after the LMI applied for legal status, President Rafsanjani declared the LMI illegal (News from Middle East Watch 3 Sept. 1991, 1-2).

The Islamic regime's response to these groups demonstrates a mixture of tolerance and repression. For example, although the LMI is illegal, it has not been forced into exile, and although Bazargan's speeches can be published, they are ignored by the major media (Whitley 22 Mar. 1993).

6.        APPEALS TO EXILES TO RETURN

Since the beginning of the the Islamic Revolution, some 3 million Iranians have left the country and are now living in exile. The first to leave were those who were in power or had done well under the Shah. Next to leave were those who had participated in the revolution but were forced into exile because of their opposition to Khomeini. The third wave of asylum seekers consisted of young men fleeing the Iran-Iraq war. High unemployment and inflation resulting from the country's war efforts were contributing factors to a fourth wave of people leaving Iran (The Economist 2 May 1992; Le Monde 5 Feb. 1993; Xinhua 20 Mar. 1992).

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, the government has encouraged thousands of skilled Iranians living abroad, mostly in the US, UK, France, Germany and Canada, to return to help rebuild the country (Country Reports 1991 1992, 1414). The importance of this new policy was emphasized at a meeting in New York in May 1991, when some 200 Iranian business people were addressed by Iran's minister of finance and the governor of the Iranian central bank. The majority of these business people had been "condemned in absentia for being monarchists or having worked for the Shah," and their property had been confiscated by the regime (Middle East International 17 May 1991, 13).

The Iranian ambassador to Germany reportedly summarized the new approach as an open-door policy to all Iranian exiles, with the exception of those who had engaged in terrorist activities or assassinations (Ibid., 13). On 20 March 1992 President Rafsanjani called upon exiled Iranians to return home, and promised they would face no danger even if they had left the country illegally (Xinhua 20 Mar. 1992). Iranian exiles were also encouraged to invest in the Tehran stock market (Keyhan 6 Aug. 1992).

There are conflicting reports on the success of this campaign. The Middle East seems to consider it a success (June 1992, 9), while Middle East International says "the great majority of Iranians are still reluctant to return permanently, though some have made short, experimental trips" (17 May 1991, 13). There are no figures on exactly how many exiled Iranians have returned home. One report suggests that if and when these business people return, the issue of restitution of confiscated property is likely to be problematic (Le Monde 5 Feb. 1993).

A special category of returnee consists of former political activists. No information is available on exactly how many have returned or how they are treated. Several have reportedly appeared on Iranian television denouncing political groups to which they previously belonged (The Economist 2 May 1992). For example, Tehran television reported that some of the 59 members of the PMOI returned to Iran in December 1991 under the supervision of the UNHCR. They were quoted as saying they fled the PMOI because they were "dissidents in an internal 'organizational crisis' and critical of the 'crimes' committed by the group" (Xinhua 4 Dec. 1991).

7.             AMNESTIES AND POLITICAL PRISONERS

In its statement to the 49th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Amnesty International reported that [h]undreds of political prisoners...remained in prison, and hundreds of others were arrested and detained following civil unrest during [1992], while re-arrests of former political prisoners in Tehran were reported in May and June (Feb. 1993, 2).

Although on special occasions such as the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran's spiritual leader, will sometimes declare an amnesty for certain categories of prisoners, such amnesties reportedly exclude those convicted of drug-related crimes, armed robbery, economic sabotage and "crimes against the establishment of the Islamic republic" (Xinhua 10 Feb. 1992). Political prisoners who have been released are either set free on temporary leave or must sign statements promising they will not undertake any political opposition activities. Most have to report to the authorities at regular intervals, and often require a relative to act as a guarantor (Amnesty International Feb. 1993, 3).

8.              EXECUTIONS OF POLITICAL OPPONENTS IN EXILE

The Iranian government has long been accused of dispatching death squads to Turkey, Iraq and Europe to assassinate enemies of the regime (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 303). The list of victims of such assassinations continues to grow, and is not limited to any particular party.

Two prominent members of the Movement of National Resistance were killed in 1991. Dr. Abdolrahman Boroumand, president of the executive committee of the MNR, was stabbed to death in Paris on 18 April (Amnesty International Jan. 1992, 9; Irana Vox, May. 1991, 3). Shapour Bakhtiar, Iran's last prime minister before the Islamic revolution, and his personal secretary, Souroush Katibe, were stabbed to death in Suresnes, France on 6 August (Amnesty International Jan. 1992, 9; Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 303).

Two KDPI leaders were also assassinated abroad. Dr. Abdolrahman Ghassemlou, along with 2 companions, was killed in Vienna on 13 July 1989 (Amnesty International Jan. 1992, 10; Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 303). His successor, Dr. Sadiq Sharifkandeh, and two of his colleagues, the KDPI representatives in France and Germany, were murdered in Berlin on 17 September 1992 (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 303; LDDHI 20 Sept. 1992).

As well, two members of the monarchist Organization of Kaviyani Banner have been assassinated: Colonel Ataollah Byahmadi in Dubai on 1 June 1989 (Amnesty International 1990, 124-25), and Dr. Cyrus Elahi in Paris in October 1990 (Le Point 16 Aug. 1991; BBC Summary 26 Oct. 1990). In August 1992, pro-monarchist artist Feridun Faruchsad was murdered in Bonn (Le Devoir 10 Aug. 1992). Some four years earlier he had begun producing an hour-long programme for the Voice of Kaviyani Banner, the organization's radio station (United Nations 28 Jan. 1993, 16).

Dr. Kazem Radjavi, an NCR representative, was assassinated in Geneva in April 1990 (Amnesty International Jan. 1992, 10). In June 1992 Amnesty International issued a statement concerning the case of Ali Akbar Ghorbani, a PMOI member who was abducted near his home in Istanbul on 4 June 1992 (12 June 1992). His body was found in Turkey in January 1993 (Ibid. 11 May 1993). Mohammed Hussein Nagdi, a former Iranian diplomat in Italy and one of the most active NCR representatives, was killed in Rome by two gunmen on 16 March 1993 (The New York Times 19 Mar. 1993, 12).

Although proof of a direct link has not been established, an "unprecedented acknowledgement of responsibility" came on 6 September 1992 when the head of the Iranian intelligence service "confirmed the role of Iranian agents in the assassination of opposition members abroad." He further added that the activities of Iranian opposition movements both inside and outside the country were being closely monitored by intelligence service agents (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 303; VIK 12 Oct. 1992).

9.               FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

In 1990 Amnesty International noted that the 1980s were "marked by a lack of progress toward the establishment of institutions and procedures which could have provided Iranian citizens with safeguards of their fundamental human rights" (Dec. 1990, 3). The situation in 1993 is much the same. Political trials continue to fall far short of internationally accepted standards. Hearings are held in camera, legal safeguards such as the right to appeal are absent, and those arrested risk torture and ill-treatment (Amnesty International 12 Mar. 1993).

Organized opposition to the Islamic regime declined dramatically in the 1980s. Most opposition groups have been forced to operate in exile, and although many manage to maintain some form of clandestine operation inside Iran, the lack of freedom of political expression makes it difficult to assess the level of domestic support for them (Amnesty International Dec. 1990, 4). The end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 and of the Gulf War in 1991 further undermined the strength and effectiveness of the Iranian opposition. The KDPI is the only opposition group able to present any sort of threat to the Islamic regime (Hooglund 30 Mar. 1993), yet this must be considered relative at best; as the recent trilateral meetings between Iran, Syria and Turkey on the issue of Kurdistan suggest (Le Monde 19 Feb. 1993, 4), negotiations with the regime may be the only avenue open to the Kurdish opposition.

In contrast to the hard line it has adopted against the PMOI and the KDPI, the government has taken a relatively lenient approach toward the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI), which it feels poses no real threat to the regime. Nevertheless, although the constitution does permit political parties and Iranian authorities have stated their intention to comply with the 1981 Political Parties Act, the Ministry of the Interior still refuses to legalize the LMI (Country Reports 1992 1993, 1002; United Nations 2 Jan. 1992, 30).

The Iranian authorities continue to maintain tight control over political participation. In February 1992 UPI reported that Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, had asked an election supervisory body to ensure that opponents of the regime did not find their way into parliament as a result of the 10 April 1992 elections (23 Feb. 1992). Although hundreds of groups have applied for registration under the Political Parties Act of 1981 (Hooglund 30 Mar. 1993), the only groups allowed to register have been those allied with various factions of the Islamic clergy and a number of non-political professional groups (United Nations 2 Jan. 1992, 31).

Despite its attempts to control all political opposition, the Iranian regime was unable to prevent riots and demonstrations from sweeping across Iran in 1992, protests sparked largely by deteriorating social and economic conditions (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 300; The Middle East Mar. 1993, 14). Amnesty International has expressed concern that Iranian authorities might use such demonstrations as an excuse to further suppress and persecute political opposition, citing as evidence the executions of thousands of political activists after the defeat of Mujaheddin forces in late 1988 (11 May 1993). Recent evidence suggests that even membership in non-violent opposition groups may now be deemed a capital offence (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 303).

10. REFERENCES

Abidi, A.H.H. 1989. Iran at the Crossroads: The Dissent Movement. New York: Patriot Publishers.

Abrahamian, Ervand. 1989. Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.

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Agence France Presse (AFP). 15 October 1992. "Au moins 4 blessés dans l'explosion d'une bombe à Teheran." (DIRB Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 13-19 Oct. 1992, Vol. 4, No. 16)

Agence France Presse (AFP). 6 April 1992. "Air Raid Triggers Worldwide Attacks on Iranian Diplomatic Missions." (IRBDC Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 31 Mar.-6 Apr. 1992, Vol. 3, No. 14)

Al-Hayah [London, in Arabic]. 22 October 1992. Arlit Khuri. "Kurdish Official Rules Out Dialogue with Tehran." (FBIS-NES-92-206 23 Oct. 1992, pp. 38-39)

Al-Majallah [London, in Arabic]. 13-19 January 1993. "Mojahedin-e-Khalq Official Discusses Group's Role." (FBIS-NES-93-013 22 Jan. 1993, p. 70)

Amnesty International, London. 11 May 1993. Telephone interview with researcher.

Amnesty International, London. 12 March 1993. Urgent Action. (AI Index: MDE 13/03/93). London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International, London. February 1993. Iran: Written Statement to the 49th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. (AI Index: MDE 13/02/93). London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International, London. 7 December 1992. "Addition to Weekly Update Service 08/92." (AI Index: NWS 11/48/92). London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International, London. 3 December 1992. Urgent Action. (AI Index: MDE 13/22/92). London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International, London. 1 October 1992. Iran: Executions of Prisoners Continue Unabated. (AI Index: MDE 13/18/92). London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International, London. 12 June 1992. "Addition to Weekly Update Service 03/92." (AI Index: NWS 11/23/92). London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International, London. January 1992. Iran: Imprisonment, Torture and Execution of Political Opponents. (AI Index: MDE 13/01/92). London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International, London. 1992. Amnesty International Report 1992. London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International, London. December 1990. Iran: Violations of Human Rights 1987-1990. (AI Index: MDE 13/21/90). London: Amnesty International.

Amnesty International, London. 1990. Amnesty International Report 1990. London: Amnesty International.

Amuzegar, Jahangir. 1991. The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Avanti [Rome, in Italian]. 10 November 1992. "Discusses Ties with Iraqi Kurds." (FBIS-NES-92-220 13 Nov. 1992, pp. 55-57)

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 15 April 1992. "Iran Freedom Movement Members among 108 Pardoned on Recommendation of Khamene'i." (NEXIS)

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 5 November 1991. "Iran in Brief: Protests and Unrest Reported in Tehran and Esfahan." (NEXIS)

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 30 September 1991. "Iran Flag of Freedom Organisation Outlines Its Policies." (NEXIS)

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 20 August 1991. "Iran in Brief: Banned Opposition Group Urges Respect for Political Freedom of Iranians." (NEXIS)

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 26 October 1990. "Iran in Brief; Opponent of Regime Killed in Paris." (NEXIS)

Chehabi, H.E. 1990. Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1992. 1993. United States Department of State. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1991. 1992. United States Department of State. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

Le Devoir [Montréal]. 10 August 1992. "Opposant iranien assasiné à Bonn." (IRBDC Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 4-10 Aug. 1992, Vol. 4, No. 6)

The Economist [London]. 2 May 1992. "Come Home, Almost All Is Forgiven." (IRBDC Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 28 Apr.-4 May 1992, Vol. 3, No. 18)

The Economist Intelligence Unit, London. 1988. Country Profile 1988-89: Iran.

The Europa World Year Book 1992. 1992. Vol. 1. London: Europa Publications Ltd.

Le Figaro [Paris, in French]. 3-4 October 1992. Claude Lorieux. "Iranian Kurdish Leader on Iraqi Kurds, Tehran Regime." (FBIS-NES-92-196 8 Oct. 1992, pp. 38-39)

Hicks, Neil. Coordinator of Middle East and North Africa Department, Lawyers Committee on Human Rights, New York. 23 March 1993. Personal interview.

Hooglund, Eric. Editor of Middle East Journal, Washington, DC. 30 March 1993. Telephone interview.

Hooglund, Eric. Editor of Middle East Journal, Washington, DC. 19 March 1993. Fax communication.

Hooglund, Eric. Editor of Middle East Journal, Washington, DC. 1986. "Iran 1980-85: Political and Economic Trends," The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic. Edited by Nikki R. Keddie and Eric Hooglund. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Human Rights Watch. December 1992. Human Rights Watch World Report 1993. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Immigration and Refugee Board Documentation Centre (IRBDC), Ottawa. January 1989. Iran: Country Profile.

The Independent [London]. 13 February 1993. Safa Haeri. "Five 'Commandos' Die in Attempt to Kill Rasfanjani." (DIRB Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 9-15 Feb. 1993, Vol. 5, No. 8)

Irana Vox [Paris]. March-May 1991. No. 56. "Editorial: Reprise des relations normales?"

Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies [Villanova, PA]. 1989. Vol. 23, No. 1-2. Charles MacDonald. "The Kurdish Challenge and Revolutionary Iran."

Keddie, Nikki R. 1986. Introduction. The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic. Edited by Nikki R. Keddie and Eric Hooglund. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Keyhan [London, in Persian]. 22 October 1992. "Repeated Bomb Explosions Reported in Tehran." (FBIS-NES-92-227 24 Nov. 1992, pp. 67-68)

Keyhan [London, in Persian]. 17 September 1992. "Skirmishes Between Law Enforcement, Guards." (FBIS-NES-92-196 8 Oct. 1992, pp. 39-40)

Keyhan [London, in Persian]. 6 August 1992. "Expatriates Can Invest in Stock Market." (FBIS-NES-92-167 27 Aug. 1992, p. 57)

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. 1992. Critique of the Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practises for 1991. New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.

Ligue pour la défense des droits de l'homme en Iran (LDDHI), Paris. 13 December 1992. "Communiqué."

Ligue pour la défense des droits de l'homme en Iran (LDDHI), Paris. 20 September 1992. "Communiqué de presse."

Ligue pour la défense des droits de l'homme en Iran (LDDHI), Paris. 31 July 1992. Letter to the Special Representative for Iran of the United Nations Human Rights Commission.

Los Angeles Times. 6 April 1992. "Iranian Planes Attack Exiles' Base Inside Iraq." (NEXIS)

The Middle East [London]. March 1993. Alan Cowell. "Khomeini's Leaden Legacy."

The Middle East [London]. June 1992. Sheherazade Daneshku. "Rasfanjani Sweeps the Board."

Middle East International [London]. 19 February 1993. Safa Haeri. "Shaken to the Bone."

Middle East International [London]. 12 June 1992. Safa Haeri. "The Mashad Riots."

Middle East International [London]. 17 May 1991. Safa Haeri. "Charming Them Home."

Middle East International [London]. 5 April 1991. Safa Haeri. "Tension Mounts."

News from Middle East Watch [New York]. 3 September 1991. "Iran: Political Dissidents, Held for over a Year, Are Reportedly Sentenced."

News from Middle East Watch [New York]. 29 June 1990. "Iran: Arrests of 'Loyal Opposition' Politicians."

Le Monde [Paris]. 18 March 1993. Mouna Naïm. "Téhéran a lancé un raid contre les Kurdes iraniens dans le nord de l'Irak."

Le Monde [Paris]. 2 March 1993. Mouna Naïm. "Les hostilités sont ouvertes au sein de la hiérarchie chiite."

Le Monde [Paris]. 19 February 1993. Mouna Naïm. "Les Kurdes vivent dans la crainte d'un rapprochement entre Bagdad et certains Etats de la région."

Le Monde [Paris]. 5 February 1993. Mouna Naïm. "Iran: le nécessaire retour des exiles." (DIRB Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 2-8 Feb. 1993, Vol. 5, No. 7)

The New York Times. 19 March 1993. Alan Cowell. "Iranian Is Killed by 2 Gunmen on a Scooter."

The New York Times. 22 September 1991. Patrick E. Tyler. "Teheran Convicts Nine in Opposition." (NEXIS)

Le Point [Paris]. 16 August 1991. "Chapour Bakhtiar: la logique sanguinaire." (IRBDC Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 27 Aug.-2 Sept. 1991, Vol. 2, No. 9)

La Presse [Montréal]. 22 February 1992. "Comme le pouvoir, la résistance s'arme jusqu'aux dents." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 23 September 1991. "Iranian Courts Sentence Eight Liberal Dissidents to Jail." (NEXIS)

Revolutionary and Dissident Movements: An International Guide. 1988. Edited by Henry W. Degenhardt. London: Longman Group UK Ltd.

Sarraf, Tahmoores. 1990. Cry of a Nation: The Saga of the Iranian Revolution. New York: Peter Lang Publishing.

Siavoshi, Sussan. 1990. Liberal Nationalism in Iran: The Failure of a Movement. Boulder: Westview Press.

The United Press International (UPI). 23 February 1992. Ralph Joseph. "Iranian Leader Wants Opponents Kept out of Majlis." (NEXIS)

United Nations, Commission on Human Rights. 28 January 1993. (E/CN.4/1993/41). Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

United Nations, Commission on Human Rights. 2 January 1992. (E/CN.4/1992/34). Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

United Nations, Commission on Human Rights. 13 February 1991. (E/CN.4/1991/35). Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

United Nations, Commission on Human Rights. 12 February 1990. (E/CN.4/1990/24). Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Voice of Iranian Kordestan (VIK) [in Persian]. 30 May 1993. "More Attacks Reported." (FBIS-NES-93-104 2 June 1993, pp. 59-60)

Voice of Iranian Kordestan (VIK) [in Persian]. 12 October 1992. "Fallahiyan Said to Confirm Support for Terrorism." (FBIS-NES-92-199 14 Oct. 1992, p. 49)

Voice of Iranian Kordestan (VIK) [in Persian]. 30 August 1992. "Battle in Mahabad Detailed." (FBIS-NES-92-171 2 Sept. 1992, p. 64)

Whitley, Andrew. Executive Director, Middle East Watch, New York. 22 March 1993. Personal interview.

The Xinhua General Overseas News Service. 20 March 1992. "Rafsanjani Appeals to Emigrants to Return Home." (IRBDC Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 17-23 Mar. 1992, Vol. 3, No. 12)

The Xinhua General Overseas News Service. 10 February 1992. "Iran's Leader Decrees Amnesty." (IRBDC Indexed Media Review [Ottawa], 4-10 Feb. 1992, Vol. 3, No. 6)

The Xinhua General Overseas News Service. 4 December 1991. "Exiled Iranians Back Home." (NEXIS)