Questions
1. Please advise whether there are militant Islamist Groups active in Yogyakarta?
2. Are there reports of forced recruitment by such groups?
3. Are militant Islamist Groups active in Sumatra?
4. Are militant Islamist Groups active in Poso?
5. Are there reports of a 2007 attack on a building near Wonsobo?
6. Are there reports of Indonesians fighting in Afghanistan in recent years?

RESPONSE

1. Please advise whether there are militant Islamist Groups active in Yogyakarta?

In March 2007 the Indonesia Matters website reported on the comments of the head of Indonesia’s state intelligence service: “In speaking of the recent arrests of a number of Islamic militants in or near Yogyakarta, central Java, men who are believed connected with militant leader Abu Dujana, the head of the Badan Intelijen Nasional (BIN), Hendropriyono, said that the province of Central Java, including the special area of Yogyakarta, is the centre of terrorist organisations in the country” (Patung 2007, ‘Central Java’, Indonesia Matters website, 26 March http://www.indonesiamatters.com/1090/central-java/ – Accessed 30 May 2007 – Attachment 1).

Indonesian police have undertaken a number of actions in Yogyakarta against persons associated with Islamist groups suspected of involvement in militant acts. A major incident occurred in March 2007. The Kyodo news service reported of March 2007 raids in Yogyakarta that: “During the raids, the National Police’s counterterrorism unit Detachment 88 arrested six members of Jemaah Islamiyah…shot dead another JI member and discovered caches of weapons, ammunition, explosive materials, as well as 20 bombs”. Arrests also occurred in June of 2007 when two Jamaah Islamiyah members suspected of having an involvement with bombings conducted by the Noordin Top network were seized in

The International Crisis Group has referred to the Java areas of Solo-Yogyakarta as the “nerve center” of the Jamaah Islamiyah network in a May 2007 report on the network (see page 6 of International Crisis Group 2007, ‘Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Current Status’, Asia Briefing no.63, 3 May – Attachment 2). The map below shows the location of Yogyakarta and Surakarta (known locally as Solo) in Java:

In January 2004 an article in the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor noted that the Yogyakarta based Majilis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI) organisation is suspected of facilitating militancy through ties to international networks and to “Laskar Jundallah (which reputedly acts as the paramilitary arm of the MMI)”:

No less seriously, at least residual ties appear to remain between domestic Indonesian Muslim radicals and outside forces under the umbrella of the Majilis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI), an ostensibly peaceful civil society organization based in Yogyakarta. A sizeable component of LJ (now disbanded), for instance, is known to have been recruited from Central and South Asia while the group itself is alleged to have provided terrorist training facilities for JI militants near to the port city of Poso. Equally significant, the leader of Laskar Jundallah (which reputedly acts as the paramilitary arm of the MMI), Agus Dwirkana, has been identified as one of the main planners behind a series of bomb attacks that rocked Manila and Jakarta in December of 2002 (the so-called Christmas bombings), which regional intelligence sources insist were instituted with the explicit endorsement and support of Bin Laden’s terror network (Holt, A. 2004, ‘Indonesia and the Global War on Terrorism: Jakarta’s Mediocre Response to Terror’, The Jamestown Foundation website, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 2: Issue 2, 30 January http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=400&issue_id=2904&article_id=23507 – Accessed 14 September 2004 – Attachment 26; for historical background see the 2002 study by Dr Willem van der Geest: Kadir, S. 2002, Mapping Muslim Politics in Southeast Asia after September 11’, European Institute for Asian Studies website, December http://www.eias.org/publications/briefing/2002/muslimsea.pdf – Accessed 28 April 2008 – Attachment 27).

A BBC News background page on Islamist militancy in Indonesia notes that the nominally disbanded Laskar Jihad has based itself in Yogyakarta:

**Laskar Jihad**

The paramilitary group became known for fighting a “holy war” against Christians in the Moluccan islands and central Sulawesi.

From 2000, the group, which was based in Yogyakarta in southern Java, sent thousands of men to go to the troubled regions to lead Muslim villagers against their neighbours.

Soon after the Bali bombing, the group announced it was disbanding. But it has denied its decision was linked to the bomb.

Its commander, Jafar Umar Thalib, is on trial accused of inciting religious violence, so analysts say the decision to disband could be an attempt to avoid a prison sentence.

The group says its mission is to forge a spiritual form of jihad through preaching, not fighting. It runs a school and hospital near Ambon, in the Moluccas.

Mr Thalib fought with the Afghan Mujahideen against occupying Soviet forces. He denies any links with al-Qaeda but met Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan in 1987.

Analysts say Laskar Jihad has a domestic agenda and does not have convincing links with international networks.

…Some analysts believe Laskar Jihad was set up with the backing of elements in the Indonesian military (‘Indonesia’s Muslim militants’ 2003, BBC News, 8 August http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2333085.stm – Accessed 29 April 2008 – Attachment 28).

A 2005 study of Laskar Jihad (submitted as a doctoral dissertation at Universiteit Utrecht by a scholar named by Noorhaidi) provides extensive information on the Laskar Jihad group including the circumstances which surrounded its official disbandment in 2002 (see pages 225 to 227). It may be of interest that Wonosobo is also mentioned as an area hosting numerous former Laskar Jihad fighters. Noorhaidi states that in the course of researching the study: “Interviews were conducted where Laskar Jihad veterans are concentrated both in and outside Java, including Yogyakarta, Solo, Magelang, Wonosobo, Semarang, Cirebon, Makassar and Ambon”. The report notes as follows of Laskar Jihad’s presence across Indonesia and in Solo and Yogyakarta in particular:

Laskar Jihad claimed to have recruited approximately 10,000 fighters out of 40,000 Salafis associated with the Ihyaus Sunnah network. This figure represents almost two-thirds of all male adults in the network, since women and children are automatically excluded from the obligation to participate in jihad. They are scattered all over Indonesia, from Medan in North Sumatra to Makassar in South Sulawesi, with concentrations in Central Java, including Yogyakarta, Solo, Wonosobo, Temenggung, Semarang, Kebumen, Purwokerto and Cilacap. The majority are therefore ethnically Javanese. In these regions they construct enclaves, called ‘titik daurah’ (daura sites), which are usually centred on modest mosques or musallas, smaller places to pray (Noorhaidi 2005, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia, Universiteit Utrecht website http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/dissertations/2006-0705-200332/full.pdf – Accessed 28 April 2008 – Attachment 13)

In 2003 BBC News reported on the increasing presence of “extremists” in Yogyakarta and also of a resistance to the presence of such views.

Two hundred miles to the west of Cianjur, musicians performed part of the great Hindu epic, the Mahabharata, in the Royal Palace of Yogyakarta.

This city is the heart of traditional Javanese culture which blends Islam with older Hindu and animist faiths. But despite its long reputation for tolerance and moderation, Yogyakarta now has extremists of its own, campaigning from offices inside the city.

Following evening prayers, Irfan Awwas preached a hardline view of the world to his young and impressionable audience, as a chilling warning for the West.

“If America continues to commit atrocities against the Islamic community – at the moment they’re threatening Iraq and they’re pressurising the Indonesian government to arrest Muslims – then I am certain that a new generation will be born, blessed by God, and aware of
everything America has done which will carry out actions much bigger than what we saw in Bali.”

Frustrations

Today, few Indonesians see things the way that Irfan Awwas does. There is even a campaign now in Yogyakarta, led by the traditional Sultan, to drive the extremists out of their city. (‘The changing face of Indonesian Islam’ 2003, BBC News, 8 January [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2635711.stm – Accessed 28 April 2008 – Attachment 31).

A September 2004 ICG report on salafist groups in Indonesia makes extensive note of the various salafi groups in Yogyakarta. “The term salafism describes a movement that seeks to return to what its adherents see as the purest form of Islam, that practiced by the Prophet Mohammed and the two generations that followed him”. Militant groups like Jamaah Islamiyah are typically described as being salafist in terms of their approach to interpreting Islam. This said, and as the ICG note, while many militant Islamist groups may be salafist not all salafist groups are necessarily militant. Page 9 provides historical background on the rise of salafi schools and groups in Yogyakarta and a ‘Directory of Salafi Charitable Foundations And Pesantrens’ appears from page 36 to 47, many of the listed entities being based in Yogyakarta, this is followed by a list of salafi identities (the name Muchtar Rudin, or a variation, would not appear to be listed) (see: International Crisis Group 2004, Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix, Asia Report no.83, 13 September – Attachment 4).

2. Are there reports of forced recruitment by such groups?

In the short time available to research this response no information could be located that would indicate that militant Islamist groups, of the type discussed above, have been engaging in forcible recruitment in Yogyakarta. Reports addressing the recruitment activities of such movements typically relate that such groups engage in social and religious outreach programs and networking as a means of attracting new members to their cause. In the case of JI, family and kinship networks are also said to be of great importance. Associations formed through friendships, at the work place, via Islamic study groups, and in some cases in jail, are also said to play a key role in recruiting new members. A recent ICG report of February 2008 notes that JI has been hard hit by the arrest of many of its members and that the group’s “[b]ook production has increased as JI’s operational capacity has weakened, likely reflecting a decision of the leadership to devote more time to organisational rebuilding and recruitment”. The report makes no reference to forcible recruitment or of the use of threats as a means of engaging new members (see: Thompson, G. 2008, ‘Jemaah Islamiah reaches out amid Islamic publishing boom’, ABC News, 1 March [http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/03/01/2177117.htm – Accessed 28 April 2008 – Attachment 32; Ismail, N.H. 2006, ‘The Role of Kinship in Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiya’, Terrorism Monitor, vol.4, no.11, 2 June – Attachment 33; see page 14 of: International Crisis Group 2008, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing Industry, Asia Report no.147, 28 February – Attachment 5; and: ‘JI militants recruiting from Jakarta jails’ 2005, Straits Times, source: Reuters, 23 February – Attachment 34).
Page 162 to 165 of Noorhaidi’s 2005 study of Laskar Jihad provides an extensive discussion of the situation of fighters who joined Laskar Jihad. The study notes the large number of recruits that came from Solo and Yogyakarta and the surrounding area, and mentions the Wonsobo district by name in one example. As in the ICG’s study of Jamaah Islamiyah and Davis’s study of Laskar Jihad, Noorhaidi emphasises the importance of friendship and kinship networks.

For these people, joining Laskar Jihad appears to have been a sort of religious adventure. It normally began with an acquaintanceship with an orthodox version of Islam disseminated by a variety of Islamic da’wa groups operating under the banner of the Tarbiya movement. As noted in chapter II, these groups have developed since the beginning of the 1980s on university campuses and other target areas. People became acquainted with Islam in different ways. Some actively sought out religious activities organized by the groups as soon as they arrived in the cities. Others were passive seekers, whose interest was aroused only after they unwittingly became targets of Islamic mission activities. This process occurred primarily through pre-existing social networks and interpersonal bonds. The pattern has been, as Lorne L. Dawson (2003) suggests, ‘friends recruit friends, family members each other and neighbors recruit neighbors’. Closeness with an active member of an Islamic group, either familial or spatial, therefore, has often been a determining factor.

In the work cited earlier, Iannaccone underscores the significance of social ties in determining one’s engagement in a strict religious movement. He argues that people who lack extensive social ties to friends and family outside the sect are more likely to join (or remain active) and are still more likely to join if they have friends or family in the sect. On the contrary, those who have extensive social ties are less likely to join the sect. He emphasizes that a potential member’s social ties predict conversion far more accurately than his or her psychological profile (Noorhaidi 2005, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia, Universiteit Utrecht website [attachment link] – Accessed 28 April 2008 – Attachment 13).

Suspected and known information associated with Laskar Jihad recruitment is discussed on page 22 of Michael Davis’s 2002 study ‘Laskar Jihad and the political position of conservative Islam in Indonesia’. Whereas Noorhaidi and the ICG have emphasised the importance of kinship networks as a mechanism for recruitment, Davis finds that in some cases new members joined Laskar Jihad despite, rather than because of, the wishes of family members.

The composition of Laskar Jihad’s 3,000-10,000-strong membership has been a source of considerable speculation. Some observers have suggested that as many as 80 per cent of its members are, in fact, serving members of the TNI, while others have alleged the involvement of substantial numbers of foreigners in the group’s ranks. Laskar Jihad spokesmen state that their membership reflects a genuine cross-section of Indonesian society, although the organization’s website stresses that its members “mostly are university students in Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Sumatra”. The group’s spokesmen claim that recruits come from pesantren (Islamic schools) run by teachers sympathetic to Laskar Jihad, or have been inspired to join by conservative Muslim media publications. In tapping into such sources of support, Laskar Jihad is drawing on the efforts of organizations such as DDII and KISDI, both of which have long cultivated followings on university campuses and in pesantren for their campaigns against pluralism and Western political values, such as liberal democracy and human rights.

While examining Laskar Jihad’s membership reveals more about the kinds of support that conservative Islam in Indonesia can draw on, the usefulness of such analysis has to be set in
the context of the small numbers the group has succeeded in recruiting. Ultimately, the mobilization of 3,000-10,000 from a population of around 185 million Muslims does not amount to a mass movement or signify a sea-change in the character of Indonesian Islam. Even Laskar Jihad members drawn from supposed hotbeds of radical Islam, such as ITB (the Bandung Institute of Technology) admit that their peers and families were perplexed by their decision to join the jihad. While Laskar Jihad leaders have claimed that their ranks are expanding, there are grounds for questioning this assertion. Since closing their training camp in Bogor in April 2000, Laskar Jihad, has, by its own admission, not held any further large-scale training and recruiting programmes and state that training is now only conducted in Ambon itself. While both the group and its allies claim that new members are still being recruited, they are reluctant to give any precise figures. (for Davis’s 2002 report, see page 19 of: Davis, M. 2002, ‘Laskar Jihad and the political position of conservative Islam in Indonesia’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, April, vol.24, no.1, pp.12-32 – Attachment 35).

3. Are militant Islamist Groups active in Sumatra?

4. Are militant Islamist Groups active in Poso?

A February 2004 International Crisis Group report provides historical background on the involvement of the Islamic militant groups in the conflicts which have affected Poso in Central Sulawesi. The report lists a great number of the many Islamic militant groups who have been active in Poso over recent years. Particular attention is given to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and its off-shoot Mujahidin KOMPAK as well as Laskar Jihad (International Crisis Group 2004, Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, Asia Report no.743, February – Attachment 10).

The influence of such groups in Poso is said to have been rolled back considerably since 2004. In its most recent report on the situation, published in January 2008, the ICG commented that “Poso is quieter and safer, by all accounts, than it has been in years” (the January 2008 report is available at: International Crisis Group 2008, ‘Indonesia: Tackling Radicalism in Poso’, Asia Briefing no.75, 22 January http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/b75_indonesia_tackling_radicalism_in_poso.pdf – Accessed 28 April 2008 – Attachment 38).

5. Are there reports of a 2007 attack on a building near Wonsobo?

No reports could be located on an attack taking place near Wonsobo (or Wonosobo). Searches were conducted within Factiva news database and online.

It may be of interest that in mid 2006 Indonesian police conducted a raid in “Binangun village, Kretek Subdistrict, Wonosobo”, killing one person suspected of involvement in the militant Islamist network led by Noordin Top, and arresting others. According to the ICG one of those killed was a prominent “recruiter” in the network. In June 2007 it was reported that “Central Java Police Chief Inspector General Dody Sumtyawan” had said that “terror suspects were spread in many areas of Central Java, including in the districts of Banyumas, Karanganyar, Sukoharjo and Wonosobo. ‘They are hiding in areas where they think they will be safe,’ he added” (for a report on the raid see: ‘Live grenade said found at home of late Indonesian terror suspect’ 2007, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, source: Detikcom website, 8 August – Attachment 7; for the ICG’s comments see page 18 of: International Crisis Group 2007, Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge, Asia Report no.127, 24 January – Attachment 8; for the Police Chief’s comments, see: ‘Police now know names of many terror suspects in C Java’ 2007, LKBN ANTARA, 11 June – Attachment 9).

Also, as is noted in response to Question 1, Noorhaidi’s 2005 study of Laskar Jihad refers to Wonosobo as an area hosting numerous former Laskar Jihad fighters. Noorhaidi states that in the course of researching the study: “Interviews were conducted where Laskar Jihad veterans are concentrated both in and outside Java, including Yogyakarta, Solo, Magelang, Wonosobo, Semarang, Cirebon, Makassar and Ambon”. The report goes on to relate:

Wonosobo is another region in Central Java that has likewise contributed a significant number of combatants to Laskar Jihad. In contrast to the fighters from Solo, those from Wonosobo, which used to be a largely abangan region, are mostly peasants, or, more precisely, agricultural labourers who cultivate potatoes, cabbages, carrots and other vegetable crops on ex-plantation areas controlled by businessmen who live both inside and outside the town. Some villages have provided fertile ground for the Salafi da’wa movement. Adjacent to Wonosobo, Temenggung, a tobacco-producing region, also contributed several hundred
Call for Laskar Jihad. The majority are tobacco growers, or agricultural labourers working on tobacco-farming land. A similar contribution was made by Kebumen and Cilacap, two other regions located in the south of the same province. From these two regions, hundreds of rice-growing peasants, agricultural labourers and petty traders joined the Laskar Jihad mission (http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/dissertations/2006-0705-200332/full.pdf – Accessed 28 April 2008 – Attachment 13).

5. Are there reports of Indonesians fighting in Afghanistan in recent years?


An overview of the information available is presented below under the following subtitles:

**Calls for Indonesians to fight in Afghanistan in 2001**

At the time of the US-led 2001 military intervention into Afghanistan there were calls from certain Islamic groups in Indonesia to send fighters to Afghanistan. The Indonesian government stated that it would act to prevent the departure of any such persons. Even so, Laskar Jihad called for a force to be sent and “Indonesian Islamic Youth Association
(GPI)…said it will send 3,125 volunteers as jihad (holy war) fighters to Afghanistan despite the difficulties of getting permission from the government”. One government minister reportedly admitted there was little the government could do to prevent such persons travelling to Afghanistan: “Justice and Human Rights Minister Yusril Ihza Mahendra said…the government could do nothing to stop Indonesians wishing to go to Afghanistan as ‘jihad’ fighters except appeal to them to think more of domestic affairs” (‘Laskar Jihad considering response to US strikes on Afghanistan’ 2001, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, source: Satunet web site, 8 October – Attachment 15; ‘Indonesians banned from joining holy war in Afghanistan’ 2001, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, source: Detikcom website, 1 October – Attachment 16; ‘Indonesian Muslims register for holy war against US’ 2001, Asian Political News, 1 October – Attachment 17; ‘Indonesian Muslim Group to Send 3,100 Volunteers to Afghanistan’ 2001, Xinhua News Agency, 2 October – Attachment 18; ‘Govt can’t prevent people going to Afghanistan – Minister’ 2001, ANTARA, 2 October – Attachment 19; ‘Immigration warns would-be “jihad” warriors’ 2001, Jakarta Post, 2 October – Attachment 20).

No information was located which reported that any Indonesians had actually travelled to Afghanistan and successfully joined with Taliban forces to fight, although it was claimed by the Darul Islam movement at this time that the supply of Indonesian fighters to Afghanistan, and to the Taliban specifically, was constant and ongoing. It was also claimed that support was being received in Indonesia from international sources. Harold Crouch, then the regional head of the ICG, expressed doubts as to certain aspects of the claims.

…in recent weeks, one Indonesian radical organisation, Darul Islam, has made some startling statements.

Its spokesman, Al Chaidar, openly claims to have strong links with the Taleban in Afghanistan.

“Every year since 1989, there has been co-operation in military training, and we have sent between 100 to 200 people each year to Afghanistan, to be trained to be good soldiers for Islam.

He says that assistance from an international network of Muslim extremists – including al-Qaeda – flows into Indonesia.

This, he says, is primarily to help local Muslim fighters continue their Jihad or holy war against the Christian community in the Moluccan islands in eastern Indonesia.

But many observers in Indonesia are sceptical, including Harold Crouch, director of the International Crisis Group in Jakarta which has produced a report on local extremist groups.

“It is of course possible that money has gone into bank accounts here. The real test is whether there’s anything in the behaviour of radical groups in Indonesia that can’t be explained, and which requires us to say that there must be some kind of external force behind those people,” he says.

Ethnic and national identities of fighters in Afghanistan and northern Pakistan

An April 2008 article notes of the early years of the Taliban in the 1990s that “[a]t times the Taliban has also included many non-Afghan volunteers from the Arab world, Eurasia, and southeast Asia”. Nonetheless, the report makes no reference to the presence of any southeast Asian fighters with the Taliban ranks at the present moment. It is widely reported that Taliban are principally comprised of ethnic Pashtun from the districts southern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan. Some Uzbek and Tajik fighters are also said to be found in the current Taliban network, as well as some remnant Al Qaeda fighters. Remnant Al Qaeda forces are said to be particularly concentrated in the Pakistan border district of South Waziristan. A March 2007 report published South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG) has noted that “[s]ome Pakistani journalists, who had visited the South Waziristan area in March-April 2004, had estimated the total number of foreigners, who had been given shelter there by the local tribes, as about 600, about 200 of them Uzbeks and the remaining Chechens, Uighurs, Arabs and others”. Alternatively a Jamestown Foundation article commented of the 2004 South Waziristan fighting that there were also “widespread reports claiming that all the ‘non-Pakistanis’ now under detention are Afghan refugees and not, as had been claimed earlier, ‘Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens or (Uighur) Chinese’” (for the April 2008 report, see: ‘Taliban Resurgence’ 2008, The World website, 27 April http://www.theworld.org/?q=node/4024 – Accessed 29 April 2008 – Attachment 41; for the ethnic composition of Taliban forces, see: Korgun, V. 2003, ‘Afghanistan’s Resurgent Taliban’, The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, vol.1, no.4, 24 October – Attachment 42; and: Liebl, V. 2007, ‘Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam and Taliban: A Short View’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol.18, no.3, pp.492-510 – Attachment 14; for the SAAG report see: Raman, B. 2007, ‘Attacks On Uzbeks In South Waziristan – International Terrorism Monitor’, South Asia Analysis Group website, no.2180, 23 March http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers22%5Cpaper2180.html – Accessed 29 April 2008 – Attachment 43; see also: Raman, B. 2007, ‘Fallujah 2003-04 replaying in Pakistan’s Pashtun belt’, Rediff News, 15 October http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/oct/15raman.htm – Accessed 29 April 2008 – Attachment 44; for the contrary information in the Jamestown Foundation report, see: Khan, A. 2004, ‘Pakistan’s Hunt for Al-Qaeda in South Waziristan’, Terrorism Monitor, vol.2, no.8, 23 April http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/ter_002_008.pdf – Accessed 29 April 2008 – Attachment 45).

Jamaah Islamiyah in Karachi in 2004

It may be of interest that Indonesians affiliated with Jamaah Islamiyah have, in recent years, been discovered training in Pakistan with Lashkar-e-Toiba. As a Jamestown Foundation report relates: “On September 22, 2003, Pakistani authorities arrested 15 Malaysian and Indonesian students studying in various madrasas run by LeT in Karachi; the detained included Gun Gun Rusman Gunawan, brother of Jemaah Islamiyah’s operational commander and senior al-Qaeda leader, Hambali” (John, W. 2005, ‘Lashkar-e-Toiba: New Threats Posed by an Old Organization’, Terrorism Monitor, vol.3, no.4, 24 February – Attachment 46).

Previous Indonesian participation in the anti-Soviet conflict in Afghanistan

A number of Indonesians reportedly did travel to Afghanistan, via Pakistan, during the anti-Soviet conflict. According to the ICG much of this was organised by the Islamist Darul Islam movement from which the Jamaah Islamiyah movement broke away in 1992. A 2002 ICG report referred to the network which facilitated the transfer of members to Afghanistan as the Ngruki Network; the ICG wrote that the “network has as its hub a religious boarding school (pesantren or pondok) near Solo, Central Java, known as Pondok Ngruki, after the village where the school is located”. In a subsequent 2003 report the ICG reported that its research
had found that: “All senior members of [Jamaah Islamiyah’s] central command trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s, before JI formally existed…in the camps of the Saudi-financed Afghan mujahidin leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf”. The ICG estimates that “[m]ore than 200 members trained in Afghanistan from 1985 to 1995”. The ICG also notes that some limited contact occurred between Jamaah Islamiyah and the Taliban in the mid 1990s (see page 10). In 2001 it was reported that “Al Chaidar, an Islamic activist and leader of one of eight factions of the Darul Islam network, [had claimed that] the organisation is largely constituted by the approximately 15 000 Indonesians who returned from Afghanistan after fighting alongside the mujahadeen against the Soviet Union”. This number seems much larger than that discussed by other sources. A 2001 ICG report states: “According to one report, a military intelligence source estimated that 800 Indonesians had fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s. A spokesman for the Laskar Jihad estimated that the number was more than 400. …One prominent Muslim scholar, however, wonders how many actually went further than Peshawar in Pakistan” (for the 2002 ICG report see: International Crisis Group 2002, ‘Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the “Ngruki Network” In Indonesia’, 8 August

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