GREATER EXPECTATIONS: UN Peacekeeping & Civilian Protection
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The brutal reality of modern day conflict and the recognition of an international responsibility to protect civilians in times of crisis has made peacekeeping more important — and more controversial — than ever. As the nature of peacekeeping has evolved, the recent European Union and United Nations peacekeeping forces in Chad and the Central African Republic illustrate key lessons on how to meet this challenge of peacekeeping and civilian protection. The U.S. should support and promote new developments in peacekeeping operations in order to help create an effective method to protect civilians.

Peacekeepers today are routinely mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence. Yet, there is no clear doctrine to tell military peacekeepers how to make a protection mandate work. Furthermore “peace enforcement” — when one or more parties to the conflict do not consent to the deployment of peacekeepers — is frequently not appropriate for UN peacekeepers to undertake. This requires new tools such as the developing African Union Standby capability or the European Union rapid deployment capacity.

In 2007, the UN Security Council authorized an EU peacekeeping “bridging operation” to protect civilians and displaced people from ongoing insecurity in Chad and the Central African Republic that eventually transferred authority to the UN. Through patrols, successful interventions and one-on-one interaction with the local population, the European Union (EUFOR) peacekeepers built up a body of knowledge about the operating environment and a positive reputation. Their deployment established a strong foundation for the incoming UN peacekeepers, known as MINURCAT.

Nonetheless, the handover faced many challenges that could be avoided in future bridging operations. Three months after the handover, MINURCAT was only deployed to 47% of its full capacity. In order to maximize the benefits of future bridging forces, the UN follow-on force needs to be mandated much earlier to allow the UN adequate time to prepare the mission for a smooth transition. Including senior mission leadership
in the planning team at UN headquarters was a success for MINURCAT and should be continued in the future. Finally, when calling for troops and other contingents, the UN system must shift to a capabilities-driven approach to force generation, rather than focusing strictly on numbers of troops deployed.

One particularly unique element of the UN engagement in Chad is the support and training of a Chadian police force called the Département Intégré de Sécurité (DIS). DIS officers were drawn from the existing Chadian gendarmerie and police, and trained by the UN to address ongoing banditry and impunity and keep refugee camps safe. Overall, the DIS officers have performed well and have been positively received by the refugee and humanitarian communities. Although isolated incidents of violence by the DIS have reflected badly on the MINURCAT force, the UN should continue to build on and refine the DIS model for future operations.

There are clear steps the U.S. government can take to increase the overall effectiveness of global peacekeeping forces and to support the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations as it works to improve peacekeeping forces around the world. Some of these steps are relatively simple, such as continuing to pay U.S. peacekeeping dues in full and on time and working with the UN to provide standardized peacekeeping training. However, the U.S. should also be willing to deploy U.S. forces and ‘enabling’ assets such as engineering units, and strategic lift capabilities to help missions deploy quickly and completely.

The world is beginning to understand that we all have a responsibility to protect people from violence, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Learning from the experiences of EUFOR and MINURCAT will help future missions operate more effectively, and ensure that greater numbers of people are protected from harm.
GREATER EXPECTATIONS: UN Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection

INTRODUCTION

UN peacekeeping has become more important, and more controversial than ever. After the massive failures of international governments to protect civilians from systematic violence throughout the 1990’s, and with the brutal conditions created by modern day conflict, the international community has begun to recognize our responsibility to better protect civilians from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and other crimes against humanity.

In order to meet this responsibility, governments are increasingly looking to UN peacekeepers. Peacekeeping mandates have steadily become more complex and difficult to achieve, but the ability of the UN system and the political will of member states to adequately staff and equip those missions have not evolved with expectations.

Some progress is being made. The UN is making efforts to improve the quality of guidance and training that it delivers to peacekeepers, and to make deployments more efficient. International institutions such as the European Union and the African Union are developing new tools to complement UN peacekeeping, particularly where peace enforcement is necessary. The EU and UN peacekeeping operations in eastern Chad and Central African Republic have also established new and creative ways to resolve peacekeeping and protection challenges.

This report analyzes the evolution of peacekeeping and civilian protection norms and provides an in-depth look into the peacekeeping missions in Chad to draw lessons from their challenges and successes. In addition, this report looks at what the U.S. can do to support the efforts and innovations of the UN and other peacekeeping bodies. The U.S. has a key role to play to gain greater international acceptance in the belief that we have a responsibility to protect people in times of crisis. But it also can do more to support real action that protects people from harm.
THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING
AND THE PROTECTION IMPERATIVE

Background

UN peacekeeping is not what it used to be. The UN Security Council authorized early peacekeeping operations to fulfill the UN’s role under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the chapter dealing with “Pacific Settlement of Disputes.” These missions were deployed with the consent of both parties to the conflict in order to monitor and enforce existing peace agreements. For example, the Security Council first mandated the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFYCIP) in 1974 to supervise a ceasefire and monitor a buffer zone between the Cyprus National Guard and Turkish Cypriot forces. These peacekeepers represented a “thin blue line” between two groups who had agreed to their presence. The mandates were simple and the danger and political controversy surrounding the missions were very low.

Following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s UN peacekeepers began to be deployed in new and more challenging places, such as Somalia in 1992 and Liberia in 1993. The nature of conflict
was changing, and intra-state conflicts, often with multiple internal armed groups, usually meant that one or more of the armed actors did not consent to the involvement of peacekeepers. The potential for peacekeepers to become targets dramatically increased. Their neutrality was also increasingly compromised by calls from concerned governments and humanitarian actors for peacekeepers to engage in the protection of civilians, which often demands that peacekeepers take action that will put them at odds with armed groups involved in the conflict.

Over time it became clear that UN forces designed to fulfill traditional peacekeeping roles were woefully underequipped, and both politically and operationally unprepared to take on the more robust peacekeeping demanded by complex protection mandates. Increasingly, UN peacekeeping operations were being authorized under the more aggressive Chapter VII of the UN Charter which pertains to “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression.”

Expectations have steadily increased and UN peacekeeping operations have been entrusted with ever more complex and dangerous missions. Humanitarian and political actors have increased the pressure for more missions, more rapid deployment, and more difficult civilian protection tasks. In all, the total number of UN peacekeepers deployed has increased from roughly less than 20,000 at the beginning of 2000², to over 93,000 today³.

**Protection of Civilians**

The many traumatic experiences of the 1990s — the genocide in Rwanda, crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia, and the systematic use of rape as a weapon of war in what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo — resulted in the push for UN peacekeepers to take on a much more active role in the protection of civilians.

As U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice recently said, “We have just drawn down the curtain on the bloodiest century in human history. That is why the United States is determined to work...to ensure that the 21st century
takes a far lesser toll on civilians — on innocents who should be sheltered by the rule of law and the rules of war. I believe deeply that atrocities are not inevitable.”

Today mission mandates routinely include authorization for peacekeepers to take measures to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence. Some mandates even prioritize protection of civilians above all other objectives, such as the current mandate for the UN Mission in DR Congo (MONUC) and in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT). Yet in spite of the overarching international focus on civilian protection, there is no clear definition or doctrine to tell military peacekeepers what protection is or how to make a protection mandate work.

The protection of civilians is, first and foremost, the responsibility of states. In a conflict situation, however, protection roles and tasks are broadly dispersed among humanitarian and political actors, as well as domestic and international security forces. Everything from the safe positioning of refugee camps to the intervention of military peacekeepers to prevent an attack on a village is part of the broader effort to keep civilians safe in conflict affected areas.

**The Responsibility to Protect**

The Responsibility to Protect is a central part of the wider effort to keep civilians safe. After the genocide in Rwanda, and the failure of the international community to intervene to prevent an unfolding mass atrocity, individual diplomats and leaders of human rights and humanitarian organizations began to elaborate on the idea that there is a particular international duty to intervene in order to prevent, protect against, and rebuild communities in the wake of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity. In 2001 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) formally elaborated this concept, which they named “the responsibility to protect.”

The Commission raised important questions about sovereignty and the role of the state with regards to the protection of people
within its borders. In its 2001 report, the ICISS asserted that “state sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.” It further stated that “where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.”

All 192 UN member states endorsed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm in the 2005 World Summit outcome document, which asserted both the right and the responsibility of the international community to intervene, with or without the consent of the host government, in cases where genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and/or crimes against humanity can be reasonably expected or are being committed. This intervention is defined in terms of both peaceful and forceful forms:

The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.
The bulk of the debate has since focused on the international responsibility to intervene militarily to protect civilians as a measure of last resort.

The U.S. Government has embraced R2P in principle, but not always in practice. In the 2008 report published by the Genocide Prevention Taskforce (co-Chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and former Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen) the authors “acknowledge[d] that the United States’ record in responding to threats of genocide has been mixed. Over the span of time, our top officials have been unable to summon the political will to act in a sustained and consistent manner or take the timely steps needed to prevent genocide and mass atrocities from occurring.”

When genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes or crimes against humanity are being committed, it is important that world governments respond with quick, concerted diplomatic action, and, if necessary, that the UN Security Council give swift authorization for the deployment of a non-UN peace enforcement operation, with or without the consent of the host government. However, the authorization of non-consensual intervention continues to be politically controversial.

Specifically, the permanent members of the UN Security Council are extremely reticent to authorize the deployment of international forces without the consent of the host government, even when the host government is perpetrating violence against its own people. One recent example was the lengthy Security Council debates over the deployment of peacekeepers in Darfur, and the insistence by Security Council members that it was necessary to submit to the many compromises demanded by the Sudanese Government in order to secure its consent for the deployment. This made a farce of the international commitment to R2P given the fact that the Sudanese Government had been implicated in the very crimes that the Security Council was seeking to halt.
THE CHALLENGE OF UN PEACEKEEPING

Building a Peacekeeping Mission

Former Secretary General Kofi Annan famously called the UN “the only fire brigade in the world that has to acquire a fire engine after the fire has started.” Even when peacekeeping is the most appropriate protection tool, the UN must always overcome significant challenges to deploy and support each new mission.

UN peacekeeping missions are notoriously slow to deploy, and the quality of the forces and equipment is inconsistent. This is largely due to the fact that the UN has no independent military capacity and depends entirely on the voluntary troop contributions of member states to make up the mission requirements. It is also often the result of an inflexible, numbers-based approach to the accumulation of troop contributions, which has made it difficult for countries with advanced or non-traditional military structures to contribute troops to UN missions.

Even after appropriate contingents have been identified, each Troop Contributing Country (TCC) then has to negotiate its own agreement with the UN, which dictates what those forces will be used for within the mission. This often limits where particular contingents can be deployed in the field, and the level of danger that they can be exposed to.

Forces acquired in this piecemeal manner have very different training standards and combat capabilities, and the philosophies of their commanding officers often differ greatly. In military terms, the different capabilities, philosophies, training and contractual limitations make robust military action challenging. This is exacerbated by the fact that contingent commanders often defer to the instructions from their respective capitals rather than yielding entirely to the direction of the Force Commander, a fact which compromises the Force Commander’s authority, and would be unheard of in typical military operations.
A female member of the Nigerian battalion of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) stands in the rain.

© UN Photo/Christopher Herwig
In an effort to enhance the overall operational standards of peacekeeping operations the United States is currently involved in international peacekeeping training through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) programs. These programs provide millions of dollars each year to develop military peacekeeping capabilities in potential troop contributing countries around the world. The problem is that the trainers use U.S. training modules as opposed to using the standardized modules developed by the UN for this purpose.

A coherent, standardized training program for current and prospective TCCs is essential to overcome some of the discrepancies in capacity between contingents and ensure that all forces have a common understanding of their role.

Furthermore, countries with advanced militaries, such as the U.S., need to go beyond just training and funding peacekeeping operations. These countries need to show a commitment to UN peacekeeping by committing more personnel and advanced support, such as engineers, heavy transport, and medical units. The availability of these resources is crucial to the deployment of new missions, and the early commitment of enabling units helps peacekeeping operations get off the ground quickly. This would set the foundation for more effective operations.
Robust Peacekeeping vs. Peace Enforcement

UN peacekeeping is not an appropriate tool to use when non-consensual intervention is needed. For example, peacekeepers should not be deployed in circumstances where the host government is also the perpetrator of violence against its civilians and is unwilling to give its consent for the deployment of international peacekeeping forces. This is the distinction between “robust peacekeeping” and non-UN “peace enforcement.”

The UN’s 2008 “Capstone” document outlines the crucial distinction between the two:

Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict. By contrast, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless authorized by the Security Council.9

The 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy addresses such circumstances, stating that “where perpetrators of mass killing defy all attempts at peaceful intervention, armed intervention may be required, preferably by the forces of several nations working together under appropriate regional or international auspices.” For this sort of non-consensual intervention the U.S. needs to contribute to the development of new tools, such as the African Union Standby force, and the European Union Rapid Deployment capacity, and adapt old ones like NATO to make the R2P a practical reality.9

Achievable Peacekeeping Mandates: the Role of the UN Security Council

It is the UN Security Council that crafts the mandates and determines the character of each new UN peacekeeping deployment. Where peacekeeping is not appropriate, it is also the Security Council that can authorize the deployment of a non-UN peace enforcement mission.
For UN peacekeeping operations, it is critical that the Security Council recognize the limitations of the tool. In deliberations over the viability of a new UN peacekeeping operation the Security Council must consider:

- Whether a situation exists the continuation of which is likely to endanger or constitute a threat to international peace and security;
- Whether regional or sub-regional organizations and arrangements exist and are ready and able to assist in resolving the situation;
- Whether a cease-fire exists and whether the parties have committed themselves to a peace process intended to reach a political settlement;
- Whether a clear political goal exists and whether it can be reflected in the mandate;
- Whether a precise mandate for a United Nations operation can be formulated.10

If these questions can not be satisfactorily answered, and these conditions fulfilled, then the Security Council must consider whether or not a peace enforcement operation is the more appropriate way forward.

The US should use its leadership position on the Security Council to ensure that all new peacekeeping operations have clear, achievable mandates, and that they are well resourced to fulfill the tasks that the UN has set for them.

**Beyond Military Forces: UN Police and the Rule of Law**

In conflict situations civilians face a variety of threats, and many of them can not be easily addressed by military peacekeepers. With a mandate to protect civilians “under imminent threat of violence” peacekeepers can stop an attack that occurs in front of them, but can not arrest perpetrators or conduct investigations.

Those powers are the sole purview of the sovereign host state and its domestic security institutions, such as local police or gendarmerie. In most cases, however, violent conflict results
in the breakdown of the rule of law. Police, judicial, and corrections systems, if they ever existed at all, become unreliable or non-existent.

In very rare cases — such as in Timor Leste and Kosovo — the breakdown of the state apparatus is such that the UN assumes custodianship of the country, effectively becoming the state. This is called an “executive mandate,” and in these cases the UN has control of police and other security institutions within the country. But under ordinary peacekeeping mandates, as is the case with MINURCAT in eastern Chad and CAR, peacekeepers have little capacity to address the day-to-day insecurity caused by a lack of law and order.

Creative solutions — like the UN trained, Chadian controlled police force in eastern Chad (see pg. 18) — are being developed in order to address protection concerns generated by a lack of rule-of-law, without compromising state sovereignty. The U.S. should support these and other efforts to bolster local police and justice sector institutions in conflict-affected areas, through predictable, long-term funding.
LESSONS LEARNED IN CHAD AND CAR

The Call for Deployment: Protection without Politics

The ongoing peacekeeping efforts in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) are an excellent illustration of the state of UN peacekeeping today. Starting with a UN authorized EU bridging force (EUFOR) in January of 2008, and followed by an expanded UN peacekeeping operation (MINURCAT) in March 2009, peacekeepers in Chad have been given a strong protection role, but no authority to address the root causes of the conflicts in Chad and CAR.

In 2006 insecurity in eastern Chad was threatening the delivery of humanitarian assistance to 250,000 refugees from Darfur and displacing thousands of Chadians. The international community called on the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force to protect civilians and facilitate the delivery of aid.

From the outset the Government of Chad was resistant to the idea of deploying international peacekeeping forces in Chadian territory, but France, a strong ally of the Chadian government, backed the idea. In the end, Chad agreed to the deployment of a European Union peacekeeping force to provide area security for civilians and to protect the delivery of aid. This force would eventually hand over responsibility to a UN mission. Both missions had protection as their primary role under the condition of strict impartiality.
Under pressure from the humanitarian community to deploy a peacekeeping mission that would protect civilians, the UN Security Council made a major concession to the Government of Chad in order to secure its consent for the mission. It accepted a mandate for the force that does not give the mission leadership the right to initiate peace talks between the government and the rebels in the east, despite the fact that a peace process is completely non-existent. MINURCAT cannot intervene in any way in Chad’s internal security crisis. There is currently no peace to keep in Chad.

**The Bridging Force**

The EUFOR mission was seen by all parties as a test case for future EU peacekeeping engagement. The Security Council authorized the “bridging operation” on October 15, 2007 and it became operational five months later.

The force was composed of troops and equipment from a number of EU countries, though France provided the bulk of the military forces, as well as the necessary political pressure to deploy. France’s role illustrates the importance of having an engaged lead country, both politically and materially, in the deployment of a new peacekeeping operation.

EUFOR established bases in N’Djamena, the Chadian capital, and in strategic locations throughout eastern Chad, and in the northeast corner of the Central African Republic. Through patrols, successful interventions and one-to-one interaction with the local population, the peacekeepers also built up a body of knowledge about the operating environment, and a positive reputation among the Chadian people and the Darfurian refugees. All of this established a strong operational foundation for the incoming MINURCAT peacekeepers.

In addition to the immediate gains from the deployment of the EU peacekeepers, the effort gave the UN some additional time to consolidate their own forces. Due to the continued reticence of the Chadian government to allow UN military forces on its territory, however, the authorization for the UN force came many months after the EU mission became operational. By May of 2009, three months after the handover, MINURCAT
was only deployed to 47% of its full capacity. In order to maximize the benefits of future bridging force arrangements, the UN follow-on mission needs to be authorized as early as possible — and not less than six months before the transfer of authority — to allow sufficient mission preparation time.

**MINURCAT: Challenges Transferring to a UN Mission**

The transfer of authority from the EU to the UN forces in Chad and CAR was a challenge, but the handover was an overall success, and the lessons learned can be applied to future bridging operations.

*Planning and mission leadership*

The transfer of authority required the EU and UN to work closely together in the field and at force headquarters to capture institutional memory and to transition smoothly.

To that end the MINURCAT force Chief of Staff, a European Officer, was embedded at UN headquarters alongside the military planners. He had an opportunity to participate in the development of the MINURCAT concept of operations and other key deployment plans, giving leadership that helped shape the mission.

This also gave the Chief of Staff the opportunity to gain a better understanding of the way things work at UN headquarters, and therefore a better sense of how to resolve problems and work more constructively with headquarters once he was in Chad. This is particularly useful at the deployment stage of a mission, and by all accounts played a positive part in the relatively smooth transition between EU and UN authority.

In the future, more senior mission leadership, including the Force Commander if possible, should be included in the planning team at UN headquarters, in order to lend their views and experience to the development of core mission concepts and to develop the networks and relationships that are necessary to get things done within the sprawling UN bureaucracy.
Transfer of mission resources

One of the major benefits of the bridging force concept is the ability of the initial force to lay the logistical groundwork for the later UN mission. In this case the Chadian government believed that the bases being vacated by the European forces should be transferred to Chadian control. The UN had to negotiate after the fact to secure those bases for the MINURCAT deployment. This was due largely to the fact that the EU mission was authorized well before the Chadian government had agreed to the deployment of UN forces, and as such the transfer of bases was not negotiated up front. Wherever possible, the full range of transition issues, including the transfer of property and equipment, should be negotiated with the host government from the outset.

The transfer of human resources was also a critical factor. A number of European contingents “re-hatted” their troops, placing them under UN authority, which instantly gave MINURCAT forces experience and understanding of the mission environment, as well as established relationships with local people and the humanitarian community.

Military to civilian transfer

Some of the greatest frustrations involved in the transition between EUFOR and MINURCAT resulted from the shift from a fully military administrative and logistics system to the more bureaucratically heavy UN system. Some of these changes were purely logistical, such as adjustments in the nature of
procurements procedures and the efficiency of the logistics chain. Others were of a more critical nature, such as the discrepancies between European and UN standards for the availability of medical and casualty evacuation.

Over the course of a recent assessment mission in Chad, Refugees International found that these challenges and discrepancies were being resolved. In the future, however, the UN may find that their bridging partners have established higher operational standards that the UN mission will then need to adapt to, or risk losing the benefits of the re-hatted forces.

Finally, the shift from a wholly military mission to a multidimensional UN peacekeeping operation — complete with Human Rights Officers, Humanitarian Liaison Officers and civilian leadership — caused a great deal of strain on the relationship between MINURCAT and the international humanitarian, human rights and development staff that were already present in the country. EUFOR had established good civil-military information sharing systems with the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The division of labor and working relationships between the new civilian components of the mission were not well established or negotiated with their non-mission counterparts such as UNHCR, UNICEF, and the numerous NGOs involved in protection tasks. Coordination mechanisms were slow to develop.
**Wider systemic challenges**

At the level of UN headquarters, the office responsible for garnering troop contributions (the Force Generation Service) displayed an inflexibility that has implications for UN peacekeeping more broadly. The government of Norway offered to supply a self-sustaining medical unit to MINURCAT, but due to changes in the Norwegian approach to military configuration, the shape of the unit did not match up with the more traditional force configuration that the UN force generators were requesting. The inflexibility of the UN system very nearly prevented the deployment of a highly capable contingent.

As international advocates call for countries with advanced — and often non-traditional — military forces to contribute more troops to UN peacekeeping, it will be essential that the UN system adapt its force generation standards so that it can accept contingents with the particular capabilities needed to stand up new missions, rather than just numbers of troops.

**The DIS: Addressing Banditry and the Rule of Law Vacuum**

The Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS) is one of the unique elements of the UN engagement in eastern Chad. This Chadian police force was created to work alongside UN peacekeepers to enhance security for refugees and humanitarian personnel in eastern Chad. DIS officers have been vetted and given additional training by MINURCAT (in cooperation with other UN agencies, funds and programs) and is supported in the field by UN police mentors. However, this is still a Chadian force, under the command and control of Chadian authorities.

The DIS was created to address the ongoing banditry and impunity that plagues eastern Chad, and particularly the threats to civilians and humanitarian agencies that have been the target of frequent attacks and carjacking. These police were drawn from the ranks of the existing Chadian gendarmerie and police, and have been deployed to police refugee camps and the surrounding areas within a ten kilometer radius.

The DIS concept was developed in response to the frustration expressed by EUFOR forces that they were equipped to handle
civilian protection on the rare occasion of rebel incursions, but not able to resolve the basic law-and-order gap in the east. Peacekeeping patrols and the establishment of a wide, multinational presence throughout eastern Chad could reduce the likelihood of attack, but peacekeepers do not have the legal authority to arrest perpetrators or conduct investigations.

Similarly, the lack of credible policing and judicial capacities in eastern Chad meant that the government was similarly unequipped to fulfill this role. By creating a police force under the command and control of the Chadian state, but with UN training, equipment and mentoring support, the UN hoped to create a capable, accountable community police force that could work in conjunction with UN peacekeepers to keep refugee camps safe.

The application of this concept is still in its early stages. 850 DIS officers have been vetted and trained, and the bulk of the officers have been deployed to the refugee camps throughout eastern Chad. Since the DIS began to deploy, difficulties relating to discipline and chain of command, as well as disagreements over the division of labor between MINURCAT military and the DIS, have begun to present themselves.

In some locations a lack of discipline has resulted in some serious incidents of violence against refugees, UN police and Chadian civilians. These incidents have been isolated, however. Overall the DIS officers have performed well and have been positively received by the refugee and humanitarian communities. However, even isolated cases of violence and indiscipline have reflected badly on the MINURCAT force. The UN’s central role in the creation and support of the DIS has meant that the UN mission is held responsible for their actions, in spite of the fact that the mission doesn’t command the force.

In order to address some of these challenges, the UN will be offering two-month induction training sessions to all incoming DIS personnel and on-the-job training by UN police will continue to occur even after DIS officers are deployed. However, training can only resolve a small number of the concerns raised by the DIS deployment.
If a similar policing model is pursued in future, there are a few additional lessons that could be usefully applied.

First, the concept of operations for the DIS did not account for the perspectives of military peacekeepers or planners. As a result, the extent and nature of the interface between the military peacekeepers and the DIS officers were not clearly defined. This has led to confusion on the ground. Important questions pertaining to such issues as the extent that MINURCAT should work to protect DIS officers, or the division of labor between the DIS and MINURCAT military with regards to humanitarian escorts, have left serious protection gaps, and caused disruptions in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Future development of operational concepts and guidance for similar policing bodies should include input from military commanders and planners to avoid this confusion and frustration.

Second, the support given to the UN police that have been tasked with mentoring and training the DIS in the field sites has been inconsistent from one deployment site to the next. In some sites the DIS were deployed long before the UN police officers in an attempt to augment security quickly. This left the DIS officers without mentors, and made it difficult for UN police deployed after the fact to establish themselves as mentors to DIS officers who do not respect their position.

Furthermore, many UN police were deployed without any logistical support, or in some cases even without shelter and supplies. There have been complaints of a lack of institutional political support, and poor responsiveness to the concerns of the UN police commanders on the part of senior mission leadership. In this sort of arrangement, where the UN police mentors have no command and control over the new police officers, they derive their authority from the ability and willingness of senior mission leadership to address their concerns to the host government. It is imperative that UN police are supported, politically and materially, in order for them to be effective mentors, monitors and trainers.
Finally, though the disciplinary problems with the DIS officers have been relatively isolated, misbehavior has inevitably been magnified by media attention and international scrutiny. And as stated above, their unprofessional conduct is sometimes unfairly associated with the UN peacekeeping mission. In the future it may be more advantageous for the police training and mentoring to be done in coordination with peacekeepers, but funded and executed by a bilateral or regional partner. While such a politically sensitive arrangement needs to be developed carefully with each host government, this could achieve the same net security gains while insulating the wider peacekeeping operation from the public backlash associated with possible disciplinary challenges.

The world is beginning to understand that we all have a responsibility to protect people from violence, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Learning from the experiences of EUFOR, MINURCAT and other operations will help future missions operate more effectively, and more importantly, ensure that greater numbers of people are protected from harm.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

U.S. Recommendations

- Through GPOI, ACOTA, and PKSOI the U.S. should work more closely with the UN to provide standardized peacekeeping training, both bilaterally and through support to regional peacekeeping training centers, to increase global peacekeeping capacity.

- The U.S. Administration should provide U.S. forces and assets, such as engineering units, tactical and strategic lift capacity, and other ‘enablers’ to help UN missions deploy quickly and completely.

- The U.S. Congress and Administration should continue to pursue the policy of paying U.S. peacekeeping dues in full and on time.

- As a member of the Security Council, the U.S. should ensure that UN peacekeeping missions are only deployed where mandates are achievable, and that missions are resourced to meet the demands of the respective mandates.

- The U.S. Administration should work with partners such as NATO, the EU and the AU to develop protection capacities that can be deployed quickly and respond effectively to counter threats against civilians where UN peacekeeping is not an appropriate mechanism.

- The U.S. Administration should support the Responsibility to Protect as a global norm and use diplomatic resources to advance the concept among countries reluctant to accept it.

UN Recommendations

- UN Force Generation Service should shift from a numbers-based approach to a capabilities-driven approach based on the military standards and operational tasks required to fulfill the mission mandate.

- DPKO should institute a policy whereby senior military leadership are present in New York during the planning
stages of peacekeeping missions to help shape the concept of operations and to familiarize themselves with the headquarters side of the UN system.

- DPKO should continue to build on and refine the policing concept that underpins the *Détachement Intégré de Sécurité* in Chad.

- DPKO must quickly translate ongoing studies on civilian protection into clear guidance on protection concepts, operational standards, and peacekeeper training.

- Where “bridging” operations are in place, the UN Security Council must seek to authorize UN peacekeeping follow-on missions as early as possible, and not less than six months in advance of the transfer of authority.
ENDNOTES

1 UNFICYP was first deployed in 1964, but the mandate was expanded in 1974 to take into account the de-facto ceasefire agreement between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces.


6 Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields. Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, A/RES/60/1, 2005, Paragraph 139.


9 See Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers.

10 Ibid, p.47.

11 MINURCAT was originally authorized in September 2007 and deployed without a military component.
RESOURCES


