Inter-NGO Committee for Somalia (UK) (INCS-UK) 1991 Reports - Executive Summary

 

1.   INTRODUCTION

This summary covers five 1991 reports on Somalia by two non-governmental aid agencies: the Inter-NGO Committee for Somalia -- UK (INCS-UK) and World Concern. The London-based INCS-UK was created in January 1991 by six British aid groups immediately following the ouster of President Mohamed Siad Barre. World Concern is a U.S.-based non-governmental development aid agency.

The reports represent accounts of five field trips - four by INCS-UK and one by World Concern - undertaken between February and September 1991 in 14 of Somalia's 17 administrative regions. While targeted specifically for groups involved in international development assistance, the reports provide information on the political-security situation, political structures and their stages of development within various regions, and internal and external migration issues.

Major international human rights groups have not sent investigative teams into Somalia since the fall of Siad Barre, and, given the generally unstable situation that has prevailed in Mogadishu and regions south of the city, few journalists have ventured into that part of the country. The INCS-UK and World Concern reports are likely among the most significant detailed recent accounts of political, social and economic conditions in Somalia.

2.            BACKGROUND INFORMATION

On 27 January 1991, President of Somalia Mohamed Siad Barre fled Mogadishu, precipitating the fall of his government to the armed forces of the United Somali Congress (USC).(1) The shaky coalition of rebel groups which pushed him from power soon fell into conflict, resulting in fierce battles between the USC and a Darood coalition of rebel groups which included the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and armed members of Siad Barre's Marehan clan.(2) The heaviest fighting occurred in the southern Mogadishu-Kismayo corridor, the control of which changed hands four times between February and July 1991 (see section 3.2 Reports on Southern Somalia). There was also fighting between the USC and the Majeerteen-dominated SSDF in the Galgaduud and southern Mudug regions .(3)

Northern Somalia, on the other hand, has remained relatively calm despite enormous damage to cities and towns resulting from the three-year civil war between the Isaaq-based Somali National Movement (SNM) and the various armed forces of the Siad Barre government. Estimates of the number of anti-personnel land-mines left over from the war in the north range up to one million.(4)

Two political events have been central in shaping the current situation in Somalia. First, in mid-May 1991, the SNM proclaimed the independence of the northern regions of Awdal, Waqoyi Galbeed, Todgheer, Sanaag and Sool, officially naming the new country the Republic of Somaliland. The announcement reportedly came after extensive consultation with major sectors of the population including representatives of the four main non-Isaaq clans. There are non-Isaaqs in the Somaliland government but they do not belong to the political groups representing non-Isaaq clans. Those groups have thus far been excluded from the provisional government of the new republic.(5)

Second, in late July 1991, six political groups signed an agreement in Djibouti composed of a number of provisions including a ceasefire, the establishment of a two-year interim government followed by free, multi-party elections, and renewed efforts to defeat Siad Barre and his loyalist forces.(6) The latter are ensconced in the southwestern region of Gedo and had, by October 1991, reportedly advanced into the adjacent region of Bay.(7)

The Djibouti Agreement has thus far not been fully implemented and has, since September 1991, been overshadowed by tensions between two rival factions of the USC. Fighting escalated into full-scale warfare in Mogadishu in mid-November 1991 as one faction, led by Mohamed Farah Aideed, stepped up its efforts to oust the interim President, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, also the leader of the rival USC faction. Like most other political groups and rebel groups in Somalia, both factions are clan-based, with Aideed's group being Habar Gedir and Mahdi Mohamed's Abgal. Both clans belong to the Hawiye clan-family.

3.      SUMMARY OF REPORTS

3.0      General

The five reports covered in this executive summary are as follows:

1) INCS-UK, "A Report of the Assessment Mission to Bari, Nugaal and Mudug Regions of Somalia from September 17th-September 30, 1991, To the Inter-NGO Committee for Somalia (UK)," October 1991.

2) INCS-UK, "A Report to the Inter-NGO Committee for Somalia (UK) on a Visit to Southern Somalia, Mogadishu and Kismayo, 13th-24th July 1991," August 1991.

3) World Concern, "Report on an Emergency Needs Assessment of the Lower Juba Region (Kismaayo, Jamaame, and Jilib Districts), Somalia," July 1991.

4) INCS (UK and Kenya), "A Report of the Assessment Mission to Northern Somalia from March 28th to April 8th 1991," April 1991.

5) INCS (UK and Kenya), "A Report of the Assessment Mission to Mogadishu, Hiraan, Bay, Middle Shabelle and Lower Shabelle Regions from February 23rd to March 4th, 1991," March 1991.

Note: Please refer to the map on page 9a of the report of October 1991 for the location of the administrative regions of Somalia.

3.1  Report on Bari, Nugaal and Mudug

Two INCS-UK representatives visited the three regions between 17 and 30 September 1991, covering most municipalities in Bari, Nugaal and northern Mudug. The report provides relevant information on demographic structure, an evolving civilian government, the security situation, and displaced persons.

The predominant clan in the three regions is the Majeerteen clan of the Darood clan-family. Four major Majeerteen sub-clans are in turn the dominant groups within the three regions, as follows: Omar Mahamoud in Mudug; Issa Mahamoud in Nugaal; Osman Mahamoud and Ali Suleiman in Bari. The situation is complicated by the existence of a "traditional border area" in southern Mudug which separates three clans - Majeerteen, Marehan (Darood clan-family) and Habar Gedir (Hawiye clan-family) - from each other (p. 12). INCS-UK representatives were told that villages along the Galkaiyo-Dusa Mareb road were deserted. The Majeerteen had reportedly moved north, the Habar Gedir east and the Marehan west and south.

The report indicates that in late September 1991, the SSDF controlled Bari, Nugaal, and a northern portion of Mudug. The USC reportedly controlled southeastern Mudug including the towns of Hobyo and Haradera, while Marehan forces controlled the northern Galgaduud town of Abudwak. The approximate demarcation line between the SSDF and the USC was between Galkaiyo and Garad (see map on p. 9b of the report).

The USC captured and occupied Galkaiyo, the capital of Mudug, between

24 February and 1 April 1991. At the time of the INCS-UK mission, the city was the military headquarters of the SSDF but continuing instability was reflected in the fact that the regional capital had been moved provisionally to Burtinle. The report also states that "SSDF front line forces" were reportedly 30 kilometres south along the road to Dusa Mareb (p. 108).

By October 1991, the SSDF had installed the leaders of a civilian government in the area under its control, although the report emphasizes that it was unclear at the time which positions below those of regional governor and district commissioner had been filled. Two aspects of this situation are notable.

First, although the SSDF is a signatory to the Djibouti Agreement which calls for a united Somalia, it has created an autonomous government of the "Northeast." According to the report, "the northeastern and central regions are at present effectively administered separately from Mogadishu" (p. 19). Throughout the INCS-UK visit, SSDF representatives emphasized that negotiations on development assistance should be conducted with the regional authorities (p. 19). By September 1991, an Executive Committee was in place covering the three northeastern regions, supported by regional and district governments. The report describes a relatively decentralized structure, however, in which the regions and districts act independently of the Executive Committee.

Second, the SSDF has taken steps to ensure the dominance of civilian over military authority. This is in sharp contrast to the situation in southern Somalia where the military commanders of the USC and the Somali Patriotic Movement appear to have been the highest authority since January 1991 (see section 3.2).

Stability throughout most of northeastern Somalia has undoubtedly contributed to the establishment of civilian government. Except for Mudug south of the Galkaiyo-Garad line, the report indicates that the three regions are relatively calm. The INCS-UK team heard gunshots only in Bossaso and saw only a few light arms being carried by people in the towns and villages visited.

Excluding Somaliland, the northeastern regions are perhaps the most stable areas in the country. This is best illustrated by an examination of migration issues. As the report states, since the ouster of Siad Barre there has been a "massive movement of people into the northeastern and central regions" (p. 9). Based on information collected from numerous towns and villages in all three regions, the INCS-UK estimates that, by October 1991, Mudug, Nugaal and Bari had experienced 12-month population growth rates of 71, 26 and 31 percent respectively.

There have been reports that the migration route taken by displaced people from southern Somalia, through Ethiopia, to the northeastern regions is extremely hazardous. Some men have reportedly been killed and children have died in transit due to lack of adequate food supplies (see p. 43).

3.2              Reports on Southern Somalia

3.2.0              General

The INCS and World Concern produced three reports on various regions in southern Somalia between March 1991 and August 1991. Developments since this period, especially in Mogadishu, have dated much of the information in the reports, however, they still provide a relatively comprehensive overview of fighting between armed Darood groups - led by the SPM - and the USC in the Mogadishu-Kismayo corridor from early February to the end of June 1991. They also address a number of issues that are not addressed in the vast majority of other reports and press articles dealing with southern Somalia.

Although the table of contents of the report of August 1991 indicates that the INCS-UK visited six regions in southern Somalia, these visits were somewhat brief. During the eleven-day visit, various members of the INCS-UK team spent one day in Balcad (Middle Shabelle), one day split between Afgoi and Wenla Weyne (Lower Shabelle), and two days split between Kismayo (Lower Juba) and Jilib (Middle Juba). The team did not travel to Hiraan, but spent the remaining time in Mogadishu. Thus, the August 1991 report is not particularly detailed in its coverage of the situation outside the capital. The report of March 1991 is more useful in this regard as it mounted more extensive field trips covering 12 towns and villages in Middle and Lower Shabelle, Hiraan and Bay. The August 1991 report provides interesting information on nascent government structures, displaced persons and refugees.

3.2.1          Collapse of the Legal System in Mogadishu

In late February, there was little effective government in the capital and general anarchy was slowly developing. Information in the August report indicates that little had changed in this regard, despite the recent signing of the Djibouti Agreement. At the time of the report, the central government in Mogadishu had failed to achieve recognition at either the national or international level and it therefore remained "unable to attract those resources that would allow it to re-establish effective government services" (p. 12).

Since the fall of Siad Barre, the forces designated to maintain law and order in Mogadishu have been those of the USC. The August 1991 report, however, describes them as "incoherent and undisciplined, with no clear central command structure" (p.16). It also links them to summary executions and other human rights abuses. The report sums up the situation as follows:

Security in Mogadishu for every person still remains precarious. Many people, though not the majority still carry guns openly in the streets. All vehicles, of what ever size, have at least one armed guard protecting [it] (p.16).

3.2.2   Clan Relations and Demography

The report of March 1991 contains information on clan relations in Mogadishu. By that time, large numbers of Daroods had fled the city to southern Somalia, however, according to the March 1991 report, members of two Darood clans, the Dulbahante and the Warsangali, remained and were "at serious risk of persecution and summary killing" (p. 56). A plan to evacuate them to their traditional clan lands in the northern regions of Sool and Sanaag was being considered but the August report does not provide confirmation on whether it had been successfully carried out.

The World Concern report of July 1991 provides information on clan demographics and relations in Middle and Lower Juba. While Kismayo and most of Lower Juba are a "power base of the Ogadeen," pockets of other clans are scattered throughout Middle Juba and the eastern-most district of Lower Juba (p. 6). The report points out that "one of the most vulnerable groups in the area will be those ethnic Somalis whose clan does not possess military control of the region" (p. 8). At present, this would refer to those Hawiye who remained after the USC withdrew from the region in late June 1991.

3.2.3             Ethnic Relations

The population of Somalia has a very high level of ethnic homogeneity, however, the area between Mogadishu and Kismayo - especially the district of Kismayo and the Lower Juba River valley - is home to a significant number of non-Somalis. They are people of Arab descent living in the Lower Shabelle towns of Merka and Brava as well as descendants of slaves from eastern and southern Africa - known as Gosha - who have established communities in the thick forests of the lower Juba River. According to the July report by World Concern, the Arab population of Kismayo had fled the city soon after the fall of the government in January 1991.

The World Concern report of July 1991 emphasizes that, as the battle lines oscillated across the regions of Lower and Middle Juba and Lower Shabelle in the first half of 1991, non-Somalis were amongst the chief civilian victims of the warring parties. Both the July and August reports describe abuses committed against the Gosha by USC forces, who suspected them of sympathizing with the SPM, and emphasize that the Gosha remain a particularly vulnerable group. The July report cites observations made by international agencies, "that the `low caste' status of the Gosha can negatively affect the flow of relief and development goods they receive, especially if those goods are handled through ethnic Somali intermediaries" (p. 6).

The report of March 1991 documents allegations of serious human rights violations by USC troops against the non-Somali inhabitants of Brava. Since the USC vacated the town in June 1991, Brava has been occupied by the SPM.

3.2.4        Migration Issues

Detailed information on clan demographics in Mogadishu contained in the March 1991 report has almost certainly become outdated with renewed fighting in the city beginning in November 1991. The report also outlines the first waves of displaced Daroods who were fleeing to the countryside to avoid attacks by the forces of the USC.

An interesting issue is the role of religious institutions and communities - the latter are known as jameecooyin - in the current conflict. As described by the July report, wide-spread respect for the jameecooyin in Lower and Middle Juba had translated into a taboo against attacks on these communities, which had led to their extensive use as places of refuge for those from vulnerable groups. The July report describes two such communities near the towns of Jamaame and Jilib. It adds, however, that both USC and SPM forces distrust the role of the communities and that "mounting hunger warfare, and anarchy in the region may soon overwhelm the taboo which for five months has protected [them]" (p. 18). The March report also indicates that the Sheik Ali Sufi mosque in Mogadishu was being used at that time as a refuge for Darood women and children.

The report of July 1991 provides details of the massive fluctuation in the population of Kismayo throughout 1991. In January 1991, the city became a refuge for Daroods fleeing advancing USC forces. When Kismayo was under USC occupation in May and June, its population shrank from about 200,000 to 20,000 as those Daroods fled west.

3.2.5         Freedom of Expression and Political Prisoners

In the midst of more obvious human rights concerns, the issue of freedom of expression has received scant attention recently. The report of August 1991 states that "one of the most positive changes since the overthrow of the former government is the new freedom of the media" (p. 29). In August 1991, there were eleven newspapers circulating in the city, of which only one, Dalka, was government-owned. In addition to criticizing the Somali Patriotic Movement and the independence policies of the SNM, the newspapers did not "refrain from criticizing the USC, [interim President] Ali Mahadi and [Mohamed Farah] Aideed if they disagree[d] with their policies or actions" (p. 29). Radio Mogadishu was reportedly just as open in this regard. During the INCS-UK visit in July, there were three non-violent demonstrations by unarmed civilians, two of them urging the USC to change its current policy on central issues.

In its report of March 1991, the INCS-UK comments on the issue of prisoners in Somalia. At that time, all prisoners in "police and security gaols [in Mogadishu] appear[ed] to have been released" (p. 62). Of three political prisoners who were being monitored by Amnesty International at the time of Siad Barre's fall, one had been freed while the whereabouts of the other two was still uncertain. The INCS-UK report recommends that NGOs monitor prison conditions once they are back in use, however, the subsequent reports do not address this issue.

3.3              Report on Northern Somalia

Even before the May 1991 independence declaration, northern Somalia was a special case, due primarily to the unparalleled damage caused by the three-year civil war between the SNM and the Siad Barre regime. The April 1991 INCS-UK report indicates that by that time, the SNM had taken major steps toward establishing a government independent of Mogadishu.

The outstanding issue then - and one which remains central today - was reconciliation between the Isaaq and the four major non-Isaaq clans. Numerous statements throughout the report on relations between the clans paint an unclear picture. At that time, it was too early to say that peace had been established between the Isaaq and other clans. The report indicates that "fear has been overcome with the Gadabursi, the Isa and the Warsengele," but that, "the Dulbahante are still nervous of the Isaaq" (p. 13). In the latter case, the most recent clashes had occurred in mid-March.

The report suggests that relations between the Isaaq and Gadabursi were good in March 1991. The SNM captured the main Gadabursi city of Borama on 4 February 1991, "causing very little damage." At the same time, however, 130 people were killed and "the vast majority" of the population as well as about 40,000 refugees fled west (pp. 71-2). By 23 February 1991, 60 percent had reportedly returned. The report indicates that the main Gadabursi rebel group, the Somali Democratic Association (SDA), had negotiated a peace agreement with the SNM by 21 February 1991 and that the SDA had subsequently become "part of the SNM" (p. 72). Numerous subsequent reports provide no confirmation of such a union.

The April 1991 INCS-UK report provides useful, albeit sometimes contradictory, information on clan demographics and relations in Somaliland. The reader must sift through various town and village reports to piece together a clearer picture. The accounts on Borama, Ceerigabo (Erigavo), Jidale, Caynaba, and Las Caanod are particularly useful in this regard.

The report also provides scattered information on the developing governmental and legal structures in the northern regions. It indicates that in some places small police forces were operating and that a mobile court was travelling throughout Somaliland to deal with the cases of a number of prisoners-of-war. In its references to those and other prisoners, the INCS-UK report indicates that they were not being ill-treated and that they were being cared for as well as could be expected given the disastrous economic situation prevailing throughout Somaliland.

4.                FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Given the often shallow coverage of events in Somalia following the fall of Siad Barre, the five reports reviewed in this summary are noteworthy for their detailed accounts of political, social and economic developments in various regions of Somalia up until late September 1991. In general, they indicate the following: 1) in October 1991, most of the three northeastern regions appeared to be experiencing relative political stability; 2) in August 1991, the situation in Mogadishu and the surrounding area was tenuous; 3) in July 1991, the SPM had just recently re-established control over Lower and Middle Juba, and part of Lower Shabelle; and 4) in March, the northern regions - now the self-declared Republic of Somaliland - were already under the effective authority of the SNM and were relatively stable.

Clan relations remain the key defining factor of Somali politics and their volatility has become clear in the few months since the last INCS-UK report was written. Even independent Somaliland - thus far the most stable part of Somalia - now appears susceptible to inter-clan conflict. Reports have been unclear, but since mid-December 1991, armed members of two Isaaq clans - the Habar Yoonis and the Habar Jalco - have clashed on two occasions.(8) While it is still too early to say whether these incidents represent a fundamental rift within the Isaaqs and the SNM, a recent article in Le Monde states that the various Isaaq clans have now staked out zones of control and that old grudges between those clans, submerged during the war against the Siad Barre regime, are resurfacing.(9)

In an another incident in early January 1992, armed Islamic fundamentalists clashed with SSDF troops in Bossaso, resulting in the death of a UNICEF doctor.(10) Islamic fundamentalists have seldom been mentioned as an organized force in Somali politics since January 1991 and, as in Somaliland, it is too early to discern a pattern that would seriously threaten stability in the northeastern regions.

Taken together, however, the above two incidents serve to emphasize that the basic political-security situation in all parts of the country has been uncertain and will likely remain subject to rapid change for some time to come. Extreme poverty, shortages of food and a devastated economy are characteristic throughout most regions of Somalia and these factors will surely contribute to an unstable political and human rights situation throughout at least 1992.

5. FootnoteS

 (1) "Somalia: Where Do We Go From Here?" Africa Confidential [London], 8 February 1991.

(2) "Somalia: Fighting Reported Between USC and SPM Forces," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 February 1991, p. ME/0994/ii; Jean Hélène, "Somalie: Des affrontements entre factions rebelles avaient fait plus de cent mort près de Mogadiscio," Le Monde [Paris], 12 February 1991; "Somalia: Talk of Cease-Fire But Fighting Goes On," The Indian Ocean Newsletter [Paris], 13 April 1991; "Crisis as the World Prevaricates," New African, June 1991; "Somalia: Circle Closes Again Around Mogadishu," The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 30 March 1991.

(3) Hamish Wilson, "Unsettled Dust," Africa Events [London], March 1991; "Minister Wants `Peaceful' Settlement With Siyad," AFP [Paris], 21 March 1991 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 March 1991), p. ME/1028/B/1.

(4) Actual figures have ranged between 250,000 mines as cited in "Violations of the North," New African, May 1991, and one million mines as cited in United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Information Bulletin No. 4 On Operations in the Horn of Africa," 16 August 1991, p. 12.

(5) On the issue of consultation, see "Somalia: One State or Two?" Africa Confidential, 14 June 1991; "Kenya/Somalia: Nairobi Accused of Intrusion," The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 6 April 1991. On the composition of the government, one source calls it an "SNM team." See "Somalia: One State or Two?" A significant number of non-Isaaqs were in the original government formed in June 1991, however, the top posts were occupied by Isaaqs from the SNM. See "Somalia: Somaliland Government Line-Up," The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 8 June 1991, p. 6; "Somalie: Les sécessionistes du Nord ont formé leur gouvernement," Le Monde, 8 June 1991. In a telephone interview conducted on 24 February 1992, Daniel Compagnon, a Quebec-based specialist of Somali affairs, confirmed that none of the non-Isaaq political groups are represented in the government.

(6) "Somalia: Djibouti Conference Egg-Shell Agreement," The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 27 July 1991; "Fresh Start," New African, September 1991; "A Peace Horn," Africa Events, September 1991.

(7) Specific information on Siad Barre's loyalist forces is difficult to find. The following articles taken together form a relatively clear picture. Marc Yared, "La Somalie à feu et à sang," Jeune Afrique [Paris], 30 January-5 February 1992, pp. 32-35; "Minister Appeals for `War' Against Siad Remnants," Radio Mogadishu, 25 October 1991 (FBIS-AFR-91-209), 29 October 1991, p. 9; "Official Accuses Siad Forces of `Genocide'," Radio Mogadishu, 22 October 1991 (FBIS-AFR-91-207), 25 October 1991, p. 7; Said Samatar, Somalia: a Nation in Turmoil (London: Minority Rights Group, August 1991), p. 21.

(8) "Somaliland: Fighting in Burao," The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 25 January 1992; "Médecins Somalie," Agence France Presse, 15 January 1992.

(9) Jean Hélène, "Somalie: la demande du secrétaire-général de l'ONU les parties en conflit se rencontrent à New-York," Le Monde, 13 February 1992.

(10) "Somalia: Fighting in Bosaso," The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 18 January 1992, p. 3.

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