India, which hosted more than 350,000 refugees in 1996, continued to play a pivotal role in South Asian refugee issues. During the year, it permitted an additional 7,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees to enter, but forcibly returned to Burma six Burmese who had applied to UNHCR for mandate refugee status, and arrested ethnic Nepalese Bhutanese refugees who protested Bhutan's refusal to permit them to return home. USCR visited India in November. While there, USCR interviewed urban refugees and representatives of Burmese Chin refugees in New Delhi, visited Tibetan refugees in Dharamsala, and met newly arrived Sri Lankan refugees in Tamil Nadu. USCR also met with UNHCR and government officials. Although India was not a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol and still did not permit UNHCR access to most refugees in the country, India joined UNHCR's Executive Committee in 1995. Local and international refugee advocates believed that India's continued refusal to accede to the Refugee Convention and its refusal to permit UNHCR access to most refugees were negative influences on India's South Asian neighbors, none of which had signed the Convention. The Indian authorities complained that the Convention imposes one-sided obligations by requiring host countries to permit refugees to enter and to assist them, but not requiring countries of origin or the international community to work toward solutions. They further argued that India had in any case followed the spirit of the Convention by permitting refugees to enter. A source familiar with the Indian government's position on refugees said that because India believes it already adequately assists refugees, it does not need UNHCR; that refugees are not high on India's political agenda; and that India wants "solutions" regarding refugees, which the Indian government believes it can best achieve bilaterally. India hosted refugees from five of its immediate neighbors and from several other countries farther afield. The Indian government's response to the various refugee populations was as varied as the refugee groups themselves. The more than 352,000 refugees in India included 110,000 Tibetans, whom the Indian government continued to welcome; about 100,000 Sri Lankan Tamils (62,000 in government-run camps); 53,000 Bangladeshi Chakma whom India has tried to pressure into returning home in recent years; some 40,000 ethnic Chin from Burma as well as 200 Burmese pro-democracy student activists registered and mostly assisted by UNHCR; 30,000 ethnic Nepalese from Bhutan whom India largely granted the same rights as Indian citizens; and a number of so-called urban refugees (18,607 Afghans, 243 Somalis, 195 Iranians, and 161 refugees from other countries) living primarily in Delhi whom UNHCR recognized as refugees and in some cases assisted. An estimated 250,000 Kashmiris were internally displaced in India, and as many as 13,000 Kashmiri refugees were reportedly living in Pakistan. In the northeast Indian states of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, and Mizoram, inter-ethnic strife and conflict among the Indian armed forces and more than 40 ethnic insurgent groups led to at least temporary displacement of people in a number of areas. However, as a result of the Indian government's imposition of strict censorship on developments in the region and its denial of access to outsiders, little concrete information was available about the extent or nature of displacement. Tibetans Tibetan refugees first fled to India in 1959, when China annexed Tibet. Thousands more have arrived in recent years, fleeing Chinese government crackdowns on Tibetan opposition to Chinese rule, or seeking the opportunity for a Tibetan education or religious life. To reach India, Tibetan refugees risk a perilous journey over the Himalayan Mountains and through Nepal. The precise number of Tibetans living in India varies from year to year as new refugees arrive and some return to Tibet after completing their studies or pilgrimages, but the Tibetan government in exile estimated their number in 1996 at about 110,000. The refugees are scattered throughout India. Several thousand live in and around Dharamsala, home of the principal Tibetan political and relief organizations, and of the Dalai Lama, Tibetans' spiritual leader. However, there are more than two dozen other Tibetan settlements in eight Indian states, the largest being in Karnataka and Himachal Pradesh. During 1996, 2,843 new Tibetan refugees arrived in India. Some 2,125 entered through Nepal, the remainder through other routes. The Tibetan administration enrolled about 500 newly arrived children in Tibetan schools and referred some 550 new arrivals to Tibetan monasteries and nunneries in India. It encouraged about 1,200 new arrivals who had gone to India primarily to receive the blessing of the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet because it did not have the means to assist them in India. Since 1979, an estimated 30,00 Tibetans have arrived in India, of whom about 60 percent remained there for at least some period (some returned to Tibet after completing their studies). The Indian authorities have not offered them the same status as earlier Tibetan refugees and, particularly in recent years, have not sanctioned their moving into established Tibetan settlements without Indian government authorization. They have not, however, taken any steps to prevent them from entering or remaining in India. The Indian government has been very flexible in its approach to the Tibetans, who generally have good relations with their Indian hosts. India permits the Tibetans to work, although as noncitizens it is often difficult for them to get jobs, and has issued many of them identity documents so that they can travel in and out of the country. While many Tibetan refugees have achieved economic self-sufficiency (some becoming quite successful), some, including a number of elderly persons, women-headed families, and recent arrivals, continued to struggle. The Tibetan administration's welfare department assisted those who were in need. The Indian authorities have also permitted Tibetan refugees to establish their own administration, which in effect functions as a Tibetan government in exile. The Tibetan administration includes an elected assembly, a judiciary, and a number of departments, including education, health, information and international relations, and religion and culture. Although largely well integrated socially and economically in India, Tibetans continue to identify themselves as refugees, and most reportedly hope to be able to return someday to Tibet. Sri Lankan Tamils More than 7,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees arrived in India during the year. They fled increased fighting between the Sri Lankan military and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rebels in Sri Lanka. That fighting also internally displaced hundreds of thousands of Sri Lankans, virtually all Tamils. At the end of the year, there were an estimated 100,000 Sri Lankan refugees in India, 62,000 of whom (including the new arrivals) lived in camps and were assisted by the Indian government and the local authorities. As many as 40,000 other refugees lived outside the camps by their own means. Most Sri Lankan refugees arrived in India in several waves between 1983 and the early 1990s, also fleeing fighting between Sri Lankan government forces and the LTTE. Although the Indian authorities and local people initially welcomed the refugees, they became less welcoming following the LTTE's assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. The election of a new government in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu in 1996 appeared once again to ease tensions. While some camps were well maintained, others were badly neglected. Housing and sanitation facilities were particularly inadequate. The Indian authorities gave camp residents cash grants and provided them some non-food items at subsidized rates. The refugees were allowed to work outside the camps, but the authorities imposed restrictions on their movement in and out of the camps, severely limiting their ability to get work. New Delhi did not allow UNHCR or other international groups regular access to the camps. In early 1992, the Indian government began repatriating Sri Lankan refugees, in some cases by force. Following international criticism, India temporarily halted the repatriation. Repatriations resumed in mid-1993 after India agreed to permit UNHCR to interview refugees before their departure to ensure they were repatriating voluntarily. Repatriations continued on and off during 1994 and 1995, but were again suspended in mid-1995 following an escalation in the Sri Lankan conflict. No Sri Lankan refugees repatriated with assistance from the government of India or UNHCR during 1996. Most of the newly arrived refugees in 1996 were from Jaffna and had originally fled their homes during the October 1995 government offensive. Some sources, including the Sri Lankan government, speculated that the LTTE coerced or encouraged the refugees to go to India. They said that the LTTE paid all or part of the US $70 to US $105 per person cost of the journey to India for some of the refugees in order to embarrass the Sri Lankan government and promote sympathy for the Tamil cause. The Sri Lankan and Indian governments pointed to those allegations to justify their efforts to prevent would-be Sri Lankan refugees from reaching India. In August 1996, the Indian government threatened to seize the boats of Indian fishermen if they provided transportation for Sri Lankan refugees. On September 27, USCR wrote to the Indian authorities urging them to continue to grant fleeing Sri Lankans refuge. In October, the Sri Lankan navy intercepted nearly 300 people attempting to flee to India, claiming that the asylum seekers were being forced to leave against their will. That same month, India's foreign minister again said the government would "stem the flow" of Sri Lankans into India, but did not take any further actions to prevent the flow. USCR visited southern India in November and interviewed a number of the newly arrived refugees, who said that they had decided to go to India because, as displaced persons in Sri Lanka, they had found little chance of living normally, little safety from fighting, and no education for their children. None indicated that the LTTE had in any way forced, coerced, or encouraged them to go to India. USCR interviews suggested that if such pressure did occur, it probably was not widespread. Bangladeshi Chakma Since 1986, refugees belonging to ethnic and religious minority groups, mostly Buddhist Chakma (one of several ethnic groups that comprise the Jumma people), have fled the Chittagong Hill Tracts region of predominantly Muslim Bangladesh. They fled harassment by Muslim settlers and fighting between the Bangladesh security forces, which supported the settlers, and a Chakma insurgent group. Although India allowed them to remain, it did not permit UNHCR or other international organizations access to them. The Indian government and local authorities assist the refugees, but a 1994 report on the Chakma refugees by the New Delhi-based South Asia Human Rights Documentation Center (SAHRCD) described conditions in the camps as "abysmal." Since 1993, India has pressed the refugee leadership and the government of Bangladesh to arrange for the refugees to repatriate. A trial group of some 1,850 persons repatriated in 1996 but were unable to reclaim their land and did not receive the aid that the Bangladesh government promised them. There have been no organized repatriations since. At the end of 1996, some 53,000 Chakma refugees remained in India. UNHCR has expressed concern about the Chakma refugees and has offered to help India and Bangladesh work out a new repatriation program, but the Indian authorities have repeatedly refused to permit UNHCR any role. Although there was no organized Chakma repatriation during 1996, according to the Bangladesh government, nearly 3,000 Chakma repatriated on their own initiative. The Bangladesh government wrote to USCR saying that it provided the returnees cash grants for shelter construction, food, and agricultural loans, and that the returnees were able to reclaim their former land. In January, another group of some 65,000 Chakma who had lived in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh for more than 30 years became the focus of considerable attention. On January 9, the Indian Supreme Court ordered a halt to efforts by a local group in Arunachal Pradesh to forcibly repatriate the Chakma, allegedly at the instigation of the Arunachal Pradesh state government. The Chakma's case had been brought before the court by India's National Human Rights Commission. Although this group of Chakma were generally regarded as immigrants rather than refugees, the case was important because it upheld the rights of noncitizens at a time when anti-immigrant sentiment was running high, particularly in northeastern India. The Supreme Court found that "there exists a clear and present danger to the lives and personal liberty of the Chakma," and called on the government of the state of Arunachal Pradesh to "ensure that the life and personal liberty of each and every Chakma residing within the state shall be protected and any attempt to forcibly evict or drive them out of the state by organized groups...shall be repelled." The court also ordered the government to permit the many Chakma eligible to apply for Indian citizenship under the Citizenship Act of 1955 to do so. Burmese As many as 40,000 ethnic Chin Burmese refugees lived in India's northeastern Mizoram state (estimates of the number ranged from 20,000 to 40,000). The Chin, who are largely Christian, are among the many ethnic minorities that have suffered discrimination under successive Burmese regimes, and persecution and human rights abuses at the hands of the present State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) regime, considered one of the worst human rights violators in the world. Another 500 Burmese whom UNHCR recognized, and in some cases assisted, lived in Delhi. Among them were 200 former students involved in the pro-democracy movement that SLORC crushed in Burma, and about 200 Chin who managed to get to Delhi from Mizoram to seek UNHCR protection. In previous years, due to inadequate information about the Chin resulting from India's tight control of access to its northeastern states, USCR regarded the Chin as a population living in refugee-like circumstances. Based on additional information obtained during its 1996 visit to New Delhi, however, USCR now considers the Chin to be refugees. That is because India did not have any refugee determination process for which the Chin could apply, and because it did not permit UNHCR, which believed that some portion of the Chin may be refugees, access to the Chin to make that determination. Some of the Chin have been in India since 1962, when ethnic Chin took up arms against the then-military regime in Burma. Most, however, entered India following SLORC's crackdown on the democracy movement in 1988. The Chin lived for many years relatively peacefully among the local Mizo people, to whom they are closely related ethnically. Many were housed in two refugee camps, Champai and Saiha, which the Indian authorities established for them. The situation for Chin refugees changed dramatically beginning in 1994, due both to spreading antiforeigner sentiment in Mizoram and other states in northeast India, and to the Indian government's improved relations with SLORC. In September 1994, the Indian authorities forcibly returned as many as 10,000 Chin to Burma (estimates of the number deported varied significantly). According to Chin refugee sources, some of those who were returned disappeared, and others were detained in forced labor camps. In early 1995, India and Burma reportedly signed a trade agreement that led to closer relations. Following SLORC complaints that members of the Chin National Front (CNF) insurgent group were using the refugee camps as bases, the Indian government closed the camps in June 1995. The situation deteriorated when, on July 12, 1996, a Mizo leader was killed, allegedly by members of the CNF. At about that time, the CNF had imposed a blockade of the main road between Burma and Mizoram, angering Mizo businessmen. The Indian authorities were at odds with the CNF not only because of its threat to India's relations with SLORC, but also because India suspected some CNF members of aiding an ethnic Naga Indian insurgent group. Following the killing of the Mizo leader, the local authorities arrested 50 Chin, including some said to have been recognized by UNHCR as persons of concern to the agency, and reportedly tortured them. The Mizoram authorities then reportedly said that all Chin would have to leave Mizoram and return to Burma by August 13, but did not take steps to implement the order. On August 21, India involuntarily repatriated six Burmese Chin defectors from the Burmese military who had fled to India. All six had gone to New Delhi and applied to UNHCR for recognition as refugees. The Indian authorities told the asylum seekers that they could only be offered refuge in Mizoram. The six returned to Mizoram, where the authorities handed them back to the Burmese authorities, despite protests from UNHCR. Bhutanese Some 30,000 ethnic Nepalese refugees from Bhutan fled to India beginning in 1991. Under the terms of the Indo-Bhutanese friendship treaty of 1950, India allowed Bhutanese to live and work freely in India. Therefore, the Indian government did not assist the Bhutanese or require them to live in camps. However, because the Bhutanese in India fled Bhutan and remained outside their country for the same reasons as Bhutanese refugees in Nepal, USCR considered them to be refugees. During the year, Bhutanese refugees living in Nepal attempted a number of "peace marches" from the Nepal-India border to the India-Bhutan border. The marchers, led by a group called Appeal Movement Coordination Council, reportedly wanted to make their way to Thimpu, the Bhutanese capital, to ask Bhutan's king to permit the Bhutanese refugees in Nepal to repatriate. Few of the marchers made it very far, however. On most occasions, the Indian authorities blocked the marches and arrested the marchers, usually charging them with violation of Section 144 of the Indian Penal Code, which prohibits more than five people to gather in one place if the police have ordered them to disperse. On some occasions, Indian police reportedly beat the marchers. The Indian authorities arrested 258 marchers on January 3, 150 on January 17, and 343 on February 27. Indian courts ordered 150 of the refugees released unconditionally on February 28. The authorities released all the other refugees in detention within a few days. The marches continued, however. The Indian authorities arrested marchers several times between March and June. On April 22, the authorities reportedly beat 15 detainees; in late June, one arrested marcher died while in custody. On July 5, the courts again ordered the release of the detained refugees. The authorities released 791 detainees. On July 15, in response to a question from a member of the Indian parliament, the Indian minister of external affairs said that the marchers were seeking to "agitate the matter of their status" and that it was "the consistent policy of the government of not allowing [sic] political activities on Indian soil directed against friendly countries." The minister acknowledged that one detainee, whom he said was "suffering from tuberculosis," died at Berhampur Central Jail. The only group of peace marchers actually to reach Bhutan arrived there on August 15. However, the Bhutanese authorities returned the group to India soon afterward. Late in the year, a number of peace marchers attempted to establish refugee camps close to the IndoBhutanese border in West Bengal. The Indian government closed the camps and attempted to force the Bhutanese back to Nepal. The Nepalese authorities initially resisted the refugees' return. During the five days when the Nepalese and Indian border authorities negotiated whether the refugees would be allowed to re-enter Nepal, peace marchers blocked the bridge across the Mechi River that borders India. "Urban" Refugees UNHCR also recognized some 18,600 Afghans and 600 persons of various other nationalities, including 243 Somalis, 195 Iranians, and 84 Sudanese, as refugees. These 19,200 so-called urban refugees, who mostly lived in and around Delhi (reportedly at the Indian government's insistence) were the only refugees in India to whom UNHCR had full access. In part because India had no national legislation regarding refugees, the Indian government did not grant even the UNHCR-recognized refugees any legal status, nor did it permit them to work. It did, however, permit them to stay, though it required them to renew their residence permits yearly. One source noted that the absence of any laws regarding refugees in a country that "is a country of laws," posed a serious problem for refugees. The director of SAHRDC added, "There is an urgent need to influence drafting of a consistent legal framework to deal with the refugees and internally displaced persons to prevent political ad-hoc-ism and forcible repatriation." More than 14,000 of the Afghans arrived in India in 1993 and early 1994. An estimated 60 percent were Hindi-speakers whose families had migrated to Afghanistan from present-day India. UNHCR initially provided cash assistance to 12,500 of the refugees and arranged for 6,200 to receive primary education. In 1994, UNHCR terminated assistance to about 6,000 of the refugees, some of whom it gave a one-time, lump-sum grant intended to help them develop their own income generating activities. UNHCR based its decision to terminate assistance to many of the urban refugees on a study that the agency conducted in 1993 that indicated that many of the refugees were living in good conditions. During 1996, UNHCR began terminating assistance to some non-Afghan refugees. SAHRDC reported that two refugees whose assistance was terminated committed suicide in despair. It said that one, a 27-year-old Afghan woman, burned herself to death at the back gate of the UNHCR office in New Delhi. In April and May, a number of Burmese urban refugees staged a sit-in and hunger strike outside the UNHCR office to protest the agency's plans to terminate their assistance and give them lump-sum grants. According to a 1995 report by SAHRDC, UNHCR's cash assistance was "insufficient to meet basic necessities." The report added, "Rent rates are high and consume a considerable amount of...[refugees' cash assistance] leaving very little for food, clothing, and other necessities." SAHRDC also criticized the lump-sum selfsufficiency grants, saying that the sum offered was "too meager to establish any business or develop selfsufficiency." UNHCR said that one year after giving the lump- sum grants, it reviewed the progress of refugees who received them. It found that many had done well, that some needed extra help, which UNHCR gave, and that others were not doing well and UNHCR had reinstated their assistance. UNHCR said that 5,000 urban refugees continued to receive assistance at the end of the year. Internal Displacement In recent years, an estimated 250,000 Kashmiris, mostly Hindus but including some Muslims and Sikhs, have been displaced from their homes in predominantly Muslim Kashmir. They were displaced by communal violence, fighting between Indian government forces and Kashmiri Muslim insurgents who seek independence or union with Pakistan, and widespread human rights abuses by both sides. A majority of the displaced lived in camps, primarily around Jammu and Delhi, that reportedly lacked even basic amenities. According to Human Rights Watch, both the Indian security forces and militant organizations in Kashmir continued to commit human rights abuses against civilians during the year. In May, UPI reported that inter-ethnic violence between ethnic Bodos and Santhals in Assam state had also displaced as many as 150,000 Santhals, but USCR was unable to obtain further confirmation of the report. Other reports suggested that a number of persons had also been displaced in Manipur state as a result of inter-ethnic strife between Nagas and Kukis, but information about the number displaced was not available.
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