U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 1997 - Lebanon

Although hundreds of thousands of civilians from southern Lebanon were displaced temporarily in April as a result of attacks from Israel, Lebanon in 1996 generally continued to recover from 17 years of endemic violence and civil war that ended in 1991. Although the Lebanese economy and security situation were progressing well despite the setback of the Israeli offensive in April, the situation of Lebanon's 352,668 UNRWA-registered Palestinian refugees showed no improvement, and Lebanon made little progress in returning about 450,000 long-term internally displaced persons to their homes. Palestinian Refugees In addition to the UNRWA-registered refugees, another 42,000 unregistered Palestinians live in Lebanon. About 22,000 of these trace their exile to the 1967 War, and therefore fall outside the UNRWA refugee definition. Another 20,000 are considered to be of Lebanese origin, but call themselves Palestinians. Although the quality of life in Lebanon generally improved in 1996, the socio-economic conditions for Palestinians remained stagnant. However, Palestinians in Lebanon at least were spared the violence of previous years. An exception occurred in April when Israel fired rockets into the Ein el Hilweh refugee camp during its offensive against the Hizbullah in southern Lebanon. Nevertheless, even then, while hundreds of thousands of Lebanese were displaced by Israeli shelling, most of the 172,000 Palestinians living in the conflict area did not leave. Since Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the Declaration of Principles in September 1993, the Lebanese government has often stated that it will not accept the permanent resettlement of Palestinians. The government told the Multilateral Working Group on Refugees that Palestinians could not be assimilated in Lebanon due to the delicate political situation there. The government proposed that Palestinians originally from the West Bank and Gaza Strip should return there, and that Palestinians should move to other neighboring states via family reunification. The remainder, the Lebanese government contends, should be resettled in countries willing to accept them. Lebanon has suggested that 25 to 30 percent of its resident Palestinians should go to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 40 percent should go to the Gulf states, Iraq, and Syria, and the rest should emigrate to the United States, Canada, and Australia. The legal status of most Palestinians in Lebanon remained uncertain in 1996. The Lebanese government has generally rejected the option of permanent status for Palestinians, though unofficially, about 28,000 to 30,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon appear to have been granted Lebanese citizenship (citizenship is not a factor that bears on UNRWA's definition of refugee status). In response to the expulsion of Palestinians from Libya in 1995, many of whom carried Lebanese laissezpassers, the Lebanese interior ministry issued a decree in September 1995 requiring that Palestinians residing abroad obtain entry visas in advance before re-entering the country with Lebanese travel documents. During 1996, Lebanon reportedly canceled Lebanese travel papers for Palestinian refugees from Lebanon who, while outside the country, had obtained passports from other countries for travel purposes. The Lebanese authorities canceled the records of about 16,500 such refugees, according to press reports. The Lebanese government has imposed employment restrictions on most Palestinian professionals, and on commercial activity. Many Palestinians, therefore, were working illegally in 1996, although the Lebanese authorities cracked down on Palestinian illegal employment during the year. Most Palestinians who are able to find jobs work as unskilled laborers. Many Palestinians in Lebanon also lost income as a result of the loss of remittances from family members working in Kuwait and other Gulf states, as well as the departure of the many offices of the PLO from the country, and the consequent inability of the PLO to pay indemnities to the "families of martyrs." Deteriorating Camp Conditions Conditions deteriorated in the 12 refugee camps in Lebanon during the year due, in part, to Lebanese government interference with efforts to reconstruct damaged camp housing and infrastructure, UNRWA's tight budget constraints, and the cessation of aid for basic services from the PLO. Decent housing continued to be a critical and, at times, unmet need for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The government prohibits UNRWA from reconstructing totally destroyed Palestinian refugee camps, such as Tel Za'atar, Jisr el Basha, Nabatiyeh, and upper Mieh Mieh. The agency is also forbidden to build houses on empty lots outside the camps. Limited funding also prevented UNRWA from meeting Palestinian housing needs during the year. Poor living conditions were also reflected in UNRWA's caseload of special hardship cases, which accounted for 10 percent of all UNRWA-registered refugees in Lebanon, the highest percentage in any of the areas of UNRWA operation. UNRWA reported that the massive displacement of Lebanese civilians in April disrupted its operations as well. Because some UNRWA schools were used as temporary shelters for displaced persons, the school year had to be extended to make up for lost time. Palestinian refugee children were not allowed to attend Lebanese public schools, and half of the UNRWA schools operated on double shifts. Nearly half of UNRWA schools were located on unsatisfactory rented properties, and UNRWA used prefabricated classrooms to cope with overcrowding. Palestinians were not entitled to seek health services from public hospitals (unless UNRWA agreed to cover the costs) and therefore relied on UNRWA clinics for primary and secondary health care. UNRWA's budget constraints caused a decline in services provided during the year. Due to the high cost of hospitalization, UNRWA limited referrals, reduced hospital stays, and implemented cost-sharing for specialized care with those hospitals with which it had contractual arrangements. To demonstrate the disaffection of many Palestinian refugees in Lebanon with the peace process being conducted by the PLO with Israel, all of the refugee camps in southern Lebanon, except al-Rashidiyya, which is pro-Arafat, called general strikes on January 20 to protest the Palestinian Authority elections taking place that day in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The authorities maintained an uneasy standoff throughout the year concerning Abu-Mohjen, the head of a Palestinian splinter group, "Band of Supporters" (Osbet al-Ansar), accused of involvement in a political assassination of a Sunni religious cleric in 1995. He fled into the Ein el-Hilweh refugee camp. In early January 1996, the Lebanese Council of Ministers said it would enter the camp to arrest Abu-Mohjen, but did not do so. In September, a gun battle erupted inside Ein el-Hilweh between Abu-Mohjen's group and PLO members. By year's end, however, Abu-Mohjen remained at large, an indication that, despite their rhetoric, the Lebanese authorities still did not exert control inside Palestinian refugee camps. Other Refugees UNHCR recognized 2,408 refugees in Lebanon in 1996. The majority, totaling 1,385, were Iraqis. UNHCR also registered as mandate refugees 550 Afghans, 214 Sudanese, 127 Somalis, and 132 of other nationalities. Only 13 percent of UNHCR's caseload were female. During the year, 86 refugees were resettled in third countries, including 77 Iraqis. UNHCR reported that in two cases, refugees voluntarily left Lebanon during the year, although neither returned to the country of origin. One, a Somali, was able to establish Yemenite citizenship based on ancestry in that country, and went to Yemen; the other, a stateless Palestinian widow and her six children, went to Iraq as their country of first asylum. The government agency responsible for foreigners, the Surete General, not only issues passports and residency permits, but also runs a detention facility where hundreds of foreigners are held pending deportation. Conditions in the facility are reportedly poor. Temporary Internal Displacement On April 11, Israel launched Operation Grapes of Wrath, a heavy aerial and artillery bombardment of southern Lebanon, principally of Shi'ite areas from which the Hizbullah militia had launched Katyusha rockets into Israel. Israel warned civilians to leave the area as it escalated its attacks. In short order, between 200,000 and 400,000 became temporarily displaced. Despite Israeli claims of capacity for pinpoint precision bombing, the pattern of attack suggested that targets were not limited to Hizbullah military installations. Rather, shelling and bombardment were expanded in what appeared to be a strategy of fomenting generalized hardship, destruction, and chaos as a means of forcing the Lebanese government to assert greater control over the Hizbullah militia. That strategy also appeared geared toward creating a wave of displaced civilians from southern Lebanon, thereby causing disruption throughout southern and central Lebanon, including Beirut. Bombing targets ranged northward, well outside of Hizbullah-controlled areas, including a power plant on the outskirts of Beirut. Water pumping and electricity were disrupted in many areas, bridges were destroyed, and roads made impassable. The coastal highway was also pockmarked with craters, hit by shelling from the Israeli warships blockading Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut. In the first days of the shelling, on April 13, an ambulance carrying four children and two women was hit by a rocket fired from an Israeli helicopter gunship, killing all six. Most of the displaced moved northward along the coast to the Sidon region and greater Beirut, either seeking shelter with friends and relatives or staying in public shelters, such as schools and social centers. According to ICRC, about 60,000 remained within the war zone, often because of elderly or infirm family members who were unable to move. About 7,000 people in the south took refuge inside UN compounds, according to UNIFIL (United Nations International Forces in Lebanon). On April 18, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) shelled one such UN compound at Qana, killing 102 displaced civilians who had sought shelter there. Israel said that the attack was a mistake. The next day, April 19, USCR wrote to the Israeli government raising questions about the attack. Noting Israel's immediate characterization of the attack as "a tragic mistake," USCR nevertheless questioned Israeli rhetoric and actions leading up to the attack. The letter cited Israeli chief of staff, Gen. Amnon Shahak, saying, "We will not hesitate to attack Hizbullah targets even if they are in the middle of the civilian population, which we would like to spare." This, said USCR, "did not assure us that sufficient steps were being taken to avoid the type of tragedy that did, in fact, occur." The USCR letter went on to say, "It also seems evident that Hizbullah was not being exclusively and directly targeted in this campaign, as the bombings of Beirut demonstrate. This suggests a willingness on the part of the Israeli government to create heavy hardships for the civilian population of Lebanon as the strategy for stopping Hizbullah shelling of northern Israel." In addition to calling upon the Israeli authorities to stop firing on civilian populations, USCR said, "We also hope that your government will explicitly give a green light to the civilians that you warned to leave southern Lebanon that it is safe for them to return. Otherwise, 200,000 to 400,000 people are likely to remain displaced, with all of the problems associated with displacement." On May 1, the Israeli government responded to USCR, saying that the Israeli attacks were an exercise of its "legitimate right of self defense" in response to the firing of about 600 Katyusha rockets into northern Israel between February and early April. The UN later issued a report concluding that the attack on Qana was not due to technical or human error. The report documented that 11 shells hit in or above the compound and four more nearby, and that the attack moved progressively away from the Katyusha rocket launching sites toward the compound, suggesting targeting rather than misfires. On April 26, Israel and Lebanon consented to an unsigned cease-fire by which both sides agreed that armed groups in Lebanon would not fire mortars or other weapons into Israel and that Israel would not target civilian populations in Lebanon. Both sides agreed that civilian-populated areas would not be used as launching grounds for attacks on the other. The agreement established a multilateral group, the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group, to monitor the agreement. Its members are the United States, France, Syria, Israel, and Lebanon. In the final tally on Grapes of Wrath, Amnesty International cited official Israeli media sources as saying that the IDF fired 25,132 artillery rounds into Lebanon and that the Israeli air force flew 2,350 sorties, about half of which hit targets. According to those Israeli sources, the Hizbullah fired 746 rockets, of which 533 hit Israel, injuring 62 civilians and two soldiers, but killing none. Amnesty cited Lebanese military records as saying that 154 Lebanese civilians and 11 combatants were killed, and that 351 Lebanese civilians were injured. Long-Term Displacement Lebanon's civil war caused the violent fragmentation of a pluralistic society into fairly distinct sectarian areas. At the height of the civil war, as many as a million people were internally displaced, and many people were often displaced briefly during the course of the war. A UNDP study in 1995 found that 90,000 families or 450,000 persons were still displaced from the civil war period. The study indicated the places of origin, as well as the present location of the displaced. The majority, 62 percent (35,012 families), originated in the Mount Lebanon governorate; a smaller majority of the displaced, 52.7 percent (29,826 families) were remaining in the Mount Lebanon area in 1995. Another 23.7 percent (8,920 families) were displaced from southern Lebanon, yet only 15.8 percent of the displaced (8,920 families), were living there in 1995. Although only 7.7 percent (4,336 families) originated in Beirut, a larger 20.2 percent (11,419 families) were living there in 1995, indicating migration into Beirut from other parts of the country, most likely the south. In other regions, displacement did not seem to take as great a toll. Only 4.2 percent of the displaced (2,367 families) originated in northern Lebanon, where, in 1995, 3.7 percent (2,124 families) were living. The Beka'a valley accounted for 2.3 percent (1,315 families) of the civil war displaced, and in 1995 represented 5.8 percent (3,293 families) of the total. Many of the displaced are among the poorest in Lebanese society. The poorest of the homeless, called Muhajjaran, mass along the banks of the Awwali and Zahrani rivers in makeshift shelters in unsanitary conditions. In most cases, however, internally displaced Lebanese have found shelter with friends and family, but often live in overcrowded conditions. The UNDP study found that 45,000 of the displaced families were living in other people's houses, and that another 12,000 families were living in places unfit for habitation. A government ministry, the Ministry of Displaced Persons, headed by Druze leader Walid Jumblat, has been charged with overseeing the return of displaced persons. The ministry reported that about 70,000 of the displaced families are actively seeking return. There are still many obstacles to return, however, including limited government funding, destroyed infrastructure, lack of schools and jobs, and fear for physical security in the areas they left. In the weeks preceding parliamentary elections in August and September, the National Assembly hotly debated the question of where and how displaced persons would vote. Many Christians who were displaced from the Chouf district in the southern part of the Mount Lebanon governorate during the civil war have not been able to return. In the 1992 elections, many Christians from the Chouf Mountains did not vote because they were afraid to go to polling stations in the villages from which they had fled, although many other Christians boycotted those elections as well. In 1996, those formerly Christian villages were largely occupied by the Druze minority, which is concentrated in the Chouf Mountains; many of the Druze who were displaced have been able to return, in large part due to Jumblat's intercession. To resolve the situation, separate polling stations were established in east Beirut to enable Christians displaced from the Chouf Mountains to cast votes without requiring them to return to their original villages.
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