1. Please provide a brief description of the Sokoto Caliphate, including whether the head of the Caliphate is the Imam or Mufti of all Muslims in Nigeria.

The Sokoto Caliphate was a theocratic state established in 1804 in what is now Northern Nigeria; however, at its apogee it also included territory in what are now the nation-states of Benin, Guinea and Niger. The Sokoto Caliphate was created following a jihad (holy war) declared by the Fulani, Usman dan Fodio, against the Hausa city states and various other ethnic groups in what is now the ‘middle belt’ of Nigeria.¹ The International Crisis Group (ICG) states that this middle belt provided the caliphate with a “vast reservoir of slaves for the Sokoto Caliphate.”²

In the nineteenth century, the Sokoto Caliphate was one of the largest states in Africa, albeit configured as a federation of many emirates. The Caliphate’s head of state and religious leader was the Sultan of Sokoto, while the actual administration of the state was devolved to the emirs, each of whom developed bureaucracies to run their individual emirates. Each emir derived his legitimacy by doubling as the emirate’s religious chief.³

In 1900 the British forged an alliance with the Sokoto Caliphate, effectively annexing the state into its empire, while allowing the Sultan and the emirs to continue much as they had always done. The ICG reports that in return for their loyalty, the British guaranteed the Emirs that restrictions would be maintained on Christian missionary activity and western education in the north, “effectively freezing any real political transformation.”⁴ IRIN News states that the alliance also allowed the caliphate to extend its authority over “other ethnic nationalities in northern Nigeria which had successfully resisted Sokoto hegemony prior

¹ ‘NIGERIA: A History of Conflicts’ 2010, IRIN News, 10 January
to colonial conquest.”  

However, the British did abolish slavery in the caliphate; which according to one source constituted somewhere between 25 and 50 percent of the population.

In 1914, the British merged its Sokoto Caliphate colony with its protectorate to the south, thus creating ‘Nigeria’. Given the British ban on Christian missionary activity in the Caliphate, western educated ‘southern’ Nigerians would come to dominate the ranks of the colonial administration, creating an indigenous southern middle class. The system of emirates in the north meant that the Hausa-Fulani elite would maintain its grip on power, stymieing the growth of a local middle class. This religious and socio-economic divide between the north and the south heavily informs the post-colonial experience of Nigeria.

In the first decades of independence, the role of the emirs (and subsequently the Sultan of Sokoto) would change. According to Blench et al, the northern emirs no longer enjoyed absolute authority and “had to work with another constituted authority known as the council”. Nevertheless, for the time being the emirate bureaucracies “retained control of most local government affairs.” However, between 1967 and 1968, the judiciary, prisons and Native Authority police were removed from their control and in 1976 local government laws changed the status of all traditional rulers in Nigeria (including the emirs) “from administrators of local government to advisers.”

Today, the majority of the emirs have retained their titles; however, most of the emirates are no longer delineated political spaces and the emirs have no constitutionally codified role. There are exceptions; Global Security.org states that in Sokoto, Katsina, and Kano, the emirates “retain much of their old authority.” However, it adds that “[o]thers, such as Zazzau, have recently lost control over areas they formerly claimed, and their authority may be waning.”  

Nevertheless, most emirs are said to retain a high degree of regional loyalty, particularly given their religious authority, and subsequently some are said to be heavily involved in regional politics.

Like the emirs, the Sokoto Sultanate has no constitutionally defined administrative or supervisory role over any emirate or chiefdom. The Sultan of Sokoto remains the head of “traditional institutions in Sokoto state” and he is considered to be the leader of Nigerian Muslims, bearing the title ‘Sarkin Musulmi’, or Commander of the Faithful. He is also

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5 ‘NIGERIA: A History of Conflicts’ 2010, IRIN News, 10 January  


7 ‘NIGERIA: A History of Conflicts’ 2010, IRIN News, 10 January  


9 ‘Nigeria Christian / Muslim Conflict’ 2005, Global Security.org, 27 April  

President of Jama’atul Nasrul Islam (JNI), the official body that “oversees Islam in Nigeria in partnership with Supreme Council on Islamic Affairs”. One of the Sultan’s many traditional roles in the Nigerian umma (community) is that he “announces the sighting of the moon to mark the month of Ramadan and the beginning and end of the annual fast.”

According to the website of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Washington DC, Sokoto remains the centre of “Islamic activities” in Nigeria and the Sultan of Sokoto remains “the spiritual leader of Muslims in the country.”

The current Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammad Sa’ad Abubakar, is also President of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs and, together with the Catholic Archbishop of Abuja, is the co-chair of the Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC). According to the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, one of the roles of NIREC and the co-chairs is to “reduce inter-religious tension and promote inter-religious cooperation.”

Another role of NIREC is to advise the Nigerian President on religious matters. As the official head of the Islamic community in Nigeria, the Sultan is often called upon to exercise his authority and wisdom to calm tensions during religious crises, be they Sunni-Shi’ite clashes (as witnessed in Sokoto in 2005), or Muslim-Christian. However, some Christians do not see the Sultan as an honest broker; Christians in Plateau state during the violence of 2003-2004 reportedly described the Sultan as ‘meddling’.

Many Nigerian Christians see the Sultan as the spiritual leader of the Hausa-Fulani, and therefore symbolic of Hausa-Fulani hegemony rather than a national statesman.

There is perhaps some justification for this perception. In March 2000 the Sultan of Sokoto chaired a meeting of “traditional rulers, former heads of state and eminent leaders of the North to fuse together the various Northern organisations and interest groups.” According to Kehinde Olayode of Obafemi Awolowo University, from the meeting emerged the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), “a regional political pressure group that emerged as countervailing force to the resurgence of ethnoregional groupings in the South. It was a realignment of forces to revive the idea of [a] ‘monolithic North’.”

Olayode states that at the meeting, the Sultan of Sokoto “implored all the previous organisations that had been championing Northern interests to dissolve and be subsumed into a new initiative”.

Christian and southern distrust of the Sultan may also stem from the fact that in 1993 the then Sultan of Sokoto, Ibrahim Dasuki, controversially supported the annulment of

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15 Olayode, K. 2010, ‘Self-Determination, Ethno-Nationalism and Conflicts in Nigeria’, Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique, 18 February, p.15
national elections in which a ‘southern’ Yoruban was believed to have won. Indeed, the appointment of Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki in the first place heavily undermined the legitimacy of the Sultanate. Dasuki was appointed by General Ibrahim Babangida, “his friend and business partner”. 

The Sokoto Caliphate is a caliphate in name only. Today, the Sultan of Sokoto is the spiritual leader of Muslims in Nigeria, President of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, and co-chair of the Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC), the chief advisory body on religious affairs to the Nigerian government.

2. Is there any information available that indicates that the Caliphate or its agents target particular (Christian) individuals wherever they are in Nigeria because their names have been given to the Caliphate by local Muslims through an established or an informal communications network that operates throughout Nigeria? Is there any information available that indicates that they, or police and/or military officers acting on their behalf, locate Christians hiding in southern Nigeria who fled violence in Jos?

As indicated in the response to question 1, the Sokoto Caliphate ceased to be a state at the beginning of the twentieth century, and its emirates ceased to have any real administrative role following changes introduced in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, the Sultan of Sokoto is the spiritual leader of Muslims in Nigeria, President of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, and co-chair of the Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC), the chief advisory body on religious affairs to the Nigerian government. In no way can it any longer be associated with a quasi-state structure. Contrary to the views of some fanatical Christians, the Sokoto Caliphate is not in any way associated with jihad or provoking sectarian or communal violence. Indeed, the Sultan of Sokoto is often the first Muslim leader called upon to help ease inter-religious tensions.

There are some Christians who believe that the Nigerian army conspired with Hausa-Fulani herdsmen in the planning and execution of several attacks on the largely Christian Berom villages near the city of Jos, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of people as part of a local jihad. A Nigerian representative of Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) aired his suspicions to The Cypress Times: “[t]he military, for [a] start, somehow managed to miss convoys of Muslims with axes and machetes travelling in the night during curfew hours. So that raised suspicions at the beginning. … Generally in Nigeria, when you drive around, there are check points. Especially in Jos…The things we are now hearing is that some of the attackers were dressed in a new military uniform that was issued specifically so that you could distinguish fake soldiers from real soldiers. And this uniform should really not be available generally. Or so everybody was informed. Yet, according to the

survivors of last night’s attack, some of those attackers were wearing that very uniform.”

However, reports indicate that thousands of Christians fleeing the violence sought and received refuge at the army’s Rukuba Military barracks in Jos. Many others sought refuge at the police station.

There is no evidence that people who have fled violence in Jos are now being sought and located by extremists, with the assistance of members of the army and/or police force. There is a large corpus of sources that state that despite appearances that the conflict in Jos is sectarian (Christian/Muslim), it is actually caused by economic and political factors. A May 2010 paper by the United States Institute of Peace states that the conflict in Jos “reflects a long history and a complexity of issues – at the core of which is a constitutional question about which ethnic groups are defined as ‘indigenes’ of Jos and which are ‘settlers.’ These repeated cycles of “religious violence” occur in Jos because on a local level the constitutional question as to whether Jos’s Muslim migrant settlers should have equal rights as the indigenous Christians remains unanswered.”

The violence of November 2008 was sparked by the victory of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in all 17 Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Plateau state, in elections deemed tainted by widespread fraud. The PDP won resounding majorities in regions with large Hausa-Fulani populations, who largely support the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANP). The Hausa-Fulani appear to support to the ANP in the belief that once in power they will overturn the discriminatory indigene policy. The subsequent tainted victory of the PDP caused considerable anger.

In 2005 Nigeria’s Inspector General of Police (IGP) told a British-Danish joint mission that even people who have fled the jurisdiction of northern Shari’a courts will not be arrested by the Nigerian Police Force and returned to such courts. Nigerian Police have, however, arrested “at least 500 persons” on suspicion of participating in the killings in Jos in November 2008. According to the US Department of State, a year later many of these people arrested remained in custody, awaiting trial. These two facts strongly suggest that police do not support the Islamification of the legal system, nor have they turned a blind eye to the perpetrators of the violence in Jos.

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21 "Six pastors killed, 40 churches razed in Jos violence’ 2008, Compass Direct, 11 December

22 Herskovits, J. 2010.'Nigeria: Critical Time for Nigeria’s Future’, All Africa Global Media, 14 March

23 Swartz, S. 2010, ‘Is Nigeria a Hotbed of Islamic Extremism?’ United States Institute of Peace, Brief 27, 4 May, p.4


3. Who are the Aljimiris? Are references to the Caliphate Sokoto and the Aljimiris used interchangeably?

No information has been located on a group known as the Aljimiris. Aljimiri may be a local pronunciation of Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa, a fundamentalist Islamic group which staged a number of attacks on police stations in Nigeria in 2004, reportedly declaring that they intended to “kill all ‘unbelievers in uniform’” and calling “on all Muslims in the country to rise up for Jihad to defend Islam and establish justice.”

Aljimiri may also be a local pronunciation or mispronunciation of Ansar al-Mujahideen, the Salafist Jihadists who recently expressed support for Boko Haram, the most radical of northern Nigeria’s Islamic militant groups. Boko Haram and Kala Kato are the two most violent Islamic militant groups in Nigeria, whose stated intention is to create a northern caliphate. However, there are no reports of any association of Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa, Ansar al-Mujahideen or Boko Haram with the Sokoto Caliphate or the violence in Jos or elsewhere in Plateau state.

4. Is there any information available that indicates that the Aljimiris or their agents target particular (Christian) individuals wherever they are in Nigeria because their names have been given to them by local Muslims through an established or an informal communications network that operates throughout Nigeria? Is there any information available that indicates that the Aljimiris, or police acting on their behalf, locate Christians hiding in southern Nigeria who fled violence in Jos?

No information concerning a group called the Aljimiris has been located. No organisation or group with a similar sounding name has been associated with the violence in Jos. No information has been located stating or suggesting that persons who escaped the various violent clashes between local Christian ethnic groups and Muslim Hausa-Fulani herdsmen in Jos are being sought by Islamic militant groups or sympathetic police. As mentioned in the response to question 2, the police have arrested at least 500 people, many of whom are Muslims, on suspicion of participating in massacres in and around Jos in November 2008. There are no reports that any of those arrested have been handed over to Muslim extremists.

5. Is there any information available about any other national, Muslim (terrorist) organisation or network that collects the names of individuals and targets them for persecution?

Islamic extremist groups in Nigeria such as Boko Haram, Kala Kato and Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa are small, regionally confined and have little popular support. In large part, this is due to the fact that Islam in Nigeria is largely devoid of Salafist or Deobandi influences.

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from the Arabian Peninsula and South Asia. Since its inception in 1804, the Sokoto Caliphate has sponsored what Stephanie Schwartz at the United States Institute of Peace describes as a “West African version of Islam, less dependent on outside influences in the Arab world”. Sufism, abhorrent to Salafists and Deobandis, is very popular, particularly Tijaniyya Sufism. There is a home-grown conservative Islamic movement, known as the Izala movement; however, they have not been linked with violence. Growing in popularity is also Shi’ism. Other sects include Qadriyya, Tariqa, Malikiya, Islamiya and Ahmadiyya. None of these groups have been associated with terrorism or ‘Talibanisation’.

The Da’awa is the preaching arm of the Hisbah, the enforcers of Shari’a law in 12 Nigerian states. Zamfara, Niger, Kaduna, and Kano state governments reportedly fund Hisbah to enforce various prohibitions, including those on alcohol and prostitution. However, the US Department of State reports that in many parts of the country Hisbah primarily serve “as traffic wardens and marketplace regulators.”

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) states that Kalo Kato is mostly confined to Bauchi State. In December 2009, Kalo Kato “engaged in intra-sec violence in which at least 38 people, … were killed”; however, the USCIRF states that most people killed were “co-religionists” and the “apparent cause of the violence was rivalry and suspicion between the leader of the Kalo Kato group and his followers.”

The most extremist Islamic group in Nigeria is Boko Haram, which approximately translates as Western Education is Sinful. Boko Haram is responsible for destroying over 20 churches; however, in 2009 police captured hundreds of Boko Haram members, including the leader, Mohammed Yusuf (who was controversially killed while in custody). In September 2010 Boko Haram staged an attack on a prison in the town of its former headquarters Maiduguri, reportedly freeing “more than 700 prisoners”, approximately 100 of which were Boko Haram.

None of these groups have been associated with the violence in Jos, nor could they be described as networks, with the capacity to locate and eliminate Christians who have relocated. Rarely are their activities conducted outside of their home regions in the north. A rare exception occurred in June 2010 when members of Boko Haram reportedly harassed members of the Arewa United Group at a meeting in Lagos. Some of these alleged Boko Haram members were reported to be carrying machetes. According to


32 ‘Nigeria Christian / Muslim Conflict’ 2005, Global Security.org, 27 April


35 ‘Death toll climbs in attack by Islamic sect’ 2009, Compass Direct, 7 August

36 ‘Suspected Islamists kill two in Nigeria: police’ 2010, Google News, source: Agence France Presse, 21 September
Lagos’s PM News, the Boko Haram members fled following the arrival of the police’s Rapid Response Group.  

6. Deleted.

7. Is there any information that indicates that the kind of violence that erupted in Jos occurs in all states of Southern Nigeria during periods of political upheaval or uncertainty?

Since the restoration of democracy in 1999, communal and sectarian violence regularly appears to accompany politics, particularly in the Niger Delta and in the so-called middle belt. Events in the last decade include:

- In May 1999, in Kaduna State over 100 people were killed in violence following the succession of the local Emir.
- Between February and May 2000, over 1,000 people reportedly died in rioting in Kaduna following the introduction of Shar’ia law. “Hundreds” of ethnic Hausa were then reportedly killed in reprisal attacks in southeastern Nigeria.
- In September 2001, over 2,000 were people were killed in inter-religious rioting in Jos.
- In October 2001, hundreds were killed and thousands displaced in communal violence that spread across the middle-belt states of Benue, Taraba, and Nasarawa.
- Between 2002 and 2003, 72 villages in Plateau state were destroyed in battles between Christian Tarok farmers and Muslim Hausa cattle herders.
- In the two weeks surrounding the presidential elections in 2003, more than 100 people were killed.
- In April 2004, at least 20 people died in clashes between Tarok and Fulani militias in the Shendam district of central Plateau State.
- In May 2004, approximately 30 people were killed in Kano in reprisals for killings of Hausa-Fulani in Plateau state.

On 1 October 2010, members of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), a largely Christian Ijaw militant group, detonated two car bombs in the Nigerian capital Abuja, close to where the Ijaw Christian President, Goodluck Jonathan, was attending a parade. The car bombs claimed at least 12 lives. The Economist states that the attack in Abuja “is unlikely to be the last act of political violence in Nigeria before the poll”, referring to Presidential elections scheduled for 2011. “The country’s police say

[38] ‘Nigeria Christian / Muslim Conflict’ 2005, Global Security.org, 27 April
[40] ‘Nigeria Christian / Muslim Conflict’ 2005, Global Security.org, 27 April
they foiled a similar attack in September. Security at airports has been stepped up. The episode has made everyone involved in Nigeria’s steamy politics twitchy.\textsuperscript{41}

Siri Aas Rustad of the Center for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute in Oslo states that violence is a common feature of political competition in Nigeria and that such violence is “most often carried out by gangs, often called cults, of unemployed youth, and paid for by politicians, party leaders or other patrons, often called ‘Godfathers’. The gangs are ordered to attack political enemies, rig elections and secure their own patrons.”\textsuperscript{42}

Attachments

1. ‘NIGERIA: A History of Conflicts’ 2010, IRIN News, 10 January


5. ‘Nigeria Christian / Muslim Conflict’ 2005, Global Security.org, 27 April
   \url{http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/nigeria-1.htm} – Accessed 4 November 2010.


\textsuperscript{41} ‘A bloody election omen’ 2010, The Economist, 7 October
\url{http://www.economist.com/node/17209786?story_id=17209786&fsrc=rss} – Accessed 5 November 2010 – Attachment 23

\url{http://www.prio.no/sprtrans/-1415422889/Nigeria_full_report.pdf} – Accessed 5 November 2010 – Attachment 17


21. ‘Death toll climbs in attack by Islamic sect’ 2009, Compass Direct, 7 August


23. ‘A bloody election omen’ 2010, The Economist, 7 October