UNHCR CDR Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from the Sudan

1.   SUDANESE ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND REFUGEES IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: MAJOR TRENDS

This Chapter provides a statistical overview of refugees and asylum-seekers in Western Europe[1] and North America in general and of Sudanese refugees and asylum-seekers in particular. It is based on official government statistics provided to UNHCR.

The following observations should be taken into consideration when comparing individual asylum statistics from different countries. Firstly, due to a lack of common standards for the compilation of such statistics, the scope for any detailed comparison is limited. For instance, data may refer to individuals or principal applicants ("cases"), to those who submit a request for asylum or to those who are admitted into the asylum procedure. While persons fleeing from former Yugoslavia who benefit from temporary protection have usually been granted protection on a group basis, they are included in the asylum statistics to the extent that they were allowed or required to submit an individual asylum request. Even within countries, comparisons may be hampered due to changing counting practices over the years.

Although statistics on asylum applications and determination may reflect certain migratory tendencies, it must be stressed that these statistics are not synonymous with international migration statistics as such. Thus, whereas asylum applications submitted at the border are related to a movement, many applications are in fact submitted by persons who already established residence within the country of asylum. Similarly, people whose claims are rejected do not necessarily leave the country where they sought asylum.

The statistics presented refer to asylum applications and status determination of asylum-seekers by receiving country of asylum and generally exclude refugees accepted for third country resettlement. In the attached tables, "Applications" refer to the number of asylum applications; "Conv. status" refers to the number of persons (or, in some instances, cases) granted refugee status under the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; "Rejections" refers to the number of persons (cases) whose asylum application was rejected, and "Humanitarian" refers to the number of persons (cases) who were allowed to stay for humanitarian (i.e. non-Convention) reasons. Generally, the decisions recorded in the tables refer to first instance decisions only. UN Convention recognition rates (see Tables 6a and 6b) have been calculated by dividing the number of Convention status recognitions by the total number of Convention status recognitions plus the number of negative decisions. While this allows to make comparisons between countries, which is the purpose here, this also implies that the rates calculated may differ from those provided by governments.

Lastly, it should be noted that, in the tables, a zero may indicate that the value is zero or unknown or that the information is not available. Some of the more recent data, including those for the USA and the UK, are preliminary and subject to confirmation.

1.1   Total asylum applications (Table 1 and 2)

During 1995, some 320,000 persons applied for asylum in Europe, about the same number as in 1994 (319,000). The countries receiving the highest proportion of asylum-seekers in Europe are listed below:

Main receiving country (in %)	1993	1994	1995
Germany	59	40	52
United Kingdom (cases only)	4	10	14
Netherlands	7	17	9
Total	70	67	75

 

Source: Table 1 and 2

Germany remains the main recipient of asylum-seekers in Europe, accounting for half of all asylum applications submitted in Europe during 1995. The United Kingdom has experienced a significant increase in the number of asylum applications, its share increasing from 4 per cent in 1993 to 14 per cent in 1995 (cases only). Together, the three major receiving countries Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom accounted for 75 per cent of all asylum applications submitted in Europe during 1995.

In 1995, the main three receiving countries were followed by France, accounting for 6 per cent of all applications, Switzerland (5 per cent), Belgium (4), Sweden (3) Austria, Denmark and Spain (each 2) and Italy (1). Finland, Greece, Norway and Portugal each accounted for less than 0.5 per cent of the applications submitted during 1995.

In North America, the United States received some 80 of all applications during 1990-1995. In the period 1993-1995, this percentage was even higher, between 85 and 90%.

1.2   Overall Convention status recognitions (Table 1 and 2)

In 1995, some 48,000 persons were granted Convention refugee status in Europe, slightly more than in 1994 (47,000). Almost 50 per cent of all persons recognised as refugees under the 1951 Convention in 1995 were recognised by Germany (23,500), followed by the Netherlands (8,000 or 17%), Denmark (4,800 or 10%), France (4,500 or 9%), Switzerland (2,600 or 6%), Belgium (1,300 or 3%), the United Kingdom (1,200 or 3%, cases only) and Austria (1,000 or 2%) (see Table 2).

Although Canada received only 20% of all applications submitted in North America during 1990-1995, 70% of all asylum-seekers granted Convention status in that region were granted asylum by Canada.

1.3   Overall non-Convention recognitions (Table 1 and 2)

Some 38,000 persons were allowed to remain for humanitarian reasons in Europe during 1995. Non-Convention recognitions were concentrated in Denmark (38 per cent), the Netherlands (28), the United Kingdom (12), Germany (10) and Sweden (9) (Table 1 and 2).

1.4   Sudanese asylum applications (Table 3 and 4)

During 1990-1995, some 10,000 Sudanese nationals applied for asylum in Europe. The following table shows the countries which received the highest proportion of these applications:

Main receiving country (in %)	1993	1994	1995
Germany	41	37	43
United Kingdom (cases)	20	22	13
Netherlands	11	18	22
Total	72	77	78

Source: Table 3 and 4

In 1995, the number of applications from Sudanese nationals peaked with some 2,700 application lodged, with 78% of applications lodged in Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

In North America, Sudanese asylum applications have remained more constant at around 600 per year since 1991, most of which were lodged in Canada.

1.5   Convention recognitions of Sudanese asylum-seekers (Table 3 and 4)

During 1990-1995, some 1,560 Sudanese asylum-seekers were granted asylum in Europe, half of whom were granted Convention status by the United Kingdom in 1993 (740 cases). Canada granted asylum to another 1,500 Sudanese and the United States to some 650.

In 1995, Germany granted Convention status to 63% of all Sudanese nationals who were granted refugee status in Europe, followed by the Netherlands (16%).

1.6   Sudanese asylum-seekers allowed to remain for humanitarian reasons

The number of Sudanese asylum-seekers allowed to remain in Europe for humanitarian reasons during 1990-1995 (1,500) was almost similar to the number of Convention recognitions (1,560). 55 per cent of these Sudanese nationals were allowed to remain in the United Kingdom, another 22% in the Netherlands.

In Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (countries which grant a humanitarian status), Sudanese are almost invariably granted humanitarian status rather than Convention status. The only exception is the United Kingdom where the number of Sudanese granted Convention status during 1990-1995 (950 cases) outnumbered the number of cases granted exceptional leave to remain (830).

In 1995, Germany and the Netherlands accounted together for 84% of all humanitarian status recognitions of Sudanese.

1.7 Convention recognition rates

During 1990-1995, Convention recognition rates for all asylum applications lodged were comparatively high in Belgium (31 per cent), France (20%) and the Netherlands (20%), i.e. at least double the overall rate for Europe (11 per cent). Conversely, relatively low Convention recognition rates were recorded in Finland (2 per cent), Greece (5), Norway (2) and Portugal (4). In Canada, the total Convention recognition rate was some 65%, and in the United States some 27% (Table 6a).

The 1990-1995 Convention recognition rate for Sudanese asylum-seekers in Europe (25%) is significantly higher compared to the overall recognition rate for all asylum seekers, although the recognition rate had dropped to 11% in 1995.

Recognition rates for Sudanese asylum-seekers reached some 95% in Canada and the United States in 1995.

1.8   Main conclusions

·         During 1990-1995, some 3.7 million applications for asylum were submitted in Europe (75%) and North America (25%). The leading receiving countries were Germany (1.5 million applications) and the United States (674,000);

·         During 1990-1995, some 363,000 asylum-seekers were granted refugee status under 1951 UN Convention, 241,000 in Europe (66%) and some 123,000 in North America. Countries which granted refugee status to the largest of asylum-seekers were Germany (93,000), Canada (87,000) and France (60,000);

·         During 1990-1995, 11% of all decisions in Europe resulted in the granting of Convention refugee status, compared to 46% of all decisions in North America. Countries with the highest Convention recognition rates are Canada (65%), Belgium (31%) and the United States (27%);

·         During 1990-1995, an additional 224,000 persons were allowed to remain for humanitarian reasons in Europe, almost equalling the number of Convention recognitions (humanitarian status is not granted in North America). Sweden granted humanitarian status to almost half of these (48%);

·         In 1995, some 320,000 asylum requests were submitted in Europe, equal the number in 1994. In North America, some 175,000 asylum requests were recorded in 1995, up from 170,000 in 1994;

·         In 1995, Convention status recognitions were at the same level as in 1994: in Europe, some 48,000 persons were granted Convention status, in North America some 22,000;

·         In 1995, an additional 38,000 persons were granted humanitarian status in Europe, down from 56,000 in 1994;

·         During 1990-1995, some 10,000 Sudanese applied for asylum in Europe, compared to 3,000 in North America. Whereas in Europe, the number of Sudanese asylum-seekers peaked in 1995, when 2,700 applications were recorded, the numbers in North America have remained fairly stable over the past five years (500-600). In Europe, major destination countries for Sudanese asylum-seekers are Germany (39%) and the United Kingdom (31%). In 1995, however, the Netherlands had become the second largest receiving countries in Europe (22%), after Germany (43%);

·         During 1990-1995, Convention recognition rates for Sudanese asylum-seekers were significantly higher than for the total asylum-seeker population. Thus, in Europe, the recognition rate for Sudanese was some 25% (although it had fallen to 11% in 1995), whereas in North America, it stood at some 90% (95% in 1995);

·         In countries granting humanitarian status, Sudanese who were not rejected were usually (the Netherlands) or entirely (Norway, Sweden) granted such a status, except in the United Kingdom where the majority of recognised Sudanese was granted Convention status.

2.   COUNTRY-SPECIFIC AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The biggest country in Africa in terms of land mass, the Sudan is ethnically one of the most diverse countries in the world, fragmented into 56 ethnic groups and 597 subgroups. The basic division is, however, between the North and the South of the country. The conventional categorisation of the Sudan in terms of an Afro-Arab culture in the north and an African culture in the South is in part a reflection of the country's particular geographical position midway between the Arab and African worlds. It is also the result of a historical process that saw the gradual penetration of Arab culture and Islamic religion into the indigenous societies of the North of the Sudan.

The term 'Arab' is used by anthropologists in the context of the Sudan in a historic sense only and refers to those people "who emigrated from Arabia to the Sudan and their descendants, and to the indigenous folk who were absorbed into Arab tribes and adopted their culture" (Hamilton, J., 1935, 81). Some authors find that this has provided for a certain uniqueness of the Sudan, leading to a particular. Sudanese identity. "Just as the south is a mixture of various cultures, the north is a product of racial and cultural integration between Arab and indigenous Sudanese races, and although various economic, social and political factors have caused the overplay of the Arab symbol, the product can justifiably be called Sudanese" (Premdas R., et al., 1990, 129). Other authors disagree with this.

Indeed, one the consequences of this combination of factors is that "[i]nterethnic relations [in the Sudan] are coloured by the historic conflict between Arabs and [the African population]. Southern Sudan was one of the principal catchment areas of the Arab slave trade, and the memories of Arab indignities and slave raids linger in the South. Islam, with its strong assimilationist tendencies, poses a continuing threat to the fragile social structure of the black tribes" (The Encyclopaedia of the Third World, 1992, 3:1800). This process has been met with resistance in the South. Over the years this resistance has grown into a sentiment favouring a separate entity for the south of the country, which arose "as a result both of the colonial policy and of differences between the North and the South, some of which are natural and some man-made. History, economic disparity between North and South, mistakes and blunders of inexperienced politicians and the activities of the missionary societies - each have contributed to the problem" (Beshir, M., 1968, 101). Particularly, the aspiration to an Arab-Islamic cultural identity among Northern Sudanese is "directly linked to the institutionalised discrimination against non-Arab peoples. The Northerners' sense of social prestige – in the face of discrimination from ‘purer' Arabs in Egypt and the Gulf – is defended by looking down upon the ethnic groups further south and west" (Verney P., 1995). All of these factors have contributed to a sense of common identity among the southerners, distinct from the one in the North.

The colonial period in the history of the Sudan (1898-1955) was characterised by "mildness and political conservatism"; as a result, "Sudanese cultures were only superficially affected by colonisation, and economic change was not accompanied by massive social restructuring as in other areas of the continent. British colonialism was perceived as quite mild, respectful of Islam (or of the native cultures in the South). . .. The Southern Policy was intended by the British to give the Southern Sudanese protection against their Northern neighbours" (Prunier G., January 1996).

Even before the British administration, at the very outset of the "opening" of the South in the 1840's, the inhabitants of this area began developing an understanding of their common fate vis-a-vis both, the Turco-Egyptians, invading from Egypt, and the Northern Arabs. Later, "with the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium at the end of the [nineteenth] century, the externally imposed identity of the South came more into focus. The colonial administration policy was tailored in a way as to treat southern Sudan as a single region, insulated from political and economic developments in the North . . . The colonial administration made the South a closed area, and outsiders needed permission to reside or travel there. The British believed that cutting the three southern provinces from the rest of Sudan would make their eventual assimilation into a greater East African federation under British control easier " (Cuny F., 1992, 390-391). The British colonial administration "had left a country hastily sewed together, in which mutually hostile communities tried to settle their disputes by resorting to force. It was virtually inevitable that, when the British abdicated, the northerners being the strongest of the two sections of the Sudanese people, should attempt to assimilate the South by force. This in turn made the rise of a southern resistance and separatist movement inevitable (Premdas R., 1990, 129, 130).

The evolution of the North and the South as distinct separate parts and their uneven levels of economic and social growth, exacerbated by policies of the foreign administration of Sudan in the nineteenth century are a valuable context to an understanding of the diversity and complications that the development of the country as a single entity presents today. Yet the impression that may be gained from historical accounts is remarkably void of the belligerent attitudes of animosity that on the surface appear to underlie the relations between Muslims and Christians in the country today. For example, S.Trimingham in his book on Islam in the Sudan writes that by the end of the fourteenth century

the majority of the population were still Christians, but . . . Arab immigration became a flood and the tribes poured southward to the richer lands beyond the inhospitable Nubian stretch which had up till now acted as a barrier. This immigration was seldom undertaken by organised masses with a definite territorial aim, but by separate tribes or sections with an ill-defined aim of living their nomadic life in the environment best suited to it . . . The Arabs, having no racial prejudices, intermarried freely with the indigenous inhabitants (1965, 71).

The problems between the North and the South of the country thus cannot be reduced to questions of religion alone. It is indeed the "religiously sanctioned Arab cultural and political domination and an armed politico-cultural rejection of the same by the Black Africans" (Prunier G., 1996, 2) that is at the root of the past and current conflict if the Sudan, and which has, over the past years and decades, been threatening its existence as a unified nation-state. Another author refers to the situation in the Sudan as "a clash of incompatible cultures, which historical mischance has placed under the same flag" (Viorst M., May/June 1995, 50). The core issue is that of different identities in the North and the South of the Sudan and the different alternatives they offer the country. The main problem over the years has been the inability to find an answer to the question of whether the currently existing and different identities can be resolved within the framework of unity (Deng F., 1995, 100).

2.1   Post-colonial history, the Addis Ababa agreement and the return to war

Post-independent Sudan has been characterised by the weakness of parliamentary politics combined with successive military regimes (1958-64, 1969-1985, 1989 onwards) accompanied by conflict in the South from 1956 until 1972, and from 1983 up until today. The conflict is, as mentioned above, rooted in attempts by the North to Islamize the entire country, a process started immediately after independence and met with armed resistance in the South. Attempts by Southern Sudanese to provide a better organisational base to counter the politics of the North (for instance, with the creation in exile of the Sudan African National Union) quickly faltered with fragmentation usually occurring along tribal lines.

Two particular episodes of recent history of the Sudan merit special attention. In 1969, a bloodless coup d'etat brought to power a young general, Jaafar al-Nimeiri who three years later signed the February 1972 Addis Ababa agreement granting autonomy to the South's provinces under a single regional authority. This was the first serious attempt to give constitutional guarantees for the South's autonomy. A new administrative structure was to be set up for the South, including a legislature, an executive organ, a regional administration and district administrations. The regional government was made responsible for the preservation of public order, internal security, administration, and development in the cultural, economic and social fields (Tvedt T., 1994, 71). The agreement was the product of a particular situation where President al-Nimeiri had just survived a coup d'etat attempt by his Communist allies and the Southern resistance found unity under the control of J. Lanu with support from Israel. There were also other conditions favouring settlement (Rothchild D., Hartzell C., 1993, 68-77). The Addis Ababa agreement was "one of the rare cases in which Africa's internal conflicts were resolved by peaceful negotiations, [and] it was propagated as a model for solving similar conflicts in Africa and the Third World in general" (Harir S., 1994, 11). However, the accord had certain weaknesses, such as the failure to define the limits of the central government in its relations with the South, which thereby undermined the agreement's future.

Developments in the late 1970s' were described by the Minority Rights Group as President "Nimeiri's incremental betrayal of the south" (April 1988, 5). The ever-increasing dependence of the President on the traditional, conservative Islamic parties (Muslim Brothers, Ansar religious sect, Umma Party) as well as divisions among the southerners eventually led to the decision by President al-Nimeiri to dissolve the regional government in the South provided for in the Addis Ababa agreement and divide the one region in the South into three regions. This latter decision, implemented in May 1983, was dictated by the desire to prevent the domination of the South by one ethnic group (i.e. the Dinka) (Africa South of the Sahara, 1993, 814). In September 1983, President al-Nimeiri's "September laws" outlined a revision of the Penal Code in order to link it "organically and spiritually" with the Islamic law of the Shari'a. This decision by the President "marked the formal institutionalisation of Sudan's Islamic path" which "fragmented more than unified the Sudan, generating opposition among many sectors of society who regarded him as little more than an Islamic dictator", leading to the resumption of the war in the South (Esposito J., 1992, 88-90).

The second episode relates to the years 1985-89 when civilian rule in the country was restored and parliament reconstituted. The new government of Sadiq al-Mahdi (Umma party) distanced itself from former President al-Nimeiri's Islamization programme, but was never able to resolve the issue of Islamic law. The participation of the National Islamic Front (NIF) in the ruling coalition "ensured that the government was prevented from further dismantling Islamic laws passed under Nimeiri or from adopting a more conciliatory approach to the country's southern problem" (Islam and Islamic Groups, 1992, 227). There were increasing reports of human rights violations by the government, in particular atrocities committed against civilians in the war in the South. Human rights organisations expressed concern over the apparent resurgence of slavery in the Sudan and the retention of corporal punishments prescribed by Shari'a law (Africa South of the Sahara, 1996, 929).

2.2   The advent of the National Islamic Front (NIF)

Widespread discontent with continued lack of progress in resolving the civil conflict one way or another (complete victory over the South or negotiated peace with unity of the country), especially in military circles, accompanied by severe economic problems, contributed to the deepening of the internal crisis in the Sudan in 1988-89. This crisis lead to overtures by certain members of the Northern polity towards representatives of the South and in 1989 peace with the South looked increasingly likely (Prunier G., January 1996). A meeting of peace delegations was scheduled for early August 1989 in Addis Ababa, but was pre-empted by a bloodless minority coup d'etat, staged by a small group of army officers affiliated with the NIF. Led by Brig.Gen. Omar al-Bashir, the new rulers quickly removed the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi from power and formed a 15-member Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC) which declared its primary aim to be the resolution of the Southern conflict (Africa South of the Sahara, 1996, 930). The sincerity of this proclamation has subsequently been questioned by some observers since the "decision of the NIF to take power was a radical move to try to prevent [negotiating with the South] what was felt by many of its activists as a betrayal of the true nature (i.e. Arabo-Islamic) of the Sudan" (Prunier G., January 1996).

A brief review of the National Islamic Front reveals that the NIF is invariably described as

an ideological movement that seeks comprehensive reform of Muslim society for the establishment of a just social order centred on faith. For the NIF, Islam provides a comprehensive belief system that organises an all-encompassing way of life. It delineates a vision of the past and the future, and prescribes all social organisation and norms of daily existence. The relevance of faith is not confined to the arena of individual morality, but is also integral to the conduct of socio-economic and political relationships. This holistic world view negates any separation between religion and politics (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, July 1996, 20).

In 1987, the NIF published its national charter which contained a description of proposals concerning the future of the South of the Sudan. In an admission of southern realities, the NIF accepted the right of all citizens, regardless of religion, to hold public office, advocated freedom of conscience and equality before the law, stating that in a federal state, non-Muslim regions would be allowed to opt out of the Islamic legal system. Later, the leader of the NIF and the "mastermind of the Sudanese Government" (New York Times, 6 December 1994), Hassan al-Turabi, stated that once the civil war was settled, the South would be offered regional control of the administration of criminal law and would not be required to punish for the consumption of alcohol or carry out capital punishment for theft (Warbung G., 1995, 231).

After it's advent to power, the NIF rapidly established it's control through a network of locally-based Popular Committees (al-Lisan ash-Shabiya), which fulfilled the dual purpose of conducting local monitoring and observation for the new regime in every neighbourhood of the country, while rooting themselves in the socio-economic reality of the land by serving as conduits for the distribution of price-controlled basic necessity goods such as cooking oil, flour and sugar (Prunier, G., January 1996, 26). These committees caused many citizens to be wary of neighbours who could report on them for "suspicious" activities, including "excessive" contact with foreigners. The committees also furnished or withheld documents essential for obtaining an exit visa (U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996, 1997).

Following protests from the regular police about unlawful use of police powers by these committees, the government introduced the semi-regular People's Police Force – whose recruits are nominated by the committees – to exercise police powers now removed from the committees. This force formed part of an intricate network that included the Public Order and Behaviour Police which appears to have originally been conceived of as a "moral" brigade intended to enforce the provisions of the Public Order Law of Khartoum State promulgated in 1992. The last addition to the network was made in 1993 when the Ministry of Interior of the Sudan established a Deployment of Comprehensive Security Plan, and an official police force with the same name (Human Rights Watch, May 1996). The creation of the People's Police and the Deployment of Comprehensive Security Police and the dilution of police powers would bring about better control of the population in the residential areas and neutralise political opposition to the regime at that level. In addition, the Public Order, Comprehensive Security and People's Police forces appear to have the combined task of ensuring a gradual tightening of religiously-based controls on Sudanese society (Ibid.).

In parallel, at the military level, legislation was quickly enacted which legalised militias under the umbrella authority of Difaa esh-Shabiyi or Popular Defence Forces (PDF), which through massive recruitment was boosted to a force of several hundred thousand, designed to become a politically-motivated army in competition with the regular forces (Prunier G., January 1996, 27).

The impact of the years of NIF rule has been devastating on the country, adding more pain to what was already a war-torn country. The Economist in 1993 reached the conclusion that, "four years after taking power in an Islamist-backed coup, Sudan's leadership have gone the rhetorical leap beyond other Islamic revolutions, adopting the concept of jihad as a domestic and foreign policy. It is at once a slogan and a raison d'etre, a way of defining their regime in terms of the hostility they perceive - and encourage or invent - in the outside world" (7 August 1993). This policy of "Islamization and Arabization of the society aims at defining a new uniform national identity, based on the interpretation of Islam by the National Islamic Front. Islam in Sudan is used in a way to obtain and secure political and economic power. In an ethnically, religiously and culturally pluriform society such as Sudan, this policy inevitably leads to a culture of intolerance. Practices such as forced conversion, ethnic cleansing and impregnation of women are regarded as legitimate political means" (Pax Christi International, January 1994, 7).

Today, three years later, the "Sudanese government no longer finds a need to resort to such drastic measures [as blatant human rights violations] on a comprehensive scale characteristic of the early years of the regime. There is, however, ample evidence of pervasive government restrictions on the right of Sudanese citizens to enjoy freedom of expression, opinion, religion, association and movement. The Sudanese government has criminalized political and ideological dissent, engages multi-faceted security forces to monitor citizens' behaviour, and has installed a system of reward and punishments based on adherence to government policies and public observance of government-approved Islamic practices. Though more subtle than mass arrests and summary executions, these control mechanisms are equally debilitating to the fundamental freedoms of Sudanese citizens" (Lawyers Committee on Human Rights, June 1996, 3).

In an attempt to legitimise it's rule, at least in form, the NIF organised presidential and parliamentary elections in March 1996 which it easily won in an atmosphere of boycott by the opposition, political parties being banned since 1989, with severe restrictions on free speech, assembly and association (Reuters, 19 March 1996).

2.3   Conflict in the South and the SPLA

The conflict in the South has continued unabated since 1983. The imposition of the Shari'a law in September 1983 caused "many non-Muslims, who comprise at least one-third of the population, to argue that they were henceforth second class citizens in the eyes of the law in their own country" (Daly et al., 1993, vii). The reintroduction of the Shari'a in a militant form in 1991 reflected the "radical agenda" of the NIF government to "convert Sudan into a totalitarian Islamic state. Sudan's thirty million citizens would be ranked according to religion, sect, political affiliation and sex and granted or deprived of rights accordingly" (Human Rights Watch, 1993, 51).

The main force fighting the government in the South is the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the armed wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), headed by John Garang. This movement emerged as part of the Anya-Nya II southern secessionist movement in November 1983 with grievances related to the fact that President al-Nimeiri had abrogated the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement; that Islamic law had been imposed on the non-Moslem South; and that the natural resources of southern Sudan had been "stolen" by the central government (Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, 1991, 323). According to the SPLM/SPLA Manifesto of 1983, the movement is "convinced of the correctness of its socialist orientation. The SPLM/SPLA programme is based on the objective realities of the Sudan and provides a correct solution to the nationality and religious questions within the context of United Sudan, thereby preventing the country from an otherwise inevitable disintegration". The ultimate objective was the creation of a ‘New Sudan' which, as the SPLM/SPLA wrote in 1989, "is a concept which strives to establish a new cultural order in the country. It takes as its point of departure the notion that the human beings in any society have equal rights and obligations regardless of race, beliefs, colour, etc. The establishment of the new Sudan cultural order demands of necessity a radical restructuring of state power to establish genuine democracy and to follow a path of development that will lead to far-reaching social change" (quoted in Mohamed Salih M.A., 1994, 197). The important issue that reflected the main position of the SPLA was its stance in favour of a united ‘New Sudan'.

Throughout it's brief history the SPLA has suffered numerous reverses in its fortunes, from controlling nearly all of the South of the Sudan, to almost total military defeat by the government army in 1993, to renewed prominence at the head of the recent anti-government offensive of the united opposition under the umbrella of the National Democratic Alliance. Over the past decade and a half, there have been several high level defections by leaders of the SPLA to form new movements with similar or differing agendas (Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), SPLA-united (two factions), SPLA-Bahr al-Ghazal, etc.) with subsequent armed conflict between the factions. Some of the defectors eventually returned into the ranks of the SPLA. SPLA-Mainstream, as J. Garang's main part of the movement has become known, as well as other splinter groups, have been accused of gross human rights violations against civilians during the war against the government and especially in the inter-factional fighting between the different movements of the SPLA. The SPLA has been reportedly been receiving support from Uganda, and, at times, Tanzania (Indian Ocean Newsletter, 11 November 1995).

Two of the splinter factions of the SPLA, the SSIM and the SPLA-Bahr al-Ghazal, have signed in April 1996 a "peace charter" with the Government of the Sudan. The Charter favours the preservation of the unity of the Sudan, but allows for a referendum to enable the people in the South to determine their political aspirations (Reuters, 10 April 1996). Defections to the SSIM from the SPLA continued as recently as December 1996, when a group of SPLA officers decided to join the SSIM (Indian Ocean Newsletter, 14 December 1996).

There have been numerous attempts to mediate in the conflict between the North and the South, most notably those of the Inter-Governmental Agency on Drought and Development (IGADD, now known as IGAD), an inter-governmental forum which comprises Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Djibouti and the Sudan. All these efforts have thus far been unsuccessful in bringing about a peaceful solution to the conflict.

3.   RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In June 1995, a conference of Sudanese opposition forces, under the umbrella of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) agreed on forming a common front against the Government of the Sudan which, as it claimed, represented the "beginning of the end" for the authorities in Khartoum (Reuters, 24 June 1995). The conference was held in Asmara, Eritrea, and brought together 11 groups from both the North and the South, including the Democratic Union Party, the Umma party, the SPLA, and the Beja Congress. The revival of the NDA, founded in 1989, was crowned by the creation of a politico-military committee and by a joint programme for reorganising the country. Despite internal disagreements within the NDA, especially on the issues of the status of the South, the participants at the NDA conference issued a communiqué stating a common position that "the right of self-determination is a basic human democratic and people's right" and that a referendum in the South should offer the options of independent statehood or unity with the North under a federation or confederation" (Ibid.). SPLA leader J.Garang noted that the NDA demanded to "take over" the peace process organised by the IGADD states (Reuters, 25 June 1995).

The decisions of the conference were aimed at "opening up new fronts (in the East or the West, or both) and preparing for a revolutionary insurrection in the North" (Indian Ocean Newsletter, 1 July 1995). Some 18 months later, in December 1996, the situation seemed right for implementing this plan of action.

Since early December 1996, a new, and what appears to be, decisive offensive has been staged by the NDA against the NIF-led Government in Khartoum. The significantly differing aspects of this offensive reflect the decision of the NDA to advance on several fronts from the East and the South. At the beginning of 1997, representatives of the NDA in the Eritrean capital, Asmara, announced that their operations have extended to cover five fronts in the Sudan (UNDP/EUE, 20 January 1997). Within a month the SPLA troops, co-ordinating their attacks with NDA forces, captured the border towns of Kurmuk and Qassein, close to the city of Damazin and in the immediate proximity of Sudan's largest hydroelectric power station at Roseires which is the main supplier of electricity to the capital (Reuters, 13 January 1997). The following day, new victories were claimed by the forces of the NDA/SPLA (Reuters, 14 January 1997). The Government of the Sudan declared a "holy war", called for a general mobilisation against the attacks and Khartoum University was closed to allow students to join government armed forces (The Times, 16 January 1997). The capital itself seemed quiet with no real signs of a war taking place in the country (Reuters, 21 January 1997).

"The battle for Sudan has begun", wrote Africa Confidential in an article reviewing recent developments (31 January 1997). The newsletter had predicted "a major confrontation between the Sudanese opposition and the National Islamic Front government" almost a year ago (12 April 1996). The strategy of the opposition as outlined above is to combine attacks from different directions with an uprising in the capital. As the Indian Ocean Newsletter wrote on 1 February 1997, "[i]t now seems unlikely that the Sudanese rebels are out to capture Damazin . . . The strategy seems to be to hit the government forces with everything they've got in order to rouse the countryside against the Khartoum regime" (1 February 1997).

The Sudanese authorities have accused Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda of direct support of the latest rebel attacks, blaming the United Nations and calling the offensive an "imperialist, Western Zionist Ethiopian Tigrayan Ugandan plot" (Africa Confidential, 31 January 1997). Sudan claims that Ethiopian troops directly participated in the invasion (Reuters, 13 January 1997). Despite respective rebuttals by the countries mentioned, there is evidence of at least indirect support for the rebels from these countries. Relations between Sudan and Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda have been strained for a number of years, with mutual accusations of support for each others anti-government movements. This time, however, there is "little question that the [NDA/SPLA] rebels operate with the backing of both countries [Eritrea and Ethiopia], which have allowed them to set up bases and have given them logistic assistance". This has been described as "a new turn" in the 14-year old conflict (The International Herald Tribune, 5 February 1997). The line of support extends further as the United States is reportedly extending nearly $20 million of military aid to Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda to help them against Sudan in what the Economist described as "Africa's new proxy wars (8-14 February 1997). At the same time, the United States Government denies it is seeking a change in the Sudanese Government (Reuters, 6 January 1997). Egyptian President H.Mubarak promised during a recent visit of the head of the Sudanese political opposition S. al- Mahdi to Cairo that he would support several Arab countries (such as Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and even Libya) which had in the past wished to assist the National Democratic Alliance but had been discouraged from doing so by Cairo (Indian Ocean Newsletter, 11 January 1997), despite the fact that Sudan has been directly linked to the assassination attempt on the life of the Egyptian President in Addis Ababa in the summer of 1995. However, despite all the animosity that exists between the Sudan and its neighbours, it appears that there is little interest among these countries to see a division of the Sudan (Tribune de Geneve, 1-2 fevrier 1997).

By portraying the recent attacks of the rebels as an foreign plot against the country, the Government of the Sudan is attempting to mobilise what is left of support for the Sudan in Arab countries. Syria and Jordan have responded with strong statements (The Economist, 25 January 1997). Iraq apparently condemned what it called "an Ethiopian aggression" (Tribune de Geneve, 18-19 janvier 1997), and Iran declared its support for the territorial integrity of Sudan (Reuters, 29 January 1997). At the same time, the overall failure of the Sudan to gain support from neighbouring Arab countries in its fight against opposition forces was considered to be the "price it is paying for backing radical Islamic groups in these countries" (Financial Times, 29 January 1997).

The renewed fighting has caused thousands of Sudanese to seek refuge abroad. On 8 January 1996, Reuters reported the arrival of more than 4,000 refugees in Ethiopia.

The recent attacks by the SPLA together with the NDA Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF) from the territory of Ethiopia seems to have taken the Government of Sudan by surprise. Indeed, before these recent events it appeared that the goals of the participants in the NDA were too diverse to allow for a united military action, and the SPLA did not seem to be in a position to lead these attacks after its lack of success over the previous several months.

During the second half of January 1997 the military situation appears to have somewhat stabilised, although there are reports of new fighting on the Uganda border (Reuters, 26 January 1997), denied several days later by the SPLA (Reuters, 29 January 1997).

The authorities in Khartoum have been holding in detention "scores" of government critics suspected of planning an insurgency in the capital in co-ordination with the NDA. Among the detainees were members of the Umma and DUP parties (Reuters, 29 January 1997). Even though one report indicated the release of two of these detainees, it said that the "arrests are the most revealing evidence so far of how seriously the Islamic government in Khartoum is taking the rebel forces threat to engineer its overthrow by stirring up a rebellion in the capital rather than besieging the city from outside (Financial Times, 9 February 1997). However, Jane's Foreign Report claimed that "even though the regime [in Khartoum] has suffered reverses on the battlefield, full-scale war between Sudan and its neighbours is unlikely. . . The fate of Turabi and his followers will probably be decided among the Sudanese Muslims themselves (23 January 1997). Africa Confidential appears to support this view stating that "[w]eapons will not solve the government's problem, which is popular anger. During a five-hour power cut last week, people thought Roseires dam had been taken and began coming onto the streets to celebrate. Last September's protests were called off because the NDA was not ready. This time, the people may not wait - whatever the opposition's military position (31 January 1997).

4.   INTERNATIONAL and NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Sudan is a state party, among others, to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol since 22 February 1974; the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights since 18 March 1986; the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment since 4 June 1986; the 1965 Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination since 21 March 1977; the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child (acceded to on 24 July 1990); the 1981 African Charter on Human and People's Rights since 18 February 1986.

The following information on the Constitution of the Sudan and its judicial system has been compiled on the basis of information from Africa South of the Sahara for 1997 (1996) and complimented by excerpts from a report by the U.S. Lawyers Committee on Human Rights (July 1996).

After the coup d'etat of 6 April 1985, the Constitution of April 1973 was suspended, pending the drafting and promulgation of a new Constitution. A transitional Constitution, approved in October 1985, was suspended following the coup d'etat of 30 June 1989. The country has been ruled since on the basis of "Constitutional Decrees". Political parties are banned.

The judicial system was until 1983 divided into two sections, civil and Islamic, the latter dealing only with personal and family matters. In September 1983, President Nimeiri revoked all existing laws in favour of a new system of Islamic (Shari'a) law. Under the provisions of the new penal code, alcohol consumption and gambling were prohibited, while imprisonment was in part replaced by dismemberment and the death sentence was increasingly resorted to for an expanded number of offences. Crimes of murder were henceforth judged in accordance with the Koran. Following the coup d'etat of 1985, the Shari'a courts were abolished, and it was announced that the previous system of criminal courts was to be abolished. Islamic law was reintroduced in March 1991, but was not applied in the southern states of Equatoria, Bahr al-Ghazal and the Upper Nile.

The Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure are deemed to fall short of international norms. Serious concerns remain at to the independence of the judiciary and the legal profession.

The National Security Act of 1994, as amended by the Transitional National Assembly in 1995 (TNA, the provisional legislative body established in 1986 and replaced by the National Assembly after the March 1996 elections), provided the security forces with leverage to operate largely outside of the law (Lawyers Committee on Human Rights, July 1996, 45). Provisions of the National Security Act appears to violate the international prohibition on arbitrary arrest and detention and do not permit prompt review by a judicial authority of the reasons for detention, preventing judicial review for periods of up to six months of often incommunicado detention, while pre-empting proceedings against any officials responsible for human rights violations. The National Security Act also is deemed to violate international law in that it does not provide for any effective supervision of security detention, particularly in unacknowledged places of detention, known as "ghost houses". It permits a situation in which torture and disappearance may occur unchecked (Human Rights Watch, May 1996).

The 1989 Special Courts Act created special security courts to judge a wide range of offences, including violations of constitutional decrees, emergency regulations, some sections of the penal code, as well as drug and currency offences. Special courts, on which both military and civilian judges sit, handle most security related cases (Country Reports for 1996, 1997).

Public Order Courts were created by order of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to provide a fast track for the administration of justice under public order laws and related regulations. Public Order Courts were to provide speedy justice, but defendants are generally denied due process (Human Rights Watch, May 1996).

5.   THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

5.1   The General Situation

Reports covering events in the Sudan in the past months and years are strikingly similar in their assessment of the situation in the country, especially when it comes to descriptions of the policies adopted by the leadership of the country and its human rights record.

One of the most recent descriptions of the human rights situation in the Sudan was provided by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on the Sudan, in October 1996. In his report, the Special Rapporteur stated that during 1996 he

continued to receive reports and information on grave and widespread violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by government agents, and abuses and atrocities against the life, liberty and security of individuals committed by members of different groups fighting against the Government in the areas controlled by them or the conflict zones. Indeed, the frequency and seriousness of these reports underline that since April 1996 the situation of human rights in the Sudan, in certain areas, has deteriorated at an unprecedented pace as compared to previous years (14 October 1996, 17).

The violation of political and civil rights in the Sudan, according to Human Rights Watch, "remains the norm almost seven years after the elected government was toppled by a military coup backed by the National Islamic Front (NIF) party. A state of emergency was imposed on the date of the coup, June 30, 1989, which has never been lifted. The transitional constitution of 1985 was abolished and although elections for president and some members of the assembly were held in 1996, these elections were held without political parties, which remained banned since the 1989 coup, and in a climate of denial of basic freedoms of speech, assembly, and association, with the threat of arbitrary arrest by an ever-present security apparatus and detention with possible torture or ill-treatment" (Human Rights Watch, May 1996). In a subsequent report, Human Rights Watch added that the "civil war. . .continued to be the context of massive human rights violations, including indiscriminate attacks on civilians and refusal of relief access to the needy, arbitrary detentions, mistreatment, and torture" (December 1996).

In the views of another source, "[t]he human rights record [in 1996] remained extremely poor, as both the Government and insurgents committed serious human rights abuses. Government forces were responsible for extrajudicial killings, disappearances, forced labour, slavery, and forced conscription of children. Government security forces regularly harassed, arbitrarily arrested and detained, tortured, and beat opponents or suspected opponents with impunity. Prison conditions are harsh, and the judiciary is largely subservient to the Government. The authorities do not ensure due process, and the military forces summarily tried and punished citizens (U.S.Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996, 1997). The situation in Sudan has, over the years, received wide-ranging condemnation from the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the U.S.Congress, the European Community, and the Vatican, in addition to numerous reports by international human rights organisations.

This human rights situation in 1996 remained largely unchanged compared to previous years. It has to be noted though that the Government of the Sudan resumed co-operation with some human rights monitors in 1996, allowing the U.N. Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on the Sudan and the Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance to visit areas under the Government's control. Also, slightly greater press freedom was reported by Human Rights Watch before the March 1996 elections (December 1996). The U.S. Department of State too acknowledged in its annual report on human rights practices that in 1996 "the Government [of the Sudan] began to implement international conventions and basic human rights practices" (Country Reports for 1996, 1997).

The response by the authorities of the Sudan to the accusations of human rights violations is, in the words of the Chairman of Sudan's Human Rights Committee, a government body, that "most cases of torture and abuse were committed by security individuals in breach of the law" (Reuters, 10 July 1996). The NIF leader al-Turabi replies to allegations of Sudan's indifference to human rights by saying that "[i]n many respects, Sudan recognises that it has not achieved the model it set for itself. Sudan is going through a transition, and at times like these, of course, we haven't the capacity to observe normal procedures. How do you expect a complex country like ours, which is economically in very bad shape and politically in a state of civil war, to maintain a constitutional system without some limitations on liberty? We admit we've tipped too far toward government control; we need more freedom. But we haven't forgotten the model, and we are working actively to attain it" (Viorst M., May/June 1995, 54). A report by the Government of the Sudan to the U.N.Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 1994 spoke of "many positive constitutional developments in the field that have taken place in the Sudan [which] have already had a marked impact on the enjoyment of human rights in many parts of the Sudan, particularly in the war-affected areas in the south and in western Sudan (4 May 1994).

In contrast, human rights monitors have provided voluminous descriptions of human rights abuses in the Sudan a simple review of which would have to cover many pages. The narration below provides a summary of the main areas of discrimination. Violations of the political rights of Sudanese citizens have been described in the previous paragraphs and in the section related to the National Islamic Front.

5.2   Ethnic discrimination

The Government of the Sudan continues to discriminate against ethnic minorities in "almost every aspect of society" (Country Reports for 1996, 1997). This includes discrimination in education, employment and other areas, including language discrimination.

With regard to the treatment of ethnic minorities, the Sunday Times (London) reported in 1992 that "the [ruling] junta's jihad of cultural genocide shares many of the hallmarks of Yugoslav 'ethnic cleansing'. Villages are systematically razed; young Nuba boys from central Sudan are shipped to Khartoum to be educated as Muslims while their parents are held in detention camps; men from the Dinka tribe who enter government-held towns in search for food risk execution unless they allow themselves to be circumcised. Anyone who attempts to prevent their children being educated as a Muslim is threatened with death" (1 November 1992).

Amnesty International issued a report on 19 February 1993 that highlights the abuses against the Nuba in the Sudan. Its report stated that there were "especially disturbing reports of mass killings in the remote Nuba mountains - where the government is engaged in military action which appears to amount to 'ethnic cleansing'. . .The most recent reports claim that hundreds of civilians have been extrajudicially executed in the Nuba Mountains in late December 1992 and early January 1993". The human rights organisation accused the authorities of being "flagrant in their disregard of human rights", while at the same time also accusing the SPLA of serious human rights violations (1993). The plight of the Nuba was also described at length in an African Rights publication of July 1995, entitled "Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan". This report called the Government's policy towards the Nuba as "genocide by attrition" (July 1995, 9). There were also reports that this particular minority was the target for slavery, with "government troops and PDF militias capturing and enslaving women and children in army-sponsored raids on southern and Nuban villages" (Human Rights Watch, December 1996, 57).

5.3   Religious Persecution

Freedom of religion for non-Muslims has been "interfered with or denied in many ways, and non-Muslims have been discriminated against on account of religion" (Human Rights Watch, July 1996, 193). In Government-controlled areas of the South, there continued to be credible evidence of a policy of Islamization of public institutions (Country Reports for 1996, 1997). It seems, however, that the Government in Khartoum has not applied Shari'a law in the southern provinces (Prunier G., January 1996, 1).

Since 1957, successive Sudanese governments have effected programmes of Islamisation of the country's administrative and judicial systems (Encyclopaedia of the Third World, 1987, 3:1836). The war between 1955 and 1972 attests to the state of affairs where Islamic pressure intended to turn Christians into second class citizens (The World in Conflict, 1989 War Annual, 1989, 215).

Sunni Islam, introduced in the 14th century, is the official religion and is followed by 70% of the population. In Sudanese society, organised into small-scale family, clan, lineage, or tribal groups, "Islam, represented by Sufi holy men and privileged religious lineages or Sufi brotherhoods, plays a role of defining, symbolising, and organising these small groups, either within or across kinship lines, to create coalitions, alliances, and new political movements among otherwise unrelated peoples", all of whom "depend on Islamic religious teachers for organisation" (Burke E., Lapidus I., 1988, 7). Yet, with the exception of the Arabs, Islam has not totally replaced the vestiges and observances of earlier, traditional forms of belief. The roughly four million people of the southern provinces adhere mainly to indigenous, animistic beliefs, and have long resisted any Islamization. Christianity is followed by approximately 5% of the population, most of them concentrated among the Dinka in the south (Encyclopaedia of the Third World, 1992, 1800-1801).

On religious persecution in general, the Sudan Monitor reported that "non-Muslims in the Sudan are tolerated provided they are not conspicuous. By conspicuous is meant an individual who is successful, vocal or otherwise highly visible due to his/her occupation or position in society. Typical examples are: church leaders, regional administrators, businessmen, politicians, professionals" (1 July 1990). Furthermore, "there is a direct correlation between one's degree of success, if from a minority religious group, and one's risk of persecution, for non-Muslims as well as Muslims with secular ideas. For example, a successful professional from a minority religious group could be at the same risk level as a Muslim secularist stating his/her opinion openly" (Ibid.). All other discriminatory practices of the current regime against non-Muslim communities seem to continue unabated - notably in the fields of education, health care and employment (Country Reports for 1996, 1997).

The above can be substantiated by other reports, including a U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service report which concluded in 1993 that "as it was imposed in Sudan, Shari'a included provisions that were unacceptable to non-Muslims, and to a substantial portion of Sudan's Muslim population. National institutions with non-Muslim employees, including the military, were subject to Islamic law. Non-Muslims living outside the southern region were liable for severe punishment for actions that are not considered criminal in most secular and Sudanese Christian and traditional religious practices, such as drinking or selling alcohol. The form of the Shari'a penal code adopted in 1983 included provisions allowing forms of corporal punishment (hudud) such as amputation of limbs, flogging, stoning, beheading, and crucifixion" (February 1993, 7).

Christian churches in the Sudan "have been subjected to Government intrusion into the organisation of their religious affairs. Christian priests have been arrested on specious charges, and church leaders have been denied their right to freedom of movement" (Human Rights Watch, May 1996, 204).

5.4   Freedom of the Press

The U.S. Department of State described the state of freedom of opinion in the media during 1996 thus: "The Government severely curtails freedom of speech and press. Government intimidation and surveillance, fostered in part by an informer network, continued to inhibit open, public discussion of political issues. Radio, television, and much of the media are controlled directly by the Government and are required to reflect government and NIF policies" (Country Reports for 1996, 1997). The slightly greater press freedom allowed just before the elections in March 1996 appears to have ended quickly after the elections. The last independent newspaper, "Al Rai Al Akhar", was closed by the authorities in July 1996 (Human Rights Watch, December 1996, 55).

5.5   Women and Children

Perhaps more than other groups, non-Arab, non-Muslim women of lower socio-economic status, in particular from war-stricken areas of South and Central (Nuba Mountains) Sudan are targeted particularly for human rights violations (The Fund for Peace, July 1995). Women may suffer discrimination on the basis of some aspects of the law and traditional practices and there are widespread occurrences of rape (Amnesty International, January 1995). A considerable number of children has suffered serious abuse, including enslavement and forced conscription in war zones (Le Monde, 17 fevrier 1995; Country Reports for 1996, 1997). There are numerous indications of slavery-like practices in the Sudan carried out by both, the Government and the SPLA, involving women and children (Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/24,19 July 1996).

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Statistical Tables

Table 1   Asylum applications and decisions (Origin: all nationalities)

Country	Status 1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total
Austria	Applications	22,790	27,310	16,240	4,750	5,080	5,920	82,090
	Conv. status	860	2,470	2,290	1,200	680	990	8,490
	Rejections	11,780	17,220	21,200	14,200	8,340	6,630	79,370
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	Applications	12,960	15,170	17,650	26,880	14,350	11,420	98,430
	Conv. status	680	600	760	1,040	1,510	1,300	5,890
	Rejections	1,150	1,680	2,010	2,520	3,270	2,750	13,380
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Denmark	Applications	5,290	4,610	13,880	14,350	6,650	5,100	49,880
	Conv. status	710	990	750	650	540	4,810	8,450
	Rejections	0	0	0	0	0	3,500	3,500
	manitarian	1,400	1,980	2,020	2,090	1,360	14,110	22,960
Finland	Applications	2,730	2,140	3,630	2,020	840	850	12,210
	Conv. status	20	20	10	10	20	0	80
	Rejections	330	630	1,340	1,440	490	270	4,500
	Humanitarian	140	1,700	560	2,070	300	220	4,990
France	Applications	53,070	46,540	26,910	27,570	26,040	20,170	200,300
	Conv. status	13,540	15,980	10,810	9,910	6,210	4,530	60,980
	Rejections	74,510	65,780	27,580	25,580	23,810	24,430	241,690
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Germany	Applications	193,060	256,110	438,190	322,610	127,210	166,950	1,504,130
	Conv. status	6,520	11,600	9,190	16,400	25,580	23,470	92,760
	Rejections	116,270	128,820	163,640	347,990	238,390	114,380	1,109,490
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	3,630	3,630
Greece	Applications	6,170	2,670	1,850	810	1,300	1,310	14,110
	Conv. status	170	120	60	40	90	200	680
	Rejections	2,330	5,210	1,740	710	670	1,050	11,710
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	Applications	3,170	24,450	2,490	1,530	1,430	1,750	34,820
	Conv. status	820	1,200	340	130	300	280	3,070
	Rejections	560	22,590	6,620	1,300	1,390	1,430	33,890
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	Applications	21,210	21,620	17,460	35,400	52,570	29,260	177,520
	Conv. status	690	780	4,820	10,340	6,650	7,980	31,260
	Rejections	9,000	14,540	20,330	15,780	32,150	32,160	123,960
	Humanitarian	860	1,920	6,890	4,660	12,690	10,520	37,540
Norway	Applications	3,960	4,570	5,240	12,880	3,380	1,460	31,490
	Conv. status	110	100	60	50	20	30	370
	Rejections	2,060	2,260	2,880	4,690	2,960	1,410	16,260
	Humanitarian	1,220	1,640	1,040	470	1,770	910	7,050
Portugal	Applications	80	240	690	2,090	730	330	4,160
	Conv. status	40	10	20	40	10	10	130
	Rejections	50	50	0	600	1,700	550	2,950
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	40	30	70
Spain	Applications	8,650	8,140	11,710	12,250	12,000	5,680	58,430
	Conv. status	490	310	540	1,290	630	460	3,720
	Rejections	0	5,480	10,590	16,250	12,210	6,080	50,610
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	230	230
Sweden	Applications	29,350	27,350	84,020	37,580	18,640	9,050	205,990
	Conv. status	2,170	1,400	620	1,050	790	150	6,180
	Rejections	0	0	0	41,420	10,300	5,570	57,290
	Humanitarian	9,220	15,510	8,780	34,720	36,560	3,540	108,330
Switzerland	Applications	35,840	41,560	18,130	24,110	16,130	17,020	152,790
	Conv. status	570	880	1,540	3,830	2,940	2,650	12,410
	Rejections	11,150	28,480	30,130	18,700	18,740	13,460	120,660
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom	Applications	26,200	44,820	24,630	22,350	32,830	43,930	194,760
(cases)	Conv. status	910	490	1,120	1,590	840	1,280	6,230
	Rejections	690	3,360	18,460	10,690	12,650	17,700	63,550
	Humanitarian	2,370	2,190	15,330	11,130	3,650	4,390	39,060
Canada	Applications	36,740	32,350	37,750	20,290	22,010	26,070	175,210
	Conv. status	10,710	19,430	17,440	14,100	15,220	9,610	86,510
	Rejections	3,840	8,870	11,070	11,450	6,440	4,100	45,770
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United States	Applications	73,640	56,310	103,960	143,120	147,610	148,890	673,530
(cases)	Conv. status	4,170	2,110	3,910	5,010	8,250	12,680	36,130
	Rejections	24,160	4,170	6,510	17,980	29,180	13,850	95,850
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Europe	Applications	424,530	527,300	682,720	547,180	319,180	320,200	2,821,110
	Conv. status	28,300	36,950	32,930	47,570	46,810	48,140	240,700
	Rejections	229,880	296,100	306,520	501,870	367,070	231,370	1,932,810
	Humanitarian	15,210	24,940	34,620	55,140	56,370	37,580	223,860
Total North	Applications	110,380	88,660	141,710	163,410	169,620	174,960	848,740
America	Conv. status	14,880	21,540	21,350	19,110	23,470	22,290	122,640
	Rejections	28,000	13,040	17,580	29,430	35,620	17,950	141,620
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Grand total	Applications	534,910	615,960	824,430	710,590	488,800	495,160	3,669,850
	Conv. status	43,180	58,490	54,280	66,680	70,280	70,430	363,340
	Rejections	257,880	309,140	324,100	531,300	402,690	249,320	2,074,430
	Humanitarian	15,210	24,940	34,620	55,140	56,370	37,580	223,860

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 31-May-97

Table 2 Share of asylum countries in total number of applications and decisions (Origin: all nationalities)

Country	Status	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total
Austria	Applications	5.4%	5.2%	2.4%	0.9%	1.6%	1.8%	2.9%
	Conv. status	3.0%	6.7%	7.0%	2.5%	1.5%	2.1%	3.5%
	Rejections	5.1%	5.8%	6.9%	2.8%	2.3%	2.9%	4.1%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Belgium	Applications	3.1%	2.9%	2.6%	4.9%	4.5%	3.6%	3.5%
	Conv. status	2.4%	1.6%	2.3%	2.2%	3.2%	2.7%	2.4%
	Rejections	0.5%	0.6%	0.7%	0.5%	0.9%	1.2%	0.7%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Denmark	Applications	1.2%	0.9%	2.0%	2.6%	2.1%	1.6%	1.8%
	Conv. status	2.5%	2.7%	2.3%	1.4%	1.2%	10.0%	3.5%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%	0.2%
	Humanitarian	9.2%	7.9%	5.8%	3.8%	2.4%	37.5%	10.3%
Finland	Applications	0.6%	0.4%	0.5%	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%
	Conv. status	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%	0.3%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%
	Humanitarian	0.9%	6.8%	1.6%	3.8%	0.5%	0.6%	2.2%
France	Applications	12.5%	8.8%	3.9%	5.0%	8.2%	6.3%	7.1%
	Conv. status	47.8%	43.2%	32.8%	20.8%	13.3%	9.4%	25.3%
	Rejections	32.4%	22.2%	9.0%	5.1%	6.5%	10.6%	12.5%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Germany	Applications	45.5%	48.6%	64.2%	59.0%	39.9%	52.1%	53.3%
	Conv. status	23.0%	31.4%	27.9%	34.5%	54.6%	48.8%	38.5%
	Rejections	50.6%	43.5%	53.4%	69.3%	64.9%	49.4%	57.4%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.7%	1.6%
Greece	Applications	1.5%	0.5%	0.3%	0.1%	0.4%	0.4%	0.5%
	Conv. status	0.6%	0.3%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%	0.3%
	Rejections	1.0%	1.8%	0.6%	0.1%	0.2%	0.5%	0.6%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Italy	Applications	0.7%	4.6%	0.4%	0.3%	0.4%	0.5%	1.2%
	Conv. status	2.9%	3.2%	1.0%	0.3%	0.6%	0.6%	1.3%
	Rejections	0.2%	7.6%	2.2%	0.3%	0.4%	0.6%	1.8%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Netherlands	Applications	5.0%	4.1%	2.6%	6.5%	16.5%	9.1%	6.3%
	Conv. status	2.4%	2.1%	14.6%	21.7%	14.2%	16.6%	13.0%
	Rejections	3.9%	4.9%	6.6%	3.1%	8.8%	13.9%	6.4%
	Humanitarian	5.7%	7.7%	19.9%	8.5%	22.5%	28.0%	16.8%
Norway	Applications	0.9%	0.9%	0.8%	2.4%	1.1%	0.5%	1.1%
	Conv. status	0.4%	0.3%	0.2%	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.2%
	Rejections	0.9%	0.8%	0.9%	0.9%	0.8%	0.6%	0.8%
	Humanitarian	8.0%	6.6%	3.0%	0.9%	3.1%	2.4%	3.1%
Portugal	Applications	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.4%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%
	Conv. status	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.5%	0.2%	0.2%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%
Spain	Applications	2.0%	1.5%	1.7%	2.2%	3.8%	1.8%	2.1%
	Conv. status	1.7%	0.8%	1.6%	2.7%	1.3%	1.0%	1.5%
	Rejections	0.0%	1.9%	3.5%	3.2%	3.3%	2.6%	2.6%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%	0.1%
Sweden	Applications	6.9%	5.2%	12.3%	6.9%	5.8%	2.8%	7.3%
	Conv. status	7.7%	3.8%	1.9%	2.2%	1.7%	0.3%	2.6%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	8.3%	2.8%	2.4%	3.0%
	Humanitarian	60.6%	62.2%	25.4%	63.0%	64.9%	9.4%	48.4%
Switzerland	Applications	8.4%	7.9%	2.7%	4.4%	5.1%	5.3%	5.4%
	Conv. status	2.0%	2.4%	4.7%	8.1%	6.3%	5.5%	5.2%
	Rejections	4.9%	9.6%	9.8%	3.7%	5.1%	5.8%	6.2%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
United Kingdom	Applications	6.2%	8.5%	3.6%	4.1%	10.3%	13.7%	6.9%
	Conv. status	3.2%	1.3%	3.4%	3.3%	1.8%	2.7%	2.6%
	Rejections	0.3%	1.1%	6.0%	2.1%	3.4%	7.7%	3.3%
	Humanitarian	15.6%	8.8%	44.3%	20.2%	6.5%	11.7%	17.4%
Total Europe	Applications	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Conv. status	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Rejections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Humanitarian	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Canada	Applications	33.3%	36.5%	26.6%	12.4%	13.0%	14.9%	20.6%
	Conv. status	72.0%	90.2%	81.7%	73.8%	64.8%	43.1%	70.5%
	Rejections	13.7%	68.0%	63.0%	38.9%	18.1%	22.8%	32.3%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
United States	Applications	66.7%	63.5%	73.4%	87.6%	87.0%	85.1%	79.4%
	Conv. status	28.0%	9.8%	18.3%	26.2%	35.2%	56.9%	29.5%
	Rejections	86.3%	32.0%	37.0%	61.1%	81.9%	77.2%	67.7%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total North	Applications	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
America	Conv. status	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Rejections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 31-May-97

Table 3 Total number of asylum applications and decisions (Origin: Sudan)

Country	Status	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total
Austria	Applications	10	0	10	0	10	40	70
	Conv. status	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rejections	0	0	10	0	10	20	40
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	Applications	20	10	10	40	130	240	450
	Conv. status	0	0	0	10	0	0	10
	Rejections	0	0	0	10	0	10	20
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Denmark	Applications	0	0	10	20	10	20	60
	Conv. status	0	0	0	10	0	0	10
	Rejections	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	10	0	10	20
Finland	Applications	10	0	0	0	0	0	10
	Conv. status	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rejections	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Humanitarian	0	0	10	0	0	0	10
France	Applications	20	20	30	40	40	70	220
	Conv. status	10	10	20	20	10	10	80
	Rejections	10	10	10	10	20	20	80
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Germany	Applications	380	290	860	600	550	1,150	3,830
	Conv. status	0	10	20	80	90	120	320
	Rejections	10	100	50	850	910	650	2,570
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	110	110
Greece	Applications	0	0	50	20	10	0	80
	Conv. status	0	10	0	0	0	0	10
	Rejections	10	10	10	10	0	0	40
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	Applications	20	10	10	30	100	170	340
	Conv. status	10	0	0	20	40	20	90
	Rejections	10	10	10	20	50	130	230
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	Applications	50	100	90	160	260	600	1,260
	Conv. status	0	0	10	20	10	30	70
	Rejections	20	60	130	110	150	590	1,060
	Humanitarian	10	0	10	20	130	160	330
Norway	Applications	10	30	30	40	20	20	150
	Conv. status	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rejections	10	10	10	0	10	10	50
	Humanitarian	0	30	10	10	10	30	90
Portugal	Applications	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Conv. status	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rejections	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	Applications	0	0	0	10	20	20	50
	Conv. status	0	0	0	0	10	0	10
	Rejections	0	0	0	20	10	20	50
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sweden	Applications	40	0	0	160 0	20	220
	Conv. status	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rejections	0	0	0	0	0	40	40
	Humanitarian	10	20	30	40	10	0	110
Switzerland	Applications	10	30	60	50	0	0	150
	Conv. status	0	0	0	10	0	0	10
	Rejections	0	0	20	20	0	0	40
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom	Applications	340	1,150	560	300	330	350	3,030
(cases)	Conv. status	10	10	150	740	30	10	950
	Rejections	10	10	130	80	130	40	400
	Humanitarian	10	10	120	660	20	10	830
Canada	Applications	140	380	360	250	310	430	1,870
	Conv. status	110	150	480	260	260	250	1,510
	Rejections	20	20	20	30	30	10	130
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United States	Applications	80	290	270	240	250	250	1,380
(cases)	Conv. status	10	30	50	100	170	290	650
	Rejections	0	10	10	30	40	20	110
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Europe	Applications	910	1,640	1,720	1,470	1,480	2,700	9,920
	Conv. status	30	40	200	910	190	190	1,560
	Rejections	80	210	380	1,130	1,290	1,530	4,620
	Humanitarian	30	60	180	740	170	320	1,500
Total North	Applications	220	670	630	490	560	680	3,250
America	Conv. status	120	180	530	360	430	540	2,160
	Rejections	20	30	30	60	70	30	240
	Humanitarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Grand total	Applications	1,130	2,310	2,350	1,960	2,040	3,380	13,170
	Conv. status	150	220	730	1,270	620	730	3,720
	Rejections	100	240	410	1,190	1,360	1,560	4,860
	Humanitarian	30	60	180	740	170	320	1,500

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 31-May-97

Table 4 Share of asylum countries in total number of applications and decisions (Origin: Sudan)

Country	Status	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total
Austria	Applications	1.1%	0.0%	0.6%	0.0%	0.7%	1.5%	0.7%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	2.6%	0.0%	0.8%	1.3%	0.9%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Belgium	Applications	2.2%	0.6%	0.6%	2.7%	8.8%	8.9%	4.5%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.7%	0.4%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Denmark	Applications	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%	1.4%	0.7%	0.7%	0.6%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.0%	3.1%	1.3%
Finland	Applications	1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	5.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%
France	Applications	2.2%	1.2%	1.7%	2.7%	2.7%	2.6%	2.2%
	Conv. status	33.3%	25.0%	10.0%	2.2%	5.3%	5.3%	5.1%
	Rejections	12.5%	4.8%	2.6%	0.9%	1.6%	1.3%	1.7%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Germany	Applications	41.8%	17.7%	50.0%	40.8%	37.2%	42.6%	38.6%
	Conv. status	0.0%	25.0%	10.0%	8.8%	47.4%	63.2%	20.5%
	Rejections	12.5%	47.6%	13.2%	75.2%	70.5%	42.5%	55.6%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	34.4%	7.3%
Greece	Applications	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	1.4%	0.7%	0.0%	0.8%
	Conv. status	0.0%	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%
	Rejections	12.5%	4.8%	2.6%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Italy	Applications	2.2%	0.6%	0.6%	2.0%	6.8%	6.3%	3.4%
	Conv. status	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%	21.1%	10.5%	5.8%
	Rejections	12.5%	4.8%	2.6%	1.8%	3.9%	8.5%	5.0%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Netherlands	Applications	5.5%	6.1%	5.2%	10.9%	17.6%	22.2%	12.7%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	5.0%	2.2%	5.3%	15.8%	4.5%
	Rejections	25.0%	28.6%	34.2%	9.7%	11.6%	38.6%	22.9%
	Humanitarian	33.3%	0.0%	5.6%	2.7%	76.5%	50.0%	22.0%
Norway	Applications	1.1%	1.8%	1.7%	2.7%	1.4%	0.7%	1.5%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	12.5%	4.8%	2.6%	0.0%	0.8%	0.7%	1.1%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	50.0%	5.6%	1.4%	5.9%	9.4%	6.0%
Portugal	Applications	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Spain	Applications	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%	1.4%	0.7%	0.5%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.3%	0.0%	0.6%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.8%	0.8%	1.3%	1.1%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Sweden	Applications	4.4%	0.0%	0.0%	10.9%	0.0%	0.7%	2.2%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.6%	0.9%
	Humanitarian	33.3%	33.3%	16.7%	5.4%	5.9%	0.0%	7.3%
Switzerland	Applications	1.1%	1.8%	3.5%	3.4%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	5.3%	1.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
United Kingdom	Applications	37.4%	70.1%	32.6%	20.4%	22.3%	13.0%	30.5%
	Conv. status	33.3%	25.0%	75.0%	81.3%	15.8%	5.3%	60.9%
	Rejections	12.5%	4.8%	34.2%	7.1%	10.1%	2.6%	8.7%
	Humanitarian	33.3%	16.7%	66.7%	89.2%	11.8%	3.1%	55.3%
Total Europe	Applications	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Conv. status	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Rejections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Humanitarian	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Canada	Applications	63.6%	56.7%	57.1%	51.0%	55.4%	63.2%	57.5%
	Conv. status	91.7%	83.3%	90.6%	72.2%	60.5%	46.3%	69.9%
	Rejections	100.0%	66.7%	66.7%	50.0%	42.9%	33.3%	54.2%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
United States	Applications	36.4%	43.3%	42.9%	49.0%	44.6%	36.8%	42.5%
	Conv. status	8.3%	16.7%	9.4%	27.8%	39.5%	53.7%	30.1%
	Rejections	0.0%	33.3%	33.3%	50.0%	57.1%	66.7%	45.8%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total North	Applications	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
America	Conv. status	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Rejections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees      31-May-97

Table 5 Share of country of origin in total applications and decisions (Origin: Sudan)

Country	Status	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total
Austria	Applications	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.2%	0.7%	0.1%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.3%	0.1%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Belgium	Applications	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.9%	2.1%	0.5%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.4%	0.1%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Denmark	Applications	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%	0.1%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%
Finland	Applications	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	1.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
France	Applications	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.3%	0.1%
	Conv. status	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Germany	Applications	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%	0.4%	0.7%	0.3%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.1%	0.2%	0.5%	0.4%	0.5%	0.3%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.2%	0.4%	0.6%	0.2%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	3.0%
Greece	Applications	0.0%	0.0%	2.7%	2.5%	0.8%	0.0%	0.6%
	Conv. status	0.0%	8.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%
	Rejections	0.4%	0.2%	0.6%	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Italy	Applications	0.6%	0.0%	0.4%	2.0%	7.0%	9.7%	1.0%
	Conv. status	1.2%	0.0%	0.0%	15.4%	13.3%	7.1%	2.9%
	Rejections	1.8%	0.0%	0.2%	1.5%	3.6%	9.1%	0.7%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Netherlands	Applications	0.2%	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%	2.1%	0.7%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.4%	0.2%
	Rejections	0.2%	0.4%	0.6%	0.7%	0.5%	1.8%	0.9%
	Humanitarian	1.2%	0.0%	0.1%	0.4%	1.0%	1.5%	0.9%
Norway	Applications	0.3%	0.7%	0.6%	0.3%	0.6%	1.4%	0.5%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.5%	0.4%	0.3%	0.0%	0.3%	0.7%	0.3%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	1.8%	1.0%	2.1%	0.6%	3.3%	1.3%
Portugal	Applications	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Spain	Applications	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%	0.1%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	0.3%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%	0.1%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Sweden	Applications	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.2%	0.1%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%	0.1%
	Humanitarian	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Switzerland	Applications	0.0%	0.1%	0.3%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
	Conv. status	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
United Kingdom	Applications	1.3%	2.6%	2.3%	1.3%	1.0%	0.8%	1.6%
	Conv. status	1.1%	2.0%	13.4%	46.5%	3.6%	0.8%	15.2%
	Rejections	1.4%	0.3%	0.7%	0.7%	1.0%	0.2%	0.6%
	Humanitarian	0.4%	0.5%	0.8%	5.9%	0.5%	0.2%	2.1%
Total Europe	Applications	0.4%	1.2%	1.0%	1.2%	1.4%	1.6%	1.1%
	Conv. status	1.0%	0.8%	2.8%	1.8%	1.7%	2.6%	1.7%
	Rejections	0.5%	0.2%	0.2%	0.3%	0.5%	0.2%	0.3%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Canada	Applications	0.1%	0.5%	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%
	Conv. status	0.2%	1.4%	1.3%	2.0%	2.1%	2.3%	1.8%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
	Humanitarian	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
United States	Applications	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.5%	0.8%	0.4%
	Conv. status	0.1%	0.1%	0.6%	1.9%	0.4%	0.4%	0.6%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%	0.7%	0.2%
	Humanitarian	0.2%	0.2%	0.5%	1.3%	0.3%	0.9%	0.7%
Total North	Applications	0.2%	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.7%	0.4%
America	Conv. status	0.3%	0.4%	1.3%	1.9%	0.9%	1.0%	1.0%
	Rejections	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.3%	0.6%	0.2%
	Humanitarian	0.2%	0.2%	0.5%	1.3%	0.3%	0.9%	0.7%

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 31-May-97

Table 6a 1951 UN Convention recognition rates (Origin: All nationalities)

Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total
Austria	7%	13%	10%	8%	8%	13%	10%
Belgium	37%	26%	27%	29%	32%	32%	31%
Denmark	-	-	-	-	-	58%	71%
Finland	6%	3%	1%	1%	4%	0%	2%
France	15%	20%	28%	28%	21%	16%	20%
Germany	5%	8%	5%	5%	10%	17%	8%
Greece	7%	2%	3%	5%	12%	16%	5%
Italy	59%	5%	5%	9%	18%	16%	8%
Netherlands	7%	5%	19%	40%	17%	20%	20%
Norway	5%	4%	2%	1%	1%	2%	2%
Portugal	44%	17%	100%	6%	1%	2%	4%
Spain	-	5%	5%	7%	5%	7%	7%
Sweden	-	-	-	2%	7%	3%	10%
Switzerland	5%	3%	5%	17%	14%	16%	9%
United Kingdom	57%	13%	6%	13%	6%	7%	9%
Canada	74%	69%	61%	55%	70%	70%	65%
United States	15%	34%	38%	22%	22%	48%	27%
Europe	11%	11%	10%	9%	11%	17%	11%
North America	35%	62%	55%	39%	40%	55%	46%
Grand total	14%	16%	14%	11%	15%	22%	15%

            United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 31-May-97

Table 6b 1951 UN Convention recognition rates (Origin: Sudan)

Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total
Austria	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Belgium	0%	0%	0%	50%	0%	0%	33%
Denmark	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%
Finland	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
France	50%	50%	67%	67%	33%	33%	50%
Germany	0%	9%	29%	9%	9%	16%	11%
Greece	0%	50%	0%	0%	0%	0%	20%
Italy	50%	0%	0%	50%	44%	13%	28%
Netherlands	0%	0%	7%	15%	6%	5%	6%
Norway	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Portugal	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Spain	0%	0%	0%	0%	50%	0%	17%
Sweden	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Switzerland	0%	0%	0%	33%	0%	0%	20%
United Kingdom	50%	50%	54%	90%	19%	20%	70%
Canada	85%	88%	96%	90%	90%	96%	92%
United States	100%	75%	83%	77%	81%	94%	86%
Europe	27%	16%	34%	45%	13%	11%	25%
North America	86%	86%	95%	86%	86%	95%	90%
Grand total	60%	48%	64%	52%	31%	32%	43%

            United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 31-May-97

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[1] Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.