U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 1998 - Afghanistan

    NO EXIT: STAYING THE COUSE IN AFGHANISTAN by Don Krumm Eighteen years after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, one of the world's longest and most protracted refugee predicaments continues. Between 1990 and 1995, the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan dropped from about 3.6 million to about 1.2 million, and in Iran from about 2.3 million to 1.4 million, at which point repatriation stagnated, and the number of refugees has remained essentially unchanged. Voluntary repatriation from Iran to Afghanistan has ground to a virtual halt; only 2,233 refugees voluntarily repatriated to Afghanistan from Iran in 1997, according to UNHCR. The number of refugees repatriating from Pakistan has largely been offset by new refugee arrivals. The official count of 2.6 million Afghan refugees tells little. In Iran, arrivals for the past two years have automatically been termed illegal aliens; in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, they are considered exclusively as labor migrants. Whatever their status, some 5 million or more Afghans remain outside Afghanistan. Inside Afghanistan, the fighting continues. During a visit to Afghanistan in October and November 1997 on behalf of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, I spoke with humanitarian workers there who have dedicated years of their lives to helping the victims of conflict. Yet, even these people express exasperation with the violence, the penchant for revenge in defense of personal honor, central to the Pashtunwali code. Internecine warfare, unrelenting since 1990, and the inability of the factions to coalesce for the good of the country, have lost Afghanistan many friends and supporters. Humanitarian workers wonder aloud whether international assistance may actually prolong the fighting. They sometimes say, "What's the use?" Disquiet is evident among international donors as well. The international community has spent a considerable amount of money in the eight years since the Soviet withdrawal, and has very little to show for it. In addition to the seemingly intractable violence, poppy growing and opium production seem to be on the rise, significantly dampening donors' enthusiasm to help in Afghanistan. As reflected in UNHCR and ICRC budgets between 1995 and 1997, donors' contributions to maintain first-asylum support in Pakistan and Iran are declining, and international humanitarian programs inside Afghanistan are dwindling. An ICRC source said that Afghanistan is their largest under-funded account. By some estimates, donors' total funding for a year in Afghanistan is the equivalent of one day's worth of proceeds from the country's drug trade. While this statement is impossible to verify, it shows the relative lack of leverage that the UN and NGOs have to affect a peaceful outcome to the continuing conflict. But Western donor countries will probably resist the temptation to withdraw altogether from Afghanistan. Something of the "great game" played by outside powers a century ago continues. Powerful Western interests want to block ethnic-based warfare from spreading into Central Asia and even Pakistan, and to maintain options that might improve their chances of gaining access to vast oil and gas deposits in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Providing continued humanitarian relief and seeking a peace process are consistent with these goals. But are there new relief or development concepts that can help lay the conditions for peace? Are they worth trying? The Taliban Much depends on one's perception of the Muslim fundamentalist Taliban. On the one hand, they have brought relative stability to three-quarters of Afghanistan; on the other, this has come at a price to women and ethnic minorities that many consider too steep. Taliban-controlled areas appear to be relatively calm‹that is, for Afghanistan. Most Afghans give high marks to the Taliban for their ability to bring security to the sizeable territory under their control. Checkpoints in Kabul, Logar, and Paktia Provinces are lightly manned and non-threatening; guns are not in evidence among the general populace in cities and villages. Outside of their inability to work with women, international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) appear to be able to work relatively unhindered in these provinces. The Taliban run Afghanistan according to a strictly interpreted Islamic code. They demand that women not work or show their faces in public; they are intolerant of Western cultural influences, such as music tapes and television programs. Their concept of Islam makes difficult the type of compromise that would ease working relations with the international assistance community or achieve a negotiated settlement to Afghanistan's conflict. Kabul, the capital, and Herat, the major city near the border with Iran, are sometimes described as being under the rule of a Taliban "army of occupation." International relief workers suggest that the Taliban regard residents of these cities as having been supporters of the communist Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), who cannot be trusted and need to be dealt with harshly. The Taliban's discrimination against women, opposing their rights to employment, education, and health care, and their harassment of men with hair and beards that do not conform to prescribed Taliban norms, are particularly felt in these cities. The Taliban appear to spend most of their time and energy in a determined effort to win a military victory over their opponents in northern Afghanistan. Although the Taliban fully control 19 provinces, and have split the so-called "Northern Alliance"‹comprised of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Shi'ite Hazaras‹by holding key portions of Kunduz Province, the drive to win the war appears to have stalled. Taliban efforts to take and hold Mazar-I-Sharif failed twice. Despite these setbacks, the Taliban continue to recruit fresh fighters for another attempt. The front lines of the fighting are only 25 km north of Kabul, which is under a Taliban-imposed nighttime curfew. All international organizations have well-rehearsed plans for evacuating the city. Humanitarian air missions, either for administrative purposes or transport of relief goods, are sometimes unable to use Kabul airport because of insecurity. Relief flights are often diverted to an airstrip near Gardez, considerably south of Kabul. Meanwhile, the opposition Northern Alliance is having great difficulty staying united. In November 1997, Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostom drew public attention to mass graves thought to contain the bodies of some 2,000 Taliban militia presumed to have been slaughtered by his rival Uzbek warlord, General Abdul Malik, thus making rapprochement between the two warlords difficult at best. Ethnic Tajik Afghans, under former president Mohammed Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Masood, are for the moment isolated and probably biding their time in the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul. Some international observers in Afghanistan think that the Taliban also may not be as cohesive as they appear, and see their insistence on pursuing the war footing in the north as the principal strategy for maintaining cohesion in the south. By this logic, if a negotiated settlement were to be achieved between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, the vaunted security that now prevails in the south could once again come into question. Internal Displacement The number of internally displaced Afghans is unknown. Estimates run between 1 million and 1.5 million people, including some 300,000 who abandoned their homes in northern Afghanistan between October 1996 and July 1997. Most of those who fled the north at that time are non-Pashtun in ethnic origin, and therefore generally not welcome in Pakistan, at least not in large numbers. Starting in 1994, the government of Pakistan closed its border with Afghanistan, saying Afghans were "safe in Afghanistan." As a consequence, UNHCR created the Sar Shahi emergency camp in the desolate desert environment east of Jalalabad, which now accommodates about 120,000 displaced persons. It subsequently handed responsibility for the camp to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA). An additional 28,000 displaced persons are encamped near Herat, closer to the Iranian border. Although clearly at odds with the Taliban, Iran has nevertheless withdrawn its welcome mat to new Afghan refugees. During the last weeks of 1997, the Iranian authorities forcibly returned about 1,000 Afghans per week. All new arrivals are called "illegal immigrants" and are prevented from seeking recognition as refugees. An institutional framework for assisting internally displaced persons in Afghanistan has been established. A cooperation agreement, signed in April 1997 by ICRC, UNOCHA, UNHCR, and WFP, designated ICRC as the lead agency for assisting displaced persons throughout Afghanistan. To further support ICRC, task forces comprised of international organizations and NGOs have been established in major cities to help provide assistance. However, while this framework shows progress in providing institutional support for internally displaced Afghans, international humanitarian organizations make little effort to identify or assist internally displaced persons outside the camps. Hazarajat‹an Isolated Region Between 1 million and 2 million ethnic minority Hazara Shi'ites are trapped in the mountains southwest of Kabul. Since mid-1997, the Hazarajat region, which cannot feed itself in the best of times, has for all intents and purposes been blockaded. The Taliban maintain the blockade from the south, while the Northern Alliance commanders, ostensibly allied with the Shi'ites against the Taliban, prevent food from reaching Hazarajat from the north. On November 13, 1997, with winter snows about to close the mountain passes, the Taliban formally denied ICRC permission to send a food convoy to the region. Earlier in 1997, a WFP ten-truck convoy traveling to Hazarajat from Mazar-I-Sharif reportedly ran into ten separate roadblocks en route to Hazarajat, each of which appropriated a truckload of food. By the time the convoy arrived in Hazarajat, the trucks were all empty. The Hazarajat region is distant from international borders. Hazara people, distinguishable by their Mongoloid features and lack of facial hair, have a hard time disguising themselves outside of their immediate region. These factors make it difficult for them to flee the country. Special Concerns for Women The Taliban claim that the measures they are taking with regard to women are an extension of their security objective. They say that acts of violence and abuse against women had risen dramatically prior to the Taliban's arrival in Kabul, Herat, and the other big cities, and that their policies are intended to "protect" women. These same policies are seen by western relief and development professionals as stripping women of their basic human rights. The overall Taliban plan to "protect" women manifests itself in such actions as totally removing women from the workforce, making sure that when out in public their faces are hidden under the burka, closing down their education facilities, communal bathhouses, and health facilities, and insisting that they follow the mahram edict by which all Muslim women must be accompanied by a close male blood relative when traveling, even including trips to the marketplace. The policy of removing women from the workforce is life threatening to many women. The conflict in Afghanistan has left hundreds of thousands of women widowed, and thus sole bread winners for their families. There are some 60,000 war widows in Kabul alone. For them, the impact of not being able to provide for their families is devastating. Relief organizations are experiencing increased difficulty in performing basic surveys to determine women's needs. The Taliban harass women for cooperating with NGOs that try to provide them basic services. NGOs in Afghanistan are vigorously debating what stance they ought to take regarding continued assistance to Afghanistan if the Taliban do not permit women to have equal access to benefits. Some international groups believe that all assistance to Afghanistan should be withheld until the Taliban yield on this point. Others would limit the ban only to education and health programs. Despite considerable international pressure, the Taliban have appeared convinced that their policy was absolutely right, and have seemed unlikely to yield. As this publication goes to press, however, the Taliban and the UN, on May 13, 1998, signed a 23-point memorandum of agreement detailing the privileges, immunities, and obligations of UN staff in Afghanistan. The memorandum refers to future actions to be taken to increase girls' and women's access to education and health care. A first step, perhaps. Prospects for Repatriation There is not much to go back to in Afghanistan. After 18 years of general bludgeoning, first by the Soviets and then by internecine rivalry, Afghanistan is in tough shape. The UN ranks it near the bottom of countries on its general "misery" index. The following factors, in addition to continued fighting, contribute to the general climate that constrains return to Afghanistan: • Before the Soviets entered in 1979, 85 percent of Afghans earned their livelihoods through agriculture. Eighteen years of fighting have destroyed much of the country's irrigation capability, ruined the agrarian economy, mined agricultural land, prevented a generation of children born in refugee camps from learning agricultural skills, and killed or injured hundreds of thousands of farmers. Given these factors, the agricultural situation is substantially worse than it was in 1979. • Development agencies working on education in Afghanistan estimate the illiteracy rate at 85 percent. If true, education is about at the same stage of development now as it was in 1955. • The Taliban greatly restrict females' access to health care in Kabul and Herat, and probably throughout the country. This restriction undoubtedly discourages female refugees in Pakistan, who number more than half the total there, from repatriating. • If Kabul is any measure, the urban job base has been shrinking since 1994. Observers estimate that 60 percent of Kabul is 90 percent destroyed. In addition, much of Kabul's destroyed urban area is sown with landmines. • There is extensive deforestation in Afghanistan. The hills south of Kabul, said to have had trees ten years ago, are denuded. The sight of truck after truck loaded with wood for home heating and cooking heading for Kabul suggests that the problem is worsening. Conclusion As long as some regions of Afghanistan are stable, there is a chance that a substantial number of refugees could return, especially among the ethnic Pashtun refugees predominantly living in Pakistan. However, expectation of voluntary repatriation probably should not exceed 100,000 per year for the next several years, depending on political developments and absorptive capacity inside Afghanistan. Women, probably more than half of the refugees, and non-Pashtun minorities are understandably more reluctant to return to Afghanistan under current circumstances, and should not be pressured to repatriate. While maintaining assistance programs in neighboring countries, humanitarian needs inside Afghanistan remain compelling. Internally displaced Afghans are facing severe problems. The ability to deliver relief to the north has been substantially disrupted by the ransacking of UN/NGO capability in Mazar-I-Sharif, and continued fighting there. The Hazara people in central Afghanistan are almost totally isolated from any means of support. Donors and relief agencies should insist that relief be provided even-handedly to civilians in both the Hazarajat region and Pashtun areas. Even-handed assistance also means that donors and humanitarian agencies alike must insist that depriving women of education, health care, and employment opportunities is intolerable. The May 13 Taliban-UN memorandum is a hopeful sign. At least, now, a framework is under construction, if not completed. What is needed for the donors, the humanitarian workers, and, yes, the Afghans themselves, is a transparent road map enabling them to understand better who is working where, on what projects, with what amount of resources, why particular sites have been chosen, and what the short-, medium-, and long-term objectives are. Assistance cannot succeed in isolation. Without diplomatic initiatives geared toward building peace and respect for human rights, humanitarian relief and development will not be sustainable. A strategic humanitarian framework is the sine qua non for continued international involvement in Afghanistan. Piecemeal efforts, as well-intentioned as they may be, will not succeed without coordination, transparency, and a focus that encompasses solutions. To succeed, the humanitarians, in their own way, must be as principled and disciplined as the Taliban. Don Krumm is a consultant to the U.S. Committee for Refugees. He is an expert on international response to humanitarian emergencies.
Disclaimer:

This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States.