Provinces unstable as fighting continues...

In January, tensions grew between Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) junta soldiers and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels in Freetown as hostilities between the "kamajor" traditional hunters and the military erupted into a virtual war in the south and the east of the country. On 4 January heavy fighting started between the kamajors and the army around Bo (240 km south of Freetown) after the kamajors had intensified attacks and raids on highways in the area. Hundreds of civilians fled the town of Bo as the AFRC fought with heavy guns and rocket propelled grenades and the kamajors used AK-47 rifles in addition to their more traditional spears and machetes. Fighting spread throughout the south and east and well-armed kamajors fought government soldiers in Zimmi, Kenema, Pujehun and around the diamond mining area of Tongo Fields. On 18 January, the kamajors took Tongo town, with heavy losses reported on both sides. Three days later, the junta claimed to have retaken the town. Thousands of civilians fled the fighting in the south and east of the country, while humanitarian agencies scrambled to provide aid. Estimates put the number of internally displaced at 8,000-10,000. The major highways into Freetown were impassable. The kamajors displayed hostility toward civilians and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and generated some heavy propaganda that until now had been more common among the military and the rebels. Still, the kamajors maintained that, despite offensive attacks that are in clear violation of the Conakry Accord, they remain deeply committed to the return of the democratically elected government. In fact, they cited their repeated attacks as evidence of their commitment and a logical consequence of the junta's refusal to disarm by the deadline outlined in the accord.

UN makes assessment visit...

The twice delayed UN technical survey mission led by UN Special Envoy Francis Okelo visited Freetown for three days starting 14 January. The mission is expected to make a recommendation to the UN Security Council regarding the deployment of a military observation force in Sierra Leone. Okelo, who appears to have gained the trust of the junta, publicly maintained his commitment to the deadlines set by the Conakry Accord, but privately questioned the realism of the aggressive timetable that is already well behind schedule. He said that he would encourage a meeting between the C-5, (foreign ministers from Liberia, Ghana, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria who are empowered by ECOWAS to negotiate with the junta), to try to move the deadlocked issues forward.

Conakry Accord: Same old issues outstanding...

The following issues-whose resolution hold the key to progress in the implementation of the Conakry Accord-remain unresolved at this time:

• the release of rebel leader Foday Sankoh;

• the demobilisation of the Sierra Leone army; and

• the dominance of Nigerian soldiers in ECOMOG.

There is no agreement on how to address these issues and a promised follow-up meeting has yet to happen. Described by Francis Okelo as "legitimate concerns", these issues must be resolved and quickly or the full implementation of the accord, and indeed the peace process, will be stalled. The registration of child soldiers is the only element of the accord that began on schedule, but the process has since been held back in all areas of the country, (with the exception of Freetown), due to security concerns. Social workers endeavouring to register boy soldiers said consistently that they were faced with the challenge of soldiers refusing to disarm without the release of Foday Sankoh, stating simply "No Foday, No Peace". The BBC reported that of an estimated 5,000 child soldiers, less than 1,300 have so far been registered. The junta reaffirmed its commitment to restoring power to President Kabbah by 22 April, providing the three deadlocked issues listed above are addressed. Admitting they had problems with the accord when they signed it on 22 October, the junta explained that to not sign it "would have sent the wrong message" to the international community. They used this logic as an explanation for Johnny Paul Koroma's statement in December that he would not hand-over in April. ECOWAS claimed that the deadlines were still realistic and said that C-5 was working out modalities for the full implementation of the accord. New ECOMOG force commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi (see below) stated his commitment to the full implementation of the Conakry Accord. It was not clear what the implications of ECOMOG's massive pullout of neighbouring Liberia would be, as 10,000 troops now have no posting.

Population is tense and pessimistic...

Almost daily price increases and a three-way propaganda war (between the kamajors, the AFRC and Kabbah) are tiring the already weary population. There has been an increase in incidents of civilian intolerance toward the military and Freetown papers reported cases of men in military uniform being harassed by civilians, who are fed up with requests for food, petrol and other scarcities. Armed robbery and looting continue.

Junta struggles for illusion of legitimacy...

The traditional celebratory "happy fire" that usually marks the start of the New Year in Sierra Leone (and that inevitably results in civilian deaths) did not happen this year. The Department of Defence pleaded with soldiers to not fire their weapons and said that anyone who did would be "prosecuted". The junta feared that any sounds of gunfire would provide ECOMOG with an excuse to "retaliate" with not-so-happy fire. Additionally, the Department of Defence described the "indiscriminate and irresponsible firing" that traditionally marks the start of the New Year as causing "a drain on warlike resources and unnecessary loss of life". In apparent accordance with their Anti-looting decree No. 6, which stipulates that all looters will be shot, the junta disciplined seven of its members for their alleged involvement in looting and vandalising the Iranian embassy on New Year's Eve. The high profile crime caused deep embarrassment within the junta and outrage from Iran, which has positioned itself as a friend (and donor) to Sierra Leone. (President Kabbah visited Iran last year and continues to describe Sierra Leone, when convenient, as an Islamic state.) Five people's revolutionary leaders involved in the looting were sacked and two others demoted and stripped of their salaries. Mr Tamba Gborie, who had the dubious honour of being the first to announce the coup on state radio last May, was one participant demoted (to lance-corporal) and fired. He was said to have been outraged by his dismissal and led a shoot-out at Johnny Paul Koroma's residence several days afterwards. No casualties were reported and Lance Corporal Gboire is now being held in Pademba Road Prison. Junta Foreign Secretary Paulo Bangura claimed to have conducted "behind-the-scenes" diplomacy in Cote d'Ivoire, although it is unclear if his efforts resulted in anything other than showing the travel ban on the junta to be ineffective.

New ECOMOG Commander...

Nigerian Defence Headquarters named Major-General Timothy Shelpidi as the eighth commander of ECOMOG, replacing Major-General Victor Malu. The unexpected replacement took place on January 8, just three days after the announcement was made. The shift was believed to be the result of Charles Taylor's growing intolerance of General Malu. General Shelpidi is a career soldier described as a "brilliant tactician" and is not expected to change the profile of ECOMOG drastically. However, there will be implications for Sierra Leone as ECOMOG will have time and soldiers on its hands when the 10,000 troops currently stationed in Liberia leave.

Kabbah and democracy...

While President Kabbah remains in Guinea, in a state of 'outrage', a BBC report on 26 January indicated that a group of 40 parliamentarians from the ousted government would return to the Lungi region before April. It was unclear how they planned to "govern" from Lungi. The constitution, suspended by the junta in May, stipulates that the parliamentarians are permitted to govern anywhere on Sierra Leonean soil.

Other developments...

UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook appointed John Flynn, the former British ambassador to Angola, as his special representative to Sierra Leone. Immediately following his appointment, Mr Flynn travelled to New York to meet with relevant UN officials. He has indicated he would consider opening an office at Lungi. President Charles Taylor of Liberia called for the release of Foday Sankoh, fanning popular belief that he is sympathetic to the junta. It is widely believed that Liberia is arming the rebels to some extent, and that ECOMOG is arming the kamajors to some extent. Regional observers are questioning the agenda of kamajor chief Sam Hinga Norman. His increasing unpredictability, the aggressive actions of his "traditional hunter" force (including forcing 30 passengers on a commercial bus travelling from Bo to walk in the forest for three hours) and his ethnic assertions (he has called for a "Mende-land" to be established in the south of the country) are creating the perception of the kamajors as the "new" rebels. Rumours of mercenaries... There were repeated rumours throughout the month that President Kabbah had signed another contract with Executive Outcomes. This seems unlikely as the mercenary group is still owed a significant amount of money for the "help" it provided President Kabbah in containing rebel attacks more than two years ago. The likely method of payment-a stake in the country's rich diamond mines-is not practicable now as control of and access to the diamond rich areas fluctuate between various armed elements of the military, the kamajors, and non-native diamond merchants.

Economic situation

The economy does not function. Inflation is measured on a week-to-week basis. Prices of potatoes and onions have almost doubled since Christmas and are at 70,000-90,000 leones per 50 kg bag. Pre-coup prices were17,000-20,000. Rice is at 70,000 leones per 50 kg bag in some areas of the country, up from a pre-coup price of 17,000 leones. Petrol and diesel are so scarce that any stocks-no matter how small-are obvious targets for looting. The streets are virtually empty of commercial traffic.

Embargo

Although the ECOWAS sanctioned embargo does not apply to humanitarian aid, much-needed food and medicine stocks have been held at the Guinea border as obscure procedures are finalised. Several food relief NGOs are reporting dangerously low stocks of food, particularly for children's feeding centres. On 24 January, a rice ship attempting to evade the blockade was repelled by ECOMOG in the main harbour at Freetown, and did not succeed in reaching land.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

ICG is calling for the following actions to be undertaken immediately to help head off a complete collapse of the peace process and avoid a serious deterioration in the security and humanitarian situation.

1. The timetable for implementation of the Conakry Accord must be amended, with realistic but solid targets set for each stage of the process. The population of Sierra Leone has been promised that democracy will be theirs in eleven weeks. Unless something significant happens on 22 April, disillusionment and mistrust will overwhelm any prospects for further progress.

2. The emphasis should be on putting back in place a credible democratisation process. As ICG has argued in the past, all available options, including the installation of an interim government empowered to oversee demobilisation and prepare for fresh elections, should be considered. The Effort to return the country to democracy will at worst fail and at best provide very short-lived results as long as it is pinned exclusively to the return of the previous government, intact. Demobilisation and, critically, reintegration, of all armed elements is a prerequisite to both sustainable security and sustainable democracy and ensuring Sierra Leone has a government that tackles these issues should, for now, be the strategic goal of international policy.

3. Finally, ICG repeats its call for the international community to support the proposal to post UN military observers in Sierra Leone. The presence of UN military observers would provide an important counter-balance to Nigeria's dominant role in ECOMOG.

Freetown, Sierra Leone
5 February 1998
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