Overview: Indonesia uses a civilian law enforcement-led, rule-of-law-based approach in its domestic counterterrorism operations. Since the 2002 Bali bombings, Indonesia has applied sustained pressure to successfully degrade the capabilities of terrorists and their networks operating within Indonesia's borders. There was no major attack against Western interests in Indonesia in 2015. There is growing concern that foreign terrorist fighters returning from Iraq and Syria with new training, skills, and experience could conduct attacks against Indonesian government personnel or facilities, Western targets, or other soft targets.

As of December, Indonesian officials estimate that there are approximately 800 Indonesian foreign terrorist fighters in Iraq and Syria, though official estimates fluctuate between agencies and services. Indonesian officials say they have identified 284 Indonesian citizens actively involved in fighting in Iraq and Syria and are investigating an additional 516. They also believe that 52 Indonesian foreign terrorist fighters have died in Syria and estimate that another 60 to 100 have returned to Indonesia. The bulk of this number of estimated returnees includes those Indonesians and their families who have been detained and deported by authorities in transit countries while en route to Syria and Iraq. Fighters may also return undetected by exploiting vulnerabilities in the land and sea borders of this vast archipelagic nation.

Abu Wardah (also known as Santoso) is the leader of Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) and is Indonesia's most-wanted terrorist. He remained at large in the remote jungle area near Poso, Central Sulawesi. In July 2014, Santoso publicly pledged allegiance to ISIL. Several terrorist convicts were paroled in 2015 after completing their prison terms, including senior leaders of Jemaah Islamiya; these senior leaders are counter-ISIL. There is a growing government- and civil society-led effort to promote Indonesian Islam as a peaceful and moderate alternative to violent extremist teachings elsewhere in the world.

Indonesia does not provide a safe haven for terrorists. However, members of the terrorist group MIT meet and train in the isolated area near Poso, Central Sulawesi. Indonesian officials are committed to eliminating this threat.

2015 Terrorist Incidents: In 2015, MIT was blamed for the murders of three civilians. In August, a member of the Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) was killed in a shootout with a suspected MIT terrorist. In late November, a member of the Indonesian military (TNI) was shot and killed by an MIT member in another confrontation.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Indonesia follows a strong rule-of-law-based counterterrorism approach. After investigation by the police, terrorist suspects' dossiers are sent to the Task Force on Counterterrorism and Transnational Crimes (SATGAS), which is part of the Attorney General's Office, for prosecution. Relevant legislation includes the Law on Combating Criminal Acts of Terrorism (15/2003), the Law on Prevention and Eradication of Anti-Terrorist Financing (9/2013), the 1951 Emergency Law, and Indonesia's Criminal Code.

Counterterrorism efforts are police-led, with Detachment 88 – the elite counterterrorism unit of the police – leading operations and investigations. Counterterrorism units from the Indonesian military may be called upon to support domestic counterterrorism operations and responses on an as-needed basis. Law enforcement units are increasingly able to detect, and in some cases prevent, attacks before they are carried out.

Law enforcement personnel participated in a range of training and professional development activities, including through the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, with training focused on building sustainable police capacity in tactical crisis response and investigative skills.

Indonesia recognizes the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and was a co-sponsor of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2178. The government has repeatedly and forcefully denounced ISIL, but it has yet to pass laws explicitly criminalizing material support, travel to join foreign terrorist organizations, or commission of extraterritorial offenses related to counterterrorism. Since mid-2014, officials have been considering amending Law 15/2003 or issuing a Presidential Decree in Lieu of Law to more effectively prosecute Indonesians traveling to join terrorist groups abroad or providing material support to foreign terrorist organizations.

Indonesian prosecutors stated that they prosecuted 56 terrorism-related cases between January and October 2015. Of those, 16 cases are related to ISIL activity and five have resulted in convictions, with the remaining cases ongoing. For example, charges were filed against Afif Abdul Majid, former Central Java branch head of Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), not only for his role in providing funding for a JAT training camp in Aceh in 2010, but for joining and participating in exercises with ISIL while in Syria. He was convicted in June for the former charge and sentenced to four years in prison, but the judge could not convict Majid for ISIL-related activities due to insufficient evidence under Indonesia's current counterterrorism law. On March 21, six individuals were arrested by Detachment 88 for allegedly funding or recruiting for ISIL. Two of those arrested, Amin Mude and Tuah Febriwansyah, aka Muhammad Fachry, acted as key facilitators sending Indonesians to Syria to join ISIL. In November, Amin Mude was successfully convicted under 15/2003 and 9/2013 and sentenced to five years and six months in prison. Despite some domestic convictions, Indonesian law lacked the provisions to criminalize and prosecute acts of, and support for, terrorism committed abroad. Frequent personnel rotation at various agencies – including the police, legal cadres, and the judiciary – represents a challenge to building long-term institutional expertise.

The National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) is responsible for coordinating terrorism-related intelligence and information among stakeholder agencies, and comprises detailees from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the TNI, and the Indonesian National Police (POLRI). In September, President Joko Widodo (known as Jokowi) called for concrete steps to strengthen the BNPT's interagency coordination role.

Violent extremist groups exploited social media and mobile phone applications to spread propaganda and recruit people to their cause. In March, the Minister of Communications and Information declared the government had blocked 70 ISIL-related blogs and websites at the request of the BNPT. On occasion, the BNPT will also request that specific social media accounts be suspended. The BNPT maintains multiple websites and social media accounts, publishes books, and organizes public discussion forums to counter extremist narratives. While legislative reform to tackle foreign terrorist fighters is still pending, some of Indonesia's efforts dovetailed with obligations outlined in UNSCR 2178. For example, Indonesia condemned ISIL and sought to prevent the movement of terrorists, including through enhanced controls related to the issuance of identity papers. Indonesia also implemented several of the Global Counterterrorism Forum's (GCTF's) good practices for a more effective response against foreign terrorist fighters.

In early 2015 POLRI launched Operation Camar Maleo, a significant and sustained police operation in Poso, Central Sulawesi, in an effort to root out members of MIT. The operations have involved a thousand personnel from the Brimob, Detachment 88, and members of the Indonesian military. At least 10 alleged terrorists have been arrested in the province and two were killed. MIT is reported to have approximately 20-40 members left in Poso. In December, MIT leader Santoso issued a message online calling for Indonesians to join ISIL in Iraq or Syria and to execute attacks on Indonesian authorities. Santoso also threatened to destroy the Jakarta Metropolitan Police. On September 13, 2014, police in Central Sulawesi arrested seven people, including one Turkish national and three ethnic Uighurs from China's Xinjiang Province, for alleged links to MIT. In July 2015, the Turkish national and Uighurs were convicted of conspiring to join MIT and sentenced to six years in prison.

Also in July, police arrested three people deemed a threat to public safety in East Nusa Tenggara province for alleged involvement in ISIL and on suspicion of spreading ISIL ideology. On August 12, three suspects were arrested by Detachment 88 for suspected involvement in a plot involving improvised explosive devices in Solo, Central Java. The ringleader, Ibadurahman, allegedly received assistance from other Indonesians in Syria. On December 18 and 19, Detachment 88 conducted raids in East and Central Java, arrested several suspected terrorists, and seized bomb-making equipment.

As of early November, there were 230 terrorist prisoners held in 26 prisons throughout Indonesia, overseen by the Directorate General of Corrections under the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. Some of Indonesia's most hardened terrorists and ideologues are incarcerated in several prisons on the island of Nusakambangan, off the southern coast of Java. Authorities remained concerned about the potential recidivism of released terrorist prisoners. In addition, terrorists convicted on non-terrorism charges are not always counted or tracked through the justice system as convicted terrorists, creating a potential loophole in disengagement and de-radicalization efforts.

Immigration officials at major ports of entry, especially larger international air and seaports, have access to biographic and biometric domestic-only databases. Military and police personnel are often posted at major ports of entry to ensure security. Police maintained a watchlist of suspected terrorists, but there are not always clear lines of coordination among stakeholder agencies. Indonesia shares information through INTERPOL but does not regularly screen through INTERPOL at immigration checkpoints. Information sharing with countries in the region is often on an ad hoc basis, and there is no centralized database or platform for the sharing of information with countries in the region or internationally.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Indonesia is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. The Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center is a member of the Egmont Group. In June, Indonesia achieved milestone progress by being removed from FATF's International Cooperation Review Group (ICRG) after five years of being named on the Public Statement. This determination was based on Indonesia's passage of key legislation criminalizing money laundering and terrorism financing, and by implementing terrorist asset freezing pursuant to UNSCR 1373 and the UN 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and al-Qa'ida sanctions regime.

Implementation of asset freezes is known to take some time and Indonesia needs to find a way to expedite the implementation of asset freeze provisions. Indonesia adopted a joint resolution to further implement asset freezing as required under UNSCR 1373 and 2253. Indonesia continued to issue orders to freeze the assets of all UNSCR 2253 (ISIL and al-Qa'ida)-sanctioned individuals and entities and is working to implement an electronic process to ensure that its freezing process is "without delay." Santoso was put on Indonesia's list of domestic terrorists in 2015.

The passage of the terrorism financing law was an important step forward, and Indonesia has filed cases under this new legislation. In 2015, Indonesia brought 13 cases and obtained nine convictions. Indonesia must continue to develop investigative resources and intelligence to counter international organizations engaging in money laundering and terrorist finance. Although non-profit organizations such as religious and charitable organizations are licensed and required to file suspicious transaction reports, the terrorism financing law does not require monitoring or the regulation of such organizations to prevent misuse, including terrorism financing.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Countering Violent Extremism: Indonesian officials recognize the importance of addressing radicalization to violence and countering violent extremism (CVE). Vice-President Jusuf Kalla led the Indonesian delegation to the Leader's Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism hosted by President Obama in New York in September. In his address, he stressed that military intervention alone cannot defeat violent extremism and instead highlighted an approach that focuses on improving social welfare and equity, strengthening legal frameworks, and de-radicalization and counter-radicalization efforts. He said that Indonesia will continue to promote the spirit of tolerance by empowering moderates through dialogue and actively engaging civil society, including the two largest Islamic organizations Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, to provide counter-narratives to terrorist ideology.

CVE programs are included in counterterrorism efforts, but because of limited resources and the vast amount of territory of the Indonesian archipelago, CVE efforts are not yet comprehensive. Government efforts are augmented by contributions from various civil society organizations. Some of the groups offered positive alternatives, such as sports, film-making, camps, and rallies, for populations vulnerable to violent extremism, especially youth. However, civil society efforts suffered from similar challenges of scale in reaching at-risk populations across the archipelago.

The BNPT has expanded the Terrorism Prevention Coordination Forum (FKPT) to 32 of Indonesia's 34 provinces, and leverages these groups to broaden community engagement. Forum members are usually civic and religious leaders who coordinate CVE-related programming and activities within their communities. The level of engagement and activities of each FKPT varies by region and available resources. For example, the BNPT collaborated with FKPTs in Mataram, Semarang, and Yogyakarta, to organize workshops to help young student leaders develop counter-narratives and amplify these messages using social media platforms. Through presentations from former terrorists, survivors of terrorist attacks, law enforcement personnel, and religious leaders, the BNPT encouraged discussion of religious tolerance and CVE.

With respect to ISIL, Indonesian government efforts to develop a counter-messaging strategy are nascent. In addition to the BNPT, the Indonesian National Police are training officers in the Public Relations Division on effective counter-messaging approaches. The Jokowi administration is promoting the concept of Indonesian Islam as a positive and tolerant form of Islam practiced by the majority of Indonesia's Muslims and an alternative to violent extremist ideologies. The two largest Islamic civil society organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, are at the forefront of this effort. In November, NU released a 90-minute film titled the "The Divine Grace of Islam Nusantara" (Rahmat Islam Nusantara) which directly challenges and denounces ISIL interpretations of the Quran and the Hadith.

A de-radicalization blueprint for terrorist prisoners issued by the BNPT in late 2013 has yet to be fully implemented. Counterterrorism officials, in coordination with the Directorate General of Corrections and other relevant law enforcement agencies, planned to open a de-radicalization center in Sentul, south of Jakarta, but it was not operational at the end of 2015. There was ongoing debate about how to handle the most hardcore violent extremists, but the evolving consensus is to confine these prisoners in one of Indonesia's maximum security detention centers.

International and Regional Cooperation: Indonesia participated in counterterrorism efforts through several international, multilateral, and regional fora including: the UN, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), ASEAN, APEC, and others. Indonesia expanded regional and international cooperation, especially in response to the foreign terrorist fighter issue. With Australia, Indonesia co-chaired the GCTF Working Group on Detention and Reintegration, and it participated in a range of GCTF workshops. Indonesia remained active in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Inter-Sessional Meetings on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) and the APEC Counter-Terrorism Working Group. In November, Indonesia and Australia co-hosted a Counterterrorism Financing Summit in Sydney, Australia. Indonesia continued to use the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) as a regional resource in the fight against transnational crime with a focus on counterterrorism. The United States and other foreign partners routinely offered counterterrorism training courses at JCLEC. Since its inception in 2004 as a joint Australian and Indonesian initiative, JCLEC has trained more than 18,000 police officers from 70 countries.

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