U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 1998 - Colombia

  More than a million Colombians were internally displaced at the end of 1997. Most, some 600,000, became displaced between 1984 and 1994. Another 275,000 were displaced during 1995 and 1996, and more than 200,000 were newly displaced in 1997. Colombia hosted more than 200 refugees, including 75 from Nicaragua, 35 from Chile, 30 from Hungary, and 80 from other countries, according to UNHCR. USCR made its second site visit to Colombia in November 1997 to assess the situation for displaced Colombians. USCR visited BogotÁ, MedellÍn, the Uraba region, and Montes de Maria. Causes of Displacement Displacement in Colombia is a direct result of conflict, political violence, and rampant human rights abuse. The conflict in Colombia includes the Colombian armed forces, left-wing guerrilla groups, and right-wing paramilitary organizations. Rarely do the armed groups actually fight each other. They direct their violence at unarmed civilians. According to a Colombian NGO that maintains a data bank on the displaced, 33 percent of those displaced between 1995 and 1997 blamed paramilitaries for their displacement, 28 percent held the guerrillas responsible, and 10 percent charged the armed forces. The rest blamed more than one party or did not know which group caused their displacement. Paramilitary groups deliberately displaced civilians from rural areas, saying their aim was to eliminate any possibility of guerrillas gaining support from people in small towns and rural areas. However, most observers agree that the paramilitaries also deliberately depopulate areas to benefit their wealthy patrons, including large landholders, business people, and narco-traffickers. In its 1997 report on human rights, the U.S. Department of State said that the guerrillas commonly target "local elected officials or candidates for public office, teachers, civic leaders, business owners, and peasants opposed to their political or military activities." They do so to intimidate the local population into supporting them, but their tactics often lead people to flee and become displaced. As many as 15,000 guerrilla fighters effectively control up to 40 percent of Colombia's territory. Paramilitaries and guerrillas do not only kill. They torture and maim, sometimes forcing their victims' loved ones and neighbors to watch, instilling terror and intimidation. During the year, armed groups committed some 70 massacres that left more than 500 people dead. According to the December 22, 1997 El Colombiano, the largest number of massacres, 26, occurred in the department of Antioquia. The Colombian armed forces, including the army, navy, air force, and police, continue to engage in widespread human rights abuse, which also results in displacement. The U.S. State Department says that members of the armed forces guilty of human rights violations are virtually never brought to justice, and that the military maintains "an almost unbroken record of impunity." Many observers, both Colombian and foreign, believe the Colombian military condones or even directly assists the paramilitaries. Violence and displacement have taken a heavy social, psychological, economic, and political toll on the Colombian people. According to the Catholic Bishops' Conference, violence has touched almost every family in Colombia, making it "one of the most violent countries" in the world. Political figures, human rights workers, NGO staff, and clergy who work with the displaced are also targeted. Several prominent human rights workers have been killed, presumably by paramilitaries. Among these were two well-known researchers with the Center for Research and Popular Education (CINEP), who were killed in May, and the head of an association of displaced persons in Tolima Department, who was killed in September. In December 1997, the BogotÁ office of an international NGO that assists the displaced was broken into and the agency's files searched. Many candidates for office in local elections scheduled for October 26 became victims of the violence. There were more than 30 election-related murders, and more than 1,100 candidates for office in some 125 communities dropped out of their races because of threats made against them, primarily by guerrillas. In February, Colombia signed Protocol 11 of the Geneva Conventions, which establishes the neutrality of civilians in conflict situations. However, the formal adoption of the measure did nothing to deter the violence against civilians. Conditions for the Displaced Most displaced Colombians live in conditions ranging from modest to insufferable. Some receive government assistance during the first 90 days of their displacement. After that, however, they‹like all other displaced Colombians‹must fend for themselves. Displaced persons usually find temporary work, often just daily. It is hard work, for example on construction or road building crews, and it is poorly paid. Many of the displaced try to create work for themselves in the informal economy, buying fruit and vegetables, cigarettes, or other products from markets and wholesalers and selling them on street corners or house to house. The Colombian government did not acknowledge the magnitude or impact of internal displacement in the country until 1992. Having acknowledged the problem, however, it has done little to solve it and made only modest efforts to aid the displaced. The government disputed NGO assessments that more than a million Colombians are internally displaced. It argues that many displaced between 1984 and 1994 are now integrated and should no longer be counted as displaced. In early 1997, the government published CONPES Document 2924, which proposed a three-point strategy of prevention, immediate assistance, and consolidation and socio-economic stabilization. In July, the government established the Consejeria Presidencial para la Atencion Integral a la Poblacion Desplazada por la Violencia (Presidential Counselor for Integrated Attention to the Population Displaced by Violence). The Consejeria's role is to design projects to prevent displacement, coordinate the different branches and levels of government, coordinate humanitarian response, design programs to help the displaced to return home or integrate in new locations, and seek international cooperation and financing for programs for the displaced. In July, the government also passed Law No. 387 of 1997, which made official the plans and programs in earlier CONPES documents and decrees regarding the displaced. The law did not, however, spell out specific proposals for how to implement a response. Most observers familiar with the situation for the displaced criticize the government's response. They say that the government has done little to translate its words into action, it has assisted only a fraction of the displaced, and it has made no serious effort to tackle the causes of displacement. Despite their lack of resources, Colombian NGOs, religious-based organizations, and academics and jurists have been crucial in raising awareness of the plight of displaced Colombians and mobilizing a response to their needs. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and ICRC both have programs in Colombia. Several international NGOs, mostly European, assist the displaced, either directly or through partnerships with local NGOs. New Displacement in 1997 In early 1997, paramilitaries forcibly displaced whole communities from their home areas in the Riosucio area of northern ChocÓ, a vast, sparsely populated jungle area rich in mineral deposits, coal, hardwood, and, reportedly, oil. More than 13,000 residents of the Riosucio region fled their homes. Several thousand residents of communities near rivers fled by boat on the Atrato River to the Gulf of UrabÁ. Most then crossed the gulf to reach Turbo, a large coastal town. Several hundred remained behind in the village of Bocas del Atrato, where local people opened their homes to them. Some 4,200 residents of nearly 50 other Riosucio communities who lived farther from rivers fled their homes on foot in March. They walked for four weeks toward the town of Mutata, but when they reached the village of Pavarando, southwest of Mutata, the military stopped them. The camp that the government established in Pavarando for the Riosucio displaced is the only site in Colombia that resembles a typical refugee camp. Living conditions are basic and government assistance limited. At the end of 1997, it was home to some 4,600 displaced people, 750 of whom had arrived since March 1997. Conditions for the displaced in Turbo are worse than for those in Pavarando. They are housed in a large, unventilated sports hall in which they all sleep side by side on the floor or on the bleachers. Initially, some 3,900 displaced people lived in this crowded, unsanitary facility. Some moved to one of two new, smaller centers for displaced people, or to Turbo town, during the year. At the end of 1997, some 3,000 displaced people remained in the sports hall and about 2,300 others were living in Turbo town. The Riosucio displaced want to return home, but have insisted that the government create conditions permitting them to return and live in safety, and help them to survive economically. The displaced sent a group of representatives to BogotÁ to negotiate with the government conditions for their return. In November, the Consejeria announced that the displaced in Pavarando would sign an accord saying they had agreed to return home. But the displaced refused, saying that while the agreement promised them financial assistance, it did not guarantee their security. In July, paramilitaries arrived by air in the town of Mapiripan, in Meta Department, and killed more than 30 of the town's residents. According to Human Rights Watch, "The Mapiripan attack lasted for five days without any reaction from police or military forces based in the area." Some 35 residents of San Jose de Apartado, a community in Antioquia Department that has declared itself a "peace community," were also killed during the year. Another massacre and large-scale displacement took place in March in El Salado, in Bolivar Department. Virtually all of El Salado's several thousand residents fled en masse after paramilitaries attacked the town and killed six of its residents. Soon after the displacement, government representatives met with those displaced in Carmen de Bolivar and encouraged them to return home. The government made several promises: to establish a police post, to ask ICRC to monitor human rights, to provide housing and income-generation assistance (including creating a revolving credit fund for farmers), to staff and equip a health post, to improve the road between El Salado and Carmen de Bolivar, and to restore education. The government also promised to help returnees rebuild their homes, renew economic activity such as farming, and survive until their first harvests. Altogether, some 370 of the 700 families who lived in El Salado had returned home as of late November 1997. According to returnees whom USCR met there, however, the government had not delivered on most of its promises.
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