Democracy Within or Without the Law

 

1.   HUMAN RIGHTS

1.0     Introduction

Following almost eight years of a brutal military dictatorship and, subsequently, a troubled return to democracy, Argentina's economic decline has brought the living standard of Argentines from that of a developed country to average Latin American poverty levels.

Some of the current main concerns of human rights organizations in Argentina stem from or have been sharpened by the critical economic situation (WOLA 11 Dec. 1990; Frund 11 Dec. 1990). In addition to hunger and increased infant mortality, particularly in villas miseria (shanty towns surrounding cities), crime has risen sharply. Cases of police brutality, excessive use of force, and actions by civilians which have been labelled by some as a sign of an emerging "vigilantism," are also on the increase. Support for policemen employing illegal methods and citizens resorting to arms and killing thieves has been voiced at all levels (including tacit assent by some of the highest government officials) (The Sunday Times 14 Oct. 1990, 8 July 1990). People apparently feel the need for greater protection. For example, recent reports indicate that one out of every 100 arrests results in a conviction. There are also reports of people who, after identifying their assailant in a police line-up, have been pursued and killed by the released attacker (Los Angeles Times 9 Sept. 1990, 18).

Crime is not limited to the streets: cases of policemen blackmailing and kidnapping for profit have been reported, as well as cases of judges fabricating charges against citizens (Ibid.). Congressmen and provincial governments have also come under scrutiny for scandals involving misappropriation of funds, fraudulent public tenders and even theft of food coupons for the poor (Interpress Service 9 Feb. 1990).

At least one judge and a journalist have been threatened for exposing scandals (Committee for the Protection Nov. 1990; The Sunday Times 14 Oct. 1990). Also, a congressman of the opposition party Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) has reportedly received death threats for uncovering a multi-million dollar fraud by a Peronist militant and close supporter of Menem (Latinamerica Press 24 May 1990, 5).

1.1            The Right to Leave

Tens of thousands of people a year, mostly middle class, have been leaving the country since the late-1980s, including descendants of Spanish and Italian immigrants whose children and grandchildren have reportedly been making use of their right to their forebears' citizenship (The Los Angeles Times 20 Nov. 1990, 1). Argentines can, by virtue of bilateral treaties, travel to neighbouring countries without a passport, although residence in the latter may require specific permits or visas from host countries (Argentine Consulate 21 Dec. 1990). Argentine officials normally check the identity of individuals upon leaving since people with charges pending, those on parole, or those who lack proof of military service or official exemption from it, are normally forbidden to leave the country (Ibid.).

One unusual example of migration is the case of an Argentine spy working abroad who lost his job due to government budget cuts and, faced with the prospect of returning jobless to an impoverished Argentina, opted to seek asylum in the United States (The Sunday Times 28 Jan. 1990).

This case, however, is not necessarily representative of Argentine asylum seekers or secret service agents. In fact, the various Argentine intelligence services continue to function despite rivalries, reduced budgets and personnel, and redefined missions (Ibid.). But the extent to which these services are under the government's control came into question after it was discovered and widely publicized that the President's house had been bugged.

1.2                Constitutional Rights

President Menem, facing challenges throughout the country including his own home, where his wife has reportedly aligned herself with his most vigorous political enemies, has resorted to a number of measures of questionable legality. For example, an "emergency law" passed in the first days of his government to facilitate privatization of public companies, reportedly contradicts the constitutional right of individuals to sue the state. Also, the right to strike has been limited by a decree which is in apparent contradiction with previous laws and the Constitution's provisions concerning the matter (The Economist 27 Oct. 1990, 46).

In a move that virtually erased the savings of many companies and hundreds of thousands of Argentines, Menem's government transferred billions of dollars in private savings to 10-year term bonds overnight (The Washington Post 23 Feb. 1990, A18). In another move, apparently devised to appease potential mutineers, pardons were granted to military officers whose trials had not been completed, despite a constitutional provision which limits pardons for people who had been sentenced (The Economist 27 Oct. 1990, 50). Hope that these new measures will be overturned is waning in light of the recent increase of the number of judges in the Supreme Court from five to nine. Menem personally appointed the four new justices (Ibid.).

1.3         The Right to a Fair Trial

The presidential pardon of officers charged and convicted for mutiny during the Alfonsín administration and for atrocities during the "dirty war," as well as the purging of judges and prosecutors who conducted their trials, are a major concern for human rights organizations (Human Rights Watch 1990; WOLA 11 Dec. 1990; Frund 11 Dec. 1990). The so-called "dirty war" of 1976-1980 describes the arrest by by the military and security forces of thousands of persons against alleged subversive and terrorist activities, and the subsequent disappearance of these persons. The Presidential pardons as well as his promise to release the last former junta-members remaining in prison have drawn harsh criticism at home and abroad. The resultant sense of impunity could encourage a return to the atrocities of the "dirty war" (The Los Angeles Times 2 Nov. 1990, 5; Latin American Regional Reports 18 Oct. 1990).

1.4      The Right to Strike

Privatization of public enterprises has come under attack by Seineldín and has become a very heated issue in Argentina. A series of strikes opposing the process have contributed to the economic decline. Bombs have been detonated at different places to signal opposition to the privatization of the national telecommunications company. Although responsibility for the bombings has been claimed by the "Ché Guevara Brigade," the true identity of the terrorists has not been determined (FBIS-LAT-90-084 1 May 1990, 38). However, the same group has claimed (or at least the same name has been used to claim) responsibility for bombings and other actions lacking a clear political purpose, including the kidnapping of the son of a trade union leader (FBIS-LAT-90-122 25 June 1990, 36; FBIS-LAT-90-132 10 July 1990, 34).

1.5  Anti-Terrorist Operations

Terrorist tactics, mainly bombings of political and commercial facilities without victims or known perpetrators, have been in evidence since late 1986; the use of these tactics reached a climax on 25 June 1987 with 16 bomb attacks on UCR premises within four hours. Alfonsín's Interior Minister suggested that this intimidatory campaign was the work of people who had participated in the military repression of the mid-seventies (Latin American Weekly Report 9 July 1987, 4-5). One report indicates that throughout 1987 the police eliminated, in addition to a small number of left-wing terrorist groups, "a number of highly sophisticated groups of terrorists, mainly extreme right-wingers with connections to the `dirty war' task forces" (Latin America Weekly Report 1 Dec. 1988, 3). These anti-terrorist operations were carried out by the police during the last years of the Alfonsín government and included the capture of large arsenals of weapons, ammunition and explosives belonging to the army. The arsenals were found in warehouses owned by a civilian who was reputed to be a member of paramilitary death squads set up by the armed forces during the mid-seventies repression (Ibid.).

2.         WHO'S WHO IN ARGENTINA TODAY

2.0                Introduction

The attack on the military school and barracks at La Tablada in January 1989 by the Marxist group Frente Popular de Resistencia (FPR) (Popular Resistance Front), attracted world attention. The FPR was linked to the Movimiento Todos por la Patria (MTP) (All for the Motherland Movement), described as a front organization (Latin American Weekly Report 20 Apr. 1989, 6-7). A number of non-Argentine Latin Americans apparently took part in the rebel attack, which was violently crushed. The aftermath of the attack is reported to have included abuses against the surviving attackers by security forces (Human Rights Watch 1990, 50).

The FPR was allegedly a marginal faction of Argentine Trotskyism. The group's mastermind is reportedly one of the former leaders of the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), the armed branch of the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Workers' Party, Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT). Rebel activities by the ERP and other groups prompted counter-insurgency operations that led to the "dirty war" in the mid-seventies which virtually eliminated both the ERP and the PRT and led many of their surviving members to join new organizations (Latin American Weekly Report 20 Apr. 1989, 6-7, 2 Feb. 1989, 2). Other Trotskyist groups have now opted for more conventional methods. The Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) (Movement Towards Socialism) forms, together with the pro-Moscow Frente Amplio de Liberación (FRAL) (Communist Broad Liberation Front) and other groups, Izquierda Unida (IU) (United Left) electoral coalition which has been experiencing a rapid rise in popularity over the past few years (Latin American Weekly Report 2 Feb. 1989, 2). The leadership of the MAS has also participated in the prosecution of officers who committed human rights abuses during the military regime of the late 1970s and the early-1980s. Other Trotskyist groups currently active in Argentina include the Partido Obrero (PO) (Workers' Party), the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR) (Revolutionary Workers' Party) and the Partido de los Trabajadores por el Socialismo (PTS) (Workers' Party for Socialism) (Ibid.).

2.1      The Army

Although Menem may have gained support from a significant sector of the armed forces with pardons, his popularity among voters in general has apparently suffered. Moreover, there are those who question the extent to which he maintains control over the security forces.

In mid-1990, the chief of the Federal Police offered to resign as a result of public charges concerning the existence of a group within the police force that was responsible for "a campaign of intimidation against judges and deputies" (FBIS-LAT-90-109 6 June 1990, 34).

During the uprising of early December 1990, rebel soldiers were unequivocally subdued by that portion of the army loyal to Menem. Apparently, Menem is currently on good terms with a sector of the armed forces (The Christian Science Monitor 5 Dec. 1990, 1-2). How long this good relationship will last is the question Argentines are asking.

2.2               The Peronists

To add to current difficulties, the ruling Peronist Party is not a united front. Different factions have emerged over the decades. A recent split within the main Peronist Party (formally known as Justicialista) has also resulted in the internal division of its main labour ally, the Central General de Trabajadores (CGT). As well, it is widely reported that Saúl Ubaldini, leader of the dissident faction of the CGT (known as "rebel CGT"), has formed an alliance with Menem's wife and carapintada leader Seineldín in opposition to the government. At least three rival Peronist rallies took place in Buenos Aires at the same time during the 17 October 1990 Peronist "Day of Loyalty," emphasizing divisions within the ruling party (Latin American Weekly Report 8 Nov. 1990, 4).

Vice-President Eduardo Duhalde has given public warnings similar to those given by Alfonsín some years ago, stating that "shady characters" previously arrested for alleged links with far-right conspiracies are currently supporting and financing Seineldín (Ibid.). Some independent observers have pointed out that the recent behaviour of pardoned mutineers has proven that granting them pardons may have been a major mistake of Menem's (The Christian Science Monitor 5 Dec. 1990, 1-2).

2.3                The Carapintadas and Mohamed Alí Seineldín

The carapintadas officers who mutinied against Raúl Alfonsín and who have been described as neo-nazis, have become increasingly vocal and demanding since Menem pardoned them. Following their pardon, they reportedly carried out a smear campaign against Alfonsín and his party (FBIS-LAT-90-076 19 Apr. 1990, 17), only to turn against Menem and his policies.

Carapintada leader Mohamed Alí Seineldín was reported to have been the army liaison of the Triple-A death squad of the early 1970s and an important figure in the "dirty war" (Latin America Weekly Report 15 Dec. 1988, 3). He has been rallying support throughout the country by visiting shanty towns, meeting with interest groups, union and community leaders, and preaching an ideology which mixes Catholicism and militarism (FBIS-LAT-90-061 20 Mar. 1990, 45). Appearing shirtless in the rain in poor neighbourhoods, he has reportedly warned against liberalism and "the left," arguing for the need to save the homeland and defend institutions should the future fail to produce his perception of a solution to the current failing economic and political situation (Ibid.). Support for Seineldín has come not only from a diverse portion of the civilian population but also from those military officers who staged an uprising in December 1990 (The Christian Science Monitor 5 Dec. 1990, 1-2). The rebels' demands for a re-organization of the army were not only reminiscent of some of Seineldín's preaching, but also constituted an attack on Menem's authority as head of the armed forces (Ibid.).

2.4   The Montoneros

Also in 1990, former leaders of the Montoneros, a guerrilla faction which split from the Peronist party more than a decade ago and recently rejoined the party, returned from their asylum in Uruguay after Menem granted them pardon. They have now reportedly expressed their support for both Menem and the carapintadas (FBIS-LAT-90-095 16 May 1990, 36). Seineldín has, however, branded the Montoneros as Marxist and has denied any ties to them (FBIS-LAT-90-130 6 July 1990, 36).

2.5                Political Parties of the Left

On the other hand, Marxism as a political ideology, has reappeared and seems to be consolidating support. Trotskyists have gained a place in Congress, although their Movimiento al Socialismo and Partido Obrero have been reportedly linked to the looting and riots of mid-1989 (Latin American Weekly Report 15 June 1989, 2). While the old Communist Party of Argentina (PCA) has been affected by internal conflicts (FBIS-LAT-90-097 18 May 1990, 21), the MAS is said to be strong in the shanty-towns; it attracted some 60,000 people to a Buenos Aires rally on 1 May 1990 (Latin American Weekly Report 24 May 1990, 6). "Left-dominated" unions have existed for a few decades, albeit under the shadow of the Peronist-dominated CGT, but could reportedly increase their presence in the near future (Ibid.).

2.6                The Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP)

The Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), which constituted the largest guerrilla organization in the hemisphere during the 1970s, was decimated by military repression. There was no indication of its continued existence until, in 1987, the ERP was held responsible for a bomb attack on the home of the intelligence chief of the Second Army Corps at Rosario (Revolutionary and Dissident Movements 1988, 17). Although unconfirmed by other reports, The Los Angeles Times (29 Nov. 1990, 2) reported that a recently-arrested Bolivian associated with an off-shoot of the ERP, the Union of Revolutionary Workers, was allegedly linked to a plot to kill George Bush during his recent visit to Argentina.

3.               FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

International human rights organizations and media have not recently reported the existence of major terrorist or guerrilla movements. There are no reports of the repression of political groups, and elections at the provincial and municipal levels have taken place without incident. However, recent developments have cast doubts over the rule of law and the respect for democratic proceedings and institutions by some individuals, both within and outside the government.

Despite the increasing participation of various sectors of the population in politics and a continuous debate of ideas, an air of instability pervades the social and political scene. Argentina is witnessing a resurgence and increasing influence of groups and characters who are not only reminiscent of, but who were actually linked to the brutality of the "dirty war." Their appearance at a time of political confusion and deep economic crisis adds to a set of conditions similar to those which eventually led to the military coup of 1976.

If the atrocities committed in the aftermath of the 1976 coup are an indication of possible future actions, the figures provided in the book Nunca Más (Never More) (CONADEP 1984) are revealing: about two thirds of the 9,000 documented cases of persons tortured and disappeared were men; 35 percent were 21-25 years of age, 30 percent were 26-30 years old and 25 percent were age 16-20; labourers constituted approximately one third, students and office employees about 20 percent each. Although professionals (lawyers, doctors, architects, etc.) accounted for 11 percent and journalists nearly two percent of the documented total, they constitute a very large portion of their profession. About two thirds of the raids, arrests and kidnappings took place at night and at the victims' homes, with the rest occurring mostly in public places, the workplace and schools. The actual total figures may vary somewhat since the investigators later found that many cases, particularly those from remote locations and the countryside, were never reported or documented, while evidence of many cases was destroyed (CONADEP 1984, 273-297).

The same source documents cases of cooperation between the security forces of Argentina and neighbouring countries, constituting what is termed by the investigating commission as a veritable "multinational repressive apparatus." Security forces from different countries operated in neighbouring states, kidnapping, torturing and killing without regard for borders, victimizing even refugees recognized as such by their host countries and under the protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Ibid., 265).

In the mid-seventies, most of the victims of the "dirty war" apparently did not receive death threats. Military personnel who specialized in infiltrating human rights organizations and support groups, actually participated in the subsequent arrests of the groups they had infiltrated. At the same time, people who had been tried by the courts, found innocent and subsequently released, were kidnapped and killed even as they left the courts and detention centres. Policemen and soldiers who participated in the campaign were not immune since a number of them were also victimized when they showed humanitarian concern for the victims or their relatives, or when they expressed disapproval of the illegal profiteering which was carried out by many of their colleagues (Ibid., 254-256).

Recently, some judges and journalists have been publicly labelled as leftists, while other individuals, like the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, have received threats. Also, a report was prepared by the Secretaría de Inteligencia del Estado (SIDE) (State Intelligence Secretariat) and was made public in July 1990 by government officials. The report indicated that the carapintadas were planning a takeover of military facilities in late 1990 by groups of retired officers and civilians. The takeover would include the seizure of broadcasting stations and the abduction of journalists, politicians and businessmen "deemed hostile to their cause" (Latin American Weekly Report 9 Aug. 1990).

Following the demise of the last military dictatorship, many officers of the armed forces are reportedly trying to come to terms with and become accepted by the majority of civilians. At the same time, support for the rebellious carapintadas was lacking amongst more than half of the officer corps in late 1989 (Ibid.; The Christian Science Monitor 5 Dec. 1990, 1-2). These factors are important when considering the potential for a future coup or a return to the "dirty war." A coup attempt could result in fighting within the armed forces and possibly trigger a civil war.

The trauma of the last military dictatorship remains, along with the hatred and prejudice which characterized the period. As a result, the ideal of a stable and united Argentina remains elusive. Division and factionalism are not restricted to the ruling Peronists: the military, the Communist and labour parties and institutions, as well as the varied socioeconomic strata, shift, divide and polarize. The shallow roots of Latin American democracies have yet to find an anchor. It may be some time before they have a strong hold on the southern cone of America.

4.                ADDENDUM: BACKGROUND

The military junta which seized power in 1976 and was pressured to resign in 1983 left behind a wake of economic chaos and social upheaval: total defeat in the Falklands War; a mismanaged economy, where priority was given to newly-created nuclear and military industries over long-standing sectors of the economy; and years of torture and murder. In some cases, people who were simply relatives or friends of people suspected to have links with socialist organizations were victimized or saw many of their loved ones disappear.

In 1983, Raúl Alfonsín led the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) party to power, supported by a majority of Argentines who wanted to administer justice to the military and avoid repetition of the Peronist failures. In his first days in office, Alfonsín formed a commission which documented and summarized in Nunca M s, thousands of cases of atrocities from the military's "dirty war." The commission's investigation was often obstructed by the military and its members' offices and homes were bombed by paramilitary groups linked to the security services (Amnesty International 1985). Backed by a majority both in Congress and in the streets, Alfonsín nevertheless managed to see that justice for human rights abuses was levied against a number of senior military officers from the previous dictatorship.

During Alfonsín's presidency, a growing unrest among the younger ranks of the military gave way to three mutinies and led to the subsequent passage of two laws which limited the accountability of military officers. These incidents served to cast doubt on Alfonsín's capacity to control the military (Latinamerica Press 11 May 1989, 6). The consequence was the emergence of a type of military men known as the carapintadas ("Painted Faces," after the facial camouflage used during their uprisings). Their leader is Lt.-Col. Mohamed Alí Seineldín. The group has been described by an international human rights organization and Alfonsín himself as neo-nazis, neo-fascists (FBIS-LAT-90-076 19 Apr. 1990, 17) and "even more totalitarian and fanatic than the generation that took over the country in 1976" (Latinamerica Press 11 May 1989, 6).

Despite the negative mood of the military, during Alfonsín's presidency the trials of senior military officers accused of human rights abuses continued while other officers, already tried, remained in prison. The Supreme Court, provincial governments and other institutions remained in the hands of civilians. Economic conditions, however, continued to deteriorate. In fact, after many decades of prosperity which had brought Argentina closer to the developed world than to its Latin American neighbours, economic output and living standards have, since the mid-seventies, continuously declined (The Los Angeles Times 20 Nov. 1990, 1).

Although debate continues on the root causes of the economic decline, with some blaming a lack of work ethic and others the political leadership, the large middle class of Argentina is noticeably poorer. Although per capita income has remained stable at about US$2,500 over the last few years, actual purchasing power has dropped considerably. In 1989 inflation was running at 3,000 percent, while sales shrunk in some sectors to one tenth of those of previous years. Unemployment was also widespread. Those fortunate enough to be employed often held a number of jobs at the same time just to meet basic needs (Ibid.); in an expensive city like Buenos Aires, the minimum wage is currently less than US$50 a month. Many of the poorest, dependent on communal soup kitchens, took advantage of unrest to loot markets and stores during the last days of the Alfonsín administration and again during the first months of the current Menem administration.

With the standard of living descending to levels unprecedented in Argentina's recent history, poverty and its attendant frustrations are viewed as fertile ground for dissent and radical opposition to the government (The Washington Post 23 Feb. 1990, A10).

5.                BIBLIOGRAPHY

Amnesty International. 1985. Argentina: The Military Juntas and Human Rights. London: Amnesty International Publications.

Argentine Consulate, Montréal. 21 December 1990. Telephone Interview with Representative.

The Christian Science Monitor. 5 December 1990. Bonasegna, C. "Argentine Revolt Reveals Lingering Army Tensions."

CONADEP. 1984, 1985. Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires. Nunca M s - Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas.

Committee for the Protection of Journalists. November 1990. "Argentina" in CPJ Update. Washington, D.C.

Degenhardt, Henry W., ed. 1988. Revolutionary and Dissident Movements. An International Guide. Burnt Mill, Essex: Longman Group UK Ltd.

         The Economist [London]. 27 October 1990. "Rules, What Rules?"

FBIS-LAT-90-061. 29 March 1990. "Seineldín's Political Theory Analyzed" in Somos [Buenos Aires, in Spanish], 12 February 1990.

FBIS-LAT-90-076. 19 April 1990. "Raúl Alfonsín Interviewed On Political Parties" in DYN [Buenos Aires, in Spanish], 18 April 1990.

FBIS-LAT-90-084. 1 May 1990. "Two Bombs Explode In Buenos Aires; No injuries" in Telam [Buenos Aires, in Spanish], 30 April 1990.

FBIS-LAT-90-095. 16 May 1990. "Montoneros Leaders Support Army `Painted Faces'" in Clarín [Buenos Aires, in Spanish], 11 May 1990.

FBIS-LAT-90-097. 18 May 1990. "Fernando Nadra Resigns From Communist Party" in La Prensa [Buenos Aires, in Spanish], 16 May 1990.

FBIS-LAT-90-109. 6 June 1990. "Interior Ministry On Allegations Of Police Abuse" in Buenos Aires Herald [Buenos Aires, in English], 5 June 1990.

FBIS-LAT-90-122. 25 June 1990. "Bomb Explodes At Bank; 3 Policemen Injured" in DYN [Buenos Aires, in Spanish], 22 June 1990.

FBIS-LAT-90-130. 6 July 1990. "Colonel Seineldín Denies Ties To Marxism" in DYN [Buenos Aires, in Spanish], 4 July 1990.

FBIS-LAT-90-132. 10 July 1990. "Ché Guevara Commando Kidnaps TU Leader's Son" in Noticias Argentinas [Buenos Aires, in Spanish], 9 July 1990.

Frund, M. 11 December 1990. Human rights researcher covering Argentina, based in the U.S. Telephone Interview.

Human Rights Watch. 1990. Annual Report 1989. New York/Washington, D.C.

         Inter Press Service. 9 February 1990. Valente, M. "Probes Alleged Fraud In Assistance Program."

         Latinamerica Press [Lima]. 29 March 1990. "Crisis Puts Argentines On Edge."

         Latinamerica Press [Lima]. 11 May 1989. "Argentina Under Alfonsín."

         Latinamerica Press [Lima]. 24 May 1990. "Nothing Is Sacred."

         Latin American Regional Reports: Southern Cone [London]. 18 October 1990. "Bipartisan Plea To Menem."

         Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 9 July 1987. "Argentina Still Fears the `Services'."

         Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 1 December 1988. "Major Arms Haul Fuels Concern."

         Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 15 December 1988. "Colonel Who Wanted a `New Argentina'."

         Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 2 February 1989. "The Trotskyists, a Decade Later."

         Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 20 April 1989. "Identifying the La Tablada Raiders."

         Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 15 June 1989. "Tense Calm After a Week of Looting."

         Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 24 May 1990. "Comeback for Argentina's Left."

         Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 9 August 1990. "Return of Argentina's Mutineers."

         Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 16 August 1990. "Menem Wants Firing Squad Back."

         Latin American Weekly Report [London]. 8 November 1990. "Seineldín Is Back On the Coup Track."

         The Los Angeles Times. 9 September 1990. McCullough, E. "Crime Mounts And One Man Says `No More'."

         The Los Angeles Times. 2 November 1990. Long, W. "Army Colonel Putting New Military Pressure On Argentine President."

         The Los Angeles Times. 20 November 1990. Long, W. "Argentina's Vanishing Middle Class."

         The Los Angeles Times. 29 November 1990. "Argentines Deny Paper's Story of Plot to Kill Bush."

         The Sunday Times [London]. 28 January 1990. Avignola, M.L. "Argentine Spies Pensioned Off."

         The Sunday Times [London]. 8 July 1990. Avignola, M.L. "Killer Becomes Argentine Hero."

         The Sunday Times [London]. 14 October 1990. Avignola, M.L. "Argentine Police `Torturer' Enjoys Status of a Hero."

         The Washington Post. 23 February 1990. Robinson, E. "Menem's Honeymoon Over, Argentine Economy Sinking Again."

WOLA. Washington Office on Latin America. 11 December 1990. Telephone Interview with Representative.