U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 2002 - Colombia
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Date:
10 June 2002
An estimated 2.45 million Colombians were internally displaced at the end of 2001, including about 342,000 who became displaced during the year. An estimated 80,000 to 105,000 Colombians were living in refugee-like circumstances in neighboring countries, primarily Venezuela (50,000 to 75,000) and Ecuador (30,000), while some 23,200 Colombian refugees and asylum seekers were in other countries.
The Colombian refugee population in neighboring countries included about 5,500 in Costa Rica, 4,100 in Ecuador, 900 in Panama, and a few hundred in Venezuela. During the year, 12,860 Colombians applied for asylum in countries outside the region, including 7,603 in the United States, 3,533 in European countries, 1,627 in Canada, and 97 in Australia and New Zealand. Since the late 1990s, tens of thousands of Colombians have traveled abroad every year with tourist visas (particularly to the United States) only to remain in those countries once their visas have expired.
During the year, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) facilitated the repatriation of 149 Colombian refugees, mostly from Ecuador (82) and Panama (67). Panama forcibly returned about 400 Colombians during the year. Venezuela forcibly returned an unknown number of Colombians, some observers estimating the number to be as high as 1,200.
Colombia hosted 227 refugees, including 210 recognized refugees (three of whom were newly recognized during 2001) and 17 persons whose asylum claims were pending at year's end.
In estimating the number of displaced in Colombia, and for other figures regarding internally displaced Colombians, the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) relies primarily on the Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES), a Colombian nongovernmental organization (NGO) that works closely with the Catholic church, other NGOs, and local authorities to produce detailed statistics on displacement in Colombia. The figure of 2.45 million displaced Colombians is cumulative from 1985 and may include a number of people (reliable data are not available) who have returned home.
The government of Colombia also compiles data on displacement, and estimates that about 525,000 displaced persons are in need of assistance. However, the government estimate takes into account only new displacement since 1995 (during the first two years that the registration system was in place, 1995 and 1996, the government only registered about 3,400 people). Even since 2000, when the registration system became fully operational, many displaced persons have not registered with government agencies, often because they do not trust the government. USCR therefore believes that CODHES' figures better reflect the actual level of displacement.
Conflict and Displacement: Background
Although Colombia has experienced virtually nonstop conflict for more than 50 years, the present phase of the fighting – and the displacement associated with it – dates from the mid-1980s. The parties to the conflict include left-wing guerrilla groups, right-wing paramilitary organizations, and the Colombian armed forces. Narcotraffickers and other criminal elements contribute to the country's widespread violence.
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Colombian Armed Revolutionary Forces) and ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – National Liberation Army) guerrillas commonly kill or threaten local officials, civic leaders, and business owners whom they perceive to be opposing them. Although the guerrillas' tactics are aimed at intimidating the local population into supporting them, more often, their tactics alienate civilians and cause them to flee. The FARC funds its insurgency through kidnapping and by taxing wealthy individuals, businesses, and coca growers and narcotraffickers in areas under its control. Much-anticipated peace talks between the government and the FARC began in January 1999 and continued intermittently through 2001, but did not yield any concrete results.
Since 1995, the AUC ("Autodefensas" Unidas de Colombia – United "Self-Defense" Groups of Colombia), an umbrella organization that encompasses most of the paramilitary groups that operate in Colombia, has been responsible for a majority of the killing and forced displacement of civilians in Colombia.
The AUC's stated objective is to rid Colombia of the guerrillas, but the organization has many other interests. According to Colombia's Ministry of Defense, "In many places, narcotraffickers interested in expanding their rural properties have armed and utilized rural self-defense [paramilitary] groups not only to eradicate the guerrillas from certain areas, but also to expel other land owners, generally small and medium land owners, with the aim of appropriating their lands." The U.S. State Department describes the AUC as a "mercenary vigilante force financed by criminal activities." The Colombian Commission of Jurists has asserted that there is "active or passive participation of government forces" in many of the crimes committed by the paramilitaries, a charge repeated by many other local and international human rights groups.
More than 6,000 of the 33,000 members of guerrilla and paramilitary groups in Colombia are estimated to be children, some as young as ten years old. Most join these groups voluntarily to escape poverty or to avenge the killing of family members, although guerrilla and paramilitary groups also forcibly recruit many children.
Most displaced Colombians live in poor conditions. Nearly 50 percent of displaced Colombians are unemployed, and those who find work usually obtain only poorly paid day labor. Many of the displaced also work in the informal economy, peddling fruits and vegetables, cigarettes, or other products. Only 34 percent of displaced Colombians have access to health care and, according to the Colombia's human rights ombudsman, only 15 percent of displaced children attend schools.
A disproportionate number of displaced persons are members of minority groups. Although Afro-Colombians make up only 16 percent of the Colombian population and indigenous people 2 percent, together they account for more than one-third of all displaced people.
The government has enacted a law and issued several decrees that outline its responsibilities to the displaced, but its record on implementation has been poor. Since 1999, the Red de Solidaridad Social (Social Solidarity Network), a national public entity directly under the administration of the Colombian president, has been responsible for aid to internally displaced Colombians. Although the government's response to the emergency needs of newly displaced persons has improved since 1999, its response to displaced persons' post-emergency needs remains inadequate.
Colombian NGOs, the Catholic church, and other religious-based organizations are crucial in mobilizing a response to the needs of the displaced. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provides emergency assistance to newly displaced persons, while the World Food Program provides many displaced persons food aid. According to the Colombian government, local and international NGOs, the ICRC, and UN agencies provide 80 percent of the assistance that displaced Colombians receive. UNHCR provides the Colombian government technical advice, and helps the government maintain the registration system for the displaced. UNHCR has three field offices that seek to ensure the "implementation of domestic legislation for displaced persons at the local level" and provide support to displaced persons' organizations.
In June 2000, the U.S. Congress approved "Plan Colombia," a controversial, two-year, $1.3 billion aid package for Colombia that provided $519 million to the Colombian military and $123.8 million to the police to combat narcotrafficking. The remainder was for alternative development projects (to encourage farmers to grow crops other than coca), assistance to displaced persons and former child soldiers, human rights and democratization projects, and anti-narcotics efforts in countries bordering Colombia.
Conflict and Political Developments in 2001
The conflict in Colombia intensified in 2001 and expanded into new areas of the country, including Colombia's largest cities. Guerrillas and paramilitaries undertook armed actions (battles, killings, armed raids) in almost 1,000 of Colombia's 1,097 municipalities. They fought for control of territory (particularly lucrative coca-growing areas), massacred civilians, and terrorized the populations of whole villages into fleeing in order to take over their lands or eliminate support for the opposition. The U.S. State Department reported that more than 40 villages were abandoned following attacks by paramilitaries or guerrillas (see box).
According to Colombia's human rights ombudsman, paramilitaries and guerrillas perpetrated more than 125 massacres – some of them exceptionally gruesome – during the year. Altogether, violence associated with the conflict in Colombia left 3,700 civilians dead in 2001, including 152 union leaders, 11 human rights advocates, 10 indigenous leaders, and a number of members of Congress and government officials. Another 3,041 people (eight per day) were kidnapped during the year, mostly by FARC and ELN guerrillas. More than 70 percent of all reported kidnappings in the world in 2001 were in Colombia.
In September, the U.S. State Department designated the AUC as a terrorist organization (the FARC and the ELN were already on the State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations). In October, Human Rights Watch reported that links between the Colombian military and the AUC continued, charging that "Colombian military and police detachments continue to promote, work with, support, profit from, and tolerate paramilitary groups." The State Department's human rights report on Colombia corroborated those findings, observing that in 2001, "elements of state security forces tolerated or even collaborated with paramilitary groups." The report noted, however, that the Colombian authorities "confronted and detained significantly more members of paramilitary groups" in 2001 than in previous years.
In February, President Andres Pastrana raised hopes for peace when he traveled to a region of the country controlled by the FARC to meet with the guerrilla group's leader, Manuel Marulanda. However, the visit did not yield any concrete results, and Pastrana's critics disparaged the president for being too "soft" on the guerrillas. The FARC cut off talks several times during the year, allegedly to protest the government's failure to curb paramilitary groups. At year's end, the peace process appeared to be on the verge of collapse.
Pastrana also proposed ceding an area of land in the Magdalena Medio region to the ELN (as he had done with the FARC in 1998) as a goodwill gesture aimed at promoting formal peace talks with the group. The AUC opposed the proposal and stepped up violence in the region to prevent the plan's implementation. Government and ELN officials met in Cuba in November, but the only concrete result was that the ELN agreed to a cease-fire during the Christmas period.
During the year, several important international delegations visited Colombia to assess human rights conditions, including the situation of displaced persons. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson, who visited in April, criticized all parties to the conflict for failing to respect international human rights. Robinson also expressed concern over paramilitary groups' expansion and alarm over links between the Colombian military and paramilitary groups.
Representatives of the Organization of American States' Human Rights Commission, which carried out an assessment visit to Colombia in December, condemned the intensifying of the conflict and the deterioration of the civilian population's human rights.
On several occasions in 2001, the U.S. Committee for Refugees wrote to the Colombian government to express concern over authorities' failure to protect displaced persons, communities at risk, and human rights workers. USCR urged the Colombian government to take immediate steps to ensure the safety of these groups.
Forced Displacement in 2001
According to CODHES, about 342,000 Colombians became internally displaced in 2001. Colombia's Ministry of Defense reported that paramilitaries were directly responsible for 50 percent of forced displacement during the year. Guerrillas were responsible for 20 percent of displacement, while conflict between paramilitaries and guerrillas led to 22 percent of forced displacement.
More than 35 percent of all displacement in 2001 consisted of groups of people – often entire communities – fleeing together, frequently following massacres in their villages. During the year, 42 villages were completely abandoned, though in many cases residents returned within days or weeks.
Nearly all of the 1,200 residents of Chengue in Sucre Department fled their village hours after the massacre of 24 of their neighbors by paramilitaries on January 17. According to the Associated Press, two days after the massacre, "Most of the 100 people still in Chengue were frantically packing up their belongings to flee the region."
Following the massacre of 11 civilians in Peque, Antioquia Department, in July, thousands of residents of Peque town and surroundings villages fled their homes. A week after the massacre, one newspaper reported, "The communities outside Peque look like ghost towns – doors and shutters are locked and horses and wild dogs roam free."
In 2001, the government newly registered 207,415 persons as displaced, while rejecting the registration applications of more than 41,000. Although the government ascribes such rejections to false claims, some of those who are rejected claim that the authorities' decisions are often capricious and unfounded. The government delivered three-month emergency assistance to 158,500 of the displaced persons registered in 2001. The government also reported that it provided reintegration assistance to 100,000 other displaced persons. The ICRC said that it provided emergency assistance to 125,000 newly displaced persons in 2001.
In August, a UN inter-agency mission led by Kofi Asomani, the UN special coordinator on internal displacement, visited Colombia. According to Asomani, "There has been a progressive increase in the numbers, geographical extension, and political complexities of the displacement phenomenon. These populations are in urgent need of protection and assistance in almost every sector." Asomani added that, despite the scale of the problem, "There is a lack of awareness of and therefore sympathy for the plight of the internally displaced. Moreover, the issue of internal displacement has not been factored in the national political agenda."
Indigenous people and Afro-Colombians, a disproportionate number of whom have been displaced since the late 1990s, again suffered extensive violence and displacement in 2001. According to the December 28 La Nación newspaper, "This year, more than ever, the situation of indigenous people was aggravated as a consequence of the worsening of the armed conflict." The newspaper noted that the largest mass displacement of indigenous people took place in Cordoba Department, where 374 members of the Emberá Katío ethnic group fled their homes in June after paramilitaries threatened them.
La Nación also reported that "a series of mass killings in black and indigenous communities prompted the displacement of hundreds of families" near Buenaventura, a city on the Pacific coast with a large Afro-Colombian population.
U.S. Government Role in Colombia in 2001
According to CODHES, Plan Colombia exacerbated displacement in 2001. "Some 36,000 people fled the poisonous chemicals sprayed from the air and the operations by the military and paramilitary groups that preceded these fumigations," CODHES reported, noting that 18 months into the program, more coca was being grown in Colombia than before the fumigation began. In October, the director of the U.S. Agency for International Development's program in Colombia told representatives of U.S. NGOs that in 2000 and early 2001, some 37,000 families in Putumayo Department had signed agreements to eradicate their coca crops voluntarily in exchange for financial and agricultural assistance aimed at helping them earn a living without planting coca. However, by early October, only 586 families had received any assistance. Nevertheless, when a new round of fumigation began in the area in November, the Colombian authorities fumigated the farms of both those growing coca and those who had agreed not to grow coca.
In November, the London-based Colombia Forum said that the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11 had led to increased U.S. support for the Colombian government's anti-insurgency efforts. One State Department official labeled the FARC the "most dangerous international terrorist group in the Western Hemisphere." In October, the U.S. Senate approved an "Andean Regional Initiative" that included more than $250 million in aid to the Colombian military and police for 2003. The U.S. ambassador to Colombia said that the United States would help set up anti-kidnapping units in Colombia and train and equip the Colombian military to protect oil pipelines that belonged to U.S. companies. Some critics of U.S. policy in Colombia expressed concern that these measures would result in increased U.S. military involvement in the country.
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