Sri Lanka: Current Situation

Update

Adrian Schuster

Translated by a professional translation agency on behalf of the UK Border Agency

Bern, 15 November 2012
## Contents

1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1

2 Political developments since 2010 ............................................................................ 2  
2.1 Analysis of the war and of war crimes committed ............................................. 2  
2.2 2011 and 2012 regional and provincial council elections ............................... 2  
2.3 Growing militarisation ......................................................................................... 3  
2.4 Judiciary independence under pressure ............................................................ 3  
2.5 Corruption ............................................................................................................. 5

3 Security Situation ........................................................................................................ 5  
3.1 Security apparatus ............................................................................................... 5  
3.2 Tamil paramilitary groups ................................................................................... 7

4 Human rights ................................................................................................................ 8  
4.1 Arbitrary killings committed by security forces and by groups close to the government ................................................................. 8  
4.2 Abductions and ‘disappearances’ ....................................................................... 8  
4.3 Arbitrary arrests and torture .............................................................................. 9  
4.4 Profile of at-risk groups ...................................................................................... 11  
4.4.1 The Tamils in the North and East ................................................................. 11  
4.4.2 Journalists .................................................................................................... 13  
4.4.3 Opponents and defenders of human rights ................................................. 13  
4.4.4 Women and children ................................................................................... 14

5 Displaced persons ....................................................................................................... 16

6 Socioeconomic Situation in the North.................................................................. 17

7 Returning from abroad ............................................................................................ 19  
7.1 Airport Checks .................................................................................................... 19  
7.2 Safety of returnees ............................................................................................. 19
1 Introduction

In 2012, the Sri Lankan government made a determined effort to give the impression of a return to normality following decades of civil war. In order to do this, it announced in particular the closure of the largest camp for displaced persons, as well as their resettlement. At a dazzling pace vast areas were declared demined. Among those retained in rehabilitation camps, a very large number has been released. In the North, reconstruction is progressing rapidly. Work is especially focused on infrastructure. The A9 road crossing the Vanni region to Jaffna is completed; other roads are being repaired or are under construction.

However the conflict and its causes have not been analysed in depth. The authorities deny any involvement of the army in war crimes. A reconciliation commission assembled by President Mahinda Rajapaksa has indeed adopted recommendations in a comprehensive report. However these recommendations are only implemented to the extent at which they do not challenge current power relations, or the government's point of view.

The president has made sure that his family occupy key positions in the government. On the other hand, the rights of the population are more and more constrained, in particular in the North of the country. Tamils, the opposition, journalists and human rights activists are subjected to surveillance and threats from the government. Justice is not independent and criminals remain unpunished. Government security forces and paramilitary groups associated with them kidnap, arrest and torture presumed enemies of the State.

This update is a follow-up on the previous 2010 update and the 2011 special report. Alongside publicly accessible sources, it is based on research carried out in the field by the Swiss Refugee Council during the autumn 2012 fact finding mission.

---

1 Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the President’s brother, is Minister of Defence, while the other brother Basil Rajapaksa is Minister of Economic Development as well heading the Presidential Task Force in the Northern province. Other members of the family occupy important posts. Freedom House, Countries at Crossroads, Sri Lanka 2012, 20 September 2012: www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/sri-lanka.

2 Several contacts within Sri Lanka and abroad were consulted during the research. They were Tamil and Sinhalese representatives of civil society such as human rights activists, women rights activists, lawyers, journalists and the opposition politicians, but also representatives of international organisations, several UN agencies, NGOs, development and humanitarian agencies, representatives of embassies. Discussions were also conducted with returnees.
2 Political developments since 2010

2.1 Analysis of the war and of war crimes committed

At present, the war crimes committed by representatives of the governmental army during the conflict have not been subjected to a proper inquiry. Those responsible have still not been brought to justice. The Sri Lankan government has set up its own commission, the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), which, in its 400-page report, portrays the role of the army in a favourable light. A number of critics have accused the LLRC of being biased and of not carrying out the investigations into war crimes seriously. The LLRC made 285 recommendations. Whilst the report in English was translated into local languages, it has not been made public. During summer 2012, the government outlined the possible implementation of a very selective choice of LLRC recommendations in a much-criticised national action plan. In July 2012, President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared that 50% of LLRC recommendations had already been put into action. This affirmation called into question the desire for serious redress.

2.2 2011 and 2012 regional and provincial council elections

A section of the independent observers reported widespread irregularities, intimidation, attacks and outbreaks of violence during the elections of 2011 and 2012. A clear division between South and North became apparent during the 2011 regional elections. The United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA), which incorporates the ruling parties, won a clear victory in the South with the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP). The North by contrast was dominated by the Tamil National Alliance (TNA). The UPFA won a clear victory in the 2012 provincial council elections. It was only in the Eastern Province that the results were more balanced. In the Northern Province, where the towns of Jaffna, Vavuniya, Mannar, as well as the Vanni region, are
located, no provincial council elections have yet taken place since the end of the civil war.

**Reduction in the number of seats in the Northern Parliament.** In August 2011, the commissioner in charge of elections decided to reduce the number of seats in the Jaffna district Parliament from 10 to 6, since the number of registered electors had been reduced from almost 800,000 to 480,000.¹¹ This decision, seen as a sign of the growing political marginalisation of the Tamil population, was heavily criticised by Tamil politicians and members of civil society.¹²

### 2.3 Growing militarisation

In 2012 a record new budget for the Ministry of Defence was voted in without any real parliamentary process.¹³ Never before had a Sri Lankan Ministry disposed of such a budget. Even during the civil war, it had never been so high. The army is becoming increasingly involved in the **private sector**. It has seats in administration councils, sells agricultural products, owns restaurants, hotels, sports stadiums, as well as having its own airline and offering tourist cruises.¹⁴ **Administration, development and humanitarian activities in the North** are heavily militarised. The governors of the Northern and Eastern provinces are ex-military.¹⁵ In the North, the army and the Presidential Task Force (PTF) exert control over the choice of development projects and humanitarian activities undertaken.¹⁶ The requirement for students to undergo military training, the fact that security in universities has been placed in the hands of private Ministry of Defence companies and that Heads of schools have been ranked as officers are further signs that the army is seeking to increase its influence in the **education system**.¹⁷

### 2.4 Judiciary independence under pressure

The 18th Constitutional Amendment of September 2010 reinforced **executive influence over the judiciary** and the president may now directly appoint judges of the Supreme Court, civil courts and courts of appeal, as well as the attorney-general.¹⁸

---

¹⁴ The Economist, Sri Lanka’s Army, In bigger barracks, A victorious army keeps busy despite the lack of an enemy, 2 June 2011: www.economist.com/node/18775481.
¹⁶ OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August and September 2012; ICG, Sri Lanka’s North II, Rebuilding under the Military, 16 March 2012, p.15.
The judicial system is increasingly used in order to punish opposition politicians. This trend was especially noticeable in the trial of former general Sarath Fonseka, who has since been released.

**Threats and attacks upon judiciary power.** Sri Lankan justice is heavily exposed to political pressure. The Supreme Court has, in its own words, regularly been subjected to threats and pressure from the government. In October 2012, the secretary of the Judicial Service Commission was attacked by unidentified men armed with knives, having strongly criticised executive interference into judiciary power in a press release. In November 2012, Parliament brought a suit for the impeachment of the Chief Justice, following criticism from her.

**Delays in the processing of cases.** Judges struggle to base their decisions on Supreme Court orders to which they have, according to Freedom House, only limited access. Added to this are considerable delays in the processing of cases (sometimes over 10 years), such that many people rot in prison without having had a trial. The Ministry of Justice admits to around 650,000 cases outstanding.

**Criminal impunity.** Several cases seem to prove that being close to the ruling party and to the president provides protection from legal proceedings. Politicians under pressure join the ranks of the ruling party in order to avoid proceedings. In December 2011, a local politician of the ruling party was implicated, according to eyewitnesses, in the murder of an Englishman and the rape of a Russian in the South of the country, but was not prosecuted. An arrest warrant for fraud was ordered against a public television journalist who was close to the President, but the man concerned was never arrested. Investigations pertaining to a case of manipulation

---


26 Ministry of Justice, Current Measures to Combat Law Delays, Website: www.justiceministry.gov.lk/.


of budgetary activities were interrupted under pressure from the President.\textsuperscript{30} Those close to the security apparatus are almost always protected from prosecution, especially concerning cases of torture and human rights violations.\textsuperscript{31}

\subsection*{2.5 Corruption}

Corruption is rife in the Sri Lankan administration and the government does little to combat it.\textsuperscript{32} Bribing civil servants, police officers and judges in order to obtain better treatment from the authorities or to get out of prison is a standard practice.\textsuperscript{33} According to observers, the airport authorities can be bribed equally easily. Paying a bribe can allow one to leave the country in spite of an arrest warrant, false papers or other irregularities which would normally hinder one’s departure.\textsuperscript{34}

\section*{3 Security Situation}

\subsection*{3.1 Security apparatus}

\textbf{Consolidation under the Ministry of Defence.} All security forces, including the police, are subordinate to Minister of Defence Gotabaya Rajapaksa and operate for the most part without civil checks.\textsuperscript{35} The President has on several occasions used the \textit{Public Security Ordinance} in order to provide the army with policing functions.\textsuperscript{36} Over the course of local and provincial elections, the security forces, in particular the police, have also received orders coming directly from government politicians.\textsuperscript{37}

\textbf{Strong military presence in the North.} According to observers established in the North and East and in spite of statements to the contrary from the government, the army and security apparatus retain a heavy presence, \textit{operating increasingly in plain-clothes}, which renders their presence less visible.\textsuperscript{38} While over 1,200 Tamils have been, according to official sources, recruited into police ranks since 2009, the security apparatus remains essentially in the hands of the Sinhalese.\textsuperscript{39} For the Tam-
il population, it is difficult to gain recourse to police services: often, complaints from representatives of Tamil ethnicity are not even registered, as the police civil servants only speak Sinhalese. 40

The CID and TID. The special police unit, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), operates independently from territorial police units and can arrest suspects in any part of the country. The Terrorist Investigation Department (TID) is a counter-terrorism unit. It can arrest people under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and has its own detention centres. 41 The two special units arrest and torture suspects and presumed enemies of the State. 42 According to OSAR records, the CID and TID are extremely active in the North, undertaking the surveillance of potential militants of the Tamil cause, the opposition, human rights activists and journalists. Those who criticise the government are also subjected to surveillance in Colombo and have their phones tapped. 43 Ex-members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) work for the CID. 44 A number of CID and TID activities seem aimed especially at intimidating the opposition, journalists and relatives of those who have disappeared. 45 In villages of the North and East, the CID uses local informants, which enables the surveillance throughout the country of those who criticise the government. 46

Persons of Tamil ethnicity who go into Sinhalese areas must be registered with the police. This is not the case for Sinhalese citizens going into Tamil areas. In Batticaloa and in Jaffna, this policing measure began in 2011. In the North and in the East, it also involves photographing Tamils and interrogating them about their relatives living abroad. 47 In Colombo, it seems that major raids are now less frequent. As for checkpoints, the situation in Sri Lanka has relaxed a little: the army maintains a major post on the A9 and registers all persons going from Vavuniya to Jaffna. There are still other checkpoints on smaller roads of the Vanni area. 48

40 OSAR interviews with a local contact in Sri Lanka, September 2012.
43 OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August and September 2012.
48 OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka and personal observations, August 2012.
3.2 Tamil paramilitary groups

The EPDP (*Eelam People’s Democratic Party*) in the North and the TMVP (*Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal*) in the East are registered political parties maintaining an armed wing. According to indications from the *International Crisis Group*, the EPDP is weakening the TNA and is preventing the development of serious political resistance against the government. It is operating in Jaffna, Vavuniya and Mannar. In Colombo, its activities are limited.

In the East of the country, the TMVP is divided into two active groups in the areas of Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Ampara. During 2012 elections to the provincial council, they formed, as a political party, an alliance with the ruling party. The Karuna group remains armed and takes an aggressive stance towards those who resist the ruling party (the SLFP).

The EPDP and TMVP are responsible for murder, abductions and extortion. SFH-OSAR is aware of recent cases pertaining to active members of Tamil civil society who have been abducted, threatened and tortured by the EPDP in Jaffna. Aside from political motives, purely criminal intent seems also significant. The EPDP and groups from the TMVP extort from the rich, no matter what their ethnicity. The activities of the EPDP and TMVP are often covered up or supported by public security forces and are rarely subject to legal proceedings. In Jaffna, the EPDP collaborates with the secret service and other security forces. According to a contact, the protection of EPDP and TMVP activities by public security forces is not guaranteed. On the other hand, two other groups active in the North, the PLOTE (*People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam*) and the TELO (*Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation*) seem weakened.

---

49 SFH-OSAR, Sri Lanka, Themenpapier, 22 September 2011, p. 18.
50 ICG, Sri Lanka’s North, 6 March 2012, p. 12f.
51 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), The Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP), including whether they mistreat Tamil populations in the north or in Colombo; if so, whether they extort Tamils; relationship between the EPDP and the Sri Lankan army (October 2010-December 2011) [LKA103961.E], 8 February 2012: www.irbcisr.gc.ca:8080/RIR_RDI/RIR_RDI.aspx?id=453813&l=e.
52 They are distinguishable through their respective leaders: Pillayan et Karuna. See SFH-OSAR, Update, Sri Lanka, Aktuelle Situation, 1 December 2010.
53 IRB, The Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) and Karuna factions; their relationship with each other, reports concerning their treatment of Sinhalese and Tamil citizens, whether they are still active as paramilitary groups [LKA103950.E], 17 February 2012: www.irbcisr.gc.ca:8080/RIR_RDI/RIR_RDI.aspx?id=453812&l=e.
55 See also 4.4.3.
56 The EPDP is also carrying out illegal sand extraction. ICG, Sri Lanka’s North I, 6 March 2012, p. 12.
58 ICG, Sri Lanka’s North I, 6 March 2012, p. 12.
59 OSAR interviews with a contact from an international organisation working in Sri Lanka, August 2012.
4 Human rights

In the opinion of several observers, the human rights situation in Sri Lanka is extremely precarious.\textsuperscript{60} The government’s National Action Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, in place since December 2011, has changed nothing. The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka is not independent; it is made up of members close to the government who have no experience in the area of human rights.\textsuperscript{61}

4.1 Arbitrary killings committed by security forces and by groups close to the government

Even after the end of the civil war, the security forces and paramilitary groups close to the government have continued to assassinate people. Since these crimes often take place in the Tamil-majority North and East, some observers believe them to be politically motivated.\textsuperscript{62} There are also deaths in police custody. The police often claim that the victims have been killed as they attempted to escape.\textsuperscript{63} A number of reports have documented killings committed by public security forces.\textsuperscript{64} For example, the killing of 27 prisoners by the \textit{Special Task Force} during interrogations conducted on the 9th November at Colombo’s Welikade prison.\textsuperscript{65} A week earlier, four prisoners had been killed by the police in Galle.\textsuperscript{66}

According to the last human rights report from the \textit{US Department of State}, a series of killings committed by unknowns were linked to the EPDP, TMVP or public security forces. There is no reliable data on the subject however, since, fearing sanctions, the victim’s relatives often prefer not to make the death known, given that such denunciations have in the past led to the assassination of certain plaintiffs.\textsuperscript{67}

4.2 Abductions and ‘disappearances’

Practically no other country presents so many cases of unsolved kidnapping as Sri Lanka: the last \textit{UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances} annual report mentions 5,653 cases linked to the conflict, not counting the final


\textsuperscript{61} OSAR interviews with a contact in Sri Lanka, August août 2012; HRC, Compilation prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21; Sri Lanka [A/HRC/WG.6/14/LKA/2], 13 August 2012: www.upr-info.org/IMG/pdf/a_hrc_wg.6_14_lka_2_e.pdf.


phase of 2008 and 2009. According to the database of the International Committee of the Red Cross there were 15,780 missing persons in Sri Lanka at the end 2011. In 2012, there remain reports of an enormous number of ‘disappearances’ and abductions committed by unknowns in Sri Lanka in 2012. According to a summary of several articles appearing in the media, there has been at least one disappearance every five days in Sri Lanka in 2012. Many people are kidnapped in Colombo or in the Northern Province. A number of sources suggest responsibility lies with the public security forces, the EPDP and TMVP. At present, investigations on several thousand disappearances reported over the last few years continue to make little progress. In the North, kidnappings are not always reported to the authorities, as the relatives often suspect the involvement of security forces.

Some of the kidnappings appear to be politically motivated, since the victims are from the opposition, active members of civil society, human rights activists and presumed sympathisers or ex-members of the LTTE. Demands for ransom are equally frequent and often target the rich, such as shop owners.

### 4.3 Arbitrary arrests and torture

The PTA is still in force; it allows people to be arrested and detained for up to 18 months without charge on the basis of a mere suspicion. According to some observers, the security forces often indulge in arbitrary or illegal arrests. As in an

---

71 Groundviews, A disappearance every five days in post-war Sri Lanka, 30 August 2012: www.groundviews.org/2012/08/30/a-disappearance-every-five-days-in-post-war-sri-lanka/.
75 OSAR interviews with a contact in Sri Lanka, August 2012.
abduction, people are often picked up by strangers in civilian clothing, with no arrest warrant.\(^{80}\)

Relatives of wanted persons are also harassed, threatened and arrested. Many people have never found out why they had been arrested, nor for how long they would be held prisoner. It is rare for relatives to have access to detainees or to be informed of a transfer to another prison. The security forces and paramilitary groups are still running secret prison establishments. Detainees are often refused access to lawyers for weeks. They are also prevented from contesting their detention before a court.\(^{81}\)

In June 2012, Tamil detainees in the detention centre in Vavuniya went on strike in order to attract public attention to their long incarceration without access to a judge, and to the inhuman detention conditions. The prison was stormed by some 300 representatives of the security forces and the strike was ended with great brutality. Two detainees were beaten to death by the security forces.\(^{82}\)

Members of the security forces often seek to cash in on a release. Once released, former detainees are generally subject to surveillance and it often happens that they are arrested and harassed again by the authorities.\(^{83}\)

Cases of abuse and torture are very common in prison. Reports state that diverse forces Sri Lankan security forces very often or even systematically make use of torture in order to extract confessions.\(^{84}\) There are also known to have been instances of torture perpetrated by the EPDP and the TMVP.\(^{85}\) Torture is a means recognised by society of advancing police investigations. Only really serious cases are recognised as such and attract public attention.\(^{86}\) Beatings, burnings, sexual violence and rapes, as well as the suspension and asphyxiation of victims are common and documented methods.\(^{87}\) The Asian Human Rights Commission documented seven cases of torture just between July and September 2012.\(^{88}\)

In Sri Lanka, doctors often refuse to treat the victims of torture, who then, fearing other ill-treatment, are reluctant to go to public hospitals. That is why many of them consult private doctors. In Sri Lanka, it is rare for victims of torture to lodge a com-

---

\(^{80}\) AI, Locked away, March 2012, p. 16.

\(^{81}\) AI, Locked away, March 2012.


\(^{83}\) AI, Locked away, March 2012.


\(^{85}\) OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August 2012.

\(^{86}\) OSAR interviews with local contact, September 2012.

\(^{87}\) Victims are struck with plastic rods (filled with cement), wooden sticks and cables, cut with metal instruments, burned with cigarettes and metal bars, raped and sexually abused, suspended and immersed in water to the point of asphyxiation. Also, plastic bags filled with exhaust gases are placed on their heads. Freedom from Torture, Sri Lankan Tamils tortured on return from the UK, Briefing, 13 September 2012, p. 6: www.freedomfromtorture.org/sites/default/files/documents/Freedom%20from%20Torture%20briefing%20-%20%20Sri%20Lankan%20Tamils%20tortured%20on%20return%20from%20the%20UK_0.pdf.

\(^{88}\) UKFCO, Quarterly Updates, Sri Lanka, 30 September 2012.
plaint, because that would require a certificate issued by State doctors. Those who do so are put under pressure by the public prosecutors, who make every effort to get them to withdraw their complaint.

4.4 Profile of at-risk groups

4.4.1 The Tamils in the North and East

Although the LTTE may have been defeated and there is not the slightest sign that this organisation has survived, the State machine of Sri Lanka is extremely paranoid and is trying to contain any resurgence of this group or the germination of tendencies of independence alongside the Tamils. This concern has direct repercussions on all of the Tamils in the North and East, because their ethnicity alone could indicate possible proximity to the LTTE.

Every inhabitant of the North could be arrested at any time on the basis of a mere suspicion. According to Amnesty International, it is observed from the way in which the arrests take place that the State scarcely protects Tamils throughout the country. Tamils are being arrested and imprisoned in markedly greater numbers than the Sinhalese by virtue of the PTA. Many are imprisoned without charge and tortured. It often happens that representatives of the Tamil race are abducted and killed by persons unknown. In particular, the security forces see the Tamils who fled the Vanni region during the last phase of the conflict as a potential danger to security. Considered by the government as the intellectual base of the struggle for more independence, the Tamil population of the city of Jaffna is particularly threatened.

According to some observers, the security forces and paramilitary groups carry out especially heavy surveillance in the North and East; they threaten and harass the population of these regions. Anyone expressing criticism of the government or who speaks out in favour of greater Tamil independence makes himself a suspect. According to a report by the BBC, many representatives of the Tamil race who have lived in the region controlled by the LTTE have no national identity card. That makes them suspects in the eyes of the security forces and can lead to arrests.

The Tamil population lives in a permanent state of fear and insecurity; it dares not express itself publicly on political matters. In the North, the security forces and paramilitary groups restrict its freedom of assembly. Assemblies of more than three persons must be reported to the army. Even private events such as weddings, reli-

---

89 OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, September 2012.
90 OSAR interviews with local contact from an international organisation working in Sri Lanka, August 2012.
91 OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August and September 2012.
92 Ibid.
94 AI, Locked Away, March 2012, p.16.
95 OSAR interviews with local contact, August 2012.
97 Results of a confidential survey conducted by an international organisation in Trincomalee.
igious or funeral rituals are under surveillance by the security forces and require authorisation. Tamil political parties are often prevented from demonstrating.

**Presumed and former members of the LTTE.** There are even suspicions directed at Tamils having a low profile, who do not escape surveillance. The authorities check whether these people may be in contact with the diaspora. This is especially the case of those who were recruited, whether or not by force, by the LTTE. Even persons occupying civil functions within the LTTE are suspects, for example accountants, cooks, drivers or construction workers. The authorities also extend their suspicions to acquaintances and relatives of former members of the LTTE. In May 2012, some 150 to 200 former members of the LTTE were victims of a wave of arrests in the East of the country. According to statements made by local politicians, many of them had been committed to the LTTE before the last combat operations of 2009. Some of these people are still languishing in prison. Politically-motivated killings or acts of vengeance target LTTE sympathisers. This is especially the case of former LTTE combatant Balachchandran Satkunarasa, who was found hanged from a football goal post in June 2011 by the inhabitants of Jaffna. Freedom from Torture has established that some people were tortured because of their real or presumed links with the LTTE. In general, these are also low-profile persons. According to several reports, people who return from abroad are often suspected of maintaining links with the LTTE and particularly threatened.

**Former prisoners in the «rehabilitation camps».** Amnesty International has verified the fact that prisoners from rehabilitation camps suffered torture and ill-treatment. According to official indications, most of the over-12,000 persons detained in the “rehabilitation camps” have been released. According to the Ministry of Defence, there are still some 800 remaining. Trials have been instituted against some of these people. The former prisoners of the «rehabilitation camps» constitute an extremely vulnerable group. Once released, they have to report regularly to the security forces. However, this obligation is not founded on any legal basis. Their identity cards showing their status as former «rehabilitation camp» prisoners have recently been withdrawn from them. And yet these protected them to a certain extent from a new arrest, which could take place at any time. The former prisoners from the «rehabilitation camps» are under surveillance, especially those who could play a role in a possible resurgence of the LTTE movement. This category encompasses not only former combatants, but also those who occupied administrative

---

98 OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August and September 2012; The Guardian, We even need permission to bury our dead, Sri Lanka’s war legacy lingers, 28 June 2012: www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/jun/28/sri-lanka-war-legacy.
99 OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August and September 2012.
100 UKFCO, Quarterly Updates, Sri Lanka, 30 September 2012.
102 Freedom from Torture, Out of the Silence, 7 November 2011, p. 6f.
103 For more details on this, see 7.2 Security of people who return.
104 AI, Locked Away, March 2012.
106 This has been confirmed several times in OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August and September 2012. One of these contacts believed that the obligation to report in had recently been relaxed slightly, but was not sure that this would last.
functions within the LTTE. Police controls, wrangling and harassment reduce their chances of finding employment to almost zero. This is especially the case since former prisoners from the «rehabilitation camps» encounter huge difficulties in their efforts to reintegrate.  

4.4.2 Journalists

Journalists who criticise the government are threatened, harassed, attacked, abducted, even killed, throughout the country. These attacks lead the media to censor themselves. On numerous occasions, senior officials have treated journalists as traitors and put pressure on editorial staff and publishers to encourage them to present the government in a positive light. Frederica Jansz, a Sinhalese journalist from a newspaper critical of the government, has personally received serious threats by telephone from the Minister of Defence Gotabaya Rajapaksa, followed by other death threats. Her predecessor had been killed by unknown men in 2009. The perpetrators of this crime are still at large. A member of the entourage of the presidential clan bought the newspaper, which apologised to the Minister of Defence on the front page and sacked the journalist. In the North, two regional newspaper editors received death threats after reporting on a controversial protest in the region. Online media which dare to criticise the government are subject to constant surveillance and acts of sabotage. In July 2012, the police thus closed the offices of two websites of the opposition, confiscated computers and documents and arrested nine employees. In 2012, the CID carried out a number of raids on newspapers. Some observers see this as an act of intimidation.

4.4.3 Opponents and defenders of human rights

Throughout the country and especially in the North, the security forces and paramilitary groups close to the government use harassment, threats and attacks in an attempt to muzzle criticisms of the government, especially if they emanate from opponents or defenders of human rights, or the denunciation of war crimes by the ar-

---

108 OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August 2012.
110 OSAR interviews with journalists present in the area, August 2012.
113 UKFCO, Quarterly Updates, Sri Lanka, 30 September 2012.
115 UKFCO, Quarterly Updates, Sri Lanka, 30 September 2012.
my. In this climate of fear, small groups of militants dare not speak out in public. Priests, lawyers and NGO workers who have frequent contact with foreigners are the victims of threats and acts of repression. A Tamil priest who holds a legal advice centre for the Tamil population of Jaffna and who criticised the government in an interview given during summer 2012 to the Washington Post had to go into hiding following serious threats from the EPDP. His female co-worker was abducted and tortured. The CID keeps human rights defenders and opponents under surveillance, as proven by several examples known to the OSAR.

Lalith Kumar Weeraraj and Kugan Muruganandan, who are both members of an opposition party, disappeared in Jaffna in December 2011. Weeraraj was trying to draw attention to the human rights situation of the Tamils; he had been threatened on several occasions, attacked and arrested by the security forces. The two militants have still not been found. On 7 April 2012, two opponents were abducted by unknown men in a suburb of Colombo. They were later released. In March 2012, human rights defenders from Sri Lanka who had taken part in the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva suffered threats and intimidation by the official delegation of Sri Lanka. The Minister for Public Relations, Mervyn Silva, had then threatened to «break the bones of the traitors to the Nation».

4.4.4 Women and children

The violence inflicted on women and children continues to pose a major problem throughout Sri Lanka. Reliable statistics on this matter are scarce. An official source says that 4,505 cases of «serious crimes», including 1,871 rapes and 8,067 «minor offences» comprising in particular 2,726 cases of sexual abuse against women and children were reported to the police in 2011. One can assume that the number of unreported cases is far higher, since most victims dare not speak to the police, out of fear or shame. The police have nevertheless recorded an alarming increase in the number of complaints of rape by comparison with previous years and identified girls between 13 and 16 years as especially vulnerable. The victims of sexual violence are heavily stigmatised by society, which means for example they have trouble finding a husband. Sri Lankan law prohibiting rape and domestic violence is not sufficiently respected and the perpetrators of these crimes generally go un-

118 OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka , August and September 2012.
120 OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka , August and September 2012.
121 A TNA politician, for example, told OSAR that the CID always attends his working meetings. OSAR also knows of a case where the CID attempted to prevent a meeting between human rights defenders and foreign diplomats in Jaffna. OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka , August and September 2012.
123 UKFCO, Quarterly Updates, Sri Lanka, 30 September 2012.
124 Ibid.
punished.\textsuperscript{128} Rape within marriage is not punishable, unless the couple is legally divorced.\textsuperscript{129}

There are several credible indicators that members of government security forces or paramilitary groups force women and children to submit to acts of sexual violence.\textsuperscript{130} This misconduct is especially common in prison. A report by Freedom from Torture has demonstrated that female detainees are very often exposed to acts of sexual violence committed by the security forces.\textsuperscript{131} In the South of the country, more and more crimes against women and children are committed by the security forces or their former members.\textsuperscript{132} Many of the victims do not report these acts of abuse out of fear of reprisals. According to the Asian Human Rights Commission, the presence of female police officers in police stations has not improved security for women, because some of these officers also take part in these attacks.\textsuperscript{133}

\textbf{Widows or women who live alone} in the North of the country are even more at risk of becoming victims of sexual violence. The strengthening of the military presence and the ever-increasing abuse of alcohol among the traumatised local population add to the insecurity of women and children.\textsuperscript{134} In August 2011, there was a great deal of talk about the attacks committed by unknown men called «Grease Devils»: women, mostly Tamil, were raped and killed.\textsuperscript{135}

The victims of rape and domestic violence often receive no support whatsoever. Access to crisis centres, to a legal consultation and to psychological counselling is very limited, especially in the North.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{128} There are examples of cases known where the victims have withdrawn their complaint and where the rapists have gone unpunished. This is the case of the local politician who raped a Russian woman (see 2.4) or of the MP Duminda Silva, who was acquitted in March 2011, because the victim, who was depressed, did not wish to continue the trial. See also BBC News, Concern in Sri Lanka over rising number of child rapes, 18 July 2012; USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2011, 24 May 2012, p. 35.


\textsuperscript{131} Freedom from Torture, Out of the Silence, 7 November 2011.

\textsuperscript{132} ICG, Women’s Insecurity in the North and East, 20 December 2011, p. 13.


\textsuperscript{134} OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August and September 2012; ICG, Women’s Insecurity in the North and East, 20 December 2011, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{135} ICG, Women’s Insecurity in the North and East, 20 December 2011, p. 30ff.

5 Displaced persons

In November 2012, at the Human Rights Council of the United Nations in Geneva, the government announced the closure of the largest and best known of the displaced persons camps, Menik Farm, and the moving of its nearly 300,000 occupants. But according to what is said by Tamil politicians, around 75,000 of the 300,000 persons concerned were simply removed to new transit camps.\(^\text{137}\) Even after the closure of Menik Farm, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre refers to even more than 115,000 displaced persons.\(^\text{138}\)

**Difficulties of displaced persons on return.** Nearly 470,000 persons are registered as repatriated, but have not managed to establish themselves on a long-term basis in one place.\(^\text{139}\) According to observers, many of these people have been transferred against their will.\(^\text{140}\) A large number of them have not been able to return to their place of origin, generally because the army was still blocking these areas regarded as high security zones.\(^\text{141}\) No compensation was granted in exchange for the occupied land. Persons transferred have the utmost difficulty in finding a source of income in their new location. The population of a fishing village was for example transferred to the Vanni region in the middle of the jungle, far from the sea from which it derived its livelihood.\(^\text{142}\) Accommodating returnees is still a major problem.\(^\text{143}\) The government is hindering humanitarian work, subjecting it to stringent control. In particular it has set a cap on construction costs of housing for returnees. In the view of many experts, the sum specified is not even enough to build a simple house with its own toilet.\(^\text{144}\)

According to official statements, 98% of the regions stated to have priority for the return of displaced persons have been cleared of mines by the army at a remarkable speed.\(^\text{145}\) According to international experts, the official data is not credible, as mine clearance in these vast areas is not compliant with international standards. Safe and complete mine clearance will take decades more. A good number of the regions to which displaced persons are returning cannot therefore be regarded as safe.\(^\text{146}\)

\(^{137}\) The Island, At least 75,000 of the 300,000 IDPs are still living in Transit Camps in the North and East: Sampathan, 13 October 2012: www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=63726.


\(^{139}\) Ibid.

\(^{140}\) UKFCO, Quarterly Updates, Sri Lanka, 30 September 2012.

\(^{141}\) Part of the high security zones have been turned into so-called public economic zones, without access to them being facilitated by this.

\(^{142}\) OSAR interviews with representatives of development agencies working in Sri Lanka, August 2012.

\(^{143}\) Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), Former IDPs want more than leaking shacks, 2 November 2012: www.irinnews.org/Report/96697/SRI-LANKA-Former-IDPs-want-more-than-leaking-shacks.

\(^{144}\) OSAR interviews with representatives of development agencies working in Sri Lanka, September 2012.

\(^{145}\) HRC, National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21; Sri Lanka [A/HRC/W.G.6/14/LKA/1], 10 August 2012, p. 27: www.upr -info.org/IMG/pdf/a_hrc_wg.6_14_lka_1_e.pdf.

\(^{146}\) OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August 2012.
6 Socioeconomic Situation in the North

Development of the North of Sri Lanka allows for a wide variety of assessments. According to official statements, the gross national product in the North of the country has increased by around 22%, compared with a national average of 8% in 2011. Experts explain this progress mainly by the large infrastructure projects of the government and by the fact that this is on the basis of a very low starting point after the conflict.

These figures emerge from a new study by the World Food Programme carried out in 2012; they reveal the full extent of poverty in the North, in particular in Jaffna where 55% of inhabitants are unable to ensure food security for themselves. The majority of families in the five districts of the North who are unable to ensure their livelihood, that is nearly 65%, live in Jaffna. In that city, 55% of households have an income below the poverty line set at one US dollar per day. The food required is admittedly available at the markets, but the people cannot afford it. Some 38% of households eat on credit. Only a small minority has the benefit of the very modest support intended by the State for the poorest level of the population (between 3 and 4 Swiss francs per month). Many Tamils who have lived in the region controlled by the LTTE do not have access to public benefits, lacking a national identity card.

According to statements by a number of observers, the unemployment rate is very high in the North: around 30%, whereas the national average is 4%. According to the World Food Programme study, Jaffna is particularly affected, as nearly 90% of households in the city have at least one person who is unemployed. In its 2011 survey, the Department of Census and Statistics gives no figures for the North of Sri Lanka. Construction in the North offers relatively few jobs, as the government is supporting mechanization, with a view to speeding up work. Moreover, contracts are mainly awarded to businesses from the South which are Sinhalese for the most part and who come with their workers. Lacking occupation, the army also takes part in the work and occupies job opportunities in this sector. Those with Tamil ethnic origins generally can only participate in reconstruction at the lowest level, as workers (poorly) paid by the day. With the exception of reconstruction of infrastructure,

---

147 HRC, National report, 10 August 2012, p. 8.
149 People are considered food secure when they have all-time access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life. For a detailed definition see the World Food Programme: www.wfp.org.
151 OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August 2012.
153 IRIN, Sri Lanka, Too many jobless youth in former warzone, 1 October 2012.
154 IRIN, Sri Lanka, Focus on food insecurity, 9 July 2012.
156 IRIN, Sri Lanka, Too many jobless youth in former warzone, 1 October 2012.
157 OSAR observations and interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August and September 2012.
very few businesses are active in the North.\textsuperscript{158} This creates a problem, in particular for the majority of returnees who must in the main earn their living as day workers.\textsuperscript{159}

Agriculture and fishing would be other important sources of income in the North.\textsuperscript{160} But as the army and the security forces seize the houses and land of private individuals, while the owners do not dare to oppose this, returnees and even part of the local population have difficulty gaining access to this property.\textsuperscript{161} There is no compensation for houses occupied or destroyed.\textsuperscript{162} Despite the reduction of high security zones, the army is still blocking vast areas, including fertile farming land.\textsuperscript{163} State-funded priority access to water pumps, tractors and fertilizer allows it to produce agricultural goods at low cost and sell them cheaply, harming the income opportunities of local small farmers.\textsuperscript{164}

Fishing was formerly an important economic factor for the North of Sri Lanka. But some sectors of the coast are still included in the navy’s security zones. The army also sold some coastal areas to private enterprise. Big Chinese and Indian trawlers are illegally depleting the fishing grounds of the North and East and are severely compromising the activity of small Tamil fishermen by damaging their nets. The government does nothing to protect the rights and means of subsistence of indigenous fishermen.\textsuperscript{165}

For women, the situation is extremely difficult. Alone, they have practically no means of earning a living. Women’s rights defence groups report that some are prostituting themselves out of despair.\textsuperscript{166} Observers estimate that in the North, the unemployment rate is twice as high among women as among men.\textsuperscript{167}

As Sinhalese is little spoken by the Tamil population of the North, they have very limited access to the labour market in other parts of the country.\textsuperscript{168} Starting their own business represents a huge challenge for many of those with Tamil ethnic origins. For besides the start-up capital required, such an initiative requires a series of authorisations that have to be obtained from administrative bodies dominated by the Sinhalese.\textsuperscript{169} Those who do not give up in the face of these obstacles must further

\textsuperscript{158} IRIN, Sri Lanka, Too many jobless youth in former war zone, 1 October 2012.
\textsuperscript{159} Ministry of Health Sri Lanka/UNICEF/WFP, Assessment of nutritional status and associated factors in Northern Province, March 2012, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{161} OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka , August and September 2012; Tamil Net, 1033 lands, houses to be permanently appropriated for SL military in Jaffna, 13 June 2012: www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=35290.
\textsuperscript{162} With the exception of civil servants. OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka , September 2012.
\textsuperscript{163} OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka , August and September 2012; ICG, Sri Lanka’s North II, 16 March 2012, p.21.
\textsuperscript{164} ICG, Sri Lanka’s North II, 16 March 2012, p.21.
\textsuperscript{165} OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka , August and September 2012.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{167} OSAR interview with a contact on site, August 2012.
\textsuperscript{168} IRIN, Sri Lanka, Too many jobless youth in former war zone, 1 October 2012.
expect that their business suffer reprisals from the EPDP and racketing by criminal
groups.

7 Returning from abroad

7.1 Airport Checks

Screening at the airport. OSAR has already described in detail the procedures in
force at the airport. Returning Tamils undergo a long procedure aimed at finding
possible links with the LTTE. They are first taken aside and questioned by the au-
thorities in charge of immigration, then interrogated by the State Intelligence Service
(SIS). They then undergo a check and interrogation by the CID. According to the
statements of several contacts, these interrogations may last up to 14 hours. Offi-
cials do not hesitate to use violence. If there is sufficient evidence or contradictory
statements, returnees are handed over to the TID for further interrogation and, de-
pending on the case, arrested. Tamils from the North and East, and persons be-
tween the ages of 20 and 40 undergo even more minute checks. Those carrying
false papers, or who have had an arrest warrant issued against them or who are
suspected of links with the LTTE or the media run a high risk of being imprisoned.
Persons arrested are first taken to the Negombo prison.

7.2 Safety of returnees

According to what has been said by a number of observers, persons returning to Sri
Lanka are regarded as traitors who have discredited Sri Lanka abroad. It must
therefore be assumed that they are an at-risk group. There is admittedly no evidence
that all returnees are abducted, arrested and tortured in a systematic way. However,
there are a number of reports which document cases and show the risk.

Abductions. Affluent returnees may be the target of criminal or paramilitary groups
seeking to extort money or information from them.

CID Checks. The police or CID have on a number of occasions gone to find return-
ees in their place of residence to interrogate them. Observers report the case of
returnees undergoing permanent surveillance by the CID over six months. Arrest
is possible at any time.

171 OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August and September 2012.
172 For further details see SFH-OSAR, Sri Lanka, Themenpapier, 22 September 2011, p. 15f.
173 OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August and September 2012.
174 OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August and September 2012: IRB, Sri Lanka, Infor-
  mation on the treatment of Tamil returnees to Sri Lanka, including failed refugee applicants; reper-
cussions, upon return, for not having proper government authorization to leave the country, such as
175 OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August and September 2012: IRB, Sri Lanka, Infor-
mation on the treatment of Tamil returnees to Sri Lanka, 22 August 2011.
176 OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August and September 2012.
Arrests and torture. Several recent reports give accounts of arrests of Tamils and Sinhalese returning from abroad. Arrests are most often accompanied by torture.\(^{177}\) Contrary to various human rights defence groups, the UK authorities dealing with migration take the view that the measures concern only returnees who have committed an offence against the law in Sri Lanka.\(^{178}\) It is often difficult to obtain information on the spot, as returnees are very afraid to speak about what they have suffered in prison.\(^{179}\)

The arrest of Dayan Anthony caused something of an uproar. On his return from Australia he was detained for nearly 16 hours. At an orchestrated press conference in the presence of the security forces, he denied having been arrested. The credibility of the press conference was widely questioned.\(^{180}\)

OSAR is aware of the case of a Tamil arrested after his return from Switzerland, accused of maintaining links with the LTTE and questioned about Tamils he had met in Switzerland. The intervention of the Asian Human Rights Commission and a Swiss NGO was required for this person to be released.\(^{181}\) Human Rights Watch has documented other similar cases of returnees from Switzerland: a 29 year-old Tamil originally from the Vanni region who had been forcibly recruited by the LTTE in 2008 arrived in Switzerland in September 2010 as an asylum-seeker. On 15 February 2011, he returned voluntarily to Sri Lanka after his application for asylum was refused, and on 23 July 2011, officials in plain clothes took him away by force in a small white van. They told him they had information on his activities in Switzerland and tortured him. To save his life, the unfortunate man signed confessions in Sinhalese, without understanding them. In the meanwhile, he fled to Great Britain. A 33 year-old Tamil originally from Batticaloa had to leave Switzerland in April 2011, after his application for asylum was refused. Following the refusal by France and Great Britain to grant him asylum, he went back to Sri Lanka on 27 February 2012. He had just left the airport when he was pulled into a little white van, then tortured in a nearby building. This man who was also accused of links to the LTTE also fled to Britain.\(^{182}\)


\(^{179}\) OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August and September 2012.


\(^{181}\) Details of this case can be given on request.

\(^{182}\) HRW, Document containing cases of Sri Lankan deportees allegedly tortured on return, 15 September 2012.
At risk despite a low profile. Freedom from Torture (FFT) comes to the conclusion that Tamils returning from abroad risk being tortured, if in the past they have had a real or presumed link to the LTTE at any level whatever and if they have been able to leave the country safely. FFT has documented 24 cases of persons tortured after returning voluntarily to Sri Lanka. These are almost exclusively men and women of Tamil ethnic origin between 20 and 41 years of age. Among them there are at least twelve who have been interrogated on their own activities or those of other Tamils abroad. 183

A stay abroad may increase the threat. It is striking to note that these people were not arrested before their departure abroad on account of their real or presumed link to the LTTE. According to an FFT study, it is the combination of a stay abroad and these alleged links at whatever level which leads to a heightened risk of torture. 184 A Tamil NGO reports that the political activities of Tamil exiles in Great Britain have been documented and photographed by Sri Lankan embassy personnel and they may represent a threat in the event of return. 185 In Switzerland also, Tamils are photographed by Sri Lankan embassy collaborators if they take part in demonstrations against the government. 186

Arrests do not necessarily take place immediately. Some victims have been intercepted and tortured over a year after their return, while others were directly carried off at the airport or arrested in hotels, checkpoints or at their home in the following days, weeks or months. 187

Monitoring by States deporting asylum-seekers. In the event of a voluntary return from Switzerland and many other States, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Colombo is providing reintegration assistance on return. 188 It welcomes people at the airport and organizes transport for them. The persons concerned then make contact themselves with the IOM. If they do not request support, contact is lost. Services come to an end and the file is generally closed after twelve months. 189

In the event of forced return, an embassy staff member in principle accompanies the arrival at the airport. 190 The CID is informed in advance. 191 The contact details of the embassy are given to returnees, so they may make themselves known in the event of a problem. 192 But apparently, it is not certain that these support measures taken by the States returning asylum-seekers can guarantee the safety of returnees in the long term.

183 Freedom from Torture, Sri Lankans Tamils tortured on return from the UK, 13 September 2012, p.3.
184 Ibid.
185 British judges have recognised this on several occasions. TAG, Returnees at Risk, 16 September 2012.
186 OSAR interviews with a contact in Switzerland, November 2012.
187 Freedom from Torture, Out of the Silence, 7 November 2011, p.7; TAG, Returnees at Risk, 16 September 2012.
188 The UK authorities have recently entrusted to a British NGO the task of supporting returnees.
189 OSAR interviews with contacts in Sri Lanka, August and September 2012.
190 Information given by email by a contact at the Swiss embassy in Sri Lanka on 15 November 2012. Since 2011, Switzerland has returned 16 persons who have refused proposed voluntary return. According to the Federal Office of Migrations, no special flight has been chartered for this purpose. Information given by email by the Federal Office of Migrations, 13 November 2012.
SFH-OSAR publications on Sri Lanka and other countries of origin are available at: www.fluechtlingshilfe.ch/herkunftslaender

Register to receive the SFH-OSAR Newsletter with information on new SFH-OSAR publications: www.fluechtlingshilfe.ch/news/newsletter