Twenty-First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1083 (1996) of 27 November 1996, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) until 31 March 1997 and requested me to keep the Council informed of the situation in Liberia, especially on the progress of demobilization and disarmament. The Council also requested me to submit by 31 January 1997 a progress report and recommendations on possible United Nations support for the holding of free and fair elections. The present report reviews developments in Liberia since my predecessor's last report dated 19 November 1996 (S/1996/962).

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. During the period under review, some progress has been made towards the implementation of the Abuja Agreement. The disarmament and demobilization process began on schedule on 22 November 1996, but has been hindered by several constraints, as indicated in section IV of the present report. In accordance with the revised schedule of implementation of the Abuja Agreement, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) has deployed troops in the interior of Liberia in support of the disarmament process. UNOMIL has also deployed military observer teams to the disarmament sites.

3. The deep divisions that resurfaced within the Council of State in the aftermath of the shooting incident at the Executive Mansion on 31 October 1996 have persisted. However, during their visit to Liberia in mid-January, the Special Envoy of the Chairman of ECOWAS, Chief Tom Ikimi, Foreign Minister of Nigeria, the Foreign Minister of Guinea, Mr. Lamine Camara, and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Ghana, Mr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas, met separately with the Chairman and some members of the Council of State. The Council then met, on 16 January, for the first time since the 31 October incident. At the meeting, which was held in the presence of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) delegation, the ECOMOG Force Commander, my Special Representative and others, Chief Ikimi appealed to all members to extend their fullest cooperation to ensure a successful conclusion of the Liberian peace process. He stressed the importance of disarmament to the peace process and proposed that the Committee of Nine be reconvened early in February, following the 31 January deadline for its completion, to confirm that it had been carried out.

4. The second ECOWAS verification and assessment meeting, convened in accordance with the revised timetable for the implementation of the Abuja Agreement, also began on 16 January. In a statement issued on 18 January, Chief Ikimi expressed concern at the slowness of the disarmament and demobilization process and the quantity and poor quality of the arms collected thus far. The reasons for this appeared to include lingering suspicions among the faction leaders and insufficient incentives for the fighters. Chief Ikimi also stated that the Council of State had assured him and the members of the verification team that they would resume normal meetings and facilitate the successful implementation of the Abuja Agreement. He stressed that the deadline for the completion of disarmament and demobilization would not be extended beyond 31 January and called on faction leaders to ensure a substantial turnover of weapons and the demobilization of their fighters by that date. The assessment team had agreed to recommend that the ministerial meeting of the Committee of Nine scheduled for March 1997 should be brought forward to early February in order to assess the outcome of the disarmament exercise and endorse the mode of implementation of the rest of the programme.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

Status of the ceasefire

5. During the period under review, violations of the ceasefire continued to be reported. UNOMIL has received six new complaints from ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K wings of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) concerning incidents in Grand Cape Mount and Bomi counties. These include a complaint from ULIMO-J regarding an attack on its fighters by ULIMO-K at Doe Village near Tubmanburg on 22 November; a complaint from ULIMO-K concerning an attack by ULIMO-J on its convoy escorting Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) fighters at Underwear Town, near Sawmill in Lower Lofa County on 24 November; a complaint from ULIMO-J concerning an ambush by ULIMO-K on a taxi at Amadu Town, Bomi County, on 14 December; a complaint from ULIMO-K concerning an attack by a platoon-sized force of ULIMO-J in Jay-Due, north of Suehn District and Gbana on 12 January; a complaint from ULIMO-J of an ambush on the Monrovia-Bomi highway on 16 January in which no faction has been accused; and a complaint submitted on 24 January by ULIMO-K against ULIMO-J for importing warlike materials into Monrovia. The investigations of the Ceasefire Violations Committee (CFVC) into these allegations have been hampered by the failure of some factions to attend its meetings.

6. As indicated in the 19 November report (S/1996/962, para. 12), the report of CFVC on the incident in September 1996 in Greenville has been forwarded to the ECOWAS Committee of Nine on Liberia for review and appropriate action. The investigation into the ceasefire violation aspects of the Sinje massacre has also been completed and is being submitted to ECOWAS. CFVC found that 21 individuals had been identified as victims of the massacre, which took place on 28 September 1996. The massacre appeared to be the work of some ULIMO fighters acting on their own. No evidence of the involvement of the ULIMO High Military Command could be established.

7. The investigation into the shooting incident of 31 October at the Executive Mansion, when five persons, including a close personal aid to Charles Taylor, were killed and several injured, is also still under way.

Deployment of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group and the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

8. The force strength of ECOMOG remains at 7,500 all ranks. To date, the additional troops pledged for ECOMOG have not yet arrived in Liberia, though some of the support pledged by donor countries is now becoming available. The Force Commander has deployed into the interior of Liberia in support of the disarmament process, while retaining a force of sufficient strength in Monrovia to assist in maintaining its safe-haven status. ECOMOG deployed initially at the designated disarmament sites of the Barclay Training Center, Camp Schiefflin, Tubmanburg, Bo Waterside, Kakata, Voinjama, Buchanan, Camp Nama and Zwedru, and subsequently at three additional sites at Tapeta, Greenville and Harper (see annex III).

9. ECOMOG has also established buffer zones between ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K in Bomi and Grand Cape Mount counties, as well as between the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) in Grand Gedeh County. The creation of a similar buffer between the NPFL and ULIMO-K in Bong and Lofa counties and between NPFL and LPC in Sinoe, Maryland and Grand Kru counties is also being contemplated, but ECOMOG considers that it would require additional troops and logistic support for such a deployment.

10. With regard to future deployment plans, the ECOMOG Force Commander has declared that any fighters found with a weapon after 31 January 1997 will be treated as criminals. Following that deadline, ECOMOG has indicated that it intends to carry out cordon and search operations to disarm recalcitrant fighters. ECOMOG will also be responsible for providing security for the electoral process.

11. The new Chief Military Observer of UNOMIL, Major-General Sikandar Shami, assumed his functions on 16 December 1996. As at 28 January 1997, the military strength of UNOMIL stood at 78 military observers, who are deployed at the disarmament sites at Bo Waterside, Tubmanburg, Kakata, Camp Nama, Voinjama, Zwedru, Tapeta, the Barclay Training Center, Greenville, Camp Schiefflin and Buchanan (see annex I). Monitoring teams are also deployed at James Spriggs Payne Airport and at the seaport in Monrovia.

IV. DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION

12. When the disarmament and demobilization exercise began on 22 November 1996 as scheduled, UNOMIL and the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Office (HACO), which is responsible for the operational aspects of demobilization and for coordinating bridging and reintegration activities, were facing severe logistic, financial and manpower constraints. It will be recalled that during the April 1996 crisis in Monrovia, United Nations assets were comprehensively looted and, owing to the breakdown of the ceasefire and the deteriorating security situation, my predecessor was compelled to reduce the strength of UNOMIL drastically and to adjust the Mission's budget to a minimum level.

13. When the peace process was reactivated with the adoption of the revised schedule of implementation of the Abuja Agreement, my predecessor submitted proposals to the Security Council (S/1996/858, paras. 22-30) for assistance that the United Nations could provide, including support for disarmament, demobilization, and the verification of compliance by the factions. While the Security Council, in a letter dated 8 November 1996 from the President of the Council addressed to my predecessor (S/1996/917), welcomed these proposals and encouraged the Secretary-General to make all appropriate arrangements necessary to carry them out, it remained concerned that conditions in Liberia might not be right for the implementation of the proposals at that time, given the continued insecurity in some parts of the country. The Council also referred to my predecessor's assurance in paragraph 59 of his 17 October 1996 report (S/1996/858) that the personnel and logistic resources needed to implement the proposals would not be deployed unless the factions took the concrete steps required to implement the revised timetable of the Abuja Agreement. When the disarmament and demobilization exercise began, UNOMIL and HACO did not have the necessary manpower, financial or logistic resources to carry out their responsibilities in full. They were operating with the curtailed level of resources requested, following the aftermath of the April 1996 crisis, until commitment authority to incur additional expenditures was granted by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on 20 December 1996.

14. Despite these constraints, UNOMIL was able to deploy two military observers to each of the designated sites at the Barclay Training Center, Camp Schiefflin, Tubmanburg, Bo Waterside, Kakata, Voinjama, Buchanan, Camp Nama and Zwedru on 22 November. HACO also deployed demobilization teams to all active sites. Additional sites were subsequently designated by the ECOMOG Force Commander at Tapeta, Greenville and Harper. UNOMIL deployed military observers to Tapeta and Greenville on 19 and 27 December 1996 respectively, followed by HACO demobilization teams. Military observers and HACO demobilization personnel were expected to be deployed to Harper by the end of January. The demobilization exercise coordinated by HACO is therefore currently being carried out at all designated disarmament sites.

15. In order to lend credibility to the disarmament and demobilization exercise, a fixed ration is given only in exchange for a serviceable weapon or 100 rounds of ammunition. Reintegration coupons and/or food rations are issued to the demobilized fighters, who are then transported to their final destinations. ECOMOG has provided limited transportation to make up for a shortage of vehicles, and additional trucks for UNOMIL were scheduled to arrive shortly. The World Food Programme (WFP) has facilitated disarmament and demobilization by providing a single food ration to demobilized combatants who have surrendered a serviceable weapon. By 26 January 1997, about 596 metric tons of assorted food commodities had been distributed to some 12,500 demobilized combatants.

16. During the first week of disarmament and demobilization, the factions' fighters showed remarkable enthusiasm to disarm, and turned out in large numbers. However, at Zwedru, which is earmarked for LPC, and Voinjama and Bo Waterside, which are both earmarked for ULIMO-K, commencement of the process was delayed because of local concerns expressed by the leadership of the factions concerned.

17. During the second week of the exercise, the pace of disarmament started slowing down at all sites. However, as the present report was being completed, the process gathered speed, with a surge in the number of disarming fighters over the past 10 days. An ad hoc disarmament site was established at Sawmill on 11 January, which resulted in the disarmament of 916 ULIMO-K fighters. Almost 2,500 fighters were disarmed on 25 and 26 January, along with a significant surrender of heavy weapons by NPFL at ad hoc disarmament sites established at Gbarnga and Saniquellie. ULIMO-J and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) also indicated that they would shortly disarm at Tubmanburg and Camp Schiefflin. As of 26 January 1997, a total of 12,510 fighters had been disarmed and a total of 4,428 serviceable and 1,103 unserviceable weapons surrendered, as well as more than 500,000 pieces of ammunition (see annex II). At the same time, amid increasing scepticism about the declared total of 60,000, a figure established on the basis of 1993 data, ECOMOG and UNOMIL now consider that a more realistic estimate of the overall number of fighters is in the region of 33,000. That figure has been conveyed to all the factions with a request to meet it by the 31 January deadline.

18. Despite concerted efforts by my Special Representative and members of the mediation committee, as well as the ECOMOG Force Commander, deep mutual suspicion and mistrust persist among the factions and constitute the main obstacle to disarmament. As a result, some local commanders have been actively discouraging their fighters from disarming. In some instances, fighters who had disarmed without their commanders' consent have been arrested and punished. In other areas, fighters have been coming to disarmament sites to disarm under cover of darkness and have been requesting that they be transported away from these sites for their safety.

19. It must also be said that, the Council of State and the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) have not been able to extend their full support to ensure that the fighters disarm. Neither the National Disarmament and Demobilization Commission (NDDC), which is the LNTG agency charged with the responsibility for coordinating disarmament activities with the factions, nor the Council of State itself have taken the concerted action required. However, the Chairman of the Council of State, Ms. Ruth Perry, addressed the nation on the eve of the exercise and urged the fighters to come forward to disarm. The Chairman also undertook two trips covering Bomi, Grand Cape Mount, Margibi and Bong counties to encourage fighters to disarm. In this context, I wrote to the Chairman of the Council of State on 14 January 1997 to express concern at the continuing difficulties in the disarmament process and asking her to urge the faction leaders to make a serious effort to accelerate it.

V. ELECTORAL PROCESS

20. It will be recalled that, in keeping with the revised schedule of implementation of the Abuja Agreement, the United Nations received in late October 1996 a formal request from the Council of State for assistance in developing a suitable electoral framework for the holding of elections in Liberia by the end of May 1997. Following discussions with ECOWAS, a United Nations technical survey team arrived in Monrovia on 8 December 1996 and conducted consultations with a wide range of interested parties, including members of the Council of State and representatives of Liberian civil society and the international community.

21. As requested, the team focused its attention on what steps would be needed in the prevailing circumstances to create a viable and credible framework for free and fair elections by the end of May 1997. It identified three key conditions for success: a fair and credible political framework; an efficient and well-planned electoral operation; and adequate support from the international community. Based on the conclusions of the technical survey team, a set of draft recommendations were prepared, dealing primarily with the requirements for establishing a credible political framework for elections to take place. The recommendations were also developed on the basis of the need for the elections to be as inclusive, operationally simple and cost-effective as possible.

22. On 14 January, I dispatched Mr. Lansana Kouyaté, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, as my Special Envoy to the region for consultations on the draft recommendations with the Chairman of ECOWAS, the Head of State of Nigeria, and with the Liberian parties and civil society. It was proposed to the Chairman of ECOWAS, and accepted by him, that a "provisional electoral package" for the forthcoming elections should be enacted at a special meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of Nine with the Liberian parties and become an integral part of the Abuja Agreement. The package would not seek to replace or reform the existing Liberian electoral system, nor to change the country's Constitution, but would serve as a provisional mechanism that would permit the installation of a government of national unity and pave the way for a return to constitutional order. It is expected that the meeting of the Committee of Nine and the Liberian parties will take place in mid-February and be held at the summit level.

23. My Special Envoy found that, while there was broad agreement among Liberians on many of the ideas suggested by the technical team, some did not elicit the same degree of support. Moreover, the inflexible tone of some of the reactions, especially on the part of certain of the faction leaders, could be cause for concern. The features of the electoral recommendations that require further discussion include the number of chambers in the legislative assembly; whether there should be a run-off in the presidential election; the composition of the electoral commission; voting by refugees; and the roles to be played by ECOWAS and the United Nations. It is hoped that these questions will be resolved through a fully constructive approach by all the parties, including the Liberian factions, as further steps are taken towards the holding of free and fair elections in Liberia. Such steps must be taken urgently if the elections are to be held on schedule by the end of May 1997.

24. While it is clear that UNOMIL could, in addition to its present observation and verification mandate, play a key role in matters such as coordinating international electoral support and managing the international trust fund for elections, it will be necessary to await enactment of the electoral package before a clear determination can be made as to how UNOMIL and the United Nations system can best provide support for the elections. Once the package is enacted and the political and organizational frameworks have been established, specific recommendations on the role of UNOMIL will be submitted to the Security Council. It is anticipated that these recommendations would be based upon joint coordination of the elections by the United Nations and ECOWAS.

VI. HUMAN RIGHTS

25. The report of CFVC on the Sinje massacre is referred to in paragraph 6 above. In addition, the Human Rights Officer is conducting a parallel inquiry to ascertain the whereabouts and well-being of the persons who were abducted and who remain missing. UNOMIL has also received reports about a series of massacres and other violations that took place at the end of September 1996 in Bomi and Grand Cape Mount counties, which are believed to be linked to the Sinje massacre.

26. UNOMIL is conducting investigations into four other incidents related to human rights which took place in December. On 1 December 1996, three Ministry of Education personnel were abducted in Congo Town, just outside Monrovia. According to newspaper reports, the three were flogged and then killed after tyres were placed around their necks and set on fire. However, the deaths of the abducted individuals have not been established.

27. Another investigation now being finalized concerns the Bloun Town massacre of 7 December 1996, when at least 11 civilians were hacked to death. The attack represented the culmination of a series of clashes in the area over a two-month period between ULIMO-J fighters and members of the so-called Congo Defence Force, which is affiliated with ULIMO-K.

28. On 14 December 1996, four persons were killed when the taxi in which they were travelling along the Bomi Highway en route to Tubmanburg was ambushed by armed men. The UNOMIL investigation into the incident is continuing.

29. On 16 January 1997, six persons were killed by armed fighters on Bomi Highway. Five out of the six victims were identified as ULIMO-J fighters. Accusations have been levelled at the Congo Defence Force.

30. Reports of other recent apparent or alleged human rights violations received by UNOMIL include the harassment and detention of members of the international humanitarian community by ULIMO-J fighters at Vonzula, Grand Cape Mount County, resulting in the suspension of humanitarian assistance to the area on 20 December 1996, as well as the discovery of more than 100 skeletons at Greenville Hospital in December 1996.

VII. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

Bridging programmes

31. The financial commitment authority of $10 million granted by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions included an amount of $1.71 million for the purpose of initial reintegration, or so-called bridging activities. HACO will coordinate these activities, channelling funds to implementing partners. In addition, both the European Union (EU) and USAID have made funds available for this programme, as have United Nations agencies, particularly WFP, in supporting all food-for-work activities, and UNDP, through the United Nations Office for Project Services.

32. To date, a limited number of bridging programmes have been implemented, where logistics and security conditions permit. WFP, EU and UNDP/Office for Project Services have embarked on a Civil Reconstruction Team bridging programme in support of the demobilization exercise.

33. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) will play a major role in the resettlement and reintegration exercise by providing basic agricultural inputs, as well as technical support, in order to enable the resumption of productive farming activities.

34. Child fighters are receiving special attention in the reintegration exercise. Statistics on disarmed fighters indicate that child fighters constitute almost 30 per cent of the total number of combatants, of which it might be possible to reunite 90 per cent with their families. Operating within the framework adopted by the Demobilization Task Force, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has played a leading role in the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers, together with international and national non-governmental organizations. Some 3,000 child fighters have been demobilized since 22 November 1996.

35. UNDP has approved an emergency assistance project for key public institutions in order to enable them effectively to participate in the reintegration programme. These include the Ministries of Planning and Economic Affairs, Education, Agriculture, Commerce and Justice, and the Budget Bureau. In order to improve safety at Spriggs Payne Airport, one of the major channels for emergency assistance, UNDP has provided a mobile control tower, which has been operational since December 1996.

Relief, resettlement and reintegration

36. Since my predecessor's last report, the level of humanitarian assistance has modestly increased, though humanitarian activities continue to be impeded by the lack of secure access to many areas of Liberia. UNICEF supports sanitation, water, education and health programmes and has started a national vaccination campaign with the World Health Organization (WHO) in collaboration with the county health teams. WFP provides relief food to the vulnerable and to displaced people in the shelters, and has launched a school feeding programme. During the reporting period, WHO has maintained its support for the health delivery system in the country through the reactivation of health services and the supply of medical equipment and drugs, as well as by undertaking epidemiological monitoring and the training of health workers. FAO has resumed its activities and is currently engaged in planning for the coming agricultural season. FAO is also updating the plans and strategies drawn up last year for agricultural activities, as well as for food security.

37. Owing to the slow pace of implementation of the Abuja Agreement, as well as the frequent violations of the Agreement by the factions, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has not yet resumed planning for the organized return of Liberian refugees from the surrounding countries. It is hoped that, following the disarmament exercise, conditions will permit UNHCR to begin to plan for the voluntary return of the refugees.

38. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat and UNDP jointly launched, on 23 December 1996, the United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal and the United Nations system inter-agency appeal for community rehabilitation and peace programmes in Liberia. The documents focus on the continuation of humanitarian activities, the reintegration of the affected population, and the rehabilitation of basic social infrastructures and governance activities. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs is coordinating the humanitarian assistance activities, while UNDP is coordinating long-term reintegration/rehabilitation activities.

VIII. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS

39. Since the 6 April upheaval in Monrovia, economic activities, especially retail and wholesale trade in food and general merchandise, have revived to about 70 per cent of the level of the period before 6 April. The exchange rate has strengthened to L$ 52 to US$ 1 as of 15 December 1996, from a rate of L$ 80 to US$ 1 on 1 July 1996. The prices of gasoline, rice and other basic commodities have also relatively declined. However, high unemployment and arrears in the payment of salaries leave the general population still unable to meet its basic needs without humanitarian and development assistance.

40. With UNDP funding, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has started a vocational training programme in order to increase the availability of skilled labour and jobs. Collaborative assistance also includes educational support, electricity supply to the J. F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital and planning for the initiation of a governance programme, including continued assistance for the holding of free and fair elections.

41. FAO resumed operations in Liberia in September 1996 with the appointment of an Emergency Coordinator. The primary objective of the operation is to improve the coordination mechanism in the agricultural sector, with a view to designing a strategy to enhance the country's food security.

42. With UNDP funding, WHO is strengthening a rapid epidemic response task force through an active national disease surveillance system. This initiative will enhance the Government's ability to plan and monitor disease trends in the country, especially during repatriation, resettlement and reintegration. WHO is also implementing the community and social mobilization and empowerment for health and development programme, the goal of which is to build on people's own capacity and initiative for health action.

IX. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

43. Over the past two and one half months, the Liberian peace process has witnessed some positive developments. The disarmament and demobilization process began on schedule on 22 November 1996, and, as of 26 January, more than 12,500 fighters, including approximately 3,000 child fighters, had been disarmed and demobilized, handing in their weapons and ammunition as they did so. While this is not a negligible achievement, it represents little more than a third of the estimated total number of fighters in the country. The significant rise in the number of fighters disarming during the past week can be attributed partly to the public support recently given to this process by faction leaders. However, some of the smaller factions have yet to show positive results. At the time of writing, despite these hopeful signs of compliance, it appears unlikely that the disarmament process can be effectively completed by 31 January. I note, in this context, the intention of ECOMOG to use vigorous measures thereafter to ensure the maximum possible level of security.

44. Preparations for the elections continue. The support expressed for this process by interested donor countries and by the Chairman of ECOWAS and Head of State of Nigeria and his agreement that a special joint meeting of the Committee of Nine and the Liberian parties should be called in mid-February at the summit level, are welcome. It is to be hoped that those faction leaders who have criticized some elements of the electoral recommendations will nevertheless continue to assist in their elaboration and take part in elections that all agree to be necessary. In this context, I welcome the 16 January meeting of the Council of State, the first to be held since the shooting incident of 31 October 1996, and express my appreciation for the efforts of Foreign Minister Chief Tom Ikimi of Nigeria, the Foreign Minister of Guinea, Mr. Lamine Camara, and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Ghana, Mr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas in that regard. I call on the faction leaders to continue to meet regularly and to work together.

45. It is also encouraging to note that the second ECOWAS verification and assessment meeting reaffirmed ECOWAS determination to ensure strict compliance with the revised schedule of implementation of the Abuja Agreement.

46. Despite these positive developments, the security situation in Liberia remains volatile. Outbreaks of sporadic inter-factional fighting have continued, mainly between the two ULIMO factions on the one hand, while LPC continues to harbour deep suspicion against NPFL on the other. These incidents cast doubt on the commitment of the factions to the peace process. I do not believe the international community will be prepared to support the holding of elections unless they can take place in a reasonably secure environment. The ECOMOG role in ensuring the security of the elections will be particularly important. For that reason, I urge Member States to assist ECOWAS countries that have pledged additional troops to ECOMOG to enable them to reach the mission area and to assist in providing ECOMOG with resources for the maintenance of their transportation assets. The aid of the international community is also essential in supporting bridging programmes to sustain demobilized combatants and to hasten the reintegration programmes planned by the United Nations and the donor community.

47. As preparations for the Liberian elections advance, in accordance with the tight schedule mandated by the 31 May deadline, I will keep the situation there under particularly careful review and advise the Security Council accordingly.