Freedom in the World 2004 - Egypt

Political Rights: 6
Civil Liberties: 6
Status: Not Free
Population: 7,210,000
GNI/Capita: $1,530
Life Expectancy: 68
Religious Groups: Muslim [mostly Sunni] (94 percent), Coptic Christian and other (6 percent)
Ethnic Groups: Eastern Hamitic stock [Egyptian, Bedouin, Berber] (99 percent), other (1 percent)
Capital: Cairo

Overview

In the face of mounting economic problems, the war in Iraq, and American calls for democratization in the Arab world, Egypt witnessed a growing chorus of demands for political change by academics, journalists, and political opposition leaders in 2003. Although the government cracked down on unauthorized demonstrations during the year, it introduced a number of limited reforms and tolerated more open public discussion of the country's political future.

Egypt formally gained independence from Great Britain in 1922 and acquired full sovereignty following the end of World War II. After leading a coup that overthrew the monarchy in 1954, Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser established a repressive police state, which he ruled until his death in 1970. The constitution adopted in 1971 under his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, established a strong presidential political system with nominal guarantees for most political and civil rights that were not fully respected in practice.

Following the assassination of Sadat in 1981, Hosni Mubarak became president and declared a state of emergency, which he has since renewed every three years (most recently in February 2003). The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) dominates the tightly controlled political system. In the early 1990s, Islamic fundamentalist groups launched a violent insurgency, prompting the government to jail thousands of suspected dissidents and crack down on political dissent. Although the armed infrastructure of Egyptian Islamist groups had been largely eradicated by 1998, the government continued to restrict political and civil liberties.

High levels of economic growth in the late 1990s temporarily alleviated the underlying socioeconomic problems, particularly poverty and high unemployment among college graduates, that appeared to fuel broader public support for Islamist militancy. However, the country has experienced an economic slowdown over the last three years. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, foreign exchange earnings from tourism revenue, oil sales, Suez Canal receipts, and expatriate remittances have declined and foreign direct investment has fallen.

Egypt's economic problems became even more acute in 2003. In late January, the government abandoned its "managed peg" currency regime and adopted a floating exchange rate, causing the pound to depreciate substantially during the course of the year. This devaluation, along with a reduction of subsidies on basic commodities, sparked an estimated 10 to 20 percent increase in the cost of living. In September, the World Bank's country director in Egypt warned that the poverty rate may be increasing for the first time since the mid-1990s.

Economic reforms needed to attract foreign investment have progressed slowly because of fears that austerity measures will undermine political stability. In June, U.S. trade representative Robert Zoellick stated that Egypt had "a long way to go" before it became a serious candidate for a free trade agreement with the United States because of the government's failure to undertake reforms in areas such as intellectual property protection, customs regulations, money laundering, taxation, and privatization. High-profile corruption trials of former government officials and businessmen continued in 2003, but critics allege that the anticorruption campaign has spared leading politicians.

The government's stated position of neutrality in the conflict between Iraq and the U.S.-led coalition exacerbated public anger. In the weeks leading up to the coalition invasion of Iraq in March, small-scale rallies ostensibly organized to protest the war became venues for protesting the government's performance at home. The authorities reacted by deploying riot police to contain illegal demonstrations and arresting dozens of activists suspected of organizing them, while allowing a number of docile, officially sanctioned antiwar rallies. After an estimated 20,000 people gathered in Cairo on the first day of the war to demonstrate against the invasion, thousands of riot police were deployed to prevent a repeat, using water cannons, truncheons, and dogs to disperse demonstrators. Hundreds of people were injured and around 800 were detained, including two members of parliament. Several dozen people arrested during and after the rally were held without charge for weeks.

After the fall of Baghdad, the government initiated a series of limited reforms, such as the abolition of state security courts and hard-labor prison sentences; initiated a wide-ranging dialogue with legal opposition parties; and tolerated more open discussion of previously taboo topics. However, there were few signs that far-reaching political change is on the horizon.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

Egyptians cannot change their government democratically. As a result of government restrictions on the licensing of political parties, state control over television and radio stations, and systemic irregularities in the electoral process, the 454-seat People's Assembly (Majlis al-Sha'b), or lower house of parliament, is perpetually dominated by the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), as is the partially elected upper house, the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura), which functions only in an advisory capacity. There is no competitive process for the election of the president; the public is entitled only to confirm in a national referendum the candidate nominated by the People's Assembly for a six-year term. The assembly has limited influence on government policy, and the executive initiates almost all legislation. The president directly appoints the prime minister, the cabinet, and the governors of Egypt's 26 provinces.

Political opposition in Egypt remains weak and ineffective. A ban on religious parties prevents the Muslim Brotherhood and other mainstream Islamists from organizing politically, although they typically compete in elections as independents or members of secular parties. Political parties cannot be established without the approval of the Political Parties Committee (PPC), an NDP-controlled body affiliated with the Consultative Council. The PPC has approved the formation of only two new political parties in the last 21 years and routinely rejects applications. Most recently, in November, it denied an application by the Social Constitution Party.

Freedom of the press is limited. The government owns and operates all ground-broadcast television stations. Although three private satellite television stations have been established since 2001, their owners have ties to the government and their programming is subject to state influence. In October, Dream TV, owned by business mogul Ahmed Bahgat, canceled a program on well-known political thinker Muhammad Hassanein Heikal after government officials objected to its content. All radio stations are owned by the government, with the exception of two stations owned by a private company, Nile Radio Production, that were allowed to begin broadcasting in the summer of 2003. However, those two stations received licenses only on the condition that they restrict their programming to entertainment. Egypt's three leading daily newspapers are state controlled, and their editors are appointed by the president. The government encourages legal political parties to publish newspapers and exercises indirect control over them through its monopoly on printing and distribution, but heavily restricts licensing of nonpartisan newspapers. Strictly speaking, only foreign publications are subject to direct government censorship, but most privately owned publications, such as the English-language Cairo Times, have been forced to register abroad (usually in Cyprus) and are therefore subject to censorship.

Press freedom is further restricted by vaguely worded statutes in the Press Law, the Publications Law, the penal code, and libel laws. Direct criticism of the president, his family, or the military can result in the imprisonment of journalists and the closure of publications. Discussion of tensions between Muslims and Christians in Egypt and expression of views regarded as anti-Islamic are also proscribed. In June, two journalists convicted of slander in 1998 lost their appeal and began serving oneyear prison sentences, but they were released three weeks later pending the outcome of a petition by the press syndicate. Later that month, the weekly newspaper of the Takaful party, Al-Sadaa, was suspended, apparently because of its harsh anti-American diatribes, although no reason was given. The government does not significantly restrict or monitor Internet use, but publication of material on the Internet has been prosecuted under the same statutes as regular press offenses. Academic freedom is generally respected in Egypt, though professors have been prosecuted for political and human rights advocacy outside of the classroom.

Islam is the state religion, and the government directly controls most mosques, appoints their preachers and other staff, and closely monitors the content of sermons. It is presently implementing a plan to establish control over thousands of small, unauthorized mosques (known as zawaya) located in residential buildings. Most Egyptians are Sunni Muslim, but Coptic Christians constitute less than 6 percent of the population, and there are small numbers of Jews, Shiite Muslims, and Baha'is. Although non-Muslims are generally able to worship freely, the government has seized church-owned property and frequently denies permission to build or repair churches. Muslim extremists have carried out several killings of Coptic villagers in recent years and frequently burn or vandalize Coptic homes, businesses, and churches.

Freedom of assembly and association is heavily restricted. Organizers of public demonstrations, rallies, and protests must receive advance approval from the Ministry of the Interior, which is rarely granted. Hundreds of people who attended illegal demonstrations during the year were arrested and detained by State Security Intelligence (SSI) personnel. A new law regulating nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) went into effect in 2003.The Law of Associations prohibits the establishment of associations "threatening national unity [or] violating public morals," prohibits NGOs from receiving foreign grants without the approval of the Ministry of Social Affairs (which generally blocks funding to human rights defenders and advocates of political reform), requires members of NGO governing boards to be approved by the ministry, and allows the ministry to dissolve NGOs without a judicial order. In June, two existing human rights groups were denied registration under the new law – the New Woman Research Center (NWRC) and the Land Center for Human Rights (LCHR). Although an administrative court subsequently overruled the ministry's decision to reject NWRC's application, it is not yet clear whether the ministry will respect this judgment. Some groups have avoided the new NGO restrictions by registering as law firms or civil companies.

In April 2003, the People's Assembly approved sweeping changes to Egypt's socialist-era labor laws. Under the previous laws, workers were prohibited from striking, but enjoyed virtually absolute job protection – an employee who had held his job for over a year could not be legally terminated unless he committed a "grave" breach of his contract obligations. In practice, however, these laws were not enforced outside of the public sector. Private business owners, with the collusion of government regulators, circumvented the rules by not providing their workers with employment contracts or making them sign undated letters of resignation before being hired. According to one study, 82 percent of the jobs added between 1988 and 1998 in the private, nonagricultural sector in Egypt were not protected by a formal employment contract. The new Unified Labor Law allows employers to lay off workers, with compensation, and lifts the ban on strikes. However, the new law requires that strikes be approved by two-thirds of a union's members and limits the right to strike to "nonstrategic" industries. The government-backed Egyptian Trade Union Federation remains the only legal labor federation.

Egypt's regular judiciary is widely considered the most independent and impartial in the Arab world. The Supreme Judicial Council, a supervisory body of senior judges, nominates and assigns most judges. However, political and security cases are usually placed under the jurisdiction of exceptional courts that are controlled by the executive branch and deny defendants many constitutional protections. The State Security Courts, responsible for trying most defendants charged with political offenses, were abolished in June. However, the government also changed the penal code to grant prosecutors in regular cases most of the extraordinary powers that once resided with these courts. For example, prosecutors now have the authority of investigating judges and can detain individuals for up to six months without charge.

Two exceptional court systems remain in place. The Emergency State Security Courts, empowered to try defendants charged with violating decrees promulgated under the Emergency Law, issues verdicts that cannot be appealed and are subject to ratification by the president. Although judges are usually selected from the civilian judiciary, they are appointed directly by the president. Since 1992, civilians charged with terrorism and other security-related offenses have often been referred by the president to military courts. Since military judges are appointed by the executive branch to short, renewable, two-year terms, these tribunals lack independence. Verdicts by military courts are subject to review only by a body of military judges and the president. Moreover, evidence produced by the prosecution in cases before the military courts often consists of little more than the testimony of security officers and informers. Allegations of forced confessions by defendants are routine.

Although Egyptian officials said in mid-2003 that henceforth only terrorism and other security-related offenses will be tried in emergency courts, this pledge has not been upheld. Ashraf Ibrahim, a vocal opposition activist who helped expose police brutality during the March demonstrations, was arrested in April and detained for four months before being charged in the emergency courts with, among other things, "weakening the prestige of the state by disseminating false information."

The Emergency Law restricts many basic rights. Its provisions allow for the arrest and prolonged detention without charge of suspects deemed a threat to national security. In November 2002, the UN Committee against Torture concluded that there is "widespread evidence of torture and ill-treatment" of suspects by the SSI apparatus. According to local and international human rights organizations, at least three people died in 2003 as a result of suspected torture in police or SSI custody. The Emergency Law also empowers the government to wiretap telephones, intercept mail, and search persons and places without warrants. In mid-2003, parliament passed legislation weakening judicial oversight of wiretaps.

Local and international human rights organizations estimate that more than 10,000 people are currently detained without charge on suspicion of security or political offenses, and that several thousand who have been convicted are serving sentences on such charges. In September, the government released several hundred members of the radical Islamist group Gemaa al-Islamiyya, but scores of other suspected Islamist militants were arrested during the year.

Although the constitution provides for equality of the sexes, some aspects of the law and many traditional practices discriminate against women. Unmarried women under the age of 21 are not permitted to obtain passports without permission from their fathers. Muslim female heirs receive half the amount of a male heir's inheritance (Christians are not subject to provisions of Islamic law governing inheritance matters). Domestic violence is common, and there are no laws against marital rape. Job discrimination is evident even in the civil service. The law provides for equal access to education, but the adult literacy rate of women lags behind that of men (34 and 63 percent, respectively). Female genital mutilation is practiced in Egypt, despite government efforts to eradicate it. In January, the government appointed Egypt's first-ever female judge. In September, the ruling NDP initiated legislation that will allow women who marry foreigners to pass Egyptian citizenship on to their children.