Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 - Ecuador
- Author: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
- Document source:
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Date:
30 April 2009
Ecuador's greatest counterterrorism and security challenge remained the presence of Colombian narcotics and insurgent/terrorist groups in the northern border region. In order to evade Colombian military operations, these groups, principally the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), regularly used Ecuadorian territory for rest, recuperation, resupply, and training, as well as coca processing and limited planting and production, thereby involving significant numbers of Ecuadorians in direct or indirect ways. The porous 450-mile border and the lack of adequate licit employment opportunities for Ecuadorians in the region have made the area vulnerable to narcoterrorist influence and created a contraband economy. Ecuadorian officials along the border believed the FARC's economic impact allowed it to buy silence and compliance.
Ecuador stepped up its response to this threat, although it continued to face constraints on resources and limited capabilities. The Correa Administration, while maintaining the country's traditional neutrality with respect to the Colombian conflict, has stated it opposed armed encroachments of any kind across its borders. On March 1, a Colombian attack in Ecuadorian territory caused the destruction of a FARC camp and the death of FARC Secretariat member Raúl Reyes. Colombian analysis of documents contained within laptops recovered at the camp suggested elements within the Ecuadorian government had connections to the FARC. The Correa administration strongly denied ties to the FARC, claiming that the only Ecuadorian government contacts with the FARC were to negotiate the release of hostages. The government shifted troops to the border region and continued to promote a development agenda along its northern border in concert with international donors to spur economic development in the area.
Ecuador's security forces conducted operations against FARC training and logistical resupply camps along the northern border. The Ecuadorian military increased the number of operations in Ecuador's northern border region. The military's operational tempo, already higher in early 2008 than in previous years, increased further after the March 1 attack. A total of over 100 battalion-level operations along the northern border led to the discovery and destruction of 11 cocaine producing laboratories, over 130 FARC facilities (bases, houses, and resupply camps), the eradication of nine hectares of coca, and the confiscation of weapons, communications equipment, and other support equipment. These operations also netted valuable information on FARC activities and infrastructure both inside and outside of Ecuador, and resulted in the detention of 20 FARC members and the killing of one FARC member during the year. Despite increasing successes in this effort, insufficient resources, the challenging border region terrain, and a terse bilateral relationship with Colombia since the March 1, 2008 raid made it difficult to thwart cross-border incursions.
Other groups present in Ecuador, although less active in the last couple of years, included the Popular Combatants Group, the Revolutionary Militia of the People, the Marxist-Leninist Party of Ecuador, and the Alfarista Liberation Army.
The Ecuadorian government continued to strengthen controls over money laundering through the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), which it established under a 2005 Money Laundering Law. The FIU cooperated closely with the Anti-Narcotics Police Directorate, the Superintendent of Banks, the courts, and the private banker association to identify suspicious transactions and develop information for the prosecution of cases.
Ecuador's judicial institutions remained weak, susceptible to corruption, and heavily backlogged with pending cases. While the military and police have made numerous arrests, the judicial system had a poor record of achieving convictions.
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