Internal Flight Alternatives

 

MAP

See original

Source: Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook 1996 1996, p. 310

GLOSSARY

Caciques           Local bosses in rural areas, often wealthy landowners and cattle ranchers

CEDH     State Human Rights Commission (Comisión Estatal de Derechos Humanos)

CNDH    National Human Rights Commission (Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos)

CT           Workers Congress (Congreso del Trabajo)

CTM       Confederation of Mexican Workers (Central de Trabajadores Mexicanos)

EPR         Popular Revolutionary Army (Ejército Popular Revolucionario)

EZLN      Zapatista National Liberation Army (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional)

PAN       National Action Party (Partido de Acción Nacional)

PRD        Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática)

PRI          Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional)

PRODH  Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez Human Rights Centre (Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez)

La Red    National Network of Human Rights Organizations "All Rights for All" (Red Nacional de Organismos de Derechos Humanos "Todos los Derechos para Todos")

1. INTRODUCTION

An internal flight alternative (IFA) can be defined as an area within a refugee claimant's country of origin where he or she would have no fear of persecution and would not encounter "undue hardship" relocating and establishing residence (IRB Apr. 1994, 1, 8). This paper presents information within which the issue of IFA can be assessed in Mexico; it does not, however, draw conclusions as to whether an IFA exists for any particular group or individual. A follow-up to the May 1997 DIRB Question and Answer Series paper Mexico: Armed Insurgent Groups, this paper examines human rights in Mexico in the context of the political and economic situation in the period January to September 1997, although some information on the situation in 1996 is also provided.

For Mexico's estimated 93,000,000 people (Mexico Update 8 Jan. 1997), the right to freedom of movement, guaranteed in the constitution, is generally respected (Country Reports 1996 1997, 503; Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook 1996 1996, 346). Although figures on the movement of people between states and regions are not readily available, a series of financial, economic and socio-political crises have spurred internal migration from rural to urban areas, as well as north toward the United States border (Galleguillos 15 Feb. 1996, 3; Miami Herald 6 Aug. 1996), where many maquiladora assembly plants are located (NACLA Report Jan.-Feb. 1997, 25).

1.1 Political Background

Democratization of the political system, begun shortly after President Zedillo took office in December 1994, was consolidated with a series of electoral reforms adopted by the Mexican Congress in November 1996 (WOLA June 1997, 2; Harvard International Review Spring 1997, 51, 72). Among these were making the Federal Electoral Institute (Instituto Federal Electoral-IFE) independent of the Internal Affairs Ministry (WOLA June 1997, 2; Country Reports 1996 1997, 504)[1]1, giving the Supreme Court jurisdiction over electoral law violations, reducing the number of congressional representatives per party from 315 to 300, holding direct elections for the office of mayor of Mexico City (ibid.)[2]2, and federal government funding for 90 per cent of all campaign spending in subsequent elections (WOLA June 1997, 15).

The reforms were put to the test during the 6 July 1997 mid-term elections for mayor of Mexico City, the Chamber of Deputies (lower house of Congress), one-quarter of Senate seats, six states and a number of municipalities (The Toronto Star 1 June 1997). Although the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional-PRI) had an advantage during the campaigning, notably in the areas of financing and media coverage (WOLA June 1997, 2-3, 18), opposition parties made significant gains in these elections, generally deemed free and fair by observers[3]3 (The Economist 12-18 July 1997, 27; La Presse 12 July 1997, B-6). While Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas of the leftist opposition Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática-PRD) was elected mayor of Mexico City (The New York Times 15 July 1997), the National Action Party (Partido de Acción Nacional—PAN) won governorships in the states of Nuevo Leon and Queretaro (see subsections 3.1 and 3.2) (La Presse 12 July 1997, B-6). The PRD and the PAN captured 125 congressional seats each, while the Green Ecologists (Partido Verde Ecológico de México-PVEM) and Workers Party (Partido de Trabajadores-PT) took 8 and 4 seats respectively (IPS 9 July 1997). Although the PRI obtained 239 congressional seats and retained its absolute majority in the Senate (The Economist 12-18 July 1997, 27; La Presse 2 Sept. 1997, B-10), the subsequent creation of the "Group of Four" united opposition front signalled the end of PRI hegemony in Mexico (ibid.; Le Devoir 3 Sept. 1997, A-5).

1.2 Economic Situation

Notwithstanding the improved political climate surrounding the 6 July 1997 elections, the current human rights situation in Mexico reflects the deteriorating economic situation of most Mexicans since the 1980s (WOLA June 1997, 4; L'état du monde 1997 1996, 247). According to the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), "poverty has soared.... At the end of 1996 real wages were below 1980 levels, and nearly two-thirds of the population made less than $10 per day; nineteen million made less than $3 a day" (June 1997, 4).[4]4 Income disparities between the rich and poor have also grown (World Policy Journal Fall 1997; WOLA June 1997, 4; NACLA Report May-June 1997, 28). According to NACLA Report on the Americas, "today the wealthiest 10% of Mexico's population receives 50% of total income—the highest percentage since measurement began in 1950—while the poorest 20% receives barely 3%" (ibid.). Sources indicate the increasing poverty has fuelled violence and crime and spurred the expansion of drug trafficking in rural and urban areas throughout the country (see regional subsections below) (WOLA June 1997, 4; Country Reports 1996 1997, 495; L'état du monde 1997 1996, 249).

Mexico's economic problems have generated tension within the Workers Congress (Congreso de Trabajadores-CT), the country's largest union umbrella organization, comprising over 20 unions and long allied to the PRI (Jackson 25 June 1997, 8; IPS 30 Jan. 1997). On 29-30 January 1997, 11 CT member unions, including the telephone workers and electricians, met with 14 independent unions to discuss the creation of an "independent group to oppose official economic policies" (ibid). On 11 June 1997 in Mexico City, the National Co-ordination of Education Workers (Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación-CNTE), the largest opposition faction within the PRI-aligned Confederation of Mexican Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de México-CTM) (IPS 11 June 1997; Jackson 25 June 1997, 8; IPS 30 Jan. 1997), called an indefinite strike to back up demands for a 100 per cent salary increase and better working conditions (ibid. 11 June 1997; LARR: Mexico & NAFTA Report 8 July 1997c, 4). The strike reportedly affected 2 million children in pre-school, primary school and special education facilities in the capital (ibid.; IPS 11 June 1997). Similar strikes were launched in the states of Oaxaca, Guerrero, Chiapas, Michoacán, Tlaxcala, Yucatán, Durango and Coahuila (ibid.). Reports do not indicate whether there was any violence during these strikes. In addition to salary increases, strikers demanded improved funding for social security services and public education, free textbooks, breakfasts and an increase in student grants (ibid.; see also The Austin American-Statesman 22 May 1997).

2. OVERALL HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

2.1 The Judicial System

The federal court system is made up of 98 district courts, 32 circuit courts of appeal and a Supreme Court (Country Reports 1996 1997, 500). The federal justice system, which is overseen by the Office of the Federal Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República-PGR), handles crimes that violate federal laws (HRW/A Apr. 1997, 37). Every state has its own justice system, overseen by the Office of the State Attorney General (Procuraduría General de Justicia del Estado-PGJE), which is independent from the federal system (ibid., 15, 23, 36).

Mexico has separate criminal codes and codes of criminal procedure for the Federal District and the various states, although the Federal District codes are "sometimes referred to as federal codes, because they are applicable nationwide in some circumstances" (World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems 1989, 259).

Sources indicate that, while Mexican laws provide adequate guarantees of human rights, in many cases they are either ignored or incompletely implemented (Jackson 25 June 1997, 7; Americas Watch Sept. 1991, 6). According to Amnesty International,

Article 20, part II of the Mexican Constitution ... states that only statements made by a defendant before the Public Ministry or a judge and in the presence of legal counsel ... have judicial value as evidence against the defendant. In practice, statements of guilt obtained by agencies other than the Public Ministry (such as the police) or without the presence of a lawyer or attorney, continue to be routinely accepted by judges (30 Apr. 1997, 5).

        Human Rights Watch has also highlighted the uneven administration of justice which, it alleges, allows PRI supporters who commit abuses to go unpunished while individuals who commit violations against PRI supporters are "prosecuted vigorously or improperly" (Apr. 1997, 2, 22; see also Washington Quarterly Autumn 1997). Similarly, Amnesty International emphasizes the legal system's tendency to protect rather than prosecute human rights violators:

The lack of prosecutions against members of the security forces who torture perpetuates its use in the administration of justice, as a relatively quick and inexpensive method of obtaining a result which will be usually upheld by a court of law. In other cases torture continues to be used as a means of intimidating or punishing detainees, who often lack the means to seek redress before the courts (AI 30 Apr. 1997, 8).

The judicial system has also been vulnerable to corruption, even at the highest levels, as illustrated by the sacking of ten judges between 1995 and August 1997, presumably for links to drug traffickers (LARR: Mexico & NAFTA Report 8 July 1997a, 6). The two most powerful drug cartels, the Tijuana and Juárez cartels (see subsection 3.1), have reportedly offered judicial authorities up to $1 million for allowing them to operate (Excelsior 6 June 1997).

While pointing out the problems with the judicial system throughout Mexico, specialists contacted by the Research Directorate emphasize that the problems are worse in rural areas of the southern states of Guerrero, Oaxaca and Chiapas (see subsection 3.3) (Reding 22 Sept. 1997; Cemp 18 Sept. 1997), and in northern states where drug trafficking is pervasive (see subsection 3.1) (ibid.; Millet 22 Sept. 1997).

Seeking to promote the rule of law in Mexico, the government initiated a series of judicial reforms in 1995 (Country Reports 1996 1997, 500-01; World Policy Institute May 1995, 12). These reforms included selection of most lower and appellate federal court judges through competitive examinations, creation of an independent judicial council to administer the federal courts, and the resignation of all 26 Supreme Court justices, reduction of their number to 11, and the approval of two-thirds of the Senate to confirm their appointment (ibid.; Country Reports 1996 1997, 500-01). Notwithstanding these reforms, Roderick Cemp, professor of Latin American studies at Tulane University, indicates that seeking legal redress, especially at the local level, is "a gamble" for all citizens, regardless of their social class (18 Sept. 1997). According to WOLA, because of its shortcomings the justice system inspires little confidence among the majority of Mexicans (June 1997, 4).

2.2 The Security Forces

The main Mexican police forces are organized as follows:

1) General Directorate of Police and Traffic. Part of the Ministry of Government, it is the main federal police force (World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems 1989, 258);

2) Federal Judicial Police. Overseen by the federal Public Ministry, which in turn is overseen by the federal Attorney General, these forces are responsible for investigating criminal offences (World Policy Institute May 1995, 24; World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems 1989, 259). They do not wear uniforms, drive unmarked vehicles (ibid.; World Policy Institute May 1995, 24) and according to Reding, the North America Project Director and Senior Fellow for Hemispheric Affairs at the New York-based World Policy Institute, are reputed to be the "most dangerous and feared police forces in the country" (ibid.);

3) State Judicial Police and Judicial Police of the Federal District (Mexico City and surrounding areas). Overseen by the state public prosecutors, who in turn answer to their respective state attorneys general (World Policy Institute May 1995, 25), they are responsible for enforcing state laws and assisting the federal police in enforcing federal laws (World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems 1989, 258);

4) Public Security Police, also known as state security police, operate state-wide under the Ministry of Government and are responsible for maintaining order and preventing crime (HRW/A Apr. 1997, 37);

5) Municipal Police. In state capitals they answer to state governors (World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems 1989, 258). Municipal police in rural areas have close ties to wealthy landowners and cattle ranchers—local bosses, known as caciques (MA/HA Nov. 1996, 35; World Policy Journal Fall 1997)—who in turn have links to the PRI (Galleguillos 15 Feb. 1996, 29).

Some government ministries and agencies[5]5, as well as private institutions such as banks, hotels and department stores, have their own small police forces (World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems 1989, 259; World Policy Institute May 1995, 24). During his presentation to the IRB, Professor Nibaldo H. Galleguillos of the Department of Political Science, McMaster University, provided a figure of 2,000 different police organizations "operating at different levels" in Mexico (15 Feb. 1996, 18). Galleguillos added that there appeared to be little coordination between the various levels and jurisdictions of law enforcement (ibid., 28), an assessment he believes is still accurate (ibid. 17 Oct. 1997). Although there is a "significant degree of centralization or gathering" of security-related information, according to Galleguillos it is impossible to determine whether the police in one area would have access to files on individuals coming from another area (15 Feb. 1996, 18). Galleguillos notes that each state has its own problems and priorities, and as a result the ability and willingness of states to share information will vary (17 Oct. 1997). This has been particularly true in recent months due to opposition party election successes and differences between various factions within the PRI (ibid.).

Professor Richard Millet, senior advisor with the Syracuse, New York-based consulting firm Political Risk Services for Latin America and a senior research associate at the North-South Center, University of Miami, states that, although there is no centralization of security information, there is some degree of interdependence between state and federal police forces (22 Sept. 1997). Millet clarifies, however, that opposition party successes in several states have made state and federal police forces increasingly independent of one another (ibid.).

Sources indicate that corruption and impunity of police forces, often acting in collusion with drug traffickers (Galleguillos 15 Feb. 1996, 10; World Policy Institute May 1995, 1), are widespread, due in part to poor working conditions, lack of personnel and inadequate training, funding and equipment (World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems 1989, 259; The Washington Post 16 Feb. 1997; see also MA/HA Nov. 1996, 21, 29), and the absence of a tradition of professional, protective policing (Millet 22 Sept. 1997; Cemp 18 Sept. 1997). In an effort to address these problems, in 1996 the government introduced reforms in the Federal Attorney General's Office, including the "dismissal of over 1,250 corrupt officials, new recruitment and training procedures, and closer supervision of federal police and prosecutors" (Country Reports 1996 1997, 496). In order to curb the re-employment in states of police officers discharged for committing human rights abuses in other states, the government has reportedly set up a national security register of censured police officers, and the National Human Rights Commission (Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos-CNDH) (see subsection 2.3) has published the names of censured public servants in its annual report and monthly newsletters (ibid., 498).

On 11 April 1997, in order to promote a "new culture of laws," the federal and state governments signed the Public Safety Financing Agreements, committing to investing a record 2.405 billion pesos (Cdn$426 million) in public safety (Reforma 12 Apr. 1997; La Jornada 12 Apr. 1997). This reportedly represents a 700 per cent increase in resources allocated to crime-fighting equipment (ibid.; Reforma 12 Apr. 1997), and a 200 per cent increase in funding to purchase equipment for all police forces (ibid.).

In order to combat corruption and organized crime (Latin America Weekly Report 11 Mar. 1997; Reforma 5 Mar. 1997), the government replaced some police personnel with soldiers and put others under the command of the army in Tamaulipas, Mexico City, Chihuahua, and Baja California (ibid.; IPS 8 Jan. 1997). Those replaced were to be sent for retraining in the use of weapons and investigative techniques, literacy, community service and human rights (Latin America Weekly Report 11 Mar. 1997). Characterizing government efforts to fight crime and corruption as "well-meaning," Cemp emphasized the practical difficulties of implementing these changes (18 Sept. 1997).

Mexican Attorney General Jorge Madrazo has reportedly claimed that the armed forces[6]6 have been less corrupted by the illicit drug trade than have the federal judicial police (see subsection 2.2) (La Jornada 30 July 1997). However, Reding states that the armed forces "are among the most corrupt of Mexican institutions" (Pacific News Service 14 May 1996), and navy RAdm (ret.) Samuel Moreno Santillan, now a member of the PRD National Council's Strategic Planning Commission, has charged that simply being in contact with drug traffickers has made army personnel deployed to fight them increasingly vulnerable to corruption (Reforma 29 July 1997).

In one of the most notorious cases of drug-related corruption, on 19 February 1997, two months after he was appointed head of the National Institute to Combat Drugs, General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo was arrested for allegedly receiving money from the Juárez cartel (High Times Aug. 1997, 48; Manchester Guardian Weekly 3 Aug. 1997). During his seven years as head of the Fifth Military Region in Guadalajara, Rebollo reportedly protected the Juárez cartel while cracking down on competing drug organizations (The New York Times 28 July 1997). Investigations since the general's arrest have revealed several other cases of military involvement in drug trafficking (Reuters 28 July 1997; Manchester Guardian Weekly 3 Aug. 1997). Citing confidential documents produced by the Defense Ministry, a 27 July 1997 report in the Mexican weekly Proceso alleged close links between drug barons and seven senior military officers (ibid.; Reuters 28 July 1997). A 27 July 1997 Defense Ministry statement indicated that, since January 1997, 34 current and former military officials had been charged with cooperating with drug traffickers (ibid.; Manchester Guardian Weekly 3 Aug. 1997).

2.3 The National Human Rights Commission (CNDH)

The CNDH was established in June 1990 as a semi-autonomous agency of the Public Ministry (Americas Watch Sept. 1991, 1; Lawson 1996, 1022; Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook 1996 1996, 318). In 1992 the CNDH obtained operational and financial autonomy through an amendment to article 102 of the Mexican constitution and enactment of the Law on the National Commission for Human Rights (ibid.; World Policy Institute May 1995, 54). According to Human Rights Watch, its mandate is to "investigate human rights complaints, propose recommendations for legislative and other reforms to prevent future abuses, and develop programs to educate Mexican officials and the public about human rights" (Americas Watch Sept. 1991, 1). A CNDH recommendation is not binding, however, and is therefore "nothing more than an instrument to improve the provision of public services and combat impunity" (CNDH June 1997, 7).

The CNDH received 8,509 complaints of human rights violations between May 1996 and May 1997, these primarily consisting of "unjustified negation of the benefits of the law, denial of the right to petition, arbitrary arrest, violation of prisoners' or inmates' rights, illegal practice of public function and medical negligence" (ibid., 4). Although several sources indicate that torture by security forces personnel remains widespread in Mexico (AI 30 Apr. 1997 1; Country Reports 1996 1997, 498; Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook 1996 1996, 340), the CNDH ranked it twenty-fourth among complaints received between May 1996 and May 1997 (CNDH June 1997, 4).

The CNDH indicates that it has issued a total of 1,179 recommendations in its seven years of existence, of which 808 (68.5 per cent) have been complied with (June 1997, 6). CNDH recommendations between 1990 and May 1997 resulted in administrative or criminal sanctions being imposed on 2,742 federal and state public servants (ibid., 8). While noting a 5.3 per cent increase in compliance between 1996 and 1997, the CNDH added that "good disposition and greater political will, on the part of the authorities, is required to fulfil the Recommendations" (ibid., 6). The CNDH notes that between May 1996 and May 1997 the Oaxaca state government and the federal attorney general fulfilled the greatest number of its recommendations (ibid., 7), but Amnesty International has expressed concern about several state and federal authorities' non-compliance with CNDH recommendations, the CNDH's inability to enforce those recommendations, and the CNDH's definition of compliance (AI 30 Apr. 1997, 10; see also Country Reports 1996 1997, 505).

CNDH activities or programmes include the Program on Attacks Against Journalists and Civil Human Rights Defenders (CNDH June 1997, 9), provision of courses, seminars and conferences for army personnel, training for judicial police personnel and employees of the Federal Prosecutor's Office (ibid., 10), and legal counselling in various communities and "confinement centres" (ibid., 8). The CNDH reports that their visits to confinement centres between May 1996 and May 1997 resulted in the release of 252 indigenous Mexicans (ibid.). The CNDH also participates in an inter-institutional programme with the General Coordination for Protection and Consular Matters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to monitor the human rights situation of migrant workers travelling to and entering the United States (ibid., 9). Similarly, in the south it works with migration institutions, state human rights commissions (see subsection 2.4) and diplomatic representatives of Central and South American countries (ibid.). The Commission has also begun work on the Inter-Institutional Training Program for Migration Officers, which in collaboration with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Mexican Commission for Aid to Refugees and the National Migration Institute, will train 2,400 migration officers throughout Mexico over a two-year period (ibid., 10-11). The CNDH has also worked with 166 NGOs in 30 states (ibid., 11).

2.4 Other Human Rights Organizations

A number of Mexican states have human rights commissions (Comisión Estatal de Derechos Humanos-CEDH) that are mandated to investigate human rights violations involving state-level public officials (HRW Aug. 1996, 4; AI 30 Apr. 1997, 11; MA/HA Nov. 1996, 53). Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights and Heartland Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights (MA/HA) state that CEDHs "possess varying degrees of ability to affect human rights observance in their states of operation," and like the CNDH, cannot compel governments to act on their recommendations (ibid.). Citing the National Network of Human Rights Organizations "All Rights for All" (Red Nacional de Organismos de Derechos Humanos "Todos los Derechos para Todos"—La Red), Amnesty International indicates that CEDHs have a "very poor record in resolving cases presented to them: during the years 1994-1996, nearly 50 percent of recommendations published by the CNDH were related to complaints (quejas de inconformidad) brought against state human rights commissions" (30 Apr. 1997, 11). In May 1997 the CNDH reported that "State Commissions are at present struggling for the full enforcement, strengthening and respect of the principles of autonomy and independence, both operating and financial, to be able to fulfil their task completely" (May 1997, 1).

Mexican non-governmental human rights organizations have multiplied since the mid-1980s, playing an important role in the democratization process and sensitizing the population and authorities to human rights issues (Country Reports 1996 1997, 504; World Policy Institute May 1995, 53; Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook 1996 1996, 329). However, many human rights workers have received death threats for criticizing the human rights situation and defending victims of human rights abuses (ibid., 330; La Red Mar. 1997, 2; MA/HA Nov. 1996, 41; AI 10 Dec. 1996, 20). Although most death threats have not been carried out, Amnesty International reports that some human rights workers have been killed and others attacked (ibid., 19). For information on threats and attacks against human rights workers, please refer to the May 1997 DIRB Question and Answer Series paper Mexico: Armed Insurgent Groups (pp. 14-16).

Some sources suggest that while human rights organizations in Mexico cannot protect people from human rights violations, they can reduce to some extent the impunity of violators by publicizing cases of abuse (Jackson 25 June 1997, 21; Cemp 18 Sept. 1997). However, Minnesota Advocates and Heartland Alliance caution that CEDHs:

must contend with state media outlets, which often maintain cozy relations with local power structures. The limited capability to expose publicly human rights violations severely handicaps the CEDHs' ability to defend human rights. Public opinion is the principal weapon they employ. The lack of publicity seriously curtails the ability to shape public views (Nov. 1996, 53).

2.5 Groups at Risk

Sources report that violence, corruption and human rights violations are pervasive in Mexico and that the lines of conflict are not clearly defined (Galleguillos 15 Feb. 1996, 4; Reding 22 Sept. 1997). In many cases of violence it is not clear who the perpetrators are, which creates a "climate of fear" (ibid.; Cemp 18 Sept. 1997). In a May 1995 World Policy Institute report on human rights and democracy in Mexico, Andrew Reding writes:

In general, risks in Mexico are only loosely linked to particular professions, or to political, religious, ethnic, or other group affiliations. Governments—federal, state, and local—seldom engage in blanket abuse of groups, with the exception of indigenous peoples and gay men, who are subject to discriminatory treatment by society itself. The overriding risk factor is the extent to which individuals within politically-sensitive groups—such as opposition parties, labor unions, the mass media, churches, and human rights organizations—exercise their constitutional rights to dissent and, more specifically, to criticize the government or government officials, or present a serious challenge to the political status quo (May 1995, 36).

Although generally maintaining his assessment of those who are most at risk, in a 22 September 1997 telephone interview Reding emphasized that the substantial gains made by the political opposition parties in several municipal and state elections, as well as in the 6 July 1997 congressional elections, had lowered the risks faced by opposition party members and supporters. This view is shared by Cemp (18 Sept. 1997).

A study released by the Jesuit-run University Iberoamericana on 19 June 1997 indicated that 11 journalists had been murdered, 125 attacked, 9 abducted, 38 threatened, 27 robbed of their equipment, 9 harassed, and 74 journalists and media agencies sued since President Zedillo took office in December 1994 (IPS 22 June 1997). It stated that government representatives were responsible for most attacks against journalists, but there were also reports of attacks on political activists, street vendors, business people and student protesters (ibid.). In July 1997 The Globe and Mail reported an increasing number of attempts by businessmen and politicians to have journalists charged with criminal libel (21 July 1997, A1).[7]7

        Reding indicates that journalists who report on corruption of state officials could likely find safety in another state, but journalists who expose links between high-level government officials and drug cartels would be in danger anywhere in Mexico (22 Sept. 1997). According to Reding, "whistle blowers" of any profession, or people who "unearth corruption" of powerful figures using "documented evidence," would face a legitimate fear throughout Mexico (ibid.). Similarly, commenting on the situation of some Mexican journalists during his 1996 presentation to the IRB, Galleguillos highlighted the existence of the "unwritten rule ... that you can publish everything you want except that you cannot criticize the president of the Republic and you cannot dig too deep into corruption" (15 Feb. 1996, 27). Galleguillos notes that the power of the presidency has been weakened since the July 1997 elections and that journalists and opposition politicians are slightly freer to criticize certain ideas, but the situation basically remains unchanged (17 Oct. 1997).

Further information on individuals and groups that have been targeted in specific regions is provided in the following section.

3. SITUATION BY REGION

3.1 The North

The three northern states of Baja California Norte, Chihuahua and Nuevo Leon are run by PAN governors (World Policy Institute May 1995, 36; The New York Times 7 July 1997). The PAN obtained the governorship of Nuevo Leon, "the business and industrial heartland of Mexico," in the 6 July 1997 elections (ibid.). The PAN derives its core support from the industrial, mining and agricultural business class in northern and central Mexico (WOLA June 1997, 24; World Policy Journal Fall 1996). Reding notes that the "PAN is not linked to the interests of the rich" but is "almost exclusively a party of the middle class" (ibid.).

Many Mexicans have migrated to northern Mexico in search of work, particularly to the maquiladoras, which are export-processing firms concentrated mainly along the U.S.-Mexico border (HRW Aug. 1996, 2; NACLA Report Jan.-Feb. 1997b, 21). The maquiladoras in the northern border zone employ 420,000 of the 600,000 to 800,000 maquiladora workers throughout the country (ibid. Jan.-Feb. 1997a, 25; HRW Aug. 1996, 10). Around 242,000 maquiladora workers in the northern border zone are women (ibid.). Some maquiladoras have an annual employee turnover rate of 240 per cent, due in part to the fact that many employees see maquiladoras as a stepping stone to more lucrative employment in the United States (Mexico Update 12 Mar. 1997). Human Rights Watch has expressed concern that women seeking work in maquiladoras are frequently forced to take pregnancy tests as a condition of employment and denied employment if they are found pregnant (Aug. 1996, 2; ibid. 15 July 1997; La Jornada 23 Aug. 1996). Moreover, women maquiladora workers who face sexual discrimination "have few tenable options for legal redress" (HRW Aug. 1996, 4; ibid. 15 July 1997). Human Rights Watch reports that although Mexico's labour code prohibits sex discrimination (ibid.), state human rights commissions are not mandated to investigate private sector labour issues (see subsection 2.4), nor are government labour bodies legally empowered to investigate sex discrimination in the hiring process (ibid. Aug. 1996, 4).

Much of Mexico's economic wealth is generated by drug trafficking, with the northern region being "the central axis" of the hemispheric drug trade (High Times Aug. 1997, 53; The Washington Post 6 July 1997; see also Newsday 14 Feb. 1997).[8]8 The drug trade reportedly generated US$30 billion in 1994, four times the revenue from oil, Mexico's largest legal export to the United States (ibid.; Journal of Commerce 11 Mar. 1996). Much of this money is laundered through legitimate industries such as banking and tourism (Newsday 14 Feb. 1997; National Geographic Aug. 1996, 104). Mexico's five major drug cartels, all of which have bases in the north (Mexico n.d., 3), are:

1) the Tijuana cartel, which is based in Tijuana in the state of Baja California Norte. Led by the Arrellano Félix brothers, it controls the Pacific delivery routes;

2) the Sonora border cartel headed by Héctor Luis Palma Salazar;

3) the Sinaloa cartel, operating in the interior of Sinaloa state and controlled by Mario Ismael Zambada García and Baltazar Díaz Vega;

4) the Juárez cartel, led by Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, Ignacio Coronel and Juan Esparragoza, which operates in the states of Chihuahua, Sonora, and Coahuila and controls the central border area[9]9; and

5) the Gulf cartel led by Juan García Abrego[10]1[11]0, which is based in Matamoros and controls the eastern delivery routes (Reforma 12 July 1997; Mexico n.d., 3; International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1996 Mar. 1997; World Policy Institute 8 Aug. 1995, 2).

Having identified drug trafficking as the greatest threat to national security (Mexico n.d., 1; Harvard International Review Spring 1997, 51; Rochlin 1996, 36), in 1996 the Mexican government intensified its "war on drugs" (see subsection 2.2) (Harvard International Review Spring 1997, 51; Reforma 5 Mar. 1997). The number of drug seizures reportedly rose significantly during the year (Harvard International Review Spring 1997, 51; Mexico n.d., 3). In 1996 the United States and Mexican governments also established the High-Level Contact Group (HLCG) on drug control to "explore joint solutions to the shared drug threat ... and to promote closer law cooperation" (International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1996 Mar. 1997; see also IPS 8 Jan. 1997). These efforts have met with limited success, however, due in part to widespread infiltration of drug traffickers into the federal and state governments, and into the armed forces and police forces (Le Monde 14 Feb. 1997; Harvard International Review Spring 1997, 51).

In early June 1997, the army and Federal Judicial Police launched a joint operation in the north to capture the leaders of the Juárez and Tijuana cartels, the two most powerful cartels, and over 100 of their armed men (Excelsior 6 June 1997). The operation proved futile, however, since the cartel leaders were forewarned by informants in both forces, who reportedly receive as much as $100,000 for a single tip-off (ibid.).

Crime is endemic in the border city of Tijuana, an industrial centre and popular tourist destination (The Washington Post 16 Feb. 1997). The Washington Post reports that the Tijuana cartel "has sought—with considerable success—to put the streets of Tijuana beyond the control of federal, state and local authorities," but adds that it is often difficult to determine who is responsible for the violence, as the 1990s "brought a proliferation of competing criminal gangs involved in international migrant trafficking, kidnapping, bank robberies and car theft, many of which have intertwining—and often competing—relationships with the drug cartel" (ibid.).

In late July and early August 1997 sources reported an escalation in drug-related killings along the Mexico-United States border triggered by the June 1997 death of Juárez cartel leader Amado Carrillo Fuentes (International Herald Tribune 24 July 1997; Reuters 7 Aug. 1997). According to Reuters, this development signalled the "end of a code of honor among Mexican druglords to keep their turf battles in the shadows" (ibid.).

Other examples of recent drug-related violence in the north are provided below.

In January 1997 The New York Times reported that eight Mexican officials handling drug cases in Tijuana had been murdered in the previous 11 months (6 Jan. 1997), and the Mexico City-based Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez Human Rights Centre (Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez-PRODH) reported the disappearance in 1996 of 18 people in Sinaloa state and one in Chihuahua state, allegedly at the hands of drug traffickers (Country Reports 1996 1997, 498).

On 4 January 1997 in Tijuana, Odín Gutiérrez Rico, the director of criminal trials in Baja California state who was investigating the murder of former Tijuana police chief Federico Benitez, was shot to death by unknown assailants suspected to be drug traffickers (High Times Aug. 1997, 50; Mexico Update 8 Jan. 1997; The New York Times 6 Jan. 1997). On 15 July 1997, La Prensa editor Benjamin Flores Gonzalez was killed in front of the newspaper's offices in San Luis Rio Colorado in Sonora state (La Jornada 16 July 1997; The Globe and Mail 21 July 1997, A1; Reuters 16 July 1997). Although it is not clear who killed him, the involvement of drug traffickers is suspected (ibid.; La Jornada 16 July 1997). Flores Gonzalez had reportedly criticized "narco-politicians," "narco-policemen" and "traffickers" in a recent column (ibid.).

These incidents occurred despite Congress approval in October 1996 of the Federal Law Against Organized Crime, which provides for the protection of witnesses, investigators and judges in drug-related cases (Mexico n.d., 2).

3.2 The Centre

      The Economist states that under PAN governor Vicente Fox, Guanajuato state in central Mexico:

has rebounded from the national recession, with unemployment the lowest in Mexico and exports booming at three times the national rate. Unlike those of most states, its finances are both healthy and transparent. Mr. Fox has wrested both money and power away from the federal government to finance innovations in areas such as education, health care, agriculture and micro-credit (19-25 July 1997, 34).

The PAN has governed the central state of Queretaro since the 6 July 1997 mid-term elections (The New York Times 7 July 1997), as well as Jalisco, where it also controls the state legislature (World Policy Institute May 1995, 36). The PAN has also made political gains at the local level in San Luis Potosí (ibid., 35-36).

On 12 April 1997, local police in the Jalisco state capital of Guadalajara beat journalist Salvador Chávez Calderón and detained him for over two hours when he tried to report on an attack against a business (La Jornada 13 Apr. 1997). Again in Guadalajara on 25 July 1997, Ricardo Cesareo Vazquez Tafolla, a witness in the trial of General Gutiérrez Rebollo (see subsection 2.2), was ambushed and wounded by people he recognized as members of the Juárez cartel (Reuters 28 July 1997; The New York Times 28 July 1997). In response to the attack, government authorities indicated they would double the number of bodyguards protecting Vazquez Tafolla and other witnesses (ibid.). Several days later, on 29 July 1997, Irma Lizette Ibarra Naveja and retired army officer Alfredo Ixtlahuac Gaspar were murdered in separate attacks in Guadalajara (La Jornada 2 Aug. 1997). As with Tafolla, the victims reportedly had information on the infiltration of drug traffickers into the Fifth Military Region during Rebollo's nearly seven years in command (ibid.).

In a poll undertaken by researchers at the University of Guadalajara on 8 and 9 March 1997, 36.2 per cent of voters surveyed in the city of Cuernavaca, Morelos state, identified "oversight of the police" as the major problem to be addressed following the 16 March 1997 local elections (La Jornada 13 Mar. 1997). Another La Jornada report mentions Guadalajara as one of the cities "impacted by the drug trafficking networks ..., the war between the cartels" and "everyday violence" (30 Sept. 1997).

3.3 The South

The political and human rights situation has been particularly volatile in the south due to a combination of several factors: strong popular support for the PRD, seen by ruling party members and supporters as a threat to their power base; the high rate of poverty among indigenous peasants; long-standing land disputes; the emergence since January 1994 of two armed insurgent groups, the Zapatista National Liberation Army (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional-EZLN) in Chiapas and the Popular Revolutionary Army (Ejército Popular Revolucionario-EPR) in Guerrero;[12]11 government counterinsurgency operations; and the emergence of new PRI-linked paramilitary groups (HRW/A Apr. 1997, 3, 8-9; MA/HA Nov. 1996).

Several sources indicate that the poor, indigenous and peasant populations in the states of Oaxaca, Guerrero and Chiapas are the groups most vulnerable to human rights abuses, which frequently occur in the context of long-standing disputes over land ownership (Lawson 1996, 1022; Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook 1996 1996, 313-14; World Policy Institute May 1995, 18). According to Reding:

the poor have neither the political clout nor the legal resources to confront wealthy landholders. The latter resort to writs of protection (amparo) to block the execution of land reform decrees. ... When frustrated peasants respond by squatting on the lands in dispute, the well-connected landholders either prevail on the governor to dispatch police or troops, or hire private gunmen. Peasants are frequently killed in such disputes, in part to terrorize others. The murderers are almost never brought to justice (ibid.).

Others groups such as teachers, human rights activists, church members and journalists have also been targeted in the south (MA/HA Nov. 1996, v; La Red Mar. 1997). Minnesota Advocates and Heartland Alliance have described Oaxaca state, for example, as "virtually lawless" (Nov. 1996, 2), and note that "human rights violations and violence, and a failed state response to each, are systemic phenomena statewide" (ibid., 3). They add:

Agents of the state are responsible for numerous arbitrary executions, acts of torture, and other mistreatment. Law enforcement officials also possess the notorious tendency to arrest individuals arbitrarily within Oaxaca. For these reasons, many Oaxacans live in fear of the state's security forces (ibid.).

Similarly, during a 20-23 June 1997 visit, 30 representatives of La Red found that the human rights situation in Guerrero state had deteriorated over the previous 12 months (La Jornada 28 June 1997). The organization reported that PRD activists and members of social and teachers organizations, particularly in the municipality of Ahuacuotzingo, were being arrested and accused by the army of belonging to the EPR (ibid.).

Rene Jaramillo Pineda, factional leader of the National Teachers' Union, chief of technical education in Guerrero and a supporter of former Guerrero state governor Ruben Figueroa[13]12, was slain by an unknown assailant on 29 December 1996 (Country Reports 1996 1997, 497; La Jornada 30 Dec. 1996).

In separate incidents in late March 1997, at least five PRD members in Guerrero state were killed by alleged PRI supporters (Los Angeles Times 25 Mar. 1997; ibid. 30 Mar. 1997). On 23 May 1997 Jesus Abel Bueno Leon, editor of the Guerrero weekly Siete Dias, was beaten and shot dead (Latin America Weekly Report 27 May 1997). He had reportedly foreseen his death, having left behind a letter written one month earlier attributing "public responsibility" for his fate to state governor Angel Aguirre Rivero (ibid.).

In the northern areas of Chiapas armed groups such as Peace and Justice (Paz y Justicia) and the Chinchulines[14]13, both backed by the PRI, have allegedly kidnapped, tortured, killed and expelled PRI opponents (HRW/A Apr. 1997, 4; La Jornada 30 Mar. 1997).[15]14 For example, between 22 and 25 June 1997 members of Peace and Justice reportedly carried out a series of attacks against indigenous people in the Emiliano Zapata area of Sabanilla municipality, killing at least four people and wounding eight others (ibid. 26 June 1997). The attacks were allegedly in response to the 15 June 1997 killing of Peace and Justice leader Juan Lopez Jímenez by suspected PRD-EZLN supporters (ibid.). While some PRI supporters have also been targeted in Chiapas, Human Rights Watch states there is no evidence the perpetrators have "institutional links to above-ground groups such as the church and the PRD" (Apr. 1997, 5).

To escape rural violence in the south, many people have moved to state capitals where, according to Reding and Cemp, they are not usually pursued by caciques from their home areas (22 Sept. 1997; 18 Sept. 1997). Others with resources have moved even further to urban centres outside their home states (ibid.; World Policy Journal Fall 1996). However, Cemp states that rural-urban migration has put such pressure on Mexican cities that the government is "discouraging" people from moving by injecting resources into rural areas (18 Sept. 1997).

Information on the extent of drug trafficking in the south is limited. PRODH reported nine killings related to drug trafficking in the region of San Lucas Atoyaquillo, Oaxaca in 1996 (Country Reports 1996 1997, 496). According to Country Reports 1996, caciques there have "benefited not only from alleged narcotics ties but also from their ability to seize the lands deserted by peasants fleeing the violence" (ibid.). Further, while the government has justified the militarization of Chiapas and Guerrero on the grounds that it is necessary to combat narcotrafficking, Rochlin states "the real aim may be to bolster the military struggle against the Zapatista guerrillas and a variety of subversive groups in Guerrero under the guise of fighting drugs" (1996, 38).

3.4 Mexico City

With 22 million people, Mexico City is the most populous city in the world (The Toronto Star 1 June 1997). National Geographic describes the city as follows:

Nothing here seems stable. The city is ringed with volcanoes, is shaken regularly by earthquakes, and is built on a lake bed into which its buildings slowly sink. ... The city's web of streets is clogged with traffic; its air is so thick that residents have chronic sore throats and burning eyes. Aquifers and rivers that supply its water are overextended and polluted—cholera recently killed several people when they drank from a spring after their city water ran out (Aug. 1996, 26).

Many indigenous peasants, increasingly unable to survive in the southern countryside, have moved to the capital where they have found work in the informal sector (Jackson 25 June 1997, 6). Because of the city's chronic housing shortage—Mexico City is short some 800,000 units—many end up in squatters camps set up in vacant lots (UPI 19 Sept. 1996). Overpopulation and poverty have fuelled violence and crime in the city (National Geographic Aug. 1996, 26-27), which continue despite the presence of army troops and government efforts to revamp the city's police forces (see subsection 2.2) (Proceso 5 Jan. 1997; Latin America Weekly Report 11 Mar. 1997). A June 1997 report cites a recent Mexico City legislature public safety committee study indicating a 300 per cent increase in the number of hold-ups since 1989 (WOLA June 1997, 4). Other sources indicate that an average of at least 600 crimes have been committed each day since 1996 (LARR: Mexico & NAFTA Report 8 July 1997b, 7; Latin America Weekly Report 11 Mar. 1997). Latin America Weekly Report cites PRODH estimates that "active or former members of the police [were] directly or indirectly responsible for some 150 holdups a day, half the total" in 1996 (ibid.). Intolerance of corruption and injustice has also grown, however, with at least 50 sit-ins, marches and hunger strikes per week in early 1997, as compared to 10 per week in the 1980s (The Dallas Morning News 29 Apr. 1997).

In 1996, there were reportedly over 13,000 children living on the streets of Mexico City (Country Reports 1996 1997, 506). Often victims of family violence, many are involved in drugs and alcohol, prostitution and petty robberies (ibid.). Some police officers have reportedly pressured children to commit petty crimes and subsequently extorted the profits from them (ibid.).

      The New York Times reported a wave of abductions in Mexico City in late June and early July 1997 (5 July 1997). On 17 June 1997, Rev. Wifredo Guinea, a 74-year-old Jesuit priest and head of the Jesuit publishing house Obra Nacional de la Buena Prensa, was kidnapped (ibid.; ibid. 28 June 1997). Although a ransom was paid for his release (ibid.; ibid. 5 July 1997), by 5 July 1997 the priest had not reappeared (ibid.). On 19 June 1997 armed men kidnapped opposition congressman Victor Quintana for 10 hours (ibid.). They reportedly beat him, robbed him and threatened to attack his family home in Chihuahua state (ibid.). On 2 July 1997 a group of armed people wearing ski masks reportedly abducted 26-year-old Rubén Figueroa Smutny, the son of former Guerrero state governor Rubén Figueroa Alcocer (see subsection 3.3) (ibid.; La Jornada 4 July 1997). Some Mexican newspapers quoted sources close to the family as stating the family was negotiating with the kidnappers, suspected to be EPR rebels (The New York Times 5 July 1997), but the family publicly maintained he was travelling in Europe (La Jornada 4 July 1997; ibid. 9 July 1997). Rubén Figueroa Smutny reappeared in public several days after the incident (ibid.).

On 5 August 1997 Reuters reported that, following the arrest of up to 4,000 people since March 1997, the government had stepped up its campaign to fight crime, deploying heavily armed police to dangerous neighbourhoods "to round up suspected criminals by the hundreds" (5 Aug. 1997). However, according to PRD member and Mexico City Public Security Commission president Pedro Penaloza, only 15 per cent are charged with crimes and the rest are released (ibid.).

President Zedillo has reportedly promised to allow Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas to choose a new police chief and district attorney for Mexico City when he takes office as mayor on 5 December 1997 (The New York Times 15 July 1997; World Policy Journal Fall 1997).

4. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

A 2 August 1997 Le Monde article indicates that impunity appears to be on the wane in Mexico and predicts that opposition party gains during the 6 July 1997 elections will reinforce this trend (2 Aug. 1997, 4). Other sources, however, indicate that "militarization of the police" (Galleguillos 17 Oct. 1997) and lack of public security and safety are the paramount issues to be addressed in the near term (La Jornada 30 Sept. 1997; Reforma 2 Oct. 1997). Historian Lorenzo Meyer, writing in the aftermath of the July elections, states that the "authorities are structurally incapable of controlling the police forces and the apparatus for the administration of justice at its fundamental level. ... Not only is the police ineffective, but in many cases it is actually the criminal element" (ibid.). Reding indicates that "democratic accountability" is crucial to establishing the rule of law in Mexico (World Policy Journal Fall 1997). Other sources suggest the opposition parties, in particular the opposition alliance in the Chamber of Deputies, must play a key role in ensuring a successful transition to democracy (Reforma 9 Oct. 1997; The New York Times 13 July 1997, E-18), a role they may not be capable of performing (Reforma 9 Oct. 1997). While the recent elections were a watershed in Mexican politics—one observer describes the current juncture as the "most propitious moment since the 16th century for Mexican society" (ibid.)—the prevalence of crime, corruption and violence poses a major challenge to Mexico's nascent democracy (Cemp 18 Sept. 1997; Millet 22 Sept. 1997; Reforma 9 Oct. 1997; ibid. 2 Oct. 1997; La Jornada 30 Sept. 1997).

APPENDIX I: NOTES ON SELECTED SOURCES

Cemp, Roderick:

        Roderick Cemp is a professor of Latin American studies at Tulane University in New Orleans, Louisiana. A regular traveller to Mexico, he has written on Mexican politics and in 1993 authored a book on the Mexican military.

Galleguillos, Nibaldo:

        Nibaldo Galleguillos is a professor of political science at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario. He has written extensively on Mexico and has presented papers on judicial reform, electoral reform, human rights and the changing role of the military in Mexico. Galleguillos, who was an official Canadian observer during the 1997 elections, has visted Mexico three times in the last ten months.

Millet, Richard:

        Richard Millet teaches history at Southern Illinois University in Edwardsville, Illinois. He is also Senior Advisor with the Syracuse, New York-based consulting firm Political Risk Services for Latin America, and a Senior Research Associate at the North-South Center, University of Miami.

Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights/Heartland Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights (MA/HA):

        Formerly known as the Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee, Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights was founded in 1983. It is a "volunteer-based, non-governmental, non-profit organization ... comprised of more than 1,200 members dedicated to the promotion and protection of human rights worldwide. [It] impartially and independently investigates and exposes human rights violations; represents human rights victims; trains and assists groups that protect human rights; educates the public, policy-makers and children; and promotes the universal acceptance of international human rights standards" (MA/HA Nov. 1996, n.p.).

Formerly known as Travellers & Immigrants Aid, "Heartland Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights ... is a policy, advocacy and service organization which seeks to build strengths, safeguard rights, counter injustice and foster productive interdependence in order to realize the goal of full and fair societal participation for all. Through its Abbott-Addams Collaborative on Human Rights, Heartland Alliance monitors human rights and refugee situations nationally and internationally, continuing the organization's role of providing protection to persons endangered by violence or bias. ... Heartland Alliance also seeks solutions to urban poverty by researching and recommending improvements in education, employment, health and housing opportunities for impoverished individuals and families" (MA/HA Nov. 1996, n.p.).

Reding, Andrew:

        Andrew Reding is North America Project Director and Senior Fellow for Hemispheric Affairs at the New York-based World Policy Institute of the New School for Social Research, as well as international affairs expert for the United States Department of Justice. He is also associate editor of the San Francisco-based Pacific News Service. He has published widely on Mexican affairs.

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[1]1.           The IFE, which replaced the Federal Electoral Commission (Comisión Federal Electoral-CFE) in 1990 (WOLA June 1997, 12), is responsible for organizing and updating the voter registration process and voter lists, designing, printing and distributing electoral documents including ballots, tabulating and verifying votes, and training election workers (WOLA June 1997, 11). Notwithstanding its increased independence, the IFE still lacks the authority to ensure equitable media coverage, monitor campaign financing and hold public and party officials accountable for electoral code violations (WOLA June 1997, 14).

[2]2.           Prior to this reform the Mexico City mayor was appointed by the president (Lawson 1996, 1021-22).

[3]3.           An exception was the state of Chiapas, where Zapatista National Liberation Army (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional-EZLN) sympathizers reportedly burned polling stations and attacked voters (The New York Times 15 July 1997).

[4]4.           According to Country Reports 1996, as of 1 April 1996 the minimum daily wage in Mexico City, nearby industrial areas, Acapulco, the petroleum industries in southeast Veracruz state and most border areas was US$3.01 (Country Reports 1996 1997, 511). In other industrialized areas, such as Guadalajara and Monterrey, the minimum daily wage was US$2.79, and in the rest of the country it was US$2.54 (Country Reports 1996 1997, 511).

[5]5.           Among these are the Ministry of Public Health, the National Railway of Mexico, the Ministry of Hydraulic Reserves, and Mexican Petroleum (Pemex) (World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems 1989, 258).

[6]6.           The Mexican armed forces consist of the army (130,000 personnel), navy (37,000) and air force (8,000) (Europa 1996 1996, 2155; L'état du monde 1997 1996, 248)

[7]7.           For additional information on the treatment of journalists who have criticized PRI or government officials, please refer to DIRB Response to Information Request MEX26359.E of 24 February 1997.

[8]8.           According to the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Colombian drug cartels contract to their Mexican counterparts delivery of up to 70 per cent of the cocaine destined for the United States (Le Monde 14 Feb. 1997).

[9]9.           The Juárez cartel was formerly led by Amado Carrillo Fuentes, who died in June 1997 after undergoing plastic surgery (Reuters 28 July 1997). The authorities claim he died from an overdose of a sleeping drug (ibid.).

[10]10.        Abrego was extradited to the United States in January 1996, where he was convicted on drug charges (High Times Aug. 1997, 48; Pacific News Service 14 May 1996).

[11]10. Abrego was extradited to the United States in January 1996, where he was convicted on drug charges (High Times Aug. 1997, 48; Pacific News Service 14 May 1996).

[12]11.        For information on these groups, please refer to the May 1997 DIRB Question and Answer Series paper Mexico: Armed Insurgent Groups.

[13]12.        Ruben Figueroa resigned as governor in March 1996 after a Supreme Court investigation into the 28 June 1995 killing of 17 peasants in Aguas Blancas implicated state police personnel in deliberate executions and evidence tampering (Country Reports 1996 Feb. 1997, 497; Pacific News Service 18 Mar. 1996).

[14]13.        According to Human Rights Watch, the Chinchulines have three front groups: the Independent Youth Organization, the Youth Group, and the Luis Donaldo Colosio Civic Front (HRW/A Apr. 1997, 67).

[15]14.        For additional information on these groups, please consult the May 1997 DIRB Question and Answer Series paper Mexico: Armed Insurgent Groups, p. 13.