Freedom in the World 2001 - Yugoslavia

2001 Scores

Status: Partly Free
Freedom Rating: 4.0
Civil Liberties: 4
Political Rights: 4

Ratings Change

Yugoslavia's political rights and civil liberties ratings changed from 5 to 4 due to the overthrow of the Milosevic regime in October which swept to power a coalition of democratic forces that began improving various rights, including freedom of the press, the organization of elections, and the rule of law.

Overview

On October 5, 2000, the last of the great East European revolutions against communism took place in Belgrade, as a massive show of "people power" led to the overthrow of the Milosevic regime. With the Serbian opposition's victory, the political and social atmosphere in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was transformed. The overthrow of the Milosevic regime also had important effects on regional stability, as the new leadership in Belgrade, led by FRY president Vojislav Kostunica, quickly began to normalize relations with the country's neighbors.

The FRY was proclaimed by two republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in April 1992, after the latter disintegrated in 1991. Although formally the FRY had had a multiparty system, Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) had an unfair advantage over the democratic opposition as a result of its control over the country's security forces, financial and monetary institutions, and the state-owned media. During the 1990s, however, Milosevic's control over the country slowly withered. The Serbian opposition's victory in municipal elections in the fall of 1996 resulted in the SPS's losing control of the main urban areas in the country. In 1997, Milosevic's key ally in Montenegro lost control over that republic to an independence-oriented coalition of parties. In 1999, NATO occupied one of the FRY's two autonomous provinces, Kosovo, after a 78-day bombing campaign devastated much of the FRY's industrial and transportational infrastructure.

Throughout the 1990s, FRY citizens watched as economic mismanagement, war, and international sanctions reduced their living standard by more than a third. An added burden on the economy was the presence of 750,000 Serb refugees from Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo in the FRY – proportionally, the largest refugee population in Europe.

The beginning of the end for the Milosevic regime came in January 2000, when the long-bickering members of the Serbian opposition ended their internal squabbling and joined forces in their efforts to remove Milosevic from power. Their cause was greatly aided by Milosevic himself in July, when he unilaterally decided to rewrite the FRY constitution. The new constitutional changes significantly reduced Montenegro's role in the federal government and introduced new provisions calling for the federal president to be henceforth elected by direct popular vote. The latter move proved to be the greatest miscalculation of Milosevic's political career.

In August, 18 different opposition parties united under the banner of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). DOS nominated Vojislav Kostunica, a 56-year-old constitutional lawyer and the leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) as its candidate to oppose Milosevic in the presidential elections scheduled for September 24. Despite an electoral campaign in which the regime had numerous unfair advantages over the opposition, Kostunica managed to score a first-round victory against Milosevic, winning just over 50 percent of the popular vote to Milosevic's 37 percent.

Milosevic nevertheless refused to admit defeat and scheduled a second-round runoff election for October. On October 4, the Federal Election Commission declared the entire election invalid and called for new elections, which would have kept Milosevic in power for an undetermined length of time. On October 5, however, approximately 1 million people from throughout Serbia converged on Belgrade to protest the regime's attempts to steal the election. Faced with this massive show of popular support for Kostunica, Milosevic's hitherto loyal security forces abandoned him, and on October 6 Milosevic publicly conceded to Kostunica.

The disintegration of the Milosevic regime was confirmed on December 23, when elections to the Serbian parliament resulted in a significant victory for the DOS; official results showed that the DOS had won approximately 64 percent of the votes cast, as opposed to 13 percent for Milosevic's SPS. The scale of the DOS's victory will allow the coalition to rewrite the Serbian constitution and eliminate many of its more authoritarian features. The DOS coalition itself, however, is likely to disintegrate at some point in 2001, which could lead to a period of political instability in the country and stymie further reform efforts.

Kostunica and the DOS coalition quickly set about developing new policies on both the domestic and international fronts. Kostunica has announced that his priorities as FRY president will be resolving the constitutional crisis between Serbia and Montenegro, promoting economic reform, and improving the FRY's external relations.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

Throughout the 1990s, the Milosevic regime used a variety of means to manipulate and falsify election results. The opposition's victory in the 1996 municipal elections was recognized only after three months of nightly demonstrations throughout the country. For most of the 1990s, opposition parties were routinely denied access to the main electronic media in the country, and the tabulation of votes was extremely suspect. Since the DOS has come to power, new documents have been released showing that Milosevic had in fact lost the December 1992 elections for the Serbian presidency to his challenger, the Serbian-American businessman Milan Panic. Despite these manipulations, however, opposition parties in the FRY were very active throughout the 1990s.

The DOS victory has considerably changed the situation in the FRY with regard to the electoral system. Foreign and domestic observers have claimed that Serbia's December parliamentary elections were the freest and fairest the country has ever had. Nevertheless, the media in the country did show a significant bias in favor of the DOS during the election campaign. Electoral reform is a top priority of the new authorities.

Cultural and ethnic minorities have their own political parties, media in their mother tongue, and other types of associations. After the DOS victory, a prominent Muslim politician from the Sandzak region, Dr. Rasim Ljajic, was named the federal government's minister for ethnic minorities. An important item on the new authorities' reform agenda is enacting constitutional and political reforms decentralizing power in Serbia and Montenegro to allow for more autonomy in places like the Sandzak, Vojvodina, and Kosovo.

According to the FRY constitution, all citizens enjoy freedom of religious belief and association. Ethnic and religious identities are closely intertwined in the region, however; consequently, increases in inter-ethnic tensions often take on the appearance of religious intolerance. Restitution of church property nationalized by the Communists remains a point of dispute between church and state. The main religious organization in the country, the Serbian Orthodox Church, is leading a campaign to reinstate religion classes in elementary schools. In Montenegro, a significant point of contention is the sometimes violent controversy between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the so-called Montenegrin Orthodox Church which is not recognized by other Orthodox churches.

FRY citizens enjoy freedom of association and assembly. In practice, however, these rights have often been circumscribed over the past decade. Opposition parties, independent trade unions, and nongovernmental organizations were persecuted and/or harassed in a variety of ways under the Milosevic regime. Upon coming to power in October, the democratic opposition quickly began drafting new laws and adopting new policies to protect the rights of these organizations.

Under the Milosevic regime, the FRY judiciary lost much of its independence. Nevertheless, many justices refused to bow to political pressure. In July 2000 more than a dozen judges who were known opposition sympathizers were removed from their positions. In late November, Nebojsa Simeunovic, a judge who had refused to issue warrants for the arrest of two opposition leaders on October 3, went missing; his body was found in the Danube several weeks later. The FRY judiciary has been criticized for especially harsh rulings against ethnic minorities, especially ethnic Albanians involved in violent opposition to FRY authorities, or other types of nationalist activism. After the DOS came to power, the Kostunica government ordered the release of hundreds of Albanians under arrest, including Dr. Flora Brovina, a well-known Albanian human rights activist.

Political terror, particularly in the form of assassinations and kidnappings, was a major problem in the FRY in 2000. In January, the Serb paramilitary leader and organized crime boss, Zeljko Raznjatovic-Arkan, was gunned down in a Belgrade hotel. In February, the federal defense minister, Pavle Bulatovic, was assassinated in a Belgrade restaurant. In June, a prominent opposition leader, Vuk Draskovic, was nearly assassinated on the Montenegrin coast. In August, Milosevic's one-time sponsor and subsequent political opponent, Ivan Stambolic, was kidnapped in Belgrade. A host of lesser figures in the Yugoslav underworld have also been killed. In most cases, the perpetrators of these crimes have never been found.

There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women in politics; however, they are in general vastly underrepresented in higher levels of government. Although women are legally entitled to equal pay for equal work, traditional patriarchal attitudes prevalent throughout the Balkans often limit women's roles in the economy. Domestic violence remains a serious problem.