Update (June 1994)

1.   POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Nicaragua appears to be recovering from its multiple economic and social problems. The country would seem to be edging out of a very deep and prolonged recession, has demobilized most of the contra rebels and greatly reduced the armed forces, weathered ongoing labour and political unrest, and is finally consolidating a working consensus in congress (CAR, various reports, 1993-94).

Political wrangling has split both the ruling coalition National Opposition Union (UNO) and the opposition Sandinistas (CAR 14 Jan. 1994a, 5-6; LP 23 Sept. 1993, 5; ibid. 25 Nov. 1993, 3). The resulting chaos, which rendered both congress and government ineffective, appears to have been resolved through an alliance in congress between those Sandinistas and former UNO members who support or at least tolerate the policies of President Chamorro (Caribbean and Central America Report 27 Jan. 1994, 2; CAR 14 Jan. 1994a, 5-6). In 1993 only 19 bills were passed into law, and most were regarded as insignificant (ibid.). The alliance is expected to ensure a smoother passage of important laws and has already approved a constitutional reform that will permit faster changes to the constitution than has been legally possible (ibid.; LP 23 Dec. 1993, 7).

The original UNO coalition of 14 parties has now been reduced to a governing alliance of seven groups, led by right-wing politicians who staunchly oppose any compromise with the Sandinistas (Caribbean and Central America Report 27 Jan. 1994, 2).

Daniel Ortega, former president and leader of the Sandinistas, is predicting a comeback for his party in the next elections which are scheduled for 1996 (ibid.). His leadership was reaffirmed at an "Extraordinary Congress" of the Sandinista party in May, amid bitter divisions within the party (CAR 27 May 1994, 1-2). Ortega, who is supported by the union movement and regional party leaders, has opposed some of the Chamorro administration's neoliberal policies (ibid., 2). However, 35 per cent of the party congress vote went to a faction made up of the heads of the farmers' organization, prominent artists and intellectuals and some former members of the Sandinista government (ibid.). This group advocated a more moderate approach in order to broaden party appeal in the next national elections, as well as democratization of the party leadership and the opening of party ranks at the local level (ibid.).

In February 1994, the Atlantic coast region, sparsely populated by ethnically and linguistically distinct groups who were opposed to the Sandinistas in the 1980s, elected its *** two autonomous regional governments (CAR 4 Mar. 1994, 7; Caribbean and Central America Report 3 Mar. 1994, 1). Despite the region's peculiarities, the results were expected to give an indication of the country's realignment of political forces and prospects (ibid.). There were no absolute winners in the election: the right-wing Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) won 37 of the 90 seats (18 in the southern region, 19 in the north), while the Sandinistas won 32 seats (19 in the north, 13 in the south) (LAWR 17 Mar. 1994, 120; CAR 4 Mar. 1994, 7). The remaining seats were divided between the Yatama movement (7), UNO (6) and other minor national and local groups (ibid.).

The political and economic crises of the government are already being exploited by all parties and coalitions, apparently in preparation for the 1996 elections (LP 26 Aug. 1993, 2). The austere economic policies being applied by the government could cripple its stability and popularity (IPS 21 Feb. 1994). Despite some positive signs, many economists warn of a possible total collapse of the economy (CAR 12 Nov. 1993, 340-41). The government, however, is hopeful that agricultural production which fell in 1993, as well as other economic sectors, will improve in 1994 (ibid.; Caribbean and Central America Report 9 Dec. 1993, 2).

The government's efforts to alleviate the crisis include attempts to increase farm and small-business credits, but the money required will not be provided by international lending agencies unless certain financial reforms are implemented (The Christian Science Monitor 9 Feb. 1994). The number of small-farm credit recipients fell from 75,000 in the 1980s to fewer than 15,000, and many farmers have had to sell their land (ibid.). To complicate matters, a recent study found that "ownership of 40 percent of Nicaraguan property is either unregistered or legally contested" (IPS 21 Feb. 1994). In January 1994 new policies were announced by the president, aimed at reversing an economic situation that has so far benefitted the large landholders at the expense of small farmers (The Christian Science Monitor 9 Feb. 1994).

2.                VIOLENCE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

Since 1991 loosely-organized groups of re-armed contras ("recontras") and former Sandinista soldiers ("recompas"), dissatisfied with the land and other benefits received after their demobilization, have resorted to marauding, apparently to press for financial and political demands (Houston Chronicle 10 Feb. 1994; LP 28 Oct. 1993, 2). Violence escalated in 1993, most of it concentrated in the northern areas (ibid.; Dallas Morning News 17 Apr. 1994; CAR 16 July 1993, 203).

Army statistics estimate that at least 49 soldiers were killed and 80 were wounded in combat in 1993 (CAR 18 Feb. 1994b, 2). But by the end of 1993, most of the armed groups had either been defeated or disarmed as a result of a series of army offensives and amnesties for recontras and recompas passed by the government (Dallas Morning News 17 Apr. 1994; CAR 18 Feb. 1994b, 2). The opposition acknowledges that one of President Chamorro's achievements is this gradual pacification of the countryside (IPS 21 Feb. 1994).

The last large recontra group to have repeatedly rejected an amnesty, the Frente Norte 3-80 (FN 3-80), in early February 1994 finally agreed to a plan for a ceasefire and demobilization, after ongoing clashes had killed more than 40 people in the first month of 1994 alone (CAR 18 Feb. 1994b, 2). The group, estimated by the army to have some 800 fighters spread throughout Estelí, Boaco, Chontales, Jinotega and Matagalpa, had retreated into Honduras after an October 1993 army offensive (ibid.). They sabotaged transport and threatened the coffee harvest, to demand-among other things-the removal of both the president's Minister of the Presidency and the chief of the army.

In response, the government launched an offensive that led the group to drop its political demands and agree to enter negotiations for a permanent disarmament (ibid.; Houston Chronicle 10 Feb. 1994). Among those reported killed in this offensive were the brother of FN 3-80 leader José Angel Talavera (nicknamed "the jackal") and four other leaders, and another brother of Talavera was seriously wounded (CAR 18 Feb. 1994b, 2). The group's demands appear to have been reduced to the integration of former combatants into police forces in areas where the group has support, protection of former fighters, and political participation at the national level (ibid.).

A May 1994 report indicates that a number of recently demobilized contras have been trained and integrated into the police forces as was agreed upon in the peace accords (CAR 27 May 1994b, 8). In early May, while some demobilized members of the FN 3-80 occupied various government and financial buildings to protest alleged violations of the February peace agreement, another group claiming to be the real FN 3-80 protested against the terms of the agreement by obstructing transportation in various municipalities (ibid.).

The violence in the northern rural areas continued during the first four months of 1994. The Nicaraguan Centre for Human Rights (CENIDH) reported that in the first quarter a total of 104 "political murders" took place, in which both Sandinista militants and former contras were victims (IPS 18 Apr. 1994). The army released detailed figures for the period covering 1 January to 10 May, stating that the military offensive against armed groups in the north that began in February had left 92 civilians, 93 "irregular combatants" and 13 soldiers dead (CAR 27 May 1994b, 8). The report also lists 55 abductions, the detention of 31 suspected kidnappers and the disbandment of 20 gangs during the same period (ibid.). The head of the army stated that "24 groups of irregular combatants ... and 84 gangs of common criminals continue to operate in the area" (ibid.). Since the demobilization of FN 3-80, the government regards all armed groups as common criminals, and has announced a joint EPS-police operation to combat them (CAR 29 Apr. 1994, 6).

The Ministry of the Interior has created Special Brigades of both soldiers and police "to investigate and combat the wave of abductions and to protect farmers in the northern departments," where kidnapping for ransom has increased dramatically in recent years (CAR 27 May 1994b, 8; ibid. 29 Apr. 1994, 6). This action was in response to demands for protection from the main farmers' organization and the National Coffee Commission (CAR 27 May 1994b, 8).

The government and the army will also form part of a Special Committee that will "investigate and publicly elucidate the complaints of human rights violations in the north" (ibid.). Meanwhile, Nicaragua's Cardinal and the general manager of the country's main newspaper have proposed a plan, which includes safety provisions for combatants and economic development of the region, that they hope will bring peace to the north (ibid.).

3.       HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

Questions of judicial integrity and the administration of military justice have also been raised by a Tripartite Commission, composed of representatives of the government, the Catholic Church and the Organization of American States (OAS) to investigate abuses by and against former contras (CAR 14 Jan. 1994b, 3; CAR 14 Jan. 1994b, 3). However, previous investigative work of the Commission showed that the security situation of former contras is quite complex, and that although those responsible for abuses were not always identifiable, the investigation of the abuses was still inadequate (CAR 13 May 1994, 7).

Other human rights organizations in Nicaragua have claimed that impunity is a persistent problem, while two non-Sandinista organizations highlighted the partiality of the judicial system, unresolved property conflicts and the lack of civilian control over the military as the main obstacles to improved respect for human rights (CAR 14 Jan. 1994b, 3).

In March an investigation began into the 1990 death of a youth whose car was shot at, allegedly by General Ortega's bodyguards, as it overtook the general's motorcade. The case is being investigated by a military court, which held the bodyguards for questioning and ordered in March a ten-day movement restriction on General Ortega (San Antonio Express-News 23 Mar. 1994). The head of a human rights organization claimed, however, that the restraining order on the general "was mainly for foreign consumption," while Ortega claimed the situation was being exploited to embarass him and the army (ibid.). Amnesty International had previously expressed concern about the impartiality of the military court, given earlier indications of military obstructionism (Amnesty International 1993, 223). By June 1994, the investigation had not yet been concluded.

The United States Department of State, in the annual report used by Congress to decide allocation of international aid, reports that the security forces are largely in the hands of Sandinista officers "who operated with substantial legal and institutional autonomy," and adds that

with the deaths of nine former members of the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN) attributable to the police and the EPS, the number of serious human rights violations committed by the state security forces declined slightly in 1993, but most of these violations went unpunished (Country Reports 1993 1994, 503) [ The 1993 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR) Critique of the Department of State's Country Reports 1992, while noting that "the political bias ... underlinin[g] prior reports [on Nicaragua] continues to characterize the 1992 edition," nevertheless describes it as a "generally accurate catalogue of human rights abuses" (ibid., 504). It attributes a degree of impunity for human rights violations to government failure to prosecute and punish responsible parties and a "backlogged and often partisan judicial system" (ibid.). It also says there are "no reliable accounts" of disappearances in 1993, although torture by police to obtain confessions from detainees continued (ibid.).

Both Americas Watch and Country Reports describe killings of Sandinista cooperativists and of former contras, and the failure to resolve old and new political and extrajudicial killings (Country Reports 1993 1994, 504; also see Amnesty International 1993, 221-24). One human rights organization, described as being Sandinista, reported for 1993 a total of 482 deaths "divided roughly in half between Sandinistas and members of the Nicaraguan Resistance [contras]" (CAR 14 Jan. 1994b, 3). The amnesties aimed at pacifying the countryside have apparently exempted criminals from punishment, while military tribunals are said to protect their comrades-in-arms (ibid.).

The Nicaraguan government has expressed its strong criticism of Country Reports 1993, describing it as a misportrayal of its commitment to respect for human rights (CAR 18 Feb. 1994a, 4). The foreign minister has stated that his government "does not accept nor will it ever accept that there is the political intent to systematically violate human rights," while the Minister of the Presidency has argued that the information used by the State Department is outdated, and that the report ignores "the effort made by our country to improve consensus among the different social and political forces" (ibid.).

Tensions between the army and the executive, which many attribute to foreign policy needs of the government, were aggravated with President Chamorro's plan to replace General Humberto Ortega as head of the army in 1994 (LP 7 Oct. 1993, 4; Criminal Justice: The Americas Feb.-Mar. 1993, 11). But changes in the security services are taking place: a number of Sandinista officers were removed from the police and its head was replaced, and as noted earlier, some demobilized contras have been integrated into the police (ibid.). The police will now fall under the newly created Vice-Ministry for Citizens' Security (ibid.). This development follows the creation of a new division of Intelligence Affairs in late 1993, subordinated to the executive and with a broad mandate to protect constitutional order and national security, that will replace the army's Information Directorate (CAR 29 Oct. 1993a, 322). The changes, however, may not satisfy hardliners who want further-reaching changes, including the removal of all Sandinistas from top army positions (LP 11 Nov. 1993, 7).

Following an agreement between the executive, congress and the military, General Ortega has announced that he will relinquish his post as head of the army in early 1995 (La Jornada 5 May 1994; CAR 13 May 1994, 6-7). A new military organization law regulating the length of service in command positions and other aspects of military proceedings and institutions has been completed and is expected to be passed in the near future (ibid.).

For information on military recruitment, as well as an ongoing update on events in Nicaragua, please consult the REFINFO database and other documentation available at Regional Documentation Centres.

REFERENCES

Amnesty International. 1993. Amnesty International Report 1993. New York: Amnesty International USA.

Caribbean & Central America Report [London]. 3 March 1994. "Following the Shrinkage of UNO, the Sandinistas Head for a Split."

Caribbean & Central America Report [London]. 27 January 1994. "Uno is Reduced to a Seven-Party Rump."

Caribbean & Central America Report [London]. 9 December 1993. "Prospects for Next Year Turn Around."

Central America Report (CAR) [Guatemala]. 27 May 1994. "Nicaragua: Pyrrhic Victory for Ortega in FSLN Congress?"

Central America Report (CAR) [Guatemala]. 27 May 1994b. "Nicaragua: Occupations and Violence."

Central America Report (CAR) [Guatemala]. 13 May 1994. "Nicaragua: Ambiguous Anniversary."

Central America Report (CAR) [Guatemala]. 29 April 1994. "Nicaragua: New Chapter in Nicaragua."

Central America Report (CAR) [Guatemala]. 4 March 1994. "Nicaragua: Atlantic Coast Elections."

Central America Report (CAR) [Guatemala]. 18 February 1994a. "Nicaragua: State Department Criticizes Chamorro."

Central America Report (CAR) [Guatemala]. 18 February 1994b. "Nicaragua: New Peace Plan Raises Hopes."

Central America Report (CAR) [Guatemala]. 11 February 1994. "Nicaragua: An Endless Debate."

Central America Report (CAR) [Guatemala]. 14 January 1994a. "Nicaragua: New Parliamentary Alliance."

Central America Report (CAR) [Guatemala]. 14 January 1994b. "Nicaragua: Sandinista Army Under Fire."

Central America Report (CAR) [Guatemala]. 12 November 1993. "Nicaragua: Hopes...and Reality."

Central America Report (CAR) [Guatemala]. 29 October 1993a. "New Intelligence Apparatus."

Central America Report (CAR) [Guatemala]. 16 July 1993. "Nicaragua: New Disarmament Plan."

The Christian Science Monitor [Boston]. 9 February 1994. David R. Dye. "Nicaragua Government Promises to Help the `Forgotten' Peasants." (Central America NewsPak [Austin] 7-20 Feb. 1994, pp. 8-9)

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993. 1994. United States Department of State. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992. 1993. United States Department of State. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

Criminal Justice: The Americas [Chicago]. February-March 1993. Vol. 6, No. 1. "Nicaragua: Police Shakeup."

Dallas Morning News. 17 April 1994. "Contra Force in Nicaragua Disarms." (Central America NewsPak [Austin] 4-17 Apr. 1994, p. 11)

Houston Chronicle. 10 February 1994. Tim Johnson. "Nicaragua Accepts Rebels' Offer of Truce." (Central America NewsPak [Austin] 7-20 Feb. 1994, p. 9)

Inter Press Service (IPS). 18 April 1994. "More Than 100 Political Deaths in 1994." (Central America NewsPak [Austin] 18 Apr.-1 May 1994, p. 10)

Inter Press Service (IPS). 21 February 1994. Pablo Azocar. "Daniel Ortega Predicts Sandinistas Will Regain Power." (Central America NewsPak [Austin] 7-20 Feb. 1994, pp. 10-11)

La Jornada (Mexico). 5 May 1994. "Ortega to Leave Command of Military Forces in February 1995." (Central America NewsPak [Austin] 2-15 May 1994, p. 10)

Latinamerica Press (LP) [Lima]. 23 December 1993. David R. Dye. "Nicaraguan Political Forces Realigning."

Latinamerica Press (LP) [Lima]. 25 November 1993. David R. Dye. "Dispute Reveals Weakness in Sandinista Unity."

Latinamerica Press (LP) [Lima]. 11 November 1993. "Nicaragua: Changing Intelligence."

Latinamerica Press (LP) [Lima]. 28 October 1993. David R. Dye. "Nicaraguan Recontras Defy Ultimatum."

Latinamerica Press (LP) [Lima]. 7 October 1993. David R. Dye. "Civil-Military Crisis Plagues Nicaragua."

Latinamerica Press (LP) [Lima]. 23 September 1993. David R. Dye. "Nicaraguan Crisis Simmers as Talks Stagnate."

Latinamerica Press (LP) [Lima]. 26 August 1993. Paul Jeffrey. "Nicaraguan Parties Already at Speed for '96."

Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 17 March 1994. "Nicaragua: Elections."

San Antonio Express-News. 23 March 1994. "Nicaragua's Army Chief Confined." (Central America NewsPak [Austin] 21 Mar.-3 Apr. 1994, pp. 9-10)