The Western Gate of Central Bosnia: the Politics of Return in Bugojno and Prozor-Rama

Executive Summary

Until recently, the municipalities of Bosniac-controlled Bugojno and largely Croat-controlled Prozor-Rama were not considered promising locations for successful minority returns. Rather, they were notorious for the obstructionist behaviour of their hard-line nationalist leaders, and, particularly in the case of Prozor-Rama, for the strident rhetoric of local politicians who opposed minority returns. Despite these obstacles, some 1,000 Croats have returned to Bugojno since late 1996, and 140 Bosniacs have returned this year to Croat-controlled villages in Prozor-Rama, with more expected as houses are reconstructed. While these numbers are small, they are nonetheless significant, in the context of the dismal reality that less than 50,000 minorities have returned to their homes throughout the Federation since the end of fighting. The numbers are all the more significant in light of the area's strategic significance, legacy of bitter war-time fighting between Bosniacs and Croats, and entrenched power of the hard-line authorities. Lessons can be learned from strategies of the international community that have proved successful, as well as from the ways in which the authorities continue to impede minority return. One of the most important reasons for the recent minority returns in the Bugojno/ Prozor-Rama area, as well as in other regions, has been the presence of effective local and regional Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF) structures. The local Vrbas Valley RRTF and the Bosnia and Herzegovina Centre (BHC) Regional RRTF have been instrumental in identifying return breakthroughs, mobilising funding and co-ordinating interventions to ensure the sustainability of returns. Equally important has been the strong and proactive role that the British SFOR battle group based in Gornji Vakuf has played in the RRTFs and the returns process. The British chair the Vrbas Valley RRTF, and in their statements and actions have displayed a strong commitment to providing a secure environment in return areas. In Prozor-Rama they have deployed troops on foot patrols and in vehicles throughout the municipality, with special attention to return areas, and made clear to local officials and HDZ leaders that they will be held responsible for the safety of returning Bosniacs. The troops never left any doubt that they were equiped and willing to respond appropriately to violence or "organised" civilian disorder directed against returnees. They have also taken a proactive approach in their relations with the local population. ICG offers several recommendations regarding ways in which minority returns could more effectively be promoted throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) in general, as well as in Bugojno and Prozor-Rama in particular.

Regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina:

• The right of all of Bosnia's citizens to return to their homes is arguably the most important element of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). If people are unable to return to their homes, the vision of a re-integrated Bosnia will remain no more than an unrealised promise. Therefore, municipal authorities must meet their obligations under the DPA. This means in particular that municipal housing departments must act upon claims for repossession of houses, other real property and socially owned apartments.

• In Bugojno and Prozor-Rama, as in most other municipalities in the Federation, housing departments are not acting as they should. To safeguard the rights of citizens to their property, the deadline for submitting claims for socially owned apartments should be extended beyond the initial six months claims period ending in October 1998.

• The security strategies and proactive involvement of the British SFOR contingent in the RRTF should serve as models for other contingents in Bosnia. The SFOR Command should commend these strategies to all contingents, especially in areas where minority returns have started. Funding should be made available to SFOR contingents throughout the country to finance radio outreach programmes related to minority return.

• International donors, implementing partners and international organisations should cooperate fully with local and regional RRTFs. Donors should make funds available to the RRTFs for rapid disbursement to cover funding gaps related to minority returns. This approach would allow the RRTFs to provide better support to "spontaneous" returns, which have accounted for the vast majority of minority returns to date.

• The speed with which the RRTF recently identified concrete reconstruction projects related to minority returns in Central Bosnia in response to a Dutch government donation shows the potential of this structure. Other donors should follow this example.

Regarding Bugojno:

• The record of the Bugojno municipal housing department is one of the worst in the Federation. More than 300 claims for repossession of apartments have been lodged and none have been decided. Sustained international pressure is needed.

• The international community should hold Mayor Mlaco to his promises to ensure that Bosniacs vacate 40 Croat homes by the end of the school year (June), to support the work of the Municipal Return Office (MRO), to share return related information with the RRTF and to present a plan for Serb return to the municipality. Also, a larger number of municipal councillors, officials and minority police officers must be able to return to their homes and more Croats must be employed in the municipal administration. Until substantial progress is made on these issues, Bugojno should not be declared an "Open City" by UNHCR, though projects financing minority returns should not suffer from this.

• The UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) should hold Mlaco to his promise to integrate Serbs into Bugojno's police force.

• The international community should increase support for those in Bosnia's Catholic community who are encouraging return of Croats to their homes, particularly in the form of media and personal outreach campaigns to Croat displaced persons. Croat political parties which genuinely support returns should be assisted more actively.

Regarding Prozor-Rama:

• The municipal administration in Prozor-Rama is not functioning and property legislation is not being respected. Pressure should be put on the HDZ to change this, not only in Prozor-Rama but also in other municipalities under HDZ control. This should be a key criterion to judge the sincerity of the pro-Dayton orientation of the new HDZ leadership.

• The members of the RRTF should continue and extend their information campaigns -- utilising Radio Rama to reach the Croat displaced population in the municipality.

• Given the involvement of HVO units elsewhere in opposing return and the threats made by HDZ leaders in Prozor-Rama, SFOR should consider mandating a reduction in the HVO presence in the municipality. An investigation should establish whether there is indeed financial or other involvement of the Republic of Croatia in the building of the road between Tomislavgrad and Prozor-Rama. The heightened SFOR presence should be maintained.

Sarajevo, 31 July 1998

Introduction

Developments in the municipalities of Bugojno and Prozor-Rama1 constitute an important bell-weather for assessing progress in restoring the multiethnic character of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation). Until recently, both municipalities were scenes of Croat-Bosniac tension. The area, which controls access from the Adriatic coast and Croat-held parts of Western Herzegovina to Central Bosnia, is of major military significance. The municipalities belong to the two "cantons with a special regime" of the Federation (Canton 6 and Canton 7), in which power sharing arrangements between Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats are institutionalised, and thus offer a fair reflection of the state of relations between Croats and Bosniacs in the Federation. The municipality of Bugojno, 120 kilometres north-west of Sarajevo, lies entirely on territory controlled by the mainly Bosniac Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armija Bosne i Hercegovine, ABiH). Prozor-Rama is a smaller municipality 50 kilometres south of Bugojno. Mainly on territory controlled by the Croatian Council of Defence (Hrvatska vijece obrane, HVO), Prozor-Rama contains a small section to the west of the town centred around the village of Scipe which is under the control of the ABiH.2 Areas controlled by the ABiH have been governed by the leading Bosniac political party, the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske akcije, SDA), areas controlled by the HVO have been dominated by the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ). This territorial division is a legacy of the bitter fighting between the ARBiH3 and the HVO that took place in 1993. Given this legacy, including mutual accusations of atrocities, it could understandably be considered an unlikely place for minority returns. Moreover, for most of the post-Dayton period, politicians of this area held the reputation of being particularly hard-line and obstructionist. In the last few months, however, this has started to change. Despite continued threats, displaced persons of both national groups, as well as Serbs now displaced outside the Federation, have expressed their interest to return to their former homes. International organisations have succeeded in getting concrete commitments from municipal leaders, opening opportunities for returns driven by displaced persons.4 Recent progress has been due to three factors: the good cooperation of international organisations in the region in the framework of the regional Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF); the proactive role of the British SFOR battle-group stationed in the Vrbas Valley, which is deeply involved in supporting the returns process and maintaining a secure environment; and increasing signs that displaced persons and certain community leaders have grown tired of being manipulated by their own ethnic parties. Nowhere else in Bosnia are SFOR troops playing such a proactive role in supporting minority returns. This area also demonstrates the potential of the local and regional RRTFs to support breakthroughs, including by mobilising funding, and continuing difficulties with these structures. In this process of minority returns, the two municipalities are closely inter-linked. Over 2,000 Bosniacs displaced from Prozor-Rama now reside in Bugojno, and several hundred Croats from Bugojno reside in Prozor-Rama. Since the end of fighting in the region, these populations have lived near their original homes. Despite recent progress, however, the numbers of minority returns remain small. Many problems must be addressed for these numbers to increase significantly. In this latest of a series of municipality studies, the ICG examines both recent progress and continuing obstacles. It concludes with recommendations that, if implemented, will assist the return process in what continues to be a tense region.

The Legacy Of War

Patterns of Displacement

The municipality of Prozor was one of the first in Bosnia where fighting erupted between the Bosnian Croat HVO and the ARBiH in the autumn of 1992. At that time the two armed forces were still officially allied against the army of the Bosnian Serbs, and jointly defended the town of Jajce north of Bugojno. In spring 1993, when full-scale warfare erupted between the HVO and the ARBiH, Serb forces almost succeeded in reaching Bugojno from the north. West of Bugojno bitter fighting centred around the pass of Kupres, one of the gateways from Herzegovina into Central Bosnia. South of Bugojno, the area around Prozor-Rama offered an alternative link between Croat-dominated Herzegovina and Croat enclaves in Central Bosnia. Accordingly, there was Bosniac-Croat fighting in the whole area from Bugojno to Gornji Vakuf, and from Prozor-Rama south to Jablanica and Konjic. As in most of Bosnia, the conflict produced near total ethnic homogeneity. Most of the Croats and Serbs fled or were expelled from Bugojno. Most Bosniacs left Prozor-Rama after the fighting started. Many Croats fled either to the Republic of Croatia or to Germany. Both municipalities received displaced persons from other areas of the country. The following table provides pre and post-war population data. Population Figures Bosniacs Croats Serbs Total5 Bugojno (1991)6 19,724-42% 15,963-34% 8,854-19% 46,843 Bugojno (1997)7 38,000-94% 2,000-5% 400 1% 40,400 Minority Returns since DPA Na 950-1,0008 289 c. 1,000 Prozor-Rama (1991)10 7,173- 37% 12,213- 62% 49 1% 19,535 Prozor-Rama (1997)11 1,400- 9% 14,500- 91% 0 15,900 Minority Returns since DPA 13912 Na unknown 139

Military Strategy and Return

One of the reasons for the bitter fighting in the area has been its strategic importance. In the North of Prozor-Rama is the elevation of the Makljen feature, which boasts a concrete monument, "Tito's Fist", erected by communist leader Josip Broz Tito to celebrate the victory of his partisans in World War Two13. The Makljen feature forms an important position for heavy artillery. Once placed there, artillery can help an army dominate both the southern part of the Vrbas Valley and the access to Prozor-Rama from the Neretva-Valley and Herzegovina. At present it holds a military radar site. Recently, moves by the HVO have held the attention of international military observers. According to SFOR, the HVO presence in Prozor-Rama has increased. Troops are bussed in on a regular basis from Livno. HDZ officials have acknowledged that the HVO is assisting in the repair and significant expansion of a road through the mountains from Tomislavgrad through Rumboci to Prozor-Rama. Some local Croat politicians admit that this road is financed directly by the Republic of Croatia, via a Grude-based construction firm called Monitor14. It is a major infrastructure investment that has no economic rationale. According to SFOR, in certain parts the road is wide enough even to serve as a landing strip for aircraft. Military hardware could thereby be transported rapidly directly from the Republic of Croatia and Western Herzegovina to the Vrbas Valley, bypassing both Bosniac-held Jablanica and Bugojno. Against the background of this construction the application by the largely HVO Federation Artillery Division to open four heavy weapons sites in Prozor-Rama, including one on "Tito's Fist" itself, is striking. A key role in the drive to re-deploy artillery in the area was until recently played by Brigadier General Milo Grabovac, the HVO commander in the town of Prozor-Rama. Grabovac, nicknamed "Titan", was recently dismissed and replaced by his even more hard-line subordinate Damjanovic.15 Damjanovic is a confirmed opponent of introducing the joint insignia of the new Federation army.

Post-Dayton Obstruction

War-Lords and Hard-Line Politics

Most of the leading politicians in the Vrbas Valley came to power during the war. Many served in the armed forces fighting each other in the area. This is true for Prozor-Rama (HDZ president Dragan Meter and Mayor Jerko Pavlicevic), Gornji Vakuf and Jajce. In Bugojno, Dzevad Mlaco, a former school teacher who became mayor in 1993, also emerged as a local strongman, and took on the airs and demanded the acts of deference accorded a military leader. Complicating the political picture further are the economic and often criminal interests that grew out of the supply routes that crossed this area. Prozor-Rama was the only point of entry for humanitarian goods from the Adriatic coast to Central Bosnia for certain periods of the war. It quickly became notorious for its lawlessness and criminal structures, with a strong mafia element based principally in the town of Rumboci, to the west of Prozor-Rama town. It benefited from the town's role as conduit for supplies arriving from Split. According to international officials in the area, police chief Franjo Slisko, dismissed only in April 1998, had close relations with this mafia element. IPTF monitors report that frustration with corruption in the police force is widespread among Prozor-Rama's population. A series of post-war crimes, linked to this violent underworld, have remained unpunished. Racketeering is widespread. Notorious criminals have been seen associating with police officers. The strong local power-base of Bugojno Mayor Dzevad Mlaco is also a legacy of the war. Part of his reputation as a Bosniac hard-liner is due to his violent opposition to returns in 1996 (see below). Part is the result of repeated accusations by the HDZ that he is a "war-criminal", responsible for the disappearance of 21 Croats from Bugojno. These allegations, despite many rumours, have not been substantiated. Mlaco has emerged as an important power broker throughout Central Bosnia, at times in open contest with the more moderate Bosniac cantonal officials in Travnik, the capital of the canton. By the summer of 1997, the general sense among international officials was that only pressure on the SDA leadership in Sarajevo to in turn put pressure on Mlaco would lead to policy changes in Bugojno.

Obstructing Returns

For most of the post-war period, the authorities of both Bugojno and Prozor-Rama have obstructed minority returns. Bugojno was a Bosniac symbol of obstruction, and Prozor-Rama, in the words of some moderate HDZ politicians, an anarchic "Wild West".

Bugojno

During the November 1995 negotiations in Dayton, Federation leaders selected Bugojno as one of four municipalities for a minority return "pilot project", intended to help knit the Federation together.16 Bugojno authorities were to make possible the return of 200 Croat families. While the projects were completed quickly in Travnik and Jajce, implementation became bogged down in Bugojno. Municipal officials failed to take the administrative steps necessary to facilitate return. A string of violent incidents-unsolved by the police-created hostile conditions. Throughout 1996 and the first half of 1997, monitors reported the frequent looting of Croat homes17. Several Croat homes were destroyed during this period in the villages of Lug and Kopcic. A number of Croat residents reported receiving threatening letters signed by Hamas, the name of a Palestinian group which has engaged in terrorist acts in the Middle East. Croats who attempted to return outside of the pilot project were told by Bugojno officials to report to the municipality from which the displaced person in their home originated. Only if those authorities gave permission for the Bosniac family to return would Bugojno accept the returnee18. This attempt to institutionalise "reciprocity" was yet another effort to obstruct returns. Croat leaders in nearby municipalities often pointed to the completion of the pilot project in Bugojno as a sine qua non for progress in their own municipalities. Only in April 1997 did UNHCR declare the pilot project completed19. While the pilot project stumbled, Bugojno failed to convene an Interim Municipal Assembly (IMA) as required by the 1994 Washington Agreement. The municipal council elected in 1990 included 21 delegates of the HDZ, 20 of the SDA, and 9 of the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka, SDS). The elected mayor was a Croat. When the Bosniac army took over the town in 1993, most of the Croat population and the HDZ delegates fled. However, the HDZ continued to claim the right to choose the mayor on the basis of its 1990 plurality. The failure to establish an IMA led the High Representative in April 1996 to impose an economic embargo20 . He mandated that Bugojno should receive "no economic assistance from the international community with the exception of humanitarian aid, as long as constitutionally required local authorities are not established …21." The ban was lifted in March 1998, when the OSCE gave Bugojno final certification that it had implemented the September 1997 election results. In these elections, the SDA-led Coalition (Koalicija za Cjelovitu i Demokratsku Bosnu i Hercegovinu) won 20 seats, and the HDZ 10. As a result of the embargo, through May 1998 Bugojno had received comparatively little in housing reconstruction assistance, far less than other municipalities of comparable size that had suffered comparable damage22. The municipality was not totally cut off from assistance, however. Projects for the repair of the electricity system proceeded. Some funds flowed into the municipality from Arab donors and the municipality constructed a large mosque with Kuwaiti money.

Prozor-Rama

In Prozor-Rama, threats of violence have alternated with periods of ostensible acceptance of return under the condition of "reciprocity". One example of this type of obstruction was the return of Bosniacs to the village of Duge. After sustained efforts by UNHCR, the Prozor-Rama authorities agreed to accept returns to the two villages of Duge (Croat-held) and Hudutsko (Bosniac-held) in April 1997. The former was inhabited principally by Bosniacs before the war, the latter principally by Croats. Following the agreement, about 25 Bosniac families returned from Bugojno to Duge, although several still maintain homes in Bugojno23. However, no Croats returned to Hudutsko. According to UNHCR, the municipality proved "unable" to produce a list of interested Croats. Many Hudutsko residents had fled to Prozor-Rama town and did not wish to return, due partly to the fact that basic services and job prospects were better in town24. Also, Croats who expressed an interest in returning were discouraged by the local authorities. The return to Duge and the lack of return to Hudutsko led to bitter accusations by the Prozor-Rama authorities. Return and reconstruction continued in Duge and several other villages, without the support of the municipal authorities, who insisted on full "reciprocity".

Unfreezing The Status Quo

International Coordination and the RRTF

The Return and Reconstruction Task Force (RRTF)25 , chaired by the OHR, proved a successful mechanism for facilitating the return of displaced persons in North-West Bosnia in the autumn of 199726. As a result, the concept was endorsed at the December 1997 Peace Implementation Council meeting in Bonn. During 1998 the OHR has established regional RRTFs in other parts of the country, including Central Bosnia (based in Travnik), the South (based in Mostar) and the Posavina (based in Derventa). These in turn have set up local RRTFs covering a number of municipalities. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Centre (BHC) Regional RRTF in Travnik established a Vrbas Valley local RRTF responsible also for Bugojno. This local RRTF is led by the British SFOR contingent in Gornji Vakuf which, like the British contingent in Jajce, has become actively involved in facilitating return. Prozor-Rama is covered by the Southern Region Regional RRTF based in Mostar. The British SFOR contingent in Gornji Vakuf has been hosting a weekly meeting on Prozor-Rama, and the RRTF structure uses this meeting as a foundation for its local RRTF there. The tasks of the RRTF, as outlined in its March 1998 Action Plan, are to guide the allocation of resources, provide a focal point for information sharing, mobilise support for return, and monitor progress on the ground27. In order to fulfil these tasks effectively, however, the RRTF faces a number of challenges. The first is to achieve effective cooperation from the respective international organisations. The sheer number of autonomous players involved in return and reconstruction in any given area is striking. They include the leading international organisations with a mandate under the DPA (OHR, UNHCR, OSCE, UNMiBH), other UN agencies involved with reconstruction and humanitarian aid (UNDP, World Food Programme), different SFOR contingents covering a given area, international agencies involved in monitoring security and/or political issues (IPTF, UN Civil Affairs, European Community Monitoring Mission), organisations involved in the technical aspects of reconstruction (IMG), multilateral donors (World Bank, European Commission), bilateral government aid agencies, implementing partners and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs). To guide the allocation of resources to genuinely "open municipalities", those where minority returns are taking place, involves sharing a variety of kinds of information among these organisations and reaching a consensus on priorities. It requires combining political analysis, an understanding of return dynamics in a given area, a grasp of security risks and possible responses with the thinking and planning of donors and implementing organisations. This information must be up-to-date and comprehensive. The secretariat of the BHC RRTF in Travnik has kept track of policy proposals that emerged from the local RRTFs and the Implementers Meetings chaired by the IMG. This has allowed the development of common priorities and the emergence of a "regional identity" among international organisations. Second, the RRTF must raise resources in a timely manner. Failure to do this could undermine the credibility of the entire RRTF structure with local partners. In this context a recent donation of 1 Million DM by the Dutch government to the RRTF was an important expression of trust in the RRTF structures' capacity to identify funding gaps and high priority projects. The BHC RRTF demonstrated its familiarity with the region and readiness to work with donors by immediately drawing to the attention of the Dutch 10 already identified projects linked to minority return breakthroughs. Finally, the RRTF must anticipate violence in the face of return breakthroughs and prepare a concerted response. This requires the close involvement of SFOR. Outside of the British sector, however, SFOR has not been an active participant in RRTF meetings.

Return Plans and Return Offices

The Bonn Peace Implementation Conference in December 1997 specifically requested the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton to follow the lead of the Central Bosnia Canton by creating a return plan of its own28. After difficult and protracted negotiations led by UNHCR, this was achieved in March 1998. The cantonal plan states that "individual displaced persons or refugees may choose to take advantage of the return opportunities created by the [cantonal plan], but they are not bound to do so, and may additionally choose to exercise their individual right of return at any time.29" On 10 February 1998, the Federation Ministry of Social Policy, Displaced Persons and Refugees called for the creation of a Municipal Returns Office (MRO) in each municipality to help in the process of "planning returns30". UNHCR has pledged support to these offices and plans to establish a computer link between them, though this has been delayed several times. Several international donors, including the US Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (BPRM) and UNHCR, have made the proper functioning of MROs a condition for continued assistance. However, in both Bugojno and Prozor-Rama the MROs function badly. Bugojno was one of the first municipalities to contribute to the Central Bosnia Canton return plan, which OHR and UNHCR negotiated in the wake of violent evictions in August 1997 from Jajce. However, the relatively low level of Croat return that followed was indicative of the lack of follow-up work at the municipal level in the period before the BHC RRTF was set up. The MRO in Bugojno, established in January 1998, has repeatedly refused to release to the international community numbers on return31. Croats attempting to register have complained of occasional obstruction32. As of June 1998, the MRO had received registrations for return from approximately 1,700 Croats and 191 Serbs. Its staff includes members from each nationality; however, they have not been paid since April. International agency representatives also report that Bugojno authorities are withholding requested information on the current housing situation in the municipality. The MRO in Prozor-Rama appears functional and has a Bosniac staff member. However, the municipal authorities have principally used it as a means of hindering rather than facilitating return. In meetings with international officials, Mayor Pavlicevic has continually declared that all returnees must register with the MRO and that return without its permission is "illegal." To date, few persons have registered with the MRO. The people working in the MRO have also not been paid and the Croat head has threatened to resign for this reason.

Multiethnic Administrations

There are two important aspects to integrating minorities into municipal administrations: the participation of elected minority officials in the running of these municipalities, in accordance with the rules of the National Election Results Implementation Commission (NERIC); and the inclusion of minority members among non-elected officials in the municipality in accordance with the cantonal constitutions. In Bugojno, a multiethnic administration works with difficulty and suffers major shortcomings. In Prozor-Rama, it does not work at all. The municipal council in Bugojno was finally convened in March 1998, six months after the elections. Mlaco was elected mayor by a slim margin, encountering opposition even from within the SDA-led Coalition, which holds 20 seats in the municipal council to the HDZ's 10. A Croat, Ivo Mrso, was elected president of the municipal council, another Croat, Ljuban Vidovic, heads the municipal department for return and reconstruction. Yet Mrso and other Croat representatives told the ICG that Croats are not integrated into decision-making in the municipality, despite weekly meetings with the mayor. Three months after submitting a request, Vidovic has still not been able to move into his pre-war flat, which is occupied by a Bosniac displaced person. Also, the number of Croats employed in the administration remains unacceptably low: by the end of July 1998 only 5 of about 120 employees were Croats. At a municipal council session on 9 June Mayor Mlaco presented a plan that envisaged a total of 59 employees for all municipal departments. According to the Cantonal constitution, the number of Croats should reflect the population census of 1991. Prozor-Rama was one of the last municipalities in Bosnia to implement the 1997 municipal election results. In the September 1997 municipal elections, the HDZ won 19 seats, the SDA-led Coalition 9 and the Croatian Party of Right (Hrvatska stranka prava, HSP) 2 seats. The authorities finally convened the municipal council on 14 May 1998. It elected a Bosniac as council president and appointed another to head one municipal department. The convening of the council came only after NERIC had imposed an arbitration arrangement. At present, no functioning joint administration is in place. Bosniac municipal councillors do not live in Prozor-Rama and are not integrated into the municipality's work33. No plan for the employment of non-Croats by the municipality has been presented.

Bugojno: Unlawful Appropriation of Property Rights

A major human rights problem in Bugojno is the continued violation of property rights by the municipal administration. As the Federation Ombudsmen noted recently, Bugojno municipality is illustrative of irregularities in applying property laws, with 330 claims for repossession of apartments lodged and none decided upon34. Abuses by the municipal housing department have been frequent. The OSCE Human Rights branch intervened in a number of cases in which Croats, who had remained in the town, were evicted to make room for displaced Bosniacs. Croat property expropriated by communist authorities, which cannot legally be sold before a Law on Restitution is adopted, has nonetheless been sold by the municipality. The Federation Ombudsmen's Office has intervened in several disputes involving the confiscation or sale of properties, most of them Croat-owned, in the town. In only one of these cases did the office receive a reply. Since 1993, the Bugojno municipal authorities took over economic assets that previously had been privately owned or else managed by Croats who had fled35. In April 1997, municipal officials returned three businesses to their Croat owners36. Municipal authorities estimate that only five businesses in the town are now Croat-owned. The exclusion of Croats from economic life in Bugojno remains prevalent. The Ombudsmen recently declared that they were "absolutely dissatisfied" with the Bugojno authorities' lack of co-operation37. The municipal housing office has not responded to applications for socially owned flats, submitted in accordance with the new Federation property legislation, in a timely manner. While it has charged fees to those submitting applications it has not consistently given receipts as confirmation that applications have actually been received. Bugojno authorities have also tried to take over socially owned companies previously managed by Bosniacs who do not belong to the ruling Coalition. In November 1997, municipal authorities tried to take control of the Borac company's facilities in the town. OSCE Human Rights investigated and declared the annexation to be in contravention of the Law on Enterprises38. Intervention by the OSCE and the International Mediator for the Federation and Republika Srpska facilitated a compromise that allowed the employees to remain.

Brokering Returns

Prozor-Rama

In Prozor-Rama, despite the fact that opposition to minority returns remains strong, the pace of returns has been increasing since the beginning of the year. UNHCR estimates that, between January and May 1998, 89 Bosniacs returned to Prozor-Rama39, and that since then more than 50 Bosniac heads of household have returned. In March 1998, the Prozor-Rama authorities came under heavy international pressure to submit a list of villages to which return could begin immediately as part of the cantonal plan for return. Reluctantly, the municipality complied. In a 16 March 1998 agreement with the International Mediator, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, the municipal authorities and the local HDZ reaffirmed that returns could begin to Prozor-Rama town, Duge, Hudutsko, Here, Lizoperci, and Toscanica. Bosniac returns began in April 1998 from Bugojno and Konjic to the village of Here. Some international officials considered the choice of Here-site of massacres of both Croats and Bosniacs during the war-as provocative. Return was supported by Bugojno municipal officials and organised by a Bosniac representative, Mesud Hero, whose family originates from Here. The Prozor-Rama municipal authorities called the return "illegal", arguing, wrongly, that each individual returnee had to be accepted for return in advance by the Municipal Returns Office (MRO). Despite these objections, some 40 Bosniac heads of family returned. SFOR units in the area report that reconstruction is proceeding slowly and that most Bosniac families are not living in the village full-time. Returnees have encountered occasional harassment, but there have been no serious incidents. On 28 May, more than 170 Bosniacs from Bugojno, Konjic and Jablanica visited Prozor-Rama town. 40 heads of families remained in their homes overnight. The return, which proceeded without obstruction, was supported by the Federal Ministry for Social Affairs, Refugees and Displaced Persons, which brought in 12 trucks of building materials, food, and basic supplies for the returnees. In June there were also returns outside the return plan to the village of Borovnica, where 50 people were working on their houses on a daily basis. While ten stayed overnight in three houses to do repairs, the rest commuted from Bugojno. Bosniac return will likely continue throughout the summer as families join heads of household who have already returned. Bosniac returnees are well-organised and supported by Bosniac officials at local, cantonal and federal levels.

Bugojno

At the end of 1997, UNHCR estimated that 800 Croats had returned to Bugojno, almost all members of the 243 families that returned through the pilot project40. Croat representatives and municipal authorities estimate that another 150-200 Croats have returned outside of the pilot project, most of them in 1998. Bugojno was one of the first municipalities in Central Bosnia to contribute to the Central Bosnia cantonal return plan that was finalised in November 1997. The municipal authorities offered to accept the return of 452 Croat families to the villages of Udurlije (182 homes), Causlije (114), Lug (98) and Kopcic (58)41. In January 1998, Mlaco publicly expressed his desire to see Bugojno become a UNHCR-recognised Open City42. UNHCR responded by outlining conditions for recognition, including the meeting of the municipal council and the opening of an information and registration centre. On 12 May, Mlaco held a press conference at which he released a list of 40 homes to which Croats could return after the school year ends in late June, when the Bosniac current occupants would be required to return to their homes in Prozor-Rama and Jajce. The Bosnian Croat secretary of Social Affairs in Prozor-Rama confirmed that Bugojno authorities had issued eviction notices to 25 Bosniac families who were to return to Duge in Prozor-Rama municipality. On 15 May 1998, Bugojno authorities, though not the Mayor, greeted a return visit of Croat refugees living in collective centres on the Croatian coast. The Croat head ofd the municipal reconstruction department, Vidovic, and the Catholic priest from Bugojno had made several trips to visit Croats from Bugojno to encourage them to return. This visit, arranged by the American Refugee Committee (ARC) and facilitated by the Catholic community in Bugojno, went smoothly, and was followed by another visit in June43. There is significant potential for return from these collective centres. There remain 3,500 Bosnian Croat refugees, mainly from Central Bosnia, in collective centres on the Croatian coast. UNHCR in Knin noted that 400 refugee families (600 mainly elderly people) had registered with UNHCR their interest to return to Bugojno. Another positive development was a visit by a mixed Croat-Bosniac delegation from Bugojno to Dalmatia in the last week of July 1998 to invite former citizens to return. At a 9 June meeting of the municipal council Mlaco pushed through a declaration of openness, fulfilling one of UNHCR's criteria for recognition as an Open City. HDZ councillors initially opposed the declaration, citing the lack of concrete progress and the "extremely difficult situation and position of Croats in Bugojno." However, they did not oppose the declaration when it came before the council.44 The approximately 150-200 Croats who have returned to the municipality outside of the Pilot Project have returned mainly to the villages of Udurlije and Lug45. Of the fifty Croat homes repaired in Lug with international assistance, only 20 are now occupied. Preparations for return to the villages of Rosulje and Kandija are under way. The Catholic priest from the village of Humac has also identified 250 Croats now in Prozor-Rama who want to return to their homes. Humac has recently been noted as a priority area for projects by the local RRTF. Representatives of Serb displaced persons estimate that 4,000 Serbs have an interest in return. Bugojno municipal authorities have publicly welcomed Serb visits to the municipality. On 5 May, Mayor Mlaco met with five Serbs from Banja Luka, promised full support for their return, and expressed willingness to include Serbs in the police force. Mlaco also offered to send his returns official to Banja Luka in order to facilitate further return46. A further visit of Serbs took place on 9 June. The public statements welcoming Serb return mask a lack of progress on important prerequisites for sustainable return. For more than a year, there has been discussion of facilitating the return of an Orthodox priest to the municipality. Bugojno authorities promised to do so in 1997, but the return has not yet occurred. Bugojno authorities told the ICG that the repair of the priest's home is awaiting UNHCR funding. According to Bugojno municipal officials, only seven Serb families have returned to the municipality. The existence of a well-organised association of Serb displaced persons, particularly in Banja Luka, makes Bugojno a relatively promising place for Serb return. One obstacle is the absence of provisions for Serb return in the Central Bosnia cantonal return plan and flexible funding. Mayor Mlaco, despite repeated promises, has not yet come up with a Serb return plan as promised.

The Bugojno - Prozor-Rama Memorandum

As a result of OHR intervention, a Memorandum of Understanding on "Return to the Municipalities of Bugojno and Prozor-Rama" was signed on 19 June 1998. It set itself the target to "drastically increase the mutual return between the two municipalities within the next three months". An inter-municipal commission was set up on 8 July following another meeting of the two mayors to "review the general situation, establish material needs, and prepare a schedule for carrying our activities"47. However, until now nothing concrete has come out of these meetings. Members of the RRTF have said that they expected a time-specific schedule of returns to be drawn up by the two sides.

Security And Sfor - The Key To Minority Returns

Municipal authorities in Prozor-Rama have continued to deny or evade their responsibility for the safety of Bosniac returnees48. In several meetings with international officials, municipal HDZ president Dragan Meter has threatened that any Bosniac returnees would be greeted with violence. He had told international monitors that return to the village of Here would spark violence "worse than Drvar." The Croat Displaced Persons' Association in Prozor-Rama has become the principal voice of opposition to Bosniac return. International officials are convinced that the Association is working with the consent, if not under the direction, of the municipal HDZ leadership. It vigorously protested returns to Here in April 1998. In May 1998, as plans developed for returns by Bosniacs to Prozor-Rama town, the Association sent a letter of protest to major international organisations, calling the plans "partial and violent" as they had not been agreed upon by the mayor or the local HDZ. The letter warned that 2,500 Croat displaced persons would "go out on the street and stop returnees"49. The day before the visit, displaced persons leader Anto Simunovic attempted, without success, to gather a crowd to oppose the return. When international monitors talked to the Bosnian Croats in areas in Prozor-Rama to which Bosniacs had returned, these actually welcomed Bosniac returns as "a first step to their own return home.50" In Bugojno the security situation has improved considerably since late 1997. There continue to be isolated incidents, as when in early June 1998 a reconstructed Croat house was destroyed51. Overall, as UNHCR noted, "minorities returning to Bugojno generally do not face any harassment.52"

Police and Security

In both municipalities, the first post-war police chiefs were uncooperative and obstructed the return process. An obstructionist police chief in Bugojno was dismissed in 1996; in Prozor-Rama, the police chief, Franjo Slisko, was finally removed in March 1998, after IPTF had filled 39 non-compliance reports against him. Although Slisko remains in the municipality and may still receive a municipal pay check, the dismissals appear to have changed the atmosphere in both municipalities. In 1997 Bugojno was one of the first municipalities in the Canton to implement joint policing effectively. According to IPTF monitors, its police force now comprises 60 Bosniacs and 48 Croats and is functioning well. Mixed Bosniac-Croat patrolling is standard procedure. Croats in the municipality report that the reintegration of the police has significantly improved security conditions. However, the municipality has moved slowly in making housing available for the Croat officers. According to police officials in Bugojno, only two Croat officers have returned to live in their own homes. Another eight live with relatives. Most commute from Tomislavgrad or Livno. Catholic Relief Service (CRS), an American NGO, has been repairing further houses for Croat police officers. The municipality is not actively supporting the effort. Mlaco told the ICG that "where police officers live isn't important." Bosniacs were finally permitted to join the police force in Prozor-Rama in December 1997. There are 33 Croats and 21 Bosniacs on the force. According to police monitors, the Prozor-Rama police now conduct some joint patrols but continue to exclude Bosniac officers from decision-making.

The SFOR Battle Group

Returns to Prozor-Rama and the Vrbas Valley have benefited from the involvement of the British SFOR battle group headquartered in Gornji Vakuf. NGOs and international organisations working in Prozor-Rama and the Vrbas Valley credit the British with having excellent information on the local political situation. The contingent knows the major players, both politicians and those who exercise power behind the scenes. It monitors local radio, takes an active co-ordination and information-sharing role in the RRTF and hosts weekly meetings with international organisations in Prozor-Rama. Underlying this approach is an attitude that differs considerably from that of most SFOR contingents based in Bosnia. As the battalion puts it, providing an environment "in which each ethnic group can pursue its own objectives peacefully, without fear, and move about as it pleases, continues to be the fundamental raison d'etre of the military mission"53. Promoting minority returns within the framework of the RRTF is seen as a step towards improving the overall security situation in Bosnia.54 One example of this proactive approach was the response to the planned return of Bosniacs to Prozor-Rama on 28 May. In anticipation, a British general visited the mayor and expressed in clear terms the responsibility of the municipality for security. Throughout the day of return, SFOR maintained a very visible presence, including frequent foot patrols, 24 hours patrolling, and controls on all roads leading to Prozor-Rama. A heightened presence in Prozor-Rama continued in the weeks following the return. SFOR continues to conduct frequent night-time patrols and has stepped up surveillance of those individuals in the municipality deemed hostile to minority return. The contingent covering Prozor-Rama and the Vrbas Valley is also equipped with riot control gear, and has the experience and training to respond swiftly and effectively to any violence. Thus, it has the confidence, in the words of one commander, to "call the bluff" of local power-holders threatening violence. The threats of disruption from Prozor-Rama officials did not materialise and, in any event, were not permitted to halt the return movement. Radio Rama, the sole station in Prozor-Rama, is run by the head of the local HDZ club, Pero Pavlevic-Sero. It has, at times, made broadcasts hostile to the international community. Recently, however, at the urging of the British battle group, the station aired interviewers with battle group commanders and a series of radio shows, one hour each, which featured international officials explaining international policy, in particular property issues, to the local population. British SFOR organised and financed these radio shows.

Making Returns Sustainable

Support to Moderate Forces

The signs are clear that the HDZ leadership has little interest in actively facilitating Croat returns to Bugojno or other Bosniac-administered areas. In addition to contributing to deadlock at the municipal government level, the HDZ has not worked actively with donors and NGOs seeking to repair Croat homes in Bugojno. Several reconstruction agencies considering work in Prozor-Rama reported that their contacts with HDZ officials were of little use because the officials would not provide lists of Croats interested in return. UNHCR observed in April 1998 "a discrepancy between the strong wish of Bosnian Croat displaced persons in Prozor-Rama, Livno and the Dalmatian coast to return to Bugojno, and the lack of interest shown by their (HDZ) representatives in Bugojno."55 When a group of 50 Croats displaced in Prozor-Rama prepared to return to Sebesici on 20 June, a Bosniac-administered village in Novi Travnik, Prozor-Rama mayor Jerko Pavlicevic made a statement on Radio Rama warning Croat displaced persons not to be manipulated by Fatima Leho, the (Bosniac) Vice-Governor of the Canton who had organised the trip. This was the first large-scale movement of Bosnian Croat displaced persons from Prozor-town to former homes in Bosniac-controlled areas. In July, (Bosniac) Federation President Ejup Ganic visited the village of Rostovo, to which Croats from Prozor-Rama had returned. It is the Catholic community, rather than the HDZ, which has most actively promoted Croat return to the municipality of Bugojno. The Catholic cathedral in Bugojno provides a social network for Croats, supervising the distribution of aid and sharing information about reconstruction assistance. Father Mirko, the priest, made trips both to the Croatian coast and to Livno to encourage the return of refugees. He also travelled to Prozor-Rama to dissuade Croat displaced persons there from obstructing the return of Bosniacs in May 1998. Church members supported the return of Croats from Prozor-Rama to the village of Sebesici However, when a mass was celebrated there, the Catholic Bishop of Mostar, who was invited, choose not to attend. The recent formation of the New Croatian Initiative, NHI (Nova Hrvatska Initiativa), has raised additional hopes that changes within the political landscape of Bosnian Croats will promote returns. Though the NHI had not yet established offices in either Bugojno or Prozor-Rama by the end of July, it has signalled its intention to campaign there on a pro-return platform. NHI founder and Croat member of the collective presidency, Kresimir Zubak, referred to Central Bosnia during a trip to the United States as the best region to implement Dayton, due to its living tradition of coexistence and tolerance. In return, USAID promised to target US funds towards Central Bosnia56. HDZ activity against return extends to Croatia, which hosts several thousand Croat refugees from Bugojno. International monitors there report that refugees often encounter pressure not to return and are the targets of misinformation that exaggerates the security problems. In one instance, HDZ officers described a verbal exchange between a Bosniac and a Croat in June 1997 as a threat at gunpoint. On 30 July 1997, the Split-based weekly Slobodna Dalmacija reported the vicious beating of a Croat by the Bugojno police. What had actually transpired, according to IPTF monitors who investigated, was the brief detention of a heavily intoxicated Croat resident.

Housing Space and Reconstruction

There is widespread disillusionment among displaced persons and moderate, pro-return politicians with the lack of speed with which reconstruction aid arrives to help those who have already returned. The BHC RRTF noted the importance of identifying flexible funding for these purpuses. Money from the European Commission (EC) might yet enable the reconstruction of several hundred homes in Bugojno this year, most of which to enable Croat returns (either directly or by freeing up Croat homes currently occupied by Bosniacs). Current plans are for over one hundred homes to be reconstructed in the villages of Causilje (all Croat) and Drvetine (mixed Bosniac and Croat), though the construction has not yet started. Catholic Relief Services (CRS), with support from the US government, is reconstructing 40 homes for returnees in Humac. CRS is going to implement additional housing and infrastructure projects in both municipalities, including some to facilitate the return of Croat councillors to Bugojno. Given the experience of reconstruction projects in other municipalities and the general scarcity of resources, the issue of "double occupancy" must be addressed. As elsewhere throughout the country, people from villages occupied empty housing in the town during and after the conflict. Some families occupy two or more homes in town, as a result of adult family members having moved into other homes during the war. Recently, there have been signs that Bugojno may be willing to address double occupancy. Bosniacs whose homes have been reconstructed in the Prozor-Rama villages of Duge and Here have been sent letters stating that they must move back there. The Prozor-Rama authorities are less willing to deal with cases of double occupancy. The OSCE has reported that the municipality only designated an official to deal with such cases in early June and that he has not yet begun work. In Prozor-Rama, the municipality has so far failed to move Croat families from the town to the outlying village of Hudutsko, although thirty families have now expressed their agreement to return when their homes are reconstructed. A variant on this pattern is that some Bosniacs who fled to Bugojno during the war have now returned to other municipalities, including Prozor-Rama, but still occupy a home in Bugojno.

Conclusions And Recommendations

General:

• The opening of the return axis between Bugojno and Prozor-Rama has been helped by the acceptance of cantonal return plans. Yet specific return movements have taken place despite opposition from municipal authorities. Municipal authorities should be continually informed and engaged, but ultimately return must not depend on their consent. International officials everywhere should make clear to municipal officials that people have the right to return on an individual basis to villages even if these are not included in return plans.

• Sustainable returns demand a proactive SFOR to defuse and deter threats of violence, such as those made in April and May by Prozor-Rama municipal and HDZ leaders. The British contingent in Prozor-Rama and the Vrbas Valley has gathered excellent information on local politics. It has established strong coordination with other international organisations. This helps SFOR identify security risks, and directly benefits minority returns. The importance of having SFOR actively supporting the return process should be recognised and explained widely to other SFOR commanders. The British approach should serve as a model for SFOR in other sectors. SFOR should be an active participant in the regional RRTF structures

• In Bugojno and Prozor-Rama, as in most other municipalities in the Federation, property legislation is not respected by municipal authorities. The municipal housing departments in both municipalities function particularly poorly. To safeguard the rights of citizens to their property, the deadline for submitting claims for socially owned apartments should be extended beyond the initial six months claims period ending in October 1998.

• The RRTF structure has demonstrated its importance in Central Bosnia during the last months. For the RRTF process to work, project proposals made by regional RRTFs to support minority returns should receive priority funding. International donors and NGOs working in the area should cooperate fully with the RRTF. Donors should follow the example of the Dutch government, which recently made 1 Million DM available for the RRTF to cover minority return related funding gaps.

• Bugojno has been promised significant reconstruction funds from the European Commission for minority return projects. Everything must be done to speed up implementation of the European Commission's projects in Central Bosnia.

• As more international projects are realised, the numbers of double occupancy cases will increase. An internationally supervised process should be put in place to monitor and address this problem. Double occupancies could, for instance, be monitored by teams of Bosnians working under the instruction of a regional RRTF or UNHCR office. Bosnians have the great advantage of knowing the communities, and, if properly selected, of being able to get information from beneficiaries, neighbours and others with information. A second option would be to task ECMM or other internationals.

Regarding Bugojno:

• The record of the Bugojno municipal housing department is one of the worst in the Federation. More than 300 claims for repossession of apartments have been lodged and none have been decided. Mayor Mlaco has led an effort to privatise and sell properties and economic assets, many of which belonged to or were managed by Croats before the war. Sustained international pressure is needed to improve this dismal record. The Bugojno authorities should be called on to cooperate closely with the Federation Ombudsmen to resolve property rights violations.

• The international community should hold Mayor Mlaco to his promises to (1) ensure that Bosniacs vacate 40 Croat homes by the end of the school year in June, (2) support the work of the Municipal Return Office (MRO), (3) share return related information with the RRTF and (4) present a plan for Serb return to the municipality. More municipal councillors, officials and minority police officers must be able to return to their homes and more Croats must be employed in the municipal administration. Progress on these issues should be a precondition for recognition of Bugojno as a UNHCR Open City. However, projects supporting minority returns should not suffer from non-recognition.

• At a meeting with the representatives of Serb displaced persons, Mayor Mlaco expressed his willingness to welcome Serb returns. The incorporation of Bosnian Croats into the Bugojno police force has contributed significantly to an improved security situation. IPTF should push for the integration of Serbs into the police force..

• The Catholic community in Bugojno has demonstrated that it is an effective force for the reintegration of Bosnian Croats into the municipality. The local HDZ has not. Increased international support for the Catholic community, particularly in the form of media and personal outreach campaigns to displaced Croats, should be considered. The international community should support groups in Bosnian Croat society and political parties which actively work for return of Croats to their homes.

Regarding Prozor-Rama:

• SFOR units covering Prozor-Rama have expressed concern about what appears to be an HVO build-up in Prozor-Rama. Bosniac returnees have said that the heavy HVO presence is a deterrent to return. Given the involvement of HVO units elsewhere in opposing return and the threats made by HDZ leaders in Prozor-Rama, SFOR should consider mandating a reduction in the HVO presence in the municipality. An investigation should establish whether there is indeed financial or other involvement of the Republic of Croatia in the building of the road between Tomislavgrad and Prozor-Rama. The applications for further artillery sites in the area should be reviewed critically.

• SFOR increased its presence in Prozor-Rama to monitor the recent return movements. The rhetoric of local municipal and HDZ officials is still hostile to the return of Bosniacs. There is a criminal element in Prozor-Rama that could become active against returnees. The heightened SFOR presence should be maintained.

• The HDZ in Prozor-Rama has not been supportive of the efforts of Croat displaced persons to organise for return to Bosniac-administered areas, and has been inciting resentment among the population towards the return of Bosniacs. Nonetheless, there are indications that some Croats have a strong desire to return to their homes in the municipality. The OSCE and UNHCR should continue and indeed expand their information campaigns, utilising Radio Rama, to reach the Croat displaced population in the municipality and support their return to former homes .

Sarajevo, 31 July 1998

FootNotes

1. The municipality was called Prozor before the war; its name was officially changed to Prozor-Rama after the war.

2. The municipality of Gornji Vakuf, situated between Prozor-Rama and Bugojno, is also divided in two areas controlled by the respective armies. In the mostly Bosniac controlled municipality of Jablanica, to the south of Prozor-Rama, the HVO also holds a pocket of the municipality.

3. ARBIH refers to Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the pre-Dayton predecessor of the ABiH.

4. These commitments include the cantonal/municipal return plans, the Schwarz-Schilling Agreement of 16 March 1998 in Prozor-Rama and the Memorandum of Understanding on return, brokered by the OHR and signed by the mayors of both municipalities on 19 June.

5. The pre-war "total" figures also include "others". The pre-war population of Bugojno included 2,302 "others"; the pre-war population of Prozor-Rama, 100.

6. 1991 Census.

7. SFOR, Gornji Vakuf.

8. UNHCR Statistics Package, 1 June 1998. Some 800 were members of 243 families that returned by April 1997 as a result of the Dayton Pilot Project. Croat representatives in Bugojno estimate that another 150-200 Croats returned outside of the Pilot Project, most of them this year. Bugojno Department for Return and Reconstruction, June 1998.

9. Bugojno Municipal authorities recorded the return of seven Serb families. UNHCR estimates four members per family, on average.

10. 1991 Census.

11. SFOR, Gornji Vakuf.

12. UNHCR reported 89 Bosniac returns by the end of April 1998 (UNHCR Statistics Package, 1 June 1998). Since then, approximately 40 heads of household returned to Prozor-Rama town, and another 10 are staying permanently in Borovnica.

13. Some locals also refer to it as "Tito's flower".

14. Grude, a small town in Western Herzegovina, was the wartime capital of the illegal Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosna. It continues to be a centre of hard-line Croat nationalism. The present leader of the HDZ, Ante Jelavic, is registered to vote in Grude.

15. He remains, however, leader of the HVO veterans association HVIDRA. Indeed, all ex- soldiers' HVIDRA membership cards have his signature on the back. On many occasions, including in Drvar and Jajce during 1997, HVIDRA has participated in sabotaging minority returns.

16. On 2 November at Dayton, President Alija Izetbegovic and then Federation President Kresimir Zubak signed an agreement for the voluntary return of 600 families to 'Pilot Project' towns in the Federation. The designated towns were Bugojno, Jajce, Travnik, and Stolac.

17. OHR Municipality Handbook, 5 February 1997.

18. OSCE Weekly Report, Bugojno Field Office, 15 May 1997.

19. UNHCR Open Cities Update, 31 December 1997.

20. The aid cut-off, announced in an 18 April 1996 letter from then Deputy High Representative Michael Steiner, applied to municipalities that had not convened an Interim Municipal Assembly (IMA). The other municipalities put under embargo were Stolac, Capljina and Vares.

21. OHR, The Cantons of the Federation of BiH: Basic Figures, Facts, Problems, 31 July 1997.

22. International Management Group, Project Information Monitoring System, 1 June 1998.

23. Bosniac representatives and international monitors in Prozor-Rama report that these families have now received letters from the municipality threatening eviction.

24. UNHCR Open Cities Update, 15 August 1997.

25. Members of the RRTF include the Commission for Real Property Claims (CRPC), the European Commission, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the International Management Group (IMG), SFOR, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UNHCR, IPTF, the US government, and the World Bank.

26. The North-West RRTF successfully integrated displaced persons organisations into negotiations on return and used the media to explain effectively its plans to the broader public.

27. An Action Plan in Support of the Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina, RRTF, March 1998.

28. Conclusions, Bonn Peace Implementation Council, December 1997.

29. UNHCR, Hercegovina-Neretva Canton Returns Meeting, 8 January 1998.

30. The Instruction on the Method of Organising the Return of Displaced Persons and Repatriates to the Territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rasim Kadic, 10 February 1998.

31. At the Regional RRTF meeting on 14 May 1998, the participants concluded that Bugojno has not yet provided full information and that it "should ensure that clear statistics for returns that have occurred to and from the municipality are available." On 22 July UNHCR noted that "it still remains obscure how many people returned to Bugojno".

32. Conclusions, RRTF BHC Monthly Meeting, 14 May 1998.

33. The Bosniac Secretary for Reconstruction and Development, Meho Manov, received a letter of appointment from the municipality only in July 1998.

34. The Ombudsmen recently issued an excellent special report on this issue, On the Realisation of the Right to Return in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the first six months of 1998, July 1998

35. OHR reports that 80 percent of economic assets in the municipality were Croat-owned.

36. OSCE Weekly Report, Bugojno Field Office, 3 July 1997.

37. Kratak Izvjestaj, Office of the Federation Ombudsperson, 16 June 1998.

38. OSCE Weekly Report, Bugojno Field Office, 5 December 1997.

39. UNHCR Registered Minority Returns from 1/1/98 to 30/4/98, and Statistics Package, 1 June 1998.

40. UNHCR Statistics Package, 1 June 1998.

41. Middle Bosnia Canton: Operational Plan, Cantonal Co-ordination Body and International Management Group, 1 December 1997.

42. The Open Cities programme, initiated by UNHCR in March 1997, attempts to direct additional reconstruction aid to municipalities that demonstrate a willingness to accept minority return. To date, there are the following cities: Bihac, Busovaca, Gorazde, Kakanj, Konjic, Lakstasi, Mrkonjic Grad, Srbac, Sipovo, Travnik, Vogosca, Zavidovici and Zenica. For an analysis of the effectiveness of the program, see ICGs report, Minority Return or Mass Relocation?, 14 May 1998; and The Konjic Conundrum: Why Minorities have Failed to return to Model Open City, 19 June 1998.

43. On 19 June, 43 persons from Sibirnic in Croatia visited Bugojno

44. Letter of HDZ Bugojno Municipal Board, 10 June 1998.

45. Bugojno Department for Return and Reconstruction, June 1998.

46. Report of Regional RRTF.

47. Minutes of the meeting, 8 July 1998.

48. German CIMIC Unit, Municipality Information Report: Prozor-Rama, January 1998.

49. Croat Displaced Persons Association, Letter of 25 May 1998.

50. ECMM Daily report, 28 May 1998

51. In this case, an intervention by the Office of the Federation President led to the house's being reconstructed immediately by the Bugojno authorities.

52. UNHCR Open Cities Update, April 1998.

53. It is interesting to note that in the British sector there are few permanent checkpoints along the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL). This differs from the situation in some other sectors, where SFOR checkpoints along the IEBL contribute to the sense of the IEBL as a real border.

54. In many other parts of Bosnia, SFOR commanders view minority returns with apprehension, as an immediate security risk, rather than a step towards an enduring peace.

55. UNHCR Open Cities Update, April 1998.

56. Oslobodjenje, 26 July 1998.