Corruption in the western Balkans: BRIBERY AS EXPERIENCED BY THE POPULATION
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Acknowledgements

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Corruption is a notoriously difficult phenomenon to quantify, yet in one form or another it plays a role in every country on our planet. Like the wind, corruption remains invisible though its destructive capacity is plain to see. But in contrast to our knowledge of the elements, we still lack systematic evidence on the nature and patterns of corruption.

For the countries of the western Balkans, corruption is an issue of particular concern because of its detrimental impact on their social and economic development. Moreover, as this report demonstrates, corruption is a major concern of ordinary citizens in the region. Even so, that does not make it any easier to address the problem, or even broach the subject. The countries of the western Balkans are to be commended for acknowledging the need to conduct this evidence-based survey as part of their ongoing efforts to curb corruption.

On the basis of a bilateral agreement between the European Commission and the relevant national authorities of the western Balkan region, UNODC supported each country or area in conducting large-scale surveys on corruption in 2010. In most cases, national statistical authorities were directly or indirectly involved in implementing the survey, while other stakeholders contributed to the development of its methodology.

As a result of this collaborative study, which is based on a large-scale sample survey of more than 28,000 interviewees across the western Balkans, we now have greater understanding of the nature of corruption and its impact on the everyday lives of people in the region. It captures the actual experience—not the perception—of ordinary citizens and how bribery affects their dealings with the public administration. The report analyzes the sectors most affected, the role of public officials and bribe-payers, forms of bribery and other relevant issues. This information will aid in the development of effective anti-corruption policies. It also provides a benchmark to assess future progress.

Although this report provides a comparative analysis, it is not an attempt to rank the participating countries or areas on a corruption scale. On the contrary, the aim is to learn from their different experiences—which can help to develop good practices—and to increase awareness that the battle against corruption is a common one that is best waged with help from neighbouring countries.

Detailed individual reports have also been published for each country or area of the western Balkans that was surveyed. This wealth of information will shed needed light on the nature and local patterns of corruption and can assist policymakers in developing anti-
corruption measures and plans that are more precisely tailored to national conditions.

Combating corruption effectively requires the implementation of specific, well-targeted measures. The United Nations Convention against Corruption provides States with the essential elements to develop the legislative and institutional framework and a number of preventive measures to fight corruption. In this context, the findings in this report can help identify priority areas for action.

The European Commission and the Government of Norway deserve our thanks for supporting this important regional survey. The more information we can gather about corruption, the more effective and targeted we can make anti-corruption policies and measures. Reducing corruption enables Governments to function more effectively and better serve their citizens, fosters rather than impedes development, and improves the lives of ordinary people.

Yury Fedotov
Executive Director
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Corruption is often reported to be an area of vulnerability for the countries of the western Balkans. It is considered one of the main causes hindering their economic and social development as well as their European Union accession process, and the international community is not alone in its awareness of the problem. Results presented in this report show that the people of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia rank corruption as the most important problem facing their countries/areas after unemployment and poverty.

Corruption comes in many guises and, in contrast to other surveys that look at people’s perceptions, this survey focuses on the actual experience of administrative corruption and provides information on the nature of bribery and its procedures. This is the kind of petty corruption that affects the daily lives of ordinary people in their dealings with the public administration, the service provider which plays such a huge role in contemporary society that a remarkable eight out of ten adult citizens of the western Balkans interact with it at some point during the course of the year.

Such dealings may be for anything from a medical visit or school enrolment to the issue of a new passport or driving licence but, according to the results of this survey, a significant number of them are of a dubious variety. Although there are notable variations between countries, on average, one in six citizens of the region has either direct or indirect exposure to an act of bribery with a public official on a yearly basis. But when focusing on bribes actually paid, the percentage of citizens who pay at least one bribe in the same period—among those who have contacts with the public administration—is 12.5 per cent at a regional level. And those who pay at least one bribe actually do so with considerable regularity—on average, about once every ten weeks. When looking at national data for these and other indicators it is clear that no corruption scale can be developed for ranking the countries of the western Balkans since it is perfectly possible that the high value of a particular indicator in one country is associated with low values in other variables.

The face of corruption is all too familiar but the one seen in the western Balkans has slightly different features to those in other parts of the world. For example, the global tendency is for corruption to be mainly an urban phenomenon, yet in the western Balkans it appears to be slightly more prevalent in rural areas than in urban areas. And while, as to be expected, more men pay bribes than women, despite established gender roles that assign more home-based activities to women, the differ-
ence between the sexes is not that marked (13.3% and 11.7%, respectively).

Western Balkan women are evidently no strangers to corruption but they go about the bribery business in a slightly different manner to their male counterparts. They are more likely to pay a bribe in kind—in the shape of food and drink, for example—while men are more likely to use money. Cash accounts for two thirds of all bribes in the region and, although this type of corruption is petty, the sums paid are far from trivial: the average bribe paid across the region being 257 EUR-PPP.

Such cash payments are substantial, bearing in mind the per capita incomes of many of the region’s countries, but it would be wrong to assume that people are always coerced into paying them. Though more than half of bribes are paid in response to a direct or indirect request by a public official, in a large amount of cases (43%) payment is actually offered by citizens themselves. This shows the lack of faith some citizens have in the ability of the public administration to function without the payment of some kind of kickback for facilitating bureaucratic procedures. And the existence of deficiencies and bottlenecks in the public sector is confirmed by the fact that more than a quarter of citizens who participate in an act of bribery do so to receive better treatment, while almost exactly the same number do so to speed up a procedure.

Such a need for better treatment no doubt explains why the public officials paid most kickbacks in the region are doctors. More than half (57%) of citizens with recent corruption experience pay bribes to doctors while a third do so to nurses, who come in third place behind police officers (35%), the latter mainly being paid for the avoidance of a fine or the reduction of the amount fined.

The picture painted in this survey is sometimes a troubled one but data indicate that there is some resistance to bribery and citizens do not always consent to the payment of bribes in order to facilitate or benefit from a particular administrative procedure: for every four who do so there is one who refuses, turning down the request made by a public official. On the other hand, only a negligible number of bribe-payers (less than 2%) report their experience to the authorities. There are numerous reasons for this: some citizens do not deem bribery to be of the same gravity as “real” crimes, in part because there is a sense of acceptance that bribery is simply a common practice (22%) and also, when constituting an expression of gratitude for services rendered, actually a positive practice (18%). Citizens also fail to report bribery events because bribe-payment can, of course, be of direct benefit to the bribe-payer, and because they believe reporting to be a futile exercise as nothing would be done, nor would anyone care. The latter is not surprising considering that survey results show that a formal procedure against the public official is actually initiated in only one quarter of reported cases.

Interestingly, for almost one in three bribe-payers this survey interview was the first time they had admitted to the payment of a bribe, having never previously shared the experience with anybody, even close friends or relatives. It seems that when it comes to bribery a well-established and selective code of silence still exists in many cases. On the rare occasions that citizens do actually disclose their bribery experience to the authorities, almost 40 per cent of them go to the police, while a quarter address the complaint to the local prosecutor and another quarter to anti-corruption agencies and ombudsmen. Supervisors or colleagues of a corrupt public official directly involved in a bribery incident are, it seems, rarely confronted.

Corruption, however, not only affects the services provided to citizens by public officials. The public administration is the largest employer in any country and its associated job security and accompanying benefits are highly coveted. Some 18 per cent of the region’s citizens, or members of their households, have applied for a job in the public sector in the last three years, but of those whose application was successful one in eight admits to paying some money, giving a gift or doing a favour to help secure their position. Among those who failed, there is a widespread perception that

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1 Amounts in national currencies have been converted to Euros in terms of Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) to take into account the different cost of living in each country. Amounts expressed in PPP can be used for international comparison. The source of the conversion rates of EUR-PPP used in this study is Eurostat.
factors such as cronyism, nepotism or bribery played a decisive role in the recruitment process, while only 10 per cent believe that the selection was made on merit.

Certain malpractices may also have played some kind of role in the most recent elections held in western Balkan countries. Data show that an average of 8 per cent of citizens were asked to vote for a certain candidate or political party in exchange for a concrete offer of money, goods or a favour on such occasions. The greatest number of offers was made in rural areas, more frequently to men than women, and more often to individuals with low incomes and low educational levels.

While men in their thirties are those most exposed to bribery, characteristics such as income, education level or employment status do not appear to have a clear effect on the probability of experiencing bribery. For instance, although the prevalence of bribery increases slightly with income level, its frequency does exactly the opposite and the average number of bribes paid is actually higher among lower income groups than wealthier citizens, with no social group being exempt from bribery.

Nor, of course, is any social group exempt from the possibility of falling victim to the other five crime types examined in this survey, yet the prevalence rates for personal theft, assault/threat, burglary, robbery and car theft in the countries of the western Balkans are considerably lower than for bribery (4.3%, 2.9%, 2.7%, 1.0% and 0.9%, respectively). These are quite modest levels, very similar to those evidenced in other European countries, which probably explains why citizens of the region feel rather safe in relation to crime. Eight out of ten feel safe when walking alone after dark in their neighbourhoods and an even larger majority of the region’s inhabitants feel fairly secure in their homes.

But perceptions about corruption in the region are not so positive. Some 50 per cent of the population believe that corrupt practices occur often or very often in a number of important public institutions, including central and local government, parliament, hospitals, judiciary and the police. One third of the citizens (34%) of the western Balkans believe that corruption is actually on the rise in their own country, while half of them believe it is stable and a further 14 per cent think it is decreasing. Perceptions, it should be underlined, are nothing more than opinions and are not to be confused with the actual experience of corruption that provides the main focus of this report. Nevertheless, such a perception can be interpreted as an expression of citizens’ awareness of one of the principal challenges facing their countries, both now and in the years to come.
Corruption remains an issue for countries all over the world. Socio-economic development, the institutional and political setting, or the prevailing social and cultural norms are all elements that can shape it in very different manners, but corruption is still a scourge from which no country is truly exempt.

In the western Balkan region, drastic political and demographic changes in the past two decades have sometimes left a challenging institutional setting that is not always able to implement effective anti-corruption policies. It is small wonder, therefore, that the citizens of the region perceive corruption to be a major problem.

**International legal instruments and national policies**

Successive national Governments of the western Balkan countries have committed themselves to fighting corruption and key steps have been taken to address the issue. Western Balkan countries are party to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), a consequence of which is the Implementation Review Mechanism, established in 2009 to enable all parties to review their implementation of UNCAC provisions through a peer review process. One of the objectives of this mechanism is to encourage a participatory and nationally driven process towards anti-corruption reform.²

Both the Council of Europe Civil Law and Criminal Law Conventions on Corruption have also been ratified. On a national level, anti-corruption programmes and action plans have been established throughout the region, relevant legislation has been adopted and measures implemented to strengthen the prevention and criminalization of corruption.

In Croatia, for example, the legal framework of national legislation for combating corruption has been incorporated into the existing criminal legislation. Administrative capacity for investigating and prosecuting corruption has also been strengthened with the establishment of the Office for combating Corruption and Organized Crime (USKOK). In Serbia, the Law on the Prevention of Conflict of Interests in Performing Public Functions was, in 2003, one of the first anti-corruption measures and a further series of anti-corruption laws was adopted in October 2008. Montenegro has also adopted the Law on the Conflict of Interest, while the Public Procurement Law has established procedures that are harmo-

² The countries of the western Balkans will take part in the first cycle of the Implementation Review Mechanism according to the following schedule: Croatia (2010-2011), Montenegro and Serbia (2011-2012), the FYR of Macedonia (2012-2013), Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2013-2014).
nized with European Commission standards. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, too, the passing of the Law on the Conflict of Interest is attempting to prevent corrupt practices. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, some 40 laws have been amended or adopted to help in the repression of corruption. In Albania, the legal and institutional framework for fighting corruption is broadly in place. And in Kosovo, among others, the Law amending and supplementing the Law on Preventing Conflicts of Interest in Exercising Public Functions has been adopted.

The European Commission 2010 Progress Reports find that progress in the fight against corruption has been made in all western Balkan countries or that the authorities have at least begun to tackle the problem. The legal and institutional framework for fighting corruption is in place and in some areas it has improved considerably. The political will to fight corruption has been further strengthened and anti-corruption agencies have started their work. Yet the European Commission also finds that corruption is still prevalent in the western Balkans and continues to be of serious concern in many areas in both the public and private sector. The recently upgraded legal and administrative structures are still to be fully tested in practice. In order to make progress in the prevention of corruption, greater transparency in public administration is required and specific anti-corruption strategies need to be developed targeting vulnerable areas of the public sector.

The complexity of corruption

Corruption can occur at different levels. A distinction is usually drawn between grand and administrative (petty) corruption, with the former referring to corrupt practices affecting the legislative process and policymakers, and the latter referring to dealings between civil servants and the public. In either case, it has a devastating impact on the rule of law, hinders equal access to public services, affects public trust in state institutions and is a hurdle to economic and social development, especially in young democracies.

Corruption is a complex crime with blurred boundaries making it often difficult to distinguish between culprit and victim. It is not necessarily a one-dimensional transaction in which an active perpetrator coerces a passive party: both sides may benefit and the victim might be a third party or the community at large. Moreover, there are cultural and social factors that can further cloud the issue. The giving of gifts, for example, whether as a “thank you” or bureaucratic lubricant, may be considered acceptable in one culture yet unethical in another.

The importance of studying direct experience

In this context, comprehensive assessments of corruption can greatly assist governments in better tailoring policies and enhancing the capabilities of anti-corruption bodies. At the same time, it is widely accepted that the collection of empirical data in this area represents a real challenge due to the complex and covert nature of corruption. These difficulties are sometimes circumvented by focusing on perceptions about corruption, rather than on actual experience of it. Perception-based indicators, while useful for raising awareness about the issue of corruption and helping to advocate policy measures for addressing it, fail to provide clear indications as to the extent of corruption and vulnerable areas. Increasing concerns are also expressed about the validity of methods used to build perception-based indicators.

In recent years, tools for collecting information on direct experiences of corruption have been developed: sample surveys can produce important indicators about the extent and nature of corrupt practices. More importantly, the wealth of information gathered can shed light on the modalities of corruption and the sectors, positions and administrative procedures more at risk. Promoted by a variety of international organizations, national institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and development agencies, a number of such surveys have been conducted in several countries around the world, including in the western Balkan region, thus proving the feasibility and relevance of such an approach.

The scope and methodology of this study

Following a bilateral agreement between the European Commission and the various
national authorities of the western Balkan region, UNODC supported each country in conducting large-scale surveys on corruption. In most countries, national statistical authorities were directly or indirectly involved in implementing the survey. In all cases, strict statistical standards, including measures for protecting data confidentiality, were followed so as to ensure the highest possible quality of the data.

The main objective of these surveys was to examine actual experience of administrative corruption in each country of the region: the research probed the prevailing types and modalities of corruption that affect citizens’ daily lives, with particular focus on bribery, defined as (a) the promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties and (b) the solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.

This consolidated report for the whole western Balkan region is the fruit of those individual national surveys. Its goal is not to give scores and rankings to the western Balkan countries but rather to provide analytical knowledge about a complex phenomenon, both at regional and country level.

To fight corruption effectively it is necessary to understand its many facets since there is no simple “one-size-fits-all” solution to the problem. It is believed that the evidence-based information presented in this report will provide the Governments of the western Balkan region with an additional tool for developing well-targeted anti-corruption policies. Information that can also be made use of in the peer review process of the UNCAC Implementation Review Mechanism, as well as represent a benchmark for measuring future progress in the fight against corruption in the region.

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3 Bribery is defined as (a) the promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties and (b) as the solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.

4 The sample size was between 3,000 and 5,000 in each participating country/area; additional methodological information is provided in the Methodological Annex. Even when unspecified in the text, all results apply to the population between the ages of 18 and 64.
1. PREVALENCE OF BRIBERY

The extent of bribery

The public administration plays a vital role in contemporary society. Citizens and households depend on it for a vast array of services, ranging from medical visits and social allowances to school enrolment and the issue of documents, to name but a few. The western Balkan region is no exception: eight out of ten of its adult citizens had at least one contact with a public official in the 12 months prior to this survey (82%).

The demand made on the system is clear but when it comes to integrity in the provision and use of its services the picture that emerges is a somewhat cloudy one. One important finding of this survey is that one in six citizens of the western Balkans (2,475,000, equivalent to 16.8% of adult population aged 18 to 64) had either direct or indirect exposure to a bribery experience with a public official in the 12-month period in question (figure 1). This number represents the sum of three different groups: the percentage of citizens who actually paid money, gave a gift or counter favour to a public official; the percentage of those requested to pay a bribe by a public official but refused to do so; and the percentage of those reporting that a member of their household paid a bribe.

The data in figure 1 show that bribery is still a significant issue in the lives of many citizens of the western Balkans. But it is encouraging to note that there is a significant portion of citizens capable of saying “no”, thus refusing to pay the kickback requested by a public official. Data show that for every four citizens who pay a bribe to a public official during the course of the year, there is one who turns down such a request.

Some countries may have a high prevalence of bribery but a low frequency, or vice versa

Figure 1: Direct and indirect exposure of adult population to bribery in the 12 months prior to the survey, western Balkan region (2010)

- % of people who personally paid a bribe: 16.8%
- % of people who were asked to pay a bribe but refused: 10.3%
- % of people with household member who paid a bribe: 3.9%
- % of people with no exposure to bribery: 83.2%
When focusing on bribes actually paid, the prevalence of bribery is calculated as the number of citizens who gave a public official some money, a gift or counter favour on at least one occasion in the 12 months prior to the survey, as a percentage of citizens who had at least one contact with a public official in the same period. The average number of bribes refers to average number of bribes given by all bribe-payers, i.e. those who paid at least one bribe in the 12 months prior to the survey.

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The frequency of bribery

Nevertheless, it would be misleading to consider the prevalence rate alone when evaluating the extent of bribery in any given country or region. To get a fairer impression, the frequency of bribe paying should also be taken into consideration since, while one quarter of bribe-payers in the western Balkan region give bribes on only one occasion, three quarters of them do so on multiple occasions. The survey findings show that, on average, bribe-payers across the region pay two public officials on two and a half different occasions. Thus, on an average regional level, citizens experiencing bribery pay five bribes in a year, or the equivalent of one bribe every ten weeks or so.

As figure 2 shows, it would be unfair to attempt to rank the western Balkan countries/areas in terms of their experience of corruption as some may have a high frequency but a low prevalence, or vice versa. In Albania, for example, there is a relatively high prevalence rate but bribes are paid far less regularly than in, for example, Kosovo, which has almost half the prevalence (19.3% and 11.1%, respectively) but more than double the frequency (four occasions and ten occasions, respectively).

Distinctive features

In contrast to the situation observed in other regions around the globe, where corruption can be seen to be primarily an urban problem, rural areas in the western Balkans are affected by bribery to a slightly higher extent than urban areas (figure 3). This pattern is the same in most countries of the region, which is noteworthy considering that citizens generally interact less frequently with public officials in rural areas than in urban areas. And in Albania, the prevalence of bribery is actually almost 20 per cent higher in rural areas than in urban areas (20.9% vs. 17.7%). On the other hand, in Montenegro and Kosovo the payment of bribes is about 40 per cent more prevalent in urban than in rural areas (10.8% and 13.7% vs. 7.8% and 9.7%, respectively).

More predictable is that the prevalence of bribery is higher among men across the region than among women (figure 3). But the difference is not that remarkable (13.3% and 11.7%, respectively), showing that in spite of...
perceived gender roles, which assign men greater responsibility for dealing with the public administration and activities outside the home in general, women undertake administrative procedures to a similar extent and are no strangers to bribery. A pattern also shown by the fact that the number of payments made by bribe-payers is the same for both sexes (five bribes paid, on average). And in unique contrast to the regional trend, the prevalence of bribery in Albania is actually considerably higher among women (21.3%) than men (17%). Not only does bribery play a significant role in the lives of men in the western Balkans, it does so in the lives of women, too.
Payments to public officials come in several shapes and sizes and are made for different reasons in diverse contexts. Money or gifts, for example, may be explicitly requested by civil servants for the completion of a procedure, or offered by a citizen to facilitate a service or to express gratitude for a service rendered. In this chapter, a number of payment characteristics are presented in order to shed some light on what is clearly a complex question.

**Forms of payment**

In the western Balkan region, two thirds of all bribes are paid in cash (figure 4), while 22 per cent are given as food and drink. Considerably lower down the scale come valuables (5%), other goods (4%) and the exchange of services (3%). A large proportion of bribes take a form that can be seen as a barter—either explicit or implicit—between two parties, in which each one of them both gives and receives something in the exchange. But it should be stressed that in most cases the two parties are not on an equal footing, with one of them (the public official) usually being in a position of strength from a negotiating perspective.

There are, however, some noteworthy fluctuations in these rates in the different countries of the region (figure 5). In Albania, for example, almost all bribes are paid as cash, with only rare exceptions, while in Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, although they are the most prevalent form of bribery, cash payments account for less than half (44% and 45%, respectively) of all bribes, and other forms of bribery make up a larger share. The giving of food and drink is the second most common form of bribery in those two countries, accounting for 38 per cent of all bribes given in Croatia and a quarter in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Food is also an important means to facilitate an

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**Figure 4: Percentage distribution of bribes paid by type of payment, western Balkan region (2010)**

Note: Data refer to the last bribe paid by each bribe-payer in the 12 months prior to the survey. The sum is higher than 100 per cent since, in some cases, bribes are paid in more than one form (for example, cash and valuables).
administrative procedure in Serbia where one third of all bribes are given as food and drink. But one general pattern can be observed throughout the region: food is given by women more often (25%) than by men (19%), while cash payments are slightly more prevalent among men (70%) than among women (66%).

**Bribes paid in cash**

When focusing on bribes paid in cash, there are great differences in the average amounts paid in the different countries/areas of the western Balkans. The largest average amount is paid in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1,212 EUR-PPP), the country with the lowest prevalence rate. At the other end of the scale is Albania, where virtually every bribe is given as a cash payment and the average amount paid is the lowest of any country or area in the region (103 EUR-PPP).

Though differences in average amounts paid can, to a large extent, be explained by the variation in the cost of living between countries/areas, some interesting findings emerge. When compared to GDP per capita, the sums

![Figure 5: Percentage distribution of bribes paid by type of payment and average amount of bribes paid in cash (in EUR-PPP), by country/area (2010)](image-url)
paid in Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia show considerable values (table 1) and the ratio of average bribe paid to average nominal monthly salary makes clear that the impact of bribery on household budgets can be very significant. In the latter, for example, the average bribe paid is a substantial one and a half times the average nominal monthly salary, while in Montenegro it is a half, in Serbia slightly more than a third (35%) and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia slightly more than a quarter (28% and 27%, respectively).

Furthermore, there is a noteworthy contrast between the high average amounts of bribes paid in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the relatively low prevalence rate of bribery and number of bribes paid (see chapter 1). This suggests that bribes are less a part of day-to-day life there and are only paid when the interests at stake are high for both bribe-payers and bribe-takers.

These findings are confirmed when the actual distribution of amounts paid is considered in addition to the average values of bribes: data presented in figure 6 show that, at regional level, somewhat less than half of bribes paid in cash are worth less than 50 EUR-PPP, while almost one in four bribes is higher than 200 EUR-PPP. As already reflected in the average values of bribes, there is a considerable variation among countries/areas, with the two most extreme cases being Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: in the former, more than 50 per cent of the bribes are lower than 20 EUR-PPP; in the latter, one bribe in two is larger than 500 EUR-PPP.
Bribe-seeking modality

Bribery is a mechanism that tends to reproduce itself: bribes are often paid when there is a diffuse perception that bribes are necessary for solving certain bureaucratic problems and each bribe given reinforces the expectation that bribery is widespread and inevitable. It is a vicious circle and understanding the procedure of bribery is useful for developing measures that can fight it. In contacts with public officials resulting in the giving of money or gifts, it is noteworthy that in a large number of cases (43%) payment is offered by citizens themselves without a request, whereas in more than half of cases payment is actually made following a request. In 14 per cent of the latter the request is made explicitly by the public official, while almost a third of requests are made implicitly, when a citizen is made to understand that a kickback is necessary. Seven per cent of requests are made through a third person intermediary (figure 7).

The data suggest that the offer of bribes is often considered a standard practice in the smooth functioning of the bureaucratic system. In this context, bribes are frequently offered because they bring an immediate benefit to the bribe-payer, overcoming bottlenecks and inefficiencies in the delivery of public services. In other cases, the public official is unafraid to request kickbacks, either explicitly or implicitly, with, say, a nudge and a wink or through a third party, which shows a more premeditated and organized approach by certain public officials. In this regard, patterns experienced by different countries are quite varied, ranging from situations such as that recorded in Albania where requests are made by officials, either explicitly or implicitly, in two thirds of cases, to circumstances such as those recorded in Croatia and Serbia where offers made voluntarily by citizens represent almost 60 per cent of all cases (figure 8).
Understanding the modality of bribery is fundamental to the development of proper policies for helping to fight against it. For example, the creation of specific and well-publicised channels for reporting cases of corruption will be more effective in cases when citizens are subjected to requests for bribes, while such measures would probably be less effective when citizens themselves play an active role in bribery episodes.

The timing of a bribe payment can also shed light on the motivation behind it, in particular as to whether it is possibly made to facilitate a specific service or as a sign of gratitude for the successful completion of the procedure. Data show that a quarter of all bribes are paid after the service, while almost half are paid before. Another quarter are paid either at the same time as the service delivery or partly before and partly after it (figure 9).

There is a relationship between the type of bribe, its modality and its timing. Food and drink are more likely to be used in bribes given after the service and without a request from the public official, while cash is paid more often (three quarters of cases) in bribes given before or during the service and upon request. Though cash payments represent the preferred form of bribe in all the different cases presented in figure 10, the share of “in kind” bribes is highest when the offer is made by the citizen on his/her initiative.

The offer of bribes is often considered a standard practice in the smooth functioning of the system.

### Figure 10: Percentage distribution of bribes paid by type of payment and, respectively, by modality of bribe request/offer and by timing of bribe payment in relation to service delivery, western Balkan region (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Payment</th>
<th>Cash</th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Other goods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public official made explicit request</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public official made implicit request</td>
<td>83.9%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third party made request</td>
<td>80.6%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen made offer</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 11: Percentage distribution of bribes paid by purpose of payment, western Balkan region (2010)

- Receive better treatment: 70.6%
- Speed up procedure: 35.8%
- Avoid payment of fine: 8.0%
- Finalization of procedure: 5.1%
- Receive information: 27.6%
- Reduce cost of procedure: 19.9%
- Don’t remember: 14.1%
- Avoid other problems: 17.8%
- No specific purpose: 11.2%

Note: Data refer to the last bribe paid by each bribe-payer in the 12 months prior to the survey. The sum is higher than 100 per cent since, in some cases, bribes are paid in more than one form (for example, cash and valuables).
In every procedure, bribes may be used for different purposes. People may, for example, give bribes in relation to some medical treatment or a passport issuing procedure in order to speed up the procedure, reduce the official fee, receive information or get better treatment. Different purposes of bribes given, irrespective of the procedure for which they apply, are shown in figure 11.

Approximately 28 per cent of western Balkan citizens who get involved in bribery do so to receive better treatment, and the same amount do so to speed up a procedure. Other important motives include the avoidance of fine payment (16%) and the finalization of a procedure (12%). These data indicate that bribery is often used to overcome deficiencies and weaknesses in public sector delivery.

In this aspect, experiences also vary considerably across the region. For instance, data from Albania point to a desire for better treatment as the principal motive for paying bribes, whereas in countries/areas such as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, the main reason for paying kickbacks is to avoid prolonged waiting times. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, avoiding the payment of fines is of the same importance as the need to speed up procedures (figure 12).
Just as bribery may be employed for diverse purposes in varying guises and different contexts, not all sectors of the public administration in the western Balkan region are affected by corruption to the same extent. There are certain types of public official that seek bribes more frequently than others, while there are certain procedures and situations in which beneficiaries of public services are more prone to making offers to public officials in order to reduce red tape and finalize proceedings.

According to the experience of citizens who paid at least one bribe in the 12 months prior to the survey, the public officials who receive most kickbacks are doctors (57% of citizens with recent corruption experience give bribes to doctors), police officers (35%), nurses (33%), and municipal officers (13%) (figure 13). Other types of public officials, ranging from municipal elected representatives (3%) to land registry officers (9%), receive a smaller percentage of bribes.

Some interesting variations to the regional trend do, however, exist: payments to car registration officers are more than twice as common in Croatia than in all the other countries/areas of the region (14%); teachers and land registry officers are often reported as being bribe recipients in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and there is a notable percentage of bribe-payers who report payments to customs officers in Montenegro (figure 14).

Across the region, the urban/rural context also has some impact on the type of official involved in acts of bribery. For example, more citizens from urban than from rural areas pay bribes to police officers (42% vs. 37%) while, conversely, doctors and nurses receive more kickbacks or gifts in rural areas than in urban areas: 60 per cent and 32 per cent of bribe-
payers in rural areas make at least one payment to doctors and nurses, respectively, in comparison with 50 per cent and 28 per cent in urban areas. The only country in the region in which this pattern is reversed for all three public officials is Montenegro.

To some extent, it is unsurprising that public officials with a high level of interaction with the public also receive the highest number of bribes. However, there are some positions in the public administration, such as in the judiciary or customs service, where the frequency of interaction with citizens is certainly more limited but where bribery experiences are still a recurrent problem. For this reason, it is useful to analyse not only which types of officials account for the greatest numbers of bribe receipts but also the probability of a particular type of official receiving a bribe when he or she is contacted, independently from the frequency of interactions. To measure this, the number of citizens who paid a bribe to a selected type of public official is compared with the number of citizens who had contacts with that type of official during the 12-month period prior to the survey. Figure 15 shows bribery prevalence rates calculated as the percentage of people who paid a bribe to a selected type of public official when they contacted a particular type of official.

This indicator shows that the highest average prevalence rates are recorded in relation to police officers (11%), doctors (10%), nurses and customs officers (both 6%). Moreover, a relatively high value is registered in relation to land registry offices, judges/prosecutors and municipal officers, indicating that they also receive bribes with a certain frequency from the citizens with whom they deal. The values presented in figure 15 are particularly relevant for identifying occupations for which the risk of bribery is higher across the region.

Some noteworthy features emerge at country/area level: in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, the figure is more than double the regional average for police officers (23%), and in Albania the same could almost be said of doctors (20%), whereas for customs officers it is a remarkable three times higher (21%). In Kosovo, the prevalence rate for judges/prosecutors (10%) is twice the regional average (figure 16).

Another important indicator of the extent of bribery among selected public officials is the frequency of payments. Figure 17 shows the average number of bribes given by bribe-payers to selected public officials for the whole
3. Public officials and bribery

Whilst land registry officers receive, on average, one and a half bribes from each bribe-payer, customs officers receive almost four bribes. Though very few public utilities officers receive bribes (around 2%), those who do actually receive them on more than two and a half occasions.

The analysis of data relating to the last incident in which a citizen gave a bribe reveals that different types of public official are paid kickbacks for quite different reasons (figure 18). For example, police officers are paid bribes to avoid payments of fines or reduce the costs of the procedure, while doctors and nurses are given money or gifts to receive better treatment or, to a lesser extent, to reduce waiting times. Bribes to judges/prosecutors, land registry, social protection and car registration officers are, on the whole, paid to accelerate or finalize complicated procedures. While on a national level, in Albania, for example, the avoidance of fines and/or reductions in their amounts are common motives for bribes paid to customs and tax officials.

This shows that the numerous administrative procedures and services carried out in the public sector have different weaknesses for which bribery is often used as a remedy. The precise analysis and resolution of any such deficiencies and failings would no doubt represent a powerful preventative measure against corruption.

Modalities of bribe paying to different types of public official also show the diverse nature of payments made to them (see figure 19). In the case of doctors and nurses, for example, bribes are to a large extent offered by citizens. Payments to doctors are most commonly paid...
in cash (68% of cases) while bribes given to nurses are, particularly in Croatia and Serbia, more often given in kind (food, valuables, other goods). Social protection agency officers and municipal elected representatives are the only other officials who receive food and drink and the exchange of services more than cash payments.

All other officials receive most of their bribes in cash. The average amounts involved can vary to a considerable extent, ranging from more than 800 EUR-PPP paid to land registry and judges/prosecutors, to less than 100 EUR-PPP, paid to police officers. Nurses, together with car registration officers,
receive an average amount of approximately 150 EUR-PPP; doctors, customs officers and municipal officers receive, on average, some 250 EUR-PPP; in the case of tax officers the average cash bribe is slightly above 300 EUR-PPP.

Doctors and nurses in the public health service are, together with municipal elected representatives, among those officials who receive a large share of their bribes after the service (37%, 33% and 46%, respectively) but, overall, health-care personnel receive bribes more often before the provision of a service, as do all other public officials.

It should be noted, however, that western Balkan citizens do not always consent to the payment of bribes in order to facilitate or benefit from a particular administrative procedure. As shown in chapter 1, for every four citizens who pay a bribe there is one who refuses to do so and turns down the request made by a public official. Figure 20 shows that police officers and doctors are two types of public official whose bribery requests are often declined. Among those citizens who turn down bribe requests, a quarter have been asked to pay a bribe personally by a doctor, 23 per cent by a police officer and 9 per cent by a judge/prosecutor.
4. REPORTING OF BRIBERY

In general terms, the extent to which a crime is reported to the authorities by its victims is directly proportional to the combined effect of three factors: the perceived gravity of the crime experienced; faith in the authorities’ resolve to identify the culprits; and the immediate benefit the victim can draw from reporting the crime (events covered by insurance, for example).

In the case of bribery, it appears that none of the above factors is currently playing a role in the western Balkan region. According to the results of this survey, a mere 1.5 per cent of bribe-payers report their experience to the authorities. The main reasons for not doing so are that it would be pointless because nobody would care (30%), and that it is a common (22%) or a positive practice (nothing more than a sign of gratitude for 18%): in none of these cases is it an occurrence perceived to be an actual crime. A further fifth declare that they receive a direct benefit from paying a bribe, so there would be no point in reporting it (figure 21).

On average, factors such as the fear of reprisals or insufficient knowledge and awareness of the authorities responsible for processing citizens’ complaints do not appear to be significant in the explanation of the low reporting rate. However, in some western Balkan countries/areas a considerable proportion of citizens do raise either the fear of reprisals (slightly more than 10% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro) or a lack of knowledge about reporting authorities (10% in Kosovo) as a motive for not reporting bribery incidents.

The most common reasons for not reporting a personal corruption experience are the same in all the countries/areas of the region, but there are certain noteworthy variations (figure 22).

On the rare occasions that a report is filed, citizens approach law enforcement and judiciary officers

![Figure 21](image-url)
CORRUPTION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS: bribery as experienced by the population

For example, in Montenegro, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as in Kosovo, the main reason is a lack of trust in the authorities responsible. In Albania, it is the perception of bribery as a common practice, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Croatia, several motives have an equal importance to citizens who decided not to report a bribery incident.

This lack of trust in the authorities is particularly worrying if concrete anti-corruption measures are to be put in place, and appears to be consistent with the negative experience of the small group of citizens who file a complaint about their corruption experience (figure 23). Of those who report their bribery experience, almost 40 per cent declare that there is no actual follow-up to their claim, while an additional 18 per cent are even advised not to go ahead with it. In approximately a quarter of cases, a formal procedure against the public official is actually initiated, and in about one in ten cases an informal arrangement resulting in the return of the bribe is reached.

Almost 40 per cent of those who report their bribery experience to the authorities go to the police, while another quarter address the complaint to the local prosecutor. Anti-corruption agencies and ombudsmen are approached in another quarter of cases but supervisors or colleagues of a corrupt public official directly involved in a bribery incident are rarely confronted. On the rare occasions that a report is filed, citizens tend to approach traditional law enforcement and judiciary officers (figure 24).

An indication of effective ways for improving existing bribery reporting systems can be obtained through the data collected about which agency/official citizens would approach if they had to report a bribery experience at some point in the future (figure 25). About 28 per cent say they would approach the police,
while a quarter would, in the first instance, report the episode to the supervisor of the corrupt public official. One in six citizens considers anti-corruption bodies a viable option, almost 10 per cent would not know to whom they could report a future bribery incident, and prosecutors are perceived to be a good option by only a small portion of citizens.

Bribery experiences may not usually be reported to the authorities but bribe-payers do share their experiences with people they know. Two thirds of citizens with bribery experience discuss it with friends or family, but such talk does not go beyond immediate acquaintances and only fractional numbers of bribe-payers discuss the bribe paid with individuals or groups who may subsequently spread the word, such as NGOs or journalists.

For a considerable proportion of bribe-payers (30%), this survey interview was the very first time they had admitted to the payment of a bribe, meaning that they had never previously shared the experience with anybody, not even with close friends or relatives. When it comes to bribery, a well-established and selective code of silence evidently still exists in many cases.

Figure 24: Percentage distribution of bribe-payers reporting their personal corruption experience to authorities according to institution receiving report, western Balkan region (2010)

Note: Data refer to bribe-payers who did report their last bribe paid in the 12 months prior to the survey to authorities/institutions.

Figure 25: Percentage distribution of adult population according to institutions indicated for future reports of bribery incidents, western Balkan region (2010)

Note: Data refer to bribe-payers who did report their last bribe paid in the 12 months prior to the survey to authorities/institutions.
In addition to bribery related to public service delivery, citizens of selected western Balkan countries were asked about certain behaviours and practices in public sector recruitment and vote-buying before elections. These are two areas that can have a serious impact on both the development of an independent, professional public administration and the fairness and transparency of the electoral process.

**Public sector recruitment**

As well as being providers of myriad vital services to the population, public sector institutions jointly make up the largest single employer in any given country. In the western Balkans, available estimates indicate that, while currently on the decrease, the share of the workforce employed in the public sector is around 20 per cent or higher. But due to the sheer size and importance of the public administration, departments/agencies need to hire new staff on a regular basis. While it is usually regulated in order to ensure transparency, the recruitment process leaves a varying degree of discretion to those officials selecting the new workforce. In accordance with national principles, regulations and best practice, new staff should be selected on the basis of criteria such as competence and experience, but it is often reported that other decisive factors, such as nepotism, cronyism or even bribery, can come into play.

Job opportunities in the public sector are usually attractive to job seekers, not only for the nature of the work itself but also for the...
advantages typical of employment in the civil service, such as job security, associated social status and fair remuneration. In this sense, the western Balkan region is no exception and, according to the results of this survey, some 18 per cent of citizens or members of their households applied for a job in the public sector in the three years prior to the survey. On average, one quarter of them were successful and secured a job.

Of all those citizens who secured a job, on average, one in eight candidly admits paying some money, giving a gift or doing a counter favour in order to be hired, with percentages ranging from 6 per cent to 28 per cent in the different countries of the region (figure 26). Data clearly show that recruitment procedures in the region’s public sector suffer from a lack of transparency; something confirmed by the perceptions expressed by applicants who were not recruited.

Only 10 per cent of those who did not get the job believe that the selection was made on merit, while most think that other factors such as cronyism or nepotism (59%) or bribery (17%) played a decisive role. These are, however, only perceptions and do not necessarily reflect the real extent of such factors, but they do express a negative opinion and expectation about certain practices, which can, in turn, have an effect on certain behaviours (figure 27).

**Vote-buying at elections**

A key development in any democracy is manifested in the modalities, rules and regulations of the electoral process, including electoral campaign regulations, funding of parties and access to the media. These are all extremely important and sensitive topics for which countries implement thorough legislation in order to ensure fair and transparent elections.

**Vote-buying is often targeted at the most vulnerable social groups**
In this regard, the United Nations Convention against Corruption invites countries to identify criteria concerning candidatures for election to public office and to enhance transparency in the funding of candidatures and, where applicable, of political parties. In this framework, the survey explored one specific aspect related to the electoral process by asking citizens if they were exposed to vote-buying. The findings show that on the occasion of the last general elections held in the countries/areas of the western Balkans, an average of 8 per cent of citizens were asked to vote for a certain candidate or political party in exchange for a concrete offer, such as money, goods or a favour. As figure 28 shows, the same pattern is observed for both general and local elections. Countries’/areas’ experiences diverge considerably, with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro showing above-average values.

There are some variations in the manifestation of such phenomena and available data indicate that the greatest number of offers was made in rural areas, more frequently to men than women, and more often to individuals with low incomes and low educational levels (figure 29).

Figure 29: Percentage of adult population asked to vote for a candidate at last general elections in exchange for money, goods or a favour, by selected variables (urban/rural, sex, educational attainment, income), western Balkan region (2010)

Note: Data do not include Albania since the topic was not covered in the Albania survey. The educational attainment category “primary” includes citizens with no educational attainment and citizens with a completed primary education as their highest educational attainment. “Secondary” includes completed lower secondary education and upper secondary educations. The educational attainment category “higher” includes completed post-secondary non-tertiary education, tertiary education or masters degree/doctoral titles. The income categories “low”, “middle” and “high” are based on categories independently formed in each country on the basis of household income distribution.
6. VULNERABILITIES TO BRIBERY

By definition, two parties play a role in an act of bribery, one giving and the other receiving a payment, gift or counter favour, though, as seen in previous chapters, on occasion a third person may act as an intermediary. Less clear is the identity of the victim: sometimes it is the bribe-payer, particularly when left with no choice but to pay in order to access a service, but in other cases the agreement between the two parties, whether explicit or implicit, is made at the expense of a third party, be it a specific individual, group or the community at large. Such blurred boundaries mean that any light, however faint, that can be shed on the features and characteristics of bribe-payers may be of assistance in developing anti-corruption policies and in assessing the impact of bribery.

In general terms, the demographic and socio-economic features of the bribe-paying population closely match those of the population as a whole, though some distinctive characteristics can be noted. For example, men in their thirties are those most exposed to bribery, while the probability of being confronted with bribe requests decreases with age, for both men and women (figure 30). But when looking at characteristics such as household income, educational level or activity status, no clear patterns emerge. For example, even though the prevalence of bribery and the average amounts paid increase with the income level of the household, the average number of bribes paid is actually higher among lower income groups than wealthier households (figure 31).

Overall, administrative bribery appears to affect the different social strata without establishing a clear pattern. It is a pragmatic practice employed when a problem needs solving or a bureaucratic bottleneck needs clearing and the better off can afford to pay larger bribes in order to do so, but no social group appears to be exempt from such activities.

**Figure 30: Prevalence of bribery in the western Balkan region, by age and sex (2010)**

Note: Prevalence of bribery is calculated as the number of adult citizens (aged 18-64) who gave a public official some money, a gift or counter favour on at least one occasion in the 12 months prior to the survey, as a percentage of adult citizens who had at least one contact with a public official in the same period.
On the other hand, some patterns do emerge when looking at characteristics of bribe-payers according to the type of public official receiving the bribe. When, for illustrative purposes, analysis is limited to three types of public official, it becomes clear, for example, that men have a greater likelihood of being party to the payment of a bribe when interacting with the police or with customs officials (as shown in figure 32), while the same pattern does not emerge for citizens interacting with doctors. The highest prevalence rates are observed for men aged 18 to 29 and 30 to 39 (both 16%) interacting with the police, while the prevalence rate for women in the same age groups, though high (10% and 9%, respectively), is significantly lower by comparison. Interestingly, prevalence rates for men and women dealing with doctors are quite similar, with the only exception being the 18 to 29 age group, in which women pay bribes to a greater extent than men (12% and 8% respectively).

When it comes to educational attainment, survey results show that an increase in formal educational level actually reduces the likeli-
hood of paying a bribe to police and customs officers, while for citizens interacting with doctors, the prevalence of bribery is directly proportional to income level, with wealthy citizens tending to pay more bribes to doctors, as do residents of rural areas. These examples indicate that some specific mechanisms are often in place, superseding dealings between citizens and various types of public official. When examined at country or sub-national level, such arrangements can have different and very specific patterns, suggesting that there is a local dimension to bribery that also needs to be taken into account.
The perception of a certain phenomenon can be seen as the result of a process in which a piece of information, be it based on a direct or indirect experience, is processed and evaluated by any given person. Citizens’ opinions about corruption are, therefore, the final outcome of a complex process and the type of information available to them is the first factor influencing their opinion. The media usually plays a major role in shaping public perceptions when, for instance, it focuses on specific episodes of corruption while neglecting others. And the same information can be interpreted in different ways by different people, depending on their culture, values, socio-economic status, occupation and other variables.

Perceptions of corruption, then, do not measure corruption per se, but instead measure the psychological impact of corruption on the population. This survey focuses on actual experiences of petty corruption but understanding how corruption is perceived by citizens is important in assessing the likelihood of corrupt practices occurring: the greater the perception of corruption, the greater the probability that certain practices will persist and develop further. If it is anticipated that the payment of a bribe is required to get something done, it is more likely that the bribe will be either requested or offered. Corrupt practices, including bribery, foster perceptions about corruption and those perceptions, in turn, foster corruption.

As already stated, according to the findings of this survey, the citizens of the western Balkans believe that corruption is one of the biggest problems facing their countries today: they rank it the third most important issue to be addressed at national level after unemployment and poverty (figure 33).

Unemployment is understandably rated the most important issue, poverty/lowlstandard of living the second, while corruption is actually ranked higher than issues such as the...
performance of national government or even crime. Interestingly, considering the region’s recent past, ethnic relations are barely considered an issue at all.

In each country/area, corruption is perceived to be a higher or lower priority also depending on how other socio-economic issues are perceived by the population. In Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro, for example, corruption is actually perceived to be the second most important issue, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina it is the fourth (figure 34).

Another perspective to take into consideration when evaluating perceptions is whether corruption is perceived to be decreasing or increasing over time. As figure 35 shows, one third of the citizens of the western Balkans believe corruption is on the rise in their own country, while half of them believe it is stable and a further 14 per cent think it is decreasing (it must be reiterated, however, that perceptions about time trends are different from actual bribery experience and also differ from opinions about corruption in comparison to other topics), but there are important variations. It is interesting to note that in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia an important share of the population actually perceives corruption to have decreased, while those two countries show diverging patterns both in terms of bribery experience and opinion about the relevance of corruption in comparison to other policy issues.

Several types of institution or sectors are perceived to be permeated by corruption to a significant extent. Figure 36 shows that a significant, though variable, share of the...
population believes that corrupt practices occur often or very often in those institutions selected, with the military and NGOs among those perceived to be more immune to corruption.

Though perceptions should not be considered as direct indicators of the actual prevalence of corruption, these evaluations give a direct insight into citizens’ trust in institutions. In this respect, figure 36 shows that several institutions, both in the public and private spheres, are not highly rated by the population in terms of their integrity. In addition to the findings about the sectors perceived to be corrupt, it is highly relevant to see which practices are perceived to be more prone to corruption and to which procedures they relate (figure 37).

Certain malpractices, such as the hiring of friends and relatives and the awarding of contracts to private companies, are perceived to happen on a frequent basis among elected representatives and unelected public officials in equal shares. A large share of the adult population of the western Balkan region perceives that all these malpractices take place on a regular basis. Also, the manipulation of electoral results is perceived to take place often or very often by more than 50 per cent of the adult population. While remembering that such data only refer to perceptions, it is still remarkable that such a significant share of the population believes that certain practices are so widespread.

In addition to the perception of the extent of some behaviours, it is also important to understand how far such practices are considered as acceptable by the population as it is possible that the frequency of certain practices has the effect of making people consider such behaviours to be acceptable. Data presented in figure 38 indicate that for most citizens the various acts listed are not considered acceptable, though some nuances do exist and it appears that some behaviours are more acceptable than others. Moreover, the act of a citizen offering some money or a gift to a public official is usually more tolerated than the request actually made by a public official.
Crime and insecurity are not on a par with corruption in western Balkan citizens’ perceptions about the most pressing challenges facing their countries: only 3.5 per cent consider them the most important issue (figure 33). However, data about victimization experiences of selected forms of crime provide some important insights into the nature and patterns of crime in the countries of the region. Like bribery, assault/threat, robbery, burglary, personal and car theft are all criminal acts, but their impact on individuals and households is quite different due to the substantive differences in the material, psychological and socio-economic damages incurred. While bribery is liable to erode public integrity and the social fabric as a whole, other crime types such as assault/threat, robbery and theft often have significant psychological effects on the victims, in addition to their material consequences.

In most countries, crime trends and patterns are usually evaluated through data on reported crime as collected by the police, prosecutors or courts. The collection of data from victims of crime can provide valuable information for at least two reasons. Firstly, it provides an assessment of the so-called “dark figure” of crime, which represents all those criminal events that, for various reasons, are not reported by victims to the authorities. Secondly, it supplies a whole range of information about victims and modalities of crime incidents, which are not usually well represented in statistics produced by law enforcement and judiciary bodies.

As shown in figure 39, at regional level the prevalence rates for personal theft (4.3%), assault/threat (2.9%), burglary (2.7%), robbery (1.0%) and car theft (0.9%) are generally...
Table 2: Annual prevalence rates of selected types of crime in western Balkan region, by country/area (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>The FYR of Macedonia</th>
<th>Regional average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<td>0.9</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
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<td>Personal theft</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assault/Threat</td>
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<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Car theft</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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</table>

Note: Annual prevalence rates for robbery, personal theft, assault/threat and burglary are respectively calculated as the number of adult citizens experiencing each of these crimes, as a percentage of the total adult population (aged 18-64). The annual prevalence rate for car theft is calculated as the number of households who experienced one car, van or truck theft in the 12 months prior to the survey, as a percentage of households owning a car, van or truck.

at a much lower level than bribery.

Beyond these average regional values, some countries show somewhat higher prevalence rates for specific offences, as is the case of Serbia, which has above-average values for both personal theft (5.9%) and assault/threat (4.2%), or Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia where there are significant percentages of citizens who have been victim of an assault/threat (respectively, 3.2% and 3.4%). On the other hand, 12-month prevalence rates for car theft are significantly above the regional average in Kosovo (2.3%) and burglary rates are somewhat higher in Bosnia and Herzegovina (3.7%), Serbia (3.4%) and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (3.1%) (table 2).

While taking the differences between the countries of the region into account, an important finding of this study is that the victimization experience of the citizens of the western Balkans is not markedly different to those recorded in other European countries. This is visualized in figure 40, where prevalence rates of assault and theft recorded in the western Balkan region are shown jointly with the most recent data available in a number of other European countries.
Data indicate that most countries of the western Balkans are in the mid-to-low range of values in terms of share of the population being victim of two typical crimes, respectively against property (theft) and against the person (assault).

In contrast to what has been observed in relation to bribery, victimization is higher in urban than rural areas for all five of the crime types covered in this survey. At a regional level, the difference between urban and rural prevalence rates is biggest for assault/threat (prevalence rate more than 70% higher in cities), followed by burglary and theft (respectively, around 50% and 25% higher in urban than in rural areas). At national level, however, there are some exceptions to these regional urban/rural differences. For instance, the prevalence of theft, as well as robbery, is higher in rural than urban areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo.

Overall, victimization rates for the three crimes against individuals—theft, assault/threat and robbery—are almost equal for men and women, but these averages mask important differences between age groups of victims. As shown in figure 41, victimization for assault/threat is strongly correlated to age, with two groups appearing to be at higher risk of being victim of an assault: in particular, men belonging to younger age groups; and women belonging to middle age groups. This pattern can be observed almost uniformly in all countries of the region but, whereas the higher vulnerability of young men represents a feature similar to that experienced in other countries around the world, the elevated exposure of middle-aged women constitutes an issue that certainly deserves specific attention and further research.

When considering other characteristics of crime victims, it appears that higher income levels are associated with a greater risk of being a victim of theft, while the economic status of citizens does not appear to be related to the probability of being a victim of an assault or a robbery (figure 42).

An important feature of crimes and of their impact on victims is their level of violence, and the use of weapons by offenders represents a direct indication of that level. While taking into account that prevalence rates for assault and robbery are usually moderate, in some cases an important share of these offences are perpetrated under the threat of a weapon. At a regional level, only a minority of robberies are carried out with guns (10%) or knives (14%). However, as figure 43 shows, important variations exist at national level: if in most countries/areas knives constitute the most frequently used weapon, the case of Kosovo is noteworthy and the high percentage of offences conducted under the threat of a
CORRUPTION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS: bribery as experienced by the population

50

A gun represents a warning sign about the accessibility and availability of firearms in that area.

Reporting of crime to the police

As stated previously, reporting behaviour to the police depends on many factors, such as the expectation of what the police will eventually do about the offence or the requirements for obtaining a police report in order to make an insurance claim.

Results demonstrate that at regional level the share of common crimes experienced in the 12 months prior to the survey and reported to the police ranges from 76.3 per cent for car theft to 44.1 per cent for assault/threat. By comparison, of those who paid a bribe in the past year, only 1.5 per cent reported it to the police, as shown in chapter 4 (figure 44).

As in other countries around the world, reporting patterns in the western Balkans depend heavily on the type of offence and citizens tend to report a crime when there is a greater chance that the police will be capable of following it up, when there is a direct incentive (such as insurance cover) for filing a report or when the psychological, physical or economic impact of the offence is particularly strong. All these factors also play a decisive role in the western Balkans and when considering the differences in reporting rates at national level (figure 45) all the above factors should be taken into account.

The results of this survey show that, at an aggregate level, citizens of the western Balkans reported one out of two offences experienced in the 12 months prior to the survey (52.6%), thus indicating that further work is needed to bridge the gap between the crime experience of citizens and the authorities responsible for investigating such events and providing assistance to the victims. Data at national level indicate that the size of this gap varies from country to country: the reporting rate of any crime ranges from less than 30 per cent in Albania to more than 60 per cent in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Perceptions of safety from crime

Both the actual and the perceived prevalence of crime in a country or region affect the public’s feeling of safety or fear. The perception of safety can be differentiated between feeling safe in public spaces—when walking alone in one’s neighbourhood after dark—and feeling safe in private—when home alone after dark.

On average, almost four out of every five (78%) citizens of the western Balkans feel safe walking alone after dark, while one in seven feels “a little unsafe” and less than 5 per cent feel “very unsafe”. This general perception of a high level of safety is even more pronounced
When looking at the home. Over 88 per cent of people feel “very safe” or “fairly safe” when home alone at night, while only 2.2 per cent feel “very unsafe” (figure 46).

When looking at patterns by sex, men are less afraid than women (12.7% vs. 26.4%, respectively, feel “a little unsafe” or “very unsafe” walking alone after dark), and the youngest and oldest age groups feel more unsafe than the middle aged. Men are again considerably more likely to feel “very safe” or “fairly safe” than women (93% of men vs. 84% of women feel safe) when staying at home alone after dark (figure 47).

Perceptions of safety are not always directly associated with the experience of crime as described in the previous chapters. On the one hand, it is notable that in all western Balkan countries the inhabitants of urban areas feel less safe than those living in rural areas, a pattern probably related to the higher prevalence of crime in many urban areas. On the other hand, higher income groups feel slightly safer than middle and lower income groups, as do better educated groups in comparison to less well-educated groups, and such patterns are not directly related to the victimization experience of these social groups. Based on these insights, it may be concluded that the perception of security or vulnerability among the population depends on various factors, one of which is evidently represented by direct experience, while other personal features, such as sex, age, income and education, also have an impact.
Figure 47: Percentage of adult population according to perceptions of safety by sex and age group, western Balkan region (2010)

How safe do you feel walking alone in your area (i.e. neighbourhood or village) after dark? (percentage feeling “a little” or “very” unsafe)

How safe do you feel when you are at home alone after dark? (percentage feeling “a little” or “very” unsafe)
Corruption means different things to different people but for many it is a kind of spectre whose pernicious presence can be felt while its structure remains both intangible and impossible to delineate. Yet this report shows that, thanks to the analysis of the direct experience of bribery actually experienced by the population, it is possible to draw at least a partial profile of this particular phantom.

As in many other fields, both on the economic and social front, the data and analyses provided in this report are not to be used to score or rank countries but rather to help understand a complex issue and to assist policy-making in developing appropriate measures against it. To this end, the following elements could be retained for further consideration with a view to developing effective anti-corruption measures at national level:

- There is no single modus operandi for bribery and any particular one in force may vary depending on the specific purpose of the payment, the public official and the administrative procedure involved. Data indicate that established practices exist, and policies for fighting bribery, including preventive measures, need to take this into account. A full understanding of the mechanism of bribery will assist national authorities in developing a combined set of preventive and criminalization measures for fighting bribery in its various guises.
- Malpractice occurs on a regular basis in the performance and duties of public officials but some sectors appear to be more vulnerable to bribery than others. This obviously depends on the nature of the services provided but it also appears that some practices are more established in certain sectors than in others. A better understanding of the reasons why bribes are paid and the identification of specific issues, such as the quality of services—for example, the reduction of health service waiting times or streamlining in the filing procedure—could assist in the implementation of specific measures. And sectors shown to be more vulnerable to bribery could undergo specific assessments in order to identify priority areas in need of specific support.
- An area of concern is the very low share of bribe-payers who file a complaint with public authorities. A thorough analysis of existing reporting channels could be considered in order to make them more easily accessible, better known and, where necessary, more confidential. The information collected in this survey provides invaluable insights on how to improve such mechanisms.
In general, corruption is not accepted by citizens—they voiced great concern about it in the survey—yet bribery appears to be tolerated as a tool for getting things done and receiving better treatment. A further assessment of public awareness about corruption could be considered and further initiatives might be developed to inform those who do not deem bribery to be on a par with “real” crimes, as well as to increase understanding about the pernicious effect that kickbacks have on the fair delivery of public services.

Though still embryonic in nature, some of this survey’s findings touch on areas, such as public sector recruitment and vote-buying, which relate to the general provisions of the United Nations Convention against Corruption. Further analysis of the vulnerabilities that have emerged could thus be undertaken forthwith.

This survey is the first attempt to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the actual experience of bribery in the western Balkan region. As such, it provides the possibility of having a comparative perspective on the extent, modality and nature of bribery in the countries of the region and can give added value in understanding this phenomenon, especially in identifying those measures that are more successful in fighting it. This is particularly true if such exercises can be repeated over time in order to monitor changes at national and regional level.

A monitoring system of corruption at national level should include a variety of tools for collecting evidence about its various manifestations and assisting policymaking:

- General assessments of the experience of bribery and other forms of corruption (both for the population at large and the business sector), for the purpose of providing benchmarks and measuring progress.

- Sectoral assessments of the working conditions and integrity of public officials by sector (health sector, judiciary, police, customs, etc.), for the purpose of providing more in-depth and specific information as well as assisting in identifying targeted policy measures.

- A system for monitoring the state response to corruption—both repressive and preventive measures—in order to identify successful and unsuccessful practices.

In several countries of the western Balkan region, such systems, often initiated by anti-corruption agencies at national level, are already in development. Further involvement of government agencies responsible for producing statistical data (national statistical offices), relevant ministries and experienced research centres, with the support of international and regional organizations, will enable the countries of the region to produce high quality and relevant information for fighting corruption more and more effectively.

As the data in this report pertaining to perceptions about corruption reveal, public opinion about corruption in the western Balkan region shows a considerable level of concern about the issue. A window of opportunity is, therefore, open and it is likely that the citizens of the region would warmly welcome the further implementation of anti-corruption policies.
The factsheets show some key indicators for each country/area included in the report:

1. Percentage of population having contacts with public administration: percentage of adult population (aged 18-64) who had at least one contact with a public official in the 12 months prior to the survey.

2. Prevalence of bribery: amount of adult population (aged 18-64) who gave a public official some money, a gift or counter favour on at least one occasion in the 12 months prior to the survey, as a percentage of adult population who in the same period had at least one contact with a public official.

3. Average number of bribes: refers to average number of bribes paid by all bribe-payers, i.e. those who paid at least one bribe in the 12 months prior to the survey.

4. Average bribe paid in EUR: average amount of bribes paid in cash, expressed in Euros, as converted from local currency using average exchange rate of 2010.

5. Average bribe paid in EUR-PPP: average amount of bribes paid in cash, expressed as Purchasing Power Parities in Euros; this is the amount to be used for international comparisons.

Charts are also shown on type, timing, purpose and modality of bribery.
Western Balkan region

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<th>Indicators</th>
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<td>Percentage of population having contact with public administration</td>
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<td>294</td>
<td>216</td>
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<td>255</td>
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Percentage distribution of bribes paid, by purpose of payment

- Receive better treatment: 27.7%
- Speed up procedure: 15.8%
- Avoid payment of fine: 12.4%
- Finalization of procedure: 4.4%
- Receive information: 4.3%
- Reduce cost of procedure: 2.3%
- No specific purpose: 1.8%
- Other: 3.7%
- Don’t remember: 43.3%

Percentage distribution of bribes paid by type of payment

- Cash: 67.7%
- Food & drink: 21.9%
- Valuables: 5.1%
- Other goods: 3.7%
- Exchange of services: 3.1%
- Don’t remember: 3.1%

Percentage distribution of bribes paid by modality of bribe requests and offers

- Citizen made offer: 43.3%
- Public official made implicit request: 31.5%
- Public official made explicit request: 13.8%
- Third party made explicit request: 7.0%
- Don’t remember: 4.3%

Percentage distribution of bribes paid by timing of payment in relation to service delivery

- Before the service: 25.4%
- At the same time: 45.4%
- Partly before/ partly after: 19.8%
- After the service: 5.2%
- Don’t remember: 4.3%
### Albania

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#### Percentage distribution of bribes paid by type of payment

- **Cash**: 99.4%
- **Valuables**: 0.5%
- **Other goods**: 0.1%
- **Exchange of services**: 0.1%
- **Food & drink**: 0.0%
- **Other**: 0.0%
- **Don't remember**: 0.0%

#### Percentage distribution of bribes paid, by purpose of payment

- **Receive better treatment**: 69.7%
- **Speed up procedure**: 8.9%
- **Avoid payment of fine**: 8.6%
- **Finalization of procedure**: 5.6%
- **No specific purpose**: 2.9%
- **Reduce cost of procedure**: 0.9%
- **Receive information**: 0.1%
- **Other**: 3.3%
- **Don't remember**: 0.0%

#### Percentage distribution of bribes paid by timing of payment in relation to service delivery

- **Before the service**: 41.8%
- **At the same time**: 42.3%
- **Partly before/ partly after**: 2.3%
- **After the service**: 13.6%

#### Percentage distribution of bribes paid by modality of bribe request/offer

- **Public official made implicit request**: 56.0%
- **Citizen made offer**: 29.5%
- **Public official made explicit request**: 10.4%
- **Third party made explicit request**: 4.1%
- **Don't remember**: 0.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina

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**Percentage distribution of bribes paid, by purpose of payment**

- Avoid payment of fine: 25.0%
- Speed up procedure: 24.9%
- Receive better treatment: 18.9%
- Finalization of procedure: 13.7%
- Reduce cost of procedure: 7.8%
- No specific purpose: 2.0%
- Receive information: 0.0%
- Other: 0.0%
- Don't remember: 7.7%

**Percentage distribution of bribes paid by modality of bribe requests**

- Citizen made offer: 37.2%
- Public official made explicit request: 32.5%
- Public official made implicit request: 18.9%
- Third party made explicit request: 6.9%
- Don't remember: 4.5%

**Percentage distribution of bribes paid by type of payment**

- Cash: 79.3%
- Food & drink: 14.5%
- Valuables: 7.7%
- Exchange of services: 2.1%
- Other goods: 2.0%
- Don't remember: 2.0%

**Percentage distribution of bribes paid by timing of payment in relation to service delivery**

- Before the service: 51.4%
- At the same time: 14.6%
- Partly before/ partly after: 3.4%
- After the service: 26.5%
- Don't remember: 4.1%
Croatia

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**Percentage distribution of bribes paid by type of payment**

- Cash: 43.9%
- Food & drink: 37.7%
- Valuables: 7.4%
- Other goods: 6.0%
- Exchange of services: 4.6%
- Don’t remember: 6.8%

**Percentage distribution of bribes paid, by purpose of payment**

- Speed up procedure: 35.1%
- Receive better treatment: 18.1%
- Avoid payment of fine: 16.9%
- Receive information: 13.0%
- Finalization of procedure: 8.8%
- Reduce cost of procedure: 4.4%
- No specific purpose: 1.1%
- Other: 2.5%
- Don’t remember: 0.0%

**Percentage distribution of bribes paid by timing of payment in relation to service delivery**

- Before the service: 58.5%
- At the same time: 26.5%
- Partly before/ partly after: 7.7%
- After the service: 4.2%
- Don’t remember: 3.1%

**Percentage distribution of bribes paid by modality of bribe requests**

- Citizen made offer: 23.9%
- Public official made explicit request: 43.8%
- Public official made implicit request: 9.5%
- Third party made explicit request: 2.5%
- Don’t remember: 1.1%
Kosovo

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**Percentage distribution of bribes paid, by purpose of payment**

- Speed up procedure: 37.1%
- Finalization of procedure: 13.9%
- Receive better treatment: 7.6%
- Avoid payment of fine: 6.7%
- Reduce cost of procedure: 6.2%
- No specific purpose: 0.7%
- Receive information: 0.0%
- Other: 0.0%
- Don’t remember: 27.8%

**Percentage distribution of bribes paid by type of payment**

- Cash: 65.9%
- Food & drink: 28.4%
- Valuables: 7.2%
- Other goods: 1.0%
- Exchange of services: 0.3%
- Don’t remember: 0.0%

**Percentage distribution of bribes paid by modality of bribe requests**

- Citizen made offer: 24.7%
- Public official made explicit request: 16.9%
- Public official made implicit request: 20.2%
- Third party made explicit request: 11.8%
- Don’t remember: 26.3%

**Percentage distribution of bribes paid by timing of payment in relation to service delivery**

- Before the service: 47.1%
- At the same time: 15.1%
- Partly before/ partly after: 11.5%
- After the service: 1.6%
- Don’t remember: 1.6%
## Montenegro

### Indicators

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### Percentage distribution of bribes paid by type of payment

- **Cash**: 69.9%
- **Food & drink**: 16.9%
- **Valuables**: 12.5%
- **Exchange of services**: 1.4%
- **Other goods**: 0.5%
- **Don't remember**: 4.2%

### Percentage distribution of bribes paid, by purpose of payment

- **Speed up procedure**: 31.9%
- **Receive better treatment**: 17.9%
- **Finalization of procedure**: 17.8%
- **Avoid payment of fine**: 17.0%
- **No specific purpose**: 8.7%
- **Reduce cost of procedure**: 2.7%
- **Receive information**: 2.4%
- **Other**: 0.0%
- **Don't remember**: 1.6%

### Percentage distribution of bribes paid by timing of payment in relation to service delivery

- **Before the service**: 50.5%
- **At the same time**: 21.1%
- **Partly before/ partly after**: 11.0%
- **After the service**: 6.5%
- **Don't remember**: 11.0%

### Percentage distribution of bribes paid by modality of bribe requests

- **Citizen made offer**: 41.0%
- **Public official made implicit request**: 23.2%
- **Public official made explicit request**: 13.8%
- **Third party made explicit request**: 12.3%
- **Don't remember**: 9.8%
Serbia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population having contact with public administration</td>
<td>87.7%</td>
<td>87.6%</td>
<td>87.9%</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
<td>88.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of bribery</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of bribes</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average amount paid (EUR)</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average amount paid (EUR-PPP)</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Percentage distribution of bribes paid, by purpose of payment**

- Speed up procedure: 33.8%
- Finalization of procedure: 18.2%
- Receive better treatment: 18.1%
- Avoid payment of fine: 15.1%
- Receive information: 7.7%
- Reduce cost of procedure: 3.4%
- No specific purpose: 1.2%
- Other: 2.5%
- Don’t remember: 0.0%

**Percentage distribution of bribes paid by type of payment**

- Cash: 52.2%
- Food & drink: 33.6%
- Other goods: 6.6%
- Exchange of services: 5.2%
- Valuables: 3.5%
- Don’t remember: 2.0%

**Percentage distribution of bribes paid by modality of bribe requests**

- Citizen made offer: 56.1%
- Public official made implicit request: 19.7%
- Public official made explicit request: 13.5%
- Third party made explicit request: 8.4%
- Don’t remember: 2.4%

**Percentage distribution of bribes paid by timing of payment in relation to service delivery**

- Before the service: 42.6%
- At the same time: 28.7%
- Partly before/partly after: 18.0%
- After the service: 6.5%
- Don’t remember: 4.3%
### The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population having contact with public administration</td>
<td>74.7%</td>
<td>76.1%</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
<td>76.1%</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of bribery</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of bribes</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average amount paid (EUR)</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average amount paid (EUR-PPP)</td>
<td>1,212</td>
<td>1,597</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>1,027</td>
<td>1,545</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Percentage distribution of bribes paid by type of payment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Payment</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>45.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food &amp; drink</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other goods</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange of services</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valuables</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't remember</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Percentage distribution of bribes paid, by purpose of payment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose of Payment</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speed up procedure</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No specific purpose</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalization of procedure</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive better treatment</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid payment of fine</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce cost of procedure</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive information</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't remember</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Percentage distribution of bribes paid by timing of payment in relation to service delivery

- Before the service: 23.9%
- At the same time: 43.2%
- Partly before/ partly after: 7.4%
- After the service: 21.4%

#### Percentage distribution of bribes paid by modality of bribe requests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Request Modality</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizen made offer</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public official made explicit request</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public official made implicit request</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third party made explicit request</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't remember</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Data presented in this report were collected in seven independently administered surveys, which were conducted autonomously by national partners in accordance with jointly developed survey tools and common methodological standards.

A core questionnaire was jointly developed and, after testing in a pilot survey, was adopted by each national partner, with some minor adaptations to national contexts and needs. All surveys used face-to-face interviews for data collection. Along with the questionnaire, a complete set of common tools was specifically developed for this survey, such as guidelines for interviewers, codebook and other operational tools for the fieldwork.

In all countries, stratified multi-stage sampling methodologies were employed to select households, usually by simple random selection, but also in some instances using probability proportional to size sampling. Appropriate sample size allocation was considered in the designs (i.e. being proportional to the number of households). Over-sampling was incorporated into the selection of households to deal with possible cases of non-response.

The use of probability sampling methods allowed for the calculation of sample weights (as the inverse of the probability of selection) as might be necessary, depending on the sampling design. If required, corrections to the weights were made subsequently in order to account for non-response. When appropriate, post-stratification adjustments were made to adjust for age and/or sex imbalance between the sample and target population.

A wide variety of quality-control measures were put in place both during and after the conduct of the interviews to deal with problems in the field as they might arise and to help ensure the validity of the final dataset.

A summary of the characteristics for each of the national surveys is given overleaf.
### Albania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Responsible agency</strong></th>
<th>Institute of Statistics of Albania (INSTAT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Survey period</strong></td>
<td>September – October 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target population</strong></td>
<td>Resident population of Albania, age group 18-64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sample design**
- Stratified two-stage cluster
- Stratified by 16 geographical areas
- Enumeration areas within each stratum selected using probability proportional to size sampling (with number of households as auxiliary variable)
- Households selected randomly with replacement and with over-sampling for possible non-response

**Respondent selection**
- Person (aged 18-64) with next birthday within selected household

**Quality control measures**
- Fieldwork coordinators’ check of each questionnaire
- Fieldwork coordinators back-checking by phone (sample of interviews)
- Automatic data capture using optical scanner (with controls in place)
- Logic checks conducted on final dataset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Net sample size</strong></th>
<th>3,561</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Response rate</strong></td>
<td>72.7 per cent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Bosnia and Herzegovina

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Responsible agency</strong></th>
<th>Prism Research, Sarajevo Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Survey period</strong></td>
<td>August – October 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target population</strong></td>
<td>Resident population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, age group 18-64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sample design**
- Stratified two-stage random
- Stratified by regions, size of municipalities and type of settlement (urban/rural)
- Municipalities and settlements selected using simple random sampling
- Households selected by random walk during fieldwork

**Respondent selection**
- Person (aged 18-64) with next birthday within selected household

**Quality control measures**
- Fieldwork coordinators’ check of each questionnaire
- Fieldwork coordinators back-checking by phone (sample of interviews)
- Logic checks conducted on final dataset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Net sample size</strong></th>
<th>5,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Response rate</strong></td>
<td>73.3 per cent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Croatia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsible agency</th>
<th>Institute of Economics, Zagreb (EIZ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Survey period</td>
<td>July – August 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target population</td>
<td>Resident population of Croatia, age group 18-64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample design</td>
<td>Stratified two-stage random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stratified by 6 regions (based on geographical and historical considerations) and 4 types of settlement (categorized by size of population according to local administrative system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Households selected by random walk during fieldwork for towns and villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent selection</td>
<td>Person (aged 18-64) with next birthday within selected household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality control measures</td>
<td>Fieldwork coordinators’ check of each questionnaire (forms failing quality control measures replaced with additional interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fieldwork coordinators back-checking by phone (30% of interviews) plus face-to-face (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manual data entry with re-checking of data entered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logic checks conducted on final dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net sample size</td>
<td>3,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response rate</td>
<td>50.2 per cent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Kosovo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsible agency</th>
<th>Prism Research, Pristina Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Survey period</td>
<td>November – December 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target population</td>
<td>Resident population of Kosovo, age group 18-64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample design</td>
<td>Stratified two-stage random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stratified by geographical regions, size of municipalities and type of settlement (urban/rural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Municipalities and settlements selected using simple random sampling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Households selected by random walk during fieldwork</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent selection</td>
<td>Person (aged 18-64) with next birthday within selected household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality control measures</td>
<td>Fieldwork coordinators’ check of each questionnaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Back-check control by phone (sample of interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logic checks conducted on final dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net sample size</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response rate</td>
<td>68.1 per cent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Montenegro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsible agency</th>
<th>Prism Research, Podgorica Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Survey period</td>
<td>September – October 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target population</td>
<td>Resident population of Montenegro, age group 18-64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample design</td>
<td>Stratified two-stage random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stratified by major geographical regions, municipality and type of settlement (villages/municipal centres and urban areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Households selected by random walk during fieldwork</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent selection</td>
<td>Person (aged 18-64) with next birthday within selected household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality control measures</td>
<td>Fieldwork coordinators’ check of each questionnaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fieldwork coordinators back-checking by phone (sample of interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logic checks conducted on final dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net sample size</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response rate</td>
<td>72 per cent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Serbia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsible agency</th>
<th>Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (SORS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Survey period</td>
<td>June – July 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target population</td>
<td>Resident population of Serbia, aged 18-64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample design</td>
<td>Stratified two-stage with probability proportional to size sampling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stratified by territory (25 districts) and settlement type (urban/rural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enumeration areas within each stratum selected using probability proportional to size sampling (with number of households as auxiliary variable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Households selected using simple random sampling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over-sampling for possible non-response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent selection</td>
<td>Person (aged 18-64) with next birthday within selected household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality control measures</td>
<td>Fieldwork coordinators’ check of each questionnaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fieldwork coordinators back-checking by phone or face-to-face (10% of interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logic checks conducted on final dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net sample size</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response rate</td>
<td>70.1 per cent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsible agency</th>
<th>State Statistical Office (SSO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Survey period</td>
<td>August – September 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target population</td>
<td>Resident population of the fYR of Macedonia, age group 18-64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Sample design
- Stratified two-stage random
- Stratified by 8 regions and degree of urbanization (urban/other)
- Enumeration districts and households selected using simple random sampling
- Over-sampling for possible non-response

#### Respondent selection
- Person (aged 18-64) with next birthday within selected household

#### Quality control measures dataset
- Fieldwork coordinators’ check of each questionnaire
- 10 per cent of interviews conducted under direct supervision of fieldwork coordinators
- Fieldwork coordinators back-checking by phone (20% of interviews) and face-to-face (1%)
- Manual data entry with double entry control
- Logic checks conducted on final

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net sample size</th>
<th>3,500</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response rate</td>
<td>74.3 per cent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>