U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 1997 - Turkey

Non-European refugees and asylum seekers, particularly Iranians and Iraqis, faced daunting obstacles in 1996 to seeking asylum in Turkey and securing protection against forced return or rejection at the border. Procedural requirements often prevented asylum seekers from registering their claims. Others, sensing the hostility of the authorities, chose to remain in hiding rather than come forward with a refugee claim. Estimating the number of real refugees in Turkey, therefore – rather than only those officially recognized – is almost impossible. Needless to say, the 592 persons recognized by the Turkish government as asylum seekers in 1996 (120 Iraqis and 472 Iranians) were only a fraction of the total number of persons in Turkey with a well-founded fear of persecution in their homelands. A total of 1,504 refugees were resettled from Turkey to third countries in 1996. The conflict in Turkey's southeast involving the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) continued in 1996, not only displacing more Kurdish villagers in the southeast, but also preventing the return of hundreds of thousands who fled in previous years. Estimating accurately the number of internally displaced persons in Turkey was also virtually impossible. Internal Displacement The 12-year conflict in southeastern Turkey has set in motion a process of action and reaction between Turkish security forces and the PKK that has forced hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of persons from their homes. Although much of the displacement has been spontaneous, the Turkish military has, since 1993, systematically expelled Kurdish villagers in the country's southeast. Security forces have targeted villages refusing to join the "village guard" network (a system of state-sponsored paramilitary civil-defense forces) or villages suspected of supporting the PKK. In turn, the PKK has threatened mayors, teachers, and others whom it accuses of collaborating with state authorities, forcing them to flee the region as well. Many hamlets and villages around Mardin and to the north of Diyarbakir are ghost towns, with only damaged and destroyed housing remaining. With the exception of some villages populated by village guards, the districts of Silopi, Sirnak, and Eruh along the Iraqi border are virtually depopulated. Similar measures have targeted civilians living in the Agri and TendŸrek mountains near the borders of Armenia and Iran. At least 2,500 villages and hamlets have been emptied of their inhabitants since a February 1993 decision that villages that might support the PKK were to be evacuated. As Turkish army and security forces have sought to depopulate mountainous, rural areas, they have pushed the village populations into urban centers, creating economic hardship for large numbers of displaced persons, most of whom had been herders or otherwise tied to the pastoral economy. Many of the displaced have crowded into the provincial cities of Diyarbakir and Batman, both of which have more than doubled in population as a result of the influx of displaced persons. This campaign of forced displacement continued during 1996. Although human rights or press monitoring of the martial law zone is scanty, the Guardian Weekly reported the razing of Hiskamerg, a village of 60 mud huts 40 miles from Diyarbakir, on May 28. According to its report, based on interviews with recently displaced persons, Turkish soldiers and paramilitary village guards raided Hiskamerg and burned it to the ground; the entire village population fled to Diyarbakir. Most Turkish cities have developed impoverished, overcrowded, ramshackle slums on their outskirts, gecekondu, "huts built in one night." Many of the displaced Kurds in provincial cities and towns crowd into homes of relatives, sometimes with more than 30 people residing in dwellings intended for a single family. Some are accommodated in tents, others homeless and destitute, in the streets. A minority are housed in resettlement projects sponsored by the government. In an October 1994 report on forced displacement of Kurds in southeastern Turkey, Human Rights Watch compiled from Turkish news sources reports showing recent urban growth due at least in part to internal displacement: the city of Siirt had grown from 70,000 to 130,000; Diyarbakir had swelled from 300,000 to 900,000; Adana had grown from 900,000 to 1.5 million; and Mersin's population had increased from 550,000 to 1,000,000. That same month, Turkey's minister for human rights announced that two million people had been internally displaced as a result of ten years of unrest in southeastern Turkey. The Turkish government had previously denied that anyone was internally displaced. In February, USCR wrote to the Turkish Ministry of Interior to seek information about a report published by the Turkish Republican People's Party (CHP) charging that Turkish security troops had targeted members of the Alevi sect for forced evacuation. The report said that troops forcibly displaced Alevi people from approximately 20 villages in the eastern province of Sivas. USCR urged the ministry to investigate the report. The government did not reply to USCR's inquiry. In response to a more general USCR inquiry later in the year, the Turkish embassy said that many rural people have migrated to larger cities for various reasons, making it impossible to determine how many have been displaced specifically for security reasons. Nevertheless, the embassy estimated that about 300,000 were internally displaced. The embassy said that as security forces have extended their control in the southeast, "many refugees are returning to their homes." As of October 1996, the Turkish government reported that 15,314 persons, representing 2,019 households, had returned to their villages in southeastern Turkey. The government said that returns are continuing under the auspices of a government program. In its human rights report for 1996, The U.S. Department of State cites a Turkish member of parliament's estimate of 560,000 internally displaced persons as "credible." Clearly, internal displacement as a result of conflict and fear is part of a larger migratory phenomenon occurring in Turkey. It is not possible to determine with any precision all the factors that have contributed to Turkey's dramatic urbanization. Undoubtedly, economic factors, as well as political, also account for some of the internal migration, and even persons fleeing for political reasons often have a mix of motives, including seeking employment. As an example of the wider migration, Istanbul (in western Turkey – distant from the conflict) has added 300,000 to 500,000 new internal migrants in each of the past five years, according to some sources. During its first six months of tenure, Turkey's first Islamist government, elected to office in July, did not appear fundamentally to have altered the course of the political/military approach to the conflict in Turkey's southeast. However, the new prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, promised to implement a return program for the internally displaced persons forcibly evacuated from the southeast, and targeted investment projects in areas of potential return through an enterprise called the Southeast Anatolia Project. Asylum Law On November 30, 1994, a new Turkish regulation, Decision Number 94/6169, went into effect, requiring that non-European, undocumented asylum seekers in Turkey present themselves within five days of arrival to the police closest to where they entered the country. The regulations instruct local police near the borders to conduct interviews to determine if refugee claimants should be recognized officially as asylum seekers. Local police conduct the asylum interviews but do not make a status determination. The interview documents are forwarded to the Ministry of Interior, which, according to the regulations, arrives at a decision after considering "the opinions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant ministries and national agencies." Although the government sometimes solicits UNHCR opinions, that is not always the case. During 1996, the Turkish government recognized 592 claimants as asylum seekers and rejected 1,043. Because of Turkey's geographic reservation to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, excluding non-Europeans from its obligations on behalf of refugees, the 1994 regulations took a convoluted approach to defining the terms "refugee" and "asylum seeker." Normally, an asylum seeker is considered to be a person claiming to be a refugee whose status has not yet been determined by an adjudicator. However, according to the Turkish regulations, the distinguishing feature between a refugee and an asylum seeker is whether or not the person in question is of European origin. According to the Turkish definition, an asylum seeker, no less than a refugee, has been found by the Turkish authorities to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted according to the criteria adopted from the refugee definition in the UN Refugee Convention and Protocol. However, recognition by the Turkish authorities of a foreigner as an asylum seeker does not carry with it a guarantee against refoulement. Essentially, all that it brings is a temporary residence permit that enables the refugee to seek third-country resettlement. Under the regulations, many foreigners have not been able to file asylum claims at all. The regulations require asylum seekers to apply within five days to local police if they entered the country legally, or, if they entered illegally, to present themselves to the police in the city where they entered the country, also within five days. This means that Iranians and Iraqis who enter illegally must apply for asylum in provincial cities in eastern Turkey, such as Van, Agri, and Sirnak. However, the southeastern segment of the country is under a State of Emergency and in the midst of a continuing, bloody 12-year struggle between Turkish government forces and the PKK. Therefore, if an Iranian who enters the land border between Turkey and Iran succeeds in traversing the martial law region and goes to Ankara to claim asylum, he or she is told to turn around and return to the dangers of southeastern Turkey in order to file an asylum claim at a police station along the border. USCR Actions In July 1996, USCR published Barriers to Protection: Turkey's Asylum Regulations. In addition to analyzing the regulations, the report made a number of recommendations, including abolishing the five-day filing deadline, allowing asylum seekers to apply in their city of residence rather than at the closest entry point, and dropping Turkey's geographical reservation to its accession to the Refugee Convention. In August, the Turkish government responded, challenging a number of USCR's conclusions. The government said that USCR had an "erroneous impression" that persons not meeting the criteria for obtaining refugee status would be returned to the authorities of their country of origin. Instead, the government said, they "are given the chance to exit Turkey the way they entered." In practice, USCR found, persons from Iran and Iraq generally enter directly from those countries (although some Iranians do transit via Iraq); when they are returned, therefore, they are, in fact, sent back into the hands of the authorities in their countries of origin. "In case such persons opt to return to their country of origin," said the Turkish government, "no information on their return is furnished to the authorities of that country. Thus, this should not be interpreted as a breach of Article 33 of the Convention on Refugees related to nonrefoulement." In its report, USCR documented several specific cases – which USCR raised directly by name with the Turkish authorities – of Iranian refugees who said they were taken by the Turkish authorities to the Iranian embassy in Turkey before being returned, at which time they were interrogated and their documents taken. In any case, a breach of Article 33's prohibition on refoulement is not contingent on the transmission of information relating to the refugee claims of persons being returned. Reportedly, Turkey changed its deportation practices during 1996: previously, deported Iranians were often released along the mountainous border; in 1996, however, the Turkish authorities regularly began turning deported Iranians directly over to the Iranian authorities. The Turkish government said that USCR's claim that there is a pattern of attempts to deport persons entering Turkey from Iran "is erroneous and misleading." The letter said: In short, there is no deportation problem in Turkey. Nor is there any security pact between Turkey and Iran providing for the "deportation" of Iranians entering Turkey. The registration requirement was devised in the first place for security reasons. It aims at eliminating the presence of illegal aliens which jeopardize security in Turkey. It also serves to make a clearer distinction between those who are genuinely apt to obtain refugee status, and those who abuse the international provisions aimed at providing refuge to those who really need it. In this connection, an unbiased evaluation of the reasons for the Ordinance and its implementation is also necessary in order to convey clear information to future possible asylum seekers. Barriers to Protection did not in the least ignore the security reasons for the creation of the asylum regulations. In fact, the paper quoted Turkish government officials saying that security was their paramount concern, and a section of the report was entitled "Security Concerns Overriding." USCR's concern, in fact, is that the preoccupation with security has compromised principles of refugee protection in Turkey. In a subsequent letter to USCR, the Turkish government said, "Those individuals who do not follow the rules stated in the regulations and therefore who are not granted asylum but, instead, are asked to leave Turkey, are always allowed to come back to Turkey and seek asylum by submitting additional documentation according to the established procedure." Iranians As with other migration statistics in Turkey, the number of Iranians living in the country is a matter of wide speculation. Estimates range from 500,000 to two million. Only a fraction have ever approached the UNHCR office or the Turkish authorities for recognition as refugees. Estimates of the number of Iranians who might have bona fide fears of persecution if returned to Iran have also vary greatly, but USCR estimates that more than 10,000 may be in such circumstances. USCR recognizes this to be a rough estimate, but bases it on the sustained and continuing pattern and practice of intimidation and bias that discourages Iranians from applying for asylum, including the procedural bars included in the 1994 regulations. Taking as a starting point, an estimate of one million Iranians in the country, an estimate of 10,000 Iranian refugees in Turkey would amount to only one percent of the Iranian population in the country. USCR maintains that it is likely that most Iranians fearing persecution in their homeland would not seek refugee recognition in Turkey either because they could not meet the five-day filing deadline or for fear that they would be more likely to be forcibly returned to Iran for having registered a claim or that their lives or freedom could be endangered in Turkey for having come to the attention of the authorities. In 1996, the government reported that 803 Iranians approached the Turkish authorities seeking recognition as asylum seekers. Turkey recognized 472 Iranians as asylum seekers during the year, and provided temporary residence permits with the expectation that they would seek refugee determination interviews with UNHCR; 203 individuals were rejected and notified to leave the country. During the year, 1,454 Iranians registered with UNHCR in Turkey. UNHCR recognized 925 persons and rejected 493. On several occasions during the year, UNHCR intervened in cases of Iranians whom the office recognized as refugees, but whom the authorities were in the process of deporting to Iran. Despite interventions by UNHCR, NGOs, and other governments, 20 UNHCR-recognized Iranian refugees were refouled during the year and another 51 Iranian asylum seekers known to UNHCR were also forcibly returned. In most cases, the Iranians known to UNHCR who were forcibly returned were people who had failed for one reason or another to satisfy the procedural requirements of the Turkish asylum regulations, such as the failure to file a claim within five days at a local police station nearest to the point of entry into the country. Also during the year, 922 Iranian refugees were resettled in third countries with UNHCR's assistance. The two countries accepting the most were Canada (281) and Australia (262). A group of 21 Iranians, almost all of whom were Baha'is, approached the UNHCR office in Ankara on August 6 to seek recognition as refugees. UNHCR advised them of the Turkish asylum regulations, and told them they must return directly to the police at the city closest to where they had entered the country. All but two of them had proper Iranian identification documents and had reported their presence within the five-day filing limit. They then boarded a chartered bus and drove to Agri, a town near the Iranian border. UNHCR informed the Turkish Ministry of Interior about the group's travel to Agri, in order to assure their safety. Eyewitnesses saw them arrive in Agri and watched as local police loaded them into a van. Later, others saw the group being taken to the border and being expelled. A Turkish businessman reported seeing women and children crying and begging the police not to deport them. The Turkish government denied that the incident occurred. Local authorities denied having had any contact with the group, and said that they had "disappeared." Upon learning of their disappearance, USCR wrote an urgent letter to the Turkish Ministry of Interior seeking information about their whereabouts and assurances about their safety. USCR's letter went on to say, "We wish to remind the Turkish government that the Iranian government singles out Baha'is for persecution as a matter of official policy. Based on their faith alone, these 21 asylum seekers would clearly have a well-founded fear of persecution, and thus have valid ground for any asylum claim." The Baha'i Assembly in Turkey confirmed that the Baha'is were, indeed, refouled to Iran and, upon return, that they were imprisoned in Maku. Later, 14 of the 21 persons were able to re-enter Turkey. They confirmed that they had been refouled by local Turkish police from Agri and that they had been detained and mistreated upon return to Iran. The 14 who were able to re-enter said that they had paid bonds to gain release from detention. Subsequently, they were assisted by UNHCR staff at the border, recognized as asylum seekers by the Turkish authorities, and, at year's end, were in various stages of the resettlement process. No information was available on the other seven deported to Iran. The Turkish government wrote to USCR, saying that Iranian Baha'is in Turkey are no longer considered prima facie refugees by UNHCR. "By claiming that they are being discriminated against specifically in educational pursuits and work life because of their religious beliefs," said the letter from the Turkish government, "they want to seek asylum in Western countries." The letter said that UNHCR now recognizes Baha'is as refugees "after an intensive inspection." During the course of the year, USCR wrote to the Turkish officials on a number of other occasions to urge that particular refugees and asylum seekers imminently under threat of deportation not be deported. Although Turkish officials have commented to USCR on general issues regarding their refugee policy, they have not responded to specific inquiries about particular individuals and groups. USCR closed 1996 by again writing to the Turkish government on December 31 to appeal on behalf of three Iranian asylum seekers who had been arrested earlier in the month and who were under imminent threat of deportation. USCR reminded the Turkish authorities that the prohibition against refoulement in international law brooks "no exceptions for issues such as delays in filing an application." Iraqis As with Iranians, Turkish authorities have consistently resisted applying the refugee designation to Iraqis, insisting on its geographically restrictive interpretation of the term, and not wanting to acknowledge the obligations under international law that apply to persons recognized as refugees. Historically, the Turkish authorities have not regarded Iraqis as persons requiring individualized refugee determination procedures. In 1988, when more than 60,000 Iraqis fled to Turkey, and again in 1991, when the number of Iraqis seeking refuge in Turkey exceeded 450,000, the sheer numbers of Iraqi asylum seekers precluded individualized refugee determinations. The existence of the safe haven zone in northern Iraq has also contributed to the Turkish authorities' presumption that northern Iraq is safe for Iraqi Kurds and that they can be returned there without fear of persecution, despite the internecine turmoil among the Kurdish political factions there. Under the Turkish asylum regulations, Iraqis now have a greater opportunity for individualized determinations of their status than they did before. They also have had one advantage over most Iranian asylum seekers; most have been better able to obtain valid travel documents before leaving Iraq, which, according to the 1994 Turkish regulations, allows properly documented foreigners to file their asylum claims in their city of residence, not at the closest point of entry. As in the cases of Iranians, described above, UNHCR's role is no longer to make refugee status determinations per se (although it still exercises the prerogative under its mandate to recognize a person as a refugee, even if that person has not been recognized by the government). UNHCR acts cooperatively with the Turkish government in cases that have been screened in by the Turkish police according to the refugee definition, and recognized by the government as "asylum seekers," enabling UNHCR to make its own refugee status determination, and, if finding the claimant to be a refugee, to seek third-country resettlement on the refugee's behalf. During 1996, the Turkish authorities recognized 120 Iraqis as asylum seekers and denied 840. Those who were recognized were provided with temporary resident permits with the expectation that they would seek refugee determination interviews with UNHCR; those who were rejected were told to leave the country within 15 days with the possibility to appeal during that time. During the year, 2,540 Iraqis approached the UNHCR office seeking recognition as refugees. In 1996, UNHCR recognized 618 Iraqis and rejected 1,727. A total of 564 Iraqis were resettled in third countries with UNHCR's assistance. The two countries accepting the most were Australia (164) and Canada (149). During 1996, 32 UNHCR-recognized Iraqi refugees were refouled and another 41 Iraqi asylum seekers known to UNHCR were forcibly returned. Border Security On October 14, a group of 28 Iraqi Kurds and Christians were massacred near the Turkish and Iranian borders as they were seeking asylum in Turkey. Survivors of the massacre reported that the perpetrators were members of a Turkish paramilitary group. The Turkish government denied responsibility for the massacre. Turkey announced repeatedly in 1996 that it would create a "security zone" inside Iraq adjacent to its territory. In September, following the entry of Iraqi government forces into the town of Erbil, the Turkish government sent conflicting and confusing messages about its view of the role of Saddam Hussein, but never wavered in its determination to keep Iraqi refugees from entering and staying in Turkey. Turkish Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller reportedly told the New York Times that Turkey was prepared to drop plans to create the security zone if Saddam Hussein was able to "put an end to terrorist infiltration" from Iraq to Turkey. She later denied the statement. However, she did say, "We want to stop the influx of refugees through our borders but we cannot ask Saddam to do that for us because we have always respected UN resolutions." She added, "We are not ready to cancel the security zone because we fear the influx of refugees, and the PKK has stationed themselves right next to our borders." Evacuation from Iraq In September, as U.S. government officials were negotiating with Turkey regarding the evacuation of Iraqis who had been associated with the U.S. presence in northern Iraq, USCR wrote an op-ed piece in the New York Times saying, "The United States must prevail upon Turkey to allow in refugees for temporary asylum.... True, this creates a potential danger for Turkey, which faces tensions with its own Kurdish separatists. It is up to the United States and its allies to assure the Turks that the problem is temporary and that they will not have to pay – politically or financially – for assisting the refugees." Turkey allowed the evacuation to take place, but only on condition that all evacuees would be transited through as quickly as possible. After the evacuees crossed the Habur bridge into Turkey, Turkish security officials checked their identities and Turkish police and soldiers escorted them to a holding area near the town of Silopi near the border. From there, they were taken by bus to Diyarbakir, where they were flown out of Turkey to Guam. After the U.S. evacuations, the question remained how Turkey would respond to additional asylum seekers from northern Iraq seeking asylum in Turkey. In the last three months of the year, Turkish security officials seemed particularly vigilant in preventing Iraqi asylum seekers from entering the country spontaneously. Refugees from Turkey In December, the Turkish Foreign Ministry welcomed a UNHCR announcement that the High Commissioner would no longer recognize the Atrush camp in northern Iraq as a refugee camp. UNHCR said that the nonpolitical character of the camp had been compromised and that UNHCR could no longer provide services there. UNHCR announced that it would assist individual refugees in transit centers for another month to allow them an opportunity to make decisions regarding repatriation. PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan complained that the composition of the camp was overwhelmingly comprised of children, women, and elderly men, and called upon PKK activists in the camp to "break the chains and march toward your mountains." The PKK claimed that about 1,000 male and female camp residents heeded Ocalan's call. A Turkish Foreign Ministry official told a press conference that Turkey would provide facilities for repatriating Atrush residents. By year's end, 314 persons had repatriated from Atrush (another 40 had repatriated from Atrush in 1995). Bosnian Refugees As Europeans, Bosnians in Turkey are not handicapped by Turkey's geographical reservation to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and can, in principle, be accepted as refugees. In practice, however, Turkey's response to the 20,000 Bosnians who have sought refuge on its territory has been to extend a form of temporary protection on a par with the temporary protection schemes elsewhere in Europe. Bosnians are regarded as "guests" without permanent status. Many Bosnian refugees have opted to repatriate or to move on to third countries. By year's end, only about 1,800 remained as "guests" of Turkey, of whom 692 were residing in the Kirklareli camp near the Bulgarian border.