1999 Scores

Status: Not Free
Freedom Rating: 5.5
Civil Liberties: 5
Political Rights: 6

Ratings Change

Egypt's civil liberties rating changed from 6 to 5 due to improvements in judicial independence, the release of political detainees, and a reduction in terrorist activity.

Overview

President Hosni Mubarak won a fourth six-year term in a referendum on September 26, 1999. Official figures put the turnout at 79 percent, with 94 percent voting in favor of the sole candidate. In a speech to parliament after his swearing in, Mubarak identified economic and social stability as his primary goals but gave no indication that he would work to reform Egypt's highly centralized and repressive political system.

Egypt gained formal independence from Great Britain in 1922, though the latter continued to exercise gradually dwindling control until its surrender of the Suez Canal Zone in 1956. Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser became head of state in 1954 after leading a coup that overthrew the monarchy, and ruled until his death in 1970. A constitution adopted in 1971 under Nasser's successor, Anwar al-Sadat, grants full executive powers to the president, who is nominated by the 454-member People's Assembly and elected to a six-year term in a national referendum. Sadat was assassinated by Islamic militants in 1981 for making peace with Israel. Under Mubarak, the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) continues to dominate a tightly-controlled political system.

In the spring of 1992, the radical Gama'at Islamiya (Islamic Group) tapped into popular discontent over official corruption, high unemployment, and widespread poverty. It escalated its attacks on the police, Coptic Christians, and tourists in a campaign to establish an Islamic republic by force. The government's response has been the brutal repression of all forms of political dissent. Thousands of suspected militants have been tried and jailed without due process safeguards, and more than 70 political prisoners have been executed under special military courts set up to handle terrorist offenses. The nonviolent Muslim Brotherhood, a fundamentalist movement dating from the 1920s that is officially outlawed but generally tolerated, has been a particular target because of its popularity.

Years of repression appear to have neutralized the threat of Islamic extremism, and ideological rifts and policy disputes within the Gama'at Islamiya and the Muslim Brotherhood have left both groups divided and largely ineffective. Popular support for militants has eroded as a result of their greater emphasis on violence than on alternative policies. In addition, Egypt's rapidly growing economy has mitigated some of the discontent that fueled the spread of militant Islam. In March 1999, the Gama'at announced the end of its armed campaign against the government, which responded by releasing more than 1,000 of its members from prison.

Despite a dramatic decline in Islamist violence since the massacre of 62 people at Luxor in 1997, the threat of unrest still exists. Unemployment is estimated to be between 10 and 30 percent, and some 23 percent of Egyptians officially live below the poverty line. There is growing frustration with rampant corruption and the government's lack of respect for political and civil rights. A restrictive law on NGOs in May drew angry criticism from domestic and international human rights groups and prompted three activists to begin a hunger strike. Just prior to the presidential referendum in September, opposition parties circulated a petition calling for an end to emergency law, constitutional reform, the release of political prisoners, free elections, and the right to set up political parties. Meanwhile, arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, and summary justice against political opponents continue, and the more radical Islamist al-Jihad (holy war) vows to continue its war against the government.

Mubarak's new government reflects his commitment to economic reform. In October, he appointed former public enterprise minister Atef Obeid to the post of prime minister and publicly demanded that the government uphold higher standards of honesty, openness, and concern for the poor. Obeid, who spearheaded Egypt's semisuccessful privatization program, announced plans to decentralize decisionmaking by giving ministers greater policy-shaping roles and by moving oversight of 16 state agencies out of the prime minister's office. Although Cairo's stock market reacted to the new government with optimism, political opponents see little hope for greater political openness. The 32-member cabinet retains the previous government's ministers of defense, foreign affairs, economy, interior, and information.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

Egyptians cannot change their government democratically. The constitution does not allow for a presidential election. Instead, the elected People's Assembly nominates one candidate to be confirmed in a national referendum. Parliamentary elections in 1995 were characterized by widespread fraud and irregularity. The assembly has limited influence in economic, security, and foreign policy. Almost all legislation is initiated by the executive. The 264-member Shura Council, or upper house of parliament, has no legislative authority; its role is restricted to issuing opinions and reports on topics of its choosing. The NDP dominates the People's Assembly, the Shura Council, and local governments.

The Egyptian political opposition remains weak and ineffective. Requests to form political parties are routinely denied by the NDP-controlled Political Parties Committee (PPC), usually because their platforms are "unoriginal." The PPC has not allowed the establishment of a single party in at least 20 years. There are 14 legal political parties, but the NDP uses the political parties law and other restrictions to impede opposition activities and access to media. Security agents have reportedly infiltrated opposition parties to encourage infighting. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood may not compete in elections because of a ban on religion-based parties. They may run individually as independents, but they are often rounded up and arrested prior to elections.

The Emergency Law has been in effect since Sadat's assassination in 1981 and is up for renewal every three years. Its provisions allow for the arrest without charge of suspected opponents of the regime as well as their families and acquaintances. Amnesty International contends that thousands of suspects are currently in custody without charge. Torture, poor prison conditions, and lack of adequate food and medical care are pervasive. According to the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR), five people died in police stations between February and July 1999 as a result of torture by police. Another was reportedly tortured to death in October. Police are rarely held accountable for such cases. In May, charges were dropped against four police officers implicated in the arrest and torture of nearly 1,200 Christians in the fall of 1998.

The Egyptian judiciary operates with limited independence. The president appoints both the general prosecutor and the head of the court of cassation, Egypt's highest court. Law 47/1972 allows the justice minister to interfere with judicial rulings at will. Under Law 25/1996, the president may refer civilian cases to military courts. Since 1992, suspected Gama'at Islamiya and Muslim Brotherhood activists have been tried in military courts, where due process rights are severely curtailed. There is no appellate process for verdicts by military courts; instead, verdicts are subject to review by other military judges and confirmed by the president. While Gama'at convicts are frequently executed, Muslim Brothers have never been sentenced to death. In April, a military court sentenced nine members of Al-Jihad to death in absentia for belonging to the militant group. In one positive development, two Muslim Brothers detained in the 1950s were awarded $9,000 each by a Cairo court for physical and mental torture suffered in prison. In another, a higher administrative court in August annulled a presidential order to send 77 suspected Islamist militants to a military trial, calling the case a civil one.

The Press Law, the Publications Law, the Penal Code, and libel laws all restrict press freedom. Criticism of the president, the government, and foreign heads of state may result in heavy fines or imprisonment. The government owns stock in the three major daily newspapers, and the president appoints their editors in chief. The government also monopolizes the printing and distribution of newspapers. Opposition parties publish newspapers with government subsidies. The information ministry owns and operates all broadcast media. At least 12 journalists were charged in 1999 with such offenses as libeling government officials and spreading "false information harmful to public interests." In August, three journalists with the opposition newspaper Al-Shaab were fined and sentenced to two years in prison for libeling the deputy prime minister. In June, the managing editor of Al-Arabi was sacked under pressure from the prime minister for opposing government policies.

The interior ministry may withhold approval for public demonstrations under emergency law. The ministry of social affairs has broad powers to merge and dissolve NGOs. Those powers were expanded in May with the passage of a new law on associations, which prohibits NGOs from engaging in "political activity," requires NGOs to receive government approval for all forms of funding, and gives the government the power to approve candidates to NGO boards and to dissolve NGOs for not accomplishing their purposes. In August, the government banned the activities of the Sudanese Organization for Human Rights after it published a report alleging an active slave trade in Sudan. In July, the ministry of social affairs prohibited the establishment of the Egyptian Women's Union on the grounds that a group associated with the ministry is already working to establish such a union.

Women face discrimination in many legal and social matters. Foreign-born husbands and children of Egyptian women are denied Egyptian citizenship, and a woman must have permission from a male relative to travel abroad. A ban on female genital mutilation took effect in 1997, though it is not widely enforced. In April 1999, the government repealed a law allowing a rapist to avoid punishment by marrying his victim. In a society that links family honor to the chastity of its women, a rape victim may agree to marry her attacker in order to avoid disgracing her family. "Honor killings" occur in both Muslim and Christian communities.

The government portrays itself as a staunch supporter of Islam, the state religion, as it cracks down on fundamentalist influences in academia, mosques, and other institutions. The government had announced its intention to bring all 70,000 of Egypt's mosques under government control by 2000, but nearly half of them remain unlicensed and operate outside government authority. The imams of licensed mosques are chosen and paid by the government, which also monitors sermons. Most Egyptians are Sunni Muslim. Orthodox Copts comprise about ten percent of the population. The Jewish community numbers about 200, and there is a small number of Shi'a Muslims and Baha'is.

Muslims have murdered, kidnapped, raped, or forcibly converted scores of Copts in recent years, and burned or vandalized Copt houses, shops, and churches. The government has seized Coptic church-owned land, has closed churches, and frequently uses an Ottoman Empire-era law to deny permission to build or repair churches. No official has been held accountable for the arrest and reported torture of some 1,200 Copts in late 1998. Authorities claimed that the arrests were meant to preempt sectarian violence resulting from the murder of two Copts in August.

The 1976 law on labor unions sets numerous restrictions on the formation and operation of unions and the conduct of elections. The government-backed Egyptian Trade Union Federation is the only legal labor federation. Article 124 of the Penal Code prohibits labor strikes. In June, Hussein al-Mataani was convicted of fraud, impersonating a journalist, and establishing a union without government permission, and was sentenced to three and a half years in prison. Members of the government-approved Journalists' Syndicate had filed complaints against al-Mataani, accusing him of trying to create discord within the field of journalism.

In a positive development, a Cairo court of appeals overturned a 1996 decision that restricted the activities of the Egyptian Lawyers Union. The Muslim Brotherhood-dominated syndicate leadership was disbanded after charges of corruption and infighting by anti-Islamist members.

Child labor is a serious problem. By law, children under 14 are not allowed to work, except in agriculture, where they may take seasonal jobs at age 12 as long as they do not miss school. The law is routinely ignored, however. An Egyptian study finds that 64 percent of children work before age 14. With poverty and unemployment pervasive in Egypt, many children forego school to help earn money for their families. They find informal sector jobs, in agriculture or manufacturing, which do not guarantee standard working hours, safety regulations, or stable wages.

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