EASO Country of Origin Information Report

Pakistan
Security Situation

July 2016
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Annex 1: Bibliography

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Disclaimer

This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2012) (1). The report is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced. To the extent possible and unless otherwise stated, all information presented, except for undisputed or obvious facts, has been cross-checked.

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

“Refugee”, “risk” and similar terminology are used as a generic terminology and not as legally defined in the EU Asylum Acquis and the Geneva Convention.

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This report is targeted at asylum caseworkers, COI researchers, policymakers, and decision-making authorities.

The drafting of this report was finalised in June 2016. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the methodology section of the introduction.

### Glossary and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ah-le Sunnat Wal Jama`at</td>
<td>Political Sunni Deobandi organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJK</td>
<td>Azad Jammu and Kashmir</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Awami National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQ</td>
<td>al-Qaeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bazar</td>
<td>Enclosed marketplace or street where goods and services are exchanged or sold</td>
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<td>BLA</td>
<td>Balochistan Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLF</td>
<td>Baloch Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>Baloch Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTI</td>
<td>Bertelsmann Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPEC</td>
<td>China-Pakistan Economic Corridor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRSS</td>
<td>Centre for Research and Security Studies- research institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTD</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deobandi</td>
<td>Puritan Islamic school influenced by Wahabism that originated in a madrassa in the town of Deoband. Some militant factions follow this Islamic school, including the Afghan Taliban, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba-ePakistan (SSP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
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<td>FC</td>
<td>Frontier Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRC</td>
<td>FATA Research Center-research institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>Gilgit-Baltistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haqqani network</td>
<td>Armed insurgent movement led by Sirajuddin Haqqani. This movement is affiliated to the Taliban. Their headquarters are in North Waziristan (FATA) and in South-East Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazara</td>
<td>Ethnic group living in Balochistan province of Pakistan (migrated from Afghanistan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRCP</td>
<td>Human Rights Commission of Pakistan</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Commission of Jurists</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Islamabad Capital Territory</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDMC</td>
<td>Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IUJ</td>
<td>Islamic Jihad Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMU</td>
<td>Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter-Services Intelligence</td>
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<td>ISPR</td>
<td>Inter-Services Public Relations</td>
</tr>
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</table>
**Jamaat-ul-Ahrar**  
Splinter faction of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

**JeM**  
Jaish-e-Muhammad (Muhammad’s Army)

**Jundullah**  
Soldiers of Allah, a group linked to TTP

**Khassadar**  
Pashtun tribal militia, institutionalised by the British in recent times they are made responsible for security in Pashtun areas, and given an allowance by the Pakistani authorities

**KP**  
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

**Lashkars**  
Pashtun tribal armies or militias that can be mobilised via traditional tribal decision mechanisms

**LeJ**  
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Jhangvi’s Army)

**LeT**  
Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure)

**LI**  
Lashkar-e-Islam (Army of Islam)

**LoC**  
Line of Control, disputed border line between India and Pakistan in the regions of Jammu and Kashmir.

**Madrassa**  
Islamic school

**MQM**  
Muttahadi Qaumi Movement

**NACTA**  
National Counter Terrorism Authority

**NADRA**  
National Database & Registration Authority

**NAP**  
National Action Plan to eliminate terrorism

**NWFP**  
North West Frontier Province, the former name for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

**PICSS**  
Pakistani Institute for Conflict and Security Studies - independent research think-tank

**PILDAT**  
Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency

**PIPS**  
Pakistani Institute for Peace Studies- research institute

**PoR**  
Proof of Registration Card. Administrative document issued to registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan

**PPO**  
Protection of Pakistan Ordinance

**PPP**  
Pakistan People’s Party

**PTI**  
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf

**Razakar**  
Paramilitary force created by the Pakistani army for the fight against the annexation of Hyderabad by India, which is now used in support of the police

**SATP**  
South Asia Terrorism Portal- website run by the Institute for Conflict Management

**SMP**  
Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (Shia militant group)

**SSP**  
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Army of the Prophet Followers, a former Deobandi political party)

**TBJ**  
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism

**TTP**  
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Movement of Taliban)

**UBA**  
United Baloch Army

**USDOS**  
US Department of State

**Zarb-e-Azb**  
Codename for a military operation launched by the Pakistan army on 15 June 2014
Introduction

This report was drafted by a Country of Origin Information (COI) specialist from Cedoca, the Belgian COI unit, as referred to in the Acknowledgements section of this report.

The report aims to provide relevant information for international protection status determination (PSD, including refugee status and subsidiary protection). In Annex 2, the Terms of Reference for this report can be found.

Methodology

This report is an update of the chapter on security of the EASO COI report on Pakistan, Country Overview (August 2015 (2)).

The report is based on information available up to 18 April 2016. The information in this report results from desk research of public specialised paper-based and electronic sources, which were consulted within the timeframe and the scope of the research. For media reports on security incidents mentioned for illustration under the regional description of the security situation, the reference period was from 1 January 2015 to 31 March 2016.

To ensure the EASO COI Report Methodology was respected, a review was carried out by COI specialists from the departments listed as reviewers in the Acknowledgements section. All comments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and most of them were implemented in the final draft of this report. This implementation of comments resulted in adding information beyond the mentioned reference period.

(2) EASO, COI report Pakistan Country overview, August 2015.
Map of Pakistan

Figure 1: Administrative map of Pakistan (source: UN OCHA) (1)

(1) UN OCHA, Overview Pakistan [map], 25 February 2016.
1. General description of the security situation in Pakistan

The security situation in Pakistan in this report covers the period between the 1 July 2015 and 18 April 2016 and is an update of the chapter ‘Security situation’ in the EASO Country Overview report on Pakistan (August 2015) (1).

The security situation in the following regional divisions will be described:
• The four provinces: Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Balochistan and Sindh;
• The two territories: the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT);
• Two administrative regions: Azad Kashmir (AK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB).

1.1. Background of the conflict in Pakistan

For an extensive description of the backgrounds of violent activities by militants and security forces, as well as internal displacement in Pakistan, reference is made to the EASO Country Overview report on Pakistan (August 2015) (2). In this section, the main developments are highlighted. As outlined below, violence in Pakistan is due to politics, ethnic conflicts, sectarian violence and the tensions with India and Afghanistan (see below).

The politically-motivated violence in Pakistan is mainly caused by the instability in the north-west of the country resulting from the 2001 toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Many Afghan Taliban settled in the FATA and in the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP, currently Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), having fled the international coalition invasion led by the US in Afghanistan. Under their influence several Pakistani groups with a similar ideology continued working together in what became a federation of armed groups. This resulted in the so-called ‘Talibanisation’ of the region. Their policies included a strict application of conservative Islamic principles and resulted in violence against civilians and eventually the Pakistani authorities (3).

Since 2007 the Pakistani army has carried out military operations in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa aimed at breaking the power of the Pakistani Taliban and affiliated organisations (4). Especially from 2009 the operations against the Taliban have been a source of insecurity, causing a massive displacement from the region (5). In spite of repeated peace agreements and triumphal statements by the Pakistani army, the violence has continued in recent years. Occasional confrontations between the security apparatus and insurgents, terror attacks and anti-terrorism campaigns persist. Since 2004 the US army has conducted drone attacks against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the region (6). In recent years most of those have occurred in North Waziristan (7).

After his election in June 2013, Prime Minister Sharif initially negotiated with the Pakistani Taliban, which was a difficult and complex task (8). The talks started on 6 February 2014 in Islamabad (9), but soon stalled after the Mohmand wing of the Taliban executed 23 soldiers of the Frontier Corps, who had been held since 2010 (10). In an effort to restart negotiations the Taliban announced a month-long ceasefire on 1 March 2014 (11) which eventually ended on (12).

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(1) EASO, Pakistan Country overview, August 2015, pp. 47-65.
(2) EASO, Pakistan Country overview, August 2015, pp. 47-65.
(3) AI, As if hell fell on me, the human rights crisis in northwest Pakistan, 10 June 2010, pp. 10-11; Rashid, A., Descent into Chaos, 2008, pp. 265-270.
(5) AI, As if hell fell on me, the human rights crisis in northwest Pakistan, 10 June 2010, p. 7; ICG, Pakistan: The Worsening IDP Crisis, Asia Briefing N°111, 16 September 2010.
(8) Washington Post (The), Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s effort to seek peace with Pakistani Taliban of to rocky start, 19 September 2013.
(9) BBC, Pakistan enters peace talks with Taliban, 6 February 2014.
(10) Reuters, Peace Talks between Pakistan and Taliban collapse after killings, 17 February 2014; Telegraph (The), Peace talks collapse as Taliban execute 23 Pakistani soldiers, 17 February 2014.
17 April 2014 (19). What was left of the peace talks finally collapsed after the terrorist attack on the Mohammad Ali Jinnah airport in Karachi on 8 June 2014, which left 26 people dead. Although the attack was carried out by militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility (20).

On 15 June 2014 the Pakistani army launched an offensive in order to eradicate ‘foreign and local terrorists’. The main targets were militant strongholds in the North Waziristan tribal region where insurgents enjoyed sanctuary. The operation was codenamed Zarb-e-Azb (17). The fighting continued in 2014, but without giving the army a decisive victory over the Taliban and its allies in the FATA (18). The militants struck back with terrorism: on 2 November 2014 a suicide bombing claimed 60 lives at the Wagah border crossing near Lahore, a symbolic and sensitive area (19). On 16 December 2014 seven gunmen, apparently affiliated with the TTP, entered an army public school in Peshawar. They opened fire on school staff and children, killing 145 people, including 132 minors, mostly children of army staff. It was the deadliest terrorist attack ever conducted in Pakistan and left the population stunned and the army command livid (20). The Army Chief of Staff, General Raheel Sharif, urged the government to take strong action against the Taliban (21).

On 25 December 2014, after consultation with different political parties, Prime Minister Sharif announced a 20-point comprehensive plan of action, the National Action Plan (NAP), in order to confront the terrorist threat. Special courts would be established for the speedy trial of terror suspects and a moratorium on capital punishment was lifted. Furthermore a 5,000-strong counter terrorism force would be deployed across the country. No armed militias would be allowed to function in the country and their funding would be ‘choked’. Hate speech would be forbidden. Army commander Sharif confirmed that military operations in the tribal areas would continue (22). However, human-rights organisations criticised the speedy trial of terrorist suspects and cautioned that hundreds of non-terrorists could be executed without the proper legal procedures being followed (23).

In 2015, the military Operation Zarb-e-Azb continued. The Pakistani army was actively present in the tribal areas, targeting a wide array of militant groups (24). Besides military operations, the Pakistani army was called upon to provide security backup to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (25). The government’s NAP, which was formulated in January 2015 to reduce terrorism, seemed effective. Since the implementation of NAP there has been a decline in violence (see section 1.4.2. Anti-Terrorism Acts) (26). Despite the government’s efforts and the decline in numbers of civilian deaths from terrorist attacks in 2015, militancy has, however, not been rooted out in Pakistan (27).

Simultaneously, the nationalist insurgency in Balochistan continued to cause bloodshed in recent years, despite the victory of a number of nationalist parties in provincial elections in May 2013. Balochi activists claimed that between 2013 and 2015 the Pakistani army and intelligence agencies continued to target them. There were a number of disappearances and extrajudicial killings (28).

Sectarian tensions have been on the rise in recent years. Shias, but also Sunnis (including Barelvi and Sufis), Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus and Sikhs are victims of religiously motivated violence, especially carried out by radical militant groups (29). Most of the victims of sectarian violence are members of the Shia sect of Islam, who comprise approximately 15% of the population in Pakistan (30). Various Deobandi militant groups, such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

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(19) Dawn, TTP ends ceasefire, says talks option open, 17 April 2014.
(20) AP, Pakistani forces repel attack near Karachi airport, 10 June 2014.
(22) Jane’s, Uncertain Victory – Pakistan’s North Waziristan Offensive, 28 December 2014.
(23) Dawn, TTP splinter groups claim Wagah attack: 60 dead, 3 November 2014; Guardian (The), Dozens killed at suicide attack at Pakistan-India border post, 2 November 2014.
(25) Economist (The), The man with the plan: Pakistan after the school massacre, 24 January 2015.
(27) CNN, Justice at risk as Pakistan pushes convicts to the gallows, 25 December 2014.
(28) Foreign Policy, Actually, Pakistan Is Winning Its War on Terror, 10 December 2015.
(29) PIPS, Executive Summary of comprehensive package of NAP, 14 December 2015.
(31) AHCR, Balochistan; 160 persons extra judicially killed, 510 disappeared and 50 decomposed bodies were found during 2013, 8 January 2014; Al Jazeera, From rallies to armed resistance in Balochistan, 6 May 2014; Deutsche Welle, Pakistani army involved in Baloch kidnappings, 6 December 2013; IBT, Balochistan: ‘Hundreds of people abducted and murdered by Pakistani army’ activists say, 11 March 2015.
(LeJ), Jundullah and factions of the TTP, target the Shia community \(^{(31)}\). In particular, the Shia Hazara community in Quetta are victims of murders and terror attacks \(^{(31)}\). Also, the Christian community in Pakistan is a frequent target of sectarian violence \(^{(33)}\). Ahmadis are also the target of violent attacks by militant extremists \(^{(34)}\). They are often the victim of legal, institutional and social discrimination \(^{(35)}\).

Interethnic violence has been a problem in the province of Sindh in recent years. Tensions between Mohajir and the Pashtun population in Karachi have increased, especially the power struggle between both groups led to numerous political murders of members of the Muttahadi Qaumi Movement (MQM), Awami National Party (ANP), Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) \(^{(36)}\).

In 2015, Pakistan made some efforts to revive the foreign relationships with its neighbours and with the US. Relations with the US gradually improved, resulting in a visit of Prime Minister Sharif and General Sharif in October and November 2015 to Washington \(^{(37)}\). However, the relationship with India deteriorated in 2015. Scheduled talks about security issues stalled \(^{(38)}\). 2015 ended with a surprise visit of Indian Prime Minister Modi in Lahore, leading to the decision that both Prime Ministers would meet again on 15 January 2016. This meeting was put off after six militants of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) attacked the Pathankot Air Force Station in Punjab (India) on 2 January 2016. Pakistan condemned the attack \(^{(39)}\). In the aftermath, the Pakistani government took action against members of JeM by arresting the leader Malanga Masood Azhar, several militants and closing dozens of religious schools run by JeM \(^{(40)}\). Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan showed some signs of stabilisation with talks between both parties in the beginning of 2015 \(^{(41)}\). However, the Afghan-Pakistan relationship deteriorated after accusations by the Afghan government that Pakistan allows the Haqqani Network to operate from Pakistan and the death of Mullah Omar. This resulted in failed negotiation talks during the summer of 2015 \(^{(42)}\). The Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG), which consists of Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and the US, has asked the Taliban and all other Afghan resistance groups to join direct talks with Afghan government officials in Islamabad \(^{(43)}\).

1.2. Actors in the conflict

1.2.1. State armed forces

Pakistan Armed Forces

In 2015, the Pakistan Armed Forces had 643,800 combat troops at their disposal, of which 550,000 belong to the army. Operational control rests with the National Command Authority (NCA). Pakistan’s nuclear and conventional forces have traditionally been oriented and structured against a prospective threat from India. Since 2008, however, a priority for the army has been counter-insurgency operations, mainly against Islamist groups for which forces have been redeployed from the Indian border \(^{(44)}\). In the east of the country the 11th corps is stationed in Peshawar and

\(^{(31)}\) Deutsche Welle, Examining Pakistan’s growing sectarian violence, 18 February 2015.
\(^{(32)}\) Dawn, Eight Hazaras gunned down in Quetta bus attack, 23 October 2014; HRW, We Are The Walking Dead. Killings of Shia Hazara in Balochistan, Pakistan, 30 June 2014.
\(^{(34)}\) OHCHR, “Stop Faith-Based Killings” – UN Rights Experts Urge Pakistan to Protect Ahmadiyya Muslim Minorities, 2 June 2014.
\(^{(35)}\) Jinnah Institute, State of Religious Freedom in Pakistan, March 2016.
\(^{(37)}\) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Pakistan’s tricky foreign policy balancing act, 1 January 2016; Diplomat (The), Major Takeaways From Nawaz Sharif’s US Visit, 23 October 2015.
\(^{(38)}\) Foreign Policy, In With the Old: India-Pakistan Relations at a Standstill, 2 September 2015.
\(^{(39)}\) Diplomat (The), India: Dealing with Pakistan, 13 January 2016.
\(^{(41)}\) Guardian (The), Afghanistan and Pakistan thaw relations with pledge to fight terrorism together, 12 May 2015.
\(^{(42)}\) USIP, Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations: The Prospect of Reviving Taliban Talks, 21 December 2015.
\(^{(43)}\) Diplomat (The), Pakistan Hosts 4-Nation Talks on Afghan Peace, 11 January 2016.
the 12th corps in Quetta (45). In April 2015, the Pakistani army created a special security division for the protection of Chinese engineers, project directors, experts and workers employed on various Chinese-funded projects in Pakistan. A total of 10,000 troops have been assigned and a two-star general will head this security division (46).

The military has gradually gained control of a large part of the country’s economic resources. It is entrenched in the country’s corporate sector and controls some of Pakistan’s largest companies and significant tracts of real estate. This has enabled its members to become something of an independent class (47). The Pakistan army has thus developed a very strong ‘esprit de corps’ (48).

As Anatol Lieven observes:

‘The Pakistan military, more even than most militaries, sees itself as a breed apart, and devotes great effort to inculcating in new recruits the feeling that they belong to a military family different from (and vastly superior to) Pakistani civil society’ (49).

The unity of the army is scrupulously guarded. Islamist conspiracies by junior officers against their superiors have been penetrated and smashed by military intelligence. The efficient reputation of the army means that the institution is admired by large parts of the general populace; in the past every military coup in Pakistan was popular with most Pakistanis (50). In January 2016, General Sharif announced that he will retire in November 2016 after three years in office (51).

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)

ISI is an intelligence section of the army often mired in controversy. In October 2014, Rizwan Akhtar was chosen as new head of the ISI (52). The ISI has often been accused of conspiring to overthrow civilian governments and supporting regional insurgencies (53). It has close ties with a number of extremist Islamist groups. In the 1990s, close relationships were established with outfits such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and JeM to put pressure on India, with whom Pakistan has already been for decades embroiled on the issue of Kashmir (54). Besides this, the ISI has supported the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network and Pakistani jihadist groups allied with al Qaeda (55).

The Frontier Corps (FC)

The Frontier Corps (FC) is an auxiliary military force, theoretically under the authority of the Interior Ministry, but commanded by army officers. There are two major subdivisions, one stationed in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa/FATA and one stationed in Balochistan (56). In 2015, their total strength numbered approximately 70,000 (57). The FC helps local law enforcement maintain law and order, border control and fight organised crime (58). Reportedly, the army and FC have been involved in human-rights violations in the FATA (59). In Balochistan the FC, together with the army and intelligence services, are said to be involved in extrajudicial killings and disappearances (60).

(48) Lieven, A., Pakistan, a hard country, 2011, p. 163.
(49) Lieven, A., Pakistan, a hard country, 2011, pp. 163-164.
(50) Lieven, A., Pakistan, a hard country, 2011, pp. 163-164.
(51) Dawn, Gen Raheel Sharif puts speculations to rest, says will retire on due date, 26 January 2016.
(52) Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2015 - Pakistan, 5 May 2015
(53) Guardian (The), Can General Rizwan Akhtar clean up Pakistan’s notorious ISI spy agency?, 30 September 2014.
(54) Kalia, R., August 2015, p. 30.
(55) Roggio, B., Pakistan is ‘very cooperative and very engaged in the fight against terrorism,’ Secretary Kerry tells Congress, 25 February 2016.
(56) Jamestown Foundation (The), Transforming Pakistan’s Frontier Corps, 29 March 2007.
(58) USIP, Reforming Pakistan’s Police and Law Infrastructure, February 2011, p. 16.
(59) AHCR, Balochistan; 160 persons extra judicially killed, 510 disappeared and 50 decomposed bodies were found during 2013, 8 January 2014.
(60) HRW, We Can Torture, Kill, or Keep You for Years; Enforced Disappearances by Pakistan Security Forces in Balochistan, 28 July 2011.
The Rangers

The Rangers are a paramilitary force under the authority of the Interior Ministry (61). There are two major subdivisions, the Punjabi Rangers headquartered in Lahore and the Sindh Rangers headquartered in Karachi (62). The Rangers help local law enforcement, provide border security and fight smuggling (63). Their total strength is about 20,000 in Punjab and 25,000 in Sindh (64). The Rangers have sometimes been called human-rights abusers, notably in Sindh (65).

The Pakistani Police

The Pakistani Police has a manpower of approximately 410,000. There are 1,479 police stations throughout the country. The police are generally understood to be underfunded and are facing a difficult task fighting rising amounts of crime and, in certain regions, activity of militants and insurgents. The reputation of the police is poor (66).

According to a survey of Transparency International in 2014:

‘Police and public officials were considered the most corrupt institutions scoring highest on perceived level of corruption.’ (67)

Lashkars

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in the FATA, Pakistani army and police sometimes use irregular militia (so-called Lashkars) to control territory. They are often called ‘government Taliban’. Some of them are former Taliban. They have reportedly used indiscriminate and punitive force engaging in destruction of houses belonging to suspected Taliban and their families, arbitrary arrest and unlawful killings (68). In recent years, the Lashkars diminished in KP. The provincial government decided to discontinue their financing (69).

1.2.2. Armed groups

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

The TTP is the largest militant group active in Pakistan. It was founded in about 2007 as a loose formation of Deobandi groupings chiefly operating in the Pakistani border area with Afghanistan. Initial objectives of the organisation were the implementation of sharia law and the ousting of coalition forces from Afghanistan. After President Pervez Musharraf took action against militants hiding in the red mosque (Lal Masjid) in Islamabad, action was also taken against the Pakistani authorities (70). In 2010, membership of TTP reached 30,000 to 35,000 armed men (71). These militants are mostly Pashtun originating from the border zone between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Pakistani Taliban finances its activities by extortion, smuggling, the drugs trade and kidnappings (72). TTP has strong ties with sectarian Deobandi organisations such as LeJ and Ah-le Sunnat Wal Jama’at (73). On 1 November 2013, TTP official leader Hakimullah Mehsud was killed by a drone-attack in North Waziristan (74). The nomination of hardliner Mullah Fazlullah as his successor was considered as a rejection of possible peace talks with the Pakistani authorities (75).

In December 2014, TTP claimed responsibility for the Peshawar school attack, which killed 145 people. A spokesman said it was retaliation for the ongoing army campaign in North Waziristan (76). Due to continuation of the Zarb-e-Azb

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(61) Roggio, B., Rangers deployed to secure Islamabad outskirts, 24 April 2009.
(63) Pakistan Army, Pakistan Rangers (Punjab), n.d.
(66) USIP, A Counterterrorism Role for Pakistan’s Police Stations, 18 August 2014, pp. 3-4.
(68) AI, As if hell fell on me, the human rights crisis in northwest Pakistan, 10 June 2010, pp. 14, 32-33, 67.
(70) CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, June 2012; Guardian (The), Pakistan Taliban chief Hakimullah Mehsud is alive, says spy agency, 28 April 2010.
(71) SATP, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, 2015.
(72) LandInfo, Pakistan: Sikkerhetsrelaterte forhold i Khyber Pakhtunkw (KPK) og Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 8 November 2013.
(73) Fair, C. C., Explaining Support for Sectarian Terrorism in Pakistan: Piety, Maslak and Sharia, 2015, p. 1141.
(74) Monde (Le), Hakimullah Mehsud enteré, les Talibans choisissent un successeur, 2 November 2013.
(75) Guardian (The), Pakistani Taliban select hardliner Mullah Fazlullah as new leader, 8 November 2013.
(76) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), TTP claim responsibility for Peshawar school attack, 16 December 2014.
operation in North Waziristan in 2015, the TTP seems have to have lost ground (91). Under the strain of the military operations, the TTP has further divided. The authority of Mullah Fazlullah is declining (92). Still, the TTP remained capable of executing some major attacks (93). In 2015, the TTP was responsible for 212 terrorist attacks. These claimed the lives of 384 people (94). In comparison, in 2014 TTP carried out 352 terrorist attacks, killing 734 people (95). The terrorist attacks remained concentrated in the FATA, KP and Karachi in 2015 (96).

On 18 September 2015, 14 militants attacked a Pakistan Air Force base in Badhaber near Peshawar, killing 18 people (97). On 20 January 2016, four militants attacked Bacha Khan University near Charsadda, killing 21 people and injuring more than 30 (98). Responsibility for this attack has been claimed by Khalifa Umar Mansoor, commander of a TTP splinter group. The main organisation of the TTP declined responsibility for this attack (99). Another splinter group of the TTP is Jamaat-ul-Ahrar. This faction, led by Maulana Qasim Khorasani, split from the TTP in 2014 (100). This group claims to be responsible for seven terrorist attacks at the end of 2015 and in the first quarter of 2016, including the Lahore bombing on 27 March 2016, which claimed 72 lives and wounded more than 300 (101).

Haqqani Network

The Haqqani Network is an insurgent network that operates alongside TTP but was initially not home-grown. It was founded by Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani. Due to his old age, he handed over leadership to his son Sirajuddin Haqqani in 2007. One source reported that Jalaluddin Haqqani died in 2014 (102). Originating from Loya Paktya (Khost, Paktia and Paktika provinces in Afghanistan) they now mainly operate in North Waziristan (FATA). Though their main objective is attacking international forces in Afghanistan, they closely cooperate with TTP. The Haqqani Network also has a longstanding relationship with the Pakistani Inter Intelligence Services (ISI) which had led to frictions between Pakistan and the US (103). The vast majority of the Haqqani fighters belong to the Zadrang tribe but there are also non-Pashtun militants including Arabs, Chechens and Uzbeks. The Haqqani network was believed to have ties with al-Qaeda (104). American sources stated in November 2014 that ongoing Pakistani military operations in North Waziristan have 'disrupted' the military capabilities of the Haqqani (105). The Haqqani Network relocated from North Waziristan to Kurram Agency under the pressure of military operations (106). In March 2016, the US advised Pakistan to take strong measures against the network (107).

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

The IMU has been active in the Pakistani tribal region since late 2001, where it regrouped after sustaining heavy losses fighting alongside the Taliban during the US invasion of Afghanistan. Under the leadership of Toher Yuldashev the group targeted the Pakistani security forces from its bases in North and South Waziristan. From 2007, the IMU formed an alliance with the TTP and fought alongside them. In 2009, Yuldashev was killed in a drone attack while Pakistani military operations forced the IMU to North Waziristan where it started to cooperate with the Haqqani Network. Osman Odil became the new leader of the organisation. A radical splinter group of IMU, the Islamic Jihad

(97) Jamestown Foundation (The), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Evolves Under Pressure, 2 October 2015.
(99) Jamestown Foundation (The), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Evolves Under Pressure, 2 October 2015.
(102) Jamestown Foundation (The), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Evolves Under Pressure, 2 October 2015.
(104) RFE/RL, Pakistan University Attacker Threatens To Target More Schools, 22 January 2016.
(109) CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, June 2012.
Union (IJU), is trying to export terrorism from its Pakistan base (96). On 8 June 2014, IMU militants staged a bloody attack on Karachi airport (99). The Pakistan army made it a priority to eradicate the group. Most of the militants of IMU fled to Afghanistan (100). At the end of March 2015, the IMU reportedly pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS) (101).

Al-Qaeda

Following the US invasion of Afghanistan, many al-Qaeda operatives withdrew to the Pakistani tribal regions. By 2008 they were so deeply entrenched in Waziristan that, according to American intelligence officials, the area had become al-Qaeda’s ‘international operations hub’ (98). Among their ranks were Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens and Chinese Muslims (99). In the FATA, al-Qaeda has aligned itself with several militant groups, offering support with manpower, training and propaganda. It also attacks the Pakistani government, which is viewed as apostate for allying itself with the US-led war on terrorism. Al-Qaeda in Waziristan has developed privileged relations with the IJU (102). In December 2014, al-Qaeda lost two top operatives: the Pakistani army killed Adnan El-Shukrijuma in South Waziristan, (103) while a US drone eliminated Umar Farooq in North Waziristan (104). In July 2015, a leader of al-Qaeda known as ‘Abdali’ was killed in a raid in Lahore (105). In February 2016, the Rangers arrested 97 al-Qaeda militants in Karachi, including Farooq Bhatti, deputy chief of al-Qaeda (106).

The Punjabi Taliban

It is not clear if the Punjabi Taliban is part of the TTP or an independent organisation. The most influential group of the Punjabi Taliban is led by Maulana Asmatullah Muawiya. In 2014 the Punjabi Taliban claimed responsibility for only two terrorist attacks. In September 2014, Muawiya first intended to shift his militant activities from Pakistan to Afghanistan (105), and some days later announced he would give up the armed struggle in Pakistan entirely (106).

Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)

SSP is a former Deobandi political party founded in the early 1980s by Sunni cleric Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi in Jhang, in Punjab. Its principal aim is to fight Shia influence in Pakistan. Jhangvi was assassinated in 1990 and was replaced by Maulana Azam Tariq. Tariq, in turn, was killed in 2003 when gunmen fired bullets into the vehicle he was travelling in. Tariq was succeeded by Maulana Ali Sher Hyderi. The organisation is understood to have close ties to the Jihadi organisation Jaish-e-Muhammad. Numerous reports have labelled SSP as a violent group. At the beginning of the century it was responsible for the murder of Shia militants, ordinary Shia citizens and attacks on Shia mosques. Although the group denies involvement in violence, former president Musharraf banned it in 2002 and, in 2005, the US listed SSP as a terrorist organisation (107). Part of SSP resurfaced in more recent years under the name Ah-le Sunnat Wal Jama’at, which under the leadership of Maulana Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi contested elections in 2014 (108). Other members left SSP to form an apparently even more radical outfit under the name Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). Other extremist splinter groups of SSP are the Jhangvi Tigers, Al-Haq Tigers, Tanzeem-ul-Haq, Al-Farooq and the Al-Badra Foundation (109). Still, according to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) (110), remnants of SSP kept attacking Shias into 2015. In January 2015, Pakistani authorities executed three convicted cadres of SSP (111).

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(94) CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, 2012.
(95) Dawn, Al Qaeda leader killed in South Waziristan, 6 December 2014.
(96) Dawn, Al Qaeda leader Umar Farooq killed in N Waziristan drone strike, 7 December 2014.
(97) Dawn, Al Qaeda Pakistan chief killed in Lahore raid: Punjab home minister, 1 July 2015.
(98) Reuters, Pakistan arrests 97 al-Qaeda and other militants; Foils jailbreak plan, 12 February 2016.
(100) Dawn, Punjabi Taliban call off armed struggle in Pakistan, 13 September 2014.
(103) CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, June 2012, p. 39.
(104) For an explanation of this source, see section 1.5.1. Sources.
The core of the SSP’s supporters is formed by Sunni peasantry in the rural Jhang and by the merchant and trader classes in the urban centres. The madrassas are also a major recruiting ground for the SSP. Militants have been known to get jihadi training in Afghanistan. To fund its organisation and activities the SSP has relied on contributions from its supporters in the form of zakat. Sunni business people contribute as well. It is also widely understood that the SSP thrives on considerable financial and logistic backing from Saudi donors, who have wanted to curb Iran’s influence over the Shia population in Pakistan (113).

The SSP is reportedly not only a militant group with about 3,000 to 6,000 members and a party with one million members, but it also has a student wing, an insurance company, many offices and a nation-wide network (113).

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)

LeJ is a Deobandi terrorist group founded in 1996, when a number of militants led by Riaz Basra, Akram Lahori and Malik Ishaq broke away from Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan. LeJ is not a political party; it is a purely paramilitary organisation. Some claim that its creation was prompted by the 1994 establishment of Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (SMP), a Shia militant group that targeted leaders of the SSP. There is also a theory that the LeJ was formed as the militant wing of the SSP to attack the Shia community and that it became independent when it gained more proficiency. In the following years LeJ became a strong terrorist organisation, responsible for 350 violent attacks prior to 2001. In later years there were bombings on Shia mosques. Just like SSP, LeJ has cordial relations with JeM (114).

LeJ was placed on the US terrorist list in 2000 and was banned by President Musharraf in 2001 (115). Its underground violent activities continued unabated, especially against members of the Hazara community in Quetta (116). In February 2013, Pakistani authorities arrested Malik Ishaq after LeJ had bombed a marketplace in Quetta, killing more than 80 Shia civilians (117). Although most of the violence of LeJ targets Shias, the organisation also cultivates a radical stance against Christians, Ahmadi and Sufi Muslims (118). According to SATP, attacks by LeJ members continued into 2015. In January 2015, Pakistani authorities executed several convicted activists of LeJ (119). In a shoot-out in Muzaffargarh on the evening of 28 July 2015, the Pakistani police killed Malik Ishaq, his sons and eight other LeJ militants. Ishaq had been in and out of Pakistani custody since 2013 (120). Not much is known about the LeJ’s financial resources, but, like the SSP, ‘the LeJ has also benefited from contributions made by other Deobandi groups and sympathizers in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’ (121).

Lashkar-e-Islam (LI)

LI is a small outfit active in the Khyber Agency of the FATA, where it conducted 33 attacks in 2015, mainly on shrines, security forces and leaders of rival sectarian groups (122). LI was banned in June 2008. (123) Pakistani military operations in 2014 seem to have crippled the group’s operational capabilities (124). Many LI commanders have been killed by US drone strikes in the tribal areas. In 2015 LI announced its merger into the TTP (125).

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(113) CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, June 2012, p. 39.
(116) BBC, Pakistani group joins US terror list, 30 January 2013.
(118) CNN, Leader of militant group arrested in Pakistan, police say, 23 February 2013.
(122) CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, June 2012, p. 41.
(125) PIPS, 2015, Pakistan Security Report, 2016, pp. 11-12; Roggio, B., 3 jihadist groups merge with Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, 6 May 2015.
Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)

SMP is a Shia militant group whose aim is to protect the Shia community and target hostile Sunni Deobandi organisations such as SSP and LeJ. SMP is a radical offshoot of a mainstream Shia political party, the Tehrik-e-Jaferia Pakistan (126). The origins are unclear but it was probably founded in about 1993 by Maulana Mureed Abbas Yazdani. The current leader is Ghulam Raza Naqvi. The organisation claims to have some 30,000 activists (127). SMP was outlawed in Pakistan in August 2001 (128). In 2015, Karachi and Peshawar were the two major cities where SMP carried out most of its attacks, with 19 and 12 respectively (129).

Islamic State (IS)

It has been reported since 2015 that Islamic State (IS; also called ISIS, ISIL or Daesh) infiltrated the Pakistan insurgency sphere. There has been discussion about the importance of the appearance of IS in Pakistan. Some groups in Pakistan have started using the flag and the name of IS without having a real link to the organisation (130). In December 2015, the Pakistan government acknowledged the presence of IS after the arrest of eight persons in Karachi with connections to IS (131). Arrests of IS militants were also made in the province of Punjab (132).

A Jamestown report from February 2016 confirms contacts between IS and jihadist groups in Pakistan. The report affirms the allegiance pledged to the leader of IS, al-Baghdadi, by groups such as Tehrik-e-Khilafat Pakistan, the Shahidullah Shahid Group of TTP and Jundullah. IMU also pledged allegiance to IS (133). Sleeper cells of IS are present in the province of Punjab, Sindh and in Islamabad (134). One source mentions that IS recruits individuals in Karachi (135).

Nationalist insurgent groups

The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)

BLA is a Baloch nationalist guerrilla organisation. Its objective is an independent Balochistan, free of Pakistani and Iranian rule. Due to violence, including bomb attacks, it was outlawed in Pakistan in April 2006 (136). The leader of BLA is Nawabzada Marri (137). The BLA runs 25 camps in Balochistan and consists of numerous units that carry out guerrilla attacks in the province (138). In 2015, BLA carried out 88 terrorist attacks (139). One source stated in April 2016 that Dr. Nauman, a key member of BLA, was killed during a security operation carried out by the Frontier Corps (FC) (140).

The Baloch Liberation Front (BLF)

The Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) is another insurgent group, led by Dr. Allah Nazar Baloch. This group operates across Balochistan but is primarily active in the southern coastal Makran belt (141). According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) (142), BLF carried out 38 attacks in Balochistan in 2015. BLF is mainly active in the Awaran, Panjgur, Washuk, Turbat and Gwadar districts in the south of Balochistan (143).

(127) SATP, Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan, Terrorist Group of Pakistan, 2015.
(128) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), List of banned organisations in Pakistan, 24 October 2012.
(130) Deutsche Welle (DW), Are Pakistani militants moving closer to ‘Islamic State’?, 12 January 2015.
(132) RFE/RL, Pakistan Arrests 42 Suspected IS Militants Across Punjab Province, 4 January 2016.
(133) Jamestown Foundation (The), Growing Evidence of Islamic State in Pakistan, 4 February 2016; Diplomat (The), The Islamic State Threat Is Real in Pakistan, 18 February 2016.
(134) Jamestown Foundation (The), Growing Evidence of Islamic State in Pakistan, 4 February 2016; Diplomat (The), The Islamic State Threat Is Real in Pakistan, 18 February 2016.
(137) Pakistan Herald, Details of Nawabzada Hyrbyair Marri, n.d.
(138) OFPRA, Les acteurs du conflit armé au Baloutchistan, 8 September 2015.
(140) Nation (the), Key member of banned outfit killed in cross fire: Home Minister, 1 April 2016.
(141) USIP, Mapping conflict trends in Pakistan, 2014.
(142) For an explanation of this source, see section 1.5.1. Sources.
The Baloch Republican Army (BRA)

The banned BRA is the militant wing of the separatist Baloch Republican Party (BRP) (144). The most prominent BRA attack was in January 2015 against the electricity network of Pakistan, which caused a blackout in 80 % of Pakistan (145). BRA carried out 43 attacks in 2015. Major areas of operation are the Dera Bugti, Nasirabad, Dera Murad Jamali, Barkhan and Loralai districts of Balochistan (146). In March 2016, several militants, including commanders of the BRA, were killed by security forces in different districts of Balochistan (147).

United Baloch Army (UBA)

The UBA is another nationalist insurgent group in Balochistan and also a splinter group of the BLA (148). The UBA is led by Mehran Marri, the youngest son of Khair Bux Marri (149). Rivalry between the UBA and BLA exists and resulted in a clash in June 2015, killing 20 people (150). According to PIPS, the UBA was involved in five terrorist attacks in 2015 in the province of Balochistan (151).

1.3. Recent security trends and armed confrontations

According to several sources, the security situation in Pakistan in 2015 improved compared to previous years (152).

The 2015 report of the Pakistani Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) (153) recorded 1,901 overall incidents of anti-state violence by militants and counter-insurgency operations by the Pakistani government, in which 3,368 people were killed (154). Compared to 2014, there has been a 33 % decrease in the number of incidents, according to PICSS (155).

The Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) reported 1,097 incidents of violence, resulting in 3,503 deaths and 2,167 injured in 2015 (156). Compared to 2014, the number of violent incidents decreased by 48 % (from 2,099 to 1,097) (157). The nature of the violence in 2015 is diverse and is described in detail in the following sections.

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(144) Daily Times, BLA commander among eight killed in Sibi, 10 March 2016.
(145) Diplomat (The), Understanding Pakistan’s Baloch Insurgency, 24 June 2015.
(147) Pakistan Today, BRA commander among 7 militants killed in Balochistan, 3 March 2016; Daily Times, BLA commander among eight killed in Sibi, 10 March 2016; Express Tribune (The), Five Baloch militants killed in Dera Bugt, 14 March 2016.
(148) Diplomat (The), Understanding Pakistan’s Baloch Insurgency, 24 June 2015.
(150) Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Up to 20 killed in clashes between separatist groups in Dera Bugt, 30 June 2015.
(153) For an explanation of this source, see section 1.5.1. Sources.
Table 1 presents a breakdown of the nature of violent incidents and the number of fatalities recorded by PIPS in 2015:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of violence incidents 2015</th>
<th>No of incidents</th>
<th>No of deaths</th>
<th>No of injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist attacks</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>1069</td>
<td>1443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political / ethnic violence</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clashes sec. forces &amp; militants</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border clashes/attacks</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational attacks sec. forces</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>1560</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drone attacks</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-militant clashes/attacks</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clashes sec. forces &amp; criminal gangs</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal violence</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 2015</td>
<td>1097</td>
<td>3503</td>
<td>2617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 2014</td>
<td>2099</td>
<td>5308</td>
<td>4569</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Overall incidents of violence (PIPS) (158)

1.3.1. Armed clashes and assaults

PIPS states that, in 2015, the security forces carried out 143 attacks against militants, sectarian outfits and nationalist insurgents in the FATA, Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Karachi (159). According to PIPS, 1,560 people were killed, including 1,545 militants/insurgents (160). Besides these operational attacks the security and law-enforcement agencies had 153 armed clashes and encounters with militants in Pakistan (161). One of the most prominent encounters between security forces and militants occurred in Muffazaragh (province of Punjab) in July 2015 when LeJ’s leader Malik Ishaq was killed in an exchange of fire (162).

Another important event was the harsh clash between two rival armed groups in the province of Balochistan. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) militants attacked a camp of the United Baloch Army (UBA) at the end of June 2015. More than 20 people were killed (163).

In 2015, reports about clashes between Pakistani and Indian forces at the border in the disputed region of Kashmir continued (164). Many incidents of exchange of fire in this region were reported in June, July and August 2015 (165).

In the period of review, a major military operation against insurgents was conducted, respectively in parts of the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, named operation Zarb-e-Azb.

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(163) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Up to 20 killed in clashes between separatist groups in Dera Bugti, 30 June 2015.
(164) Guardian (The), Thousands flee homes in Kashmir as India-Pakistan clashes spread, 6 January 2015.
(165) Diplomat (The), India-Pakistan Clashes in Kashmir, 2 August 2015; Al Jazeera, India-Pakistan border clashes leave civilians dead, 16 August 2015.
**Operation Zarb-e-Azb**

Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched on 15 June 2014 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the FATA. The purpose of the operation was to target the militants in North Waziristan. The operation continued during 2015 and the beginning of 2016 (166). In June 2015 the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the military’s media wing, claimed that the Pakistani army was in control of 80 % of the territory in North Waziristan (167). 837 hideouts of terrorists have been destroyed and 253 tons of explosives were recovered after the first year of the operation, according to ISPR (168).

In December 2015, the ISPR announced that 3,400 terrorists were killed. 488 officers and men of the Pakistan Army, FC and Sindh Rangers lost their lives and 1,914 were injured in Operation Zarb-e-Azb during the last year and a half (169).

Although Operation Zarb-e-Azb was quite successful, the militants have moved to other areas and are regrouping (170). A Jamestown Foundation report states that the militants are now attacking high-profile targets such as the school in Peshawar and Badhaber PAF camp, in an effort to prove their continued strength (171).

In the first months of 2016, the Pakistani army continued the airstrikes and ground operations in North Waziristan. The army claims to be in control of strategic positions alongside the Pakistan-Afghan border (172).

At the end of February 2016, General Raheel announced the final phase of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. The Pakistani army were reinforced in the Shawal Valley of North Waziristan and carried out operations in the areas of the Shawal Valley and Datta Khel in the FATA (173). In April 2016, ISPR announced that, since the start of the final phase of Zarb-e-Azb, 252 militants were killed and ‘militants’ hubs’ in Mana, Gurbaz, Lataka, Inzarkas and Magrotai have been cleared. Still, the operation continues in the heights of Shawal (174).

**Terrorist attacks**

PIPS defines terrorist attacks as follows: ‘terrorist attacks include militant, nationalist, insurgent and sectarian attacks’. These terrorist attacks can be carried out through different methods (suicide attacks, targeted killings, bomb and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (175). Below is a description of the number of terrorist attacks and the most common methods used by militants in 2015.

**Number of terrorist attacks**

According to the 2015 report of PIPS, 625 terrorist attacks were carried out by militant, nationalist/insurgent and violent sectarian groups in Pakistan in 2015. This is a decrease of 48 % compared to 2014 (176). As many as 266 of the total reported terrorist attacks (about 46 %) exclusively targeted personnel, convoys and check-posts of security forces and law enforcement agencies (177).

Civilians were the apparent targets of 92 attacks (15 %). A total of 63 attacks (10 %) had sectarian targets, mainly members of the Shia and Sunni communities and worship places including mosques and shrines. Forty-one attacks were aimed at political leaders and workers while 39 attacks targeted tribal elders. Other targets hit by terrorists during the previous year included state installations such as gas pipelines, power pylons and railways, government officials (65 attacks), polio health workers (15 attacks), educational institutions (15 attacks), journalists and media (11 attacks), non-Baloch settlers/workers (6 attacks) and members of the Christian community (3 attacks) (178).

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(166) Jamestown Foundation (The), The Successes and Failures of Pakistan’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb, 10 July 2015.
(167) IISS, Beyond Operation Zarb-e-Azb in northwest Pakistan, 4 December 2015.
(170) IISS, Beyond Operation Zarb-e-Azb in northwest Pakistan, 4 December 2015.
(171) Jamestown Foundation (The), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Evolves Under Pressure, 2 October 2015.
(173) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Shawal operation review: Gen Raheel vows to annihilate terrorists, 29 February 2016.
**Bomb explosions and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)**

Militants employed different methods to achieve their objectives. The Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS)\(^{179}\) reported that in 2015 bomb explosions and the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were the most common tactics used by militants. According to figures in the 2015 security report by CRSS, 120 bomb explosions occurred, killing 184 and leaving 385 injured. CRSS recorded 52 IED explosions in 2015, killing 46 and injuring 114\(^{180}\). PICSS recorded in 2015 that IEDs were used in 38% of the total militant attacks and those attacks caused more casualties than any other type of attack. According to PICSS, IEDs killed 268 people in 2015\(^{181}\). PIPS observed in 2015 that militants used IEDs of different types in 256 attacks, about 41% of all terrorist attacks\(^{182}\).

**Targeted killings**

PIPS reported for 2015 that 288 terrorist attacks (46%) were targeted killings or shootings\(^{183}\). PICSS reported in 2015 143 targeted killings. According to PICSS, the most targeted killings took place in Balochistan province, followed by the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh. Compared to 2014, a decline of 48% in targeted killings was observed by PICSS\(^{184}\).

**1.3.2. Drone strikes**

The first US drone strike in Pakistan took place in 2004 in the Waziristan region. The number of drone strikes since 2004, and those killed or injured by them, varies according to the consulted sources\(^{185}\).

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) compiled its own data on drone strikes. In 2015, TBIJ recorded 13 strikes in 2015. These 13 US drone strikes killed 85 people and injured 32. The targets were divided into domestic, public, religious, and commercial buildings, outdoor gatherings and vehicles\(^{186}\).

In September 2015, the Pakistani army launched for the first time a Pakistani-made drone, a ‘Burraq Drone’, to strike at terrorists in Shawal Valley in the FATA\(^{187}\).

In the first quarter of 2016, TBIJ counted two US drone strikes, as of 18 April 2016. One occurred in North Waziristan and the other in Kurram Agency\(^{188}\).

**1.4. State ability to secure law and order**

**1.4.1. State protection, justice and security forces**

**State protection and security forces**

Pakistan has an elected civilian government. The constitution provides that the political authority is divided between the legislative, the executive and the judiciary. Bertelsmann Foundation (BTI) reports that this division is not maintained in practice and that the parliament is ‘the weakest institution’\(^{189}\). The military has a substantial influence on the national security, foreign policy and in the economic policy, according to Freedom House\(^{190}\).

Freedom House states further that: ‘Corruption, lack of accountability, and lack of transparency are pervasive problems at all levels of government, in politics, and in the military’\(^{191}\).

\(^{179}\) For an explanation of this source, see section 1.5.1. Sources.
\(^{186}\) Diplomat (The), CIA drone strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to present, n.d.
\(^{187}\) Diplomat (The), Pakistan Uses Indigenous Drone to Strike Terrorists, 08 September 2015.
\(^{188}\) Bureau of Investigative Journalism (The), CIA drone strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to present, n.d.
\(^{190}\) Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2015-Pakistan, n.d.
\(^{191}\) Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2015-Pakistan, n.d.
According to US Department of State (USDOS), there is a functioning criminal justice system in Pakistan but the effectiveness of the police varies by district, ranging from reasonably good to ineffective (192). The Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency (PILDAT) observes that the Pakistani police lacks operational capacity and professionalism (193).

Amnesty International (AI) states in its 2016 annual report, covering events in 2015, that enforced disappearances continued by security forces (194). Extrajudicial killings, violence and harassment, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and abuse of detainees and other human-rights abuses by security forces were reported (195). Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports in its World Report 2016, covering events of 2015, that security forces, especially in Sindh and Balochistan, were involved in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances (196).

**Justice**

The formal court system, as established by the Constitution, consists of the Supreme Court, a High Court for the four provinces and Islamabad and a Federal Shariat Court (197). However, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts does not extend to areas such as AJK or GB that operate under separate judicial systems (198).

USDOS states:

‘Many lower courts remained corrupt, inefficient, and subject to pressure from wealthy, religious, and political figures. The politicized nature of judicial promotions increased the government’s influence over the court system. Informal justice systems lacking institutionalized legal protections continued, especially in rural areas, and often resulted in human rights abuses’ (199).

On 6 January 2015, President Nawaz Sharif signed the 21st Constitutional Amendment Bill of 2015 and the Pakistan Army Amendment Act 1952. Those amendments gave military courts the jurisdiction until February 2017 to convict civilians for terrorism-related offences (200). In August 2015 the Supreme Court upheld the parliamentary amendments (201). Many criticised the establishment of the military courts and warned that those courts could be used as a mechanism against political dissidents or groups that had disturbed the military in the past (202). A 2016 report of BTI noted that the judiciary in Pakistan was weakened by the creation of the military courts (203).

According to a report by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), the 11 established military courts put 64 persons on trial as of January 2016. About 100 cases are pending before the military courts. ICJ reported that those convicted by the military courts belong to various militant groups such as TTP, Harkat ul Jehad-e-Islami, SSP, JeM, al-Qaeda and Toheedwal Jihad Group (204).

### 1.4.2. Anti-Terrorism Acts

On 24 February 2014, the government announced an internal policy for a five-year period, the so-called Security Policy. It mainly focused on securing urban centres and kept largely silent on the situation in the FATA and Balochistan. It referred to dialogue with all stakeholders for madrassa reforms, militants’ rehabilitation and deradicalisation (205).

According to HRW, few steps were taken by the government to regulate the madrassas (206). A prime target of the Security Policy was isolating terrorists. The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was supposed to streamline the fight against terrorism and carry out tasks ranging from counter-terrorism to political and operational...
interventions. In February 2014 the government was still engaged in peace talks with the Taliban and the Security Policy proved insufficient once the military operation in North Waziristan started and the country fell victim to retaliatory attacks by the militants (207). The December 2014 terrorist attack on the Peshawar Army Public School served as a catalyst for the political consensus when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif convened an all-parties’ conference the day after the attack (208).

This led in the same month, in consultation with all political parties, to the establishment of a National Action Plan (NAP) to eliminate terrorism from Pakistan. Key features were:

- Establishment of speedy military trial courts for two years;
- Commitment to ensure that no armed militias were allowed to function in the country;
- Countering hate speech and extremist material;
- Choking financing for terrorists;
- Establishing and deploying a dedicated counterterrorism force;
- Strengthening and restructuring of NACTA;
- Registration and regulation of madrassas;
- Administrative and development reforms in the FATA with immediate focus on return of IDPs;
- Zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab;
- Taking the ongoing operation in Karachi to its logical conclusion;
- Empowering Balochistan government for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders;
- Formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with registration of all unregistered Afghans staying unlawfully in Pakistan;
- Revamping and reforming the criminal justice system to strengthen counter-terrorism departments including authorising the provincial Criminal Investigation Departments to intercept terrorist communications (209).

Later in December 2014 Nawaz Sharif announced the formation of a federal counter-terrorism force with immediate effect. An operation was to be launched against terrorism in the major cities. The Prime Minister also confirmed that operation Zarb-e-Azb in the tribal areas would continue (210).

Following the Peshawar school attack (see 1.1 Background of the conflict), the political and security establishment preferred to set up temporary military courts to try terrorism-related offences instead of pursuing the cases via an independent judiciary. The government also introduced a series of amendments in counter-terrorism laws and introduced the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance (PPO) (211).

In March 2015 the national Coordinator of NACTA, Hamid Ali Khan, presented some of the first results of the NAP. Approximately 10 billion rupees had been confiscated from clerics and banned organisations in order to choke terror funding. In the crackdown against those accused of hate speech, the law enforcement agencies registered 5,017 cases against clerics, while 4,647 of them were arrested. More than 3,758 clerics were arrested in Punjab, 508 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 197 in Sindh, 94 in Islamabad, 86 in Balochistan and 30 in Gilgit-Baltistan. Police also closed 40 shops that were selling and distributing hate material (212).

Figures of the results of NAP for all of 2015 are difficult to ascertain. In December 2015, a senior Interior Ministry official mentioned that the government arrested nearly 100,000 people. Only 2,000 of them were militants. The government claims that NAP is working and that violence declined (213). According to PIPS, NAP is only partially successful, mainly due to lack of coordinated responses (214).

(212) Reuters, Wave of arrests after Pakistan school massacre has unclear results, 16 December 2015.
(213) PIPS, Executive Summary of comprehensive package of NAP, 14 December 2015.
1.4.3. Detention and death penalty

Detention

USDOS reports ‘harsh and sometimes life-threatening conditions and abuse in some prisons and detention centers’. Furthermore, inadequate food and water, and poor sanitation facilities were common. Overcrowding in the prisons is a serious problem, due to a lack of facilities (215). The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) mentions also in the annual report of 2015 that ‘the harsh conditions of detention in Pakistani prisons remained unchanged during 2015’ (216).

Arbitrary arrest and detention were a widespread problem, according to USDOS. The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, but authorities did not always comply (217).

As of April 2015, World Prison Brief reported that Pakistan counts a prison population of 80,169 (218).

Death penalty

In December 2014, in the aftermath of the attack on a school in Peshawar, the Pakistan authorities partially lifted a moratorium on the death penalty that had been in place since 2008 (219).

On 10 March 2015, the Pakistani government declared that executions would resume for all capital crimes. Pakistan has more than 8,000 people on death row and the law mandates the death penalty for 28 offences, including murder, rape, treason and blasphemy (220). In November 2015, a parliamentary panel approved life imprisonment or the death penalty for the rape of girls aged 13 or under (221).

According to figures of HRCP, 366 people were executed since December 2014, as of 30 March 2016 (222). In 2015, Pakistan executed 327 people (223). According to AI, Pakistan executed 326 people in 2015, the highest number that AI recorded in the history of Pakistan (224). On 29 February 2016 Pakistan hanged Mumtaz Qadri, convicted of killing former Punjab governor Salman Taseer (225). After this countrywide protests broke out (226). In March 2016, pro-Qadri supporters organised a sit-in in Islamabad, which caused a lockdown of the Red zone in the city (227).

The military courts sentenced 27 people to death in 2015, according to AI (228). As of January 2016, ICJ reported that 36 people were sentenced to death by the military courts since the establishment of these courts (229).

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(218) World Prison Brief, Overview Pakistan, n.d.
(221) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Parliamentary panel approves death penalty, life imprisonment for child rapists, 3 November 2015.
(223) AI, Death sentences and executions report 2015, 6 April 2016, p. 6.
(224) Dawn, Taseer’s killer Mumtaz Qadri hanged, 1 March 2016.
(226) Dawn, Pro-Qadri demonstrators ignore govt ultimatum as Red Zone sit-in runs into fourth day, 30 March 2016.
(228) ICJ, Pakistan: The trial of civilians by military courts, January 2016, pp. 2.
1.5. Impact of the violence

1.5.1. Sources

Varying figures on civilian fatalities are provided by four different research institutions based on different definitions and variables. This makes it difficult to interpret these figures since not all institutes outline clear methodologies.

The four research institutes that present figures about the situation in 2015 are the Pakistani Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) and the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS).

The Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), established in Islamabad, was founded in 2006 by its director, Muhammad Amir Rana, an expert on Pakistani security issues (230). PIPS divides ‘attacks’ into five categories:

(i) terrorist attacks including militant attacks, nationalist insurgent attacks and sectarian-related attacks;
(ii) incidents of ethno-political violence;
(iii) cross-border attacks;
(iv) drone attacks; and
(v) operational attacks by security forces against militants’ (231).

The Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) is a Pakistani research institute that analyses politics in the country. Established in 2008, it is based in Islamabad and headed by Imtiaz Gul, a journalist and author of several books on Pakistan (232). CRSS published a report on security in Pakistan in 2016, written by senior research associate Mohammad Nafees. Violence as defined by CRSS includes terrorism, militant attacks, sectarian violence, crime targeted killings, security operations and drone strikes (233).

The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) is a website run by the Institute for Conflict Management, a non-profit organisation set up in 1997 in New Delhi. Headed by its founder K.P.S. Gill, former Director General of Indian Punjab Police, it is committed to the continuous evaluation and resolution of problems of internal security in South Asia. SATP has established ‘a comprehensive, searchable and continuously updated database on all available information relating to terrorism, low intensity warfare and ethnic/communal/sectarian strife in South Asia’ (234).

The Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) is an independent research think-tank based in Islamabad. This institution collects statistical data regarding Pakistan-specific anti-state violence. PICSS integrated the data of the Conflict Monitoring Center in its institute. PICSS published an annual security report in February 2016 (235). PICSS divided incidents of violence mainly in two categories: ‘violent militant activities and security forces actions’. PICSS is focused on anti-state violence and related responses. Sectarian violence, general crimes, ethnic or language-based violence are not mentioned in the annual report (236).

1.5.2. Civilian population

Victims

As the four sources cited above use different definitions of violent attacks and of victims, it is impossible to give one overview of the impact of the violence on the population. Therefore, the following paragraphs present data from the different sources separately to allow comparison and clearer understanding of the situation.

In 2015, PIPS recorded 1,097 attacks (237), resulting in 3,503 deaths and 2,167 injured (including deaths from terrorism): 778 civilians, 2,340 militants and 385 security personnel (police/FC/army/Levies/Rangers) (238). Compared to 2014,
the number of violent incidents decreased by 48%, from 2,099 in 2014 to 1,097 in 2015. The number of people killed in overall incidents of violence in Pakistan decreased by 34%, from 5,308 in 2014 to 3,503 in 2015. This trend included the deaths of 2,340 militants in 2015, compared to 2,991 in 2014, a decrease of 22%. In addition, the PIPS data show that terrorist attacks (625) accounted for nearly 57% of all violent incidents. The number of people killed and injured in terrorist attacks in 2015 decreased respectively, by 38% and 54%, compared to 2014. Operational strikes killed 1,560 people in 2015 including 1,545 militants (compared to 1,917 in 2014) (239).

SATP recorded 3,682 fatalities in ‘terrorist violence’ in 2015 (940 civilians, 339 security-force personnel, 2,403 terrorists/insurgents). Compared to 2014 (5,496 deaths), this number is considerably lower, due to a nearly 50% decrease in the number of killed security personnel and terrorists/insurgents (1,781 civilians, 533 security, 3,182 terrorists/insurgents). SATP also provides figures for the first quarter of 2016. As of 3 April 2016, SATP recorded in total 694 fatalities. Of these 206 were civilians, 84 security-force personnel and 404 terrorists/insurgents (240). In comparison to the first quarter of 2015 (1,118 fatalities), this is a decline in fatalities by almost 50% (241).

Data provided by CRSS shows 4,654 fatalities and 1,925 injured from violence (242) in 2015 (including 247 from terrorism): 1,392 civilians, 2,892 militants, 421 security officials, and 12 others (see Figure 2). Compared to 7,611 fatalities in 2014, the number of victims of violence decreased by roughly 40% (243). CRSS is the only institute that conducted research on the professions of the victims. It observed that, among the fatalities of civilians, the identifiable people were found to have a link with political-religious parties or belonging to professions such as private business, jurisprudence, education or health (244). According to CRSS, a steep reduction in violence-related fatalities was observed for security personnel (245). Security personnel, according to CRSS, includes: the police, the army, FC personnel, Pakistan Air Force, Levies, Khassadars and others. The category militants includes insurgents and criminals (246).

Figure 2: Victims of violence-related fatalities 2015 (CRSS) (247)

PICSS recorded 1,901 incidents of violence (248) by militants and counter-insurgency operations by the state in 2015. 3,368 people were killed: 2,312 militants, 641 civilians, 382 security forces personnel and 33 pro-government
Razakars (249). PICSS reported 1,774 injured: 994 civilians, 516 security-forces personnel, 250 militants, and 14 pro-government Razakars. Compared to 2014, a 33% decrease in overall number of incidents is noted, with a 37% decline in deaths and a 55% decline in injured people (250).

Table 2 gives a comparison of the fatalities in 2014 and 2015 between the four sources (based on the definitions described above). Although the numbers of fatalities differ among the four sources, they all indicate a steep decline in civilian deaths and conclude that this has been caused by a decrease in violent incidents in 2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Total no deaths</th>
<th>No of civilians</th>
<th>No of militants</th>
<th>No of security forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PIPS (251)</td>
<td>5308</td>
<td>1705</td>
<td>2991</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATP (252)</td>
<td>5496</td>
<td>1781</td>
<td>3182</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRSS (253)</td>
<td>7650</td>
<td>3625 (civilians+security)</td>
<td>4025 (incl. criminals)</td>
<td>742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PICSS (254)</td>
<td>5338</td>
<td>1241</td>
<td>3415 (incl.pro-government Razakars)</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Total no deaths</th>
<th>No of civilians</th>
<th>No of militants</th>
<th>No of security forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PIPS (255)</td>
<td>3503</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>2340</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATP (256)</td>
<td>3682</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>2403</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRSS (257)</td>
<td>4654</td>
<td>1392 (incl. criminals)</td>
<td>2892 (incl. government officials)</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PICSS (258)</td>
<td>3368</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>2312 (incl.pro-government Razakars)</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Comparison of the number of fatalities in 2014 and 2015 (PIPS, SATP, CRSS, PICSS) (259)

Fatalities in 2015 and the first quarter of 2016 per month

Data compiled by CRSS shows a decline in fatalities in the last quarter of 2015 compared to the first months of the year (see Figure 3). The last months of 2015 saw a continuous decline in the number of deaths (January: 488, December: 225). The most fatalities occurred in March and August. CRSS states that the average number of fatalities from October to December 2015 was the lowest for the past three years (260).

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(249) Paramilitary force created by the Pakistani army.
(253) CRSS, Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2014, 2015, pp. 6-7, 57. In its comparison between 2013 and 2014 (p. 57), CRSS does not make a distinction between civilians and security. However, for 2014 it gives a separate figure of 742 death military/security personnel (p. 7). This is included in the total figure of 3,625 civilian/security deaths. For 2015 CRSS made a difference between civilians and security. Contrary to the other three sources, CRSS combines militants and criminals in one category.
The same trend is visible in monthly data recorded by SATP as well, although the figures differ slightly. In January 2015, SATP counted 447 fatalities and 128 in December 2015. The last quarter of 2015 shows a significant decline in fatalities in comparison with the first nine months of 2015 (261).

Data compiled by PICSS shows the highest number of fatalities were in January, March and August 2015. PICSS states that there is a visible decline in the numbers of fatalities in the last quarter of 2015 (262).

Figure 3: Violence-Related Deaths in 2015 per month (CRSS) (263)

According to data of SATP, the number of fatalities is still decreasing in the first quarter of 2016. In January 2016, 213 fatalities were mentioned, which is a decline of 50% compared to January 2015 (264). In February and March 2016, SATP counted 215 and 266 fatalities, which is a slight increase in comparison to January 2016 (265). For the first 90 days of 2016, SATP counted 694 fatalities, which is a decline of almost 50% in comparison to 2015 (1,118 fatalities) (266).

According to data in the first quarter analysis report of 2016 conducted by CRSS, 872 fatalities were counted, a decline of almost 37% compared to the first quarter of 2015. Most fatalities in the first quarter occurred in March 2016 (267).

**Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees**

Military operations and fighting in the tribal areas have created a steady stream of IDPs. Since 2008, almost five million people from KP and the FATA have been registered as IDPs, uprooted in various waves. In the autumn of 2014 approximately one million people were still displaced and in need of humanitarian assistance and support. Additionally, operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan forced many local families to flee. The majority of the displaced families have sought refuge in Bannu, with some moving to Dera Ismail Khan, Lakki Marwat, Kohat Karak, Hangu and Charsadda in KP. Others moved to Sindh province (268).

In July 2015, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) recorded approximately 1.8 million people displaced by insurgency, counter-insurgency and other related violence in Pakistan (269). The statistics of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in August 2014 profiled 1,556,400 registered IDPs in Pakistan in need of humanitarian assistance. In 2014, an additional 500,000 persons were displaced as a result of the North Waziristan emergency (270).
According to an ISPR statement, 38% of the IDPs have so far returned to their homes in the FATA as of December 2015 (271). As of January 2016, National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) recorded 447,544 IDPs out of which 265,214 have returned to the FATA (272).

In addition Pakistan still hosts approximately 1.5 million refugees from Afghanistan, according to UNHCR (273). Their Proof of Registration cards (PoR) issued by NADRA have, in principle, been extended till June 2016. An additional estimated one million unregistered Afghans are living in Pakistan (274). Reportedly, Afghans face discriminatory measures in Pakistan and the Pakistani police react in a hostile manner to Afghan men (275).

1.6. Geographical overview of the violence


As mentioned earlier, the security situation in Pakistan improved in 2015 but certain regions are still affected by violence. Differences can be distinguished among the various regions.

PIPS published a map in the year report of 2015, indicating the numbers of attacks in the different areas in Pakistan (276). As described in section 1.5.1 Sources, PIPS divides attacks into five categories: ‘terrorist attacks, incidents of ethno-political violence, cross-border attacks, drone attacks and operational attacks by security forces against militants’ (277).

In most of the agencies of the FATA and in some districts of Balochistan more than 10 and less than 50 attacks occurred in 2015. Only in Karachi more than 50 and less than 100 attacks took place in the previous year. This is an improvement compared to 2014, when in Karachi more than 100 attacks were carried out (278). Also in 2015, compared to 2014, the number of attacks decreased in the districts of Quetta, Dera Bugti, Khuzdar and Bolan (Balochistan province) (279). In 2015, no region witnessed more than 100 attacks, according to PIPS (280).

The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) reported that the violence in Pakistan in 2015 was concentrated into different ‘high intensity’ geographical areas. ACLED describes the violence in Pakistan by actor: forces of the government, rebel groups, political and communal militias, rioters, protesters, civilians and external forces (281). PIPS, however, divides different areas in Pakistan according to numbers of attacks.

(271) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), 38% of IDPs have returned home, army chief told in North Waziristan, 19 December 2016; Dawn, Return of IDPs, 21 December 2015.
(272) Frontier Post (The), 265,214 IDP families so far returned in respective agencies, 19 January 2016.
(273) UNHCR, 2015 UNHCR country operations profile - Pakistan, n.d.
(274) Voice of America, UN Prods Pakistan to Deal with Afghan Refugees, 27 February 2016.
(275) HRW, What Are You Doing Here?, 18 November 2015.
In Figure 4, an overview of the violence in Pakistan by actor is shown on a map by ACLED:\(^{282}\):

**Figure 4: overview of the violence in Pakistan by actor 2015 (ACLED)\(^{283}\)**

According to ACLED data the most intense fighting occurred primarily in Balochistan and FATA (see Figure 4). Pakistani protests were mostly concentrated in the provinces Sindh, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (see Figure 6)\(^{284}\).

In part two of this report, security trends are explained in greater detail and by geographic division (see section 2. Security situation per region).

### 1.6.2. Regional comparison of violence related fatalities 2014-2015

In this section, figures of fatalities and attacks at the regional level are given, according to the four sources as described in section 1.5.1 Sources. It is impossible to present the figures in one comparative table, as the four sources use different parameters and definitions.

PIPS only gives regional details for terrorist attacks\(^{285}\), which make up about 57 % of all violent incidents\(^{286}\). PIPS focuses on the number of terrorist attacks (and consequent fatalities per province, and indicates percentage changes in 2015 compared to 2014 (see Table 3). Compared to 2014, PIPS observed a major decrease in terrorist incidents and fatalities in 2015 (48 % overall), except in Gilgit-Baltistan where the figures slightly increased. Balochistan and the FATA were most affected by terrorist attacks in 2015. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa occupied the third position (see Table 3)\(^{287}\).
### Table 3: Terrorist attacks by region - 2015 vs. 2014 (PIPS) (288)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No of terrorist incidents</th>
<th>% change</th>
<th>No of killed</th>
<th>% change</th>
<th>No of injured</th>
<th>% change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilgit-Baltistan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamabad</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh (excl. Karachi)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>339%</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>108%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>625</strong></td>
<td><strong>48%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1069</strong></td>
<td><strong>38%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1443</strong></td>
<td><strong>54%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SATP gives data for fatalities per province in 2015, subdivided into civilians, security forces and terrorists/militants. The total number of fatalities in 2015, according to SATP, was 3,682. FATA and Sindh were the regions most affected, with 1,882 and 718 fatalities respectively. Balochistan occupied the third position with 635 fatalities (289).

CRSS recorded the most fatalities in the FATA (1,917). Still, the number of fatalities in the FATA dropped by 50% compared 2014. Overall, the decrease in fatalities can be largely attributed to a sharp decrease in violence-related fatalities in KP, in the FATA and Sindh. A very slight increase in terms of fatalities, in comparison with 2014, occurred in the province Punjab (290).

Generally, the overall trend is similar between the research conducted by SATP and CRSS, with highest fatalities in the FATA, followed by Sindh, Balochistan and KP. The overall number of fatalities for 2015, observed by SATP (3,682), is a little less than CRSS (4,653). This is mainly due to differing fatalities from Sindh: SATP (291) mentions 718 fatalities in 2015 whereas the figure is 1,221 according to CRSS (292). These discrepancies might also be caused by different definitions and parameters used by the two institutes.

Figure 5 presents a comparative regional analysis by CRSS of violence–related fatalities in Pakistan in 2014 and 2015.

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(289) SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2015, n.d.
PICSS only gives regional details for militant attacks. In 2015, 706 militant attacks were observed. 1,325 people were killed and 1,464 others injured. According to PICSS, most fatalities of militant attacks were reported in the FATA, the provinces Balochistan and Sindh.\footnote{CRSS, Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2015, 2016, p. 8.}
2. Security situation per region

In this chapter, security trends are explained in greater detail and by geographic division. In each section a general description is included of the region, followed by a description of the violence, actors of the conflict and the impact of the violence.

Under the sub-sections several incidents are described. These should be read as illustrations of trends in the security situation and not as an exhaustive list of incidents.

2.1. Punjab

2.1.1. Short description of the region

Punjab province is situated in the east of Pakistan. It borders the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in the northeast, the Indian States of Punjab and Rajasthan in the east, the province Sindh in the south, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces in the west, Islamabad federal capital area and Azad Kashmir in the north. The provincial capital of Punjab is Lahore. Lahore is the second biggest city of Pakistan, after Karachi (Sindh province). Lahore is the economic and cultural heart of the province. The population in the province is estimated at 91 million.

2.1.2. Description of the violence

CRSS reports that in 2015 the highest causes of fatalities in the province were security operations, targeted killings and militant attacks. Other types of violence mentioned by CRSS were robberies and political rivalries. In 2015, PIPS noted a 41% decline in terrorist attacks and a 34% decline in killings in Punjab, compared to the previous year. Twenty-four attacks were counted by PIPS in 2015. PICSS counted 25 militant attacks in which 110 people (civilians, militants and security forces) were killed in 2015, which is a slight drop compared to 2014.

According to PIPS, militant groups targeted personnel of security and law-enforcement agencies, members of minorities and journalists. In March 2015, Taliban suicide bombers targeted 2 churches in Lahore. In this attack, 18 civilians were killed whereas 70 others were injured. In August 2015, the Home Minister of Punjab and 12 other people were killed in a prominent suicide attack in Attock district.
Other specific targets of militants’ attacks include a suicide bombing at an **Imambargah** ((306)) in February 2015 in Rawalpindi ((307)) and the killing of eight people in October 2015 when a member of the National Assembly Sardar Amjad Khosa was targeted in a suicide attack ((308)).

On 27 March 2016 a suicide bombing killed at least 72 and injured more than 300 people in Lahore. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar claimed the attack and stated that the Christian community was the prime target ((309)). Although the attack targeted the Christian community, most of the victims were Muslims ((310)).

### 2.1.3. Actors in the conflict

Militant networks and extremists are present in Punjab. Most of these groups are concentrated in the south of the province but are expanding their influence throughout the province ((311)). In spite of the relative peace, there is a growing trend of radicalisation of the population, particularly in the south ((312)). Many **madrassas** are located in South Punjab ((313)). Due to the hesitance of the Punjab government to close down the **madrassas** in the south, the central and northern areas of Punjab have also become radicalised ((314)). A decline in terrorist attacks occurred in the south of Punjab province in recent years but Deobandi-organisations gained influence in other areas ((315)).

The **TTP**, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, LeJ and SMP are the main actors carrying out terrorist attacks in Punjab with motives ranging from sectarian targeted killings to targeting security institutions, according to PIPS ((316)). PICSS also sees the development of militants of IS in the province in 2015 ((317)).

After the suicide attack on 27 March 2016 in Lahore (see above), the government launched a coordinated operation in the province in April 2016. The Pakistani army, the Rangers, the police, and personnel of the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) of Punjab were deployed ((318)).

### 2.1.4. Impact of the violence

CRSS reports that fatalities from targeted killings decreased from 95 in 2014 to 27 in 2015. Robbery-related fatalities were at the same level as 2014. The highest number of fatalities in Punjab was because of security operations (176 deaths) and militant attacks (79 deaths) ((319)).

According to different sources, most casualties were civilians, followed by criminals, militants, security forces and others ((320)). SATP recorded in 2015, 176 fatalities (90 civilians, 9 security force personnel and 77 terrorists) (321).

CRSS states that in 2015 fatalities were recorded in 27 out of 39 districts of the province Punjab. Sixteen districts in Punjab counted more than five fatalities in 2015. Lahore was the city most affected by violence, followed by Faisalabad and Rawalpindi in 2015 (see Figure 6) ((322)).
Figure 6: Violence-related Fatalities in Punjab by district 2015 (CRSS) (323)

In the first quarter of 2016, SATP counted 116 fatalities. Among those fatalities, SATP observed 75 civilians, 5 security-force personnel and 36 militants (324). This relatively high number of fatalities in the first quarter of 2016 can mainly be attributed to the attack in Lahore on 27 March 2016 (see above) when 72 civilians were killed (325). In response, the Pakistani army carried out raids and detained approximately 216 suspected militants (326).

2.2. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

2.2.1. Short description of the region

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is situated in the north of Pakistan and borders Afghanistan in the west and the FATA in the north, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan in the east and northeast, Punjab province in the southeast, and Balochistan province in the southwest. The provincial capital is Peshawar. The population is estimated at 21 million (327).

In 2009, the Pakistani army engaged in a series of military operations against the TTP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This offensive was marked by human-rights violations and arbitrary arrests (328). These hostilities caused a large wave of displacements (329). Several sources interviewed during an Austrian Fact-Finding Mission in July 2015 stated that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is ‘remotely peaceful but remains quite vulnerable as it shares its border with the FATA, which has been the scene of large-scale operations by the Pakistani armed forces to eradicate militant activity’ (330). The local Taliban in the province went underground and continued its activity in large parts through terrorist attacks and targeted killings (331).

2.2.2. Description of the violence

PIPS reported 125 terrorist attacks (332) in 2015, a decline of 61 % in comparison to 2014 (333). According to PICSS, the security situation improved in the province. For this period PICSS recorded 139 militant attacks that killed 224 people and...
injured 253. 2015 marked a 70 % decline in militant attacks, in comparison to the previous year (334). The improvement in the security situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is linked to the military operations in the FATA, particularly those conducted in Khyber Agency as well as the measures taken under the National Action Plan (335).

Besides terrorist attacks, the province also experienced ethnic/political violence, clashes between security forces and militants, inter-tribal clashes, Pakistan-Afghan border attacks, inter-militant clashes, abductions by militants and militants-tribesmen clashes (336).

Methods of violence used during 2015 included executions, bomb explosions, abductions where captors were killed and their bodies dumped, suicide attacks, hand-grenade attacks, armed attacks, indiscriminate firing, IED explosions and cross-border attacks. The counter-violence operation carried out by security forces in the province featured air raids and clashes with militants. Custodial deaths, beheadings and executions by militants in the province were reported by CRSS as well (337).

The province was hit by a number of prominent attacks in 2015. In September 2015, militants attacked Badhaber airbase, killing at least 30 persons (338). Suicide blasts targeted prominent persons and mosques. In April 2015, a convoy of former Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao’s was targeted. In April and May 2015, militants targeted two mosques (339). At the end of December 2015, a suicide bomber attacked a NADRA office in Mardan, killing 26 and injuring 30 (340).

A wave of attacks, carried out by factions of the TTP, hit the province during the first months of 2016. In January 2016, militants attacked a university in Charsadda (341). In March 2016, a suicide attack was carried out on a court, also in Charsadda, killing at least 16 persons (342). A week later, a bus carrying government officials was hit by an IED, killing 15 persons and injuring 30 (343).

2.2.3. Actors in the conflict

Representatives of FATA Research Centre interviewed during the Austrian Fact Finding mission in July 2015 reported the presence of ‘militant sleeper cells’ in the province, which can be activated by militant groups if required. According to the Austrian Fact Finding Mission report, the following groups are present: TTP, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, TTP Mahsud group, Lashkar-e-Islam of Khyber Agency, TTP Fazlullah group of Swat and LeJ (344).

PIPS states that the TTP or associated groups carried out 115 of the 125 terrorist attacks, while 10 attacks were sectarian and mainly carried out by SMP and LeJ (345). Check-posts and convoys of the security forces were also the targets of militants in 2015 (346).

2.2.4. Impact of the violence

Estimates for fatalities from violent attacks, according to consulted sources, show a downward trend in 2015 compared with 2014 (347). CRSS reports a sharp decline in the number of fatalities among civilians, militants and security forces in 2015. CRSS mentions a slight increase in the number of fatalities of political activists (348). SATP recorded 268 fatalities in 2015, including 117 civilians, 76 security-force personnel and 75 militants (349).

(338) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Brazen assault: Bloodbath at airbase, 19 September 2015.
(339) SATP, Suicide Attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 27 March 2016.
(340) Dawn, 26 killed in suicide attack near NADRA office in Mardan, 29 December 2016.
(341) Al Jazeera, Twenty people killed in Pakistan university attack, 20 January 2016.
(342) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Suicide blast kills 16 in Shabqadar as Taliban avenge Qadri’s execution, 7 March 2016.
(343) BBC, Pakistan: Bus bomb explosion kills 15 in Peshawar, 16 March 2016.
In 2015, Peshawar was the most affected part of the province, just like in 2014. PIPS recorded 38 terrorist attacks in Peshawar. These attacks targeted civilians, security forces, educational institutions, health workers, the Shia religious community, political leaders/workers, tribesmen, power installations, government officials and buildings, Sikh community and places of worship (350). Dera Ismail Khan was the second most targeted area of the province, followed by Charsadda (351).

CRSS reports that the fatalities from violence in Peshawar declined considerably in 2015 compared to 2014. Bannu was the second district in terms of fatalities, followed by Mardan and Dera Ismail Khan (see Figure 7) (352).

Figure 7: Violence-related fatalities in KP by district in 2015 (CRSS) (353)

In the first three months of 2016, 76 fatalities (mostly civilian) were counted by SATP (354). A very slight decrease in the number of fatalities is observed in comparison to the first quarter of 2015 (80 fatalities) (355).

In the aftermath of the attacks on universities in this province (in Peshawar 2014 and Charsadda 2016), security measures were taken by the provincial government. New boundary walls were built, damaged buildings reconstructed and at the University of Peshawar armed police are guarding the main entrance (356).

In spite of frequent terrorist attacks, the situation in the province improved significantly in 2015 compared to 2008-2009. This is shown by a decline in military activity in the province. The socio-economic recovery of IDPs is slow, partly due to the damage to the agricultural infrastructure (357).

Displacement

In 2016, the UN did not report any conflict-induced displacement from areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which is only identified as a hosting area (358).

2.3. Balochistan

2.3.1. Short description of the region

Balochistan is located in the west of Pakistan. It borders Iran in the west, Afghanistan in the northwest, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in the northeast, Punjab province in the east, Sindh province in the southeast, and the Arabian

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356 Los Angeles Times (The), Threatened by the Taliban, some schools in Pakistan close -- others arm teachers and build walls, 1 February 2016.
357 IPS, Barren Fields Recover From Taliban, 30 December 2013.
358 UN OCHA, PAKISTAN: KP and FATA - Areas of Displacement, Hosting and Returns, 2 June 2016.
Sea in the south \(^{(359)}\). Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan but in terms of population is the smallest. The majority of the people are Baloch, but the second largest group are Pashtun (40 %). The provincial capital Quetta is also the home of a large part of the Hazara community in Pakistan \(^{(360)}\).

In 2006, the violent death of nationalist frontrunner and tribal head Nawab Akbar Bugti sparked unrest in the province. Since then, the two biggest militant groups, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), have staged increasing numbers of attacks on government targets and on Punjabi settlers. The authorities have reacted strongly \(^{(361)}\). During recent years, the Frontier Corps have abducted, tortured and killed hundreds of Balochi sympathisers. Human right violations are frequently cited \(^{(362)}\). The fighting in Balochistan is usually referred to as ‘a low-level insurgency’ \(^{(363)}\).

Apart from a nationalist uprising, Balochistan is also plagued by sectarian violence. The local Shia community, mostly Hazara, has increasingly become the victim of violent attacks. It is generally assumed that LeJ and al-Qaeda affiliates are responsible for most of the attacks against the Hazara community \(^{(364)}\).

Another factor contributing to the conflict in Balochistan in recent years is the international involvement in Pakistan’s efforts to build the Gwadar Port in collaboration with China. To protect the project, Pakistan intends to increase its military presence in the region. Pakistan accused India and other countries of interfering and supporting the Baloch separatists \(^{(365)}\).

### 2.3.2. Description of the violence

Balochistan counted 218 terrorist attacks \(^{(366)}\) in 2015 compared to 341 the previous year (a decrease of 36 %) \(^{(367)}\). The tactics of the insurgents include the use of IEDs, explosions, shootings, rocket attacks, grenade attacks and acts of sabotage \(^{(368)}\). PICSS mentions a decline in militant attacks in 2015 with 280 such incidents that year. PICSS states also that the use of IEDs was the most prominent tactic employed by militants, followed by physical assaults, targeted killings and rocket attacks \(^{(369)}\). Examples of security incidents in the province of Balochistan include: in January 2015, seven people, including six soldiers, were killed in a suicide attack \(^{(370)}\). In April 2015, 20 dam builders were shot dead by Baloch insurgents \(^{(371)}\). On 29 May 2015, 22 people were shot dead by gunmen near Mastung \(^{(372)}\). In August 2015, militants attacked the Jiwani airport near Gwadar district, killing two engineers of Civil Aviation Authority \(^{(373)}\). In October 2015, a bomb exploded in a bus near Quetta, killing at least 11 people \(^{(374)}\).

Apart from terrorist attacks, Balochistan in 2015 also suffered from 31 operational attacks by security forces, 44 armed clashes and encounters between security forces and militants, 10 cross-border attacks in areas bordering Iran and Afghanistan, two inter-militants clashes and one incident of political violence \(^{(375)}\). According to CRSS, targeted killings declined by 30 % and incidents of terrorism reduced by 60 % compared to 2014. Apart from targeted killings, CRSS mentions fatalities due to infighting between UBA and BLA as well as robberies, cross-border attacks, militant justice, custodial deaths, self-detonation, accidental explosions, ethnic killings, tribal feuds and police rivalries \(^{(376)}\).

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\(^{(360)}\) Encyclopædia Britannica, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, n.d.


\(^{(367)}\) Definition of ‘terrorist attacks’ by PIPS, see p. 25.


\(^{(372)}\) BBC, Pakistan dam builders shot dead in Balochistan, 11 April 2015.

\(^{(373)}\) Reuters, Gunmen kill 22 bus passengers in Pakistan attack, 30 May 2015.

\(^{(374)}\) Dawn, Militants attack Jiwani airport in Balochistan, two killed, 30 August 2015.

\(^{(375)}\) Reuters, Bus blast kills 11 in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, 19 October 2015.

PIPS also recorded a decline of 20% in sectarian-related terrorist attacks in the province in 2015 (377). In 2015, PIPS recorded 12 sectarian-related attacks, most of them occurring in Quetta. All these attacks were carried out by LeJ, and most among those killed were members of the Hazara community (378). One Hazara was killed on 12 May 2015 (379). Two weeks later, five Hazara’s were gunned down in two different attacks in the same week (380).

In the first month of 2016 terrorist attacks were on the rise in Balochistan (381). PICSS observed an improvement in the number of security incidents in February 2016 (13 incidents) compared to January 2016 (25 incidents) in the province (382). One of the most deadly attacks in the first quarter of 2016 occurred on 6 February. The TPP carried out a suicide attack on a vehicle of the security forces, killing at least 9 and injuring 34 (383).

2.3.3. Actors in the conflict

Reportedly, the most active groups in the province are the following: the Baloch Liberation Front, the Baloch Republican Army, the Balochistan Liberation Tigers, the Baloch Liberation Army, the Baloch United Liberation Front, Lashkar-e-Balochistan and the United Baloch Army. Islamist militant groups are also present in Balochistan including the TTP, LeJ and SSP (384).

About 89% of the reported terrorist attacks were carried out by Baloch insurgent groups in 2015. The TTP and other militant groups with similar objectives, including Jundullah, carried out 12 terrorist attacks and LeJ was responsible for 12 sectarian-related attacks (385).

The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) noted that security forces intensified their presence in the province since the beginning of 2016. According to AHRC, the government uses the CPEC-project as an excuse to target Baloch insurgents (386).

2.3.4. Impact of the violence

In 2015, in the province of Balochistan, 550 deaths and 395 injured were reported by PIPS out of 306 incidents of violence (387). SATP recorded 635 deaths in Balochistan (247 civilians, 90 security personnel and 298 militants) (388). CRSS counted 275 deaths of civilians and 215 deaths of militants (389).

Ninety-three bodies were discovered in different parts of the province in 2015. The identities of most of those killed and their killers were unknown (390). 463 individuals went forcibly missing in 2015 and the tortured bodies of 157 Baloch people were found, according to various sources (391).

Similar to 2014, PIPS states that Quetta (48 attacks) was most affected by terrorist attacks, followed by Dera Bugti (29 attacks) and Kech (20 attacks) (392). According to CRSS, most fatalities occurred in Quetta, Kech, Kalat and Awaran (see Figure 8). CRSS mentions that the number of fatalities in Quetta is declining in recent years, but that there is an increase of fatalities in districts such as Kech, Kalat, Awaran, Mastung and Panjgur (393).

(380) Express Tribune (The)/International New York Times (The), Two more Hazaras gunned down in Quetta, 27 May 2015.
(381) News (The), Terror attacks increased in Balochistan in last one month, 30 January 2016.
(383) Dawn, Nine killed, 34 injured as suicide attack targets security forces’ vehicle in Quetta, 7 February 2016.
(386) AHRC, Military intensifies operation in Balochistan, 20 April 2016.
(391) Nation (The), 157 killed, 463 missing persons in Balochistan last year: VBMP, 2 January 2016.
In the first three months of 2016, 164 fatalities were observed by SATP. This includes 32 civilians, 42 security personnel and 90 militants. Compared to the same period in 2015, this is a slight increase in fatalities (130 in 2015).

In 2006, when President Pervez Musharraf launched a military operation in the Marri and Bugti tribal areas, it caused a wave of about 100,000 IDPs who fled to neighbouring districts. By 2015, the precise number of Baloch IDPs was unclear because humanitarian organisations are banned from visiting the province. A huge number of Baloch IDPs fled to Afghanistan but are still being targeted by the ISI.

**Displacement**

As of February 2016, an estimated 250,000 people are displaced by violence from Baluchistan.

### 2.4. Sindh

#### 2.4.1. Short description of the region

The province of Sindh is situated in the southeast of Pakistan. It borders the province of Balochistan in the north and in the west, the province of Punjab in the northeast and the Arabian Sea in the south. The population is an estimated 36 million. The provincial capital, Karachi, is the largest city in Pakistan and is the part of Sindh where significant sectarian, ethnic and political violence occurs.

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*SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2016, 3 April 2016.*

*SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2015, n.d.*


*UNPO, Balochistan: The Silent Plight of Baloch Refugees, 26 October 2015.*

*RFE/RL, Pakistan’s Invisible Baluch Displacement Crisis, 24 February 2016; IDMC, Pakistan: solutions to displacement elusive for both new and protracted IDPs, 24 August 2015.*

*Encyclopædia Britannica, Sindh, n.d.*

*Aikins, M., Gangs of Karachi, September 2015.*
2.4.2. Description of the violence

According to PIPS, in 2015, 102 terrorist attacks were recorded across Sindh, of which 85 were in Karachi. This is a decline of 59% in comparison to 2014. In interior Sindh, 17 terrorist attacks were counted, a decrease of almost 45% on the previous years (403). Among those terrorist attacks, there were sectarian-related attacks as well, mainly targeting members of the Shia community (403). Major incidents targeting the Shia community were: in January 2015, a bomb exploded in a Shia mosque in Shikarpur, killing at least 61. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by Jundullah (404). On 13 May 2015, militants attacked a bus in Karachi, killing at least 45 people and injuring 13 others (403). On 23 October 2015, a suicide bomber killed at least 22 people who were taking part in a procession by Shia Muslims (405). In Sindh, 30 incidents of ethno-political violence (405) occurred in 2015, according to PIPS. Twenty-three of these were recorded in Karachi (406).

In terms of types of attacks, PICSS mentions militants’ physical assaults, targeted killings, suicide attacks and IEDs attacks (406). CRSS details different types of security incidents in the province of Sindh. Targeted killings and militant attacks dropped significantly. Robbery-related incidents increased compared to 2014 and 2013. Bomb explosions, landmines, IEDs, armed, rocket and suicide attacks were the methods of violence used in Sindh during the last three years (407). The fatalities from violence-related incidents dropped significantly in 2015, with the exception of suicide attacks.

2.4.3. Actors in the conflict

In Sindh, different militant groups are present such as the TTP and al-Qaeda. Also sectarian violent groups have their roots in Sindh. SSP and LeJ have consolidated their presence in Sindh, particularly in the northern part of the province (411). According to sources, traces of Islamic State-inspired groups can be found in the province (412).

Most attacks in the province in 2015 were carried out by factions of the TTP and other militant groups with similar objectives as the TTP. PIPS noted attacks carried out by Sindhi and Baloch nationalist insurgents (413).

A significant dynamic in Karachi is the power struggle between the political parties of the main demographic groups, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM, Mohajir), the Awami National Party (ANP, Pashtun) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP, Sindhi). The armed wings of these respective formations are responsible for mutual assassinations of political leaders and workers, as well as city riots and deadly clashes (414). Apart from this political violence, Karachi is the base for more than 200 heavily armed criminal gangs. Sometimes these carry out attacks for the armed wings of the political parties (415).

Since September 2013, a military operation in Karachi has aimed to eradicate criminal organisations linked to the political parties. Search operations and raids conducted by the Rangers continued in 2015 and the first months of 2016. At the end of 2015, the provincial government extended the Rangers policing powers in the province (416). As of February 2016, 12,000 people were arrested in more than 7,000 raids conducted by the Rangers (417).

(405) Nation (The), Shikarpur imambargah bombing kills 61, 31 January 2015.
(406) BBC, Pakistan gunmen kill 45 on Karachi Ismaili Shia bus, 13 May 2015.
(407) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), 20 killed, several injured as suicide bomber strikes in Jacobabad, 23 October 2015.
(409) USIP, Conflict dynamics in Sindh, 26 January 2015.
(410) News (The), Daish network exists in Sindh, 14 October 2015; Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor (The), Growing Evidence of Islamic State in Pakistan, 4 February 2016.
(412) Lieven, A., Pakistan, a hard country, 2011, pp. 303, 316; USIP, Conflict dynamics in Karachi, 19 October 2012.
(413) USIP, Conflict dynamics in Karachi, 19 October 2012; Guardian (The), Karachi vice: inside the city torn apart by killings, extortion and terrorism, 21 October 2015.
(414) Dawn, Rangers claim to have arrested 4,074 suspects in Karachi 2015, 29 December 2015.
(415) Dawn, More work left to be done in Karachi operation: DG ISPR, 13 February 2016; Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), No let-up in Karachi operation, says Rangers DG, 1 February 2016.
2.4.4. Impact of the violence

As can be observed from Table 3 (Sindh and Karachi), Sindh had the third-highest number of casualties in the country during 2015. While there was a decrease in terrorism-related fatalities in Sindh in 2015 compared to 2014, the number of killings due to sectarian-related attacks increased by 62% (102 in 2014, 165 in 2015) (418).

PIPS mentions that most of the fatalities recorded were civilians, followed by police officers, army and Rangers (419). CRSS recorded 1,221 fatalities in Sindh in 2015. In the last three years, 3,410 persons identified as civilians, political and religious party activists became victims of violence, followed by 1,538 categorised as outlaws (militants, criminals, insurgents, and kidnappers) while there were 541 security and government official fatalities (420).

The fatalities from violence-related incidents dropped significantly in 2015, with the exception of suicide attacks, according to CRSS (421). As can be observed from Table 3 (Sindh and Karachi), CRSS states that Karachi was the most affected part of Sindh in terms of fatalities in 2015. However, there was almost a 50% reduction in the number of fatalities in 2015 (1,040) compared to 2014 (2,023). A steep decline in civilian casualties is reported by CRSS, as can be observed from Table 3.

In the districts of Shikarpur, Sukkur and Jacobabad respectively, 72, 30 and 29 fatalities were recorded by CRSS (see also Figure 10) (422). PIPS makes the same observation as CRSS. As many as 242 of those killed (96%) in terrorist attacks in the province were mainly concentrated in three cities: Karachi, Shikarpur and Jacobabad (423).

**Figure 9: Violence-related fatalities in Sindh by district in 2015 (CRSS) (424)**

Overall, security operations in Sindh reduced the violence in Karachi in 2015, though militant groups moved their operations to interior Sindh, which is reflected in the higher number of fatalities in the cities in that area (also see Figure 9) (425).

In the first quarter of 2016, SATP recorded 90 fatalities (426) in the province compared to 261 in the first quarter of 2015. A high number of fatalities among militants (74) was observed in the first 90 days of 2016 (427). This was due to the ongoing operations in Karachi and interior Sindh against militants, carried out by the Rangers (428).

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(426) SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2015, n.d.
(428) Dawn, Operation being extended to interior of Sindh, 18 February 2016.
2.5. Federally Administered Tribal Areas

2.5.1. Short description of the region

The FATA are situated on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border between the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Afghanistan, and border Balochistan in the south. The FATA comprises seven agencies: Bajaur Agency, Mohmand Agency, Orakzai Agency, Kurram Agency, North and South Waziristan. The total population in the FATA is estimated to be 5 million. The FATA have a strong tribal structure.

Since 2004, the Pakistani army has conducted military operations in the FATA. As in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa this led to a series of human-rights violations and consecutive waves of displacement. These military operations had a great impact on socio-economic life in the region. Educational institutions were destroyed and agricultural output suffered.

According to an Austrian Fact Finding Mission report, the situation in the FATA improved significantly since the start of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. By 2015 most of the areas in the FATA have been cleared of militants which resulted in a significant decline in militant attacks. Due to Operation Zarb-e-Azb, most of the militants fled to Afghanistan, according to a Representative of FATA Research Centre. However, there are two ‘pockets of resistance’ left near the Pakistan-Afghan border: Dattakhel, Shawal in North Waziristan and the areas around Raigal in Khyber Agency. In November 2015, the government formed a committee that will discuss the future of the FATA.

At the start of 2016 the Pakistani government took initiatives to restore and improve daily life in the FATA. For instance, it announced the return of displaced people in the FATA and shopkeepers can resume their work in the bazars. Schools damaged by the Pakistani Taliban are being repaired and are expected to reopen soon.

2.5.2. Description of the violence

General

According to PICCS, the overall security situation improved in 2015 as a result of military actions in the FATA. The number of militant attacks decreased. PICSS counted 170 militant attacks, in which 396 people died. According to PIPS, 149 terrorist attacks were carried out, a decline of 36 % compared to 2014.

Fata Research Center (FRC) states in its annual report of 2015 that in the FATA militant violence decreased by 40 % in 2015 compared to 2014. FRC counted 293 incidents of violence in the FATA. Table 4 (see below) gives an overview of the nature of the violence for the FATA, per agency, in 2015.

Table 4 shows that the nature of the attacks is diverse. Methods used by militants included IEDs, suicide attacks, targeted killings, cross-border attacks, clashes between militants groups and militant ambushes on security personnel. Pakistani security forces reacted in 2015 with aerial strikes, ground operations and search operations. This was due to Operation Zarb-e-Azb which was mainly carried out in these areas.
Table 4: Security Overview 2015—Nature of Attacks (FRC) (443)

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<th>Nature of Attacks</th>
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<td>293</td>
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In his quarterly analysis of the first months of 2016, FRC states that there was again a rise in militant attacks and anti-militant operations in FATA compared to 2015. According to FRC, every agency in the FATA, except Orakzai Agency, experienced more militant activity (444). IED attacks remained the preferred ‘mode of militancy’ during the first three months of 2016 (445).

Below is a description of the violence, per agency, in the FATA.
Bajaur Agency

Bajaur Agency is located in the north of the FATA. Because it shares most of its border with Afghanistan, this agency is particularly vulnerable to cross-border attacks (446).

FRC describes the security situation in Bajaur in 2015 as ‘turbulent and disturbed’. The first 9 months of 2015 were particularly violent. In the last quarter of 2015 incidents of violence declined (447). FRC counted 48 security incidents in 2015, in which 49 people were killed and 30 injured (See Table 4) (448).

PIPS states that 25 terrorist attacks occurred in Bajaur, in which 20 people were killed and 27 injured (449). IED attacks, targeted killings and cross-border attacks were the dominate trends of militancy in Bajaur Agency (450).

Militants targeted civilians, political workers, security personnel and pro-government tribal elders, according to PIPS (451). In January 2015, 3 soldiers and 7 militants were killed during an army operation to clear suspected militants (452). In May 2015, an IED killed 6 persons including a tribal elder (453). In November 2015, an anti-Taliban tribal elder was killed by an IED (454).

In the first three months of 2016, FRC counted 5 militant attacks. The security forces also conducted three search operations against the militants during the first quarter of 2016. Eight people were killed and 2 injured (455).

Khyber Agency

Khyber Agency borders Afghanistan to the West, Orakzai Agency to the south, Kurram Agency to south-west and Peshawar in the east. This agency is divided in three administrative units: Bara, Jamrud and LandiKotal (456).

In October 2014, the military Operation Khyber 1 started to target militants who fled Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan and took shelter in Khyber Agency (457). In the spring of 2015 Operation Khyber 2 was launched, which lasted until June 2015. The military took control over most of the strategic areas in the agency and militant groups fled to Afghanistan (458).

According to FRC, Khyber Agency is the second most volatile region of the FATA after North Waziristan. Eighty-two incidents of violence occurred, killing 590 people and leaving 239 injured (see Table 4). The first quarter of 2015 was especially volatile with 33 incidents, due to the start of operation Khyber 2 (459).

PIPS recorded in 2015 36 terrorist attacks, a decline of 40 % compared to 2014. Fifty-five people were killed and 106 injured in those attacks (460). FRC notes an overall decline in terms of casualties (civilian, security forces and Lashkars). An increase in militant’s deaths was noticed compared to the previous year (461).

Targeted killings, attacks on security forces and Lashkars, and clashes occurred between militants and the Pakistani army (462). For example one major suicide attack occurred in January 2016 when a suicide bomber targeted a security check-post. Ten people died and more than 20 were injured (463).
Militants targeted civilians, political workers, security personnel and pro-government tribal elders in Khyber Agency, according to PIPS (464). An IED explosion in February 2015 targeted a peace committee in Tirah Valley, killing 3 (465). In September 2015, a suicide attack took place in Jamrud, killing 3 persons (466).

Although Operation Khyber 2 officially ended in June 2015, the security forces continued to conduct air strikes to weaken and eliminate terrorist pockets in the first quarter of 2016. FRC states that 6 militant attacks took place, in which 76 died (467).

Kurram Agency

Kurram Agency shares its border largely with Afghanistan. In the east, this agency borders Orakzai Agency and Khyber Agency, and North Waziristan Agency in the south. It is divided in three administrative units: Lower Kurram, Upper Kurram and Central Kurram. Kurram is the only agency in the FATA where Shiites are a majority. Kurram Agency has a history of sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia (468). From 2007 to 2012, intensive fighting between Sunni and Shia dominated the scene in Kurram Agency (469).

FRC noticed an increase in violent incidents (17) in the first quarter of 2015. In the second and third quarter the violence declined but in the last quarter of 2015 incidents increased again. Overall, 35 incidents took place, killing 111 and injuring 112 (see Table 4). Most of the incidents in the first quarter occurred in Lower Kurram. According to FRC, this can be explained by its borders with North Waziristan from which militants fled to Kurram Agency (470).

PIPS counted 17 terrorist attacks, killing 47 and injuring 95 (471). Militants used IEDs, cross-border attacks and ambush attacks. Military convoys and civilians were the targets (472). A major incident occurred in December 2015, when an IED exploded at a market close to Parachinar city, killing at least 23 people. LeJ claimed responsibility for the attack (473).

FRC mentions 5 militant attacks in the first three months of 2016, in which 3 people were killed and 2 injured (474).

Orakzai Agency

Orakzai shares its borders with Khyber Agency in the north, FR Kohat in the east, the districts of Kohat and Hangu in the south and Kurram Agency in the west. Administratively, it is divided into Upper and Lower Orakzai.

Since 2007, Orakzai Agency has been home to many militants (475). As such the Pakistani army is still present in the agency and only sporadic clashes between army and militants can be observed. Lower Orakzai has been cleared of militants but in Upper Orakzai the military remains alert, according to the report of the Austrian Fact Finding Mission (476).

Twenty-nine incidents of violence were counted by FRC during 2015 and most of the attacks occurred in the second quarter of 2015. In total 72 people were killed and 28 injured (see Table 4) (477).

[466] RFE/RL, At Least Three Killed In Northwest Pakistan Bombing, 1 September 2015.
[468] FRC, Administrative Units, n.d.
Seven terrorist attacks were recorded by PIPS (478). According to FRC, other tactics used by the militants include IED attacks and ambushes (479). The main targets of the militants were civilians and security personnel (480). For example, an IED exploded during a volleyball match in January 2015, killing 4 people (481). In February 2015, militants detonated an IED in a girls’ school (482).

In the first quarter of 2016, according to FRC, Orakzai Agency did not experience any act of terrorism (483).

**Mohmand Agency**

Mohmand Agency borders Bajaur Agency in the north and Khyber Agency in the south. In the east it borders Malakand andCharsadda districts and Peshawar District in the southeast (484).

FRC recorded 31 incidents of violence, killing 54 and leaving 43 injured (see Table 4). The situation in this agency is quite similar to Bajaur Agency. Security improved in the last quarter of 2015, according to FRC (485).

In 2015, PIPS recorded 23 terrorist attacks in Mohmand Agency (486). Militants used mainly IEDs and targeted killings and the main targets were security personnel (487). Compared to 2014, the number of civilian fatalities increased in 2015 (+22%), despite the declining number of attacks (488).

In the first quarter of 2016, 14 incidents took place, according to FRC. Thirty people were killed and 8 injured. Most of the casualties were security personnel (489).

**North Waziristan**

North Waziristan borders Kurram Agency in the north and Hangu, Karak and Bannu districts in the east, South Waziristan Agency in the south and Afghanistan in the west. Since June 2014, North Waziristan has been affected by Operation Zarb-e-Azb (see section 1.3.1 Armed clashes and assaults-Operation Zarb-e-Azb) (490).

According to FRC, North Waziristan is ‘the most volatile region’ in the FATA. Sixty-two incidents of violence were reported by FRC. In total 718 people were killed and 80 injured (see Table 4). Most incidents of violence were counted in the second and third quarter of 2015, due to Operation Zarb-e-Azb (491).

PIPS recorded 11 terrorist attacks in 2015 (492), including when three soldiers were killed after militants stormed a security post in May 2015 (493). Four security personnel died and four others were injured in an IED attack in July 2015 (494).

Besides terrorist attacks, the agency witnessed clashes between militants and the Pakistani army (495). In January 2015, aerial raids were carried out by security forces, killing 17 militants (496). Nine militants were killed in military
air strikes in April 2015 \(^{(497)}\). Most of the fatalities occurred in this agency because of the increased aerial bombings and drone attacks carried out by the Pakistani forces \(^{(498)}\). On 9 January 2015, 5 militants were killed in a US drone strike in the Mangroti area \(^{(499)}\) and, on 1 September 2015, another drone attack killed 5 militants \(^{(500)}\).

FRC notes 10 violent incidents for the first quarter of 2016 in which 155 people were killed, mostly militants \(^{(501)}\).

**South Waziristan**

South Waziristan shares its border in the north with North Waziristan, and borders Bannu and Lakki Marwat districts in the northeast, the tribal area adjoining Tank, Tank district and Dera Ismail Khan district in the east, Zhob District of Balochistan Province and Dera Ismail Khan district in the south, and Afghanistan in the west \(^{(502)}\).

FRC says the situation in South Waziristan deteriorated in 2015 compared to 2014 due to an increase of militancy and counter-militancy activities. Twenty-seven incidents of violence were counted, killing 86 and injuring 36 (see Table 4). Most of these incidents occurred in the second quarter of 2015 \(^{(503)}\).

PIPS states that there was a 108% increase in terrorist attacks in 2015 compared to 2014. Bomb blasts, IED attacks, targeted killings, clashes between the Pakistani army and militants occurred in South Waziristan. The army reacted with aerial attacks and search operations \(^{(504)}\).

Militants targeted security forces in this agency. A slight drop in civilian and militant casualties was observed in 2015 \(^{(505)}\).

In the first three months of 2016, 13 incidents were recorded by FRC and 33 casualties were counted \(^{(506)}\).

### 2.5.3. Actors in the conflict

Militants groups present in the FATA include the TTP, Mehsud Taliban, Lashkar-e-Islam, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, al-Qaida, East Turkistan Islamic Movement and the IMU \(^{(507)}\). According to FRC, the militant groups changed tactics. In 2015, militants preferred targeted killings over suicide attacks in the FATA \(^{(508)}\).

Military operations in various parts of FATA have, to a great extent, dismantled terrorist pockets. The military conducts air raids and ground operations to clear the area of militants \(^{(509)}\).

### 2.5.4. Impact of the violence

FRC observed 2,240 causalities (1,679 killings and 561 injuries) in the FATA in 2015. A predominant part of these fatalities were militants (1,463). According to FRC, this is due to the effectiveness of intensive aerial strikes and ground offences \(^{(510)}\).

CRSS states that North Waziristan was the most affected region of the FATA in terms of fatalities in 2015, followed by Khyber Agency and South Waziristan (see Figure 10) \(^{(511)}\).
In the first quarter of 2016, SATP recorded 237 fatalities. The same trend was observed throughout 2015. Most of the fatalities recorded were militants (195) (513).

Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan in 2014 caused a wave of displacement towards the FATA (514). Figures of IDPs in the FATA vary depending on the consulted sources. UNHCR states that approximately half a million IDPs fled the North Waziristan fighting as of August 2014 (515). However IDMC reports that the number of IDPs is often underestimated and says that more than 900,000 IDPs may have fled due to the violence (516). One source states that, in February 2016, 336,762 IDPs from the FATA were still living in temporary camps (517). The majority of the IDPs from the FATA do not live in IDP camps but settle in host communities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (518). Some of the Pakistani refugees have moved to Afghanistan (519).

In March 2015 the Pakistani government announced a five-phase plan (March 2015 till December 2016) for IDPs to gradually return to areas declared safe (520). Between March and June 2016, thousands of IDPs from Orakzai Agency, Khyber Agency, Kurram Agency, North and South Waziristan were expected to return to their homes (521). Despite this, many returnees face a lot of obstacles. Houses have been damaged or security forces have taken over private property (522). Also, there is a lack of health and educational facilities, shortages of water and electricity and limited business and employment opportunities (523).

At the start of 2016, the Pakistani government took further initiatives to restore and improve daily live in the FATA. For instance, besides the government announcing the return of displaced people in the FATA, shopkeepers can resume their work in the bazaars, and schools damaged by the Pakistani Taliban are being repaired to reopen soon (524).
Displacement

Between the start of a large-scale military offensive against the Taliban in South Waziristan in 2009 and March 2015, in total over 500,000 people were displaced from the agency. On several occasions people returned. As of May 2016, UNHCR registered 15,490 returned families to South Waziristan. At the same time, new displacements still occurred (525). As of 2 June 2016, UN OCHA reported about 50,000 registered families remained displaced from South Waziristan (526).

In 2014, the initiation of military operations (including Zarb-e-Azb, see section on Background of the conflict in Pakistan) displaced over one million people from North Waziristan and Khyber (527). As of 2 June 2016, UN OCHA reported 41,613 registered returned families to North Waziristan and 74,712 to Khyber. At the same time, new displacements still occurred. UN OCHA reported about 61,000 registered families remained displaced from North Waziristan and 12,439 from Khyber (528).

In 2011, military offensives displaced thousands of people from Kurram agency (529). This continued in 2012, but recently people have been returning (530). As of 2 June 2016, the UN reported that 16,045 registered families had returned and 7,525 remained displaced (531). In Orakzai agency, military offensives started in March 2010, displacing 35,000 families (532). As of 2 June 2016, 1,939 registered families had returned and 21,252 remained displaced (533).

Displacements caused by military operations from Bajaur agency date back to 2008 and from Mohmand, a major displacement wave occurred in 2011 (534). People also returned and the UN reported no more returns to both agencies in 2016, only completed returns before 2016 (535). Dawn however, did report on returns to Mohmand in 2016 (536).

2.6. Islamabad Capital Territory

2.6.1. Short description of the region

Islamabad Capital Territory is situated in the north of Pakistan between the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab and includes the capital of Pakistan, Islamabad. The federal Government of Pakistan controls the area. Islamabad Capital Territory is one of the two federal Territories of Pakistan (the other is FATA). The population is estimated at 600,000 (537).

2.6.2. Description of the violence

The PIPS report of 2015 mentions a decline of 79 % in terrorist attacks compared to 2014 in Islamabad Capital Territory. Only three terrorist attacks took place in 2015. According to PIPS, all were sectarian in nature (538).
2.6.3. Actors in the conflict

According to PIPS, Jundullah, a splinter group of the TTP, is active in Islamabad Capital Territory (\(^\text{539}\)).

2.6.4. Impact of the violence

According to PIPS, four people died, compared to 44 in 2014 (\(^\text{540}\)). CRSS reported 10 fatalities in ICT in 2015, without further explanation (\(^\text{541}\)). In the first quarter of 2016, SATP observed one fatality among security-force personnel in ICT (\(^\text{542}\)).

2.7. Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan

2.7.1. Short description of the region

The Pakistan-controlled territory of Kashmir consists of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (commonly called Azad Kashmir, AK or AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), previously named the Northern territories. Both regions have a partially autonomous administration. However, the influence of the Pakistani government and army is far-reaching, especially in AK. The latter has a population of about five million, while GB has 2 million inhabitants (\(^\text{543}\)).

2.7.2. Description of the violence

In GB four terrorist attacks have been reported in 2015, one more than in the previous year, according to PIPS (\(^\text{544}\)). There were very few attacks in AK in 2015, although there were occasional cross-border attacks along the Line of Control (LoC) (\(^\text{545}\)). PICSS reported no militant activity or any counter-insurgency operation in AK and only one militant attack in GB. PICSS states that AK and GB ‘are the most peaceful of all of the regions’ in 2015 (\(^\text{546}\)).

2.7.3. Actors in the conflict

TTP and other similar militant groups are responsible for attacks in Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan (\(^\text{547}\)).

2.7.4. Impact of the violence

CRSS observed three fatalities in GB in 2015, without further explanation. In AK no fatalities were reported by CRSS (\(^\text{548}\)). In the first quarter of 2016, SATP recorded no fatalities in AK and 10 fatalities in GB were counted (\(^\text{549}\)).
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Annex 2: Terms of Reference

The report should aim to include all relevant information concerning the following topics:

General description of the security situation
- Background of the conflict
- Parties to the conflict
- Armed confrontations and recent security trends
- Impact of the violence
  - civilian population
  - State ability to secure Law and Order

Geographical overview of the security situation

Regional description of the security situation
- Punjab
- Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
- Islamabad
- Federally Administered Tribal Areas
- Balochistan
- Sindh
- Azad Kashmir

For each region, a short description of the region (terrain, urban areas, population) should be included, followed by information on:
- Violence: Number/kind of incidents
- Impact: Number of victims (death and injured) Civilians/Military staff/fighters; Population displacements;
- Actors in the conflict (including areas of control/influence)

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