Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations

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December 20, 2013
Summary

U.S.-Thailand relations are of interest to Congress because of Thailand’s status as a long-time military ally and a significant trade and economic partner. For many years, Thailand was also seen as a model of stable democracy in Southeast Asia, although this image, along with U.S. relations, have been complicated by deep political and economic instability in the wake of a September 2006 coup that displaced Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a popular but divisive figure who remains a flashpoint for many divisions within Thailand.

In recent years, Thai politics have been dominated by rivalries between populist forces led by Thaksin (now in exile) and his opponents, a mix of conservative royalists and military figures, and other Bangkok elites. Despite his exile, pro-Thaksin political parties have won the three nationwide elections since his ouster, and the current government is led by his younger sister, Yingluck Shinawatra. Mass movements both supporting and opposing Thaksin have staged vigorous demonstrations, including protests in 2010 that spilled over to riots in Bangkok and other cities, causing the worst street violence in Thailand in decades. Large-scale anti-Thaksin demonstrations in November and December 2013 forced Prime Minister Yingluck to dissolve Parliament and call for nationwide elections in February 2014.

Many analysts believe traditional Thai elites—particularly the military’s top brass and many prominent royalist figures—remain deeply opposed to Thaksin and any indication that he might seek to return to a political role in Thailand. But Thaksin (and Yingluck) have considerable support in the country’s poorer regions, stemming from programs Thaksin pursued during his rule from 2001-2006 to provide rural healthcare and other benefits, which have continued under Yingluck. Thaksin’s ouster has brought out divisions that had been emerging for years between the growing middle-class and the poorer rural population. Risks are heightened by uncertainty about the health of Thailand’s widely revered King Bhumiphol Adulyadej, who is 86 and has been hospitalized for much of the past four years.

Despite past differences on Burma policy and human rights issues, shared economic and security interests have long provided the basis for U.S.-Thai cooperation. Thailand contributed troops and support for U.S. military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq and was designated as a major non-NATO ally in December 2003. Thailand’s airfields and ports play a particularly important role in U.S. global military strategy, including having served as the primary hub of the relief effort following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Burma. In 2012, Thailand was the 25th largest goods trading partner of the United States, with over $37 billion in two-way trade, and the United States is Thailand’s largest export market.

Although the alliance itself does not appear to be fundamentally shaken by Thailand’s political events of the past few years, Bangkok’s reliability as a partner, and its ability to be a regional leader, are uncertain. Successive Thai governments have also been unable to stem violence by insurgents in the southern majority-Muslim provinces. Under the Obama Administration, the United States has prioritized engagement with Southeast Asia and a broader strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific, but many observers argue that broad new initiatives with Thailand have been notably lacking. With its favorable geographic location and broad-based economy, Thailand has traditionally been considered among the most likely countries to play a major leadership role in the region. But growing U.S. engagement with other allies and partners such as the Philippines and Singapore, and Thailand’s domestic problems appear to have dimmed the prominence of the U.S.-Thai relationship in Southeast Asia. Thailand maintains close relations with China and is considered by some to be a key arena of competition between Beijing and Washington for influence.
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Introduction

An American treaty ally since 1954, Thailand has long been praised as an economic and democratic success story. The U.S.-Thai relationship, solidified during the Cold War, has expanded on the basis of shared economic and security interests. Thailand is a large trade and investment partner for the United States, and U.S. access to Thai military facilities and sustained military-to-military cooperation make Thailand an important element of the U.S. strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

The country’s political stability and democratic development have been shaken, however, by extensive political turmoil in the wake of a September 2006 coup by the Thai military that deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a populist tycoon whose political party had won two parliamentary elections. Thaksin’s rise—and then his fall and its aftermath—exposed deep and lasting divisions within Thai society, largely between urban elites and politically isolated rural Thais, who Thaksin courted with populist economic programs. The coup also set off power struggles among established power centers, which spilled over into unprecedented street violence in 2010 and large demonstrations in late 2013 by protestors calling for the government to stop down and, in some form, an alteration of the country’s political system.

Thailand’s economy has continued to grow strongly through the turmoil, and it remains an economically vibrant middle-income nation and a strong security partner for the United States. The turmoil, though, has called into question its democratic development and its ability to take leadership on regional or global issues. Thaksin remains in exile, and would face a two-year prison sentence for corruption should he return to Thailand. His younger sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, heads Thailand’s government and has called for nationwide Parliamentary elections on February 2, 2014.

The political turmoil has presented myriad challenges for the United States. In the aftermath of the 2006 coup, the United States strove to maintain the relationship while simultaneously imposing penalties for the interruption of democratic rule. Military aid, suspended after the coup, was reinstated after elections in December 2007, but as successive Thai governments struggled to hold on to power, new uncertainty about the durability of the alliance and Thailand’s commitment to democratic rule emerged.1

A stable Thailand is strategically important to the United States, both because of its status as a U.S. treaty ally and as an anchor for mainland Southeast Asia. U.S. policymakers are faced with how to deal with an unraveling democracy and how to respond to profound concerns about the civilian-military balance in Thai society. Many analysts consider Thailand to be so preoccupied with political infighting that its regional influence has waned. At an operational level the alliance continues to function largely smoothly, but new strategic initiatives have languished. When the Obama Administration announced a series of moves in late 2011 to “rebalance” U.S. foreign policy priorities to the Asia-Pacific region, including considerable deepening of regional

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1 A June 2012 report by the National Bureau for Asian Research concluded: “Although the U.S.-Thailand alliance made a successful transition out of the Cold War framework of the Vietnam War era to a more flexible arrangement, it has stagnated in recent years. This has been caused by domestic distractions on both sides, differences in threat perceptions, and the expansion of both countries’ political, economic, and security relations in the region.” Catharin Dalpino, Old Alliance for the New Century: Reinvigorating the U.S.-Thailand Alliance. National Bureau for Asian Research. June 8, 2012.
alliances, new moves in the U.S.-Thailand alliance were notably lacking. The country is not part of the Administration’s signature economic initiative in the region, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade negotiations.

Two fundamental questions hang over Thailand’s political landscape. One is the prospect of Thaksin’s possible return. Thaksin has remained highly prominent and visible overseas—in April 2012, for instance, he demonstrated his continued support when he made a public appearance in neighboring Cambodia during the Thai New Year holiday, telling an estimated 50,000 Thai visitors that he would “soon” return home. An amnesty bill that would have cleared his criminal charges and facilitated his return was the trigger for the large protests that began in October 2013. The other critical question surrounds Thailand’s King, Bhumiphol Adulyadej, who is 86 and reportedly in poor health. The King is widely adored, and for most of the past six decades, the monarchy has been Thailand’s most stable institution. As the question of monarchical succession nears, however, the potential for further instability emerging from that event has become a strong concern.

One of the primary motivations for maintaining strong relations with Bangkok is the ongoing competition with Beijing for influence in Southeast Asia. Thailand, long known for its ability to keep good relations with all parties, enjoys strong economic, political, and cultural ties with both China and the United States. A stronger, more outward-looking Thailand could also provide support for many of the Administration’s “rebalancing” initiatives.

**Developments in late 2013**

**Demonstrations of 2013, and Call for New Elections**

The relative stability that had taken hold since Yingluck took office in 2011 fractured again in the fall of 2013. After the ruling party tried to pass a general amnesty bill in October 2013 that would have cleared Thaksin from his corruption conviction (as well as several opposition leaders from charges related to the 2010 protests), protests erupted anew in the streets of Bangkok. The demonstrators, reported to be up to 200,000 at their peak, occupied several government compounds and created gridlock in areas of the capital city. Protest leaders called for the end of the “Thaksin regime” and demanded that a “people’s council” reporting to the King replace Parliament. Parties aligned with Thaksin have won each of the five general elections since 2001. In early December, Yingluck called for new elections, setting the date for February 2, 2014, but protesters refused to disperse. The palace endorsed the election date but the ailing King has not intervened in the latest political crisis.

The State Department issued a statement that “The United States strongly supports democratic institutions and the democratic process in Thailand,” and called on the parties to “resolve political differences peacefully and democratically in a way that reflects the will of the Thai people and strengthens the rule of law.”

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Current State of U.S.-Thai Relations

Throughout Thailand’s prolonged period of political instability, the Bangkok-Washington relationship has remained stable, although not flourishing. U.S. officials have voiced their concerns with some of the government’s policies, particularly the curtailment of Thai citizens’ rights under the state of emergency decree (now lifted). Overall, the long-standing relationship appears to have weathered the crises thus far, and has remained engaged in high-level dialogues. President Obama visited Bangkok in November 2012 as part of his first overseas trip following his re-election.

However, the opportunity costs of Thailand’s political turmoil may have been high, as the Obama Administration has announced a rebalancing of U.S. foreign policy priorities towards Asia without a major Thai component. Domestic problems in Thailand have consumed the government’s energy and ability to play a strong leadership role in the region, and Washington has looked to other allies and partners like Australia, the Philippines, and Singapore, as well as new partnerships with countries like Indonesia and Vietnam.

U.S. military officials are keen to maintain strong links with the Thai military establishment, particularly given the strategic value of Thai facilities in possible regional contingencies. Some regional analysts insist that Thailand, while imperfect, is an important democratic ally and crucial to indicate U.S. commitment to the region. However, criticism has emerged that U.S. efforts to instill core concepts like civilian control of the military appear to have had little effect given the experience of the past few years. Although use of Thai airfields has been crucial in U.S. military operations and relief efforts, some observers doubt that Thailand would allow the United States to use the facilities in some potential conflicts.

Yet bilateral engagement has continued, particularly in the traditional areas of security cooperation. Thailand continues to host the annual large-scale multinational Cobra Gold military exercises and hosted a capacity-building exercise for the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative, a multinational effort that aims to interdict vessels carrying weapons or illicit materials.

Thailand Politics and Government

Background

The Kingdom of Thailand, a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of government, is marked by an important historical dissimilarity from its regional neighbors. Although occupied by Japan during World War II, Thailand was the only country in Southeast Asia that was not colonized by Europeans, and it also avoided the wave of communist revolutions that took control of the neighboring governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. Thailand followed a troubled path to democracy, enduring a series of mostly bloodless coups and multiple changes of government in its modern history. Although Thailand became a constitutional monarchy in 1932, it was ruled primarily by military dictatorships until the early 1990s. A military and bureaucratic elite controlled Thai politics during this period, denying room for civilian democratic institutions to develop. Brief periods of democracy in the 1970s and 1980s ended with reassertions of military rule. After Thai soldiers killed at least 50 people in
demonstrations demanding an end to military dominance of the government, international and
domestic pressure led to new elections in 1992. The 2006 coup was the first in 15 years.

Thailand’s government is composed of the executive branch (prime minister as head of
government and the king as chief of state), a bicameral National Assembly, and a judicial branch
of three court systems. In the years immediately preceding Thaksin’s election in 2001, the
Democrat Party dominated Thai politics by instituting a series of reforms that enhanced
transparency, decentralized power from the urban centers, tackled corruption, and introduced a
broad range of constitutional rights.

Social Divisions and the Thai Political Landscape

The recent political turmoil in Thailand underscores a growing divide between the rural, mostly
poor population and the urban middle class, largely based in Bangkok. By stoking Thai
nationalism and providing inexpensive health care and other support to rural communities,
Thaksin galvanized a populist movement in Thailand, with the support leading to emphatic
electoral victories for his Thai Rak Thai Party, then the successor People’s Power Party (PPP),
and now the Puea Thai Party. This success threatened the traditional model of governance, which
combines a powerful military backed by the royal family, an elite corps of bureaucrats, and a
relatively weak executive government. Thaksin’s rise and fall—and the role he continues to play
in Thai politics—did much to expose and exacerbate the country’s regional and class-based rifts.

These divisions have been emerging for years, but many hoped that the reckoning could unfold
without bloodshed. The confrontation is no longer as simple as a conflict between mostly poor,
rural Thaksin supporters and the elite, although those disparities remain significant and motivate
many of the participants. The fight also involves regional rivalries; most of the protesters hail
from the northeastern part of Thailand and resent the control emanating from the richer governing
class in Bangkok. The differences are also exploited by politicians who are motivated by their
own self-interest. Many Puea Thai politicians have attached themselves to Thaksin to win votes
but come from the same privileged—and often corrupt—club of powerbrokers as members of the
ruling coalition.

The competing protestors are divided between two main groups: the People’s Alliance for
Democracy (PAD), known as the “yellow shirts” and the United Front for Democracy Against
Dictatorship (UDD), known as the “red shirts.” The PAD, initially formed under the leadership of
media baron Sondhi Limthongkul in early 2006, led large-scale protests accusing Thaksin of
corruption and subversion of democratic practices, which some observers claim laid the
groundwork for the military coup. The PAD are a mix of the military, royalists, the bureaucracy,
and largely urban and middle class citizens. The combination of Thaksin’s broad popularity and
clampdown on opposition opinions in the media threatened many of those in the “old guard.”

The UDD, or “red shirts,” are mostly Thaksin loyalists who insist that the current government is
illegitimate and demand Thaksin’s return. A fundamental divide between the two groups centers
on the electoral process, with the yellow shirts arguing that ethical imperatives trump the polls,
while the red shirts believe that governance should be determined entirely by the population’s
vote. Both sides have seen what they perceive as distortion of the system and have taken to the
streets with their grievances.

As the crisis exploded into violence in 2010, splinter groups emerged within all of the major
institutions: the government, the military, the police, the anti-government “red shirt” protestors,
and the “yellow shirt” counter-protestors, who disrupted Bangkok with their own mass rallies in 2008. Rogue elements among the police and military forces and among the protestors’ ranks may have been responsible for the most egregious violence and damage that occurred during the stand-off.

Role of the Palace

The apparent reluctance of King Bhumiphol to be involved in the deep conflicts that have torn at Thai society has deepened the uncertainty about the path ahead. The power of the palace, and particularly the intense popularity of the king himself, has traditionally provided an important pillar of stability for Thailand. The king, who has served since 1946, commands tremendous respect and loyalty from the Thai public and has exercised influence over politics throughout his reign. The king, born in 1927, is reportedly in poor health, giving rise to anxiety about succession. In years past when civil unrest spilled over into violence, the king’s public interventions had successfully stemmed the conflict. Some leaders on both sides have begun openly questioning the king’s ability to be a unifying force, or why he did not appeal for an end to the violence during the most heated street battles.

Due to stringent lèse-majesté laws, under which it is a crime, punishable with a prison term of up to 15 years, to “criticize, insult or threaten” the King, Queen, royal heir apparent, or regent, the issue of royal continuity is rarely broached publicly. According to news reports, the use of these legal provisions has soared in recent years: reportedly, the number of charges brought before the lower courts has risen from five or six a year in the early 2000s to 478 in 2010 and thousands of websites have been blocked.3 An American was arrested for lèse-majesté in 2011, drawing complaints from the U.S. embassy in Bangkok.

Timeline Surrounding Thailand’s Turmoil

Thaksin’s Rise and Fall

The Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party, formed by Thaksin in 1999, benefitted politically from the devastation of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on Thailand’s economy, and the subsequent loss of support for the ruling Democrats. Thaksin’s platform included a nationalist call for Thais to regain control over their nation (which had been forced into an unpopular International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue plan in 1997), and populist programs that appealed to a wide cross-section of Thais. Many analysts contended that Thaksin and his party enjoyed power unprecedented in modern Thai politics.4 In February 2005, the TRT won parliamentary elections outright—a first in Thai politics—and swiftly dropped its former coalition partners to form a single-party government.

Thaksin remained electorally popular, but many criticized his government for human rights abuses, both in the restive south and through an aggressive anti-narcotics campaign that allegedly

led to hundreds of extra-judicial killings. He was also accused of intimidating journalists and paying scant attention to Thailand’s vibrant NGO sector.

Shortly after TRT’s impressive victory, Thaksin’s popularity faltered due to a weak economy, corruption scandals involving cabinet members, and his failure to stem violence in the south. In early 2006, large public demonstrations calling for his ouster gained momentum. The protestors, mostly members of the urban, educated class, were reportedly unhappy with his authoritarian style, perceived attacks on the free press, mishandling of the violence in the south, and most of all, the tax-free sale of his family’s telecommunications firm to a Singapore state company in a $1.9 billion deal that many suspected was not taxed because of Thaksin’s clout.

Widespread protests led Thaksin to call for a new round of parliamentary elections in April 2006. After a less-than-convincing victory by his party in an election boycotted by the opposition, Thaksin resigned, then quickly stepped back into power as a “caretaker” prime minister. After Thailand’s king called for the courts to resolve the crisis, the Constitutional Court ruled the elections invalid, and new elections were set for November 2006. Despite widespread discontent with Thaksin among the country’s middle class and urban dwellers, Thaksin’s strong support in rural areas was expected to propel the TRT to a win in the elections.

**Military Coup Ousts Thaksin**

On September 19, 2006, with Thaksin visiting New York for the United Nations General Assembly, Royal Thai Army Commander-in-Chief Sonthi Boonyaratglin led a bloodless military coup in Bangkok, ousting Thaksin and declaring martial law. The coup was the 18th since the formation of the constitutional monarchy in 1932, but the first in 15 years. The new leaders formed the Council for Democratic Reform (CDR), later changing the name to the Council for National Security (CNS). King Bhumiphol reportedly endorsed the takeover after it occurred. Under interim Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, a former Army commander, the ruling military government struggled to establish credibility and legitimacy in the months that followed. A series of economic policy moves unnerved investors.

After the coup, the bureaucratic and military elite—with the royal imprimatur—controlled Thailand, while the political parties appeared marginalized and disorganized. In May 2007, a junta-appointed constitutional tribunal ruled that TRT must disband because it had violated election laws in the April 2006 polls and that Thaksin and 110 party executives were banned from politics for five years. The same day, the court acquitted the opposition Democratic Party of a series of other election violation charges. Many observers criticized the rulings as delaying the return to democracy by disenfranchising the most popular political party in Thailand.

In August 2007, a nation-wide referendum on the constitution drafted by a junta-appointed committee passed narrowly amid tepid turnout. The constitution came under criticism for reversing many of the democratic principles enshrined in the 1997 charter. Under the new constitution, the number of parliamentary seats are reduced, nearly half of the Senate is appointed by a panel of judges and bureaucrats, and the coup leaders are granted amnesty. The document, designed to prevent the re-emergence of a Thaksin-like strongman leader, suggested to some analysts that Thailand may return to a period of weak, unstable coalition governments.
U.S. Response

Following the coup, U.S. officials faced the challenge of expressing disapproval for the rollback of democracy while not sacrificing what many view as a crucial relationship. Many observers saw the response as relatively mild. On September 28, 2006, the U.S. State Department announced the suspension of several assistance programs under Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-102): Foreign Military Financing (FMF, for defense procurement), International Military Education Training funds (IMET, provides training to professionalize the Thai military), and peacekeeping operation programs. Also suspended were funds for counterterrorism and other operations appropriated under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006. The suspended programs totaled over $29 million. Other programs deemed to be in the U.S. interest continued, according to the State Department. After Surayud was appointed, U.S. Ambassador Ralph Boyce was reportedly the first foreign diplomat to meet with him.

On February 6, 2008, the U.S. State Department announced that Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte had certified to Congress that Thailand had restored a democratically elected government, thereby removing legal restrictions on assistance that had been imposed after the coup. A statement from the U.S. ambassador said that funds were reinstated for programs that include the International Military Exchange Training (IMET) programs, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI).

Political Turmoil Under Successive Governments

After the coup, an interim military government took power, generally proving to be ineffective at governance but orchestrating relatively clean elections in December 2007. The People’s Power Party (PPP), a successor party to Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party, won a strong victory in parliamentary elections, but its two subsequent prime ministers—Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat—were both forced to resign because of decisions by Thailand’s court system. Thaksin, convicted in absentia of corruption, remained a major presence in Thai politics from exile, appearing via video link to appeal to his supporters. In late 2009, he accepted an economic advisory position from the Cambodian government, infuriating Bangkok officials.

Both sides of the political divide employed massive protests that disrupted Bangkok for months in 2008. Demonstrations by anti-Thaksin forces swelled in number and aggression through the fall of 2008, culminating in a week-long takeover of Bangkok’s two major airports late in the year. In December 2008, Abhisit Vejjajiva, leader of the Democrat Party, was elected by the parliament as prime minister by collecting enough defector votes from former PPP lawmakers. The PPP regrouped under the “Puea Thai” or “For Thais” Party. After the Abhisit government took power, pro-Thaksin groups took to the streets, eventually forcing the embarrassing cancelation of an Asian leaders’ summit in April 2009. At times, the demonstrations turned violent, with several deaths on each side. The protests, and particularly the airport takeovers, hurt Thailand’s economy, especially the crucial tourism sector. The respective governments in power, however, appeared loath to order a crackdown, which, they may have calculated, would make the situation appear even more volatile and chaotic.
Spring 2010 Violence

Beginning in mid-March 2010, anti-government “Red Shirt” protestors occupied parts of Bangkok for nine weeks. Initially peaceful, the demonstrations and the response from the security forces became increasingly aggressive, eventually spiraling into urban warfare. The initial restraint demonstrated by both sides gave way to the worst political violence in modern Thai history. On May 19, 2010, armored vehicles and infantry troops stormed the protestors’ encampments and several protest leaders surrendered. As the crowd retreated, a violent fringe of the movement set fire to dozens of buildings, burning a large shopping mall to the ground and damaging the Thai stock exchange. By the time a military crackdown dispersed the crowds, at least 90 people were dead and up to 2,000 wounded.

July 2011 Elections

Thailand’s national elections on July 3, 2011, swept the populist Puea Thai party into power, led by Thaksin’s younger sister Yingluck Shinawatra, a political novice who became Thailand’s first female prime minister. Although Puea Thai won a majority of seats (265 of the 500), it formed a coalition with several smaller parties to claim an even stronger hold on power and ensure Yingluck’s election. After officially taking office, she announced a cabinet that most observers saw as relatively moderate and inoffensive to the establishment powers in Bangkok. Although many analysts had earlier feared that the military would interfere with the political process if a pro-Thaksin government won elections, the army remained in its barracks.

Yingluck faced the challenge of governing a largely divided country, delivering on campaign promises to assist the mostly rural base of her party, and responding to calls for justice from the Red Shirt activists who were involved in the 2010 street protests and support the return of her brother to Thailand. The government outlined its top priorities, including reconciliation following 2010’s political violence and increasing the minimum wage. In foreign policy, the government emphasized building stronger relationships with the region, which includes addressing a longstanding conflict with Cambodia surrounding a temple on the Thai-Cambodian border.

In the 2011 elections, Puea Thai soundly defeated the ruling Democrat Party, led by Abhisit Vejjajiva, who had held power since December 2008. The Democrats captured only 159 seats, winning in their traditional strongholds of Bangkok and the south but being soundly defeated in the heavily populated and poorer northern and northeastern parts of the country. Although the Thai economy performed well in 2010, posting nearly 8% growth, the Democrats failed to win over the majority of voters. Street protests persisted through much of Abhisit’s tenure, with pro-Thaksin “Red Shirt” protestors demanding the release of the movement’s leaders who have been jailed since the outbreak of violence in 2010. Abhisit’s government had advanced plans to appeal to the poorer rural voters who had flocked to Thaksin, including more access to loans and assistance, but these efforts didn’t earn the government much electoral support. The Democrats also promoted a national reconciliation plan and advocated for reforms that would broaden public participation in the political arena. Abhisit also faced pressure from the “Yellow Shirt” movement, which launched protests calling for more assertive Thai policy on the issue of sovereignty surrounding the disputed Preah Vihear temple on the border with Cambodia.
Violence in the Southern Provinces

Thailand has endured a persistent separatist insurgency in its majority-Muslim southern provinces, which include the provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani, and—to a lesser extent—Songkhla, while dealing with political instability in its capital. Since January 2004, sectarian violence between insurgents and security forces in Thailand’s majority-Muslim provinces has left around nearly 5,000 people dead, according to press reports. The groups that have led this surge in violence are generally poorly understood, and their motives are difficult to characterize. Many believe they are mostly focused on local autonomy, but even the Thai government has a poor understanding of the diverse groups active in the south. The successive governments have taken somewhat different approaches to curbing the violence in the south, but none appear to have found a way to resolve the ongoing insurgency.

Background to the Current Conflict

The southern region has a history of separatist violence, though the major movements were thought to have died out in the early 1990s. Thai Muslims have long expressed grievances for being marginalized and discriminated against, and the area has lagged behind the rest of Thailand in economic development. The recent death toll of over 3,300 includes suspected insurgents killed by security forces, as well as victims of the insurgents. This includes both Buddhist Thais, particularly monks and teachers, and local Muslims.

After a series of apparently coordinated attacks by the insurgents in early 2004, the central government declared martial law in the region. Moreover, a pattern of insurgent attacks—targeted shootings or small bombs that claim a few victims at a time and counterattacks by the security forces—has developed. The pattern crystallized into two major outbreaks of violence in 2004: on April 28, Thai soldiers killed 108 insurgents, including 34 lightly armed gunmen in a historic mosque, after they attempted to storm several military and police outposts in coordinated attacks; and on October 25, 84 local Muslims were killed: 6 shot during an erupting demonstration at the Tak Bai police station and 78 apparently asphyxiated from being piled into trucks after their arrest. The insurgents retaliated with a series of more gruesome killings, including beheadings, following the Tak Bai incident.

Failure of Successive Governments' Approaches

The Thaksin government’s handling of the violence was widely criticized as ineffective and inflammatory. Critics charged that the Thaksin government never put forth a sustained strategy to define and address the problem, that it repeatedly and arbitrarily shuffled leadership positions of those charged with overseeing the region, and that it failed to implement adequate coordination between the many security and intelligence services on the ground.

Under the military government, interim Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont took a more conciliatory approach by publicly apologizing to Muslim leaders for past government policies in the south and resurrecting a civilian agency responsible for improving relations between the security forces, the government, and southern Muslims that Thaksin had abolished. General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, leader of the coup and the first Muslim commander of the Army, advocated
negotiations with the separatist groups as opposed to the more confrontational strategy pursued by Thaksin. However, the violence increased in the months following the coup. Some analysts said that a younger generation of more radicalized insurgents resisted the more conciliatory approach of the new leadership in Bangkok. Criticism emerged that Surayud’s policies were insufficiently implemented, law enforcement was unable to effectively prosecute cases, and that intelligence coordination remained abysmal.

Subsequent governments, under fire from their inceptions, were unable to devote sustained attention to the south. Critics maintain that several of the governments did not focus adequate resources on the area as they struggled to maintain their hold on power in Bangkok. The region remains under martial law, which allows security forces to arrest suspects without warrants and detain them for up to 30 days. Since June 2007, a more concentrated counter-insurgency campaign known as “Operation Southern Protection” led to far more arrests, but many analysts see the mass arrests as fueling local resentment. Observers note an increase in more lethal and bold attacks. Human rights groups have continued to criticize the military for its mistreatment of Muslim suspects; in March 2008, Human Rights Watch accused the army of torturing an arrested Muslim cleric who later died in police custody.6

Little Evidence of Transnational Elements

Most regional observers stress that there is no convincing evidence to date of serious Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) involvement in the attacks in the southern provinces, and that the overall long-term goal of the movement in the south remains the creation of an independent state with Islamic governance. Many experts characterize the movement as a confluence of different groups: local separatists, Islamic radicals, organized crime, and corrupt police forces. They stress, however, that sectarian violence involving local Muslim grievances provides a ripe environment for foreign groups to become more engaged in the struggle. Some of the older insurgent organizations earlier were linked to JI, have reportedly received financial support from foreign Islamic groups, and have leaders who have trained in camps in Libya and Afghanistan. The insurgency has at times heightened tensions with Malaysia, as many of the leaders are thought to cross the border fairly easily. Despite these links, foreign elements apparently have not engaged significantly in the violence.

Leadership of Insurgency Unclear

Identifying the groups directing the insurgency has been challenging, but most analysis suggests that there is no one organization with authority over the others. Some reports suggest that the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) has coordinated other groups that operate largely autonomously. Other actors are older Islamist separatist groups, including the Pattani United Liberation Organization (Pulo) and Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP). An organization called Bersatu at one point claimed to be an umbrella grouping for all the insurgent factions, but appears to have very limited authority over the disparate networks.

The government’s inability to establish an authority with whom to negotiate has limited its ability to resolve the conflict peacefully. In February 2013, Yingluck’s government made an effort in this regard, announcing that it would initiate peace talks with the Barisan Revolusi National (BRN), a group whose leaders largely reside outside Thailand. BRN reportedly suspended the talks in August 2013. Had the effort been successful, it is unclear how it would have influenced the actions of groups on the ground.\footnote{International Crisis Group. \textit{Talking and Killing in Southern Thailand}. August 9, 2013.}

### U.S.-Thailand Security Relations

#### A Long-Standing Southeast Asian Ally

The 1954 Manila Pact of the former Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), together with the 1962 Thanat-Rusk communiqué, forms the basis of the U.S.-Thai security relationship. Although SEATO was dissolved in 1977, Article IV (1) of the Manila Pact, which calls for signatories to “act to meet the common danger” in the event of an attack in the treaty area, remains in force. Thailand has been considered to be one of the major U.S. security allies in East Asia, along with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines.

The U.S. security relationship with Thailand has a firm historical foundation based on joint efforts in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Thailand sent more than 6,500 troops to serve in the United Nations Command during the Korean War, where the Thai force suffered over 1,250 casualties.\footnote{See http://korea50.army.mil/history/factsheets/allied.shtml (official public access website for Department of Defense Commemoration of the 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Korean War).} A decade later, the United States staged bombing raids and rescue missions over North Vietnam and Laos from Thailand. During the Vietnam War, up to 50,000 U.S. troops were based on Thai soil, and U.S. assistance poured into the country to help Thailand fight its own domestic communist insurgency.\footnote{\textit{The Eagle and the Elephant: Thai-American Relations Since 1833} (Bangkok: U.S. Agency for International Development, 1997).} Thailand also sent troops to South Vietnam and Laos to aid the U.S. effort. The close security ties continued throughout the Cold War, with Thailand serving as a solid anti-Communist ally in the region. More recently, Thai ports and airfields played a crucial role in maintaining the flow of troops, equipment, and supplies to the theater in both the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars.

In October 2003, President George W. Bush designated Thailand as a “major non-NATO ally,” a distinction which allows more access to U.S. foreign aid and military assistance, including credit guarantees for major weapons purchases.\footnote{Under section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President can designate a non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization state as a major ally for the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act.} An agreement concluded with the United States in July 2001 allows Thailand to purchase advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles for its F-16 fighters, a first for a Southeast Asian state.\footnote{Limaye, Satu P. “Minding the Gaps: The Bush Administration and U.S.-Southeast Asia,” \textit{Contemporary Southeast Asia}, vol. 26, no. 1 (April 2004).} Thaksin authorized the reopening of the Vietnam-era U.S. airbase in Utapao and a naval base in Sattahip, from which the U.S. military can logistically support forces in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Thailand served as the logistics hub for much
of the U.S. and international relief effort after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Burma. U.S. relief operations by air and sea for the entire region were directed out of Utapao air base and Sattahip naval base.

Impact of the 2006 Coup

The military coup and subsequent suspension of military aid by the United States threatened to derail the strong bilateral defense relationship. Following the reinstatement of aid, Thai and U.S. military officials emphasized their commitment to a smooth resumption of close military ties. Several of the programs listed below were suspended under Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-102). In May 2007, the annual “Cobra Gold” multinational military exercises went forward despite the suspension of several other military cooperation programs, and have continued annually since.

Support for U.S. and International Operations

Thailand strengthened its partnership with the United States by contributing troops to two American military operations and the broader war on terrorism after the September 11, 2001, attacks. Thailand sent 130 soldiers, largely engineers, to Afghanistan to participate in the reconstruction phase of Operation Enduring Freedom. Thai forces constructed a runway at Bagram Airbase, provided medical services, and conducted some special forces operations. Although Thailand remained officially neutral during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, it contributed to reconstruction efforts in Iraq by dispatching over 450 troops, including medics and engineers, to the southern city of Karbala. The deployment proved unpopular with the Thai public, particularly after the deaths of two soldiers in December 2003. In spring 2004, Thaksin threatened to withdraw the troops early if the security situation continued to disintegrate and resisted U.S. calls to postpone the withdrawal until after the January 2005 Iraqi elections. The withdrawal was completed in September 2004.

In 2010, Thailand contributed to two international efforts by deploying its military. Two naval ships were sent to assist in the multinational counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia for a four-month tour. In late 2010, Thailand also sent a battalion of troops for peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Sudan.

Thailand reportedly provided a “black site” where U.S. Central Intelligence Agency officials were allowed to secretly hold suspected terrorists. According to press reports, two major Al Qaeda figures captured in Pakistan were flown to Thailand for interrogation by U.S. officials. CIA officials have not confirmed the existence of the site.

Asia Pacific Military Transformation

The U.S. Department of Defense initiative to transform and realign the U.S. military around the globe provides potential opportunities for increased security cooperation with Thailand. Pentagon planners are breaking with the quantitative assurance of keeping 100,000 troops on the ground in East Asia in favor of a more mobile, capability-based force. U.S. military planners have

emphasized a “places, not bases” concept in Southeast Asia in which U.S. troops can temporarily use facilities for operations and training, without maintaining a lengthy and costly permanent presence. Facilities used by the U.S. military in Thailand fall under the Pentagon’s “cooperative security location” concept, in which countries provide access in exchange for upgrades and aid.\textsuperscript{14}

Bilateral Security Cooperation

Security Assistance

The United States has provided funds for the purchase of weapons and equipment to the Thai military through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program (see Table 1). As a major non-NATO ally, Thailand also qualifies for the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, which allows for the transfer of used U.S. naval ships and aircraft. The United States faces stiff competitors in the foreign military sales market in Thailand, particularly because other countries are more willing to engage in barter trade for agricultural products.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{U.S. Assistance to Thailand 2007-2014}
\begin{tabular}{lcccccccc}
\hline
\hline
DA & 0 & 0 & 4,500 & 6,151 & 5,051 & 5,051 & 4,826 & 5,051 \\
ESF & 990 & 0 & 2,500 & 2,500 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
FMF\textsuperscript{a} & 0 & 423 & 1,600 & 1,600 & 1,568 & 1,187 & 1,424 & 988 \\
GH & 1,400 & 1,492 & 1,500 & 1,500 & 1,500 & 1,500 & 1,000 & 0 \\
IMET\textsuperscript{a} & 0 & 1,202 & 1,459 & 1,571 & 1,568 & 1,318 & 1,234 & 1,300 \\
INCLE & 900 & 1,686 & 1,400 & 1,740 & 1,740 & 1,740 & 1,740 & 1,466 \\
NADR & 2,100 & 2,483 & 2,700 & 3,300 & 1,541 & 1,450 & 1,152 & 1,320 \\
Peace Corps & 2,144 & 2,278 & 2,815 & 3,064 & 3,300 & 3,000 & 3,100 & 3,700 \\
\hline
\textbf{Totals} & 7,534 & 9,786 & 15,659 & 18,362 & 12,968 & 12,246 & 11,376 & 11,275 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textbf{Sources:} U.S. Department of State; USAID.

\textbf{Notes:} DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Funds; FMF = Foreign Military Sales Financing; GH = Global Health; IMET = International Military Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, & Related.

\textsuperscript{a} These programs were suspended on September 28, 2006, under Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-102) and resumed on February 6, 2008.

Military Exercises

Training opportunities for U.S. forces in Thailand are considered invaluable by the U.S. military. Thailand and the United States have conducted over 40 joint military exercises a year, including

Cobra Gold, the world’s largest combined military exercise. For the February 2013 exercises, approximately 13,000 military personnel participated in the exercise. The fully participating nations include Thailand, the United States, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia, with observers from several other Asian nations also joining, including, for the first time, military officials from Burma.

Training

Tens of thousands of Thai military officers, including many of those in top leadership positions throughout the services and in the civilian agencies, have received U.S. training under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Designed to enhance the professionalism of foreign militaries as well as improve defense cooperation with the United States, the program is regarded by many as a relatively low-cost, highly effective means to achieve U.S. national security goals.

Intelligence

Intelligence cooperation between Thailand and the United States reportedly increased markedly after the September 11, 2001, attacks, culminating in the establishment of the Counter Terrorism Intelligence Center (known as the CTIC) in 2001. The CTIC, which combines personnel from Thailand’s intelligence agency and specialized branches of the military and armed forces, provides a forum for CIA personnel to work closely with their Thai counterparts, sharing facilities and information daily, according to reports from Thai security officials. Close cooperation in tracking Al Qaeda operatives who passed through Thailand reportedly intensified into active pursuit of suspected terrorists following the 9/11 strikes. The most public result of enhanced coordination was the arrest of suspected Jemaah Islamiyah leader Hambali, outside of Bangkok in August 2003. Other intelligence cooperation focuses on counter-narcotics or specialized military intelligence.

Law Enforcement

In 1998, the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) Bangkok was established to provide legal training for officials to combat transnational crime. The center is open to government officials from any Southeast Asian country, with the exception of Burma (Myanmar). ILEA Bangkok aims to enhance law enforcement capabilities in each country, as well as to encourage cross-border cooperation. Instruction for the courses is provided largely by the Royal Thai Police, the Thai Office of the Narcotics Control Board, and various U.S. agencies, including the Diplomatic Security Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Internal Revenue Service.

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16 Ibid.
17 ILEA-Bangkok is one of four ILEAs in the world. The others are located in Hungary, Botswana, and Roswell, New Mexico.
Counter-Narcotics

Counter-narcotics cooperation between Thailand and the United States has been extensive and pre-dates the foundation of ILEA-Bangkok. Coordination between the DEA and Thailand’s law enforcement agencies, in conjunction with a mutual legal assistance treaty and an extradition treaty, has led to many arrests of international drug traffickers. Specialized programs include the establishment of Task Force 399, in which U.S. special forces train Thai units in narcotics interdiction tactics.19

U.S.-Thailand Trade and Economic Relations

Thailand’s economy has continued to perform strongly during the nation’s years of political turmoil. In 2012, Thailand was the 25th largest goods trading partner of the United States, with over $37 billion in two-way trade. The U.S. goods trade deficit with Thailand was $15.2 billion in 2012, making up 2.1% of the overall U.S. goods deficit. U.S. foreign direct investment in Thailand was $11.3 billion in 2011. Negotiations for an FTA with Thailand were launched in 2004 but then suspended in 2006 following the military coup. In 2012, Prime Minister Yingluck expressed interest in joining the multilateral negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but Thailand has taken no further steps since then toward joining the talks.

As a major trading nation and large-scale recipient of foreign direct investment, Thailand’s economy depends heavily on its trading and investment partners. Economic relations with the United States are central to Thailand’s outward-looking economic strategy. According to the U.S. Commerce Department, U.S. trade with Thailand in 2012 consisted of $10.9 billion in exports and $26 billion in imports.20 Major exports from the United States include integrated circuits, computer parts, semi-conductors, cotton, aircraft parts, electronics, soybeans, and oil. Major imports to the United States include electronics, jewelry, seafood, clothing, furniture, natural rubber, auto parts, and rice.21 The State Department reports that although Japan is Thailand’s biggest trading partner, the United States is Thailand’s largest export market.

In order to promote the goal of higher levels of trade and investment, the Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration states that current trade concerns regarding Thailand are intellectual property rights laws and enforcement, concerns addressed through consultations and technical assistance, improvements in Thai customs practices, and lack of transparency and efficiency in the customs regime.22

Thailand has aggressively pursued FTAs with countries other than the United States in its campaign to expand trading opportunities. Agreements have been signed with Bahrain, China, Peru, Australia, Japan, India, and New Zealand. Further deals are possible with South Korea, Chile, and the European Union (EU). Thailand has championed ASEAN regionalism, seeing the

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ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA, among ASEAN countries only) as a vehicle for investment-driven integration which will benefit Thailand’s outward-oriented growth strategy.23

Human Rights and Democracy Concerns

International groups, some Members of Congress, and U.S. officials have criticized Thailand’s record on human rights. Thailand has neither signed the United Nations Convention Against Torture nor joined the International Criminal Court. Under the various governments that have led the country during the past 12 years, alleged abuses have ranged from extra-judicial killings and curtailment of the press and non-governmental groups under Thaksin, direct military intervention in the political system in the 2006 coup, curtailment of the freedom of expression under strict lese-majeste laws under subsequent governments, the bloody suppression of demonstrations in 2010, and a poor record on combatting human trafficking throughout. Numerous reports have documented the role of Thai military personnel in violently ending the 2010 protests, in which at least 90 persons were killed.

Throughout the turmoil, the state of Thailand’s democracy has become a concern for many observers. Many believed that Thailand’s democratic processes had been firmly entrenched in the 1990s through a 1997 constitution that sought to strengthen the stability of elected governments and protect greater levels of human rights. However, the 2006 coup, and then a 2007 constitution that many considered to be a move away from the ideals of the 1997 document, brought questions about whether established power centers had truly accepted the democratic system. Those questions have persisted, and the protesters who have massed in late 2013 have called for a change in Thailand’s political system, and threatened to disrupt the February 2014 elections.

Under Thaksin

During Thaksin’s rule, detractors consistently voiced concern that his strongman style threatened Thailand’s democratic institutions. Charges of cronyism and creeping authoritarianism grew louder as his political power strengthened. Previously independent watchdog agencies reportedly weakened under his watch,24 and some commentators alleged that Thaksin undermined anti-corruption agencies by installing political loyalists to protect the business interests of his family and members of his cabinet—sometimes one and the same, as Thaksin had a record of appointing relatives and friends to prominent posts.25 Thaksin insisted that political strength enhances development, citing Singapore’s economic success and lack of political opposition as a model for Thailand to follow.26

Outside groups warned that press freedom was squeezed during Thaksin’s rule, documenting multiple cases in which critical journalists and news editors were dismissed, and pointing to a libel suit against an outspoken editor filed by a telecommunications corporation that Thaksin

founded. Human Rights Watch claims that Thaksin stifled criticism from the media of his administration’s controversial policies, such as the deaths of about 2,500 individuals in the government-sponsored “war on drugs.”

Coup and Aftermath

The coup itself raised obvious concerns about the democratic process in Thailand. Much of the Thai press and some long-time Thai watchers embraced the notion that the coup was necessary for Thailand to move forward; that is, that the military coup represented less of a threat to Thai democracy than Thaksin’s perceived systematic dismantling of the democratic system. In addition, much of the state’s apparatus, including the key institutions of the parliament, the judicial branch, and watchdog agencies, reportedly has been undermined in the past several years. Uncertainty about the king’s succession compounded the concern about Thailand’s ability to preserve democratic structures and stability in the upcoming years. As political unrest unfolded in recent years, stringent lèse-majesté laws appeared to be applied with more frequency, leading to criticism from free speech advocates. It is a crime, punishable with a prison term of up to 15 years, to “criticize, insult or threaten” the King, Queen, royal heir apparent, or regent. Some groups say this has substantially curtailed freedom of expression.

 Trafficking in Persons

Thailand is a source, destination, and transit country for human trafficking victims, according to the State Department. Within Thailand, foreign migrants, particularly from neighboring countries such as Burma, members of ethnic minorities, and stateless persons are at greatest risk of being trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation and for forced labor in seafood-related industries, garment factories, and domestic work. Most victims identified by Thai officials are found in sex trafficking, including children, who are exploited for sex tourism. Children are also reportedly recruited and used by separatist groups to carry out attacks in southern Thailand.

The State Department’s 2013 TIP Report described the government of Thailand as not fully in compliance with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. Moreover, the State Department concluded that Thailand has “not shown sufficient evidence” in the past year of efforts to bring itself into compliance. For the 2014 TIP Report, Thailand will be promoted to Tier 2 or downgraded to Tier 3, depending on the State Department’s assessment of anti-trafficking progress.

Thailand in Asia

Thailand is important to the region because of its large economy and, until the coup and the civil unrest, its relatively long-standing democratic rule. Southeast Asia is considered by many Asian experts to be a key arena of soft power competition between the United States and China: the loss

of a democratic government, as well as any resulting friction with the United States, could be considered an opening for closer Sino-Thai relations.

Strong Ties with China

Sino-Thailand ties, historically far closer than Beijing’s relations with most other Southeast Asian states, have continued to strengthen. Bilateral trade and positive relations have boomed over the past decade. Even while re-asserting its U.S. alliance under Thaksin, Thailand continued to court China, including inking agreements on technology, environmental protection, and strategic cooperation.

Military-to-military ties increased through both exchanges and arms sales: China exports major weapons and military equipment to Thailand, a practice that originated in the 1980s when both countries supported Cambodian resistance groups, including the Khmer Rouge, against the Vietnamese-installed government in Phnom Penh. Many analysts saw the suspension of several U.S. military programs following the coup as an opportunity for China to expand its influence in the Thai defense establishment. China participated as an observer for the first time in the May 2008 Cobra Gold exercises. Security cooperation has also been stirred by an October 2011 incident in which 13 Chinese soldiers guarding PRC cargo boats were killed in a raid by armed members of a Burmese minority group in a portion of the Mekong River controlled by Thailand. In December 2011, China began limited joint patrols with Thailand, Laos, and Burma along the Mekong, which is increasingly used for trans-border trade.30

Trade and investment between Thailand and China have grown as well. Thai companies, many run by ethnic-Chinese families, were among the largest early investors in China following its economic opening in 1979. Thailand has been a strong backer of trade agreements with China. The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA) went into effect in January 2010, and China replaced the United States as Thailand’s largest trading partner that year. Thai-PRC trade grew 51% between 2010 and 2012, compared to 24% growth in Thai-U.S. trade.31

Thailand’s strong relationship with China is based on a history far less antagonistic than Beijing’s past with many other ASEAN countries. After the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, Bangkok pursued a strategic alignment with Beijing in order to contain Vietnamese influence in neighboring Cambodia. Bangkok restored diplomatic ties with Beijing in 1975, long before other Southeast Asian nations. The sizeable ethnic Chinese population in Thailand assimilated relatively easily and became a strong presence in the business world, and in the political arena as well. Thailand also has no territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea, unlike Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam. In 2013, it served as ASEAN’s coordinator of discussions with China over a potential Code of Conduct for parties in the South China Sea, which brought the restart of these negotiations after several years of stasis.

Thailand-Burma Ties

Thailand has long had a deeply uneasy relationship with Burma’s government, both during the period in which Burma was led by a military regime and in the current reform period. Much of the 1,800 kilometer border that separates the two nations has for years been held on the Burmese side by ethnic-minority militias that oppose the central government. The flow of narcotics, migrants, and sometimes militants across the border are some of Thailand’s most pressing foreign policy and security problems.

Until the Obama Administration began pursuing an opening with Burma, Bangkok’s approach toward Burma had been seen as conflicting with U.S. policy for many years. While the United States pursued strict economic and diplomatic sanctions against the regime, Thailand led ASEAN’s “constructive engagement” initiative, which favors integration and incentives to coax Burma into reform. From Thailand’s perspective, the engagement policy served to minimize the danger of a large-scale military struggle and to expand opportunities for Thai business in Burma. Thailand has been criticized for supporting the junta through substantial trade, particularly in natural gas. Thai-Burma trade totaled $6.1 billion in 2011, according to the Bank of Thailand.

During years when the Burmese regime was largely isolated from the international community, this gave Thailand some greater degree of access to the regime. In 2008, for instance, as international groups struggled for access to Burma to provide humanitarian relief following Cyclone Nargis, Burma granted Thai officials and aid workers entry.

In the wake of recent reforms in Burma, Thailand, like much of the region, is assessing whether Burmese reforms are real and sustainable, and seeking to build relationships in the country and encourage the continuation of political reform. In 2013, Thailand led moves to invite two Burmese Army officers to the multilateral Cobra Gold exercises, and some observers argue that Thailand could take a leadership role in bringing the Burmese military into other regional security initiatives.

Some congressional leaders have criticized Bangkok for its treatment of Burmese refugees, migrant workers, and political dissidents living in Thailand. Backed by human rights groups’ reports, some U.S. lawmakers have leveled charges of arrests and intimidation of Burmese political activists, as well as the repatriation of Burmese who seek political asylum. In the past, Congress has passed legislation that provides money to refugees who fled Burma, particularly those in Thailand.

Refugees in Thailand

Thailand has been a magnet for economic and political refugees for many years, particularly from the neighboring countries of Laos, Cambodia, and, most prominently, Burma. Displaced populations of ethnic minorities from Southeast Asia have sought refuge across Thailand’s long borders, attracted by relatively loose immigration controls and often lenient treatment by Thai authorities.


33 H.R. 4818, Foreign Operations Appropriations, Section II, Bilateral Assistance.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that over three decades, around 3 million asylum seekers have sought refuge in Thailand, and the Thai government views Burma as presenting the most immediate source of refugee problems. Burmese refugees in Thailand come from a variety of ethnic groups that have fled attacks on their villages by the Burmese army and warlords. Another estimated 200,000 refugees and asylum seekers representing groups (many of them Hmong refugees from Laos) live elsewhere in the country. In addition, Thailand’s reputation for relative tolerance for refugees, as well as crackdowns in other recipient countries, has attracted an increasing number of North Korean asylum-seekers. A strong network of international humanitarian organizations exists in Thailand to provide assistance to these populations.

Although Thailand has been generally cooperative in helping Burmese refugees, successive Thai governments have expressed frustration with the continuing presence of refugees and periodically clamped down on the incoming asylum seekers. Thailand’s position is that it does not want to become an indefinite host, nor does it want to absorb those Burmese who do not qualify as refugees. Moreover, the government argues that the camps were intended for temporary use and are not considered suitable for permanent habitation. In the last few years, the Thai government has come under considerable criticism for its refugee treatment. In late 2009, the Thai army deported over 4,300 Hmong refugees back to Laos, where they may face persecution. Although Thai officials deemed the eviction “voluntary,” the United Nations was not allowed access to determine their refugee status. Similarly, the Thai military was found to have forcibly pushed boats of Rohingya refugees from Burma out to sea in January 2009.

ASEAN Relations

Thailand’s “local” foreign policy with fellow Southeast Asian nations who make up ASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Laos, Burma, and Cambodia) consists of a web of complicated relations. As one of the largest and most economically developed of the ASEAN countries, Thailand has much to gain for promoting ASEAN’s significance in global affairs. With its favorable geographic location and broad-based economy, Thailand has traditionally been considered among the most likely countries to play a major leadership role in Southeast Asia and has been an aggressive advocate of increased economic integration in the region. Bangkok has developed strong relations with its mainland Southeast Asian neighbors through infrastructure assistance and other aid. In turn, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia provide raw materials, inexpensive manufacturing, and expanding markets for Thailand. Particularly under Thaksin, Thailand pursued enhanced relations with Singapore based on a common interest in liberalizing trade and with the Philippines centered on a mutual interest in combating terrorism, but those emphases have cooled since Thaksin’s departure.

Despite cooperative elements, Bangkok’s relations with its neighbors are often characterized by tension and diplomatic spats. Intermittent tension with Cambodia re-ignited in 2008 over competing territorial claims of Preah Vihear, a temple situated along the Thai-Cambodian border and in February 2011, several consecutive days of shelling left at least 10 people dead and prompted calls from Cambodia for the United Nations to intervene. On November 11, 2013, the International Court of Justice ruled that the temple and the area immediately surrounding it were Cambodia’s territory. Though Thai and Cambodian troops remain in the area, the ruling has been greeted peacefully.

Relations with Malaysia have been complicated by the insurgency in Thailand’s majority-Muslim southern provinces, which border Malaysia. Many Thai Muslims are ethnically Malay and speak
Yawi, a Malay dialect, and at times the Malaysian public has grown angry at the perceived violence against Muslims in Thailand. Thailand and Malaysia have cooperated on efforts to seek talks with separatist groups in the South. However, many separatist leaders reside in northern Malaysia, making the issue a point of concern as the violence continues.
Figure 1. Map of Thailand

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
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