Economic Growth and Human Rights


In January 1992 China's paramount leader Deng Xiaoping made what is now considered by many within China to be a historic and symbolic trip to southern China. The trip gave a new boost to economic reforms he had begun after his rise to power in the late 1970s, but which might have been in question following the crackdown on the 1989 pro-democracy movement. Many reports indicate that accelerated economic growth has helped quicken the pace of social change, but to what extent have these economic and social changes engendered changes in the human rights situation in a country long known for its repression and intolerance of political dissent? This paper will discuss the country's emerging political, economic and social climate, examine the often confusing portrait of the state of human rights within that climate, and finally, reflect on future scenarios put forward by China analysts (For information specific to the situation of women in the People's Republic of China, please see the October 1993 DIRB Human Rights Brief entitled Women in China).


Two major political events have influenced the current economic surge in what has been described as the world's largest--over 1.1 billion people--untapped market. The first was Deng Xiaoping's tour of the south in January 1992, which was seen as giving Deng's public blessing to the new economic order which is now officially enshrined in the constitution as the "socialist market economy" (Thurston 1993a, 7, 14; Libération 30 Mar. 1993; Reuters 29 Mar. 1993; Current History Sept. 1993, 257). The second major event was the military and political purge which reportedly took place during the 14th Party Congress in October 1992, when President Yang Shangkun, a strong force in the Tiananmen crackdown, and half-brother Yang Baibing, director of the People's Liberation Army and secretary-general of the Central Military Commission, as well as some 300 generals, were retired or replaced by people more likely to keep the military out of Chinese politics (The Washington Post 12 Feb. 1993; FEER 29 Oct. 1992, 15). According to one scholar, the resulting appointments "increase[d] professional and regional representation in the high command at the expense of political commissars and the Yangs" (Current History Sept. 1993, 258). Yang Shangkun has been replaced as president by Jiang Zemin, who is also the Communist Party of China (CCP) party secretary and commander of the army (SCMP 1 Apr. 1993; Libération 29 Mar. 1993). While such an accumulation of titles has not been seen in China since 1978, analysts do not necessarily view Jiang as an all-powerful political figure. Some see him as a compromise succession candidate without significant political clout beyond the support of the "retired" Deng Xiaoping, who clearly remains in charge despite holding only one official title--head of China's bridge-playing association (ibid. 15 Mar. 1993; The Ottawa Citizen 27 Mar. 1993).

These political changes have been seen as Deng's attempt to avoid the collapse experienced by communist governments in the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe, including the subsequent political and economic chaos (Thurston Jan. 1993a, 13-14). While worldwide communist party membership withered after 1989, membership in the CCP grew to 52 million in 1992, an increase of 2 million from 1991, with applications up by 20 per cent over the previous year (Time 10 May 1993d, 38). However, this new popularity reportedly has little to do with ideology and much to do with business: the CCP remains the centre of influence, patronage and political connections, and good relations with the party are considered essential for business success (ibid.). Deng Xiaoping reportedly has allowed party units and senior cadres to operate businesses on the side while carrying out their official duties (SCMP 1 Apr. 1993). As well, large numbers of government officials have reportedly left their posts to go into private business, which according to China Watch not only "reflects the increasing strength of the market sector, it also demonstrates how many entrepreneurs have opportunities to cash in on government contacts" (China Watch 27 Jan. 1993c, 10).


3.1   The Economy

A plethora of media reports over the last year have painted a portrait of a new China awash with money commanded by independent entrepreneurs freed from central economic control, with enormous investment from foreign joint ventures, overseas Chinese and the considerable savings of a domestic population long unable to spend their money on consumer goods (Thurston Jan. 1993a; Time 10 May 1993b; ibid. 10 May 1993f; The Economist 28 Nov. 1992). While the economic growth rate has averaged some 9 per cent annually for the last 14 years, that rate jumped to over 12 per cent last year, with much higher rates of growth being recorded in the private sector (State-owned firms accounted for 78 per cent of China's industrial output in 1978, a figure that had declined to just over 50 per cent by 1992. Chinese government officials estimate that the state's share could fall to 25 percent by the year 2000 (The Economist 28 Nov. 1992, 8; Time 10 May 1993g, 48), prompting some analysts to predict that China will have one of the world's largest economies by early in the next century (Time 10 May 1993b, 28-31; The Economist 28 Nov. 1992, 3-4).

Much of the growth has been uneven, taking place in southern coastal provinces such as Guangdong and Fujian, where special economic zones were created in the 1980s as part of Deng's strategy of freeing up the Chinese economy. These regions also have close ties with the nearby economic centres of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau, all intimately associated with China's phenomenal economic growth (Time 10 May 1993f; The Economist 28 Nov. 1992, 14). Regarding Hong Kong, for example, Time writer Jay Branegan reports:

Hong Kong manufacturers and other entrepreneurs have invested more than $10 billion in the People's Republic; they have set up some 25,000 factories in Guangdong province alone, employing 3 million people in the production of clothing, toys, electronics and other export goods. The number represents nearly four times the manufacturing workers in the crown colony. So closely are the two economies entwined that 30% of Hong Kong's currency is in circulation on the mainland (10 May 1993f, 43).

Recent reports indicate, however, that significant portions of China's recent growth are based on paper profits, including real estate and currency speculation and economic scams that have sprung up in a climate of little regulation and rampant corruption (The Toronto Star 1 Aug. 1993; Time 12 July 1993, 34-35; ibid. 10 May 1993b, 28; FEER 4 Feb. 1993a, 40). For example, reports have surfaced about the People's Liberation Army's ventures into dealing illegal currency futures and its growing business empire in consumer goods and hotels (The Toronto Star 1 Aug. 1993; FEER 4 Feb. 1993a, 40; Time 10 May 1993c, 37), and The Economist has described the speculation and tax evasion behind the forest of empty office buildings in China's largest special economic zone, Hainan province (The Economist 5 Sept. 1992, 37). Time has reported on the 8,700 new "economic development zones" created in the last year:

Less than 2% of the areas have begun to operate as industrial centres; most have simply become opportunities for real estate speculation. Typically, local authorities create a development company and begin to build, in the hope of eventually selling off industrial parks, apartment complexes and other facilities to outsiders (Time 10 May 1993e, 41).

The rapid expansion of certain portions of the economy has been accompanied by high inflation, officially running at an annual rate of 17 per cent in urban centres, although the actual rate may be higher (ibid. 12 July 1993, 35). While economic growth has by no means been relegated to the southern coastal regions--Shanghai, Jiangsu and many other disparate areas, including Wuhan, Chongqing and Shenyang are also reporting business booms (The Bulletin 26 May 1993; Asian Survey Jan. 1993, 16-17)--analysts have noted significant disparities between urban and rural development. The early stages of reform, from 1979-1983, benefited peasants by enabling them to sell portions of their crops on the free market, but in the last several years rural incomes have fallen relative to urban incomes, and it is the peasants who are especially vulnerable to inflation (FEER 4 Apr. 1991, 24). Serious rioting was reported in several rural areas in the spring of 1993 after peasants objected to the government's large-scale use of IOUs instead of cash to pay for crops (Reuters 9 Aug. 1993; The Globe and Mail 15 Apr. 1993, A6; FEER 4 Mar. 1993b, 14). As well, rural tensions and the lure of plentiful urban money have contributed to a massive population movement into the wealthier cities (FEER 4 Mar. 1993c, 20-22; ibid. 25 Feb. 1993b).

Recently the Chinese government has made attempts to tackle inflation and even out regional disparities, but much of the economy seems to be out of control, or at least out of the central government's control (Time 10 May 1993e, 40; Current History Sept. 1993, 254). Far Eastern Economic Review has reported on the Guangdong CCP secretary's snubbing of Beijing's efforts to curb inflation, and sums up the situation this way:

Some analysts warn of the possibility that a serious recession may be on the way if the speculative real-estate bubble bursts and inflation rockets out of control, forcing the centre to clamp down harder on credit. In this environment, local officials appear to believe they are living on borrowed time, and have only a short-lived window of opportunity to get projects completed (3 June 1993b, 21).

3.2   Social Climate

3.2.1  Income and Mobility

China's economic boom has seemingly overnight created a class of nouveau riche entrepreneurs with more disposable income than was previously thought possible in a communist society (The New York Times 30 Aug. 1992; The Bulletin 26 May 1993; Time 12 July 1993, 35). The mushrooming private enterprises created in the boom have also benefited millions of workers, who have traded the security of a state sector job for higher wages--but no safety net--in a joint venture or new business. The trend is so striking that it has spawned a new term, xia hai, or "plunging into the sea"--risking everything for the sake of dramatic financial gain (ibid. 10 May 1993a, 55). A recent Chinese survey estimates that half a million intellectuals have taken the plunge and are now administering 20,000 new businesses (Zhongguo Tongxun She 15 May 1993). As well, an April 1993 government announcement of gradual reforms to the work assignment system means students will have increasing freedom to find their own jobs after graduation. Ninety per cent of Chinese university and college students currently have their tuition and expenses paid by the central government. Traditionally students have been forced to accept compulsory job assignments after graduation, a system that many have charged favoured the wealthy and well-connected (UPI 5 Apr. 1993).

Many western companies like McDonald's restaurants and Avon cosmetics have made their way to China. By the end of June 1993, the number of foreign firms operating in China totalled 130,000 (ibid. 7 Aug. 1993a; The New York Times 24 Apr. 1992, A7; ibid. 3 May 1992). As well, state-of-the-art consumer goods are now available in most urban centres for the increasing number of people who can afford them (The Bulletin 26 May 1993; The New York Times 24 Apr. 1992, A7; ibid. 3 May 1992).

One by-product of this economic revolution is increased labour mobility. The traditional urban social compact which saw the state guaranteeing jobs, housing, food rations and retirement benefits, while using these guarantees to exercise control over individuals through their work units and neighbourhood committees, has been loosened for large numbers of people (Asian Survey Jan. 1993, 17; Country Reports 1992 1993, 544; (FEER 8 Apr. 1993a, 15). According to Country Reports 1992, while most urban dwellers are still dependent on and answerable to their work unit (Country Reports 1992 1993, 544),

the need for a supplemental work force in major cities has led to general, albeit varied, official tolerance for a large itinerant population which is not in compliance with formal requirements to obtain permission to change residence (ibid., 547).

This "floating population" of itinerant workers, estimated at over 100 million, has been described as "a footloose subculture approaching the population of Japan" (Time 10 May 1993b, 30). In 1991 the Far Eastern Economic Review reported that up to 2 million Sichuanese had migrated illegally to the coastal areas to work (FEER 4 Apr. 1991, 24); 1 million new migrant workers arrived in Guangdong province during the 1993 spring festival holidays alone (ibid. 25 Feb. 1993b). Many of the rural arrivals cannot speak Cantonese, and without work permits are unable to get the more profitable jobs in foreign joint ventures or hotels (ibid.). In Guangzhou the homeless often end up at the central railway station, which has been described as a "grim scene of sick children and penniless parents, [where] the forces of supply and demand seem almost as cruel as the communism before it" (ibid.). Yet the boom has also meant that many others have been able to find work and have their status regularized by authorities who recognize the region's need for labour (ibid. 8 Apr. 1993a, 15).

This massive uprooting of peasants is not just taking place in the south; South China Morning Post Weekly reports that many of the migrant workers coming into Beijing are teenagers from Zhejiang province hoping to make money for their families by doing sweatshop labour (SCMPW 21-22 Nov. 1992). Beijing police, in a raid that was highly publicized in China, recently rounded up about 250 illegal residents in Beijing and returned them to their villages in the countryside (UPI 29 July 1993). About 1.5 million of the city's 10 million people are reportedly without official residence permits, although temporary permits have been issued to several hundred thousand of them (ibid.).

3.2.2  Communications and Expression

eReports indicate that China is undergoing a communications revolution. Fax machines, satellite dishes, personal pagers and cellular phones, as well as new links to the international direct-dial network, are now being introduced in the country that historically has had the fewest telephones per capita in the world (Thurston Jan. 1993b, 134; Time 10 May 1993d, 38; Japan Economic Newswire 3 Aug. 1993). Several western sources have commented on the anomalous status of satellite dishes, many of which are being sold in state-owned stores. Officially they cannot be bought by private individuals and are only to be used to receive domestic programming, but these restrictions have been described as unenforceable, and private owners have at times enjoyed consdierable freedom to tune into Hong Kong and Taiwan stations (The New York Times 29 May 1993; Time 10 May 1993d, 38; Thurston Jan. 1993b, 134). Most recently, however, the Beijing government has reclarified its restrictions against private ownership and use of the dishes. State Council Proclamation No. 129 of October 1993 reportedly requires work units, government bodies and individuals to obtain special government permission to use satellite dishes. Those in contravention will have their equipment confiscated and face fines of US$866 for businesses and US$8,667 for government bodies (FEER 21 Oct. 1993a, 72). Satellite dishes have been banned in the past, following the Tiananmen Square massacre, for example, but the ban was reportedly widely ignored and unenforced. The same fate may await this latest ban, especially since millions of Chinese reportedly now own the dishes (ibid.; ibid. 21 Oct. 1993b, 74). According to a western diplomat quoted in Far Eastern Economic Review, an unenforceable ban might have several advantages from the government's point of view:

[the government] earns 'Brownie points' overseas for its good intentions on [protecting] intellectual property; it 'raises the rent' on illicit antennas, generating windfall profits for state enterprises that still make them; and it 'gives itself a stick' with which to crack down selectively on opponents, even if it can't implement the ban nation-wide (ibid.).

The telephone system is still outmoded and it can take up to two years to have a telephone installed, but personal pagers are filling the gap--reportedly there are now 300,000 subscribers in Beijing (Japan Economic Newswire 3 Aug. 1993).

Chinese-language broadcasts of the BBC and Voice of America are reportedly widely listened-to and respected (Thurston Jan. 1993b, 134; Time 10 May 1993d, 38), but there has also been a recent flowering of sorts of home-grown Chinese journalism and arts, at least as compared to the propaganda uniformly featured after the 1989 Tiananmen crisis (Jernow Jan. 1993, 84-86; The New York Times 29 May 1993; China Daily 29 Apr. 1993).

In August 1992, Politburo Standing Committee propaganda chief Li Ruihan made a widely-noted speech calling for greater freedoms for "cultural workers" in the arts and media (FEER 1 Oct. 1992, 32-33; Jernow Jan. 1993, 92; Country Reports 1992 1993, 545). That official encouragement, along with the realities of market competition, have reportedly brought about noted changes to Chinese arts and media in large centres like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. Several plays with apparently thinly-veiled anti-government messages have been shown in Beijing, and previously banned films, such as Zhang Yimou's internationally-acclaimed Judou and Raise the Red Lantern, are now being screened in China (FEER 1 Oct. 1992, 32-33; Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 163; Asian Survey Jan. 1993, 17). Other works, however, such as the film The Blue Kite, the anti-leftist collection of essays The Tide of History, Memorandum on Anti-Leftism and the science magazine Future and Development, have all recently been banned (Jernow Jan. 1993, 84; China Watch 27 Jan. 1993a, 2; AFP 11 Dec. 1992; Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 162-63). FEER reporter Lincoln Kaye has commented on this contradictory climate:

If, for cultural luminaries like Zhang [Yimou], domestic acclaim is finally catching up with their international reputations, others are still being penalised for their popularity abroad. Many liberal academics and intellectuals who were sidelined after the Tiananmen massacre now air their views and draw needed income by publishing commentaries in Hongkong and Taiwan newspapers.

This brings on a spate of petty sanctions, such as exit permits denied, housing entitlements revoked and periodic police detention and questioning (FEER 1 Oct. 1992, 33).

Changes and contradictions are also apparent in the more commercial world of Chinese newspapers and other media outlets, which are experiencing less government control than usual in some areas, but are also operating without the extensive state subsidies of the past (Baltimore Sun 8 Aug. 1993). The Shanghai newspapers Wen Hui Bao and Liberation Daily have begun renting out their pages to advertisers, charging as much as US$210,000 for full front-page ads (ibid.; AP 6 June 1993). Radio stations in Guangzhou and Shanghai are experimenting with a variety of western-style programming, including phone-in shows, traffic reports, on-the-spot reporting and rock music (Jernow Jan. 1993, 87; China Daily 29 Apr. 1993). A multitude of independent regional newspapers and tabloids has gone into production, prompting recent efforts by the central authorities to regain some control over this communications explosion. A central advertising corporation is being planned to monitor advertising, which according to a Xinhua report is now being controlled by "the media" (3 May 1993). In a 6 May 1993 editorial, the government-controlled Renmin Ribao proposed strong restrictions on press reform:

Mass media of all types and at all levels must operate in the light of their own strong points and characteristics. Nevertheless, on the issue of giving publicity to major domestic issues of principle and major issues concerning foreign affairs, they must maintain unity with the CPC Central Committee.... Press reform must be conducive to strengthening the party's leadership over press work. It must not weaken, let alone break away from, the leadership Renmin Ribao 6 May 1993 .

The CCP Central Committee Propaganda Department and State Press and Publication Administration have also recently called for greater controls over the publishing industry. According to the deputy head of the propaganda department, publications must be closely checked to determine, among other things, "whether they have published anything which is politically wrong or anything of low taste or obscene" (Xinhua 6 May 1993). As well, South China Morning Post reports that Chinese authorities have at least temporarily banned joint ventures with foreign media organizations in publications as part of a larger effort to regain control over the media (SCMP 15 May 1993, 18-19).

Allison Liu Jernow of the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists reports that journalists are now free to report in favour of economic reform (not against), but are not free to report on political reform. According to Jernow, on the whole the right to report in China is stronger than in previous years, but not the right to criticize, and while freedom of expression is much more open, freedom of publication is not (Jan. 1993, 89-90). She quotes one former Chinese journalist who sums up the social climate this way:

It's okay now to be critical in public, on the bus, wherever. Even Party cadres curse the system at home. If they arrested every person who was critical out in the open, there wouldn't be enough jail cells (ibid., 90).

Hong Kong and other foreign journalists continue to face strong restrictions on their ability to cover stories in China. Several serious incidents of harassment have occurred in recent years, involving reporters from the BBC, The Washington Post and ABC television among others (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 164; Jernow Jan. 1993, 109-11). Reporters working on journalist's visas in China face many travel restrictions, and are not allowed to interview unapproved sources or report on confidential documents. Many feel they are forced to work clandestinely in order to get a story (ibid., 103-04, 106, 108). They are reportedly regularly followed, their phones and rooms are bugged, and the Chinese sources they interview are often subjected to questioning from the Public Security Bureau (PSB) and are sometimes jailed (ibid., 106-07). This occurred recently to two Chinese who were interviewed by Lena Sun of The Washington Post (Japan Economic Newswire 31 July 1993). Hong Kong journalists face even greater intimidation than their western counterparts, since they are considered Chinese citizens and are thus subject to Chinese law. Those who enter China on an journalist's visa are closely watched, while those who enter on a tourist visa could be open to charges of illegal journalism (Jernow Jan. 1993, 119-21).

If the restrictions on foreign reporting are hardly new to the China scene, corruption within the official Chinese press apparently is. According to The New York Times correspondent Nicholas D. Kristof,

companies have found that they must give out envelopes with cash to attract Chinese reporters to news conferences. In Shanghai, a foreign businessman was shocked to be told by a television reporter that $15 purchased his attendance at a news conference, and a brief clip on the evening news would cost $120 more (29 May 1993).

Fraudulent practices, either by reporters or those impersonating reporters, have become so widespread that China Central Television (CCTV) felt obliged to issue an on-air warning against people impersonating CCTV reporters and collecting fees from units in exchange for news coverage. In the notice CCTV stated that they never charge fees for news coverage, nor do they deal with middlemen wanting to broker news coverage (Central Television Program One Network 17 May 1993). In addition, CCP propaganda chief Ding Guangen has recently forbidden media organs to charge fees for news coverage, and has banned the giving of donations for such coverage. According to UPI, however,

Ding did not say how the new regulations would be enforced, nor did he say how journalists would supplement their meager salaries without the gifts, leading many experts to believe that little would actually change (UPI 4 Aug. 1993).

3.2.3  Corruption

Corruption and fraudulent practices have appeared not only in the workings of the Chinese media, but have reportedly entered into many facets of daily life. Nicholas D. Kristof sums up the situation this way:

[C]orruption is rife throughout society, and young reformers indulge at least as much as aging hard-liners. Government officials, schoolteachers, traffic policemen, people in every group have their palms outstretched. Even doctors expect gifts, and it is a brave patient who undergoes surgery without complying (The New York Times 29 May 1993).

Much of the country's attention has been focused on corruption by government officials, which was one of the main issues of the 1989 pro-democracy movement (Feigon 1990, 165, 171; Reuters 21 Nov. 1992; Ladany 1993, 150). Recent studies on corruption within the CCP reportedly state that between 1983 and 1992, over 1.8 million party members and cadres were punished or tried for corruption or violation of party discipline (Cheng Ming 1 Apr. 1993a), and that in the first 10 months of 1992, corrupt Chinese officials accepted over US$66 million in bribes (Reuters 21 Nov. 1992). About half of the 64,000 cases of fraud investigated resulted in legal action, although there is no indication of how many convictions were obtained (ibid.).

Several sources indicate that party members are increasingly using their positions for financial gain (Time 10 May 1993d, 39; The Bulletin 26 May 1993; Pacific Affairs Summer 1992, 195). Time reports that the situation is especially bad in the south, where officials have been able to profit from insider stock market information (10 May 1993d, 39). Elizabeth J. Perry reports that although central officials in Beijing are trying to control the problem,

the situation at the local level is more complicated. In Yunnan Province, for example, substantial investment of drug money has reportedly made possible the construction of hotels and other "joint ventures" (Asian Survey Jan. 1993, 18).

There are also indications that corruption among government officials is more endemic in rural than urban areas. Time reports that wealthy peasants have taken control of some villages and are now able to hire local party officials as influence peddlers (10 May 1993d, 39). According to an article in Pacific Affairs, in rural areas

cadres are often able to arbitrarily determine who purchases agricultural inputs such as fertilizer at state-subsidized prices and who has to sell how much grain to the state at below market prices. The shift toward tax-based financing of local government has empowered local officials to exact fees without forcing them to account for their expenditure (Pacific Affairs Summer 1992, 195).

Government corruption is not entirely relegated to local and rural levels, however. A recent Time article lists the relatives of several senior government figures who are now closely associated with major Hong Kong investors. In the past year there have been strong upheavals in Hong Kong stock market and real estate prices, and there is deep concern over possible large-scale insider trading sponsored by Beijing (Time 12 July 1993, 35).

Furthermore, the increased economic links with Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau have brought about a rise in corruption associated with gang activity (Le Monde diplomatique Aug. 1993). In February 1993 nine Hong Kong customs officials were arrested for their involvement in a syndicate that was smuggling stolen luxury cars and electronics from Hong Kong into China through Shenzhen. The rise in smuggling has engendered close cooperation between Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and the Guangdong People's Protectorate (FEER 25 Feb. 1993a, 16). However, the volume of smuggling is said to be immense--at least US$1 billion per year of consumer goods from Hong Kong into southern China--and official corruption is playing its part. According to FEER,

because the rule of law remains arbitrary and inconsistent in China, enforcement is routinely compromised by payoffs. In 1991, for example, even the Public Security Bureau chief in nearby Huizhou [Guangdong province] was detained after authorities found a private cache of imported liquor, foreign cigarettes and several hundred thousand renminbi in his home (FEER 24 June 1993b, 34-35).

Sources have also been reporting a significant increase in other social forms of corruption, including illegal drug use, prostitution, pornography and the abduction and sale of women (The Toronto Star 1 Aug. 1993; The Sydney Morning Herald 9 Aug. 1993; Reuters 15 Feb. 1993; FEER 8 Apr. 1993a).

3.2.4  Civil Unrest

There are indications that an increase in civil unrest may be accompanying other changes in China's social climate. Recent rioting over government crop payments has been mentioned, but riots and disturbances have also been reported in connection with the opening of the Shenzhen stock exchange (The Financial Post 11 Aug. 1992, 2; Asian Survey Jan. 1993, 16) and with a massive investment fraud in Beijing (Time 12 July 1993, 34). Two curious cases of chaos in the Guangdong countryside have added to what Time calls the "sense of disorder"; in one case, over 1000 members of two villages fought "a pitched battle" over control of an adjoining forest, while in another a tourist attraction controlled by one village was bombed by rival villagers while tourists were arriving (ibid. 10 May 1993e, 41; Reuters 8 Feb. 1993; BBC Summary 2 Apr. 1993). According to Reuters, reports such as these

highlight the fact that Communist authorities have tenuous control over large sections of rural China, where clan organizations and secret societies still hold sway and battle over grievances dating back centuries (Reuters 8 Feb. 1993).

According to a report on the CCP's new anti-riot contingency plan, in 1992 there were over 10 "medium-scale" and over 100 "large-scale" riots in rural and urban areas of China (Cheng Ming 1 Apr. 1993b).

More recently in Lhasa, Tibet, long a centre of civil unrest, riots have been reported over inflation and the imposition of fees for medical services which previously had been free. Extensive use of troops was reportedly needed to restore calm. Pro-Tibet groups claimed 100 people were arrested, a figure the government denied (FEER 3 June 1993a, 13).

There are also indications that with economic restructuring and subsequent worker lay-offs from "iron-clad" jobs in state enterprises, some are venting their frustrations by violently attacking and sometimes killing their former employers. As well, strikes and incidents of sabotage are being recorded in several cities. Punishments for those involved in the most serious incidents are said to be severe (The New York Times 11 June 1992).

3.2.5  Illegal Migration

Large numbers of people have been illegally leaving China in the last few years, many of them paying steep fees to gangs to arrange the necessary travel, false papers and bribes. An estimated 100,000 Chinese citizens immigrated illegally to the United States in 1992, 300,000 since 1990 (The Ottawa Citizen 19 June 1993, D11; FEER 8 Apr. 1993d, 17). Some 85 per cent of these people left from small villages in Fujian province, paying "snakeheads" up to CDN$40,000 for a crowded spot in the cargo hold of one of the estimated 17 to 20 ships now regularly smuggling humans from Fujian to the United States (ibid., 18; The Globe and Mail 11 Apr. 1992). Many of these Fujianese end up in Manhattan, where they work for several years, usually at very low wages, to repay their debt to gangs that reportedly can exert tremendous pressure on them and on their families in China (The Ottawa Citizen 19 June 1993, D11; AFP 21 July 1993).

Recently, at least eight Chinese citizens died trying to reach U.S. shores when their vessel, the Golden Venture, ran aground 25 km from Manhattan. Some 300 people, mostly from Fujian province, had endured terrible conditions for at least 100 days during the trip. It was the 24th such ship intercepted by the U.S. since 1991 (The Toronto Star 7 June 1993; The Globe and Mail 7 June 1993, A8; The Ottawa Citizen 7 June 1993, A1). In July 1993 hundreds of other Chinese citizens on three boats were stopped by the U.S. Coast Guard and diverted to Mexico, which promised to quickly return them to China without hearing their asylum claims. Mexican officials were assured by the Chinese government that those returned would not be persecuted (ibid. 19 July 1993, A7). Recent reports indicate that all of the returnees faced fines of between 10,000 and 50,000 yuan, with some sentenced to up to five years in a labour reform camp (BBC Summary 27 July 1993; AFP 21 July 1993).

Similarly, many of the over 500 Chinese citizens fleeing China on board the East Wood, a Panamanian freighter adrift in the Pacific Ocean before being rescued by an American ship in February 1993, were returned to Fujian to face detention and fines of 10,000 yuan for illegal exit (ibid. 13 Mar. 1993; FEER 8 Apr. 1993d, 19). More recently in Fujian province, 12 people who had tried to leave the country illegally and 14 smugglers were sentenced to up to five years in jail or labour camp (ibid. 24 June 1993a, 14). Another report indicates that large groups of Chinese emigrants are funnelled by Hong-Kong based gangs through Burma and Thailand before boarding ships bound for the U.S. or other countries, in what is becoming an increasingly lucrative trade (Libération 15 Nov. 1992; Asiaweek 4 Dec. 1992, 28). The number of successful illegal immigrants is believed to be much higher, for although the Hong Kong border patrol is well-equipped and vigilant, the rocky coastline is exceptionally difficult to monitor (Libération 15 Nov. 1992). The vast majority of migrants are reportedly men who have come to look for jobs on megaprojects, such as the airport construction, which require large numbers of workers (ibid.). Australia has also experienced an upsurge in Chinese arrivals (AFP 7 Nov. 1992). According to some reports, a common strategy for criminal syndicates is to spread rumours of easy jobs abroad in order to assemble a boatload of unsuspecting people willing to raise money for the trip (BBC Summary 10 Aug. 1993; Asiaweek 4 Dec. 1992, 28).


Caught in the shift from isolationist central planning to an internationally oriented "socialist market economy," the current explosion of economic activity in China is taking place in an atmosphere largely devoid of regulation. The Chinese government is hurrying to bring in the laws, regulations and governing bodies needed in the economic sector to reassure international investors and avoid internal chaos (China Daily 20 May 1993; Woo 1992, 216; Investor's Business Daily 5 Aug. 1993), but many sources contend that true rule of law, especially concerning personal rights, is a long way from being achieved in China (Country Reports 1992 1993, 542-43; FEER 4 Feb. 1993b, 5; Woo 1992, 207). In a 1992 article on legal reforms in China after 1989, Margaret Woo sums up the situation this way:

[I]t is important to acknowledge that laws in China, though promulgated, do not all get implemented.... Indeed, the PRC [People's Republic of China] government continues to use law selectively. This selective use of law is not a new development in China, but rather reflects the PRC's legal philosophy, which defines law as the state's will and rights as the state's creation (Woo 1992, 207).

China scholar Laszlo Ladany concurs that many pieces of Chinese legislation remain "on paper only" (Ladany 1993, 95), but says the fault sometimes lies in the CCP's inability to implement laws in a country left deliberately lawless by Mao for so many years. According to Ladany,

in October 1986 the State Economic Commission and the Ministry of Justice declared jointly that over 300 laws and regulations had already been published concerning the economy, but "their non-observance is quite universal." This was because the heads of the enterprises had no notion of law; there were no legal experts to advise them; and there was no machinery to control the implementation of laws and regulations (ibid., 96).

Ladany also notes that at the same time as the government was encouraging the development of a legal infrastructure in the 1980s,

the relaxation of the economic system, the erosion of Party discipline and the official encouragement given to people to make money through their own efforts--to which the Party cadres took no exception--made the implementation of the regulations almost impossible (ibid., 97).

According to The Economist (14 Aug. 1993), the Ministry of Justice numbers China's lawyers at 50,000, with 4,100 law firms, only a few hundred of which are private firms as opposed to those operated by the government. Some 3 million civil cases were heard in 1992, 700,000 of them commercial, but three-quarters of the commercial cases proceeded without a lawyer for either side, and less than 3 per cent of Chinese companies seek legal advice before signing contracts or leases. About two dozen foreign firms are now licensed to practice in China, but, "The real problem of law in China is not the business but the rule of law itself. Both the rulers and the ruled have a 5,000-year-old habit of ignoring laws whenever it is convenient to do so" (ibid.).

One issue of recent interest is the current status of counterrevolutionary crimes, the broad category most often used in the past to charge political criminals. A new state security law does not mention counterrevolutionary crimes at all, although it does refer to the criminal law, which in turn refers to counterrevolutionary crimes (Xinhua 22 Feb. 1993; AFP 18 May 1993; LCHR May 1993, 80). Although there have reportedly been high-level discussions about eliminating the category of counterrevolutionary crime and equating it with endangering state security (AFP 18 May 1993), the consensus among Chinese legal scholars recently interviewed by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights is that no legislated changes are expected in the near future (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights May 1993, 80). The Hong Kong publication Cheng Ming reports that according to a classified Public Security Bureau document, there were over 5,000 counterrevolutionary criminal cases in 1992, down 9.2 per cent and 13.5 per cent respectively from 1991 and 1990, although serious and damaging cases had increased by 15.4 per cent and 8.2 per cent respectively (Cheng Ming 1 May 1993). Among the regions with the most cases were Guangxi, Fujian, Guizhou, Hebei, Hubei, Xinjiang and Zhejiang. Some 20 different counterrevolutionary offences were mentioned in the report, ranging from plotting the assassinations of officials and other violent acts, to organizing underground groups to criticize the government or carry out "antigovernment activities under the guise of religion" (ibid.).

There have been several well-publicized recent attempts by private citizens to use the Chinese legal system to challenge abuses of power by officials, a right explicitly granted in Article 22 of the new State Security Law (Xinhua 22 Feb. 1993). In one case dissident journalist Yin Jin tried to sue the CCP leader of Shanxi province, Wang Maolin, claiming Wang had slandered him following the Tiananmen crackdown. Yin had earlier reported on Wang's allegedly corrupt lifestyle and was imprisoned for 13 months following the crackdown, during which time he claims he was beaten into semi-paralysis. After his suit failed Yin wrote to the United Nations for protection, claiming he could not find work because of political stigmatization and that he continues to suffer physical and mental ailments as a result of the torture he endured while in prison (AFP 5 Apr. 1993; ibid. 13 Apr. 1993).

Yuan Hongbing, the editor of the banned collection of anti-leftist essays, The Tide of History, was also unsuccessful in his court challenge of the ban, although he was able to hold a seminar on the topic in a Beijing hotel (Jernow 1993, 83-84). Two Beijing University graduate students, Liao Jia'an and Wang Shengli, have reportedly been held in "shelter and investigation," a form of detention, because of the book (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 162). According to Asia Watch their families have been "unable to find lawyers willing to defend them because judicial authorities have warned Beijing law firms not to provide counsel" (News from Asia Watch 2 Mar. 1993, 15). In another case, jailed dissident Wang Juntao was reportedly denied the right to sue prison authorities, whom he claims have withheld from him proper medical care (AFP 12 May 1993).

The Chinese judicial system continues to be harshly criticized by human rights monitors for its arbitrary and unfair nature, openness to political interference and corruption, routine use of long-term detention without trial, torture to gain confessions and summary executions (Amnesty International May 1992, 1; Country Reports 1992 1993, 542-43; News from Asia Watch 2 Mar. 1993, 3; LCHR May 1993, 43, 55, 70-71, 84). Far Eastern Economic Review reports that the situation is particularly bad in Guangdong province, where the economic boom has also brought a rise in corruption and crime:

The result is a huge upsurge in arbitrary arrests and imprisonment by a judicial system--in Guangdong as well as the rest of China--completely lacking any concept of the rule of law. The notion that laws, rather than arbitrary decisions by officials, should determine whether someone is punished for real or imaginary transgressions has gained only a tenuous foothold in Guangdong's red-clay soil (FEER 8 Apr. 1993a, 15).

The article goes on to state that

the sharp increase in the number of cases in Guangdong can be seen to represent a huge number of individuals who, guilty or not, are thrown at the mercy of a fundamentally flawed legal system that displays scant regard for even minimal standards of human rights (ibid.).

Some sources have also noticed a change in the functioning of police enforcement. Domenach has characterized this change as "a curious mix of ineffectiveness and violence" (Domenach 1992, 382). The instruments of the old police state remain in place and are often used, but the will to use them can be lacking, often due to corruption, a change in policies or a diminishment of authority (ibid.). Thus Xu Yiruo, a minor dissident, was picked up four days after posting two small signs commemorating the second anniversary of Tiananmen Square; police had reportedly matched his handwriting to that on the posters (The New York Times 19 July 1993). Later, fleeing house arrest, he made an overseas call to a human rights group on a telephone that was being monitored by the Public Security Bureau, who were waiting for him before he finished his call (ibid.). Famous dissident journalist Zhang Weiguo, on the other hand, reportedly infuriated CCP party chief Jiang Zemin after giving an interview to the BBC following his release from prison in February 1991, but was able to elude the PSB for three months simply by fleeing from Beijing to his grandmother's house in nearby Zhejiang province (The Washington Post 3 Oct. 1992).

Similarly, after the 1989 crackdown, Guangdong province officials are said to have purposely moved slowly in their investigations, allowing some 300 pro-democracy activists to escape (FEER 8 Apr. 1993c, 17). Central authorities later sent several hundred PSB officers south, but they handled the cases of non-Guangdong natives only (ibid.). The Toronto Star quotes Gao Peiqi, a senior police officer from Shenzhen who defected to Hong Kong in 1991, as saying "the police in China are like a criminal syndicate" (The Toronto Star 1 Aug. 1993). He claims his own police force was so corrupt he was unable to conduct proper investigations (ibid.).

Ladany makes an important distinction between rural and urban China regarding public security. He calls Chinese villages, which number nearly 4 million, "an immense ocean," and states that

the Security and its police had no presence in the villages: the lowest level of police stations were in the county towns. Public order in the countryside was supposed to be maintained by the Party organisations. In many villages even these were absent (Ladany 1993, 137).

Ladany maintains that many peasant villages have returned to traditional ways of managing their affairs, and are ruled by old clans and peasant gangs which have contributed to the rise in crime and disorder experienced in the last decade (ibid., 138).


5.1   Dissidents

The last couple of years have seen a number of highly-publicized releases of prominent dissidents in China. Accounts of the treatment of dissidents both in prison and their lives outside have been widespread, and there have been several reports of new dissident organizations and new arrests of dissidents.

In April 1993 minister of public security Tao Siju announced that all students convicted of participation in the "June 4 political disturbance" had been released, although several major non-student "criminals" were still serving their sentences, and stated that all were in normal health. He also announced that there would be no special amnesty for those imprisoned for their participation in the 1989 pro-democracy movement (Xinhua 8 Apr. 1993; AFP 8 Apr. 1993). Perhaps China's most famous dissident is Wei Jingsheng, a leader of the Democracy Wall Movement whose 15-year sentence was scheduled to end in 1994, but who was given parole recently, reportedly in a gesture to influence Beijing's Olympic bid (Time 4 Oct. 1993, 30). Over the years there have been persistent rumours of Wei's deteriorating health as a result of ill-treatment by the authorities, as well as occasional leaks of information from official sources (Asia Television Limited 23 Mar. 1993; AFP 24 Mar. 1993; The New York Times 8 Apr. 1993; UPI 9 Mar. 1993). Wei, in an interview with Time after his release, was reluctant to talk about his treatment, but did explain that he lost half his teeth due to malnutrition early in his incarceration, and that he had been "subjected to various forms of physical and mental cruelty" (4 Oct. 1993, 30). He also explained that one condition of his parole is that he has no political rights and is not allowed to engage in political activities or business for three years (ibid.).

Another prominent dissident released recently is Wang Dan, a major Tiananmen Square organizer, who served four years and regained his freedom in February 1993 (The New York Times 18 Feb. 1993; The Globe and Mail 18 Feb. 1993, A8). Subsequent reports indicate that Wang has been unable to resume his studies at Beijing University, and for political reasons has been basically unemployable. In a curious incident in March 1993, he was reportedly handed 3,000 yuan by security agents and told to leave Beijing for the duration of the National People's Congress. When he tried to return prematurely he was held until the end of the congress two days later (SCMP 3 Apr. 1993a; The Globe and Mail 27 May 1993, A1, A7). Although followed wherever he goes, Wang has been free to visit friends, has given over 100 interviews to foreign journalists, and reportedly will write a column for a Hong Kong magazine (ibid.).

Zhang Weiguo, the prominent dissident journalist who was originally released in February 1991 and has had several run-ins with authorities since, was followed and harassed after being interviewed by and writing articles for foreign journals. In December 1992 he was granted an exit visa (The Christian Science Monitor 15 Dec. 1992; The Washington Post 3 Oct. 1992).

Several prominent dissident journalists have returned to China recently. Dai Qing, returning after a year at Harvard, stated that she would be able to travel and write freely, although her work reportedly remains banned (AFP 11 Feb. 1993). The New York Times quoted her as saying that

the Chinese Government is slowly changing from a rigid, unchanging government into a more professional, law-abiding government.... We should all welcome this. They have made some progress, and this should be recognized (The New York Times 8 June 1992).

The poet and investigative journalist Xu Gang returned from exile in France in July 1992 to be with his family, and according to a January 1993 article in the South China Morning Post Weekly, has not reported difficulties (SCMPW 9-10 Jan. 1993, 7).

However, in its survey of the treatment of released dissidents in 1992, Human Rights Watch reports that

released dissidents were dismissed from their work units or assigned work inconsistent with their training and experience. Some...were denied permission to continue their education after their release. Others lost their housing or were forced to leave their urban residences. Many were restricted to their home villages. In addition, close surveillance continued of 1989 dissidents, even those who have never been charged, as did discrimination against the families of those still imprisoned (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 163).

Several dissidents who remain in prison are reportedly in bad health and/or are being mistreated. Liu Gang, a pro-democracy dissident sentenced to six years in prison in 1991, is being tortured with beatings and electric shocks, according to an account allegedly smuggled out of prison (Television Broadcasts Ltd. 12 May 1993; The Globe and Mail 13 May 1993, A15; News from Asia Watch 1 Sept. 1992, 19-22). Wang Juntao, serving 13 years for his leadership role in the 1989 pro-democracy movement, is reportedly suffering from hepatitis B and claims he is not receiving proper medical treatment (AFP 12 May 1993). Ren Wanding, first imprisoned for his part in the 1979 Democracy Wall movement and now serving seven years for his part in the 1989 demonstrations, has also reported poor health as a result of bad prison conditions and inadequate medical care (SCMP 28 July 1992; Reuters 18 Jan. 1993). In addition, Bao Tong, a former aid to Zhao Ziyang serving nine years for counterrevolutionary activities, is said to be very ill in Qincheng Prison after four colon operations (The Standard 30 Mar. 1993). As reported above, Chinese officials have denied that prisoners like Wang Juntao and Bao Tong are in poor health (Xinhua 8 Apr. 1993). As well, the official Chinese government White Paper on Criminal Reform maintains that prisoners are guaranteed free, prompt and adequate medical care (ibid. 11 Aug. 1992).

News from Asia Watch maintains that the cost of the economic opening up that followed Deng's trip to the south has been increased repression of dissidents:

At least 40 of them were secretly arrested during 1992 and are still being held, their families often denied all information on their whereabouts or conditions of detention; and peaceful, underground dissident organizations were smashed and dispersed by the authorities (News from Asia Watch 2 Mar. 1993, 2).

The same report describes the arrest of dissidents and breakup of pro-democracy groups in Beijing, Wuhan, Tianjin, Gansu province, Anhui province, Shenzhen and Hunan province. In its conclusion Asia Watch states that economic openings do not mean a lessening of political restrictions in China, and has described the Chinese government's current strategy of releasing a few prominent dissidents early while cracking down on lesser-known ones, as a "smile offensive" meant to impress foreign nations (ibid., 26).

Indeed, with the arrest of dissident Shen Tong in September 1992, the Chinese government's tolerance for public criticism was shown to be very limited. Shen had returned to China from the United States in July 1992, to visit with pro-democracy activists in several cities and establish a pro-democracy group in Beijing. Shen was detained for 53 days and many of the people he visited were subsequently arrested, although several managed to go into hiding or leave the country. Shen was eventually returned to the U.S. after intense international pressure (ibid., 19-20; The Christian Science Monitor 15 Dec. 1992).

According to a report in the South China Morning Post (7 Apr. 1993), dissident groups have occasionally been very creative in their public activities, for instance in using message-bearing pigeons and balloons to broadcast pro-democracy messages, as happened recently in Guangzhou and Shenzhen, an incident that authorities were said to be investigating. However, according to the report, underground pro-democracy cells generally are not taking big risks, but are instead consolidating their networks in anticipation of a better political climate:

It is believed that after more than three years of intense surveillance and arrests, security authorities have stripped the dissident movement to the bones. While almost every large city has at least one underground organisation, it is doubtful whether there are national networks (ibid., 9).

The report goes on to explain that many of the released dissidents have gone into business, sometimes with the assistance of government and PSB efforts to "reform" them (ibid.).

5.2   Anti-Crime and Anti-Corruption Campaigns

Politically-motivated campaigns against crime or corruption are common to the People's Republic of China, and several have been mounted since 1989. Woo explains that although technically not legislation,

the announcement of an anti-crime campaign is "legislative" because it de facto controls how the government interprets existing criminal laws. Specifically, the anti-crime campaign calls on police to be more vigilant in arresting criminals and on the court to be stricter in their interpretation and application of criminal laws (Woo 1992, 213).

In combination with a seriously flawed judicial system, anti-crime or corruption campaigns could lend themselves to the arbitrary abuse of power by the state (FEER 8 Apr. 1993a, 15).

Periodic security blitzes are reportedly common during special state occasions as part of the CCP effort "to show the stability of the social order and the government" (Wu 1992, 64). In the fall of 1992, for instance, security was tightened on Beijing campuses, and nationally there was a noted increase in arrests, public executions and crackdowns on pro-democracy groups in anticipation of four major events in Beijing: National Day, the 14th Party Congress and visits by the South Korean president and Japanese emperor (UPI 28 Sept. 1992; AFP 28 Sept. 1992; Reuters 19 Sept. 1992; The Standard 21 July 1992). In addition, crackdowns on pro-democracy dissidents have been reported as part of the general clean-up effort associated with Beijing's bid to host the 2000 Summer Olympics (The Ottawa Citizen 22 June 1993, A2; Reuters 11 Aug. 1993).

Guangdong province, centre of the current economic boom and of growing concerns over corruption and crime, currently ranks last in the country in terms of "public order" according to the State Statistical Bureau, with the other four worst areas being Zhejiang, Liaoning, Guangxi and Beijing (Zhongguo Xinwen She 12 May 1993). The Hong Kong publication Ta Kung Pao reported a massive anti-crime campaign in Guangdong in 1992, with most of those arrested said to be common criminals or gang members (3 Aug. 1992, 60). In January 1993 some 45 criminals were executed in Guangzhou, with another 1,000 people in Guangdong sentenced to death or life in prison (Libération 12 Jan. 1993).

Amnesty International reports that as part of on-going anti-crime campaigns, there has been a rise in the use of the death penalty and summary executions. As well, officials continue to hold mass public sentencing rallies and parades before executions (Amnesty International May 1992, 15-16). Amnesty International claims that over 40 offences are now punishable by death in China, including several economic crimes such as theft and smuggling. Over 1,000 executions were documented by Amnesty International in 1991, with the actual figure believed to be between 5,000 and 20,000 (ibid., 16).

5.3   Religion

There are conflicting recent reports regarding the freedom to practice religion in China. Most western reports concentrate on the status of those involved with "underground" Christian churches, which operate without the consent of the government-approved Chinese churches. Father Pei Ronggui and eighteen other Roman Catholic priests were released from prison recently, amidst much speculation that the action was a public relations manoeuvre associated with the Beijing Olympic Games bid (Reuters 3 Apr. 1993; Libération 4 Apr. 1993; AFP 2 Apr. 1993; SCMP 3 Apr. 1993b). Father Pei had originally been arrested in connection with an April 1989 raid on an "illegal" church in Hebei province; reportedly two worshippers were killed in the raid, with 88 injured and 32 arrested (ibid.). A month later the South China Morning Post reported on a similar event in Shanxi province, where 100 Christians were reportedly rounded up and beaten, apparently to cover up an earlier beating of five Christians, one of whom died (7 May 1993). Human Rights Watch has reported on similar violent police raids on Christian gatherings in Shaanxi, and claims that arrests of Roman Catholic priests were continuing even while others were being released (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 162-63).

Far Eastern Economic Review, on the other hand, recently reported that the Chinese government has unofficially relaxed controls over underground churches:

Catholics can now openly pray for the Pope and refer to him as a religious leader, church sources report. Presbyterians, Baptists and Methodists have managed to quietly restore some of the denominational distinctions that had been merged in China's homogenised state-supported Protestantism. "In many ways, this is the best time since 'Liberation' for the church," admits Fr Cai Shuyi, 75, parish priest of St. Paul's [Church] (FEER 21 Jan. 1993, 13).

Authorities in Guangdong province have been described as "liberal--if wary," and religious freedom for Christians, at any rate, is said to be as great as anywhere in China:

Among those provinces with sizeable Catholic populations, Guangdong is the only province with no underground church. Catholic activists say the reason is that local religious affairs authorities, who operate under the close supervision of security agencies and the communist party, allow the officially sanctioned church enough leeway so that believers do not feel the need for one (ibid. 8 Apr. 1993b, 16).

In Tibet and Xinjiang, where Buddhist and Muslim organizations have been suspected of close connections with political movements against the Chinese government, religious restrictions apparently remain more severe. Religious figures suspected of political activity continue to be arrested, and restrictions remain on religious operations, teaching and training (Country Reports 1992 1993, 546-47; Amnesty International May 1992, 6-8; ibid. Nov. 1992, 5-6).

5.4   Prison System

One paradoxical outcome of the increased openness in China in the past few years is that more information is reaching the west regarding China's huge prison and labour reform system. Two major studies have recently been published: Chine: L'archipel oublié, by Jean-Luc Domenach, and Laogai--The Chinese Gulag by Hongda Harry Wu, himself a veteran of decades of reform through labour. Both studies make it clear that China's huge detention network reached its peak during the ideological turmoils of the 1950s and 1960s, but that significant portions of the network remain (Domenach 1992, 19; Wu 1992, 16-17). Wu is especially adamant in maintaining that the Chinese detention system has become an important contributor to the current economic boom, by using prison labour to create products for export (1992, 34-35, 41-42).

There are several different types of detention, including certain forms of administrative detention that require no judicial process whatsoever (Amnesty International May 1992, 3-4; FEER 8 Apr. 1993a, 16). Amnesty International reports that often those held for relatively short periods without trial under "shelter and investigation" are later moved into "re-education through labour," which allows further detention without trial for up to four years (Amnesty International May 1992, 4-5; Wu 1992, 81). Some who have served their four years have then been subjected to forced job placement, which is the practice of requiring "freed" prisoners to remain at their institutions to perform the same work for only slightly higher pay and nominally more freedom. Wu reports that in the late 1980s large numbers of people in this category were returned to normal society, many to face unemployment, while others were kept on (ibid., 132-33). Human Rights Watch also maintains that forced job placement is a continuing practice in China (Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 163).

Far Eastern Economic Review reports that in Guangdong in 1991, at least 18,800 people were put into labour camps through re-education through labour, which although usually used for minor crimes such as prostitution, petty smuggling, and hawking without a licence, may also be used to punish people for political offences (FEER 8 Apr. 1993a, 16). According to Wu, Guangdong has the most correctional facilities in China, a total of 126 holding some 300,000 prisoners (Wu 1992, 131-35, 150). This figure is endorsed by Far Eastern Economic Review as being more accurate than the 45 prisons and labour camps quoted to the magazine by the U.S. Department of State (FEER 8 Apr. 1993a, 15-16). Officially the number of inmates across the country is 1.1 million, with the number of political prisoners making up only 4,000 to 5,500 (Country Reports 1992 1993, 543; AFP 12 Nov. 1992; BBC Summary 13 Nov. 1992). Wu maintains that the number of inmates in China's prisons varies considerably according to political cycles, but that the percentage of political prisoners has dropped from earlier times to about 10 per cent of the total prisoner population (Wu 1992, 144). The official total of 1.1 million inmates suggests that there are still over 100,000 political prisoners, an estimate corresponding to Domenach Domenach's (Domenach 1992, 376).

In a December 1992 report, Torture in China, Amnesty International uses a large body of new evidence gathered from different regions of China to make the case that torture continues to be routinely used in Chinese prisons and labour reform camps to force confessions and intimidate inmates. The official Chinese government White Paper on Criminal Reform, however, states that the use of torture is forbidden in Chinese detention facilities and that prisoners are treated humanely and in accordance with the law (Xinhua 11 Aug. 1992). Chinese officials have at times publicly admitted that torture is used in correctional facilities to obtain confessions and intimidate inmates, but officially the practice is illegal and discouraged (Reuters 22 Mar. 1993; Ming Pao 15 June 1992). Indeed, in the first half of 1992 the Supreme People's Protectorate reported that over 9,000 cases involving illegal detention, use of torture and other violations by security officials had been brought to court out of the more than 24,000 investigated (News from Asia Watch 2 Mar. 1993, 3). There is no report on the outcome of the trials, and analysts are generally sceptical about the Chinese government's use of official statistics. For example, the White Paper on Criminal Reform maintains that some 40,000 appeals from prisoners were heard in Chinese courts in 1990 and 1991 (Xinhua 11 Aug. 1992), but the U.S. Department of State maintains that despite these appeals, "initial decisions...are rarely overturned" (Country Reports 1992 1993, 543).

Although the White Paper on Criminal Reform maintains that prisoners are kept in reasonable facilities, fed adequately and given ready access to medical attention (Xinhua 11 Aug. 1992), the U.S. Department of State states that

conditions in all types of Chinese penal institutions are harsh and frequently degrading, and nutritional and health conditions in China's 'reform through labor' camps are grim (Country Reports 1992 1993, 541).

Finally, many reports have surfaced recently about the use of prison labour in the manufacture of Chinese exports. China and the United States have signed a memorandum of understanding on the issue (ibid., 553; Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 163). Although the memorandum allows for U.S. officials to visit facilities under suspicion, Chinese authorities have argued that this does not give them the right to inspect those facilities, which would be in violation of China's sovereignty (Zhongguo Tongxun She 13 Sept. 1992). The White Paper on Criminal Reform explicitly prohibits the export of goods made in prison (Xinhua 11 Aug. 1992) and the practice has been denied by Chinese authorities (Zhongguo Tongxun She 13 Sept. 1992), but evidence has been gathered to show that many Chinese correctional facilities are exporting goods made by prisoners, often through provincial import and export companies (Wu 1992, 139-41; Human Rights Watch Dec. 1992, 163; Country Reports 1992 1993, 553). For instance, News from Asia Watch details the widespread abuse of prisoners, whose labour is used to produce goods for export in the Lingyuan Labour Reform Complex, also known as "Lingyuan Motor Vehicle Industrial Corporation of Liaoning province" (News from Asia Watch 1 Sept. 1992, 5). According to Asia Watch,

the sheer scale of prison-made products from Liaoning Province is astounding.... [P]roducts from this one part of the vast Chinese gulag, go to some 48 countries and range from personal items such as hair tonics to cosmetics to sophisticated electrical equipment (ibid.).

At least three and possibly more labour reform camps around Guangzhou are in fact factories producing various articles for export, according to the South China Morning Post (SCMP 16 Aug. 1992). A former inmate alleges that women inmates work for HK$7 a month, in sweatshop conditions, sometimes around the clock.

One camp visited by reporters in Guangzhou, where the woman had recently served a sentence, appeared to be little more than a factory. It had recently changed its name to Guangzhou Nylon Knitting and Dyeing Factory, and a number of visitors appeared to be businessmen on buying trips (ibid.).

According to Wu, economic reform has brought increased pressure on correctional facilities to pay for themselves and even become profitable enterprises (Wu 1992, 133-39). Corruption has also played a part, with some prisoners able to bribe officials to live with their families, perform personal services for cadres or even serve their sentences outside of prison, as long as they are sent regular payments (ibid.; The Toronto Star 1 Aug. 1993).


China's startling economic progress just four years after the chaos of Tiananmen Square has led to widely differing prognostications on the country's future. If current explosive rates of economic growth continue, China could have one of the world's largest economies within a decade or two (Time 10 May 1993b, 28; The Economist 28 Nov. 1992, 4-5). Economic powerhouse Hong Kong is set to revert to China in 1997, and despite political wrangling between Beijing and Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten, economic integration is already being achieved (Time 10 May 1993f, 43; FEER 17 Dec. 1992, 16-18). However, China's overheated economy might also slump due to rampant inflation, speculation and corruption, factors that were all present in the months leading to the 1989 pro-democracy movement (Time 12 July 1993, 34-35; FEER 3 June 1993b, 21). The loosening of social controls, massive mobilization from the countryside to the cities, uneven development, rural tensions and civil unrest are all part of the changing Chinese social equation. It has been suggested by one analyst that a combination of these factors could contribute to luan, or chaos, which to Chinese seems so evident in the post-Communist states of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Thurston Jan. 1993a, 13-14).

Many analysts point to concern over the succession after Deng Xiaoping. Ching Pao has reported on the comments of Yang Shangkun, one of Deng's possible aged successors, to the CCP Central Committee, indicating the likelihood of turmoil or crisis in the future, especially within the party (Ching Pao 5 Apr. 1993). Several sources anticipate a significant power struggle after Deng's death (Libération 15 Mar. 1993; The Ottawa Citizen 27 Mar. 1993; The Washington Post 12 Feb. 1993). Few analysts, however, are predicting a democratic China with significantly improved human rights. Robert Scalapino, an emeritus professor of government at the University of California in Berkeley, is quoted in Time as saying that China will likely develop along the lines of South Korea or Indonesia:

"Politics will continue to be authoritarian...with substantial restrictions on freedoms and a dominant single party in power, but in the social and economic spheres, pluralism will rise." It matters not that the party will probably continue to rely on Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, he adds, since "China, like other Asian societies, has always found it quite useful to separate words from actions" (Time 10 May 1993d, 39).

Similarly, Michael D. Swaine of the RAND Corporation writes that the emergence of a balanced, pro-reform, military-centered leadership coalition strongly suggests that China's existing one-party system will not collapse soon after the passing of the aged patriarchs under the onslaught of pent-up democratic forces unleashed by a paralysing succession struggle--a favourite scenario of many Western observers. Instead, a relatively stable regime led by tough-minded, no-nonsense pragmatists will probably inherit power from Deng and provide the basis for a relatively smooth transition (FEER 4 Mar. 1993a, 25).

Liu Binyan, a dissident now living in the United States, is less certain. Noting the significant tensions beneath the surface of economic reform in China, he writes that the next few years could well see genuine movement towards a more democratic China. They could also witness a period of dangerous instability. They certainly will not see a continuation of the status quo (China Watch 27 Jan. 1993b, 7).

Another possibility could well be the spectre that haunted Chinese government officials even before the "socialist market economy" was officially unleashed--that of "peaceful evolution," the steady, powerful undermining of communist goals and values by the "decadence" thought to accompany western technology and the free market system (Chiushih Nietai 7 Aug. 1991). Indeed, rates of crime, corruption and divorce are increasing (UPI 10 Aug. 1993; ibid. 7 Aug. 1993b; The Sydney Morning Herald 9 Aug. 1993) along with incomes and social freedoms, and many Chinese appear uncertain about the path ahead. However, some commentators have noted a new spirit, at least in urban China, of independence and expectation that come along with economic growth. Time quotes a U.S. Department of State official who sees "a vast expansion of personal freedom" in China, and makes his own prediction:

You can't have a guy who has his own home, his own car, his own mobile telephone, his own TV, his own fax machine and his own company but who can't vote. He just won't stand for it (Time 10 May 1993b, 31).


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Asia Television Limited [Hong Kong, in English]. 23 March 1993. "Wei Jingsheng Allowed Out of Prison for Day." (FBIS-CHI-93-055 24 Mar. 1993, p. 34)

Asiaweek [Hong Kong]. 4 December 1992. "Rackets: Who's Floating the Boat People?"

Asian Survey [Berkeley, Ca]. January 1993. Vol. 33, No. 1. Elizabeth J. Perry. "China in 1992: An Experiment in Neo-Authoritarianism."

Associated Press (AP). 6 June 1993. "Chinese Newspapers Learn Advertising Game." (China News Digest)

Baltimore Sun. 8 August 1993. "No More Free Press--in More Ways than One." (China News Digest)

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 10 August 1993. "China: Guangdong Police Intercept US-Bound Illegal Emigrants." (NEXIS)

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 27 July 1993. "Illegal Emigration: Fujian Illegal Emigrants to Mexico Return to Face Fines and Investigation." (NEXIS)

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 2 April 1993. "A Thousand People Fight 'Pitched Battle' in South China over Forest." (NEXIS)

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 13 November 1992. "China Admits to 4,000 Political Prisoners." (NEXIS)

The Bulletin. 26 May 1993. Frank Gibney Jr. "Beijing Rising." (China News Digest)

Central Television Program One Network [Beijing, in Mandarin]. 17 May 1993. "CCTV Issues Notice on Unauthorized News Coverage." (FBIS-CHI-93-094 18 May 1993, p. 23)

Cheng Ming [Hong Kong, in Chinese]. 1 May 1993. Chuan Hsun-che. "'Counterrevolutionary Cases' Can be Found Throughout the Country." (FBIS-CHI-93-092 14 May 1993, pp. 12-13)

Cheng Ming [Hong Kong, in Chinese]. 1 April 1993a. Chuan Hsun-che. "National Statistics on Corrupt Party Members." (FBIS-CHI-93-063 5 Apr. 1993, pp. 27-28)

Cheng Ming [Hong Kong, in Chinese]. 1 April 1993b. Shu Szu. "CPC Works Out Antiriot Contingency Plan." (FBIS-CHI-93-063 5 Apr. 1993, pp. 28-30)

China Daily [Beijing, in English]. 20 May 1993. Chang Hong. "State to Accelerate Economic Legislation." (FBIS-CHI-93-096 20 May 1993, pp. 19-20)

China Daily [Beijing, in English]. 29 April 1993. Dian Bo. "Radio Tuned into People's Tastes." (FBIS-CHI-93-083 3 May 1993, pp. 30-31)

China Watch [Princeton, NJ]. 27 January 1993a. Liu Binyan. "Deng Xiaoping's Final Betrayal."

China Watch [Princeton, NJ]. 27 January 1993b. Liu Binyan. "Letter From the Publisher."

China Watch [Princeton, NJ]. 27 January 1993c. "Newsbriefs: Officials Flock to Private Sector."

Ching Pao [Hong Kong, in Chinese]. 5 April 1993. Chen Chie-hung. "Yang Shangkun Says Crisis Exists Within CPC." (FBIS-CHI-93-063 5 Apr. 1993, pp. 21-22)

The Christian Science Monitor [Boston]. 15 December 1992. Sheila Tefft. "China Gives Exit Visas to Pro-Democracy Critics." (NEXIS)

Chiushih Nietai [Hong Kong, in Chinese]. 7 August 1991. Tsui Feng. "CPC's Five Admonitions for Grass-Roots Level." (FBIS-CHI-91-152, pp. 18-19)

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992. 1993. U.S. Department of State. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Current History [Philadelphia]. September 1993. David Shambaugh. "Losing Control: The Erosian of State Authority in China."

Domenach, Jean-Luc. 1992. Chine: L'archipel oublié. Paris: Fayard.

The Economist [London]. 14 August 1993. "Law Firms in China: BJ Law."

The Economist [London]. 28 November 1992. "A Survey of China: When China Wakes."

The Economist [London]. 5 September 1992. "Bubbling Along in Hainan."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 21 October 1993a. Jonathan Karp. "Prime Time Police: China Tries to Pull the Plug on Satellite TV."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 21 October 1993b. Lincoln Kaye. "Peking May Find Ban is Unenforceable."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 24 June 1993a. "Regional Briefing: China: Smugglers Jailed."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 24 June 1993b. Anthony Blass. "Smugglers' Outpost: Thousands of Chinese Flock to Xintang for Hi-Tech Gadgets."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 3 June 1993a. Lincoln Kaye. "Raging Inflation: Lhasa Price Protests Escalate into Anti-Chinese Riot."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 3 June 1993b. Carl Goldstein. "Full Speed Ahead: Guangdong Party Congress Ignores Calls to Slow Growth."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 8 April 1993a. Carl Goldstein. "Two Faces of Reform: Guangdong's Economy Booms, but the Crime Rate Soars."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 8 April 1993b. Carl Goldstein. "Free to Keep the Faith."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 8 April 1993c. Carl Goldstein. "Half an Eye on Dissent: Authorities Tolerate Political Activism Within Limits."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 8 April 1993d. Paul Mooney and Melena Zyla. "Braving the Seas and More: Smuggling Chinese into the U.S. Means Big Money."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 4 March 1993a. Michael D. Swaine. "The PLA and China's Future."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 4 March 1993b. "China: Rural Riots."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 4 March 1993c. Shim Jae Hoon, Robert Delfs and Julian Brown. "Rural Exodus: Seeds of Despair."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 25 February 1993a. Tai Ming Cheung. "Border Bonanza: Smuggling Case Raises Fears of Rising Corruption."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 25 February 1993b. Anthony Blass. "Traveller's Tales."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 4 February 1993a. Anthony Blass. "Bucks and Brass: China's PLA Advances into Currency Futures."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 4 February 1993b. "Rule of Law, Not Rulers: A New Year's Resolution for China."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 21 January 1993. Lincoln Kaye. "China: Religious Groundswell: Underground Churches Lead Christian Revival."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 17 December 1992. Frank Ching. "Hongkong: Boxed in a Corner."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 29 October 1992. Tai Ming. "Back to the Front: Deng Seeks to Depoliticise the PLA."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 1 October 1992. Lincoln Kaye. "Exit Emperor, Stage Left: 'Theatre of the Absurd' May Describe Today's Reality."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 4 April 1991. Robert Delfs. "China 2: Lop-Sided Growth."

Feigon, Lee. 1990. China Rising: The Meaning of Tiananmen. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee.

The Financial Post [Toronto]. 11 August 1992. "Stock Lottery Riot."

The Globe and Mail [Toronto]. 7 June 1993. "Seven Illegal Immigrants Die as Freighter Runs Aground."

The Globe and Mail [Toronto]. 27 May 1993. Jan Wong. "Dissident Leader Sounds Call for Quiet Revolution."

The Globe and Mail [Toronto]. 13 May 1993. "Chinese Protest Leader Tells of Prison Torture: 'Shock You Until You're Crippled,' Student Quotes Guard as Boasting."

The Globe and Mail [Toronto]. 15 April 1993. "Unhappy Chinese Peasants to Receive Cash for Crops."

The Globe and Mail [Toronto]. 18 February 1993. Jan Wong. "Dissident Chinese Leaders Freed from Prison."

The Globe and Mail [Toronto]. 11 April 1992. Jan Wong. "How China's Snakeheads Ship Their Human Cargo."

Human Rights Watch. December 1992. Human Rights Watch World Report 1993. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Investor's Business Daily [Los Angeles]. 5 August 1993. "Investor's Watch: How to Dabble in China from the U.S." (China News Digest)

Japan Economic Newswire. 3 August 1993. "News Briefs." (China News Digest)

Japan Economic Newswire. 31 July 1993. "News Briefs." (China News Digest)

Jernow, Allison Liu. January 1993. 'Don't Force Us to Lie': The Struggle of Chinese Journalists in the Reform Era. New York: Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).

Ladany, Laszlo. 1993. Law and Legality in China: The Testament of a China-Watcher. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR). May 1993. Criminal Justice with Chinese Characteristics: China's Criminal Process and Violations of Human Rights. New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.

Libération [Paris]. 4 April 1993. "Chine: Le père Pei Ronggui, libéré un an d'avance."

Libération [Paris]. 30 March 1993. "La Chine adapte sa Constitution aux réformes économiques."

Libération [Paris]. 29 March 1993. Romain Franklin. "Chine: Le PC chinois renforce la concentration du pouvoir."

Libération [Paris]. 15 March 1993. Romain Franklin. "Départ à la retraite du président chinois."

Libération [Paris]. 12 January 1993. "Chine: 45 criminels de droit commun ont été exécutés samedi à Canton."

Libération [Paris]. 15 November 1992. Caroline Puel. "La chasse aux passe-murailles chinois."

Ming Pao [Hong Kong, in Chinese]. 15 June 1992. "Shanghai Official: 'Torture, Intimidation' Used." (FBIS-CHI-92-116 16 June 1992, p. 56)

Le Monde diplomatique [Paris]. August 1993. Philippe Le Corre. "Bons 'Patriotes' investisseurs: En Chine, le retour des triades."

The New York Times. 19 July 1993. Final Edition. Nicholas D. Kristof. "Chinese Dissident's Odyssey: In and Out of Prison, Now Trying to Flee Abroad." (NEXIS)

The New York Times. 29 May 1993. Nicholas D. Kristof. "A Gentler China: A Special Report by The New York Times--4 Years After Tiananmen, The Hard Line Is Cracking (Part II)." (China News Digest)

The New York Times. 8 April 1993. Nicholas D. Kristof. "Beijing Parts the Veil for a Glimpse Into a Political Prisoner's Cell."

The New York Times. 18 February 1993. Sheryl WuDunn. "Beijing Frees No. 1 Dissident of 1989 Tiananmen Protests."

The New York Times. 30 August 1992. Nicholas D. Kristof. "Entrepreneurs in China Attain the Age of Greed."

The New York Times. 11 June 1992. Nicholas D. Kristof. "Capitalist-Style Layoffs Ignite Sabotage and Strikes in China."

The New York Times. 8 June 1992. "Chinese Dissident Sees Improvement on Rights."

The New York Times. 3 May 1992. Nicholas D. Kristof. "Out There: Cosmetics Revolution Calling in China."

The New York Times. 24 April 1992. Nicholas D. Kristof. "Beijing Journal: 'Billions Served' (Now Add Chinese)."

News from Asia Watch [New York]. 2 March 1993. Vol. 5, No. 4. "Economic Reform, Political Repression: Arrests of Dissidents in China since Mid-1992."

News from Asia Watch [New York]. 1 September 1992. Vol. 4, No. 23. "China: Political Prisoners Abused in Liaoning Province as Official Whitewash of Labor Reform System Continues."

The Ottawa Citizen. 19 July 1993. "Last Shipload of Chinese Lands in Mexico."

The Ottawa Citizen. 22 June 1993. Dave Todd. "Olympics Bid: 'Lack' of Dissidents Makes Beijing Ideal Games Site, Chinese Argue."

The Ottawa Citizen. 19 June 1993. Yaroslav Troflimov. "Voyage to the End of a Dream: Illegal Chinese Immigrants Surge to U.S. Shores."

The Ottawa Citizen. 7 June 1993. "Death Greets Chinese Off U.S. Shore."

The Ottawa Citizen. 27 March 1993. Teresa Poole. "China: Deng Bolsters Jiang with Yet Another Title."

Pacific Affairs [Vancouver, BC]. Summer 1992. Vol. 65, No. 2. Barrett L. McCormick, Su Shaozhi and Xiao Xiaoming. "The 1989 Democracy Movement: A Review of the Prospects for Civil Society in China."

Renmin Ribao [Beijing, in Chinese]. 6 May 1993. "Xinwen Zhanxian (News Front) Carries Commentator's Article on Press Reform." (FBIS-CHI-93-090 12 May 1993, pp. 14-15)

Reuters. 11 August 1993. "Lone Dissident Staged New Anti-Olympic Bid Protest in Beijing." (China News Digest)

Reuters. 9 August 1993. BC Cycle. "China Warns of Widening Income Gap Between Peasants and City Workers." (China News Digest)

Reuters. 3 April 1993. BC Cycle. "China Releases Dissident Catholic Priest." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 29 March 1993. BC Cycle. David Schlesinger. "China Gets New Constitution." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 22 March 1993. BC Cycle. "China Prosecutor Confirms Use of Torture." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 15 February 1993. BC Cycle. "China Arrests 75,000 Slave Traders Since 1991." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 8 February 1993. BC Cycle. "Bomb-Throwing Mobs Destroy Chinese Tourist Spot." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 18 January 1993. BC Cycle. "Wife Barred from Visiting Jailed Chinese Dissident." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 21 November 1992. PM Cycle. "Corrupt China Officials Take Millions in Bribes." (NEXIS)

Reuters. 19 September 1992. PM Cycle. "Chinese Authorities Execute 12 After Mass Rally." (NEXIS)

South China Morning Post (SCMP) [Hong Kong, in English]. 15 May 1993. Willy Wo-lap Lam. "'Temporary' Ban on Joint Venture Publications." (FBIS-CHI-93-093 17 May 1993, pp. 18-19)

South China Morning Post (SCMP) [Hong Kong, in English]. 7 May 1993. Chris Yeung and Daniel Kwan. "Christians Reportedly Detained, Beaten; One Dies." (FBIS-CHI-93-087 7 May 1993, pp. 21-22)

South China Morning Post (SCMP) [Hong Kong, in English]. 7 April 1993. "Pro-Democracy Propaganda Activities Reported." (FBIS-CHI-93-065 7 Apr. 1993, p. 9)

South China Morning Post (SCMP) [Hong Kong, in English]. 3 April 1993a. Geoffrey Crothall. "Wang Dan Reportedly Detained for Two Days." (FBIS-CHI-93-063 5 Apr. 1993, p. 20)

South China Morning Post (SCMP) [Hong Kong, in English]. 3 April 1993b. Willy Wo-lap Lam. "Underground Priest Released 'On Parole'." (FBIS-CHI-93-063 5 Apr. 1993, p. 20)

South China Morning Post (SCMP) [Hong Kong, in English]. 1 April 1993. Willy Wo-lap Lam. "Deng Orders 'Fusion' of Party, Government." (FBIS-CHI-93-061 1 Apr. 1993, pp. 29-30)

South China Morning Post (SCMP) [Hong Kong, in English]. 16 August 1992. Peter Woolrich, Quinton Chan and Kennis Chu. "Inmate Calls Guangzhou Camp 'Production Line'." (FBIS-CHI-92-160 18 Aug. 1992, pp. 6-7)

South China Morning Post (SCMP) [Hong Kong, in English]. 28 July 1992. John Kohut and Willy Wo-lap Lam. "Sources: Activist Ren Wanding May Lose Eyesight." (FBIS-CHI-92-145 28 July 1992, pp. 10-11)

South China Morning Post Weekly (SCMPW) [Hong Kong]. 9-10 January 1993. "Dissident Xu Returns."

South China Morning Post Weekly (SCMPW) [Hong Kong]. 21-22 November 1992. Dede Nickerson. "Migrant Workers Flood into Capital."

The Standard [Hong Kong, in English]. 30 March 1993. Agnes Cheung. "Relatives Call for Bao Tong's Immediate Release." (FBIS-CHI-93-059 30 Mar. 1993, p. 54)

The Standard [Hong Kong, in English]. 21 July 1992. "Over 500 'Underground' Dissidents Said Arrested." (FBIS-CHI-92-140 21 July 1992, p. 14)

The Sydney Morning Herald. 9 August 1993. Tony Walker. "As China Booms, Its Marriages Bust Up."

Ta Kung Pao [Hong Kong, in Chinese]. 3 August 1992. "Guangzhou Launches Massive Campaign Against Crimes and Cracks More Than 900 Criminal Cases During the First 10 Days." (FBIS-CHI-92-158 14 Aug. 1992, p. 60)

Television Broadcasts Limited [Hong Kong, in English]. 12 May 1993. "Dissident Reportedly Tortured in Prison." (FBIS-CHI-93-090 12 May 1993, p. 12)

Thurston, Anne. January 1993a. Introduction. "Frenzy for Money Masks a Dynasty in Decline," 'Don't Force Us to Lie': The Struggle of Chinese Journalists in the Reform Era. By Allison Liu Jernow. New York: Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).

Thurston, Anne. January 1993a. Introduction. January 1993b. Conclusion. "China's Press Will be Free Someday," 'Don't Force us to Lie': The Struggle of Chinese Journalists in the Reform Era. By Allison Liu Jernow. New York: Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).

Time [New York]. 4 October 1993. Jaime A. Florcruz. "After All, I've Survived."

Time [New York]. 12 July 1993. Michael S. Serrill. "Money Mad: China is a Financial Hothouse, with Investment Scams and Capital Fleeing to Hong Kong."

Time [New York]. 10 May 1993a. Sandra Burton. "Time For the 'Me' Generation."

Time [New York]. 10 May 1993b. James Walsh. "China: The World's Next...Superpower."

Time [New York]. 10 May 1993c. James Walsh. "A Leaner, Meaner Fighting Machine."

Time [New York]. 10 May 1993d. John Elson. "The Party Isn't Over--Yet."

Time [New York]. 10 May 1993e. Richard Hornik. "Limits of Progress."

Time [New York]. 10 May 1993f. Jay Branegan. "The Secret Weapon."

Time [New York]. 10 May 1993g. Barbara Rudolph. "Building on Success."

The Toronto Star. 1 August 1993. Final Edition. Peter Goodspeed. "Corruption a Fact of Life in the 'New China'." (NEXIS)

The Toronto Star. 7 June 1993. "Illegal Immigrants Sail to Tragedy."

The United Press International (UPI). 10 August 1993. "Economic Crimes Threaten the Country's Market Reforms." (China News Digest)

The United Press International (UPI). 7 August 1993a. "News Briefs." (China News Digest)

The United Press International (UPI). 7 August 1993b. "Rising Gunrunning and Gun Crimes Alarm Authorities." (China News Digest)

The United Press International (UPI). 4 August 1993. "Government Lays Down Strict New Rules for Journalists." (China News Digest)

The United Press International (UPI). 29 July 1993. "Beijing Police Bust Job Seekers from Rural Area." (China News Digest)

The United Press International (UPI). 5 April 1993. "China to Give More Freedom to Students to Find Work." (NEXIS)

The United Press International (UPI). 9 March 1993. David R. Schweisberg. "China Indicates Top Political Prisoner to Remain Jailed." (NEXIS)

The United Press International (UPI). 28 September 1992. "Chinese Officials Tighten Watch on Pro-Democracy Dissidents." (NEXIS)

The Washington Post. 12 February 1993. Lena H. Sun. "Deng Contemplates Major Purge of Army: China's Leader, at 88, Is Said to be Buttressing His Legacy." (NEXIS)

The Washington Post. 3 October 1992. Lena H. Sun. "Chinese Government Takes Ambivalent Approach to Released Dissidents." (NEXIS)

Woo, Margaret. 1992. "Legal Reforms in the Aftermath of Tiananmen Square," The Aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Crisis in Mainland China. Edited by Bih-jaw Lin. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press.

Wu, Harry Hongda. 1992. Laogai--The Chinese Gulag. Translated by Ted Slingerland. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press.

Xinhua [Beijing, in Chinese]. 6 May 1993. "Stronger Management Over Publications Urged." (FBIS-CHI-93-090 12 May 1993, pp. 15-16)

Xinhua [Beijing, in Chinese]. [Beijing, in English]. 3 May 1993. "'Check System' to be Introduced in Advertising." (FBIS-CHI-93-084 4 May 1993, p. 22)

Xinhua [Beijing, in Chinese]. [Beijing, in English]. 8 April 1993. "On Students in 4 June 'Political Disturbance'." (FBIS-CHI-93-066 8 Apr. 1993, p. 13)

Xinhua [Beijing, in Chinese]. [Beijing, in Chinese]. 22 February 1993. "State Security Law Adopted by the 30th Meeting of the Seventh NPC Standing Committee on 22 February." (FBIS-CHI-93-035 24 Feb. 1993, pp. 19-23)

Xinhua [Beijing, in Chinese]. [Beijing, in English]. 11 August 1992. "State Council Issues Criminal Reform White Paper." (FBIS-CHI-92-155 11 Aug. 1992, pp. 13-23)

Zhongguo Tongxun She [Hong Kong, in Chinese]. 15 May 1993. "Some Half Million Intellectuals 'Doing Business'." (FBIS-CHI-93-096 20 May 1993, p. 15)

Zhongguo Tongxun She. [Hong Kong, in Chinese]. 13 Sept. 1992. "Official Denies Export of Prison-Made Products." (FBIS-CHI-92-179 15 Sept. 1992, p. 38)

Zhongguo Xinwen She [Beijing, in English]. 12 May 1993. "Guangdong Trails Last in China in Public Order." (FBIS-CHI-93-091 13 May 1993, p. 19)

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