Issues Paper
The Pakistani Taliban
January 2013

Contents

1. TERMINOLOGY......................................................................................................................... 2

2. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................ 2

3. GROUPS........................................................................................................................................ 4

3.1 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) .......................................................................................... 4
   3.1.1 Organisation ....................................................................................................................... 4
   3.1.2 Tribes and Tribal Infighting ............................................................................................... 6
   3.1.3 Recruitment ....................................................................................................................... 7
   3.1.4 Area of Influence ............................................................................................................... 8
   3.1.5 Aims ..................................................................................................................................... 9
   3.1.6 Connections ....................................................................................................................... 13

3.2 Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban (MTT) ......................................................................................... 14
   3.2.1 The Mullah Nazir Group ................................................................................................... 14
   3.2.2 Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group ................................................................................ 17

4. TTP ACTIVITIES IN 2012 ........................................................................................................ 21

4.1 Federally Administered Tribal Areas .................................................................................... 21

4.2 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ............................................................................................................ 22

4.3 Punjab ....................................................................................................................................... 23

4.4 Sindh .......................................................................................................................................... 24

4.5 Baluchistan ............................................................................................................................ 25

4.6 Incidents and Recent Attacks on Health/Aid Workers or those accused of Spying for U.S. .......................................................................................................................... 25

REFERENCES................................................................................................................................... 27
1. Terminology

The term ‘Taliban’, most often, refers to the Sunni extremists who governed Afghanistan under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar until 2001. Led by Mullah Omar, this Afghan Taliban has re-established itself in Pakistan, especially in Baluchistan, and continues operations along the Pakistan/Afghan border and into Afghanistan. Whilst this group enjoys support and co-operation from the locally-based Sunni militants in Pakistan they are distinct and separate from the focus of this paper, the Pakistani Taliban. Thus, the name ‘Taliban’ in the context of Pakistan can refer to a number of militant Sunni groups which operate in various parts of the country. ‘Taliban’ serves, therefore, as a descriptor rather than a precise identification of any particular group. Those organisations most commonly referred to as Taliban, or Pakistani Taliban, are:

- Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP);
- Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban (MTT); and
- Punjabi Taliban.

Aside from these three groups, fighters belonging to a number of small militant groups operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province are also sometimes referred to as Taliban. These smaller groups are often allied to one or more of the three major groupings listed above. This paper will focus on the TTP and MTT. The so-called ‘Punjabi Taliban’ does have links with the TTP, however, it has emerged from an amalgamation of militant groups whose historic enmity has been directed towards Kashmir and India. As such the Punjabi Taliban will be treated in a separate paper dealing with other Pakistani insurgent groups.¹

2. Historical Overview

When US/NATO forces invaded Afghanistan in 2001, many Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders and fighters fled into the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in particular into the FATA. With them were large numbers of Arab, Uzbek, and Chechen fighters. The FATA and neighbouring Baluchistan, and to a lesser extent parts of KPK, became the base of operations for the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. A large number of Pakistani militant groups subsequently emerged, with the intention of assisting the Afghan Taliban to drive US/NATO forces out of Afghanistan.²

The FATA is made up of seven agencies (geographical areas), and about 60 tribes.³ Though Pashtun Sunnis predominate, the region is also home to a relatively small Shia population and a small number of non-Pashtun tribes.⁴ Pashtuns typically follow either of the Hanafi schools of Islam (Barelvi and Deobandi), in addition to the Pashtunwali, an ancient Pashtun code of ethics which governs social interaction.⁵ With Afghan and al-Qaeda fighters came more

¹ See Pakistani Militant Groups paper (forthcoming)
fundamentalist Islamic doctrines, in particular Wahhabism, a conservative school of Islam traditionally associated with Saudi Arabia. The majority of groups which use the name Taliban reportedly ascribe to the Wahhabi school, or else a similarly conservative creed. This process of religious radicalisation, leading to militant insurgency and the local enforcement of Sharia law, is often referred to as ‘Talibanisation’.6

The following map shows the seven agencies of the FATA and the location of major tribal groups:

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In 2002 Pakistan’s security forces moved into the FATA in an effort to drive out foreign fighters, particularly those working for al-Qaeda. In response to the government’s counter-insurgency programme, which resulted in civilian casualties and large scale destruction of local infrastructure, militancy increased, and local Taliban militias turned their attention towards fighting the Pakistani State in addition to US/NATO forces in Afghanistan. It was during this period that militant groups within FATA began to co-ordinate and build networks, and in December 2007 militant groups agreed to work together under the guidance of an executive council. This new organisational structure is commonly referred to as the TTP. The MTT, which began as a faction within the TTP, was established as a separate entity in 2008. In December 2011, in an effort to unite the often competing agendas of the various groups, Mullah Muhammad Omar (the leader of the Afghan Taliban) formed a governing council, which is known as the Shura-e-Murakeba. The Shura guides the activities of the TTP, MTT, al-Qaeda, Afghan Taliban, and Haqqani network, and is led by Sirajuddin Haqqani.

3. Groups

3.1 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

3.1.1 Organisation

The TTP is the largest Taliban organisation in the FATA, with reported figures on the number of groups organised under the TTP banner ranging from 13 to 40. The group was led originally by Baitullah Mehsud, with Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadur as his deputy. Baitullah Mehsud was killed in August 2009 and replaced by his relation Hakimullah Mehsud. Though Hakimullah is the TTP’s leader, or emir, the nature of the TTP’s organisational structure means that the “TTP’s participating militias and the field commanders make tactical

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decisions themselves as opposed to following the orders from the [e]mir or Shura.”15 The TTP leadership group thus sets strategy, but allows local commanders a high degree of autonomy. Factionalism is present and internecine fighting occurs frequently.16 The following is a list of TTP commanders and the agencies in which they are active17:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hakimullah Mehsud</td>
<td>Leader/Emir</td>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wali-ur-Rahman</td>
<td>Deputy Leader</td>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>North Waziristan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azaz Tariq</td>
<td>Spokesperson</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wali Mohammad</td>
<td>Local Commander</td>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>South Waziristan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Omar</td>
<td>Local Commander</td>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>South Waziristan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tariq Afridi</td>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Khyber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gul Meidan</td>
<td>Local Commander</td>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Khyber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pir Saif-ur-Rahman</td>
<td>Local Commander</td>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Khyber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fazal Saeed Utezai</td>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Kurram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullah Toofan</td>
<td>Local Commander</td>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Kurram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullah Rafiq</td>
<td>Local Commander</td>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Kurram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhunzada Aslam</td>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Orakzai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mufii Ilyas</td>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
<td>Khyber</td>
<td>Pakhtunkhwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maulana Ismail</td>
<td>Local Commander</td>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Bajaur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Ismail</td>
<td>Local Commander</td>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Bajaur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maulana Mohammad</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Bajaur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maulana Abdullah</td>
<td>Local Commander</td>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Bajaur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qari Zia Rehman</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Bajaur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omar Khalid</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Mohmand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullah Fazlullah</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Khyber</td>
<td>Pakhtunkhwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibn Amin</td>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
<td>Khyber</td>
<td>Pakhtunkhwa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reports vary on the size of the TTP’s forces in the FATA and KPK. Two reports from 2011 put the fighting force between 20,000 and 25,000, whilst a December 2010 report puts the

figure anywhere between 5,000 and 30,000, but adds that a Pakistani journalist “suggested that a realistic figure…would be 10,000 if ‘reserves’ were included”. A December 2011 report published by the Council on Foreign Relations states that “some estimates” put the TTP’s collective force at 30,000 to 35,000.  

3.1.2 Tribes and Tribal Infighting

In 1893 the Durand Line was established to distinguish between the then British India and Afghanistan. Although the line now acts as the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is typically rejected by the local Pashtuns, whose tribal affiliations often extend across the border. The most important tribes are the Afridi, Achakzais, Bangash, Duranni, Khattak, Mehsuds, Mohammadzai, Mohmand, Orakzai, Shinwari, Yusufzai, and Waziri. As the FATA has historically enjoyed general autonomy, the tribal groups, through the Jirga (tribal assembly), have been responsible for law and order. The importance of the Jirga, which is typically led by a tribal elder but open to all members of a tribe, has been affected by the rise of Taliban militants. Reports vary on the exact number killed, but since 2002 between 200 and 600 tribal elders have been assassinated by Taliban fighters. A 2009 report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies argues that the Taliban have, in effect, “displaced the tribal jirgas and elders”, adding that “the role of tribal elders was effectively buried when the implementation of Sharia was announced by the Taliban in March 2006 in South Waziristan”.

Despite the diminished role of the tribal Jirga and tribal elders in Taliban-controlled areas, tribal affiliation remains important, even within the insurgency. When the TTP formed in December 2007, the two major tribal groups in North and South Waziristan were the Wazirs and Mehsuds. The TTP’s leader Baitullah Mehsud represented the latter, while his deputy

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18 For 20,000 to 25,000 see: Qazi, S H 2011, ‘Rebels of the frontier: origins, organisation, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 22 no.4, p.574-602 p.588; and: Livingston I S and O’Hanlon M 2011, Pakistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security, Brookings Institute, 29 December.  
21 A December 2011 report published by the Council on Foreign Relations states that “some estimates” put the TTP’s collective force at 30,000 to 35,000.
24 For 600 see: Qazi, S H 2011, ‘Rebels of the frontier: origins, organisation, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 22 no.4, p.574-602 p.578

Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadur represented the former. This Wazir/Mehsud alliance lasted until June 2008, when Gul Bahadur, an Uthmanzai Waziri from North Waziristan, and Mullah Nazir, an Ahmadzai Waziri from South Waziristan, broke from the TTP. Gul Bahadur and Mullah Nazir subsequently established the MTT, to “defend the Wazir tribes interests in North and South Waziristan.” A 2009 report in Terrorism Monitor states:

Meanwhile, Baitullah Mahsud started expanding his influence in the FATA region after the formation of the TTP and attempted to subdue rival and dissenting Taliban commanders. This alarmed the Ahmadzai Wazir and Uthmanzai Wazir Taliban, who agreed on June 30, 2008 to merge their ranks to form the Muqami Tehrike-Taliban (Local Taliban Movement), or the “Waziri alliance.”

Wazir-affiliated groups have had better relations with the Pakistani security forces than those aligned with the Mehsud tribe.

3.1.3 Recruitment

Operations within the FATA and KPK by Pakistani security forces reportedly had the effect of increasing the TTP’s popularity, with many displaced or otherwise adversely affected individuals subsequently either turning to or joining the TTP as “a source of protection”. According to a September 2011 report by Shehzad Qazi, a research associate at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, the TTP also attracts individuals with a low socio-economic background, or those who have been internally displaced, through financial incentives:

Like the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban offer salaries to participants. In 2009, rank-and-file members of the movement received Rs. 15,000 (approximately $180) a month. On the other hand, a government tribal levy received only Rs. 3,500 (approximately $42) a month. According to another article, the rebels have been

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25 ‘Pakistan’s new assault on terrorism: Tackling the Taliban’ 2009, The Economist, 15 October
28 ‘Taliban, elders join hands against criminals in N. Waziristan’ 2012, Dawn, 23 November
recruiting unemployed young men from southern Punjab by offering stipends of Rs. 16,000–20,000 (approximately $193–241) a month.  

The Pakistani Taliban has been able to recruit hundreds of young Pashtuns living in refugee camps after being displaced by intense clashes between them and the Pakistani military. Taliban militants reportedly regularly visit these camps and speak to small groups of youth to convince them to participate. In addition to avenging deaths of lost family members, many join due to frustration at the government because of the lack of basic human facilities in these camps, where people suffered from pneumonia and diarrhoea. Their displacement and the government’s lack of preparedness has alienated them.  

However, many recruits are coerced to join, with boys often kidnapped and radicalised in TTP-sponsored schools. The abovementioned September 2011 report by Qazi claims that abduction is “a central feature” of the TTP recruitment process:

In 2009, the Pakistan Army rescued almost 20 boys, most of who had been kidnapped in Swat by the local Taliban. While some were cleaning dishes in camps, others were being trained to fight in the field or become informants or suicide bombers. The boys had been kidnapped from their villages and some underwent Islamist indoctrination, being told that militant jihad was the boys’ religious duty. Others are coerced into joining through their associations with madaris, which are frequented by the Taliban or affiliated with them. Hussain reports that anywhere from 1,200 to 1,500 children may have been taken by the Swat Taliban up till 2009. The children were being prepared to become suicide bombers, training for up to 16 hours a day. Many of these young boys were heavily drugged when sent on suicide missions. Some trained boys have also been sold to other militants groups for high prices.  

The TTP has also attempted to utilise social media as a means to recruit new members and promote its message.

### 3.1.4 Area of Influence

The TTP is located primarily within the FATA, and parts of the Swat Valley of KPK. In addition to its presence in these areas, reports indicate that the TTP is capable of reaching targets in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Faisalabad, Lahore, Multan, Karachi, and

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Quetta.\textsuperscript{40} It should be noted, however, that in the case of Karachi it is not always possible to distinguish between TTP and its ally TTP-Punjab, otherwise known as the Punjabi Taliban.

3.1.5 Aims

Though the leadership council of the TTP has declared that it is loyal to Mullah Omar and the Afghan Taliban, its agenda is wider than that developed by its Afghan counterparts. Having formed in response to actions by the Pakistan security forces, the TTP aims both to support the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan as well as carry out jihad against the Pakistani state, which it accuses of being apostate and an instrument of US/NATO imperialism.\textsuperscript{41} In addition to these two objectives, the TTP also aims to establish Sharia law across Pakistan.\textsuperscript{42}


To this end, the TTP has essentially established Sharia law in several parts of the FATA and KPK, which includes the banning of music, the closing of CD shops, forbidding the shaving of beards, the enforcement of conservative apparel for women, and even the banning of vaccinations. The process has been made more effective by the setting up of parallel government administrations in several agencies, which often includes the establishment of Islamic courts. The TTP promotes its dedication to Sharia via the slogan ‘sharia ya shahadat’ (Sharia or Martyrdom), and has been supported in its efforts by an alliance with Tehrik-e-Nafaz-Shariat-e-Muhammad (TNSM), otherwise known as the Movement for the Implementation of Muhammad’s Sharia, which is situated in the Swat valley of KPK and led by Sufi Mohammad.

As a consequence of its strict adherence to the Wahhabi/Deobandi Sunni philosophy and interpretation of Sharia various TTP commanders have been implicated in violent attacks on religious minorities, specifically Shia Muslims in FATA and KPK. Many TTP commanders have historic connections with violently anti-Shia organisations such Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) and reported TTP attacks on Shia could be viewed as a continuation of that animosity.

Furthermore, TTP activities against Shia should be read as part of a broader strategic agenda. The most concerted anti-Shia attacks attributed to the TTP have occurred in the Kurram Agency in FATA. The Kurram Agency is a strategically significant region that borders Afghanistan giving ready access to Kabul. It also offers an important counter-insurgency base for activities against Pakistan Army operations in North and South Waziristan. Shia and Sunni tribes in the Kurram have had a long-standing conflict over land and resources. The strategic significance of Kurram has made it an important region for the Afghan Taliban/Haqqani Network and as such TTP activities against Shia tribes in Kurram can be seen as not only consistent with anti-Shia ideology but also vital to the strategic priorities of the TTP and its allies the Afghan Taliban/Haqqani Network.

An agenda to wage jihad against the Pakistani state distinguishes the TTP from other Taliban groups within the Afghan/Pakistan border regions. Pakistani security forces operations within the FATA and KPK to drive out foreign fighters between 2002 and 2004 provoked a violent

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response from a number of militant groups allied to the Afghan Taliban. Methods used by the security forces, which included “demolishing the houses of defiant tribesmen and seizing their property”, had the effect of increasing the popularity of local militant groups. Anti-government militancy was initially limited to North and South Waziristan, but subsequently spread to the rest of FATA and the Swat Valley. Resistance intensified in the wake of the Pakistan army’s operation within the Red Mosque in Islamabad in July 2007, in which a number of conservative Islamic scholars with links to militant groups were killed or captured. The episode is associated with the formation of the TTP, and its subsequent identification of the Pakistani state as the ‘enemy’. In a 2008 interview with al-Jazeera, then-leader of the TTP Baitullah Mehsud is reported to have stated:

The main objective of the coalition of militants is waging a defensive jihad. The Pakistan army is deploying its soldiers under orders from [US president] George [W] Bush. The army is bombarding our houses and fighting with us. Therefore, we have formed this coalition to guarantee the safety of civilians and this war which the army launched in the tribal areas is an American war.

We no more feel sad about the Pakistani soldiers’ deaths. They are implementing the orders of the West and the United States and they are destroying our houses. And I do pray that Allah will guide them back to the right path because they are Muslims and this is an Islamic country.

But when the army soldiers come to this area to kill us, we will definitely be killing them. Our main aim is to finish Britain and United States and to crush the pride of the non-Muslims. We pray to God to give us the ability to destroy the White House, New York and London. And we have trust in God. Very soon, we will be witnessing jihad's miracles.

In waging war against the Pakistani state, the TTP has committed acts of terrorism in cities outside of the FATA and KPK, such as Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Karachi, and Lahore. It has also attacked security forces inside the Pakistani controlled region of Kashmir.

54 See above under ‘Area of Influence’.
The TTP’s decision to target Pakistani security forces is a topic of dispute within the larger Taliban community. Some militant groups within the TTP, such as the Mullah Nazir group and Hafiz Gul Bahadur group and Fazal Saeed Haqqani’s new group Tehrik-e Talibani Islami (TTI) in Kurram, have split from the TTP over the issue, while the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network and al-Qaeda, which are believed to enjoy support from Pakistani security forces, have reportedly attempted to facilitate a peace agreement between the TTP and the Pakistani state. The creation of the Shura-e-Murakeba in December 2011, which is led by Sirajuddin Haqqani of the Haqqani network and includes the TTP, is reportedly an attempt to focus the wider Taliban movement on the war in Afghanistan, and away from attacks inside Pakistan. According to an April 2012 report, TTP and Haqqani forces have since clashed in North Waziristan, which suggests that despite the alliance, the Taliban movement in the FATA should not be viewed as a unified bloc with common aims. A power struggle between the TTP and Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) in Khyber Agency, that included sporadic clashes between the groups, continued through 2012. LI, a Sunni Deobandi militant group formed in 2004, is predominantly based in the Khyber Agency of the FATA. The group is primarily focused on the implementation of Shari’a law and a concern for local issues within that region.

In late December 2012, the TTP released a 40-minute video in which Hakimullah Mehsud appeared with his deputy, Wali ur-Rehman. In the video Mehsud announced that the TTP was willing to negotiate with the Pakistani government, however, pledged not to disarm and

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blamed the government for breaking previous unspecified deals. There were reports prior to the release of the video that indicated an imminent leadership challenge by Wali ur-Rehman to take over from Mehsud as the commander of the TTP, drawing attention to the perceived extreme nature of violence exercised by the TTP under Mehsud’s command. The release of the video may have been used to quell such rumours and also followed three major TTP attacks in Peshawar in December. These included the assassination of a key Awami National Party (ANP) minister from KPK and the kidnapping and killing of at least 20 paramilitary soldiers from their barracks. Hakimullah also threatened to continue to fight members of government who oppose the TTP and the creation of an Islamic system in Pakistan.

3.1.6 Connections

Through the Shura-e-Murakeba, the TTP is allied with the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network, al-Qaeda and possibly the MTT. The TTP also has links with a large number of militant organisations operating inside Pakistan, including: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), TNSM, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jaish-e-Islami, Karwan-e-Niamatullah, Jundallah, Dr Ismail’s group, the Punjab Taliban, and Harkat-ul Jihad Islami (HuJI).

In addition to links with militant organisations, TTP leaders are also linked with political parties, though a December 2010 report suggests that such links may not be strong:

Although previously affiliated with religious political parties, TTP leaders now appear to have adopted a rigid anti-democracy stance.\(^76\)

A number of the TTP leadership were or are linked to religious political parties in Pakistan, namely, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) or Jamaat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI). However, apart from advocating Pakistan’s existing constitution to sharia law, the militant organisation appears to lack a political agenda: TTP leaders are not known to talk of, or write, political programs. It is unclear whose interpretation of the sharia will be endorsed as the final product: religious nuances prevail between different militant groups based on their specific brand of Islam – e.g. Deobandi, Wahhabi, Ahl-e-Hadith, and so on.\(^77\)

3.2 Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban (MTT)

Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban (MTT) is the name given to an alliance between two former TTP commanders, Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Mullah Nazir.\(^78\) The former is an Uthmanzai Waziri from North Waziristan, while the latter is an Ahmadzai Waziri from South Waziristan.\(^79\) The two separated from the TTP in June 2008 because of the TTP’s targeting of Pakistani security forces, and to protect Waziri interests (on the tribal nature of the TTP and MTT, see above under Tribes and Tribal Infighting).\(^80\) As with the TTP, the members of the MTT operate with a high degree of autonomy within their designated spheres of control.

3.2.1 The Mullah Nazir Group

\(^74\) Siddique, Q, 2010, *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An attempt to deconstruct the umbrella organization and the reasons for its growth in Pakistan’s North-west*, Danish Institute for International Studies, November, p.9

\(^76\) Siddique, Q, 2010, *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An attempt to deconstruct the umbrella organization and the reasons for its growth in Pakistan’s North-west*, Danish Institute for International Studies, November, p.5


\(^78\) Siddique, Q, 2010, *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An attempt to deconstruct the umbrella organization and the reasons for its growth in Pakistan’s North-west*, Danish Institute for International Studies, November, pp.16, 33

\(^79\) Siddique, Q, 2010, *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An attempt to deconstruct the umbrella organization and the reasons for its growth in Pakistan’s North-west*, Danish Institute for International Studies, November, pp.16, 33

\(^80\) Qazi, S H 2011, ‘Rebels of the frontier: origins, organisation, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban’, *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 5, Issue 9, 10 May
The Mullah Nazir group is reportedly made up of about 14 smaller militant groups.\textsuperscript{81} No information was found on the names of those groups. In December 2011 Mullah Nazir sent a representative, Hafeez Amir Hamza, to a meeting of the Shura-Murakeba.\textsuperscript{82}

The Mullah Nazir group operates in the Wana district of South Waziristan. This area borders Afghanistan and is home to the Ahmadzai Waziri sub-tribe.\textsuperscript{83} A 2007 Terrorism Monitor report provides the following biographical information:

Maulvi Nazir (also known as Mullah Nazir), is 32 years old, a dual citizen of Pakistan and Afghanistan and is married with a son and daughter (The News, May 4; Boston Globe, April 21). Although he presently resides in South Waziristan, he is a frequent traveller to Afghanistan’s Paktika province and Kandahar where he owns some property (Boston Globe, April 21). Common to the area, his extended family lives on both sides of the Durand Line. He belongs to the Kakakhel tribe, which is a sub-clan of the Ahmedzai Waziris (who dominate parts of South Waziristan). Intriguingly, his first association was with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami, a favorite of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) during the days of the anti-Soviet jihad (The Friday Times, March 30). His battle experience and guerrilla training are not that of an amateur. He later joined the Taliban movement in Afghanistan and remained politically aligned with Maulana Fazlur Rahman’s JUI party (Daily Times, January 9).

He moved back to South Waziristan when the Taliban lost their ground to U.S.-led coalition forces in November 2001.\textsuperscript{84}

With the approval of Ahmadzai tribal elders, Nazir has entered into a number of peace deals with the Pakistani government from 2007 to 2012, including a 2009 agreement not to attack government forces during a major counter-insurgency offensive in the FATA in 2009, which is commonly referred to as Operation Rah-e-Nijat (Operation Path of Salvation). Rah-e-Nijat was an attempt by Pakistani security forces to defeat the TTP and drive out foreign fighters.\textsuperscript{85} According to an October 2009 report in The Daily Times, a Pakistani newspaper, Nazir agreed to remain neutral during the conflict, and would not accommodate members of the TTP fleeing affected areas of South Waziristan.\textsuperscript{86} However, a 2011 article in The Long War Journal claimed that Nazir has not always honoured the agreement, having sheltered both

TTP and al-Qaeda operatives. The Mullah Nazir group has also targeted Uzbek fighters using South Waziristan as a base, whom the Ahmadzai Wazirs accuse of disrespecting local customs and engaging in criminal activity. In response, Uzbek fighters fled into North Waziristan. The willingness of the Mullah Nazir group to assist, or simply not engage, Pakistani security forces has led to them, along with MTT forces in North Waziristan, being referred to as so-called ‘good’ or ‘soft’ Taliban. This does not, however, necessarily mean that Nazir can be considered an ally of the Pakistani government. In a 2009 interview Nazir insisted that the government “is run by an infidel government equivalent to Christian and Jewish governments”, blaming it for attacks on Taliban fighters. The Mullah Nazir group also attacked Pakistani security force personnel in Wana district in 2011, despite the 2007 cease fire agreement.

On 3 January 2013 Mullah Nazir and seven other militants, including his deputy, were killed in a US drone strike while attending a meeting in the Sara Kanda area of Birmal, South Waziristan. The Nazir group quickly announced Bawal Khan as his successor. Prior to this, Nazir was injured in a suspected targeted suicide bombing on his vehicle that killed 6 and injured 12 in the town of Wana, South Waziristan, in late November 2012. No group claimed responsibility for the attack; however, sources indicate that the attack may have been a result of strategic differences between the Nazir group and the TTP and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. An order by Nazir for Mehsud tribesmen to leave areas under his control two

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days prior to the attack and the gunning down of TTP militants in Wana by militants loyal to Nazir may have created further animosity between the groups.

The consequences of Mullah Nazir’s death are yet to be felt; however, sources indicate his passing may affect the delicate balance the Pakistani government was able to achieve through the 2009 peace agreement with Nazir and other affiliated groups. A resulting power vacuum may also allow the Mehsud led TTP to advance in the Wana region of South Waziristan.

As with MTT elements in North Waziristan, the Mullah Nazir group has a close working relationship with the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network, and al-Qaeda. The Mullah Nazir group’s main focus is, therefore, fighting US/NATO forces in Afghanistan. In addition, Mullah Nazir advocates the introduction of Sharia law within Pakistan, having already introduced Sharia in those areas under his control. In an interview in 2009 he stated his opposition to democracy, which he considers to be un-Islamic. In June 2012, polio vaccinations were banned in the areas Nazir controlled, claiming the program was being used by the US to gather intelligence that lead to drone strikes. (Please see Section 4.6 Attacks on Health/Aid Workers for reports on attacks on Health/Aid workers and those accused of being spies for the U.S.)

3.2.2 Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group

The Gul Bahadur group is reportedly made up of 15-20 smaller groups. Though no information was found on the names of those groups, the following individuals are named as being either under his command or allied to his group: Khaliq Noor, Sadiq Noor, Halim Khan Daur, Gud Abdul Rehman, Sadar Hayat, Maulana Abdul Khaliq Haqqani, Saeed Khan Daur (aka Aryana), Wahidullah Wazir, and Saifullah Wazir. This group is made up of both

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Wazir and Daur tribe members, with the majority based in Miram Shah, the capital of North Waziristan, along with Gul Bahadur.\textsuperscript{104}

According to an April 2010 \textit{Foreign Policy} report, Gul Bahadur commands approximately 1500 fighters. In addition, Sadiq Noor commands 800 fighters; Abdul Khaliq Haqqani 500; Wahidullah Wazir 200; Halim Khan Daur 150; and Saifullah Wazir 400.\textsuperscript{105}

An April 2009 report in \textit{Terrorism Monitor} provides the following biographical information regarding Gul Bahadur:

Perhaps no one has greater stature or importance in the Pakistani Taliban leadership than Hafiz Gul Bahadur, supreme commander of the North Waziristani Taliban. A direct descendant of Mirza Ali Khan, a legendary Waziristani freedom fighter who fought against the British Indian government and later against the newly established Pakistani State, Bahadur is known for hosting foreign militants, mainly al-Qaeda and other Arab groups, as well as Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani of the cross-border Haqqani network.

Hafiz Gul Bahadur is 48 years old and belongs to the Madda Khel clan of the Uthmanzai Wazir. He is a resident of Lwara, a region bordering Afghanistan and is reported to have received his religious education from a Deobandi madrassa (seminary) in Multan (\textit{The Post} [Lahore], August 19). Bahadur subscribes to the Deobandi Islamic revivalist ideology and maintains a political affiliation with the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal (JUI-F), a Deobandi political party. Bahadur fought in Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s and again during Taliban rule.\textsuperscript{106}

Gul Bahadur led militants in North Waziristan in fighting against Pakistani security forces during the North Waziristan offensive in 2004-05.\textsuperscript{107} In 2006 Gul Bahadur, along with other North Wazir Taliban, agreed to a ceasefire arrangement with the Pakistani government, commonly called the 2006 North Waziristan Peace Agreement, which was partly brokered by the Afghan Talibain and Haqqani network. The agreement called for, \textit{inter alia}, the removal of foreign fighters from North Waziristan.\textsuperscript{108} Although Gul Bahadur did move against Uzbek


\textsuperscript{108} Sulaiman S and Bukhari, S A A S 2009, ‘Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban’, \textit{Terrorism Monitor}, Vol. 7, Issue 9, 10 April, p.5 \url{<http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_007_9_03.pdf>} Accessed 21 May 2012. For the agreement,
The Gul Bahadur group has actively prevented TTP fighters from entering North Waziristan, and an Afghan Taliban-sponsored attempt in 2009 to bring the opposing groups together under a new council – the Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahadeen (Council for United Holy Warriors) – collapsed after Baitullah Mehsud was killed in August of that year. During Operation Rah-e-Nijat, the government’s counter-offensive in late 2009, Mehsud TTP fighters were driven out of South Waziristan and into neighbouring Afghanistan and North Waziristan. The situation led to Mehsud TTP fighters gaining a foothold within North Waziristan, and attempting to recruit local fighters. Despite Gul Bahadur’s reported hostility towards the Mehsud-led TTP, an April 2010 Foreign Policy report notes that he continued to allow government forces to pass through North Waziristan on their way to South Waziristan, while

see: ‘North Waziristan Peace Pact’ 2006, PBS Frontline, 3 October
109 Rehman, Z 2011, ‘Pakistan’s Military Urges Tribal Uprising against Militants in North Waziristan’, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 9, Issue 34, 9 September, p.4
111 ‘Taliban, elders join hands against criminals in N. Waziristan’ 2012, Dawn, 23 November
113 Gopal, A et al. 2010, ‘Inside Pakistan’s tribal frontier: North Waziristan’, Foreign Policy, 23 April
simultaneously allowing anti-Pakistan South Waziristan militants into North Waziristan.\textsuperscript{116} This suggests a pragmatic or opportunistic rather than an ideologically predictable strategy. In December 2011, along with Mullah Nazir, he decided to participate in, the Shura-Murakeba, which includes the TTP, Haqqani Network, Afghan Taliban, and al-Qaeda. A 2012 report by the Geneva Centre for Training and Analysis suggests, however, that the ongoing presence of TTP fighters in North Waziristan is causing hostility, despite the formation of the Shura. In April 2012, Gul Bahadur reportedly published a pamphlet in which he blamed ‘southerners’, which is apparently a reference to the TTP, for undermining his agreement with the Pakistan government, and asked locals to “rise up against [them]”.\textsuperscript{117} The Haqqani network has reportedly assisted Gul Bahadur in attacks on TTP affiliated fighters who have refused to return to South Waziristan.\textsuperscript{118}

In November 2012 Gul Bahadur was involved in the formation of a 100 men strong \textit{lashkar}, including elders of the Uthmanzai tribe, at a \textit{Jirga} near Miramshah. Gul Bahadur and other local Taliban commanders authorised the \textit{lashkar} to take action against those attacking Pakistani security forces in North Waziristan as well as urging those involved in such attacks to leave the region immediately.\textsuperscript{119}

As with the Mullah Nazir group, Gul Bahadur’s decision to distance himself from attacks on Pakistani forces, focusing instead on the Afghanistan insurgency, has led to his group being labelled the so-called ‘good’ or ‘soft’ Taliban.\textsuperscript{120} Ittehad-e-Mujahedd-e-Khurasan (IMK), an alliance of local and foreign fighters in the FATA, have, in consequence, targeted members of the Uthmanzai Wazir and Daur tribes for spying on behalf of the US and Pakistani governments.\textsuperscript{121} Gul Bahadur has reportedly responded by abandoning his links with the IMK.\textsuperscript{122}

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\textsuperscript{116} Gopal, A et al. 2010, ‘Inside Pakistan’s tribal frontier: North Waziristan’, \textit{Foreign Policy}, 23 April \\
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The Gul Bahadur group shares similar broad goals as the Mullah Nazir Group: support the insurgency in Afghanistan, and work for the implementation of Sharia law in Pakistan. As with Mullah Nazir, Gul Bahadur has set up parallel administrations in those areas under his control, in which Sharia law and a conservative code of ethics are enforced. In addition, Gul Bahadur’s group banned polio vaccinations in North Waziristan until all US drone attacks in the region cease. (Please see Section 4.6 Attacks on Health/Aid Workers for reports on attacks on Health/Aid workers and those accused of being spies for the U.S.)

4. TTP Activities in 2012

Please note that most reports do not differentiate between TTP, MTT or Punjab Taliban militants; this is especially the case with regards to incidents in Karachi. The following list is not exhaustive. For a more detailed list see Incidents Involving Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) website. Please note that SATP does not cite sources used.

4.1 Federally Administered Tribal Areas

- On 6 July The New York Times reported that approximately 15 militants belonging to Gul Bahadur’s group were killed in a US drone strike in the village of Zoi Narai of the Datta Khel subdivision in North Waziristan.
- On 1 October The Express Tribune reported that six labourers of the Frontier Workers Organisation (FWO) were released with the assistance of a Jirga in the Sanzala area of South Waziristan. The labourers were kidnapped a week prior by the TTP from the Gomal Zam Dam.
- On 14 October The Nation reported that three university students suffered burn injuries after TTP militants threw acid at their faces while on their way home from Kohat on a Parachinar-bound vehicle in Kurram Agency.
- On 4 December The Long War Journal provided a statement from a TTP spokesman who stated that the Taliban “condemned the attack” that injured Mullah Nazir in Wana, South Waziristan. The report added that “Nazir has been at odds with the

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128 ‘3 girl students hurt in Kurram acid attack’ 2012, The Nation, 14 October <http://immibelweh03/NXT/gateway.dll/cisnet bacis/cisnet_bacis_pak_frame/bacis_cx298730?f=templates$fn=document-frameset.htm$Q=%5Bandy%5FATA%20TTP%20attack%5D%20x=server$3.0#LPHit1> Accessed 19 October 2012.
Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan as well as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the past”. The spokesman quoted in the report further stated:

“The problem created in South Waziristan is a tribal feud between the Ahmedzai Wazir and Mehsud clans which would be settled as per tribal customs”.129

- On 17 December the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) reported that three Pakistani paramilitary soldiers were killed by a TTP ambush after their convoy came under fire in the Lakki Marwat tribal frontier region.130

- On 7 January 2013 The Australian reported that US drones killed at least 12 TTP militants in Babar Ghar village, South Waziristan. An unnamed security official in Miranshah quoted in the report stated that “a close relative of TTP chief Hakimullah Mehsud was among the dead”.131

4.2 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

- On 7 November SATP reported on a suicide bomb attack that killed six people, including a Superintendent of Police and four other policemen, in the Qissa Khawani Bazaar of Peshawar. A TTP spokesman reportedly claimed responsibility for the attack.132

- On 10 December DFAT reported that a TTP suicide bomb attack on a police station in the Khaki region of Bannu killed four policemen, two civilians and injured nine others.133


132 ‘Six persons, including SP and four policemen, killed in suicide attack in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’ 2012, South Asia Terrorism Portal, 8 November.

On 22 December The News International reported the death of ANP President for KPK Bashir Ahmed Bilour and nine others, after TTP militants launched a suicide bomb attack outside the residence of the party’s local leader in Peshawar. On 30 December The Times of India reported that 21 of the 22 Pakistani paramilitary soldiers kidnapped from two camps by approximately 200 heavily armed militants outside Peshawar, were executed after their bullet ridden bodies were found close to the camps. The Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack according to the report.

4.3 Punjab

On 12 July The Express Tribune reported that 9 security personnel were killed while they slept when TTP gunmen raided their hostel in Ichra, Lahore.

On 16 August The Express Tribune reported on a TTP attack on a Pakistan Air Force (PAF) base in Kamra, Punjab. A TTP spokesman quoted in the report stated that “four suicide bombers had carried out the attack to take revenge for the killings of Baitullah Mehsud and Osama bin Laden”. Eight militants and one security official were killed in the attack which reportedly lasted over five hours.

On 23 August the South Asian Intelligence Review referred to a TTP attack on an Army camp near Waziribad town in the Gujranwala district of Punjab on 9 July. Militants reportedly killed 8 Special Forces personnel in the attack.

On 6 September The Express Tribune referred to TTP threats against the Dera Ghazi Khan Nuclear Facility in Punjab, which were reportedly intercepted by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) following the TTP attack at the Kamra air base. The report referred to the TTP threat of attacking nuclear installations as revenge for the death of their South Punjab head, Abdul Ghaffar Qaisrani.

• On 4 January 2013 *Dawn* reported that seven Pakistani soldiers were kidnapped from their bus by suspected Taliban militants as it was travelling through Jand in Punjab, bound for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, after leaving army headquarters in Rawalpindi.¹⁴⁰

### 4.4 Sindh

• On 8 November 2012 the *Associated Press* (AP) reported a Taliban suicide truck bomb attack at a paramilitary compound that killed three and injured 20 Pakistani soldiers in the North Nazimabad area of Karachi.¹⁴¹

• On 22 November the *BBC* reported that at least two people were killed in a TTP bomb attack outside a Shia mosque in Karachi. The TTP also claimed responsibility for a bomb attack on a Shia procession in Rawalpindi that killed 23 people and injured 62 on the same day.¹⁴²

• On 2 January 2013 *Dawn* reported that four people were killed, including a worker from the *Muttahida Qaumi Movement* (MQM), and 42 injured when a bomb planted on a motorbike detonated in the Federal B area of Karachi. A spokesman for the TTP claimed responsibility for the attack, noting that workers of the MQM were the intended targets.¹⁴³

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4.5 Baluchistan

- On 2 May *The Express Tribune* reported that two people were killed and 16 others injured when a bomb attached to a parked car detonated as a convoy of Frontier Corps passed in Quetta. The TTP claimed responsibility.\(^{144}\)

- On 4 July the SATP referred to the arrest of 12 militants reportedly belonging to the TTP by law enforcement agencies near Sambaza in Zhob district, close to the border of Waziristan Agency of FATA, following a raid on their hideout.\(^{145}\)

- On 28 September the SATP reported that a tribal leader was among four people killed in an armed attack carried out by the TTP in the Zhob district.\(^{146}\)

4.6 Incidents and Recent Attacks on Health/Aid Workers or those accused of Spying for U.S.

- On 26 May the BBC reported that Dr Shakil Afridi, who was suspected of providing intelligence to the CIA in the mission to find Osama Bin Laden under the cover of a polio vaccination programme, was sentenced to 33 years in prison in Kyhber agency.\(^{147}\)

- On 18 July the *Integrated Regional Information Network* (IRIN) reported that Hafiz Gul Bahadur banned polio vaccinations in North Waziristan which also prompted TTP leaders in South Waziristan to also enact the ban. According to the report, Bahadur “said polio teams will be allowed into the tribal belt only if US drone attacks targeting militants are stopped”.\(^{148}\)

- In October 2012, *Central Asia Online* reported the execution of a local of Miranshah in North Waziristan. The report noted unknown assailants carried out the attack and left a note on the body that “warned other tribesmen to refrain from anti-Taliban activity or they would meet the same end”.\(^{149}\)

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\(^{147}\) ‘Pakistan Taleban plan to abduct or kill doctor in Bin-Laden mission – report’, *BBC*, source: *The Express Tribune*, 26 May

\(^{148}\) ‘Taliban block polio efforts’ 2012, *Integrated Regional Information Network*, 18 July

On 19 December the BBC reported that four female Pakistani polio vaccination workers were fatally shot in coordinated attacks across Karachi while a fifth woman was shot and killed in Peshawar. The report highlighted that no group had yet claimed responsibility, however, that the Taliban have issued threats against the polio drive in Pakistan.¹⁵⁰

¹⁵⁰ ‘Karachi polio killings: Vaccination workers shot’ 2012, BBC, 19 December
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