TIMOR-LESTE:

IDPs returning home, but to ongoing poverty and lack of access to basic services

A profile of the internal displacement situation

31 October, 2008
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The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council, is the leading international body monitoring conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide.

Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.

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OVERVIEW

IDPs returning home, but to ongoing poverty and lack of access to basic services

Two years after violent conflict erupted in Dili in May 2006, some of the 100,000 people who remained displaced in April 2008 have started returning home. About a third of these internally displaced people (IDPs) were in camps in the capital, and the rest with relatives and friends in the districts where they had sought refuge after the violence. However, perhaps 40,000 people have been unable to return, while others have struggled to rebuild their lives in return areas or transitional sites.

At the end of 2007, the government launched a new strategy to address the IDP issue within a broader national recovery programme. Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru (Together Building the Future) aims to get people back to their homes and help them reintegrate, while addressing the needs and rights of the wider community. While taking steps to close camps, the government in April 2008 started distributing recovery packages to IDPs willing to return. 16,000 families registered to take part, and more than half received the recovery package in the first six months, leaving between 35,000 and 40,000 people still displaced as of October 2008. According to government data, the overwhelming majority of the returnees have managed to retrieve their homes and property. When this was not possible, because people who had moved in claimed the house to be theirs or asked for compensation before leaving, discussion and negotiation have reportedly solved most problems.

Many difficulties have also been reported, however. Threats against returnees have led to cases of re-displacement. People in areas of return still have little access either to food and basic services such as potable water, sanitation or health care, or to livelihood and income-generating opportunities. Many of the issues that contributed to the 2006 violence, such as the tensions between easterners and westerners, the factionalised security forces and the land and property ownership disputes, remain to be addressed by a recovery strategy that remains poorly funded.

Despite the active support of the international community, the government’s overall capacity to implement the strategy remains weak. Of particular concern is the absence of effective early recovery programmes and the state’s limited capacity to monitor and address the protection concerns of both returnees and the wider population. Widespread impunity and lack of accountability continue also to be encouraged by a government ready to undermine the rule of law and the credibility of the judicial system in the name of reconciliation.

Background

In Timor-Leste the majority of the population of just under one million has experienced violent forced displacement. In 1974, Portugal’s withdrawal from its south-east Asian colony was preceded by a short civil war in which thousands of people were killed and tens of thousands displaced. During Indonesia’s occupation of the new state of Timor-Leste from 1975, there were large-scale displacements as people fled or were resettled as the Indonesian army sought to control the territory and crush the FRETILIN rebel movement. From 1975 to 1999, between 84,000 and 183,000 more people than the peacetime baseline died due to hunger and illness, and almost all east Timorese experienced at least one period of displacement (CAVR, Chapter 7.3, 30 January 2006, pp.143-144).
Following a UN-sponsored agreement between Indonesia, Portugal and the United States, a referendum was held in 1999 to determine whether the country would remain as a Special Autonomous Region of Indonesia or become an independent state. In the months prior to the referendum, an estimated 60,000 people were displaced from their villages to urban centres by a campaign of violent intimidation conducted by pro-integrationist militias supported by the Indonesian army. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of the population voted in favour of independence from Indonesia. Following the announcement of the result, further intense violence and widespread human rights abuses by the militias led to the destruction of much of Timor-Leste’s infrastructure and housing stock, the collapse of the economy and state institutions, and the forced displacement of the majority of the population. 500,000 people sought refuge within Timor-Leste, while 240,000 crossed the border to West Timor where tens of thousands still remained in 2007 (Inside Indonesia, December 2007; ICG, 4 May 2006, p.2). After three years under UN administration, Timor-Leste was declared independent on 20 May 2002.

Displacement following internal conflict in 2006

In April 2006, violent internal conflict erupted after sections of Timor-Leste’s army, later known as “the petitioners”, rose up in response to alleged regional-based discrimination by officers originating from eastern areas of Timor-Leste. In May armed clashes became widespread between groups of easterners and westerners within the army and police and among the wider population. Youth gangs armed with machetes, slings and bows rampaged through Dili threatening and attacking easterners and their properties. 37 people were killed, around 3,000 houses were destroyed and over 2,000 severely damaged, and an estimated 150,000 people, mainly easterners, fled their homes (OCHA, 17 July 2007, p.7). Approximately half of the displaced sought refuge within the capital, mainly in government buildings, schools or churches, and subsequently in over 50 makeshift camps, while the other half fled eastwards to their districts of origin, to be accommodated by families and friends.

The crisis resulted from several factors, including weak and factionalised state institutions, political rivalries dating back to the independence struggle, extreme poverty, and a large and disempowered youth population. Although there was no history of violence between easterners and westerners, and regional identities were probably manipulated for political ends, there were real and perceived differences in the roles played by each group in the independence struggle. Easterners who constituted the bulk of the surviving resistance also gained the best access from 2002 to institutions and resources, mainly through the FRETILIN party. Unresolved land and housing disputes also helped fuel the violence; in the wake of the large-scale displacements that occurred before and after the 1999 independence vote, many returning easterners occupied land and houses left vacant by those who had relocated to West Timor and only gradually returned in the following years (AusAID, 15 September 2006, p.3).

By August 2006, the Australian-led military force had stabilised the security situation and a number of internally displaced people (IDPs) started returning. However, these initial returns mainly involved IDPs without significant housing and protection problems, and return rates soon slowed considerably. During 2007, further sporadic violence prevented the return of the majority of the displaced and even led to further displacement. The introduction of the new government in August 2007 triggered renewed violence in the eastern districts which led to the displacement of an estimated 4,000 people in Viqueque and Baucau (OCHA, 29 August 2007).

By April 2008, around 100,000 people remained displaced, a third in camps, mainly in Dili, and the remainder with host families, mostly in the rural districts (OCHA, 18 April 2008, p.5). They were unable or unwilling to return due to the volatile security situation, their lack of confidence in the judicial system and the reconciliation process, the lack of progress in rebuilding destroyed or damaged houses, and the failure to resolve land and property ownership issues. The lack of
livelihood opportunities in the context of rising food prices had also encouraged many IDPs to stay in camps in Dili where humanitarian assistance was available.

**National recovery strategy encourages substantial returns**

In December 2007, the government launched a new strategy (*Hamutuk Hari’l Futuru* -Together Building the Future) to overcome the 2006 crisis by addressing the displacement issue within a more comprehensive approach. The strategy rests on five pillars: shelter and housing, social protection, security and stability, socio-economic development, and confidence building and reconciliation. A stated objective of the strategy is to help remove the obstacles preventing the return of the displaced and ultimately assist them in finding durable solutions (Government of T-L, 19 December 2007).

The strategy does recognise the range of solutions which IDPs may envisage. Those willing and able to return home can receive a cash recovery grant based on the extent of damage to their property and up to a maximum of $4,500, or a basic house plus $1,500 should their own have been damaged beyond repair. Those unable or unwilling to return can either use the cash recovery grant to build a house on state-owned land, or they can choose to settle in a basic house on a resettlement site. Temporary relocation to a transitional shelter site is offered to those willing but unable to return immediately (OCHA, 18 April 2008, p.34). By October 2008, the resettlement option had not been implemented, and in practice IDPs could only choose between returning home and moving to a transitional site.

The strategy initially ignored displaced people who had been tenants in the house they were living in, but had had their property looted during 2006 (ICG, 31 March 2008, p.13). Members of this group, which reportedly constituted the majority of people displaced, were later offered a $200 "reintegration package" to convince them to leave the camps (MSS, 18 June 2008).

The strategy, combined with a halving of food rations distributed in camps from February 2008, proved immediately effective in encouraging people to leave the camps: 28 camps in Dili closed by October 2008. By October, around 9,000 out of 16,000 registered families had accepted the recovery package (OCHA & UNMIT, 30 October 2008, p.3). According to government data, some 90 per cent of those who have received the recovery package have been able to return to their original homes (IRIN, 22 September 2008). Preliminary data collected by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) showed lower return rates, with 70 per cent of families returning to their homes and 17 per cent to relatives. Only 60 per cent of homes were described as in good condition (OCHA & UNMIT, 15 October 2008, p.4).

For those unable to return, 667 transitional shelters have been built on seven sites by NRC and the government since 2006. The houses are basic but offer much better conditions than camps with electricity, cooking facilities, latrines and tap stands. As of October 2008, the shelters had an 88 per cent occupancy rate accommodating a total of 3,125 people (OCHA & UNMIT, 1 October 2008, p.3). Many IDPs have been initially reluctant to move to these sites, sometimes located outside of the city, with some afraid of getting stuck there and choosing instead to accept the compensation package and move into makeshift tents.

**Unresolved issues raise concerns over sustainability of returns**

While most returns appear to have been successful, there are concerns over the conditions in which they have taken place and their long-term sustainability. The lack of monitoring activities during the early phase of returns also means that there is not enough information on the access of returning IDPs to basic services or protection.
There is no legal framework in place to address land and property disputes. During the 2006 unrest, the destruction of homes and businesses mainly affected people from the east, many of whom had migrated to Dili after 1999. The attackers saw the opportunity to reclaim what they considered as their property or grab new property. Now most IDPs are returning to their homes without any formal mechanism in place for property restitution and compensation and without an effective land and property law to determine ownership.

Many of the IDPs' houses have been occupied by squatters. While some have refused to hand over the houses to their owners, most appear to have agreed to do so but only in exchange for some compensation. Having made improvements to the house or kept it in good condition, the squatters see themselves as entitled to some money, a solution which many returnees reportedly accept (ABC, 22 September 2008). Given the critical housing stock shortage, many of these secondary occupants now risk becoming homeless themselves.

In a country where 40 per cent of the population live on less than 55 cents a day, the return of displaced people to their homes with money or other benefits has inevitably led to social tensions and feelings of jealousy. Six months after receiving materials to rebuild their damaged homes, a hundred families in Viqueque district still refused to use them out of fear that it would anger other families in the area who had not received any assistance (OCHA & UNMIT, 30 June 2008, p.6). In July and August, two houses were burnt in an incident between returnees and the community in Uraho, Ermera district (OCHA & UNMIT, 20 August 2008, p.5). In June, IDPs returning from Jardim and Arte Moris camp were threatened upon return and re-displaced (OCHA & UNMIT, 16 June 2008, p.2). The arrival of IDPs in some transitional shelters has also led to tensions with neighbouring communities (ICG, 31 March 2008, p.5).

Since July 2008, UNDP/MSS dialogue teams have been mediating between returning IDPs and their receiving communities to help resolve these tensions (MSS, 9 October 2008). According to NRC however, this dialogue has focused on the delivery of information about the current government policy, rather than the issues which were behind the violence of 2006, such as land and property ownership disputes. Also, although the government planned for pre-return dialogue with all parties involved, in the rush to resolve the IDP situation this is not taking place in any significant way (NRC, September 2008). Communities in return areas have often complained about insufficient preparatory work by the government and the lack of information given to them prior to the return of the displaced (OCHA & UNMIT, 30 June 2008, p.5).

Almost immediately after the return process started, international humanitarian agencies concerned about the pace of the process, the insufficient preparation and the lack of return monitoring urged the government to slow down the returns (HCC, 6 May 2008, p.2). In June, with the government still prioritising the closure of camps despite reports of significant protection concerns for returning IDPs, the inter-agency Protection Working Group (PWG) proposed a rapid assessment of return conditions. The assessment was to provide more information on the extent to which IDPs returning have sufficient access to basic services such as water and sanitation and on protection issues they may be facing upon return. The PWG decided that the rapid assessment was not needed since IOM was planning a larger post-return monitoring project. The 11-month long project, supported by NGOs such as CARE, CRS, JRS and Belun, started in July but it is reportedly lacking a specific IDP protection angle since it is more focused on community’s access to basic services. The findings of IOM’s monitoring project were first made available at the end of October, more than six months after the return process started (IOM, 28 October 2008).

More groundwork is also needed to ensure that material conditions are conducive to sustainable return. Inadequate access to water and sanitation in areas of return has been reported as a major concern in areas of return both in Dili and in the districts (OCHA & UNMIT, 30 June 2008, p.5). It is also unknown how the returnees used their recovery package and what will happen once the
money is used up. With unemployment rates rising and little economic opportunities available outside of Dili, there are concerns that the recovery package will be used on immediate needs such as food (after the two-month rice ration is exhausted) or on consumer goods such as fridges, TVs or motorcycle, instead of on long-term investments on homes or livelihoods. Some returnees in the districts reported having to use some of the cash from their recovery package to buy food (OCHA & UNMIT, 30 June 2008, p.2).

With more IDPs expected to need alternative solutions to return, the shortage of available sites is becoming a problem (OCHA & UNMIT, 23 July 2008, p.5). Identifying land for all types of social housing will remain difficult given Dili’s booming population and the existing housing stock deficit. One idea proposed by NRC is to build transitional shelters that can be later transformed into permanent basic housing. These “Transformable Transitional Shelters” would not be limited to IDPs but would also be available for other groups in need of secure housing (HCC, 7 October 2008, p.3).

Thus there are reasons to be prudent despite the encouraging initial caseload of IDP returns. The high return rate may be partly explained by the fact that those who returned first were also likely to be the ones who expected to face the fewest obstacles. The return and reintegration of the remaining IDPs may therefore prove to be more difficult. Also, many of the underlying causes and social factors which exacerbated the 2006 civil unrest such as land and property disputes, the regional divisions, the lack of economic opportunities as well as weak state institutions are simply not addressed by the national recovery strategy, the funding of which also remains highly uncertain. These issues may remain outstanding until violence breaks out and creates displacement again. In October 2008, fears of political instability driven by east-west divisions were fuelled by rumours of power struggles within the police force and by dissatisfaction among eastern officers of the defense force about the investigation of the 2006 crisis. As a result, some IDPs in camps were reportedly reconsidering their return plans (HCC, 3 October 2008, p.2).

**Humanitarian issues**

**Widespread food insecurity**

The 2006 unrest had a significant negative impact on Timor-Leste’s already fragile economy and further constrained people’s already limited capacity to meet their basic needs such as access to food, potable water, adequate sanitation, health care, livelihood opportunities and education. Prior to the crisis, Timor-Leste was already the poorest nation in Asia, ranking 142nd of 177 countries in the 2006 Human Development Index. In 2008, the country dropped to 150th position (UNDP, 2008).

Many businesses, markets and government offices closed down during 2006 and the violence led to widespread supply disruptions. Commerce recovered slowly but continued to be hampered by higher transaction costs and above all by lower purchasing power. During 2007, rice shortages and a poor harvest led to a sharp increase in food prices and made the country increasingly reliant on imports. In March 2008, the consumer price index (CPI) had increased by almost 20 per cent since 2006 , with higher food and fuel prices accounting for most of the increase. The price of Thai rice, which represents 13 per cent of the consumption basket, went up by 200 per cent during the first months of 2008, forcing the government to import more rice for resale to control domestic inflation.

Poor and unemployed people in urban areas were most affected by the inflation, with significant differences in prices noted between Dili and the districts (UN T-L, 27 August 2008, p.2). The cost of building materials sharply increased during 2008, due to inflationary pressure increased by the distribution of recovery packages for reconstruction.
Limited access to arable land and vulnerability to floods and other natural disasters have also threatened food security (USAID 30 September 2008). In a report released in October 2008, Oxfam estimated that 70 per cent of the population were moderately to severely food insecure, with Covalima and Oecusse Districts particularly affected (Oxfam, 16 October 2008, p.4). In September 2008, WFP warned of increasing rates of malnutrition which it considered already at unacceptable levels with half of the children under five chronically malnourished, 46 per cent underweight and 12 percent wasted (WFP, 12 September 2008, p.5).

In this context of widespread food insecurity, displaced people living in camps were not found to be among the most vulnerable. A WFP assessment conducted in Dili in September 2007 showed that almost half of the population was food insecure with a quarter facing health risks linked to a deterioration of their nutrition. IDPs were not particularly worse off than the general population. On this basis, WFP recommended that free food distributions in camps be stopped, with assistance provided instead to IDPs returning home to repair their houses. Cash or food for work and livelihood activities were recommended for the most food insecure groups (WFP, September 2007, p.3). Accordingly, WFP halved the food ration to IDPs in camps in February 2008, and terminated it two months later. So far, however, none of the recommended food for work schemes, livelihood activities or social safety nets have been implemented in any large-scale manner that would counterbalance the termination of food distribution or deal with food insecurity (NRC, October 2008).

In the districts, food security has further deteriorated in the past two years as poor harvests followed adverse weather conditions (Oxfam, 16 October 2008, p.15; FAO/WFP, 21 June 2007, p.4). With most international assistance targeting IDPs in Dili and a very limited humanitarian presence in the districts, little has been done to support the capacity of the host population to assist the displaced people. The limited access to these areas and the fact that most IDPs are staying with friends and relatives makes any assessment of their needs more difficult. With no free food distribution available to the displaced and particularly high levels of food insecurity, access to food was reported as difficult and cited as a major concern by IDPs and host communities (OCHA/UNMIT, 2 June 2008, p.6). Some expressed concern that their reliance on cheaper food products were negatively impacting their children’s nutritional status (OCHA/UNMIT, 30 June 2008, p.2). In October 2008, WFP helped to increase the country’s capacity to manage food shortages by refurbishing two food warehouses and starting to build a third. Of the three warehouses, one is in Dili and the two others are in the districts where food is more difficult to transport due to poor roads (IRIN, 16 October 2008).

The government decided in early 2008 to grant large tracts of the country’s scarce agricultural land to foreign biofuel companies, eliciting sharp criticisms from NGO representatives and members of the parliamentary opposition who denounced the move as part of a larger effort to privatise land which will likely undermine the country’s food security (Tim Anderson, 15 September 2008).

Remaining IDPs in camps require continuing support

As of October 2008, 21 camps remain open in Dili, hosting an estimated 23,000 people. The main protection concerns relate to water and sanitation, health, and other challenges created by the sustained presence of such a large displaced population in crowded makeshift camps which often lack the space for sanitation infrastructure. Although the conditions in the camps have improved significantly since 2006 and major disease outbreaks have been avoided, residents continue to be vulnerable to flooding and diseases such as malaria, respiratory and skin infections.
In May 2008, the inter-agency Water and Sanitation Working Group identified the IDP camps at Hera Port, the National Hospital, the Jardim and the Airport as requiring urgent closure (OCHA/UNMIT, 9 May 2008, p.2). By mid-October, all of them had been closed. Most of the IDPs still in camps were likely to require emergency shelter at least until the end of the year. As of October it was not clear if the government would replace the tents for IDPs remaining in the camps, a move the humanitarian community was arguing for in anticipation of the rainy season (OCHA/UNMIT, 15 October 2006, p.2).

While some improvements have already been made to the remaining camps, assessments are still ongoing to better determine the needs of residents. The largest camp, at Metinaro 25 kilometres east of Dili, has been identified as one of the most vulnerable to flooding and landslides, increasing the risk of health problems for the estimated 10,000 residents (IRIN, 10 October 2008).

Protection issues facing displaced children and women

There are serious protection concerns for displaced women and children, who are exposed to a variety of protection risks due to physical and sexual violence in the overcrowded camps, and also outside the camps (Plan, June 2008, p.111; UNICEF, 5 July 2007). A sharp increase in the number of cases of gender-based violence (GBV) was reported in Timor-Leste during 2007, and only a minority of these cases has been investigated by the police. Most GBV cases have reportedly been solved through traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, the decisions of which are reportedly not always enforced (UNMIT, 21 August 2008, p.10).

Child abuse involving sexual, physical and psychological violence is also reported as a serious problem (UNMIT, 8 November 2007, p.14). Also of particular concern is the issue of access to education, in particular for displaced children in camps, many of whom have avoided schools in areas of displacement because they didn’t feel safe. Although there are several organisations focusing on emergency child protection issues, the government’s failure to address the inadequacies of the education system remains a main long-term protection concern (OCHA, 18 April 2008, p.30; NRC, 3 September 2007). For those returning, agencies have expressed concern about the lack of psycho-social assistance available in areas of return (OCHA & UNMIT, September 2008, p.4).

National response

The government’s initial strategy to deal with the displacement crisis rested on the assumption that all IDPs would return once the security situation had stabilised. The response therefore mainly focused on meeting the immediate humanitarian needs of the displaced, mainly in camps, while starting a community dialogue programme known as Simu Malu to restore security and trust between communities. However the response proved inadequate and ineffective (OCHA, 16 January 2007, p.8). By the end of 2006 it became clear that returns were not taking place as expected despite threats by the government to cut off assistance (Kammen/Hayati, March 2007, p.2). Acknowledging that more efforts were needed to assist IDPs to return or relocate, a comprehensive assistance package consisting of food, shelter, construction materials and transport was offered to IDPs agreeing to leave the camps (MTRC, 24 November 2006, pp.1-3). By July 2007 however, only 4,800 IDPs had taken advantage of government assistance to move out of the camps (MTRC, 17 July 2007).

The failure of the government to convince the IDPs to return is explained both by its lack of institutional and operational capacity to properly implement its return and reintegration strategy, and also by displaced people’s lack of faith in the government’s ability or willingness to address
the underlying causes of the 2006 unrest. Many IDPs were unwilling to return in an environment of persistent instability and impunity in which the renegade leader of the “petitioners” Major Reinado, seen by many IDPs as the cause of their displacement, was still free after mysteriously walking out of prison in August 2006 (ICG, 31 March 2008, p.7; BBC, 31 August 2006). Reinado’s death in February 2008, during an attack against both Prime Minister Horta and President Gusmao, left many questions unanswered but did certainly help to make conditions more conducive to the return of the displaced (Reuters, 13 August 2008; John Martinkus, 15 February 2008; BBC, 11 February 2008).

Since 2008, the government has started implementing the national recovery strategy, *Hamutuk Hari’I Futuru*. The strategy aims to address the challenges of reconstruction and recovery with a particular focus on the solving of the displacement crisis. The plan’s main weakness is the lack of funding for implementation. The government has committed a total of $15 million in 2008 to address the needs of IDPs, but this is far from sufficient to cover the cost of even the first pillar on housing, let alone the four others. That international donors are expected to complement missing funds leaves much of the strategy up in the air (ICG, 31 March 2008, p.13). Ten months into the programme, only two pillars, on housing and confidence building, are functioning (HCC, 3 October 2008, p.1).

While most of the secondary occupancy disputes in the current return process have reportedly been resolved on a case-by-case basis through dialogue and negotiation, the absence of a legal and regulatory framework governing land and property ownership continues to cause uncertainties over property rights and prevent the resolution of land and property disputes. Establishing a comprehensive land register, a clear titling system and a functional dispute settlement mechanism in a country where most land is unregistered and governed by customary law will be a complex and daunting challenge that the government must meet if it is to enable durable solutions for the displaced population.

Responsibility for the monitoring and protection of the displaced lies with the Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice (the *Provedor*), which has been operational since March 2006 but remains of very limited capacity. In 2007, the *Provedor* scaled down IDP monitoring activities which it was conducting with assistance from UNMIT and the Human Rights Monitoring Network (RMDH), a network of Timorese NGOs, due to lack of funds (OCHA, 17 August 2007, p.2). Budgetary constraints prevented the opening of offices outside of Dili and only in June 2008 was the IDP cell re-activated (UNMIT, 21 August 2008, p.15). Overall, the capacity of state institutions to provide protection services to IDPs or the general population remained extremely limited (OCHA, 18 April 2008, p.30).

Widespread impunity and lack of accountability must be addressed as a matter of priority if the government’s credibility is to be restored in the eyes of both the international community and citizens, in particular those victims of the 2006 unrest. Those responsible for burning the houses, looting the properties and forcing people out of their homes must be prosecuted if the displaced are to put their trust in the return and reintegration process. There are reasons to believe that this will not be easily achieved. Following the February 2008 attack, a three-month “state of siege” was declared during which the number of reports of ill-treatment and human right violations against civilians by security forces increased significantly. Although those responsible for the violations were identified, none were brought to justice (UNMIT, 21 August 2008, p.3). In July 2008, 94 prisoners received a presidential pardon, including former Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato who had been sentenced in 2007 to seven years for distributing arms to civilians in 2006. This was widely criticised by church officials and human right activists who said this move was undermining the rule of law and further weakening people’s faith in the justice system (ABC, 8 September 2008). On 13 October 2008, President Ramos-Horta asked the UN to drop its investigation into the 1999 violence, in order to maintain good relations with Indonesia (Reuters, 13 October 2008).
International response

The immediate response of the international community to the civil unrest of May 2006 was the mobilisation of a 3,000-strong military and police force led by Australia. This was followed by the establishment in August of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) with a broad mandate to provide support in the humanitarian, security, political and development sectors. UNMIT’s mandate has already been renewed twice and is due to run until at least February 2009.

From 2006 to 2008, the UN launched two successive Consolidated Appeal Processes (CAPs) requesting a total of $58 million to address the humanitarian needs of IDPs and the vulnerable population and to help them find durable solutions through return, resettlement or reintegration (OCHA, 17 July 2007, p.1). Donors funded two-thirds of the CAP in 2007, but critical sectors such as health care, water and sanitation, protection and human rights, and economic recovery remain largely underfunded (OCHA, 20 October 2008). While re-affirming its commitment to continue providing emergency assistance to IDPs in camps, the Transitional Strategy and Appeal (TSA) launched by the international community in March 2008 also offered strong support to the government’s recovery strategy, recognising that early recovery initiatives were needed if the displaced were ever to return home. Seven months after its launch, 59 per cent of the $28 million requested had been funded, with economic recovery, protection and health care largely underfunded. In the past two years, Australia, the US, the European Commission and Japan have been the main humanitarian donors, accounting for 63 per cent of all contributions.

The Humanitarian Coordination Committee (HCC), established in September 2007 and chaired by the Humanitarian Coordinator/Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, is the main forum to discuss humanitarian issues and elaborate policies. Coordination of the protection response to the IDP situation takes place in the inter-agency Protection Working Group (PWG) chaired by the Minister of Social Solidarity (MSS) together with UNICEF. Since the departure of UNHCR in July 2007, the lead on the protection sector has been shared between UNMIT’s Human Rights Unit and UNICEF. It remains unclear who will take the lead after the departure of UNICEF’s IDP adviser at the end of October 2008.

The existing coordination structures informally follow the cluster leadership arrangements, and discussions were ongoing in October 2008 about a possible rolling out of the cluster approach in Timor-Leste. While the cluster approach would certainly help increase the humanitarian actors’ capacity to identify and fill gaps within sectors and strengthen sector leadership, it is however unlikely to address challenges linked to working with the government, nor shall it resolve problems of government’s lack of accountability and poor coordination and implementing capacity. In the context of a transition between emergency humanitarian assistance and early recovery, where the government is now expected to take increasing responsibilities, coordination structures will become more dependent on national institutions (OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 21). Strengthening these as well as local capacity should therefore be a priority of the international community.

In parallel to its humanitarian plan, the international community is also involved in an International Compact recovery and development programme, which provides a common platform for coordinating international assistance in key areas such as the public and security sector reform, justice, governance, the rule of law, youth employment and human resource development. In March 2008, a development partners meeting was held in Dili during which the government officially launched the Compact and its national priorities for 2008, including: public safety and security; social protection and solidarity; youth needs; employment; social service delivery and
governance (UNSC, 29 July 2008, p.11). The UN and the World Bank are actively supporting the monitoring of progress towards these objectives.
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Socio-economic background

East Timorese women traditionally restricted by the norms of culture and customs (December 2006)

- East Timorese women are victims of a gender-based division of labour which sees them carry the heaviest burden while suffering economic and political discrimination on land and property issues;
- From birth to marriage, women are kept within the sphere of male influence and have limited opportunity to enjoy their basic economic, social and political rights;
- Almost two-thirds of women from 15-60 years old are illiterate, compared to half of men.

ICTJ, December 2006, p. 289
"Traditionally, East Timorese women have been restricted by the gendered norms of culture and custom. The majority of East Timorese women live in rural villages, where the sexual division of labor demands that they carry the heaviest burden. Besides a range of domestic tasks—gathering firewood and water, cooking, caring for children, the elderly and the ill—they also work alongside men in the fields. Men, on the other hand, have economic and political advantages derived from their rights to land and property, as well as their traditional role as negotiators in the public sphere. The economic security offered a woman through the custom of barlaque (bride price) in reality means that at marriage a woman simply moves from her father's domain of power, influence and control into the domain of her husband and his family, a process that, in effect, excludes her from access to basic economic, social, and political rights. According to the United Nations Childre's Fund (UNICEF), in Timor-Leste the maternal mortality ratio is 800 per 100,000 live births, and many women are anemic, which increases the risk of hemorrhage during delivery. More than 80% of births take place in the home, and there is a high incidence of low birth weight.24 Female-headed households now stand at 14%, female literacy is 35% and the few women in the labor force are concentrated in lows skilled jobs."

UNDP, January 2006, p. 2
"Women in Timor-Leste suffer significant discrimination – in the household, the workplace and the community. Girls are more likely than boys to drop out of school and almost two-thirds of women aged 15-60 years are illiterate, compared with less than half of men. Women also suffer discrimination at work: they are less likely to work in the formal labour force and they are paid significantly less than men.

Women now have more access to information on reproductive health but many still lack full access to family planning services. As a result, Timor-Leste’s women tend to have high fertility rates and many die in childbirth – the maternal mortality rate is up to 800 per 100,000 live births.

The extent of discrimination against women is evident in the gender-related development index (GDI). This shows a slight improvement since 2001, largely due to an increase on female incomes, though this was offset to some extent by a poor performance in education."
Another serious concern is gender-based violence. Women continue to be subjected to domestic violence, sexual harassment in the workplace, rape and other forms of mistreatment and sexual abuse. Around half of women in intimate relationships suffer from some form of violence."

Gender-based violence and child abuse are major concerns (August 2008)

- Despite steps taken by the government, including a law for the promotion of equality, the UN considers that key legislation is still missing to address legal gaps and establish clear procedural guidelines for dealing with Gender Based Violence (GBV) crimes.
- In 2007, at least 482 GBV cases were reported to the Vulnerable Person’s Unit (VPU) offices in Timor-Leste’s 13 districts. The number of reported cases increased in 2008 as compared to the previous period.
- Lack of resources and institutional support, including lack of procedures for gathering evidence and supporting medical examinations were serious obstacles to the investigation of cases.
- The majority of GBV cases were resolved through traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, usually in the form of family meetings. There was concern that traditional dispute resolution mechanisms were not always victim-centered.

UNMIT, 21 August 2008, p. 10

"41. Gender-based violence (GBV) remained a major human rights concern. Timor-Leste’s Government took some positive steps, including the approval in March 2008 by the Council of Ministers of the Organic Law of the Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality. However, key legislation that would help address legal gaps and establish clear procedural guidelines for dealing with GBV crimes, in particular the Domestic Violence Law and Criminal Code, had not been adopted by the end of June 2008.

42. Within the PNTL, the Vulnerable Person’s Unit (VPU) is responsible for receiving and investigating allegations of GBV. In 2007, at least 482 GBV cases were reported to VPU offices in Timor-Leste’s 13 districts. Investigations into these cases – including in serious cases such as rape – were often delayed as VPU offices lacked resources and institutional support.27 Gathering of evidence in relation to GBV cases was a key problem. The PNTL did not have procedures for gathering evidence, and supporting medical examinations were not available. In addition, victims were rarely willing to testify in court, and witness statements were often not available, given the nature of the crime. Only one quarter of the cases (117) reported to the police in 2007 were forwarded to the Office of the Prosecutor-General for further investigation and prosecution.28 The remaining cases were either withdrawn by victims, often following mediation by VPU officers, or resolved through traditional mechanisms. This is of great concern in view of the fact that some categories of GBV crimes are public crimes under the applicable Indonesian Penal Code.29

43. The Office of the Prosecutor-General received 101 cases of GBV crimes between September 2007 and March 2008.30 This constitutes an increase compared to previous periods. Ninety-six of these cases were from Baucau and Dili Districts, while only a few cases were forwarded from other jurisdictions. As of April 2008, the Office of the Prosecutor-General had filed indictments in 12 of the 101 cases. District courts were also increasingly active in relation to GBV cases, although no statistics were available on the number of cases of GBV that were heard. The Timorese NGO Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JSMP) carried out monitoring of such trials.31

44. The majority of GBV cases were resolved through traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, usually in the form of family meetings. During interviews, victims and community leaders stated..."
that concerns about the impact on the family, financial considerations and the slow progress of the official judicial system were main factors leading to a preference for informal mechanisms. There was concern that traditional dispute resolution mechanisms were not always victim-centered. Even though victims were given the chance to provide information, it was not clear to what extent this was taken into consideration in the final decision. Compensation, when paid, was received by the victim’s family rather than the victim. The lack of a legal framework regulating traditional mechanisms meant that there was no oversight of the extent to which they upheld basic fair trial guarantees, including the presumption of innocence, the right to appeal and enforcement of decisions. For example, in one case a rape victim was awarded financial compensation by a traditional mechanism, but when the perpetrator - a relative - refused to pay, this was not enforced. In view of this, it is essential that the authorities, in consultation with civil society and traditional leaders, decide on the role and standards of traditional justice mechanisms and their relation to the formal justice system."

**UNSC, 29 July 2008, pp. 8-9**

"27. The attacks of 11 February and the subsequent declaration of a state of siege presented challenges to the respect for human rights. On the positive side, the Government adhered to constitutional provisions when declaring the state of siege. Restrictions defined in relevant legislation on the right to movement, and on freedom to demonstrate and assemble, and provisions for members of the military to conduct home searches at night with judicial warrants did not violate Timor-Leste’s international obligations. Serious concerns arose, however, concerning an increase in allegations of ill-treatment, excessive use of force and intimidation, in particular during arrest, by members of the Joint Command. UNMIT also received reports of death threats, illegal arrests, illegal home searches and abuse of authority. UNMIT regularly provided information on cases of alleged human rights violations or abuse of power to the appropriate Timorese authorities up to the highest levels. Accountability mechanisms were extremely weak, however; even when identified, perpetrators often faced only a verbal reprimand, including in cases of serious beatings.

28. Gender-based violence remained a major human rights concern. Cases were frequently "resolved" through traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, which were not always victim-centred and were not regulated by a legal framework. United Nations agencies are providing a range of support to address gender-based violence at national and local levels, including preparation of a training manual in Tetum on domestic violence, support to the national campaign for men to end violence against women, mapping of gender-based violence cases, and capacity-building of local authorities and communities on ways to handle such cases. In addition, United Nations agencies made efforts to encourage women to participate in conflict mediation and conflict resolution activities in the community."
(VPU) of the PNTL is responsible for receiving and investigating allegations of gender-based violence.

Women increasingly report abuses to the police. In some districts, cases of domestic violence constituted more than half of the complaints filed with the police in 2005. Many civil society groups in Timor-Leste are active in supporting women victims of SGBV. Groups such as Fokupers, Pradet and JSMP provide counselling, legal assistance, shelter in safe houses and escorts to judicial hearings. Some women NGOs, together with human rights monitoring groups, are currently monitoring the situation of women in IDP camps and provide trainings for camp managers on how to report and deal with cases of SGBV. Fokupers released a report in August 2007 about violence against women committed in 2005-6, based on 172 cases, including 114 cases of domestic violence and 48 of sexual violence. The report expresses as one of its main concerns that the formal justice system did not deal effectively with many of these cases.

As the national and Dili district VPU ceased to function in 2006 as the result of the crisis, it proved to be difficult to obtain reliable updated figures on SGBV cases. VPUs in the districts were particularly hampered by lack of resources and institutional support. Due to the general constraints faced by the police and the justice system in Timor-Leste, lengthy delays often occurred in the investigation of rape cases. There are legal gaps that need to be filled in order to prosecute SGBV in accordance with international standards. The still applicable Indonesian Penal Code, for example, does not consider spousal rape a crime. The enactment of the Domestic Violence Law could help to overcome many of these obstacles, as it would provide specific legal definitions and clear procedural guidelines on how to deal with SGBV crimes and how to support victims. The draft law is currently pending with the National Parliament.

More information needs to be gathered regarding how traditional dispute resolution mechanisms deal with cases of violence against women and children, and particularly, whether these processes duly respect women’s rights. While there appears to be acknowledgement of the value of traditional justice, including for disputes relating to minor crimes only, it is important that the authorities, in consultation with civil society and traditional leaders, decide on the role of traditional justice mechanisms and their relation with the formal justice system."

Demographic factors have increased the vulnerability of Timor-Leste to civil conflict (July 2008)

- The authors contend that Timor-Leste's particular demographic situation has exacerbated the country's vulnerability to conflict, a conflict which has been largely brought about by the followig stress factors: a) a high proportion of teenagers and young adults with few employment opportunities, b) high in-migration rates in Dili with its social and economic consequences, and c) a strong regional component opposing migrants of different origins;
- It is projected that if fertility, mortality and in-migration in the capital city remain constant, the population of Dili will be 303,115 in 10 years, a population increase of 72.5 per cent.
- In Dili, unemployment is estimated at 23 per cent overall and 40 per cent among those aged 15-29

Neupert, Ricardo & Lopes, Silvinio, September 2006, pp. 41-42

"This study has attempted to identify and examine possible demographic components in the civil conflict that Timor-Leste is currently experiencing. Using a theoretical framework that proposes that the position of societies in the process of demographic transition is related to vulnerability to conflict, three socio-demographic risk factors were analyzed: a) a high proportion of teenagers and young adults in the population combined with little opportunities of employment other than in the predominant subsistence sector of the economy; b) high in-migration rates to Dili and the
consequent rapid urbanization that the capital city is experiencing; and c) the surfacing of a strong regional component in the conflict as a result of the presence in Dili of migrants of different origin.

There is convincing evidence that, in fact, the previously mentioned variables have been important stress factors and they have shaped some of the main characteristics of the conflict. The facts that the unrest is centered mainly in Dili and that it has adopted the form of violent street gang fights representing eastern in-migrants on one side and westerners and Dili natives on the other, suggest that the previously mentioned three demographic processes are, in fact, factors that have increased the vulnerability of the community to civil conflict.

It is important to mention that what is proposed here is not that demographic factors are the cause of Timor-Leste civil unrest. The conflict is complex, caused by the interaction of multiple determinants, and cannot be reduced to demographic processes. However part of the problem is related to the population position of the country at the initial stages of the demographic transition. (...) Population in East-Timor is growing extremely fast (3.2% per year). The working age population is growing faster (3.4%) and the 15 to 24 years population, which is usually entering the labor force, is growing even faster (3.7%). This growth is even more substantial in Dili due to in-migration. A simple projection exercise, considering that fertility, mortality and in-migration in the capital city will remain constant in the next few years, indicates that the population of the city will increase from 175,730 to 233,508 between 2004 and 2009, that is, an annual increase of 5.7%. In 2014, if mortality, fertility and net migration rates remain constant, the population of Dili will be 303,115, that is, the population will increase by 72.5% in 10 years.

Planners and policy makers must find forms to accommodate this population in the economy and, in general, in the society. The problem is that there is no pace of economic growth, no matter how rapid and sustained it may be, no feasible employment structures reforms to be carried out, and no possible job creation policies to be implemented, that will be able to result in an occupational absorption of such a huge labor force increase. This massive labor force supply will undoubtedly become a major economic, social and political problem both in rural and in urban areas."

UNSC, 29 July 2008, p.12

"42. In Dili, home to about one quarter of the labour force, unemployment is estimated at 23 per cent overall and 40 per cent among those aged 15 to 29. With thousands of young people entering the workforce each year, job creation is a top priority for the Government, for which it has been receiving assistance from the United Nations. In March 2008, the Youth Employment Promotion Programme was officially launched, a joint initiative involving the Government and the United Nations country team, with a total budget of $16.5 million. The four-year programme aims to deliver employment and training support to 70,000 young women and men, in all districts. In the launching phase, the programme initiated the establishment of a network of youth career centres to assist young people. The National Labour Force Development Institute was also launched. This will be responsible for the creation of a labour-market oriented vocational training system."

Alignment of youth gangs with political factions has exacerbated the 2006 unrest (June 2007)

- Youth gangs, which caused much of the April/May destruction, have an estimated 20,000 members throughout the country;
Many gangs have political as well as regional affiliations and have infiltrated security forces and the police. Strong allegiances to the martial arts groups within the security forces and the "ethnic" nature of the crisis have inflamed the conflict;

Post-conflict resettlement land disputes seem to be a major source of ongoing violence evidence, suggesting that burnings and intimidation campaigns against easterners revolve around individual property disputes. Eastern families have often illegally occupied dwellings left vacant after 1999 and are being violently evicted by youths, many of whom have reportedly been paid;

The issue of gang violence has not featured proeminently in the 2007 presidential campaign;

A youth survey conducted in 2005 showed three main findings: widespread concerns about security and the lack of employment opportunities, endorsement of violence by a significant minority of young people and finally, for most young people, the involvement in martial arts groups as a matter of self-identity.

AusAID, 15 September 2006, pp. 1-4
"The recent civil conflict in East Timor has been highly revealing not just of the social and political divisions within the Timorese security forces, but also of the existence of a large number of gangs, who perpetrated the bulk of the destruction following the disintegration of the police force. The enmity between the different branches of the security forces has been well documented, subject to enquiries and a series of national dialogue seminars. Little has been written however, about gang violence in East-Timor, yet it has been a constant feature of the East Timorese post-independence landscape.

The martial arts groups have long been a concern, with some 15-20 martial arts groups, and registered members estimated at around 20,000, almost all male.2 The alignment of some martial arts groups with different political factions has escalated the current conflict. One group 'Korka is officially aligned with Fretilin, and PSHT is widely identified with the two main opposition parties the PSD and PD. The use of these gangs for political intimidation can be seen from recent serious clashes in Ermera, Gleno, and Suai. The leader of another group, Kung Fu Master, was also killed during clashes between police and army in Tobar, early in the conflict.

The infiltration of martial arts groups into the security forces has further inflamed the situation, in addition to creating a potential for conflicting loyalty. Some martial arts group members interviewed for this study said deference to 'wargas' or martial arts masters take precedence over other loyalties. Abilio Massoko for example, a former resistance leader, was a police commander and leader or 'warga' of PSHT. Massoko, also known as Abilio Audian, was arrested for distributing guns in the recent conflict. PSHT members received guns, although it's not established if they received them from Massoko. Police are also often accused of siding with one group against another during martial arts clashes. (See Figure 5)

Of most concern however is the apparent ethnic nature of the current conflict. Some have been quick to dismiss this rivalry as being politically driven, yet the fighting between western and eastern gangs in Dili also considerably predates the current conflict. In Dionisio Babo Soares' Doctoral Thesis 'Branching From the Trunk: East Timorese Perceptions of Nationalism in Transition' he describes continuous clashes between the two groups since independence, and even since World War Two, resulting in numerous casualties. 3

The shooting of demonstrators on April 28 and the murder of twelve police on May 25 this year near the UN compound in Dili have also polarised views on ethnicity. Many people now reductively cite these events to justify anti-eastern views, saying that easterners killed westerners, and therefore should be punished. A payback motive undoubtedly generates a great deal of the random violence taking place, especially against the refugee camps, in turn leading to retribution by eastern gangs.
Land disputes arising from post conflict resettlement also seem to be a major source of ongoing violence, especially disputes over ownership of the former Indonesian civil service accommodation around Taci Tolu, Perumnas and Surik Mas. There’s strong evidence that some of the current spate of house burnings and intimidation campaigns against easterners revolves around individual property disputes, where eastern families have often illegally occupied dwellings left vacant after 1999, and efforts are now being made to violently evict them. There’s anecdotal evidence that gangs are being paid to enforce these evictions. However in some areas now effectively cleansed of easterners such as Perumnas, gangs are now merely turning on each other, so this explanation is not comprehensive.

Many gangs appear to be led by former resistance figures, such as Lito Rambo, Kommandante Mau Kiak (recently arrested on August 18 this year) Sintu Kulao, and Ameu Van Damme. These figures are in turn said to be loyal to different factions within the security forces and political parties, with loyalties and enmities dating back to resistance times. There’s also evidence to support the contention that this is a turf war between these groups to some degree, for control of gambling, extortion and border smuggling rackets.  

As this study found, it’s impossible to generalise about these groups, which comprise a broad spectrum from small, informal groups of young males who mostly just play guitar and drink, highly cohesive, organised youth groups with coherent objectives and a range of sporting and civic activities, to large organised, ethnically based criminal gangs.”

ICG, 13 June 2007, p. 8

"Gang violence, another huge social problem especially in Dili, has not been raised in the campaign. Since 2000 clashes involving martial arts groups and urban gangs have occurred in all districts, causing a number of deaths. The 2006 breakdown in traditional authority structures and the simultaneous collapse of the formal security sector exacerbated the problem, particularly in Dili, where the violence often reflected an east-west divide. All parties seem to agree that the rift must be healed, that there should be dialogue with gangs and that certain gang members must face justice. But no one has practical policy recommendations to match the rhetoric."

Curtain, Richard, 2006, p. 4

"I could foresee the potential for conflict emerging but could not predict how far it would deteriorate. Residing in Dili in late March and early April, 2006, I observed clear signs that the Government was turning its back on a problem that could easily escalate, particularly if the size of the protests grew and the authorities applied force in an excessive way. My insights came from a national youth survey I helped to design and administer in late 2005 and early 2006. On an assignment from UNICEF to help develop a national youth policy, we interviewed a random sample of over a 1,000 young people aged 15 to 35 years.

Key results of a national youth survey
Three of the national survey findings survey stood out. First, concerns about security dominated the responses of most respondents. Young people’s need for increased sense of security, civil order and well-being was fundamental to how they viewed their situation. This need underpinned,
for example, their attitudes to whether they believed they could play a positive role in the community or not.

Young people’s concern about security reflects the deep trauma most of the population had suffered during the Indonesian occupation. However, the survey responses also refer to widespread fears among young people about a lack of economic insecurity due to unreliable sources of income. In many cases, food insecurity was a major concern, stemming from drought and low yielding subsistence crops.

A second key finding of the survey was the endorsement of violence by a significant minority of young people. One in five young people agreed with the statement that ‘violence should be met with violence’. This response was stronger among 15 to 24 year olds.

Most young men in Timor Leste are involved in martial arts groups. However for many this involvement is more a matter of self-identity in a society where there are few other ways of acknowledging the place of young people. The survey found that violence by young men was more likely to occur where the community leadership was weak. In the areas where young people were more predisposed to violence, survey respondents were twice as likely to agree that their community leaders had failed to resolve local conflicts."

East-west identities in Timor-Leste (February 2008)

- According to most East Timorese interviewed for a USAID study, the east-west divide is a political manipulation. Despite having little "reality" in Timor-Leste's history of inter-group relations, the activation of these regional identities has transformed this divide into a self-perpetuating feature of social relations which is likely to persist in the future;
- Interviews conducted for the UN inquiry into the April/May events have expressed opposing views on the east-west issue, some pointing to it as a new phenomenon and others saying it dates back to the Portuguese era;
- The UN report contends that the east-wide divide is a simplification of a more complex situation and that its rise can partly be explained in the context of a poorly defined national identity with political interests and communities having become embroiled in the issue;
- Rebecca Engels contends that the east-west divide can be traced back in the country's history, in particular in economic rivalries between the east and the west and the resistance against the Indonesians which was mainly fought in the east;
- According to Andrew Harrington, an east-west divide did exist prior to the April/May unrest. This distinction is best expressed in an opposition between firaku (east) and kaladi (west), a division which is geographic and somewhat political but not "ethnic", as each group comprises multiple ethnicities, languages, cultural identities, and language families.

RSC, 28 February 2008, pp. 27-31

"Displacement and the emergence of regional identities

Timor-Leste’s capital lies in the West of the country, but its population is mixed with people immigrating from all regions of the half-island. Although the crisis originated in the army, the mobilisation of regional identities following the petitioners’ claims of discrimination made the situation in Dili extremely volatile for the larger population. Various writers have referred to the origins of the east/west split in the security forces, and in the recruitment of the F-FDTL in particular (see e.g. Simonsen 2006, ICG 2006). However, until 2006 it was commonly thought that the relationship between Lorosae/Firaku (east) and Loromonu/Kaladi15 (west) was merely one of mild prejudice (Simonsen 2006: 590). Writing in 2005, Simonsen argued that the predominantly regional distinction lacked sufficient clarity to be described as a serious ethnic fault
Each side contained subgroups with diffuse boundaries. Nevertheless, ‘it has been found that the regional cleavage did influence voting behaviour in 2001 [for the constituent assembly]’: support for Fretilin was higher in the east (ibid.).

Analysis of the crisis has often begun with east/west violence. In this section I shall review some of these analyses with the view to put regionalism within the context of past violence and displacement. The emergence of regional identifications as an organising principle for conflict is a prime example of crisis dynamics, which take on a life of their own in future conflict and the interpretation of past conflict. Through the next subsections I argue that what Harrington (2007) calls the ‘vehicilisation’ of regional boundaries is a process rather than aim of violent conflict.

The first part revisits some accounts of the origins of the distinction between east and west. The second part contests the east/west distinction as established fact. The last section argues that past displacement and violence have played a key role in producing regional identifications as a new form of articulating conflict within East Timorese society.

Click here to read the following sections:
- Origins of regional identifications,
- A closer look at the distinction, and
- The role of past displacement and property disputes in emerging regional affiliations (pp. 27-31)

USAID, November 2006, p. 16

"Manipulation and amplification of East (lorosae) – West (loromonu) identities has become a dominant and self-perpetuating feature of inter-group relations in Timor-Leste. This is significant since once these sorts of divisions have been activated and people are targeted because they belong to a particular group, identity tends to become more rigid and antagonistic. The historical record from around the world shows that once these prejudices solidify, there is likely to be little room for moderation or compromise.

Most Timorese interviewed by the team expressed a strong view that the lorosae – loromonu divide is a political manipulation rather than an entrenched fault line with substantive organic roots. However, conceptualization of problems in identity-based terms has nevertheless become ubiquitous within the broader population. This is fuelled in no small part by fear, but also by an apparent willingness on the part of many Timorese to accept the proposition that there are in fact fundamental differences between lorosae and loromonu. This new identity-based schism is therefore likely to persist as a fault line that can be manipulated as an incentive or used as an organizational means for violence in the future."

OHCHR, 2 October 2006, p. 20

"31. The current crisis has been created partially, but exacerbated significantly, by communal factionalism. This factionalism is most commonly articulated in the perception that persons from the east and west of Timor-Leste discriminate against each other. The Commission has heard opposing views on the origin and longevity of this cleavage. On the one hand it is suggested that it is a totally new phenomenon, as evinced by the total absence of the issue in the thousands of
testimonies collected by the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation. On the other, the Commission of Inquiry has been told that it is a long-dormant issue dating from the Portuguese era. Most people interviewed by the Commission agree that the east-west phenomenon was manipulated during the crisis by groups with specific political interests.

32. In the view of the Commission the east-west division is a simplification of a far more complex issue. Timor-Leste has no modern history of concerted political violence between easterners and westerners as unified and opposing groups. However, there are sensitive divisions within Timorese society relating to notions of national and communal identity. The poorly defined national identity, particularly in the absence of a common enemy post-1999, is critical to an understanding of how the east versus west distinction has arisen in recent years. This division infected both F-FDTL and PNTL prior to 2006, as manifested in actual or perceived acts of discrimination and nepotism. Additionally, political interests and communities have become embroiled in the issue.

Engel, Rebecca, August 2006, p. 9
"Despite most people’s perception that the East/West issue was no more than a stereotype, there are historical grievances that have existed between certain groups in the East and others in the West. At times there has been tension among Makasae traders from the East who have a traditionally strong presence throughout the country’s markets. Similarly, following the Indonesian invasion, many in the West were killed, leading the resistance to seek out the more secure base in the Matebian Mountains of the East. The rich agriculture lands of the Western districts enabled farmers to contribute financially to the resistance through their coffee and rice sales. At the same time, the Indonesians had a particularly pronounced presence in the West of the country stemming from their invasion over the mountains along the border.

Unfortunately today, what may have been small prejudices held by some within Timor-Leste, can no longer be assumed to be irrelevant. Whatever the initial motivation of the youth that went on a rampage throughout the capital, the impact has been an increase in fear and anger. The cleavage between East and West exists perhaps in a way it did not before as some people reference this as a rationale for threats and violence. It may be useful to explore this issue more systematically to ensure that divisions within society are not unwittingly being reinforced in the future.

At the same time, to focus alone on East/West cleavages is insufficient. Evidence suggests that there is not one motivating factor behind the violence and destruction. Rather, it appears that each neighbourhood has its unique challenges and issues. Certain families have been targeted because of their political or familial association, others are targets of socio-economic jealousies couched in ethnic sentiments. Yet others are victims of random gang violence, land and property disputes, or historical political tensions that are just now re-emerging as the conditions are ripe. Much of the destruction has occurred on government land occupied in 1999 with the withdrawal of Indonesians; the motivational factors for violence are relevant as strategies to rebuild the destroyed homes and kiosks are developed."
"Many internationals staff and foreigners are sceptical of reports citing ‘ethnic split’ as the cause of recent conflict; certainly an unreported east-west divide could not have arisen or remained hidden since the 1999 referendum? Mild jokes about east and westerner Timorese do circulate, but they are of a trivial nature and furtive at most. Many locals, national NGO staff, and community leaders agree – there is no real problem between east and western Timorese. However, with incomplete knowledge, those inquiring into recent events are perhaps asking the wrong questions.

With enough background knowledge of the situation, one might phrase their questions differently. The use of two ‘magic’ words (or ‘concepts’) entirely changes responses from the Timorese. It would become clear the international community was oblivious to a serious pre-existing internal dispute, one with now threatens to sunder the country in two.

Violence along east-west lines in Timor-Leste is not a new phenomenon. Rather, it has been noted as early as the 1940’s, yet did not receive much attention from foreign scholars present. At the time it was misinterpreted as common conflict between Timorese kingdoms, typical of the colony at the time. The distinction and conflict between firaku and kaladi, or broadly speaking between east and west, has since been widely accepted within Timor-Leste, though not all Timorese would identify with either group.[31] Indeed “on the streets of Dili, among local East Timorese, there is a popular distinction made between talkative easterners (firaku) and more taciturn westerners (kaladi).”[32] The issue, however, has become deeply politicized in recent times.[33]

The terms themselves, firaku and kaladi refer broadly to a geographical distinction between those from the Eastern portion of Timor-Leste, and those from the West. The division is geographic and somewhat political, not per se ethnic using traditional definitions thereof, as each group comprises multiple ethnicities, languages, cultural identities, and language families. (...)

Using these definitions, estimates show firaku make up a minority between 30-40% of the population and kaladi a majority of 50-70%.[37]

Dionisio Babo Soares, current head of the Timorese side of the Truth and Friendship Commission with Indonesia, explains in his 2003 thesis multiple opinions exist on the origin of the two terms. The most popular view sees the terms as being Portuguese derived, referring to the attitudes and comportment of inhabitants from eastern and western TimorLeste. Accordingly, the terms may be phonologically derived from Portuguese, namely the terms, ‘calado’ (silent, quiet, hushed) and ‘vira o cu’ (to turns one’s backside to a speaker in a rude manner). ‘Calado’ was apparently used in reference to westerners “because of their slow, quiet, taciturn attitudes”, while ‘vira o cu’ was used for easterners “because of their temperamental attitude and stubbornness. As a group they would not hesitate to turn their backs – or backsides – to their masters when called to observe instructions.”[38]

Districts Commonly Associated with Firaku and Kaladi

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<tr>
<th>Firaku</th>
<th>Kaladi</th>
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<tr>
<td>Baucau</td>
<td>Dili</td>
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<tr>
<td>Viqueque</td>
<td>Liquiça</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lautém (Los Palos)</td>
<td>Aileu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manatuto</td>
<td>Ainaro</td>
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This most common view sees the two "pidginized" Portuguese pronunciations of kaladi and firaku and perhaps points to colonial roots of the distinction. Such colonial inventions have often served administrative purposes, particularly in Africa (e.g. Hutu & Tutsi in Rwanda);[39] the full origin of this historical split merits additional research.

Regardless of the origin, evidence suggests the stereotypes were popularized by the 1940’s in Dili (though perhaps earlier) where both ‘groups’ congregated seeking access to designated market spaces and property. They made their way to Dili, populated slum areas, created ‘ghettos’, and began running small businesses. Dili itself may once have been considered a Mambai area, e.g. kaladi, but as the colonial capital, it was an obvious draw for Timorese merchants from other areas who flowed into the city from east and west, “controll[ing] transactions in the local market, including the selling of fruits, vegetables, and other items.”[40]

Arguments and violence were common, leading to “street battles and killings among [east and west]. The absence of law enforcement at the time – which concentrated more on protecting the colonial government’s interest – turned this rivalry into a kind of tradition.”[41] There was intense competition over limited land and market space in Dili’s Mercado (now known as Mercado Lama).

As people continued to move into Dili, association with one’s geographic origin as a ‘community’ –loromonu and lorosae – became the norm for both ‘groups’. Individuals likely identified with their respective communities based on perceptions of shared beliefs and a shared common ‘enemy’.[42] Community in this sense refers to the aspect of people’s identity deriving from feeling connected with groups they can identify with, feel recognized by, and thereby feel validated.[43] In this way it seems the concepts and terms, firaku and kaladi, have become ingrained in Timorese culture, and fits with the definitions. The distinction seems to be relegated largely to Dili where both groups are in close contact with one another.”

**Generalities about the agricultural sector (June 2007)**

- The bulk of Timor-Leste’s agriculture is low input/output subsistence farming, with maize as the main crop;
- The country is divided between two different climatic zones, north and south. The south has two rainfall peaks and a wet season extending over 7 or 9 months, while the northern wet season is 3-5 months shorter;
- The agricultural cycle starts in November with land preparation and planting of maize in upland areas, followed by nursery preparation and transplanting of rice in lowland areas, in December/January in the northern part, and a month or two later in the south coast;
- Harvesting of maize begins from February and is completed in April, while harvesting of wet season rice is around June/July in the north and August/September in the south;
- Crops include cereals, cassava, and also sweet potatoes, Irish potatoes, beans and bananas which play an important role as coping mechanism in difficult periods, hence their important contribution to overall food security;
- Livestock production is on a small scale and includes cattle, buffalo, sheep, goats, pigs and poultry.

*FAO/WFP, 21 June 2007, p. 10*
Timor-Leste has a total land area of approximately 14,500 sq. km, of which 600,000 hectares are suitable for crop and livestock production. Approximately 174,000 hectares are arable with an additional 124,000 hectares that can be used as bushed gardens. Untapped land however abounds in some parts of the country. This gives some leeway for mechanization and the possible development of large-scale agriculture. However, the vast majority of farmers grow for their own subsistence and a large proportion of them practice inter-cropping, especially with maize as the main crop. Despite some apparent increase in agricultural production during recent years, the sector suffers from lack of investments that could provide a more business-friendly environment. This particularly concerns market infrastructure and public services like extension and agricultural statistics.

Climatic conditions
Two climatic zones correspond to the northern and the southern part of the country, and they are divided by mountains and a central plateau: The northern part has one rainfall peak within the wet season lasting between four to six months. The coastal areas receive on average from 500 to 1,500 mm of rainfalls yearly, while above 500 m rainfalls vary between 1,500 to 3,000 mm. The southern part has two rainfall peaks during the wet season which lasts between seven and nine months. The first peak is situated in December and February and the second peak manifests itself in May and June. Coastal areas get an average annual rainfall from 1,500 to 2,000 mm, while the areas above 500 m receive more abundant rainfall from 1,700 to 3,500 mm. Starting with the onset of the main, northeast-monsoon, and rainy season, the agricultural cycle in Timor-Leste normally begins in November with land preparation and planting of maize in upland, followed by nursery preparation and transplanting of rice in lowland, in December/January in the northern part, and a month or two later in the south coast. Harvesting of maize begins from February and completes in April, while harvesting of wet season rice is around June/July in the north and August/September in the south. In the south where there is a second rainy season (maize and rice) in areas with some supplementary irrigation. The relative importance of the second crop is however small, approximately 10 percent of the total production areas. Planting is around 90–110 days prior to the harvesting of maize and rice while generally cassava is planted in December inter-cropped with maize.

Farming systems
Low input/output subsistence farming forms the bulk of Timorese agriculture. Shifting cultivation, often based on slash and burns is widely practiced. Soils are shallow in a large proportion. Inter-cropping of maize and cassava is usual on steep slopes situated in the northern area of the country but also in the more fertile terrain found in the southern part of the country. Cowpeas and sweet potatoes are also cultivated at the onset of rains in November. While cereals and cassava are grown in most parts of the country, other crops like sweet potatoes, Irish potatoes, beans and bananas constitute a significant portion of the diet of subsistence farmers and bring useful nutrients, two characteristics which explain their important role as coping mechanism in difficult periods, hence their important contribution to overall food security. The main lowland rice is generally irrigated but also to a smaller extent is grown as rainfed, while upland rice is in most cases rainfed. Irrigated areas are often poorly maintained and managed and some networks need urgent, large scale, repair. Other crops include yam, soybean, taro (swamp and upland), squash, pumpkin, cabbage, onion, peanuts, sago, coconuts, fruits, coffee, and tobacco. The availability of the produce varies rather widely according to the location, season and tradition in line with the fact that the country is very heterogeneous despite its small size.

3.5 Livestock
Livestock raised in Timor-Leste include cattle, buffalo, sheep, goats, pigs and poultry. Production is mostly on a small scale and based on traditional systems with no commercial livestock in rural
areas. Pigs and poultry are mostly raised at household level to meet basic needs of the family, namely: (i) to be used to fulfill social obligations, (ii) to be sold in case of unexpected/unmet cash requirements, and (iii) to be consumed by the family on special occasions. Buffalo is raised mainly to provide animal power in paddy rice farming systems, being meat consumed when available as a by-product. Cattle, buffalo, sheep and goats are considered as family assets and therefore marketed only when strictly necessary, with the exception of the districts bordering West Timor where cross-border trade represents an important source of income due to the higher prices for livestock in Indonesia. Animals are generally left roaming freely on extensive areas with little or no feed supplementation. Overgrazing and land degradation are commonly observed along the Northern coast.

**Timor-Leste is one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world (July 2008)**

- Timor-Leste is one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita income of $389 in 2003, ranking 142nd among the 177 countries in terms of HDI;
- Since 2002, Timor-Leste has not experienced significant progress in poverty alleviation or in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Poverty is increasing.
- Almost half of the population has no access to safe water and 80 per cent have no access to sanitation facilities;
- A rapid and badly managed urbanisation process mainly affects the capital, Dili, where the population doubled between 1999 and 2004 to 174,000 people;
- Unemployment rates are very high in a country with few economic opportunities, in particular for Dili's urban youth, almost half of whom have no job;
- Timor-Leste's population has one of the highest growth rates in the world and more than half of the population is below 20 years old.

**UNMIT, 8 November 2007, p.12**

"The 2006 crisis in Timor-Leste has to be understood in the context of the economic and social circumstances of the country. All levels of human development define Timor-Leste as one of the world’s least developed nations and the poorest in Asia.9 Half of the population lacks safe drinking water, 60 of 1000 infants born alive die before their first birthday, and life expectancy is only 55.5 years. More than 40% of the population lives on 55 cents per day and only 57% is literate. Alarmingly high youth unemployment was a major contributing factor to the outbreak of violence in 2006. The youth unemployment rate staggers at 50%. Three quarters of the population engage in subsistence agriculture but food security is threatened by drought and low productivity. An estimated 45% of children in Timor-Leste under the age of five are chronically malnourished. In rural areas, approximately 30% of children between 7-12 years of age are not receiving education. According to an International Labour Organisation survey of 2006, child labour is prevalent in the agricultural sector, street and market vending as well as domestic work undermining the right of many children to attend school.

HRTJS recognizes the intention of the Timor-Leste Government to make determined efforts to combat poverty and youth unemployment, as expressed in the Government’s Program and the International Compact for Timor-Leste.10 The situation shows a clear link between poverty, frustration and instability. There is an urgent need to develop social safety nets for support to the poor and vulnerable. Public works and cash transfer programs would be some of the measures that could safeguard economic and social rights and stimulate the economy.11 The lack of access to basic services, however, is profoundly affected by the absence of a regulatory and legal framework through which citizens can claim their rights. A draft labour code has not been approved to date, while more efforts need to be undertaken to discuss and adopt a
comprehensive framework on land and property rights. The displacement of at least 10% of the population during the 2006 crisis underlines the critical socio-economic conditions in Timor-Leste, and further aggra
vated the situation by igniting new conflicts between IDPs who are receiving services, and poor communities that are not benefiting from humanitarian assistance. HRTJS recommends that the Timor-Leste Government initiates the drafting of a report on implementation of the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, for submission to the relevant UN treaty monitoring committee. The reporting process and the ensuing recommendations by international experts should assist in a structured, rights-based approach to the alleviation of poverty and provide a framework for the further mobilization of international support.”

OCHA, 16 January 2007, pp. 8-9

"The situation in Timor-Leste is aggravated by prevailing poverty, with one-fifth of the population living on less than $1 per day.6 Per capita income was just $389 in 2003, ranking 142nd among the 177 countries included in the 2006 UNDP Human Development Report,7 below Sudan and the Republic of Congo. Life expectancy for men is at 57 and for women 59 years of age. 44% of the population do not have access to safe water and 81% have no access to sanitation facilities8.

High in-migration rates to Dili and rapid urbanisation of the city have been added stress factors9. Massive population movements into Dili have seen the population double in size to 174,000 people between 1999 and 2004. Unemployment and lack of opportunities have created enormous social tension. The 2004 Census of Population and Housing shows that 8.5% of the population were unemployed nationwide in 2004, rising to 26.9% in Dili and to as high as 44% for urban youth10. These figures are likely to have risen significantly since the census took place. Youth unemployment is expected to remain an urgent challenge. 53% of the population is below the age of 20, and the median age of the population is just 18.2 years. Timor-Leste has one of the highest levels of fertility in the world (7 children per woman), with population growth among the very highest (3.2%).

The infant mortality rate11 is 60, the under-five mortality rate 129,12 and 45% of children under five years of age are underweight. 27% of the population between the age of 15 and 24 are illiterate. Only 15% of the population aged 18 years or older hold a high school diploma, 2% have a university degree,13 and half of all adults are illiterate.14

Since the signing of the Timor Sea Oil Treaty, petroleum has become Timor-Leste’s dominant source of revenue. The IMF is of the opinion that oil and gas wealth offers the potential of a significantly more prosperous future15 and forecasts that, of an estimated $172 million of revenue contained in the central Government budget for 2006, a full 94% ($161 million) can be accounted for by gas and oil revenues.

In spite of this, significant improvements in the socio-economic situation during the next twelve months are not expected. The crisis has disrupted the private sector, causing a significant rise in inflation, from previously 1% to 6% in 2006. Annual economic growth rates of 7% or more will be needed to reduce poverty significantly. There is an urgent need for growth and job creation in the non-oil private sector, to encourage the creation of a business-friendly environment, accompanied by the necessary legal structure."
UNDP, January 2006, p. 2
"Timor-Leste’s low HDI corresponds to a high level of income poverty. The income poverty line is set at $0.55 per capita per day. In 2001 the proportion of the population with an income below this was around 40% – only slightly smaller than in earlier years. Income poverty is more pronounced in rural (46%) than urban (26%) areas. However there are also contrasts between different urban areas: lower in Dili and Baucau (14%) and higher elsewhere.

The poorest people tend be those with least education and they are likely to be working in agriculture. Widows and orphans of the resistance, veterans and former child soldiers are also among the poorest. Especially disadvantaged and vulnerable are those children – one in ten – who have lost one or more parents.

A broader measure of poverty is the human poverty index (HPI) which is a composite measure of deprivation that combines the probability of survival to age 40, illiteracy, the proportion of children who are underweight and the proportion who lack access to clean water. Since 2001, Timor-Leste’s HPI too has improved, but only slightly; progress in survival and literacy has been offset by a deterioration in living standards."

UNSC, 29 July 2008
"38. Despite the best efforts of the Government and its partners, Timor-Leste has not experienced significant progress in poverty alleviation or in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals since the restoration of its independence in 2002. Per capita income in the non-oil economy is about 20 per cent lower than it was in 2002, implying that poverty is increasing. Public investments need to increase in the non-oil-and-gas sectors if the economy is to experience real growth over the next several years."

Australia, Timor-Leste and the Timor Sea oil and gas reserves (June 2007)

- In May 2002, Australia and Timor-Leste signed the Timor Sea Treaty, giving the latter 90 per cent of oil and gas revenues over a small area, but only 18 per cent of the wider and more lucrative Greater Sunrise Field;
- Under international maritime law, most of the Greater Sunrise Field would belong to Timor-Leste;
- Between 2002 and 2006, negotiations between the countries dragged on and it was only in January 2006 that a new agreement was signed. Under the agreement, both countries are to share the revenues 50-50;
- In February 2007, the Timor-Leste parliament ratified the treaty, which came into effect three days later. The Australian government invoke the clause of "national interest" to bypass its parliament.

In 1989, Australia signed an agreement with Indonesia, known as the Timor Gap Treaty, which gave Australia a very generous deal in the exploitation of the vast oil and gas resources located under the Timor Sea. In May 2002, Timor-Leste and Australia signed the Timor Sea Treaty, an interim agreement under which Timor-Leste is entitled to 90 per cent of oil and gas revenue, but which covers a very limited area of the much wider and lucrative Greater Sunrise Field, where oil and gas reserves are estimated at $30 billion.
Under this temporary agreement Timor-Leste's share of revenue from the Greater Sunrise Field is limited to 18 per cent, although most of it lies within what would normally be considered as Timor-Leste maritime boundary under international maritime law (Oxfam, December 2003). While negotiations between the two countries dragged on in the following years, depriving Timor-Leste of a badly needed revenue stream to finance its development, Australia continued to enjoy the large benefits of the exploitation of oil and gas reserves. In January 2006, both countries signed the CMATS treaty under which Timor-Leste is entitled to half of the revenues, giving it a projected $15 to $25 billion in the next 20 years.

With the Timor-Leste Parliament still to ratify the treaty - a condition precedent to the exploitation of the oil and gas reserves - dissenting voices in the country urged the parliamentarians to reject the treaty arguing that giving away half of what would be mostly considered as Timor-Leste's property under international wasn't adequately protecting the rights of the country and that a better deal should be sought (Symonds, Peter, 12 July 2006). Indeed, one of the conditions set forth by the treaty was that Timor-Leste put its claims to rights, jurisdiction and maritime boundaries on hold for the next 50 years (Australian Parliament, June 2007, p.40). On 20 February 2007, the Timor-Leste Parliament finally ratified the CMATS treaty. The Australian government invoked the “national interest” exemption clause to bypass the Parliament and the agreement came into force three days later on 23 February 2007 (La’o Hamutuk, 16 March 2007).

SOURCES:

ABC, 20 February 2007
"East Timor's Parliament has finally agreed to ratify an agreement with Australia over the management of oil and gas resources in the Greater Sunrise field in the Timor Sea. The country's Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta, has welcomed the agreement's approval after a year of parliamentary debate.

"With this agreement, large investors such as Woodside, can start to invest in the Greater Sunrise to manage oil and gas," Dr Ramos-Horta said.

Woodside Petroleum, which operates the Greater Sunrise field, froze the multi-million-dollar project in 2004 as negotiations between Australia and East Timor dragged on. Under the accord, Australia and East Timor will split the royalties from the field 50-50."

Symonds, Peter, 12 July 2006
"Immediately after being sworn in, Ramos-Horta made another pledge to Canberra, vowing to quickly push legislation through the East Timorese parliament ratifying a deal with Australia over the division of proceeds from Greater Sunrise, by far the largest of the Timor Sea oil and gas fields. "We cannot be known as a country that signs agreements and then doesn’t ratify them. Our credibility as a state and as a government is at stake," Ramos-Horta blandly declared.

Alkatiri’s refusal to buckle to Australian bullying in negotiations over the Timor Sea energy resources was one of the main reasons for Canberra’s hostility to his government. While an agreement was finally signed in January, it has not been ratified because of opposition from those who still felt that it conceded resources to Australia that under international law belonged to East Timor. The Australian resources corporation, Woodside, has been waiting on ratification before
resuming development work on the gas field, conservatively estimated to contain $20-25 billion of reserves."

UNIYA, 3 September 2004
"While the politicians make their decision by Christmas, the officials, painstakingly, have to negotiate maritime boundaries in the Timor Gap which is the gap left in 1972 by Australia and Indonesia when they set boundaries for their respective continental shelves. The gap is the seabed opposite East Timor which was under the jurisdiction of Portugal prior to 1976. The delineating of the continental shelf determines which government has sovereignty to exploit oil and gas reserves.

Australia and Portugal never reached agreement about a boundary. From 1953 to 1976, consistent and opposed positions had been adopted by the governments of Australia and Portugal. Mining companies had conducted exploration activities consistent with the licences they were granted by either government. Throughout, Portugal was consistent, insisting that it had control of the resources on its side of the median line between Australia and Timor. Australia was consistent, insisting that it had control of the resources on the continental shelf up to the Timor Trough. Australia argued that this 3,000 metre deep trough was a natural geological feature marking the end of the Australian continental shelf on one side and the end of the narrower and steeper Timor continental shelf on the other side.

By 1989, Australia and Indonesia were unable to reach agreement on a seabed boundary in the Timor Gap even though Indonesia's national interest would have been well served by a maritime boundary finalisation that recognized Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor and its adjacent seabed. Back in 1972, Indonesia had conceded Australia the entire continental shelf under waters less than 200 metres in depth. But international law moved on. By 1989, Indonesia would have been more likely to succeed in a claim for continental shelf up to a median line drawn midway between Australia and Indonesia. Given these complexities, Australia and Indonesia decided to leave boundary agreements well alone, and to finalise a treaty providing a sharing in the government revenues from mining projects in the Timor Gap."

Oxfam, December 2003
"The tens of billions of dollars worth of oil and gas resources contained in the Timor Sea, a 135 nautical mile stretch of seabed between Australia and East Timor, represent the greatest hope for realising the East Timorese men and women's basic needs, including economic development, health and education.

The relative share East Timor will receive from this wealth in the Timor Sea is dependent on where the maritime boundary between Australia and East Timor is drawn. Australia and East Timor have not agreed to permanent maritime boundaries. For more than a year, East Timor has requested that the two nations agree to a timely process for negotiations to determine the maritime boundaries between East Timor and Australia. Despite agreeing to commence boundary negotiations in Darwin in November, the Australian Government has refused to agree a timetable or an end date for resolving the issue."
The Interim Timor Sea Treaty

Until the maritime boundary issue is settled, Australia and East Timor have signed a number of interim resource-sharing agreements on the Timor Sea oil and gas fields. As a new nation, with extremely limited national revenues, East Timor is dependent on timely revenue flow these oil and gas reserves.

The principal interim arrangement is the Timor Sea Treaty, signed in May 2002. The Treaty is meant to be a ‘provisional arrangement of a practical nature’, that is ‘without prejudice’ to the final delimitation of a maritime boundary, as required by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The Treaty confirmed the establishment of a Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) to establish temporary maritime boundaries, (for details see map attached). The establishment of the JPDA was derived from the 1989 Timor Gap Treaty between Australia and Indonesia, a treaty that heavily favoured Australia because the major oil and gas fields lie in territory claimed by Australia extending to the edge of the Australian continental shelf, sending the vast bulk of revenue flows to Canberra.

A generous deal for East Timor?

At first glance the terms of the interim Treaty appear generous to East Timor, which will receive 90% of oil and gas revenue from the Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA). Most of this revenue – worth up to $3 billion - will come from the relatively small Bayu Undan gas field.

However, many East Timorese see Australia’s generosity as limited to only one slice of a greater Timor Sea cake to which East Timor is entitled to lay claim. Because most of the much larger and more lucrative Greater Sunrise Field (estimated to be worth up to $30 billion) lies outside the current JPDA, East Timor is only entitled to 18% of this revenue under the current interim arrangements. In addition, East Timor will receive nothing at all from the Corallina/Laminaria field, currently providing $600 million in revenues to the Australian Government.

Where should the maritime boundary be drawn?

Under international maritime law, East Timor could successfully lay claim to a far greater proportion of the oil and gas reserves of the Timor Sea.

Under current international maritime law, where the distance between two countries is less than 400 nautical miles, a median or middle line between the coastlines is the acceptable mechanism for establishing boundaries through the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Since the early 1980s, such median lines have been the preferred method for countries and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to determine maritime boundaries between countries less than 400 nautical miles apart.

However, the Australian Government has rejected establishing a maritime boundary along a median line between the two countries.

Is Australia Playing Fairly in Negotiations?

A growing number of East Timorese believe that the Australian Government is displaying a lack of good faith in the maritime boundary negotiations.

Under normal circumstances, when a maritime boundary cannot be agreed by two countries, the matter can be referred to an independent umpire to make a determination – the International Court of Justice. However, when East Timor pointed out that it could seek to have the matter independently adjudicated by the International Court of Justice, the Australian Government formally withdrew from the dispute settlement procedures offered by the International Court of
Justice and the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea with respect to maritime boundary disputes.

This tactical manoeuvre, perceived by the East Timorese Government as an 'unfriendly act', has effectively removed any opportunity East Timor might have had for seeking an independent, third party resolution of the maritime boundary dispute. These actions left East Timor with no legal mechanism to establish its boundaries in the absence of cooperative negotiations from Australia.

This has led to growing claims that the Australian government has consistently obstructed any attempt to settle permanent seabed boundaries. Many observers fear that the Australian government will continue to delay negotiations to establish permanent boundaries within a reasonable amount of time because the current interim arrangements for revenue flows favour Australia at East Timor’s expense.

Central to this view is the estimated $30 billion revenue from the Greater Sunrise field, which would lie entirely within East Timor’s maritime boundaries under the UNCLOS median line principle. However, under the current interim arrangements, 82% of the revenue from the Greater Sunrise field goes to Australia and only 18% to East Timor.

The global food crisis and its impact on Timor-Leste's food security (August 2008)

- Global food crisis is largely due to the rise of oil prices which has affected the cost of producing and transporting food. In parallel, a higher demand for agrofuel feedstock has created a surge for the demand of grain. Weather and structural factors have accentuated the tension between supply and demand. On the demand side, the population growth and the improvement in diets also contributed to a higher demand. Speculation is reported to have worsened the situation by increasing market volatility.

- In Timor, rice shortages and a poor harvest led to a sharp increase in food prices in 2007 and made the country increasingly reliant on imports. In March 2008, the consumer price index (CPI) had increased by almost 20 per cent, with higher food and fuel prices accounting for most of the increase.

- The price of Thai rice, which represents 13 per cent of the consumption basket, went up by 200 per cent during the first months of 2008, forcing the government to import more rice for resale to control domestic inflation.

- Poor and unemployed people in urban areas were most affected by the inflation, with significant differences in prices noted between Dili and the districts.

UN HRC, 4 August 2008, p. 4
"4. The Special Rapporteur has listed elsewhere the different factors which have caused the global food crisis. Since then, a consensus has emerged on those factors. A brief summary may suffice here. The increase in the price of oil led to a corresponding rise in the cost of producing food, both because of the costs of fertilizers and pesticides and because of the transportation, packaging and processing costs, widening the wedge between farmgate prices and prices on international markets. It also led to a higher demand for agrofuel feedstock, particularly maize, soybean, and palm oil, creating more competition for cropland between food, feed for livestock, and fuel, and a surge in the demand for grain. The resulting tension between supply and demand was accentuated, on the supply side, by other factors, some purely conjunctural, others more structural in nature. Weather-related events in 2005-2006 led to worse-than-expected harvests in certain major cereal-exporting countries, although the overall level of production remained stable. But more importantly, agricultural production needs time to adapt to price signals, because it requires new investments, the absorption of new technologies or the switch to higher-priced crops. In the current context, the cost of energy, both for production of food and for freight, further
slowed down the ability of producers to respond to demand. And in many regions, agricultural producers have been unable to continue improving their productivity per hectare as they have been doing since the 1960s – either because the productivity is already such that margins for improvement are almost non-existent (as in the EU and in the United States, Canada or Australia), or because of insufficient access to credit and infrastructures, depleted soils, and a system of international trade in agricultural products which has reduced agricultural production in those countries to lower-than-subsistence levels after the 1980s (as in Sub-Saharan Africa where important margins subsist for productivity improvements).

5. On the demand side, the continuation of levels of consumption in the industrialized countries, particularly of animal protein-rich food such as dairy products and meat, which would be unsustainable if they were to be replicated universally, and improving diets in large, fast-growing economies – although they still lag far behind the levels of consumption achieved in the OECD countries –, have further contributed to putting pressure on the markets. These changes in diets multiply the impact of natural population growth, which increases by about 75 million persons each year. Finally, the resulting increase of the prices of agricultural primary commodities on the international markets was exacerbated by (although not caused by) the arrival on those markets of non-commercial investors, who massively shifted to primary agricultural commodities in 2006 and especially 2007; while there remains disagreement about whether this, per se, contributed to the soaring of prices, it certainly did lead to more volatility in the concerned markets."


"The increase in global commodity prices has had a distinct impact on Timor-Leste’s economy. The higher cost of food has pushed consumer price inflation to almost 9% in 2007. At the same time, higher oil prices have led to a surge in petroleum revenue that has enabled a steep increase in government expenditure. This, along with a rebound in industry and services that cater to the international community, led to a rebound of non-oil GDP growth to 7.8 percent in 2007.

The 2006 civil unrest led to widespread supply disruptions and a jump in transportation costs, with many businesses and government offices closed down for extended periods. Subsequently, in early 2007, a failure to secure normal import levels caused a rice shortage which led to a spike in prices. After a short reprieve, prices continued their upward drift, as a poor harvest contributed to higher food prices and increased reliance on imports. As of March 2008, the consumer price index (CPI) was almost 20% higher than two years earlier. As price increases have centered on food items, inflation has impacted negatively on poverty, especially in the urban areas, where unemployment is high. At the same time, the expected positive impact experienced by some agricultural producers has been muted by the prevalence of subsistence-based farming.

In 2007, food prices rose by 13.1%. Given a 60% weight in the consumption basket, this explains almost all of the 8.9% increase in the overall CPI. Food prices continued to increase in the first quarter of 2008, at a 12.9% annual rate over the previous quarter and with the overall food group surpassing the price level experienced during the rice crisis in early 2007. Higher fuel prices have also contributed to CPI inflation but the impact has been relatively limited given the low weight of under 3%. However, as food and fuel prices continue to increase, inflationary pressures are now spreading. The cost of building materials has risen sharply in recent months, especially in Dili and contributing to an increased gap between prices in the capital and the rest of the country.

Rice market developments have had a particularly large impact on consumers. The price of the benchmark Thai rice increased by 200% in just six months from late 2007. Moreover, a range of countries in the region have instituted export bans, limiting availability. Following the shortages in early 2007, and in the absence of formal social safety nets, the Timor-Leste Government has been importing rice for resale to local retailers. This has held down consumer prices. As rice
represents 13% of the consumption basket, inflation would have been much higher if there has been full pass-through of international price increases. With full pass-through, the 12 month inflation rate to March 2008 would have been 17% rather than the 3.7% reported. As stocks of rice imported before the price spike have now been depleted, the government faces a sharp increase in the cost of market interventions. The preliminary 2008 mid-year budget update includes $240 million (about 50% of non-oil GDP) for an Economic Stabilization Fund, which may be used for continued rice purchases.

With the promulgation of the new Tax Law No. 8, on 30 June 2008, the reduction in indirect taxes (a combined reduction of sales tax and import duty from 6% each to 2.5% each) will reduce the cost of imported goods and thus help lower consumer prices.”

Privatisation of land risks undermining Timor-Leste’s food security and its biodiversity (September 2008)

- The government decided in early 2008 to grant large tracts of the country’s scarce agricultural land to foreign biofuel companies, eliciting sharp criticisms from NGO representatives and members of the parliamentary opposition who denounced the move as part of a larger effort to privatise land which will likely undermine the country’s food security

Anderson, Tim, 15 September 2008

"In July 2008 Timor Leste’s Agriculture Minister Mariano Sabino spoke at seminars about agricultural sustainability and food security in Dili and Dare. Yet a few months earlier the Minister had signed a document which could deliver the most devastating blow to Timor Leste’s sustainability and food security since independence.

In a January 2008 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Indonesian-based GT Leste Biotech, Minister Sabino agreed to hand over 100,000 hectares of Timor’s scarce agricultural land to be used as a sugar-cane plantation.

Similarly, in February, Secretary of State Avelinho da Silva signed a contract with the Australian-based biofuel company Enviroenergy Developments Australia for Jatropha development on 59 hectares of land at Baucau. It is rumoured that even larger tracts of land are under discussion for rubber plantations.

These documents signal a move underway in the AMP Government to privatise large tracts of Timor Leste’s land. Yet the country’s Constitution says that “only national citizens have the right to ownership of land” (s.54). This means neither foreigners nor corporations can own land. However the recent agreements would effectively alienate prime agricultural land to foreign corporations through long term leases.

When Minister Sabino’s MOU and the Enviroenergy contract were made public, they attracted widespread condemnation. Demetrio de Carvalho, Director of the Haburas Foundation, said a sugarcane monoculture would threaten East Timor’s biodiversity and that the chemicals used would pollute the country’s water. Fretilin MPs warned this land ‘give away’ was corrupt and would threaten the country’s food supply. NGO representatives argued that large plantations would destroy the soil and that participation in the biofuel industry would push food prices even higher.

The AMP Government responded with counter-claims that biofuel plantations would generate thousands of jobs, provide cash opportunities for neighbouring farmers and add to the country’s
infrastructure and training capacity. Minister Sabino claimed the plantations would not compete with food crops and argued the benefits of biofuels.”

IPS News, 17 June 2008
"The East Timor government’s recent decision to grant vast lands to an Indonesian company to plant sugar cane has been heavily criticised by Timorese society, who are demanding that the government immediately revoke the contract with the foreign company.

"The process on how the agreement was made is not transparent. Public did not know beforehand," said Demetrio de Carvalho, director of Haburas, an East Timorese environmental NGO in an interview with IPS. "The monoculture system that will be applied for the plantation will threaten East Timor’s biodiversity."

To some, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) -- that was signed on Jan. 15 by Mariano Assanamí Sabino, East Timor’s Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries and GT Leste Biotech, the Indonesian company that will set up and implement the project in East Timor -- has compromised East Timor’s national interest over profit.

The MOU states: "The government will grant the company the exclusive concession of 100,000 hectares of unproductive land… to be utilised for sugar plantation, sugar plant and ethanol plant. The government shall accord the company a 50 years contract to land use and extendable to another 50 years… the project are strictly private ventures with no state participation of any sort whatsoever."

The critics are not only from civil society organisations, but also from within the coalition government and Fretilin, the main government opposition party. Mario Carascalao, the president of Democratic Socialist Party -- a political party that is part of the ruling coalition party, Majority Parliamentarian Alliance – made it known for the first time in a parliament session early June about the existence of the MOU.

In an interview with IPS he said, “the government cannot just give 100,000 hectares to someone without knowing the owners of the land… it will create instability. Some politicians believe that when they are in power they become owners of the country and can do whatever they want.”

The sudden agreement, between East Timor’s government and GT Leste Biotech raised peoples’ eyebrows here. Nonetheless, it was strongly supported and recommended by Xanana Gusmao, East Timor’s prime minister and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Indonesian president following their meeting during Gusmao’s recent visit to Indonesia.

(...) Nonetheless, the government’s commitment to produce sugar and ethanol for export is considered as a blunder by its critics. “The agro fuel market is growing, but it is a market craze that is created almost like a bubble, and it may crash any time so it is a risk for a hundred thousand hectares of land,” said Shalmali Guttal, researcher of Focus on the Global South, a Thailand-based NGO, in an interview with IPS during a recent visit to East Timor."

Political background

From decolonisation to independence (1974-1999)
• Timor-Leste’s fight for independence started in 1974, when the Carnation Revolution in Portugal caused political agitation in what had been its south-eastern colony for nearly 400 years.

• Following a short civil war, thousands of people were killed and tens of thousands displaced to West Timor. On 7 December 1974, only days after the FRETILN movement had declared the independence of Timor-Leste, Indonesia invaded the country.

• In 1979, East Timor was declared ‘pacified’.

• Between 1980 and 1987, the resistance led among others by Xanana Gusmao reorganised and a split appeared between Gusmao and the FRETILIN leadership as the former wanted an all-nation resistance including all political parties.

• The imprisonement of Gusmao in 1992 made him the primary political figure of the resistance.

OHCHR, 2 October 2006, pp.16-17

"19. The 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal triggered political activity in Portuguese Timor. The Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) was formed in May 1974 and ASDT shortly thereafter. ASDT became FRETILIN in September 1974. The relationship between these two parties had deteriorated by mid-1975. On 11 August 1975 UDT launched a pre-emptive armed attack upon FRETILIN. The counter-attack was launched on 20 August 1975. This date is now commemorated as the day of the founding of the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL). A short civil war ensued in which thousands of people were killed in combat, hundreds of political prisoners were executed and tens of thousands of civilians were displaced to West Timor. On 7 September 1975 the UDT leadership issued a petition calling for the integration of Portuguese Timor into Indonesia.

Indonesian invasion, occupation and the Timorese resistance

20. On 28 November 1975 FRETILIN made a unilateral declaration of independence. The following day the four other Timorese political parties met in Bali and issued a joint declaration calling for the integration of Portuguese Timor within Indonesia. On 4 December 1975 a FRETILIN delegation left Timor-Leste to seek diplomatic and economic support for the anticipated military confrontation with Indonesia. That delegation included José Ramos-Horta, Mari Alkatiri and Rogerio Lobato. On 7 December Indonesia invaded Timor-Leste.

21. Dili fell quickly to the invading army. Between late 1975 and early 1978 FRETILIN/FALINTIL controlled the interior regions of the country, in which a significant part of the population sheltered. At a FRETILIN national conference that was held in mid-1976, zonas libertadas (liberated zones) and bases de apoio (resistance bases) were established. By February 1979 the last two bases de apoio, which were situated in the west of the country, fell. On 26 March 1979 the Indonesian encirclement and annihilation campaign, Operation Seroja, was discontinued. Indonesia declared that Timor-Leste was pacified.

Reorganization of the resistance

22. By 1980 the resistance was in disarray. Xanana Gusmão, one of three surviving members of the 1975 leadership inside Timor-Leste, was elected as both Commander-in-Chief of FALINTIL and National Political Commissar of the FRETILIN Central Committee. In the face of opposition from the hard-line FRETILIN faction, he adopted a policy of resistance based upon national unity rather than upon FRETILIN partisanship. Timorese society was encouraged to suppress internal political differences and unite against a common enemy. In December 1987 Xanana Gusmão resigned from the FRETILIN Central Committee and severed the connection between FALINTIL and FRETILIN. FALINTIL became the armed wing of the newly created National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM), This Council included FRETILIN, UDT and other nationalist parties. As a result, FRETILIN lost absolute control over the policies of the resistance. The
resulting tensions between Xanana Gusmão and much of the FRETILIN leadership still reverberate within Timor-Leste today.

23. The 1991 massacre at Santa Cruz cemetery, in which Indonesian forces shot into a crowd of people gathered at the funeral of a youth killed by the same forces, killing 271 persons and injuring 362 more, both cemented the national unity basis of the resistance and hastened the rise of the civilian clandestine movement. In November 1992 Xanana Gusmão was captured and imprisoned by the Indonesians, making him the primary political figure of the resistance. Concurrently, the clandestine resistance movement expanded across the country and a popular movement was re-established. On 30 August 1999, 78 per cent of the Timorese population voted for emancipation from Indonesian administration in the United Nations-sponsored Popular Consultation. In anticipation of the result, Indonesian security forces unleashed militias upon the population. Wide-scale burning and looting occurred as 1,500 people were killed and hundreds of thousands displaced."

FRETILIN assumes total control of government (1999-2006)

24. The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) period was one of great change. Party politics returned to the country for the first time since 1975. Critically, many of the 1975 political leaders assumed political prominence in the new domestic environment. In May 2000, FRETILIN held its first major political conference in Timor-Leste in 25 years. The party withdrew from the Xanana Gusmão-led umbrella organization National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), the successor to CNRM, shortly thereafter. PSD was founded in July 2000, followed by PD in mid-2001. In the August 2001 elections FRETILIN won a 57 per cent majority of the popular vote and all but one of the district seats. Ultimately, FRETILIN acquired 55 of the 88 seats in the Constituent Assembly. Significantly, support for FRETILIN was very high in the eastern districts, but much more diluted in the western districts.

25. The UNTAET period also witnessed the creation of many modern State institutions. These include the National Parliament, the Council of Ministers, local government structures, the police service and the defence force. The current functioning of the police service, PNTL, and the Defence Force, F-FDTL, in particular, is hampered by a perceived lack of legitimacy arising from the manner of their creation. PNTL was founded with a core of Timorese who had served previously in the Indonesian police force. During 2000 FALINTIL fighters from many different regions were cantoned in Aileu. This forced cohabitation exposed long-standing political rivalries. The faltering cohesion and discipline were manifest. In late 2000, UNTAET bowed to pressure from Xanana Gusmão and agreed that the selection process for the new defence force would remain an internal FALINTIL matter. This excluded the FRETILIN leadership. On 1 February 2001, FALINTIL was retired and FDTL established.

26. Between October 2001 a transitional administration was formed. All parties participated in Government [?], with Mari Alkatiri as the Chief Minister. The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste was drafted by the FRETILIN-dominated Constituent Assembly. A number of its sections were contentious among opposition parties. The adoption of 28 November as national independence day commemorated the 1975 unilateral declaration of independence by FRETILIN. The FRETILIN flag and anthem, Patria Patria, were adopted as the national flag and anthem. The recently formed FDTL was renamed FALINTIL-FDTL (F-FDTL) in an attempt to link the future defence force with FRETILIN history and overcome the 1987 withdrawal of FALINTIL from FRETILIN by Xanana Gusmão.
27. F-FDTL suffered a broad public backlash, particularly from the veterans’ organizations which came into existence in 2001. Rogerio Lobato made populist appeals questioning the legitimacy of F-FDTL to assume the mantle of FALINTIL. Veterans groups, including Colimau 2000 and Sagrada Familia, became the focal point for anti-F-FDTL rhetoric. Following the 2001 elections these groups agitated for the reconstitution of the defence force after the restoration of independence on 20 May 2002. Rogerio Lobato was considered for but denied the position of Secretary of State for Defence after General Taur Matan Ruak threatened to leave the defence force. Roque Rodrigues was appointed. In the lead-up to 20 May 2002 Mr. Lobato and his supporters organized veterans’ marches in Dili. Upon independence Rogerio Lobato was appointed Minister of Internal Administration."

28. Following the restoration of independence on 20 May 2002 FRETILIN assumed total control over the Government under Prime Minister Alkatiri. While the FRETILIN administration has met many challenges inherent in nation-building, the power imbalance between it and its political opponents has been an issue since 2002 and informed the crisis of April and May 2006. On 15 March 2005 the last major opposition party leader remaining in Parliament resigned as Vice-President of the Parliament and quit the legislature completely.

29. The role of and demarcation between PNTL and F-FDTL within Timorese society has also been a contentious issue since 2002. In early 2003, F-FDTL was called upon to restore public order following attacks by former militia. Rogerio Lobato, by then Minister of the Interior, supported by Prime Minister Alkatiri and the Council of Ministers called upon the United Nations to establish paramilitary police units. The subsequent establishment of the Police Reserve Unit (URP) and Border Patrol Unit (UPF) with responsibility for border patrol, cross-border militia attacks and rural counter-insurgency was not well received by either F-FDTL or opposition parties. The Minister of the Interior stated his intention to expand URP to a full battalion and orchestrated a recruitment process wherein the majority of officers recruited for this unit came from western districts. The Government was unable to secure weapons for URP and UPF during the United Nations executive mandate. On 20 May 2004 this mandate ended. On 21 May 2004 the Government received a consignment donated by Malaysia of 180 HK33 semi-automatic assault rifles which were given to URP. In September 2004 the Government purchased 200 Steyr semiautomatic assault rifles for UPF. Sixty-six FN-FNC semi-automatic assault rifles were also purchased for the Rapid Response Unit (UIR). A further seven F2000 automatic machine guns were purchased, ostensibly for close protection purposes.

30. The record of PNTL intervention in public demonstrations is mixed. On 4 December 2002 a riot occurred in Dili in which a number of people were killed and wounded. Results of the subsequent inquiry into the actions of PNTL have never been made public. In July 2004 UIR officers stopped a demonstration by a veteran in front of the Government Palace. The actions of PNTL were publicly denounced as being heavy handed and lacking in respect towards a leading veteran of the resistance. In April 2005, PNTL successfully controlled the Catholic Church-led demonstrations without resort to violence. The “Church demonstration” presented the FRETILIN Government with its most serious internal political challenge. The Catholic Church issued a statement claiming that the people had lost faith in the Government and sought the removal of Prime Minister Alkatiri. Members of the FRETILIN leadership told the Commission that they believe the demonstration was an attempt to topple the Government and a significant precursor to the crisis in April and May 2006."
Continued high unemployment and slow economic progress in the short time since independence has vastly reduced support for the party, whose leadership was compromised by its shady role in the 2006 violence. Former interior minister Rogerio Lobato was sentenced to 7.5 years in prison for his role in fomenting the 2006 security crisis, while in June 2006, FRETILIN Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri resigned amid allegations that he facilitated the distribution of weapons to civilians, which a UN-sponsored Commission of Inquiry later cleared him of.

FRETILIN's political image problems run deeper, however. Over 95 percent of Timorese are Catholics and the Church is by far the most influential civil society organization. Individual clergy have alluded to support for different parties and individuals, and while the Church does not support any particular party, it has been vocal in condemning FRETILIN's attempt to secularize the education system, for example, and has arguably lent implicit support to an upsurge in anti-FRETILIN feeling, based on public dissatisfaction with high unemployment and slow developmental progress since independence.

And despite FRETILIN's early dominance of East Timor's post-independence politics, it was never the inclusive flag-bearer for Timorese independence that outsiders often perceived it to be. The election cycle was dominated by a small cadre of personalities, most of whom trace their political roots to the resistance era.

Gusmao's rivalry with FRETILIN dates to the mid-1980s, when as military leader of the resistance, he decoupled the FALINTIL military wing from the FRETILIN, aiming to set up an inclusive national resistance coalition and reach out to those alienated by FRETILIN's continued adherence to doctrinaire Marxism.

A divided UN Security Council creates UNMIT (August 2006)

- UNMIT was created on 25 August 2006 and is composed of 1,608 police officers.
- No military component was included as the Council remained divided between Brazil and Portugal favoring the UN taking military leadership and the UK and US supporting Australia's claim to keep the military leadership.
- After having initially expressed several times their preference for the UN to take the lead, Timor-Leste accepted the continuation of the Australian-led multinational force.

UNSC, October 2006
"The Council created UNMIT on 25 August through resolution 1704. UNMIT is composed of 1,608 police and 34 military liaison officers.

The resolution did not include a military component for UNMIT-as recommended by the Secretary-General-nor did it authorise the continuation of the Australia-led multinational force. And there is no formal mechanism to review the operations of the Australia-led international forces and no set deadline for their mandate. The forces are deployed in Timor-Leste under a bilateral understanding with the government.

Disagreement resulted in a split within the Core Group, with Brazil and Portugal favouring a UN component and Australia, the US and the UK backing the continuation of the multinational force. Japan (with a degree of sympathy for the latter position, largely on financial grounds) and France assumed a more conciliatory role in the Council."
Timor-Leste eventually acquiesced to the continuation of the multinational force after formally conveying several times its wish for the military component to be under UN command and control.

After a one-week rollover, the Council eventually decided to authorise neither a UN military component nor an Australia-led force. This was indicative of the lack of support within the Council for pushing the issue further. Resolution 1704, however, requested a report on arrangements between UNMIT and the international forces, and it left open the possibility of considering adjustments to the mandate.

UNSC, 17 August 2006, p. 1
"There is a high possibility that a one-week rollover of the UN presence will have to be adopted. There are still considerable divisions among Council members specifically over two aspects—the military component and whether authorisation should be given under Chapter VII. A final decision on whether the current draft resolution or the technical rollover will be adopted is expected to be taken in consultations tomorrow.

A significant number of members—China, Russia and France in particular—seem to oppose mention to Chapter VII and are concerned at the proposed rejection of the Secretary-General’s recommendation for UN command and control of the military force.

Others—the US and the UK in particular—are not in agreement with the Secretary-General’s recommendation that the Australia-led force now in Timor-Leste should progressively transfer to a small UN “blue helmet” operation under UN command and control.

There has been bitter disagreement in the Core Group on this issue. The uncompromising firm support by the US and the UK for the Australian position, which is opposed to UN command and control, has been interpreted in the Core Group and amongst Timor’s regional neighbours as clear threats of vetoes. Attempts by Japan, France and New Zealand to suggest compromise approaches failed. Neither side, Australia, the US and the UK on the one hand, and Portugal and Brazil on the other, seemed willing to seek middle ground.

Japan, as the lead country in the Council (and with an underlying sympathy on financial grounds for the Australian, US and UK positions) then presented to the Council the draft resolution with language authorising the continuation of the Australia-led force.

At press time, it seemed that Timor-Leste, which has formally conveyed to the Council several times its wish that the military component be under UN command and control, faced with the bleak alternative of accepting the US/UK position or seeing the UN mandate expire on Sunday, may have acquiesced to the US/UK/Australian position."

ABC, 17 August 2006
"Foreign Minister Alexander Downer says Australia does not want the United Nations to take over the next phase of the operation in East Timor.

Australian troops have been leading a 3,000-strong deployment of soldiers and police, which has restored calm to Dili after riots in May which killed 21 people and caused 150,000 to flee their homes.

The majority of the UN Security Council members want to replace that deployment with a UN-led military force. Mr Downer says it would be easier if the United Nations does not run it. He says Australia would stay in command of the military component whether the United Nations takes over or not."

**Presence of Australian troops seen as particularly controversial (July 2007)**

- The motives of Australia's military intervention and its continued presence with about 1,100 soldiers as of July 2007, is an issue of contention between the president Ramos-Horta, its political allies and the FRETILIN party.
- Ramos-Horta has expressed its views that Australia should remain for at least 5 years, while many of FRETILIN members think Timor-Leste should regain its sovereignty as soon as possible and that Australia had a hand in the May 2006 events and the subsequent dismissal of prime minister Mari Alkatiri and his replacement by Jose Ramos-Horta.
- Between May and June, prime minister Mari Alkatiri was the subject of particularly sharp criticism from Australian media turning him into the main person responsible for the crisis. On 19 June, one week before being forced to resign, Alkatiri was accused on an Australian TV show of having formed a "hit squad" to eliminate his political opponents.
- The UN inquiry would not be able to confirm these allegations and charges against Alkatiri would be later completely dropped in February 2007.

**AFP, 26 July 2007**

"East Timor’s President Jose Ramos-Horta on Thursday asked visiting Australian Prime Minister John Howard to keep Australian peacekeepers in the young nation until the end of 2008.

"I told the prime minister that I want to see the ISF (International Stabilisation Force) here at least until the end of 2008 because we've just started to reorganise East Timor's police and defence force," Horta said. (…) The unrest stoked by factions in the military and police left 37 people dead and forced some 155,000 people from their homes. At Dili’s request, thousands of international peacekeepers, headed by the Australian contingent, were dispatched to restore calm.

About 1,100 Australian troops remain on duty in East Timor."

**ICG, 13 June 2007, p. 6**

"Another issue discussed intensively during the presidential campaign was sovereignty, mostly in relation to defence and security. Particularly controversial was the presence of Australian troops, who arrived at the request of the government in May 2006 to help restore order after the defence forces (FALINTIL-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste, F-FDTL) split along regional lines and the national police (Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste, PNTL) disintegrated. 30 Ramos-Horta told his
rallies that he wants to keep the UN and Australian International Security Force (ISF) troops in Timor-Leste for at least five years. Lu Olo and most other candidates said the Australians should leave soon so that Timor-Leste could “regain” its sovereignty.

FRETILIN’s dislike of the continuing presence of Australian troops arises partly from the fact that many members think Australia conspired with Ramos-Horta to launch a coup against Alkatiri’s democratically-elected government in May 2006. Its members also believe that the Australian government is anti-FRETILIN. They claim the Australian ISF campaigned for Ramos-Horta in eastern Timor-Leste and disrupted Lu Olo’s rallies in Dili on 5 May and Ainaro on 3 May. But when questioned on a deadline for withdrawal of Australian troops and UN police, even FRETILIN hardliners respond: “When the F-FDTL and PDTL are ready to take over responsibility for security”.

The PD’s elections manifesto recognises the need for fundamental retraining and capacity building of the F-FDTL and PNTL in order for Timor-Leste to regain control of security. The ASDT/PSD alliance also cites the need for reform and redefinition of the country’s defence and security strategy, and while a few members have talked about possibly fusing the police and military into a single body, no documents are yet available. Lu Olo defended the government’s, and in particular Alkatiri’s role in the Timor Sea and Unitisation Agreement negotiations, arguing Alkatiri achieved an excellent deal for Timor in tough negotiations against a much larger and richer neighbour. Other candidates argued that Alkatiri had sold out Timor-Leste’s sovereignty in the Timor Sea, although they were unable to explain how.

CAVR, “Executive summary”, 30 January 2006, pp. 53-143

"Australia was well-placed to influence policymaking on the issue because the people of Timor-Leste, President Soeharto and the international community regarded its views on the question as important. Australia cautioned against force in 1975 but led Indonesia to believe it would not oppose incorporation. It did not use its international influence to try to block the invasion and spare Timor-Leste its predictable humanitarian consequences. Australia acknowledged the right of self-determination, but undermined it in practice by accommodating Indonesia’s designs on the territory, opposing independence and Fretilin, and giving de jure recognition to Indonesia’s takeover. Australia supported only one General Assembly resolution on the question between 1975 and 1982, provided economic and military assistance to Indonesia and worked hard to win over Australian public opinion and the international community to support for Indonesia’s position."

In a further breach of the people of Timor-Leste’s right to dispose of its natural resources, the Commission finds that Indonesia and Australia concluded the Timor Sea Treaty in 1989 without consulting the people of Timor-Leste or paying due regard to their interests.

Neupert, Ricardo & Lopes, Silvino, September 2006, p. 9
"The problem is complex and there are many explanations of the present crisis. They go from foreign conspiracies to the adverse socio-economic situation and old ethnic enmities. For example, it is frequently mentioned that the crisis is the result of an Australian stratagem directed to install in East-Timor a friendly government willing to make a more favorable deal to Australia for the exploitation of the rich Timor-Leste gas and oil reserves located in the Greater Sunrise
field in the Timor Sea. Other explanations emphasize the incapacity of the government to solve chronic problems of poverty and unemployment, especially among the youth. Furthermore, the poor organization of the Timorese army and police and the frailty of some state institutions are also blamed for the situation. Opposition political parties’ desperation because of its political and electoral weaknesses has also been mentioned as a major cause of the violence. They are accused of hijacking the initial protests to discredit and destabilize the government and, latter on, of promoting the action of street gangs."

CAVR, "Self-Determination", 30 January 2006, p. 32
"141. The people of Timor-Leste had high expectations of Australia based on its proximity, its presence during the Second World War, its relationship with Indonesia and its reputation as a good and influential international citizen.

142. These expectations were not fulfilled until 1999. Australia gave nominal support to the principle of self-determination throughout the decolonisation process, but did not uphold it for most of this period. It favoured only one option, that of integration with Indonesia, even though the weight of evidence from 1974 was that an act of self-determination would oppose integration. Mr Whitlam’s comment to Foreign Affairs officers in 1974 that “I am in favour of incorporation but obeisance is to be made to self-determination” was true for each of the five Australian governments that held office during the Soeharto era.*

143. Australia made it known to Indonesia at the highest levels that it opposed the use of force in Timor-Leste but once this decision was made in mid-1975 it knew and accepted it. It was quick to acknowledge the Indonesian military’s occupation of Timor-Leste and to offer legitimacy through de jure recognition of Indonesian sovereignty. Apart from one occasion, Australia voted against Timor-Leste at the United Nations, was dismissive of Portugal’s responsibility as administering power,† and by its stance and actions undermined international support for Timor-Leste."

Deep political divisions and rivalries culminate in a regime change in the wake of the April/May 2006 unrest

- The obscure role played by Xanana Gusmao in last year’s violence led many in Timor-leste to question his impartiality, although he remains a popular figure.
- Many in Timor-Leste, in particular among FRETILIN members, hold the view that the former president, played an active role in the April/May events and that the violence was orchestrated to destabilize the government of prime minister Alkatiri.
- In September 2006, the media reported on an alleged close relation between Xanana Gusmao and the rebel leader major Reinado as well as allegations that Gusmao may have played an active role in the May unrest.
- In June 2006, prime minister Mari Alkatiri was accused by Vicente 'Railos' of having armed a 'hit squad' to eliminate his political opponents. The accusation was widely publicized by the Australian media and proved decisive in forcing his resignation a few days later. The charges against Alkatiri were officially dropped in February 2007 and Vicente 'Railos' ended up working with Gusmao.
- In March 2006, a few weeks before the outburst of violence, a televised speech by Gusmao where he accused the government's decision of sacking 600 soldiers as 'unjust' and gave legitimacy to the soldier's claim of regional discrimination had a major inflammatory on what
was still a small manageable crisis and led to the first burning and looting of houses belonging to easterners and to their displacement.

**ISN, 7 August 2007**

"Gusmao's role during last year's crisis remains a touchy subject, with a number of incendiary speeches made accusing FRETILIN leaders of orchestrating the crisis, and lending implicit support to the sacked army elements' accusations of anti-western discrimination.

Questions emerged over his campaign team. Vicente 'Railos' was a FALINTIL guerrilla who was sacked from the Timorese Army in 2003. In June 2006 he blew the whistle on the Lobato plot and also accused Mari Alkatiri of involvement in fomenting violence and engaging civilian death squads. The same Railos worked as a district campaign coordinator for Gusmao’s CNRT during the parliamentary elections.

While Gusmao remains widely popular outside of hardline FRETILIN circles, some have questioned whether he has the political tact and eye for detail needed to run an administration. Engaging controversial figures such as Railos in his campaign may have alienated some swing voters disgruntled by the political irresponsibility demonstrated by much of East Timor’s elite since early 2006.

However he remains the political leader most likely to unify East Timor’s divided parties and disgruntled citizens, though his window of opportunity may be short."

**Horta, Loro, 8 June 2007**

"But Ramos Horta is not the only figure to emerge scarred from the recent crisis. Xanana Gusmao himself - the once revered guerrilla commander and father of the nation, looked upon as the pillar of national unity and impartiality - has also suffered a significant demystification. Gusmao's and to a lesser extent Horta's support for the rebel soldiers (most from the western part of East Timor) has led many to question the impartiality of the president. The military crisis - part of an explosion of internecine violence and destruction in March-June 2006 - both divided the nation between a pro-Gusmao/Horta faction and the rest, and created an artificial but bloody schism between the country's east and west.

Gusmao's perceived bias towards the western rebel soldiers greatly undermined his position and prestige, and that of his long-term ally Ramos Horta. This political and ethno-regional divide contributed to the further fragmentation of the vote in the first round. The regional issue also severely undermines the national character of the country's major party Fretilin, with many in the west perceiving it to be dominated by easterners and no longer viewing it as a truly national party. Fretilin also became increasingly associated with the unpopular Mari Alkatiri, who is accused in some quarters of having secured the party leadership in a dubious election.

The only unifying factor behind the various parties that supported Ramos Horta in the second round seems to be a strong distaste of Alkatiri and strong opposition to Fretilin. But these factors by themselves are not enough on which to build a political foundation, and Ramos Horta will need more to assume the role of a president for all Timorese."
Symonds, Peter, 26 February 2007

"The decision earlier this month by East Timor’s prosecutors to drop all charges against former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri barely rated a mention in the Australian, let alone international, media. This was in sharp contrast to the extraordinary campaign of vilification conducted last May and June to justify Australia’s military intervention in East Timor and to force Alkatiri’s resignation.

The accusation that Alkatiri and his interior minister Rogerio Lobato had armed a “hit squad” to assassinate political opponents was the main charge used to oust the prime minister. While Lobato faces trial over the alleged offence, the case against Alkatiri has been dropped for lack of evidence. (…)

The former prime minister has threatened to sue the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), which first televised the allegation in a “Four Corners” program “Stoking the Fires” on June 19. The program dredged up a series of unsubstantiated claims right at the point when the Australian government and its allies in East Timor were desperate for a means to lever the prime minister from office. Alkatiri told the Sydney Morning Herald: “The ABC damaged my image, my family and my party.”

The vilification of Alkatiri began before the dispatch of Australian troops to East Timor in late May. The Australian media published story after story denouncing Alkatiri as an aloof autocrat, blaming his Fretilin government for the political unrest wracking the small nation, and openly urging his removal. Amid a series of violent provocations by rebel soldiers, the Howard government, with the support of President Xanana Gusmao, pressured Alkatiri into agreeing to the entry of Australian troops. (…)

The decision to drop any charges against Alkatiri was foreshadowed last October when a special UN commission of inquiry found no evidence “on the basis of which it could recommend that Mari Alkatiri should be prosecuted for being involved in the illegal possession or use of weapons”. The report called for further investigations to determine if Alkatiri knew about the illegal arming of civilians by interior minister Lobato. But four months later the case has been dropped.”

ICG, 10 October 2006, pp.7-8

"By the end of February, the number of protestors had risen to 593, and on 16 March, when they still refused to return to post, Matan Ruak ordered them dismissed. When asked about it later, he said impatiently, “we had given them every chance. What else could I do?”33

Alkatiri supported the decision; Xanana Gusmao, who was out of the country at the time, did not. On 23 March, he addressed the nation in an emotional televised broadcast that all agree sharply worsened the situation – “27 minutes of incendiary words”, was how one local journalist phrased it.34 The president called the dismissals incorrect and unjust and warned commanders that failure to address the complaints would lead to more divisions. He said if 400 soldiers left their barracks, it suggested there was a serious problem within the institution. Discrimination had long existed within the F-FDTL; it was not just a question of lack of discipline. He said if this issue was not properly resolved, it would leave the impression that the F-FDTL was just for easterners who believed that only they had fought the war, and all the others, “from Manatuto to Oecusse”, were “militias’ children”.35 The fact that he quoted directly from the petition seemed to give additional legitimacy to the complaints.
The speech had an immediate impact in two ways. By so clearly and publicly undermining Matan Ruak’s decision, it soured the relationship between two men whose alliance had been a mainstay of the resistance for more than twenty years, thus opening the way for further efforts by FRETILIN to make its influence felt within F-FDTL.36 And by legitimating western grievances, it seems to have led directly to attacks on easterners in Dili by a few petitioners and others rumoured (without evidence) to have Rogerio’s backing. By 27 March, seventeen homes had been burned to the ground, and easterners were crowding on to buses to flee the city. The violence led Alkatiri to state that only FRETILIN could ensure stability, in turn heightening suspicions in the anti-Alkatiri camp that the rioting had been provoked for political ends.37"

**Engel, Rebecca, August 2006, p. 2**

"The ex-Prime Minister is considered by some to be a scapegoat of an Australian (and American) driven plot to remove a difficult man with Portuguese affinities from power. Others are certain that there was a very strategic effort to create divisions within the military in order to weaken the institution considered more loyal to the President and/or to ensure it would defend the party interests as necessary.

The ex-Prime Minister’s ultimate downfall, however, was not altogether surprising given his unwillingness to address the people constructively prior to mass demonstrations in Dili. What is more striking is that divergences of opinion that have existed for years have come to light. Beneath the cries of discrimination and the fear that has emerged between East and West, is a lack of agreement on the approach to government and a lack of mechanisms for communication and decision making - not just for day-to-day policy but also with regards to fundamental issues of politics and the future of the State being built.

The lack of political agreements ensured that political divisions were reinforced and woven into the fabric of the State and has informed its formation up until the breaking point. Examples can be found in the formation of police and military, and the subsequent alleged politicisation of its leaders. Use of budgetary resources has also been contentious including the investment priorities and non-transparent/ nonaccountable tendering processes. The targeted linking of the State to the Fretilin party has left opposition parties always on the defensive and political appointees are at times more concerned with party politics than national service."

**Martinkus, John, 20 September 2006**

"Two weeks ago we revealed written orders from East Timorese President Xanana Gusmão to the rebel commander Alfredo Reinado that showed a close relationship between the two at the height of the crisis in Dili in May this year. That was followed by front-page revelations in The Australian that Gusmão paid at least a share of Reinado’s hotel bill during the crisis.
Now, former East Timorese police commander, Abilio ‘Mausoko’ Mesquita, who is in jail for his role in the violence, has claimed in a leaked statement that Gusmão himself ordered him to attack the house of the Commander of East Timor’s military, Brigadier Taur Matan Ruak, on 24 and 25 May."

**The Australian, 12 September 2006**

"ALFREDO Reinado, the East Timorese army deserter whose actions ultimately led to the ousting of prime minister Mari Alkatiri, has allegedly received financial help from the country's President.

There are claims that the office of President Xanana Gusmao, a long-term rival of Dr Alkatiri, paid an outstanding hotel bill on behalf of Major Reinado while the rebel leader was on the run earlier this year.

The bill covered the six weeks Major Reinado spent at an isolated, colonial-era mountaintop lodge called the Poussada, outside the coffee-growing town of Maubisse, 75km southeast of Dili.

Staff at the hotel, including assistant manager Julio da Costa, claim the bill was paid by the office of the President.

And Major Reinado, although sceptical of claims the bill was paid by Mr Gusmao, said he could not meet the entire account and he had heard reports it was picked up by the President or his Australian-born wife, Kirsty Sword Gusmao.

The claims, denied by Mr Gusmao's office, raise further questions about the coup-like strike by army officers that ultimately helped the President drive Dr Alkatiri out of office in late June this year.

Angered by what he believed was heavy-handed treatment by Dr Alkatiri and his former interior minister, Rogerio Lobato, in quelling a political protest that left six killed, Major Reinado and 20 other supporters, mostly military police under his command, deserted for the hills.

While a deserter, Major Reinado remained loyal to his commander-in-chief, with Mr Gusmao issuing an order, seen by The Australian, for him and his group to initially base themselves in Aileu, 50km southeast of the capital. But following escalating violence in Dili, Major Reinado moved deeper into the sanctuary of East Timor's mountains, establishing a base at the Poussada.

During the peak of the political crisis in June, Major Reinado's staunch anti-government rhetoric and actions provided a rallying point for anti-Alkatiri forces."

**ETAN, 12 September 2006**

"Associate Professor Damien Kingsbury, Director, Masters of International and Community Development School of International and Political Studies at Deakin University writes:
A report that East Timor’s President Xanana Gusmao paid the hotel bill for escaped rebel Major Alfredo Reinado is consistent with Gusmao's attempts to rein in the conflict the had threatened civil war in East Timor earlier this year.

Gusmao paid the hotel bill as part of his request to Reinado that Reinado stay in one location, to ensure there was no further conflict. In the circumstances of that time, that arrangement was key to limiting the then escalating conflict between factions in the military and police.

The inference that Gusmao supported or otherwise had links with Reinado remain unsubstantiated and inconsistent with Gusmao's public position on the conflict at that time. Such allegations, though, continue to be beaten up by misguided activists and journalists who appear to believe that support for East Timor means support for Fretilin means support for Alkatiri. This logic, though, does not follow."

July 2007 elections lead to formation of a new coalition government headed by Xanana Gusmao (August 2007)

- Following the June 2007 parliamentary elections and a month-long deadlock a new government was formed on 8 August and headed by former president Xanana Gusmao as prime minister.
- Despite having won the parliamentary elections, FRETLIN party is excluded from a government composed of a coalition of parties.
- On 9 May, former foreign minister and prime minister Jose Ramos-Horta was elected president winnin close to 70 per cent of the votes against FRETILIN candidate Francisco Guterres "Lu Olo"

Reuters, 8 August 2007
"Independence hero and former president Xanana Gusmao was sworn in as East Timor's prime minister on Wednesday as simmering violence continued in some districts loyal to the former ruling party.

Breaking a deadlock after parliamentary polls more than a month ago, President Jose Ramos-Horta on Monday appointed Gusmao's coalition of parties to govern after no single party won a majority.

Ramos-Horta's move sparked violent protests by supporters of the former ruling party, Fretilin, which claims the right to govern and has branded the president's move as unconstitutional."

UN News Service, 12 July 2007
"Timor-Leste’s Court of Appeals has formally proclaimed the results of last month’s national parliamentary elections in the small Asian country, where no single political party has won an absolute majority, a United Nations spokesperson said today.

Five parties and two coalitions have won parliamentary seats in proportion to their share of the vote on 30 June, in line with expectations following preliminary results, according to a statement
released today by the spokesperson of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. But no party will have an absolute majority of the 65-seat parliament, where members will serve five-year terms.

The statement said a date for the start of the new parliament has not yet been set and political parties have begun discussions about the formation of a new Government. The parliamentary polls follow elections earlier this year that led to the swearing-in of José Ramos-Horta as President."

ICG, 13 June 2007, p.1
"Timor-Leste has just elected a new president and will hold parliamentary elections on 30 June 2007. Successful elections could strengthen political institutions and thus be an important part of nation-building for a country badly shaken by civil unrest in 2006, its fourth year of independence. Issues that arose in the presidential campaign are still very much alive – in particular, national sovereignty (the reliance on international peacekeepers); use of Timor Sea revenues; and justice for the 2006 violence. But personalities rather than party platforms are likely to determine the outcome of the parliamentary contest, and no one is offering concrete solutions to the country’s many problems.

The 2007 vote for president was the first national-level election conducted according to Timor-Leste’s own laws and the first run by Timorese authorities. Eight candidates stood in the first round on 9 April, but because none won a majority, a run-off election was held on 9 May between Francisco Guterres “Lu Olo” from Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (FRETILIN), the party in power since before independence, and José Ramos-Horta, Nobel peace prize laureate, former foreign minister and, since July 2006, prime minister. Ramos-Horta won the second round with nearly 70 per cent of the vote.

This was the first chance for the people of Timor-Leste to register their opinions at the ballot box about FRETILIN, and the verdict was resounding disapproval. Many consider its poor showing to be a vote against former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and other FRETILIN leaders and say that unless there is a change in the leadership, the party will do even worse in the June parliamentary contest.

The presidential results indicate that a new party headed by former President Xanana Gusmão, Congresso Nacional De Reconstrução de Timor-Leste (CNRT), is likely to win 20 to 25 per cent of the vote and then ally with several smaller parties to form a parliamentary majority and the next government."

A crippled judicial system create the perception that impunity is and will continue to be tolerated (August 2008)

- Despite some progress, the Timor-Leste justice system continue to suffer from lack of capacity according to a UNMIT report published in August 2008. Only the most serious crimes are being prosecuted. The backlog of cases continued to grow to an estimated 4,700 criminal cases.
- In April 2008, Timor's president pardoned Rogerio Lobato, a former minister who was sentenced to 7 years of prison for arming a civilian hit squad during the 2006 violence. Lobato had only served 5 months of his sentence before being pardoned.
- There is a growing perception in the population that impunity is tolerated.
• A report by HRW, released a few weeks before the 2006 unrest started, found alarming levels of human rights abuses committed by the police since 2002 as well as a lack of police accountability.

UNMIT, 21 August 2008, p. 3
"4. In relation to the justice system, some progress was made. An increasing number of Timorese judicial personnel worked as judges, prosecutors and public defenders, and their presence in the districts increased. However, further steps are needed to strengthen the system, including the functioning of district offices. In spite of an increase in human resources, the backlog of cases continued to grow to an estimated 4,700 criminal cases. Gender-based violence remained a major human rights concern. Cases were frequently resolved through traditional dispute resolution mechanisms which were not always victim-centered and which were not regulated by a legal framework. While some progress was made towards holding accountable those responsible for criminal acts during the 2006 crisis, despite the assistance of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) funded international prosecutor, limited logistical and human resources in the Prosecutor General's Office hampered progress. Meanwhile, the Parliament had not yet discussed the final report of the Commission for Truth, Reception and Reconciliation (CAVR) which it received in November 2005."

SMH, 21 April 2008
"East Timor's president will pardon a former government minister who armed civilian hit squads during the violence that destabilised the nation in 2006. Rogerio Lobato is one of 80 criminals to be pardoned on the anniversary of East Timor's independence next month.

Analysts have reacted with alarm, saying East Timor's cycle of violence will not end until people are held accountable for their actions.

Lobato, a former Fretilin government minister, was last year jailed for more than seven years on charges of manslaughter and illegally using firearms to disturb public order. A panel of judges said his actions had contributed to the violence and instability in East Timor in 2006. Lobato has only served about five months of his sentence as he was allowed to fly to Malaysia last August for medical treatment and is yet to return.

Ramos Horta - who last week resumed his presidential duties after recovering from a rebel attack that almost killed him - said East Timor needed to foster a culture of forgiveness if it was to move forward. "Rogerio Lobato will be one of more than 80 beneficiaries of the presidential pardon," he said during a speech to parliament. "To know how to forgive is a virtue that we need to cultivate in our hearts. Let us recognise the day that our national independence was restored with a day of pardon and clemency among Timorese."

International Crisis Group (ICG) South East Asia Project Director John Virgoe described the decision as "very unfortunate". "They have had several rounds of amnesties in East Timor now and there has to come a point where people start being held responsible for their actions," he said. "Otherwise you are sending a message that you can get away with this stuff.

"You can get away with fostering violence for your own political ends if you are a politician, if you are an ordinary person you can burn down your neighbours house and you will get away with it."
UNSC, 1 February 2007, p. 8

"27. The challenges confronting the judicial system outlined in my previous report (see S/2006/628, paras. 81-88) continued to impede its effective functioning. In recent months, arrests in Dili, in particular, have created an additional backlog of cases. The capacity of the judicial system promptly to deal with its backlog and with the growing number of cases is limited, requiring it to prioritize the most serious crimes. A large number of those arrested for lesser offences were released by judicial authorities owing to capacity limitations as well as to technical deficiencies in the submission of case files. Increasingly, reports of intimidation of witnesses and the absence of mechanisms for witness protection are hampering prosecutions. These factors, coupled with a general lack of understanding among the population about judicial procedures have contributed to a growing perception that impunity is tolerated. UNMIT and UNDP are working with national authorities to overcome these bottlenecks and to facilitate longer-term capacity-building within the justice system institutions, including through UNDP’s justice support programme. This programme will require additional donor funding, however, if it is to further expand its activities to respond to evolving needs. UNMIT is in the process of recruiting qualified personnel to initiate, in collaboration with the relevant Timorese authorities and civil society, the comprehensive judicial review mentioned in my previous report (see S/2006/628, para. 88).

28. Furthermore, UNMIT is recruiting experts to establish a Serious Crimes Investigation Team which will work with the Prosecutor-General to complete the outstanding investigations into serious crimes committed in 1999 initiated by the former Serious Crimes Unit. In preparation, UNMIT retained five Timorese specialists to restore the records of the Serious Crimes Unit, which were destroyed during the violent incidents in May 2006. The report of the Commission for Truth, Reception and Reconciliation was disseminated in all districts by the Technical Secretariat that succeeded the Commission which was set up by President Gusmão on 20 December 2005. The President reiterated his support for the work of the Technical Secretariat and asked it to continue its work until a follow-on institution is established by Parliament. The bilateral Indonesia–Timor-Leste Commission for Truth and Friendship also continued its work in relation to the events of 1999."

HRW, April 2006, p. 16

"Since independence in 2002, police abuse has become one of East Timor’s most worrying human rights problems. Police officers regularly use excessive force during arrests and beat detainees once they are in custody. The police and other state institutions have often failed to respond to incidents of police abuse with appropriate disciplinary measures or criminal proceedings.

In the course of our research the number of accounts of severe ill-treatment, including torture that former detainees and prisoners described to us at the hands of police officers was striking. Several people whom Human Rights Watch interviewed had had to be hospitalized because of the severity of their injuries. While this level of severity of abuse may not yet be systematic or systemic in East Timor, the ease with which we found illustrative cases was alarming.

In his February 2005 report to the Security Council on the United Nations mission in East Timor, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted that major problems within the East Timor police force remained a cause for concern, and that "reports of police misconduct, including excessive use of force, assaults, negligent use of firearms and various human rights abuses, have increased since May 2004." He continued that "lack of transparency and a slow-paced investigation mechanism have contributed to a poor level of police accountability." Six months later, he again noted that "although the skills and competencies of the East Timorese police have been considerably
enhanced, instances of excessive use of force and human rights violations by police officers, including against members of political opposition groups, continue to be reported.”

**Timor government asks UN to drop its investigation into 1999 violence to maintain good relation with big neighbour (October 2008)**

- In October 2008, President Ramos-Horta asked the UN to drop its investigation into the 1999 violence, in order to maintain good relations with Indonesia.
- The UN has on 26 July 2007 refused to cooperate with the Indonesia-Timor-Leste Commission on Truth and Friendship (CTF), set up in 2005 to look into the violence which surrounded the 1999 bloody elections, because the CTF's terms of reference include possible amnesties for serious crimes, including crimes against humanity.
- A coalition of international and national NGOs sharply criticized the CTF describing it as not credible and unable to seek justice or even truth regarding events in Timor-Leste in 1999.

**Reuters, 13 October 2008**

"East Timor president Jose Ramos-Horta said on Monday he wants the United Nations to drop its investigation into bloodshed surrounding a 1999 independence vote from Indonesia.

Leaders in East Timor and Indonesia said in July that the issue was closed after expressing regret at the findings of a joint truth commission that blamed Indonesian security and civilian forces for "gross human rights violations".

But the United Nations, which boycotted the truth commission, has said it will continue to back prosecutions through the Serious Crime Unit, which it set up to assist East Timor's prosecutors' office in probing the violence in which the United Nations says about 1,000 East Timorese died.

"As chief of state, I don't authorise or allow the UN investigation into the 1999 crimes. Our position is keeping good ties with Indonesia," Ramos-Horta told Reuters during a visit to Soibada district, about 100 km (60 miles) from the capital, Dili."

**AFP, 31 July 2007**

"Jakarta – Indonesia's foreign minister Hassan Wirayuda has called on a commission set up to examine violence surrounding East Timor's 1999 independence vote to ignore a UN boycott threat, a report said Tuesday.

(…) "Whatever the world says, including the United Nations, let them do so... Just be self-confident about our own process, because the governments of both countries consistently support the commission," Wirayuda said in Manila, according to Kompas newspaper. He said that the UN had offered no alternative solution to the CTF and also had an interest in their officials not testifying. "They would not want to have what is being called fraud by UNAMET to be uncovered," the minister said, referring to the UN body that organised the independence referendum in East Timor.

Indonesia has long accused UN workers of favouring pro-independence supporters during the ballot and instigating some electoral fraud to help them.

East Timor and Indonesia, which ruled the former Portuguese colony for 24 years, established the CTF in 2005. The commission is aimed at reconciliation rather than prosecuting those suspected of perpetrating crimes."
UN, 27 July 2007
"The terms of reference of the CTF envisage the possibility that that body may recommend amnesty, and do not preclude it from making such a recommendation in respect of acts that constitute a crime against humanity, a gross violation of human rights or a serious violation of international humanitarian law. The United Nations' policy, however, is that the Organization cannot endorse or condone amnesties for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or gross violations of human rights, nor should it do anything that might foster them. It is the firm intention of the Secretary-General to uphold this position of principle.

Unless the terms of reference are revised to comply with international standards, officials of the United Nations will, therefore, not testify at its proceedings or take any other steps that would support the work of the CTF and thereby further the possible grant of amnesties in respect of such acts."

ETAN, 24 May 2007
"In an open letter to the presidents of Indonesia and Timor-Leste, a worldwide coalition of three dozen human rights organizations led by groups from Indonesia and Timor-Leste have called on President Yudhoyono and President Ramos-Horta to close the bilateral Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF).

The letter says, "It is obvious from its mandate and its performance that the CTF is not a credible mechanism to seek justice or even truth regarding events in Timor-Leste in 1999, let alone from 1975 to 1999." The full text of the letter is available in English, Bahasa Indonesia and Tetum.

"The CTF cannot satisfy the pressing need for justice from victims, victims' families, and the entire population of Timor-Leste," said signer Yasinta Lujina of La'o Hamutuk, a Timor-Leste-based organization. "Without justice, the wounds of the past cannot heal and a lack of respect for the rule of law will continue to destabilise Timor-Leste."

"The creation of the CTF was an act of political expediency that was doomed from the beginning", said Dr Mark Byrne, of the Australian Coalition for Transitional Justice in East Timor. "Its terms of reference permit it to recommend amnesties for the perpetrators of the most brutal human rights violations.""

WSWS, 6 June 2006
"In another article, the Jakarta Post reports: “Machete-wielding mobs torched houses and ransacked government offices, including the attorney general’s where they succeeded in breaking into the Serious Crimes Unit. Files involving all of the most prominent Indonesian defendants in the 1999 massacres that followed East Timor’s bloody vote for independence, including former General Wiranto, were stolen, said Attorney General Longuinhos Monteiro.”

Attorney-General Longuinhos Monteiro told the BBC on May 30 that his offices had been looted on several occasions and up to 15 percent of the criminal archive stolen. The Australian NEWS.com.au reported: “UN security guards fled when looting began. Attorney-General Longuinhos Monteiro confirmed at least 12 percent of all files had been stolen.”
Although the extent of damage is still not very clear, it is certain that the records of both the Prosecutor General’s Office and the defunct Serious Crimes Unit have been looted. For the sake of argument, one could ask, why would a mob be interested in looting the records of the defunct Serious Crimes Unit and particularly the case file of General Wiranto? I am afraid ordinary citizens in Timor-Leste [East Timor] may find it very difficult to answer."

**Climate of political instability fuelled by rumours of a resurgence of east-west divisions (October 2008)**

- During October, the political/security climate was reported to deteriorate due to several factors: plans by the political opposition to organise a demonstration, rumours of region-based tension in the police force and dissatisfaction among eastern officers of the defense force about the investigation of the 2006 crisis
- As a consequence of the rumours and unstable political climate, IDPs in camps are reported to feel less secure to return.

**AFP, 12 October 2008**

"An opposition plan for a massive march on East Timor's capital and rumours of tension in the police force are raising concerns of a return to instability in the tiny Southeast Asian nation.

An unsigned pamphlet has been circulated in Dili complaining of official discrimination against Timorese from the impoverished country's western region in favour of those from the east. The pamphlet also threatened protests against the government if an easterner is appointed the new police commander when the post becomes vacant in November.

Such claims of regional discrimination sparked a mass desertion by members of the armed forces, leading to fighting in 2006 between military, police factions and gangs in street violence that killed at least 37 people.

With international troops still patrolling the streets in the wake of that violence that also forced thousands to flee their homes, rumours of a return to instability have caused jitters among some Timorese in the capital.

(...) The opposition Fretilin party has also announced plans for a large protest against Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao, over his long-standing claim that the formation of his coalition government in 2007 was against the constitution. Opposition leader Mari Alkatiri has promised thousands of protesters will turn out, but has not yet set a date for the march.

(...) Edward Rees, a Dili-based analyst and former United Nations security adviser, said the tensions in the police force were not an immediate threat.

But he warned they would likely lay the groundwork for violence "within 12 to 24 months" of the departure of the roughly 2,500 international soldiers and police stabilising the country.

Rees said the pamphlet was part of a bitter internal power struggle in the police with strong parallels to similar tensions in 2004, which in turn helped lay the basis for the 2006 crisis."

**HCC, 7 October 2008, pp.1-2**

"The Timor – Leste political leadership is currently working at addressing political instability arising from the perceived threat of three kinds of discontent:
- The proposed Fretilin peace march: Some Government officials seem concerned that the peace march could become a reality. A recent special meeting of the Prime Minister and senior leaders discussed this question based on misinformation that there had been gatherings of Fretilin personnel which were thought to be a precursor to the demonstration. This situation is being monitored by UNMIT Political Affairs in Dili and the Districts and it seems that there is no planning for the demonstration within the party at this time. Indeed, it is likely that the march would be difficult to organise as there are concerns over unity within the Fretilin party.

- Issues within the PNTL: An anonymous letter was circulated in September which mentioned several issues including: the East –West tensions; the events of 11 February; potential early elections and; potential demonstrations by PNTL members. The motivation for this letter was cited as fears that an Easterner would replace the commander of the PNTL. It seems that there is a sense of dissatisfaction within PNTL with the leadership of the institution and there is political manoeuvring going on within the institution as certain individuals vie for leadership positions. The letter can be seen as part of this process. There is however, no idea as yet when a new commander will be appointed and a mobilisation of people into demonstrations is unlikely.

- F-FDTL and officers’ testimony at the request of the Office of the Prosecutor General: The officer’s statements are with the Office of the Prosecutor General in relation to the distribution of weapons in the 2006 crisis. Fretilin Secretary General Mari Alkatiri is publicly defending those officers as, defenders of the Constitution. Further to this, there are signs of dissatisfaction among veterans groups from the East if there are actions against (if their immunity as members of the Council of Defence and Security is waved) these FFDTL members. There are no signs of demonstrations in relation to this as yet.

It seems that old issues relating to East/West tensions that have not been addressed are coming up. Even if there is no evidence of demonstrations as yet, rumours are important and can be reacted on if people begin to believe them. It also seems that the impact of these rumors is already being felt in the IDP camps with feelings of insecurity coming up in IOM’s monitoring regarding intentions of IDPs to return/resettle from the camps. It will be important to see how the rumors will affects the returns that have already taken place.

HCC, 3 October 2008, p.3
"In terms of post recovery needs, there are gaps in addressing underlying issues to the crisis including land and property (there is need to bring in ARD activities for instance with the Ministry of Justice, in this regard) and a lack of adequate housing/a social housing policy and a social safety net.

Additionally, regional divisions seen to emerge during the 2006 crisis are not currently being sufficiently addressed and there is need to build a stronger national identity that overcomes regional/group identities that anticipates risks of manipulation and further community conflicts."

**Land, Housing and Property issues**

Customary systems of land and natural resource management are complex and widespread in Timor-Leste (August 2008)

- Most of the land and resources in Timor-leste is managed through customary authorities.
There can be multiple levels of ownership relating to different levels of access and control over resources. This horizontal separation of ownership is quite common, with trees being owned by one person and land by another.

**Oxfam, November 2003, p. 26**

"Customary systems of land and natural resource management are complex and widespread in Timor Leste. This finding is consistent with the existing literature on land and natural resource tenure in rural Timor Leste.

Land and natural resources continue to be managed through customary authorities across most of Timor Leste and customary rituals associated with ancestral lands, forests or water resources are widely practiced. In many locations, especially remote areas, customary practice is the only existing system of land and resource management. Land and natural resource ownership can also be quite complex in Timor Leste and there appears to be much variation from place to place. Multiple levels of ownership that relate to different levels of access and control over resources are common. Any one family’s holdings may include multiple non-contiguous plots, with different levels of access. A particular individual may have one land plot that is his or hers by inheritance, a second plot which is his or hers but co-owned with another family member, a third plot which might be co-owned with a cousin. Moreover, he or she may own particular trees in an area that is not his or her land. This horizontal separation of ownership where trees are owned by one person and land is owned by another is very common.

In determining land ownership there are different levels of control and access to land that an individual has access to. They may have access to some individual land. They may have access to some family, clan, and village land. Some of this land may be lying fallow (not actively worked), but rights are retained over this land. There is also land that is considered village reserve land which may not be farmed or used now but which may be available for use later. Permission to use this land must be sought from the relevant customary authority. This is especially the case for someone from outside the community. It may also be difficult to distinguish between landlessness and someone without access to valuable land. Irrigated rice land, for example, is valuable land. People from within the community who do not own valuable land tend to borrow land sometimes without any formal system of payment or exchange. The borrower may be responsible for fence-building to keep livestock out of the fields which can be considered a form of ‘rent’.

**Fitzpatrick Daniel, McWilliam Andrew, Barnes Susana, August 2008, pp. 23**

"Customary Systems Remain Strong despite Indonesian Occupation"

1. Customary land systems have been highly resilient in the face of Portuguese colonisation and Indonesian occupation. After episodes of displacement during Indonesian occupation, customary land systems have reconstituted themselves around their core principles of origin and alliance.

2. Origin groups define themselves as first possessors of certain areas of land. They are direct descendants of a mythical first settler. They have authority over land in most parts of rural Timor Leste. This authority is widely accepted by other groups. It is closely associated with social and moral order.

3. Origin groups form marriage-based alliances with subsidiary households on their traditional lands. Historically, these alliances have been mechanisms for incorporating in-migrants into local social hierarchy. Male in-migrants would marry women from the origin group so as to form a subsidiary household on origin group land.
4. Membership of an origin group is defined by kinship rather than territory. The boundaries of origin group land may be difficult to define and demarcate. Origin group land may not be contiguous. Sometimes areas of origin land will be cultivated in relatively dispersed settlements.

5. Origin group land tends not to coincide with current administrative boundaries, including hamlet (povocao/aldeia) and village (suco) boundaries. There is a considerable amount of potential overlap in relation to origin group claims. There is also a degree of negotiability: origin groups tend to recognize when their ancestral claims to boundaries cannot be enforced due to political or demographic weakness.

The Nature of Customary Land Tenure

6. Origin groups have authority over land allocations, including permission for the clearing and cultivating of new land. They maintain ritualised prohibitions (e.g. tara bandu) on the use of certain areas of land. These prohibitions may have an environmental significance when they apply to water sources, old-growth forests and the like. The authority of an origin group forms part of an overall system of ritual and spiritual order.

7. Within the system of origin group authority there are highly individuated rights to land. It is not accurate to describe customary land in Timor Leste in terms of communal or common property only. Residential, garden and plantation plots are "owned" by families rather than the group itself. Generally speaking, these plots remain under family control even though they are left to lie fallow. They are inherited by direct family members. They have clearly defined boundaries.

8. Members of a subsidiary household have the same basic rights to land as members of the origin group. Their descendants will inherit residential, garden and plantation plots; and may clear and cultivate new plots with permission from the origin group. This permission would not generally be refused where land is available for cultivation.

9. As part of the traditional system of alliance and exchange, subsidiary households may even have considerable political authority. For example, liurai or dato may traditionally be appointed from a particular subsidiary household. In some areas, liurai and dato will claim substantial areas of land in their own right.

10. Land is available for clearing and cultivation in most parts of Timor Leste. Population densities are relatively low. Since 1999, there has been a migration of people from rural to urban and peri-urban areas. This migration has overlapped with a general movement of people from eastern to western areas of Timor Leste.

11. Some land may be described in terms of common property. For example, there are defined areas for annual cultivation of food crops. Any group member (including subsidiary households) can farm this land. At the end of the cultivation period individual claims are relinquished and the land returns to communal property. While these common property areas are relatively small, they are highly significant in terms of maintaining food security.

12. Other areas such as water sources, forests, fringing reefs and pasturelands also have common property characteristics. In most cases, they may be accessed by any group member, including subsidiary households. In some cases there is privileged access for origin group members only. Individuals or households may also control portions of fringing reefs and rock platforms.
13. Some areas are forbidden (lulik) for use or access. These areas are closely associated with ritual or spiritual prohibitions.

14. There is a wide variety of tenure types and traditional group structures across Timor Leste. These notes present a stylised picture that reflects a basic format. They do not provide a comprehensive description of the diversity of customary structures in Timor Leste."

**Timor has suffered successive waves of land dispossession (December 2005)**

- Timor-Leste has been occupied by three different countries. As a result, there are multiple and unresolved land claims. There are 4 categories of land claimants: current occupiers, underlying traditional interests, title holders from the Portuguese are, title holder from the Indonesian era.
- As a result of the 1999 violence, most of the houses were destroyed and the majority of the population was displaced.
- To the usual challenges faced in a post-colonial experience, such as status of traditional tenure, restitution of property to those dispossessed by colonial administrations, disposition of large landholdings held by colonial elites, the 1999 violence also added problems usually faced in a post-conflict setting such as return of refugees, provision of shelter and urgent humanitarian relief, and restoration of land records and other institutions of governance.
- The main land-related issue faced by Timor-Leste were: 1) Ad hoc housing occupation and conflict caused by population displacement and property destruction; 2) Allocation of public and abandoned properties for humanitarian, security and commercial purposes; and 3) Re-establishing a form of land administration, particularly so as to minimise the risks of a developing informal market in private land.
- To tackle the illegal occupation of homes by returnees, UNTAET established Temporary Use Agreements, which provided for short term leasing of land, to allow legal occupation of illegally occupied home.

**Fitzpatrick, Daniel, February 2002, pp. 4-6**

"If one were hypothetically to create a “most challenging” land administration problem, it would contain many elements of post-conflict East Timor. In common with most new states, East Timor is emerging from a difficult colonial past. However, whereas most colonies only experienced one wave of dispossession, East Timor has suffered successive waves, from Portuguese colonisation through Japanese occupation to Indonesian invasion. These events have created multiple, and currently unresolved, competing claims to land. Indeed, as a result of its difficult colonial history, there are now four categories of potential land claimants in East Timor, namely current occupiers, underlying traditional interests, and holders of titles issued in both the Portuguese and Indonesian eras.

The conflict of late 1999 has further complicated this difficult colonial heritage. On 30 August 1999, almost 80 percent of East Timorese voters voted for independence from Indonesia. The ensuing rampage by pro-Indonesia militia, apparently supported and funded by Indonesian military interests, caused widespread population displacement and property destruction. These events created a humanitarian crisis. Most of the population was displaced; much of the infrastructure and housing stock was destroyed; economic activity almost completely ceased; severe food shortages were experienced; virtually all senior officials fled to Indonesia; and the institutions of government ceased to operate.

Re-establishing land administration in East Timor thus involves the tangled threads of post-colonial and post-conflict experience. Not only are the land claims engendered by colonial
dispossession unusually complicated, they fall for resolution in an environment of widespread population displacement and property destruction. In this sense, therefore, East Timor may provide a useful case study of land issues in "complex emergencies". On the one hand, it suffers from problems common to most post-conflict environments, including return of refugees, provision of shelter and urgent humanitarian relief, and restoration of land records and other institutions of governance. On the other hand, it faces issues common to many post-colonial environments, including the status of traditional tenure, restitution of property to those dispossessed by colonial administrations, disposition of large landholdings held by colonial elites, and development of policies to reduce landlessness and urban overcrowding.11

An important preliminary issue has been the extent to which UNTAET, notwithstanding its broad formal authority, should consider the issue of competing land claims and resolve the question of underlying property ownership in East Timor. As has been noted, late in 2000 the National Cabinet, a body established within UNTAET to head the East Timor Administration, advised UNTAET's Transitional Administrator not to proceed with plans to establish a land claims commission. In part, this decision was due to a desire not to make fundamental determinations on land ownership in the absence of a democratic mandate from the East Timorese people. However, this freeze on establishing a land claim commission has given rise to a number of fundamental questions. In particular, to what extent may resolution of post-conflict issues, including re-establishing a system of land administration and providing sufficient certainty of titles for economic reconstruction, be held hostage to the politically charged question of post-colonial land claims? How can urgent measures to minimise conflict over depleted housing stock, particularly as between returning refugees and internally displaced persons, be taken without establishing who holds the underlying property title?

These questions will be illustrated in the following part, which highlights the three major land policy issues facing UNTAET in the immediate aftermath of the violent events of late 1999. In summary, these three issues were:

• Ad hoc housing occupation and conflict caused by population displacement and property destruction;
• Allocation of public and abandoned properties for humanitarian, security and commercial purposes; and
• Re-establishing a form of land administration, particularly so as to minimise the risks of a developing informal market in private land."

De Sousa Xavier, Pedro December 2005, p. 3

"During Indonesian times, there were two particular processes which disturbed the normal use of land. These processes were: (1) transmigration and (2) translocation. Transmigration was the practice of resettling persons (in to East Timor) from elsewhere in Indonesia. Translocation was the practice of resettling/relocating East Timorese persons within East Timor. Often, translocation was undertaken for the purpose of moving rural East Timorese away from areas where they would be likely to come in contact with FALINTIL (independence) guerrillas, and into areas where they would be more easily controlled. As the data of transmigration and translocation indicates, transmigrants from elsewhere in Indonesia were always settled on sites which included translocated persons from within East Timor.
Translocation programs, by contrast, were often developed purely for the purpose of settling translocated persons only [Nixon, 2005]. Each of the Portuguese administrations and Indonesian administrations issued freehold and lesser titles/land rights (various concessions and occupation or user rights).

During the Portuguese era some 3000 titles were issued, and during the Indonesian era some 47000 titles were issued.

The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) established a process of Temporary Use Agreements, which provided for short term leasing of land, to allow legal occupation by incoming occupants, and also to generate some funds, which were directed to the East Timorese administration.

Uncertainty of future tenure arrangements following pre-1999 resettlement policies is fuelling discontent (November 2003)

- The relocation of communities or the state appropriation of ancestral land has created problems that customary land management systems has been unable to address. The loss of control over ancestral land has created discontent among customary authorities.
- As a result of Indonesian-led resettlement policies, clans or set of clans have lost both the economic and cultural use of their lands to “outsider” groups or individuals. This is creating anxiety for the ‘host’ communities who fear that the land titles the newcomers received under Indonesian rule will be validated by the state.
- The redrawing of village administrative boundaries has resulted in communities losing access to and control over their land or resources. The role of the administrative heads (Chefe de Suco) in the control of land and resources needs to be better defined in relation to the customary authority.
- Much of the land depopulated due to resettlement policies was subsequently designated as state forest and has become the property of the Timor-Leste state. This has raised the question of the right of returnees to claim what has become state property in their absence but which they consider as belonging to them or to their community.

Oxfam, November 2003, pp. 27-28

"Customary land and natural resource management systems cannot address land and natural resource tenure situations involving relocated communities and state appropriation of ancestral land: A major finding that emerges from the case studies is the ongoing discontent over the loss of control of ancestral land by customary authorities either through the presence of ‘outsiders’ on their lands through past state policies during the Indonesian period such as:-
- Resettlement policies
- Redrawing of village administrative boundaries
- Appropriation of ancestral land

In these cases uncertainty of future tenure arrangements and loss of management control by customary authorities is exacerbating this discontent.

Resettlement policies
In many cases, a particular clan, or set of clans, have lost their ancestral territory to communities resettled by Indonesian armed forces in the late 1970s and 1980s. The resettlement of ‘outsiders’ on ancestral clan land may have restricted the ‘host’ community’s access to ancestral graves, sacred places of origin, sacred water sources, or forest resources, as well as to cultivation land or individually-owned trees. The loss is both a cultural and economic one and for the communities involved these values are closely interrelated. This is a particularly important issue for
communities who are trying to exert customary prohibitions associated with resources within their ancestral territory. Some communities attempting to enforce a ritual prohibition on use of a resource (tara bandu) have difficulty when there is a significant population of ‘outsiders’ living on their ancestral land or utilizing resources within their ancestral territory. In some cases ‘outsiders’ may be either unaware of the prohibition or maybe unwilling to comply which ultimately threatens the success of the prohibition.

It is important to recognize that there are different categories of ‘outsiders’ or settlers. There are relatively homogeneous communities like Uma Tolu who were forcibly resettled as a unit for military reasons. There are also individual settlers who may have left their ancestral lands for political or economic reasons and there are also transmigration settlements including settlers from other islands within Indonesia that were organized under the Indonesian administration (some as late as 1998). Transmigrant settlements tended to be highly heterogeneous communities and most have returned to Indonesia since 1999. While individual settlers tend to respect customs of a community in which they have settled, the relatively large homogeneous groups tend to maintain their own rituals and customary systems of land management from their ancestral lands. In addition, some of these communities were also moved to highly cultivable land belonging to other communities.

In Luca, for example, approximately 280 hectares of irrigated rice land was lost to the Uma Tolu community without compensation. Now, there is considerable anxiety among the ‘host’ communities that the ‘outsiders’ will receive land titles from the state or where land titles have been issued by the Indonesian authorities these will be recognized by the state. This would effectively convert the existing ‘user right’ of the ‘outsiders’ to the land of the ‘host’ community into an ownership right which would sever the relationship between the ‘host’ community and their ancestral land. This issue is intractable within the framework of customary tenure and will require state intervention. Policies will be required that balance the needs of both the ‘host’ and ‘outsider’ communities.

Redrawing of village administrative boundaries
The redrawing of village administrative boundaries have in some areas also had a similar effect. Some communities have lost access to particular resources because the village administrative boundaries no longer reflect ancestral suco boundaries. This restricts access to land and natural resources as well as control over their management. Because the resource is no longer inside their territory, the customary authorities no longer have authority to exert control over the use of them. This raises the issue of the roles of customary and administrative leaders in the management of natural resources. In some cases the administrative authority such as the Chefe de Suco is also a customary authority but this varies between locations. In many cases the customary leaders play a greater role in the management of the land and natural resources within the suco but often the Chefe de Suco is also involved. This issue is particularly important given the plans for suco elections in the coming year. The definition of the role of the Chefe de Suco in land and natural resource management in relation to customary authorities is a priority and will frame the need for redefinition of suco administrative boundaries.

Appropriation of ancestral land
This issue appeared in this study within the context of forest policies during the Indonesian period. Much of the land depopulated due to resettlement policies was subsequently designated as state forest under the jurisdiction of the Indonesian forestry department. Under the terms of the first land law of the República Democrática de Timor Leste (RDTL), land that was state property under Portuguese or Indonesian periods now becomes the property of the RDTL. Many families from resettled communities are returning to ancestral land that may have become forested in the intervening years since they were forcibly relocated. These people are returning to forested areas that hold sacred value, markers of property such as ancestral graves, former coffee gardens, or
ancestral trees and other sacred places. For some their ancestral land was designated as state forest in their absence. Should these communities have the right to return to their ancestral lands? Do they have the right to convert their land back into productive agriculture land or does it remain part of the state forest of the RDTL?

Should the state relinquish its claims? Also, if the state allows these communities to return to their ancestral land, are they able to retain rights over land and property in the new location where they have been living, continuously cultivating land, and planting trees, for the past 24 years? These issues cannot be resolved by customary and local authorities. State intervention is required."

**Significant secondary occupation of land and housing following the 1999 conflict**

- When the 1999 violence subsided most of the 740,000 people started returning to their homes only to find that almost 80 per cent of Timor-Leste’s housing stock was destroyed.
- The first who returned or migrated to Dili were those who had fled eastwards. They rapidly occupied most land and the few houses that were left intact and in the absence of any records –most of which were burnt by pro-integrationist militias- or formal mechanisms to handle land claims, most would manage to keep occupying these properties illegally in the coming years.
- Those who had voluntarily moved to West Timor or had been relocated by force only gradually returned over the next months or years, mainly through assistance by UNHCR and IOM. Most found that other displaced people, mainly easterners, now occupied their former homes.
- Returnees were left with little or no access to alternative housing in a capital city, where housing shortages combined with a high demand of a booming population were causing prices to soar. This worsened with the arrival of the large number of foreign UN or NGO staff quick to pay hundreds or thousands of dollars of rent to whoever had something to propose in Dili.

**Harrington, Andrew, February 2007**

"Immediately following the 1999 referendum, pro-autonomy militias and the Indonesian Military (TNI) pushed or forced hundreds of thousands of Timorese out of Dili and into West Timor as refugees.

After violence wound down, those who had not been forced into West Timor returned to Dili first. For a variety of reasons (e.g. time and relative distance from the city- discussed further below) the first people back were mainly firaku. Upon arrival, they found the scorched earth campaign had left housing particularly hard-hit; the militia had “significantly damaged” up to 30% of houses in Dili, while an estimated 80% of housing across Timor-Leste as a whole was rendered uninhabitable.[59] Housing was in short supply.

Those returnees who arrived in Dili first occupied various lands and properties. These included former Indonesian State properties, private residences, local militia members’ houses, and virtually any intact housing belonging to Timorese who had fled and yet to return.[60] However, the National Land Agency (NLA - Badan Pertanahan Nasional) was among the first destroyed, the records were taken onto the street, soaked with petrol, and burned.[61] This meant many formal title records destroyed, either in the NLA itself or by fire in houses where Timorese left when they fled. This left virtually formal functioning way to handle competing land claims. Since there was no formal system to speak of, incoming Timorese took the path of least resistance and simply ignored the formal regime.[62]For many of those arriving from outside Dili, a formal land system may have been alien given their lack of experience with it.[63]
The situation in Dili was made worse by returning refugees from West Timor and others displaced to the rest of Timor-Leste.[64] The UNHCR and IOM were mandated to plan and implement the return process, but neither organization took complete control over the process, perhaps due to overlapping mandates. Neither agency developed policy stating precisely where returnees would ultimately return; many were therefore returned where they requested, not to where they actually originated. Accordingly, the majority of returnees were sent to Dili, as requested.[65] Transit camps were established, but after spending some time there, returnees were then expected to find their own housing or use the shelter kits given to them (ironically brought from Indonesia).[66] As the only part of the country with economic activity, many returnees remained in Dili, opting not to return to their home districts (where intact housing may not have existed). Indirectly, IOM and UNHCR repatriation activities helped concentrate approximately 53,000 returnees in Dili.[67] Not to disparage either organization, but at the time, housing was not considered a key concern. Return and repatriation were the key aims while the situation was complicated by attacks on ex-militia members by communities, complicated further by militia attacks resulting in the death of three UNHCR workers in Atambua, West Timor.[68] There has since been a movement within the UNHCR to recognize housing and restitution as key issues to ensure sustainable and successful returns, enshrined in the Pinheiro Principles.[69]

The large number of returnees, acute housing shortages across the country, and the lack of economic activity outside Dili caused a population boom in Dili. Accordingly, there was an extreme shortage of housing. Squatters from various parts of the country, namely from the east (firaku) occupied what were then 'abandoned' lands and properties. Some occupiers were able to profit handsomely by occupying multiple houses and renting them out to locals and internationals. Rents ranged between approximately US$600 up to US$ 3,000 per month;[70] consider average income is currently an estimated US$1.01/per day, US$30.30/month.[71] This illegal rent collecting group consisted largely of easterners – including a number of civil servants and government officials – and caused significant resentment and jealousy among those forced to watch what might have been their own property (or that which they felt they had a valid claim to) rented out to foreigners for large profits.[72] Aggressive means were employed to exclude former occupants from their properties, stoking anger further. Many easterners new to Dili were unable to integrate themselves into their host communities, possibly stemming from aggressive behaviour in defence of newly 'acquired' properties and a lack of previous connections to the city.

Illegal occupation was extremely widespread. The promulgation of Law No 1/2003 required regularization of occupations in exchange for leases with the DNTP and guaranteed continued occupation. Approximately 6000 'illegal' occupants submitted applications to the DNTP for regularization.[73] An estimated 50 percent of housing in Dili was occupied illegally.[74]"

Fitzpatrick, Daniel, February 2002, pp. 7-8

"Most relevantly, for our purposes, the population displacement re-awakened endemic cycles of land conflict. Population flight, particularly during the violence of Japanese and Indonesian occupations, has been a tragic pattern in East Timor's history. In these times of violence, those who have fled land, or been forcibly removed, have often returned to find it occupied by others. The conflict that results has often not been resolved, and thus has re-emerged in the next round of displacement as people take advantage of abandonment, and/or collaboration with the invader, to re-possess lands long claimed by their forebears.17

While this pattern of displacement and land conflict has been common in rural areas, on this occasion it is now most apparent in Dili, the capital of East Timor. With large numbers of returnees, critical shortages of housing and shelter; and a lack of regional economic activity, the
inevitable result was whole-scale migration to Dili. Indeed, in March 2000, one senior CNRT official estimated to the author that a large proportion of all habitable houses in Dili were occupied by people other than their pre-30 August 1999 owners. One ethnic group in particular, from the region around Bacau, had moved into vacant houses in Dili, and allegedly violently resisted attempts at reoccupation by their original owners. Reportedly, it was social conflict caused by this group that led to much publicised violence in and around the Dili markets.18

\[\text{(...)}\]

**Destruction of property and records**

Seriously compounding these problems of population displacement was the destruction of land records, housing, and infrastructure. Militia groups, apparently under direct orders from the Indonesian military, directly targeted land title offices and records. In Dili, they entered the land titles building, took the records outside, set fire to them with petrol, and then torched the building itself. As a result it was estimated, by former East Timorese land titles officers who sifted through the remains, that approximately 80 percent of all underlying records of land in Dili were burnt and irrecoverable. Additionally, because most inhabitants of Dili were forced to flee so quickly, most copies of land titles records or certificates were left behind and also burnt in the general destruction. In other regions the destruction was even more complete, as all land titles offices were completely burnt and destroyed. Even the Catholic Church reportedly lost many of its land records in the militia violence.19

\[\text{(...)}\]

Even without the Dili land titles book, this widespread destruction of land records is not as devastating as it would be in developed land systems. Most land in East Timor is unregistered and governed by customary law. It seems likely that there are still customary authorities who retain institutional memory of land titles and transactions in their area. Moreover, in some areas, the Indonesian administration official charged with witnessing and verified unregistered land transactions, the camat or sub-district head, has remained behind because he or she is East Timorese and retains community support.21 These former officials may play an important role in verifying land claims.

Nevertheless, land that was subject to written records tends to have been valuable urban and plantation land, and conflict over this land is thus likely to generate most heat in elite economic and political circles. Moreover, the general absence of written records from the Indonesian era will necessitate reliance on oral evidence and community recognition to verify claims. Sifting oral testimony in developed legal systems, particularly in the absence of documentary evidence, presents notorious difficulties for judges and juries. In East Timor, it will be compounded by the relative inexperience of its lawyers and mediators. This fact highlights the fundamental importance of capacity-building programmes for effective post-conflict reconstruction and development.

\[\text{(...)}\]

**Destruction of housing**

Destruction of housing was also a clear objective of the militia. In Dili, for example, a milk truck was used to pump in petrol from house to house, before each was lit and destroyed. According to the World Food Programme, there was almost complete damage or destruction in the Districts of Manatuto, Viqueque, Bobanaro, Suai and Oecussi. Over 30 percent of houses were significantly damaged in the Districts of Liquisa and Maliana. Up to 30 percent were significantly damaged in the Districts of Dili, Aileu, Maubisse, Loro, Baucau, Balibo and Los Palos.25 One result was that, when IDP’s and refugees returned to seek shelter, there was an understandable rush to occupy habitable houses. This, in turn, generated some social conflict and a relatively widespread pattern of ad hoc occupation by persons other than the pre-violence occupier.

Messages from the Bishops of Baucau and Dili requesting that people refrain from unlawful occupation were largely ignored in the rush for shelter and properties. By March 2000, ad hoc
housing occupations were reportedly causing conflict in Dili, Baucau, Viqueque and Anauro. In Dili, it was a particular problem in both the Kintalbot and Komoro sub-districts. Indeed, these two quite different areas provide an example of different aspects of the problem. Kintalbot is an area with slums which were largely unregistered in the Indonesian system of land titling. It was largely occupied by poor and displaced persons, generally from areas other than Dili. The Komoro housing estate, on the other hand, is an up-market area of mainly Indonesian-owned estate housing. In some cases, this housing was allegedly occupied by opportunists, who then sought to rent them out to foreigners at increasingly lucrative rates.

Inability of UNTAET to address land and housing issues left many disputes unresolved

- Efforts of the Land and Property Unit (LPU) within UNTAET to address housing issues were largely unsuccessful, mainly because it was understaffed and underfunded, but also because UNTAET did not establish any conflict resolution mechanisms for land and property disputes.

Harrington, Andrew, February 2007

"When UNTAET deployed, there was no dedicated department for housing. When the Land and Property Unit (LPU) was finally operational months after being established, it was not given neither the funds to construct public housing nor adequate staff to deal with such issues. UNTAET (or rather those in charge of policy) perhaps did not understand the historical role disputes over land and property has in driving intra-Timorese conflict in Dili – namely that described above between firaku and kaladi groups. Considering the breadth of UNTAET’s role in running the country, it is not surprising some issues were overlooked, despite UNTAET being widely considered as the most successful UN operation to date. Were the international community aware of these past disputes, a different course of action might have been followed.

The LPU’s subsequent efforts to address housing issues were largely unsuccessful due to a combined set of circumstances militating against success, namely reservations over addressing complexities of a sputtering socio-economic situation and institutional trepidations over the difficulties associated with such a task. The LPU drafted at least eight policy papers lobbying for more support and a broader mandate. Wright notes at least some draft legislation drawn up by LPU to deal with land issues was actually rejected by the Timorese Cabinet itself, rather than UNTAET.

Fitzpatrick, who served on the UNTAET LPU, noted the absence, first of a dedicated housing division, and second, the absence of any budgetary provisions for public housing construction in 2000.

(...) In addition to (perhaps because of) the lack of resources allocated to the LPU, Fitzpatrick notes UNTAET did not establish any conflict resolution mechanisms for housing, land and property disputes in general or disputes caused by the mass delivery of returnees to Dili. Some have asserted this was due at least in part to resistance among Timorese politicians with property interests standing to gain from the lack of clarity. While Court proceedings remained open to land disputants, the formal judicial system likely would not have been up to the task.

The LPU did not provide any public housing (except for international staff, though an actual housing unit probably ought to have been created specifically to deal with the issue); an administrative system governing transactions of private lands was not established; and finally did not provide any systemic incentives for returnees to return to home Districts. Overall, because the LPU did not have the capacity it needed, it proved an impossible task to handle (or prevent) extensive illegal occupations while trying to accommodate the disorderly flow of people into Dili.
In the attempt to deal with the situation, the LPU began granting “Temporary Use Agreements”[86] (TUA) for abandoned private lands, thereby regularizing illegal occupations and generating a modest income stream. Unfortunately this caused further disputes when ‘true’ owners who had been forced to flee returned and found their residences and properties occupied ‘legitimately’ under a TUA issued by the LPU. Some properties under TUA agreements were sub-let or sold illegally to third parties.[87] The LPU, as noted by Fitzpatrick, had no way to resolve these disputes. The LPU was also unable to ensure proper implementation of UNTAET Notification No. 16/2000 on fees relating to land, buildings and property. The requirement that fair market value rent be charged for all properties administered by UNTAET was not enforced.[88] Former LPU member Warren Wright noted “many Temporary Use Agreements were made requiring a nil or nominal rental fee of $1 per month.”[89] Some high profile cases arose where private properties being put to commercial uses had incorrectly been awarded low payment TUAs,[90] while others were sublet to international staff for large rent incomes (noted above). Such practices clearly constituted abuse of the system set up to accommodate homeless Timorese[91] – perhaps made worse by the fact that UNTAET spent the revenues derived from TUAs, instead of holding them in trust for the actual owners which UNTAET’s fiduciary duty to the Timorese ought to have dictated.[92] As a result of such abuses, TUAs were eventually revised to exclude private abandoned properties, but left a legacy of unresolved disputes and intra-community jealousy.[93] TUA housing occupations formalized horizontal inequality between occupiers (namely easterners) and those whose properties were being occupied (namely westerners). It helped to stir significant tension along these lines.

(...)  
UNTAET did not introduce sufficient policy responses to deal with widespread property destruction and subsequent illegal occupations. Measures to prevent and rectify occupations of land and property on the basis of first-come-first-served were not taken, and this is precisely what occurred.[97]"

**Violence and displacement during Indonesia's colonisation (1975-1999)**

**Forced displacement used by Indonesia against East Timorese as a tool for social control and as a war strategy (1975-1999)**

- According to the CAVR report, issued in January 2006, most East Timorese living today have experienced forced displacement at least once.
- Between 84,200 and 183,000 people died during the period 1975-1999, mainly of famine-related causes mostly during the period 1977-1978 at the height of Indonesian attacks against FRETILIN bases.
- Displacement took many forms including: spontaneous flight to escape danger, scattered or in groups, forced resettlement in camps at the end of 1970s.
- Displacement also meant vulnerability to other violations, including arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment, extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, forced labour and forced recruitment.
- CAVR concluded that Indonesia displaced people from their homes repeatedly in order to control them, used food as a weapon of war, refused for reasons of military strategy to allow international humanitarian agencies access to Timor-Leste until famine had reached catastrophic proportions, and forcibly displaced East Timorese civilians to West Timor for purely political ends.
CAVR, 'Forced Displacement and Famine', 30 January 2006, pp. 143-144

"The Commission finds that:

1. The people of Timor-Leste experienced repeated periods of displacement, often in massive numbers, between 1975 and 1999. Most individual East Timorese people alive today have experienced at least one period of displacement. Many have experienced several. All displacements caused major disruption to the lives of those affected. Some directly caused major loss of life.

2. At a minimum, during the period 1975-1999, 84,200 people died due to hunger and illness in excess of the peacetime baseline for these causes of death, and that the figure could possibly be as high as 183,000. The overwhelming majority of these deaths occurred in the years 1977-1978 and during the period of large-scale Indonesian military attacks on Fretilin bases in the interior where large numbers of civilians were living and in 1979 during the subsequent period of Indonesian military detention camps and ABRI/TNI-controlled resettlement areas.

3. These displacements took many forms, occurred in a complex variety of circumstances and lasted for periods that could extend from days to years. For example:

In the period before and during the civil war of August-September 1975 displacement commonly took the form of flight to escape coming under the control of or being subjected to violence by one of the parties to the conflict.

After the Indonesian invasion in December 1975 some people fled spontaneously either in response to perceived threats or to escape a very real and present threat. At the same time Fretilin organised the evacuation of communities, sometimes resorting to coercive methods.

When the Indonesian military stepped up its attacks on Fretilin and the population under its control from 1977 onwards, some groups scattered, others were forced to keep constantly on the move to evade capture, and yet others moved in an orderly fashion to new locations.

The massive Indonesian assaults on the population concentrations still under Fretilin control that lasted from late 1977 until the end of 1978 ended with tens of thousands of people being forced into resettlement camps under the strict control of the Indonesian military. In these and subsequent displacements by the Indonesian military, such as those to the island of Ataúro in the early 1980s, the displaced found themselves being subjected to a rigorous form of detention intended to further Indonesian military objectives.

The large-scale movements that took place in the period surrounding the Popular Consultation of 30 August 1999 involved both flight from TNI and militia violence and forced deportations to West Timor.

503. Whatever form it took displacement invariably had a seriously damaging impact on those affected, including by ending in the deaths of tens of thousands of people.

4. Death was caused by famine, famine-related diseases, vulnerability to sickness from hunger, fear or exhaustion and a lack of access to medical care. It is likely that more people died from the effects of displacement than from any other violation. While the actual number of deaths is incalculable.

5. For the survivors, displacement was the direct cause of a deep and abiding anguish at the loss of family members in horrific circumstances, which they were powerless to control or change. Displacement also meant vulnerability to other violations, including arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment, extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, forced labour and forced recruitment. It also regularly entailed hunger and deprivation of the means of making a livelihood through the destruction of or loss of access to food crops, livestock, housing, agricultural implements and land.
6. Displacement also disrupted the fragile subsistence economy on which the majority of the population depended. One indication of this disruption was the dramatic fall between 1973 and 1980 in the number of livestock, which are crucial as factors of production, means of transportation and sources of wealth in East Timorese agricultural communities. The devastation of Timor-Leste’s livestock was closely related to the wider disruption created by displacements, resulting as it did from their abandonment by fleeing communities, their intentional destruction by Indonesian forces, their consumption by a population desperate for any form of sustenance, and their deaths due to starvation and bombardment.

7. In Timor-Leste displacement was a violation that primarily affected communities. Its affect on communities was often long-lasting and utterly destructive of their integrity. Displacement was often used indiscriminately by the Indonesian military against communities or groups within communities as form of collective punishment and sometimes as a form of hostage taking.

8. Displacement was a persistent theme running throughout the period of the Commission’s mandate. This was so not just because 1974-99 were years of conflict in Timor-Leste. The Commission believes that some of the most harmful impacts of displacement were the direct result of mistaken policy decisions. The Commission believes, for example, that Indonesia displaced people from their homes repeatedly in order to control them, used food as a weapon of war, refused for reasons of military strategy to allow international humanitarian agencies access to Timor-Leste until famine had reached catastrophic proportions, and forcibly displaced East Timorese civilians to West Timor for purely political ends.

HRDAG, 9 February 2006, p. 2
"Displacement was widespread: 55.5% of surveyed households reported one or more displacement events, for a total of 2011 reported displacement events between 1974 and 1999.[3]

Most displacements occurred in 1975-1980. The maximum years are 1975 and 1976, with 61,400 (+/- 13,300) and 59,800 (+/- 7,200) displacement events, respectively. The events of 1999 were substantially fewer, with approximately 28,100 (+/- 5,600) events.

Most displacements were local. Of all displacement events, 54.3% are within subdistrict, 15.6% are within district, 17.4% are within region, 9.3% are within East Timor, and 2.4% are outside of Timor.[4] Many displacements occurred in rapid succession: 22.2% of displacement events lasted one month or less, and 50.1% lasted one year or less. However, other displacements were very long, so that the mean displacement period lasted 46.7 months.[5]

The institution that respondents reported most frequently as the group telling them to move was the Indonesian military (46.4%), followed by FALINTIL (15.0%) and militias (8.8%).[6] Respondents reported that "conflict" motivated 52.3% of their displacements, with “forced by Indonesian military” contributing an additional 16.3%.

Widespread famine in IDP camps and settlements under Indonesian military control (1975-1979)

- According to the CAVR report, many people captured had to live in internment and resettlement camps for several years.
• People lacked food and basic services in the camps and were left with very limited access to their food gardens.
• Many died of malnutrition and had to grant sexual favors or pay money for food.
• In 1979, when US Catholic Relief Services arrived in the camp, it estimated that 200,000 people were in a “serious or critically malnourished condition.”

CAVR, 'Forced Displacement and Famine', 30 January 2006, pp. 148-149

"508. The Commission finds that:

44. People who surrendered or were captured by the Indonesian military had to live in camps for up to several years. The camps were supervised and monitored closely by the military. They were created for security reasons, not for the welfare of the population in them.

45. Civilians who surrendered or were captured were first moved to transit camps for registration and interrogation before being relocated to internment and resettlement camps and later to resettlement villages. While security controls eased at each of these stages, a defining characteristic of all such camps or villages was restricted or no access to gardens located further than a specified distance from these settlements.

46. The Indonesian military gave a higher priority to the attainment of military objectives than to meeting its humanitarian obligations to the inmates of these camps. From the time of their creation, provision for basic food and survival needs in the camps was inadequate.

47. The camps became the sites for a fully-fledged famine in which unknown numbers died. Already in a weakened state when they entered the camps, internees endured extended periods without access to food gardens or emergency humanitarian aid. The food that they received from the military was utterly inadequate to keep them alive. It was also often inappropriate for people already suffering severe malnutrition. Even the meager rations that the military made available to camp inmates were distributed in a discriminatory way. The Commission has learned that in exchange for food the military and their auxiliaries extorted money, family heirlooms and other valuables (for example gold and traditional beads), and sexual favours.

48. Although the military campaign waged by the Indonesian military in 1977-78 had aimed precisely at the outcome it achieved -namely the mass surrender of the population under Fretilin control into areas under Indonesian control-the Indonesian authorities made little or no preparation for meeting the barest needs of this population for shelter, food and medicines. In the early stages of this campaign it must have become apparent to the Indonesian military that the surrendering population was seriously debilitated and in dire need of these essentials for their survival. However, rather than creating conditions that might avert famine, it both neglected the basic needs of the surrendering population and imposed restrictions and sanctions on them that were bound to make their already dire circumstances even worse.

49. The scale of the famine in mid- to late 1979 and the fact that it was rapidly worsening can be seen in international aid agency reports of the time. For example, as a result of its survey in April 1979 US Catholic Relief Services estimated that 200,000 people were in a “serious or critically malnourished condition”. By September 1979 it found that the number of people in this condition was closer to 300,000. The International Red Cross described 60,000 out of the 75,000 people it surveyed in July 1979 as being “in a state of alarming malnutrition” including “20,000 dying from hunger”.515"
Resettlement from camps to strategic villages and displacement as a form of collective punishment (1980-)

- In the early 1980s, the Indonesian authorities started dismantling resettlement camps, not as much out of humanitarian concerns, but in order to relocate them to strategic or new villages.
- Forced displacement was also imposed as a form of collective punishment in the wake of guerilla attacks.
- A total of 6,000 people, most of whom were relatives of resistance fighters, were displaced to the island of Atauro from 1980 to 1984. An estimated 5 per cent of the displaced died because of the harsh living conditions, lacking basic services and food.

CAVR, 'Forced Displacement and Famine', 30 January 2006, pp. 150-151
"510. The Commission finds that:

58. From the early 1980s the Indonesian authorities introduced new forms of displacement. These were related to two separate developments. The first was the decision to dismantle or scale down the resettlement camps that had been established to accommodate the population that had surrendered in the late 1970s. The second was the reorganisation of the Resistance as a guerrilla force capable of launching localised attacks on ABRI.

59. For many the decision to move them out of resettlement camps did not lead to a marked improvement in their living conditions. There were some positive aspects, in particular the provision of schools, clinics, markets and easier transportation. However, the Commission has overwhelming evidence that at least during the first half of the 1980s, this phase of displacement was often managed in such a way as to ensure that those displaced did not enjoy the supposed benefits of the programme. Yet again it was a programme that served military objectives, but did not guarantee survival. For many of those moved, their transfer from resettlement camps to strategic villages, new villages and even back to their own villages did not substantially improve their lot. Restrictions on freedom of movement continued to have a serious impact on food production and thus on people’s well-being.

Moreover, even after the resettlement camps were dismantled, settlement patterns in Timor-Leste remained radically different from their pre-invasion form. Even today there are many signs of it. Many people were forced to live in towns and along major roads. Many fertile areas of the country were abandoned.

61. The displacements carried out in response to signs of that the Resistance had survived the destruction of its bases were heavily punitive. These displacements took place following guerrilla attacks, defections to the Resistance by East Timorese who had been enlisted into Indonesian civil defence units, and the establishment of clandestine support networks. They involved the collective punishment of whole communities and the proxy punishment of relatives of people still fighting in the forest and interior.

62. A cumulative total of more than 6,000 people were forcibly displaced to the island of Ataúro between mid-1980 and 1984. At its peak in late 1982 the displaced population exceeded 4,000. The majority of people sent to the island were not political activists or Resistance fighters, but people from the 12 districts (excluding Oecusse) who were relatives of or were suspected of having contact with Resistance fighters still in the forest. They consisted predominantly of women and children, and found it extremely difficult to fend for themselves in an environment which was extremely barren. They were kept on the island for periods ranging from a few months to six years. Those who arrived in the first wave of forced displacement were not given adequate food or other support. The Indonesian military was also negligent in its provision of basic medical care, clean water, sanitation and shelter. About 5% of the people displaced to Ataúro died there. Some
were able to survive because they received help from the local population, even though an influx of people in numbers that were not far short of the island’s total indigenous population put a severe strain on its meagre resources. Conditions improved when the International Red Cross was permitted entry in 1982. When people were released from Ataúro, some were merely transferred to other areas for a further period of internment.

63. Some of those detained after attacks by members of the Resistance on military posts and units were also sent to Ataúro. Others were displaced from their home villages and sent to areas where they had to rebuild their lives virtually unaided in extremely inhospitable environments. This was the fate of many of the inhabitants of the villages in Ainaro and Manufahi that took part in the Kablaki uprising of August 1982 and of the mainly women survivors of the mass executions that followed the Kraras (Viqueque) uprising in August 1983. The latter group were sent to the previously uninhabited area of Lalerek Mutin where they were left to fend for themselves under tight military surveillance. The population of Lalerek Mutin suffered sexual violations, disappearances, hunger, disease and death there. Their treatment was strikingly similar to that of the people from Ainaro who had been moved to the villages of Raifusa and Dotik in the district of Manufahi the previous year."

**Violence and displacement around the 1999 independence vote**

**Violence and threats cause displacement prior to the popular consultation (February-August 1999)**

- Flight, especially hiding in the hills, has been a long-standing coping mechanism of the East Timorese given the political tensions and serious violations of human rights.
- Mass displacement did not begin only after the results of the popular consultation were announced but also occurred in the months leading up to the ballot.
- As of February 1999, 60,000 fled mostly from isolated villages to district towns and, often, onwards to the capital Dili, following a campaign of intimidation and violence launched by pro-integrationist militia against persons and communities considered to support independence.
- Since many displaced people had lost their ID documents UNAMET introduced a system whereby IDPs could register to vote.
- 98 per cent of the registered electorate voted and 78 per cent of the voters rejected the government’s autonomy offer.
- A number of people reportedly voted and then immediately fled into the hills.

CHR, 6 April 2000, pp. 4-5

"11. In East Timor, displacement is not a recent phenomenon. Flight, especially hiding in the hills, has been a long-standing coping mechanism of the East Timorese given the political tensions and serious violations of human rights that have characterized the Territory’s history since its annexation by Indonesia in 1975. During that period, the Representative was informed, a large number of people also were forced by the Indonesian authorities to move from their traditional homes in the mountains into urban areas. This report, however, focuses on the heightened displacement crisis associated with the popular consultation on the Indonesian Government’s offer of autonomy for East Timor within Indonesia, held on 30 August 1999. Mass displacement, it is important to underline, did not begin only after the results of the popular consultation were announced but also occurred in the months leading up to the ballot.

A. Prior to the popular consultation
12. As early as February 1999, following the Government’s proposal in January for either greater autonomy or independence for East Timor, a campaign of intimidation and violence launched by pro-integrationist militia against persons and communities considered to support independence began to generate significant internal displacement. An estimated 60,000 persons became internally displaced, fleeing mostly from isolated villages to district towns and, often, onwards to the capital Dili. Initially, those fleeing tended to be taken into the homes of relatives and friends. As their numbers increased, churches became principal centres of refuge.

(…) 

15. Regarding the apparent aim of the intimidation, the Representative received reports of internally displaced persons being forcibly grouped together by militia for the purpose of indoctrinating them to vote pro-autonomy, with this occurring five to six weeks before campaigning was officially allowed to begin. And yet, the very fact of being displaced presented obstacles to the exercise of the right to participate in the popular consultation. The process of voter registration required the presentation of two forms of personal identification – documents that for many of the internally displaced had been destroyed or lost in the course of displacement. In an important initiative to overcome this problem, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), which was charged with overseeing the popular consultation, introduced a system whereby an affidavit from the village chief, priest, or other community leader from either the area of origin or the area to which the person concerned had been displaced was sufficient to enable internally displaced persons to register to vote.

16. Notwithstanding the intimidation and violence characterizing the period leading up to the vote, the high voter turn-out - 98 per cent of the registered electorate - indicates that they did not keep people from voting, or from voting to reject the Government’s offer of autonomy, as did 78 per cent of the voters. Indeed, the Representative was informed that one of the highest voter turnouts was by a community of internally displaced persons, all of whom (save two persons, of whom one was giving birth) courageously participated in the vote despite the severe intimidation and risks to their personal security. In another indication of the importance that the population attached to their participation in the popular consultation, it was reported that a number of people reportedly voted and then immediately fled into the hills.”

CAVR, 'Forced Displacement and Famine', 30 January 2006, pp. 151-152

"511. The Commission finds that:

64. There was a direct connection between the creation of anti-independence militias in Timor-Leste from late 1998 and an upsurge in violence which caused fear, displacement, deprivation and death.

65. This fear was compounded by a widespread understanding that despite the obligation of the Indonesian Government under the 5 May Agreements to create and maintain a secure environment for the Popular Consultation, the militia groups had the support of the TNI and the wider governmental apparatus, and on that basis enjoyed impunity for their actions. Most of the violence and intimidation in Timor-Leste in 1999 was conducted by militia members rather than Indonesian military personnel. Much of this violence did however occur in the presence of armed Indonesian military or police who took no action to prevent it. People seeking police protection from militia violence were denied assistance."
66. There is strong evidence that the militia groups forcibly recruited members into their ranks. One reason why people fled their homes was to avoid recruitment into the militias.

67. Militia violence before the Popular Consultation reached a peak in April 1999 with attacks in many places, the massacre at the Liquiça Church and spontaneous flight of many people. They sought refuge in the remote locations in the countryside, with relatives in other areas and in church compounds. Some, from the western districts and Oecusse, crossed the border into West Timor (Indonesia).

68. The objective of militia violence was to win a majority for the autonomy option in the ballot of 30 August. In the lead-up to the Popular Consultation it used violence indiscriminately to secure that outcome. Thus, while it also targeted those who were prominently identified as pro-independence, such as leaders of CNRT and members of pro-independence student organisations, ordinary civilians and whole communities and those who offered them protection, including the Church, also became its victims. One reflection of these priorities is that the militias (and the TNI) did not engage militarily against Falintil forces.

69. Under threat of this indiscriminate violence from militia groups, large numbers of people stayed away from their normal places of residence. One authoritative source estimate as many as 60,000 were displaced. Many returned only to register or vote before again returning to places of refuge.

70. As the number of displaced persons grew and settled in large concentrations in places where they thought they would find safety, their living conditions deteriorated, in some cases becoming acute.

71. The Indonesian authorities and their militia allies resorted to a variety of means, including bureaucratic obstructionism and violence, to thwart attempts by local NGOs, supported by UNAMET and UN agencies, to give humanitarian assistance to the displaced.

72. Poor security conditions and the associated flight of large numbers of people during 1998 and 1999 disrupted the planting of food crops. This compounded food shortages caused by a poor harvest in 1998 due to low rainfall."

Violence and displacement following the announcement of the results of the popular consultation (September 1999)

- Displacement occurred after the announcement of the results of the ballot was characterized by systematic and widespread violations of human rights, violence and mass destruction unleashed by pro-integration militias with the collusion of elements of the Indonesian security forces
- 80 per cent of the population was affected by the displacement and violence that followed the announcement of the results.
- 500,000 fled within East Timor, mainly in the hills while 240,000 fled or were forcibly relocated in West Timor and elsewhere in Indonesia.
- The mass removal of some 250,000 persons from East Timor to West Timor was reportedly prepared in advance by the military, in cooperation with the police.
- It aimed at discrediting the process of popular consultation by signalling that a sizeable portion of the population disagreed with the results and thereby calling into question the legitimacy of the outcome.

CHR, 6 April 2000, pp. 4-7
B. Following the announcement of the results of the ballot

17. In the days and weeks following the announcement on 4 September of the results of the ballot, the displacement crisis escalated dramatically, affecting an estimated 80 per cent of the population of East Timor. Displacement occurred in two major patterns: some 500,000 persons fled within East Timor, mostly going into hiding in the hills and usually only a few kilometers from their homes, while an estimated 240,000 fled or, as is reported to have been most often the case, were forcibly relocated, principally to West Timor but also to other parts of Indonesia. Displacement also occurred to other countries: some 1,500 persons were assisted by the international community in being evacuated to Australia. (…)

19. As has been well documented in other reports, the general context in which displacement occurred after the announcement of the results of the ballot was characterized by systematic and widespread violations of human rights, violence and mass destruction unleashed by prointegration militias with the collusion of elements of the Indonesian security forces. Many people spontaneously took flight both within and outside of East Timor, in an effort to escape these conditions of severe physical insecurity. However, displacement was also systematic, such that large numbers of persons did not flee but were forcibly relocated, that is, deliberately moved against their will. In several cases, people reportedly were ordered from their homes and, often at gunpoint, herded onto trucks, ships and planes, destined principally for West Timor but also for other parts of Indonesia. From the point of view of logistics alone, the operation appears to have been highly organized, with advance planning having been required. Indeed, the Representative was informed of documentary evidence indicating preparations on the part of the military, in cooperation with the police, in advance of the announcement of the results of the popular consultation, for the mass removal of some 250,000 persons from East Timor to West Timor. The displacement and evacuation of people, along with the intimidation, terror and destruction of property that occurred, the Commission of Inquiry has concluded, “would not have been possible without the active involvement of the Indonesian army, and the knowledge and approval of the top military command” (A/54/726-S/2000/59, para. 138). (…)

22. To a certain extent, the wave of violence and destruction unleashed after the announcement of the outcome of the popular consultation was a reaction of rage and revenge on the part of pro-integrationist forces to the results of the ballot, which clearly were not in their favour. These feelings were undoubtedly magnified by what, it was suggested, must have been a sense of shock and disbelief at the overwhelming size of the pro-independence majority. Acts of spite appeared to be intended to ensure that independence for East Timor would come at a heavy price, including in terms of denying East Timor the benefits of the infrastructure and other material investment that had been made over the years, thereby undermining its successful development as an independent nation. It was also a widely held view that the actions of the pro-integrationist forces in East Timor were intended to serve as a foreboding message to secessionist movements elsewhere in the Indonesian archipelago. While East Timor may be considered an exceptional case given its history, it is believed that the Indonesian military nonetheless were, through their actions there, giving a warning signal to insurgent movements in a number of places in Indonesia, most notably in Aceh.

23. Regarding both flight and the measures of forced relocation to West Timor and elsewhere in Indonesia, a number of overriding political factors appear to have been at play. The sudden mass movement of large numbers of people from East Timor, including both pro-integrationists who fled for fear of their own security and persons supporting independence who were forcibly relocated, appears to have been aimed at discrediting the process of popular consultation by signalling that a sizeable portion of the population disagreed with the results and thereby calling into question the legitimacy of the outcome. If the hope was that the ballot accordingly would be redone, it was suggested that it was likely believed that the electorate would by that point have been so terrorized as to ensure a radically different result. It was also suggested that the mass
displacement would assist in fostering the impression that East Timor was on the verge of civil war and descent into chaos against which Indonesia could act as a stabilizing influence. The most widely held view was that the mass forced relocation was undertaken in order to ensure for pro-integrationist forces a constituency or power base in West Timor and even a potential “bargaining chip” in future negotiations. This last reason would appear to best explain why, as will be explored below, displaced persons in West Timor continue to be impeded from returning even months after the Government of Indonesia accepted the results of the ballot.”

CAVR, 'Forced Displacement and Famine', 30 January 2006, p. 152

“73. The comprehensive “scorched earth” tactics employed by the TNI and the militia groups after the Popular Consultation, marked by threats of violence, killings, mass forced deportations and the destruction of public and private buildings throughout Timor-Leste, caused the bulk of the population to become displaced, either internally or externally.

74. About 250,000 people were displaced to West Timor after the ballot. Detailed plans for the evacuation of a large proportion of the population, involving several Indonesian Government ministries, had been drawn up well before the ballot. Most of these people were forcibly displaced, that is, violence or the threat of violence was used to ensure that the civilian population complied with the wish of the Indonesian authorities that they should leave Timor-Leste.

75. East Timorese in camps and other places in West Timor where people had settled continued to be subject to the control, intimidation and violence of militia members. Many who wanted to return to Timor-Leste were prevented from doing so by a combination or threats and misinformation from militia members.

76. While international aid organisations were able to distribute humanitarian assistance to the forcibly displaced, they were also subject to control, intimidation, attacks and killings by militia members.”

**Between 10,000 and 40,000 former East Timorese refugees still displaced in West Timor (May 2006)**

- In May 2003, a Presidential Decree provided the former refugees with two options: register as Indonesians citizens or accept temporary resident status
- Government no longer tolerates refugees living in camps and they have been told to move – either to return immediately to East Timor or resettle elsewhere in Indonesia.
- Rumour mill and the absence of unbiased and appropriate information in West Timor continue to pose obstacles for those who wish to return.
- With violence no longer a threat, a cessation clause on refugee status has been invoked by UNHCR
- As of early 2005, an estimated 28,000 ex-East-Timorese remain in West Timor. 12,000 have been relocated elsewhere in West Timor and 16,000 remain in camps near the border.
- In 2006, estimates on the number of former East Timorese refugees still living in a situation akin to displacement ranged from 10,000 to 40,000
Oxfam G-B, January 2003

"Amidst the violence that followed the UN-sponsored referendum on East Timor’s (now Timor-Leste) independence in September 1999, some 280,000 East Timorese crossed the border into the Indonesian side of Timor island. Some fled to escape violence, but many were coerced to leave their homes and cross the border by armed militia. Living under the noses of militia in rudimentary refugee camps in West Timor has meant limited access to reliable information on the situation back at home. So the process of refugee return has been a slow and painful one. As of early 2003, most refugees have managed to make their way home to East Timor. But 30,000 others remain behind.

Living alongside an equally poor local population in West Timor, in January 2003 these East Timorese are now, once again, stuck between a rock and a hard place. The government of Indonesia will no longer tolerate refugees living in camps and they are being told that they must move – either to return immediately to East Timor or resettle elsewhere in Indonesia. The fact that refugees have chosen to stay in the camps despite the poor conditions and in spite of this government policy is indicative of the vast uncertainties associated with leaving the camps.

Oxfam GB, in collaboration with a local partner, Centre for Internally Displaced People Service/CIS, and Jesuit Refugee Service, organised a survey to find out what is blocking the pursuit of successful durable solutions and to offer the refugees a chance to voice their concerns.

On the one hand, although repatriated refugees have successfully re-integrated into their home communities in East Timor, our interviews revealed that the rumour mill and the absence of unbiased and appropriate information in West Timor continue to pose obstacles for those who wish to return. Despite the keen desire to return home, many remain sceptical – even fearful – of what lies in wait in East Timor.

On the Indonesia side, the basic requirements have yet to be met. There is no infrastructure, basic services or options for getting a livelihood. Nor is there any acceptance by the local population of the need to accommodate the refugees, and help them get a viable and secure standard of living. Already there have been several cases of locally resettled refugees abandoning settlement sites as a result of friction with the local population.

What is clear from our interviews is that not only do the refugees lack durable solutions, they simply do not have enough information to know which option holds the best chance for a secure future. Lack of information leaves refugees vulnerable to continued deprivation as well as potential intimidation and coercion.

In the meantime, as of January 2003, with violence no longer a threat, a cessation clause on refugee status has been invoked by UNHCR, UN refugees agency. This means that the East Timorese in Indonesia are no longer entitled to international protection as refugees."

OCHA, 9 April 2004, p. 17

"A Presidential Decree adopted in May 2003 and subsequent instructions from the Department of Home Affairs provided the former refugees in West Timor with an opportunity to register either as Indonesian citizens or accept temporary resident status (in anticipation of future return). The registration is combined with the issuance of relevant documentation, including Identity Cards."
Following a five-point strategy put forward by the UNHCR, the Indonesian government relocated approximately 12,000 people from camps along the border, but only to other parts of West Timor rather than other parts of Indonesia, which left some 16,000 individuals near the border. Overall, there does not appear to have been any large movements of people out of West Timor; nor has border demarcation been finalized.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are still some 28,000 East Timorese who have not returned to Timor-Leste. This represents 10 per cent of those who fled or were forced to flee the violence in 1999. UNHCR also estimates that, of those remaining in Indonesia, many have chosen to do so. UNHCR continues to assist this group by assuring access to nationality rights, shelter, school and water projects. As of 15 November 2004, 248 people had returned during the year.

Long barracks with roofs of palm leaves or tarpaulin and walls of palm stalks house former East Timor refugees in Haliwen village.

The 3,500 people are among 80,000 people living in West Timor who left East Timor in 1999 and have become Indonesian citizens, according to East Nusa Tenggara (NTT, Indonesian acronym) provincial data.

Most of them have relocated from refugee camps to other places in West Timor, but 14,443 refused resettlement. Approximately 250,000 people came across the border from East Timor, then also part of Indonesia, amid violence following an August 1999 vote for independence. Those that did not return by the end of 2002 automatically became Indonesian citizens and were no longer considered refugees.

According to Father Seran, 63,000 former East Timor refugees now live in Belu and neighboring North Central Timor, the two districts covered by Atambua diocese. Among them about 20,000 children under 12 years old are in danger of not getting an adequate basic education.

Besides the camp in Haliwen, other camps that still house former refugees are in Belu's Kada village, Kefamenanu and Noelbaki village, near Kupang, at the western end of Timor Island, capital of NTT province.

Following the 30 August 1999 referendum in which East Timorese voted to separate from Indonesia, four broad groups crossed the border into West Timor: members of Indonesian army-
sponsored militias, along with their families and supporters; Indonesian civil servants, both Timorese and non-Timorese; those forcibly deported by the militia or Indonesian military (TNI); and those independently fleeing the post-poll violence. Many of the some 250,000 swiftly returned, according to UNHCR figures, 126,000 in the first three months. Those who stayed longer were initially considered refugees but lost that status at the end of 2002 and are considered Indonesian citizens. These former refugees can still go back to Timor-Leste but the rate of returns is now modest. In 2005, only around 500 took part in the repatriation program, and a scheme that provided incentive funding for repatriations has now ended.

Most of those who have elected to stay live in two districts: Belu, which borders Bobonaro and Covalima in Timor-Leste, and Timor Tengah Utara (TTU), which borders Oecusse. Precisely how many there are is a matter of debate. Before it wound up its operations in West Timor at the end of 2005, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that about 10,000 former refugees were “living in conditions of concern”, while 16,000 others had been resettled within West Timor. Other estimates are higher: a local NGO, CIS Timor, says 9,000 families (approximately 40,000 people) are in camps; the Belu district government lists 7,734 families still living in emergency housing in that district alone, while East Nusa Tenggara Governor Piet Tallo cited a figure of 104,436 individuals remaining in West Timor."

Displacement linked to the April-May 2006 violence

Complex roots of the conflict (January 2007)

- Following the dismissal of about 600 soldiers, or 35 per cent of the army forces, demonstrations by the dismissed soldiers and sympathizers hostile to the government turned into riots with youth gangs armed with machetes and home-made weapons rampaging through Dili looting and burning shops and houses.
- Political divisions within the governing elite, dating back from the pre-independence period and which had impregnated the main state institutions, such as the police and the army, are the main causes of the conflict.
- The conflict quickly spread among the population articulated around perceived regional differences between Lorosaes (Easterners) and Loromonus (Westerners).
- Underlying factors of the conflict include weak state institutions, unresolved land and property disputes, prevailing poverty, a worsening economic situation and a large number of disempowered and disillusioned youth.

ECHO, 21 February 2007, p. 1

"Four years after Timor Leste gained full sovereignty in 2002, the apparent stability that the country seemed to enjoy has given way to civil strife and communal violence, leading to the displacement of large numbers of people throughout the country.

The crisis began with the dismissal in March 2006 of 594 soldiers, representing 35% of the Timorese army. The tensions gradually unfolded, with demonstrations demanding the removal of elected leaders and turning into riots. Gangs with guns and machetes terrorized the population of the capital Dili and occupied government buildings, looting and burning houses, shops and warehouses, murdering people, and attacking security forces.

Divisions that formed during the 24-year occupation of Timor Leste by Indonesia and were carried over after the independence of Timor Leste are the main reason for the crisis. Tensions between the Timorese political leaders are continuing, and the political situation is expected to remain
unstable until the next presidential and parliamentary elections provisionally scheduled to take place in March and April 2007. A perceived regional division between the Lorosaes (Easterners) and the Loromonus (Westerners) in the country adds further complexity to the situation.

There are several additional underlying causes for the crisis that all fuel the general discontentment and encourage criminality. Prevailing poverty results in general food insecurity and widespread malnutrition, with 45% of Timorese children below five years of age being underweight. Access to basic social services like health care, water and sanitation and education is very limited, particularly outside the capital. Demographic factors including a fertility rate of 7 children per woman and a population growth of 3.2%, both among the highest in the world, are obstacles to the development of the country."

OCHA, 16 January 2007, p. 7

"The crisis originates from a complex combination of factors with political elements; extreme poverty, institutional failure and demographic factors being underlying causes. Timor-Leste declared its independence from Portugal on 28 November 1975. Nine days later Indonesia invaded and occupied the new country. Timor-Leste finally gained its independence in 2002, after 24 years of occupation, during which an estimated 180,000 Timorese died in a bloody resistance war. Divisions that formed during resistance times were carried over into the post-conflict government and the newly developed national security forces. Virtually all of the current political class are or were once members of the dominant political party, the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of East Timor (FRETILIN). A long series of disagreements finally erupted in outright fighting on 25 May 2006, when members of the armed forces (Falintil – Forcas Democraticas de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL)) and police forces (Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL)) confronted each other. The violence was fuelled by a perceived regional division between people from the West (loromonu) and the East (lorosae) stemming from deep divisions within the ruling elite, which spread quickly through state institutions and into broader society. Violent clashes were followed by arson and fighting, mainly carried out by gangs of youths in the absence of law and order."

USAID, November 2006, pp. 1-2

"The immediate trigger of the crisis was the dismissal in March 2006 of 594 soldiers from the FALINTIL-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL), a group known as the "petitioners". This group constituted approximately 40 percent of the F-FDTL. Most of the petitioners were from the west of the country and had gone on strike in January claiming discrimination and mismanagement by senior officers, who were primarily from the east. This was the spark that ignited the fire of the crisis in Timor-Leste.

In retrospect, however, it is clear that a number of key motives, means and opportunities for violence were coming together over the past few years to underpin the crisis that ultimately erupted in April/May 2006. The most salient underlying dynamics included:

• Disagreements and rivalries among Timor-Leste’s political leaders;
• Weak and politicized governance (especially in the security sector);
• Severe inadequacies in the justice system;
• Widespread absence of reliable information and severely limited formal channels for communication; and
A disaffected, disillusioned and largely disempowered population.1

A number of more proximate causes were also aligning over the past year. Among the most important of these was the exploitation by self-interested actors of confused and competitive mandates within key institutions, namely the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, F-FDTL and Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL). As a result, factionalization and politicization within F-FDTL and PNTL were able to take root, effectively undermining the stability of the security forces. A second proximate cause was the intensification of partisan – and not necessarily democratic – political maneuvering in anticipation of the 2007 elections. Further, politics became increasingly personalized and significant divisions deepened between the President (and his supporters) and the FRETILIN leadership regarding the vision of national and democratic development in Timor-Leste. Against this backdrop, the events of April/May 2006 spiraled out of control and law and order collapsed in Dili. Although the security situation in other parts of the country did not deteriorate to the same extent, the ripple effects of the events in Dili were felt throughout the country.

When analyzing the current crisis, Timor-Leste’s restive youth are also an important factor to consider.2 Despite the depth of disillusionment and alienation, youth grievances were in fact not a primary cause of the current crisis. Rather, disaffected young people, especially Dili-based young males, have played two somewhat different roles in the current crisis. First, many youth engaged in the violence have very likely been utilized by political agitators and conflict entrepreneurs as a means for attacking their enemies, exacting revenge and/or intimidating people. Second, it also seems likely that the lawlessness that has prevailed in Dili has given opportunistic and disaffected youths the chance to loot and exact revenge in response to purely personal or group considerations. Nevertheless, despite the ubiquity of problems confronting youths, it is notable that the majority of young people have avoided becoming embroiled in the violence.

ICG, 10 October 2006, p. i

"The crisis is widely portrayed as stemming from the sacking of a third of the country’s defence forces in March 2006, after which the disgruntled soldiers became part of a power struggle between President Xanana Gusmao and the now deposed prime minister, Mari Alkatiri. However, the problem is far more complex.

The roots lie partly in the battles and betrayals that occurred within the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of East Timor (FRETILIN), just before and during the Indonesian occupation. Ideological and political disputes in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly between FRETILIN central committee members and Xanana Gusmao, then commander of the guerrilla army FALINTIL, carried over into the post-conflict government.

They are also to be found in the poorly implemented demobilisation of FALINTIL fighters in 2000 and the creation of a defence force for the new country in 2001 that absorbed some of the veterans but left others unemployed and resentful while donors and the UN devoted most of their attention to creation of a new police force. That many of the police, vetted and retrained, had worked for the Indonesian administration, was more salt in the wounds of the ex-fighters.

The old ideological splits and the frustrations of the ex-FALINTIL were manipulated in particular by Rogerio Lobato, a FRETILIN central committee member who had lived in Angola and Mozambique for the duration of the conflict. As interior minister, he controlled the police, encouraged rivalry with the defence force, most of whom were personally loyal to Xanana Gusmao, and created specialised police units that effectively became a private security force.
The police under him were in charge of law and order, border patrol, riot control and immigration. It was never clear what the role of the defence force was.

All these problems had been festering for years. When 159 soldiers in January 2006 petitioned the president as supreme commander, alleging discrimination in the defence force by officers from the eastern part of the country (lorosae) against people from the west (loromonu), many interested parties saw political opportunity. More soldiers from the west joined the petitioners, while personal and institutional tensions between a president committed to pluralism and a ruling party with distinctly authoritarian tendencies, politicisation of the police, lack of any regulatory framework for the security forces more generally and the in-bred nature of a tiny political elite with 30 years’ shared history allowed matters to spiral out of control.

OHCHR, 2 October 2006, p. 16
"18. The crisis that occurred in Timor-Leste between 28 April and 25 May can be explained largely by the frailty of State institutions and the weakness of the rule of law. However, this explanation can only be understood fully in the historical and cultural context of the country. Both the Portuguese and Indonesian eras created and subsumed internal divisions within Timor-Leste. Political competition within Timor-Leste has been historically settled through violence. Accordingly, many Timorese view the events of April and May 2006 as a continuum starting from the decolonization process in 1974/75 and encompassing the violence and factionalism of the Indonesian occupation and the violence that accompanied the United Nations-sponsored Popular Consultation in 1999."

AusAID, 15 September 2006, p. 3
"Land disputes arising from post conflict resettlement also seem to be a major source of ongoing violence, especially disputes over ownership of the former Indonesian civil service accommodation around Taci Tolu, Perumnas and Surik Mas. There’s strong evidence that some of the current spate of house burnings and intimidation campaigns against easterners revolves around individual property disputes, where eastern families have often illegally occupied dwellings left vacant after 1999, and efforts are now being made to violently evict them. There’s anecdotal evidence that gangs are being paid to enforce these evictions. However in some areas now effectively cleansed of easterners such as Perumnas, gangs are now merely turning on each other, so this explanation is not comprehensive."

Neupert, Ricardo & Lopes, Silvino, September 2006, p. 8
"The crisis has not yet being solved. There are many political disagreements but the main problem is that, contrary to what was anticipated because the strong foreign military and police presence, the street violence has continues mainly in the form of west and east gangs’ fights, house burnings and frequent attacks to IDP camps. This violence occurs mainly in Dili, although some sporadic clashes have also taken place in other places of the country. As indicated above, bands are, on the one hand, Dili natives and also in-migrants form western districts of Timor-
Leste; on the other hand, Eastern gangs are formed mainly by migrants (or children of migrants) to Dili that came from the three most eastern districts of the country (Baucau, Lautem and Viqueque). As suggested above, the underlying cause of the enmity between the groups from the two regions is the perceived passive role of westerners in resisting the Indonesian occupation and in many instances actively supporting Indonesian interests.

It is important to mention that during Indonesia's occupation, many young Timor-Lesteese joined martial arts societies or groups as a way to defend themselves in the resistance activities. Since independence some of these groups have shifted toward crime, extortion operations, protection, gambling and smuggling rackets. There are strong suspicions of some of these groups’ connections with certain individuals with well-known political ambitions.

Curtain, Richard, 2006, pp. 5-13
"According to a classic sociological study, there are six key stages in explaining the outburst of mob behaviour, with each stage adding to the effect of the preceding stages. The first necessary ingredient is structural conduciveness or the underlying factors that predispose people to mob outbursts. Added to this are the pressures that make the situation worse (structural strain). The third essential stage causing people to mobilise is the emergence of a generalised belief, which identifies a simple cause of the problems and frustrations. Fourth, precipitating factors such as localised protests then serve to spread the belief leading to the fifth stage where people mobilise on a large scale to act in an unorganised but collective way. The final stage, which determines the nature and extent of the collective outburst, is the effectiveness of the available social control mechanisms.

The strong underlying conditions conducive to social protest were present in the form of a rapidly worsening economic situation, particularly in Dili. The Government’s increased assertion of centralised controls and lack of response to the worsening economy added greatly to the growing frustrations among Dili residents. The lead up to and the holding of the Fretilin National Congress as a precursor to national elections in the first half of 2007 created a political pressure cooker atmosphere, heightening fears about the behaviour of the government in how these elections would be managed.

The emergence in late March 2006 of a set of beliefs about regional differences served to identify a scapegoat for the widely perceived problems. Claims of threats and conspiracies by people from one region served to deflect angry people away from confronting an all powerful force by identifying a scapegoat – ‘a person or people blamed or punished for things done by others’.

The final factor that caused people to flee their homes was the failure of the police to keep civil order. However, the breakdown of the social order was also due to the failure of community leaders initially to halt the rumours undermining social trust and the subsequent spread of the belief that east-west differences were the cause of people’s problems.

(...)

The final stage, which tipped the protests into mob violence, was the response of the police. These protests may have remained small-scale if the police had not overreacted to the burning of a vehicle outside the Prime Minister’s Office on 28 April 2006 by firing on the crowd and shooting five of the protesters.

(...)

Failure of police command
The overreaction of the police and military to the protests outside the Prime Minister’s office on Friday 28 April 2006 caused a small protest to spread rapidly in the following weeks. By 24 May 2006, security had collapsed so completely that Foreign Minister José Ramos-Horta went on Australian television, asking for troops ‘to prevent the country sliding into further chaos’. The shooting of unarmed police on 26 May 2006 and the collapse of the police command resulted in a complete absence of social control, provoking widespread mob violence. The evidence presented on Four Corners on 19 June 2006 suggests that the actions of provocateurs also greatly contributed to this rapid escalation in violence. 32

**Failure of community leaders**

The failure of the police to keep civil order was undoubtedly the breaking point that caused people to flee their homes. However, the collapse of the social order was also due to the failure of community leaders initially to halt the rumours undermining social trust and the subsequent spread of the belief that east-west differences were the cause of peoples’ problems.

Why were the newly elected leaders in urban communities not able to step in and maintain social control by resolving localised conflicts where they initially emerged? As noted above, the national youth survey showed that where violent outbursts by young people did take place, this was often due to the failure of community leaders to resolve conflict in their areas.

**Wholesale breakdown of social order**

A key starting point for devising longer-term solutions to the current crisis needs to be an acknowledgement that there has been a wholesale breakdown of society in Dili. This was due not only to the failure of the police to maintain security. The widespread collapse of social trust has also been due to the failure of community leaders in Dili to maintain basic levels of social control. It is clear that local elected leaders failed to squash baseless rumours. Furthermore, they were unable to halt the spread of the false claims of east-west threats and conspiracies, which were used to justify attacks on neighbours.

The causes of the collapse of social control will differ between local communities within Dili. But an important factor is likely to have been weak leaders with little authority or personal capacity as mediators to resolve conflicts. Community leaders who have actively manipulated the situation to derive some political benefit may also have been a major cause of the collapse of the social trust in Dili.”

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Asia Times Online, 18 May 2006

“There are clear indications that opposition parties hijacked the protests to discredit and destabilize the government. One day before the riots, the government and the leader of the disgruntled soldiers had announced that an amicable solution to their complaints was imminent. In a sudden about-turn, the next day the soldiers demanded parliament’s dissolution - eerily similar to the demands recently made by the fragmented political opposition. (Soldiers actually read previous opposition statements word-for-word calling for the government's resignation.)

East Timor’s weak political opposition is understandably desperate. In last year’s regional elections, which were certified as free and fair by the UN, opposition parties won just one region out of the total 31 they contested. And there is no compelling reason to believe that their prospects for the country’s first ever parliamentary elections, to be held by mid-2007, will be any different.
The dominance by Fretilin (Frente Revolucionaria do Timor Leste Independente, or Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor), with a 55-seat majority in the 88-seat parliament, has recently stirred political resentments. Fretilin Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, an Arab Muslim, has taken on various powerful interest groups in Timorese society, chief among them the historically influential Catholic Church.

Alkatiri’s decision last year to make religious education in schools optional rather than compulsory put the church and his government on a collision course. When asked to comment on the street protests staged last year by the church against the policy, Alkatiri famously replied, "Well, I'm not worried since I know I'm going to hell. Who cares?"

The Roman Catholic Church, which counts 90% of the population among its adherents, has said it will campaign directly against Alkatiri if he is nominated as Fretilin's prime-ministerial candidate during next year's elections.

Alkatiri, who spent 24 years in exile in Africa after the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor in 1975, is widely viewed as a patriot. As prime minister, he has been praised for brokering a perceived fair deal with Australia over rights to contested oilfields in the Timor Sea. His refusal to accept loans from the World Bank, despite a gross domestic product per capita of a mere US$400, stems from his personal experience in Africa, where many poor countries have become disastrously dependent on foreign aid.

Rival leaders
At the same time, Alkatiri's controversial leadership style has brought him into direct conflict with President and former rebel leader Xanana Gusmao, widely viewed as the father of East Timor's independence. The Alkatiri- Gusmao rivalry dates back to the country's first formative months after independence, when the two squabbled over drafting of a constitution.

At the time, Gusmao and other influential leaders, such as Nobel Peace Prize winner and current Foreign Minister Jose Ramos Horta, fought for the adoption of a presidential system. Alkatiri objected and leveraged Fretilin’s superior numbers into the establishment of a parliamentary form of government. While largely a figurehead, Gusmao retains the power to veto legislation, dissolve parliament and call for national elections.

Gusmao has since openly supported the two main opposition parties, the Democrat Party and the Social Democrat Party, which hold seven and six seats in parliament respectively, against Fretilin. The political rivalry, somewhat dangerously, has seeped down into many government institutions, with the army and police both sharply divided between pro-Alkatiri and pro-Gusmao factions.

Factionalism, coupled with the more ethnically driven east-west regional rivalries, has made effective police response and coordination with the army almost impossible, as demonstrated by the inability to contain the recent riots.

Some analysts say that the Alkatiri-Gusmao rivalry, at least partially, explains the president's rather passive conduct during the recent riots. If Gusmao had chosen to intervene decisively, government insiders say, it's unlikely that the crisis would have spun out of control. Instead, the president stayed cloistered in his official residence, doing and saying nothing - to teach Alkatiri a lesson, some insiders contend. That some foreign diplomats took sides during the crisis also added fuel to the fire.”
April-May unrest forces 150,000 people to flee their homes in Dili (2006)

Overview of the events leading up to the April/May violence
In February 2006, some 400 soldiers originating from the western districts of the country went on strike claiming that they were being discriminated against by their leadership originating predominantly from the east. In mid-March, the government, which had in the meantime set up a commission to look into the soldiers’ allegations, dismissed the group of disgruntled soldiers when they refused to return to their posts. The group, known as the ‘petitioners’ now numbered close to 600 men, nearly half of the country’s entire defense force, the FALINTIL-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL). On 23 March, the president Xanana Gusmao, addressed the nation in a televised speech and sharply criticized the government’s decision as “unjust” adding that discrimination did exist in the army and that this problem should be properly addressed if further divisions were to be avoided. The president’s speech had an inflammatory effect on what appeared then as a relatively small and manageable intra-army crisis and in the following days, violence against easterners caused by some of the petitioners started in Dili. By 27 March, 17 homes had been destroyed and easterners had started fleeing the city (ICG, 10 October 2006, p. 8).

In the following weeks, the east-west divide would start coloring most events and actions in Dili in what now started to look like an attempt by a group of rebel soldiers, followed by large number of disaffected youth gangs and backed by unidentified interest groups, to secure a change of government by using the means of organized violence. On 28 April, a demonstration by the petitioners in Dili, joined by youth gangs and other sympathizers, deteriorated when a divided police force (PNTL) proved unable to contain the angry crowd. The ensuing violence resulted in the death of several civilians and the burning of nearly 100 houses, most belonging to easterners (OHCHR, 2 October 2006, p. 27). Faced with a disintegrating police force weakened by conflicting regional allegiances, the government decided to call on the F-FDTL to restore law and order. On 3 May, Major Alfredo Reinado, the commander of the military police deserted his post and with arms, ammunitions and a group of followers he joined the rebels. The Australian-trained major would become one of the main figures of the rebellion against the government, repeatedly calling for the prime minister’s resignation, claiming his move to call in the army to control civilians was unconstitutional. Evidence would later point at a disturbingly close relationship between the president Gusmao and major Reinado, with the latter having made no secret of his allegiance to the then president (The Australian, 12 September 2006; Martinkus, John, 20 September 2006).

It was not until the end of May that the security situation really deteriorated with members of the F-FDTL and the PNTL confronting each other militarily and the east-west divide spreading into the wider population. The collapse of law and order in Dili created a vacuum allowing youth gangs armed with machetes, slingshots and arrows to rampage through Dili orchestrating a campaign of violence and intimidation mainly targeted at easterners and their properties. There is evidence to suggest that much of the violence finds its roots in unresolved land and property disputes created by the 1999 large population movements which saw many returning easterners occupy land and houses left vacant by those who relocated to West Timor and only gradually returned in the following years (AusAID, 15 September 2006, p.3). As a result of the widespread looting and burning of houses and businesses, close to 5,000 houses were damaged or destroyed and more than 150,000 people, mainly easterners, fled their homes to seek refuge with families and friends or in makeshift shelters in and outside Dili (OCHA, 17 July 2007, p.7). While some fled the direct threats and violence, many left their homes in anticipation of the violence and amid rumors that weapons has been distributed to civilians (Engel, Rebecca, August 2006, p. 2).
"The immediate trigger of the crisis was the dismissal in March 2006 of 594 soldiers from the F-FDTL, a group known as the "petitioners". This group constituted approximately 40 percent of the F-FDTL. Most of the petitioners were from the west of the country and had gone on strike in January claiming mismanagement and discrimination by senior officers from the east. On April 24 the petitioners began four days of largely peaceful demonstrations in Dili. By April 28, on the unsanctioned fifth day of demonstrations, the scene turned violent, allegedly due to the involvement of unidentified youths and members of criminal gangs. For months many Timorese have strongly believed that agitators were responsible for the outbreak of violence, a view now corroborated by the Commission of Inquiry. However, another point that deserves attention is the fact that it was apparently relatively easy to incite fear to mobilize segments of the Timorese population, which is indicative of serious societal tensions well outside of the security sector context.

It was against this backdrop that the events of April/May 2006 spiraled out of control and law and order collapsed in Dili. While the security situation in other parts of the country did not deteriorate to the same extent, the ripple effects of the events in the capital were felt throughout the country. The breakdown of law and order in Dili resulted in approximately 37 casualties and up to 1,000 buildings destroyed.23 During late April and into May an estimated 150,000 people were displaced as they fled from their homes due to the insecurity. A series of clashes between the Military and the Police followed, and on May 24, the President, Prime Minister, and Parliament together issued a request to Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Portugal to send security forces to help restore order.

Meanwhile, frustration and discontent with the FRETILIN leadership had been building for years, both internally and externally, but had not found credible expression within the party. The increasing factionalization within FRETILIN demonstrated itself most visibly at the highly-charged FRETILIN Congress on May 17-19 and further complicated the vulnerability in the security sector. At the time of the Congress security forces were fractured and the city was reeling from violence and disorder. Increasingly vocal in their criticism of then Prime Minister Alkatiri’s leadership and blaming him for the crisis, the nascent reform group within FRETILIN took the opportunity to mount a challenge to the party’s leadership. Alkatiri’s supporters voted to implement a change of procedure for party elections at that time, using a show of hands rather than a secret ballot. Since many of the delegates to the Congress were public servants, observers have suggested that the choice of open voting could be construed as a test of their support for Alkatiri and for FRETILIN’s policies. The decision to use open voting garnered much criticism from some quarters, and an unsuccessful court challenge, but the result of the Congress was an endorsement of Alkatiri’s leadership of FRETILIN.24

On June 22, in a political standoff over Prime Minister Alkatiri’s leadership and amidst allegations that he had a hand in distributing weapons to civilians to quell the opposition, President Gusmão threw his considerable popular weight into the ring and threatened to resign if Alkatiri did not step down. After a number of very tense days, on June 26 Alkatiri announced his resignation as Prime Minister. He stated his intention to accept his own share of responsibility for the crisis and to avoid the President's resignation. However, he maintained that the violence had been part of the plot to overthrow his Government in a coup d'état. He also retained his position as Secretary General of the FRETILIN party.

Unfortunately, the change in government leadership did not end the violence, which is why it is important to understand that the motives, means and opportunities for violence may have changed over time. From its political underpinnings, the violence in Dili evolved from the initial
exact ing of vengeance against easterners, to the manifestation of social jealousies, to revenge
attacks and then into petty juvenile criminality – none of which could be effectively controlled by
the international forces alone. Following the conclusion of this assessment, a surge of violence in
Dili erupted in late October. This time it took the form of gang warfare, which many suspect was
politically motivated and deliberately fueled by drugs and alcohol. The incentives for violence are
clearly not mutually exclusive and the combination has often made it very challenging to halt the
cycle of violence, to accurately identify perpetrators and to anticipate events."

ICG, 10 October 2006, pp. 9-12

"Isolated violence took place around Dili on 26 April, with market stalls destroyed in one area and
some houses vandalised in another. Some witnesses said the perpetrators wore military
uniforms.43 The next day, as more violence loomed, Xanana, Ramos Horta, and Alkatiri met and
announced that a commission of notables would be set up to look into problems within the army.
Taur Matan Ruak was still out of the country and did not take part. But by that time, internal
problems within the defence force were no longer the real issue: it was the government’s survival.

The last day of the demonstration, 28 April, was critical for everything that happened
subsequently. Violence, started by some youths, erupted in front of the palace, killing two. One of
Rogerio’s special police units, the UIR, specialising in riot control, should have been in place – it
had been created for precisely this kind of situation – but only one squad was deployed. The
police seemed to melt away; the petitioners reportedly tried unsuccessfully to control the youths,
then marched back toward their base at Tacitolu. As they moved through the Comoro area of Dili,
fighting broke out.

With Taur Matan Ruak away, Alkatiri summoned Col. Lere, and asked the army’s help in restoring
order. This was one of the most controversial decisions of the crisis. Depending on whom one
talks to, it was either a desperate effort to bring the city under control or a signal that Alkatiri had
usurped control, deliberately waiting until Taur Matan Ruak was unavailable to make his move. In
either case, it was done without consulting the president or declaring an emergency, so it was
probably unconstitutional.44 The results were disastrous.

F-FDTL troops with no experience in crowd control were deployed to quell unrest that whatever
the other factors had a strong east versus west component, much of it attacks by loromonu youth
against lorosae neighbourhoods. Because they were under Col. Lere, a target of the petitioners’
discrimination allegation, the soldiers were assumed to be pro-lorosae and thus parties to the
conflict. Whether or not they were, their apparently indiscriminate use of force exacerbated the
east-west rift, emboldened loromonu attackers, and fuelled conspiracy theories. Soon there were
rumours – almost certainly unfounded – of an F-FDTL massacre in Dili’s Comoro neighbourhood,
and thousands of lorosae sought refuge in churches and embassy compounds.

(...) On 3 May, in protest over what he called the army’s deliberate shooting of civilians, a new
character appeared on the scene: Major Alfredo Alves Reinado, head of military police. Together
with seventeen of his men and four members of the UIR, he deserted, the second major defection
of the conflict. A few days later two more F-FDTL officers from the west, Major Tilman and Major
Tara, followed suit. Alfredo went to Gleno, Ermera to see some of the petitioners, then set up
camp in Aileu. He left the F-FDTL, he said, “because, on the day, on the 28th, it was easterners
who shot westerners. I am witness to that. I do not want to be a part of the (army) that shot
westerners”.47 In fact, he did not witness anything.

(...) The official government version is that on 23 May Alfredo’s group ambushed F-FDTL soldiers in
Fatuahi, on the outskirts of Dili, killing one and wounding seven.55
The shootout started a new round of violence. That evening, amid reports of large-scale police defections to the petitioners, armed police and civilians began gathering in Tibar, just west of Dili. Early on 24 May, this group, together with rebel soldiers, attacked from the hills above the armed forces headquarters in Tacitolu, killing an F-FDTL officer, Captain Domingos de Oliveira (Kaikeri), the logistics commander of the army training centre in Metinaro.

The immediate impact of the attack on the F-FDTL headquarters was to increase hostility between the defence force and the police, leading to disaster on 25 May. That morning, a group of F-FDTL soldiers, together with some police from a unit based in Baucau (eastern Timor-Leste) disarmed three policemen in Comoro, a particularly tense area of Dili. F-FDTL personnel exchanged shots with a police patrol car. Later that morning, youths joined several F-FDTL soldiers to torch a house belonging to a relative of Rogerio Lobato's. The house burned down with a mother and four children inside; all died. Then the house of Ismail Babo, the police commander involved in the Gleno incident, who, some suggest, was involved in the attack on armed forces headquarters, went up in flames.

As fighting spread around the city and police were nowhere to be seen, the first 100 of some 1,300 Australian soldiers landed in Dili. Xanana announced he was assuming control of security – on unclear constitutional grounds: Alkatiri questioned the legality of Xanana’s actions but said he would cooperate. Later Xanana ordered Alkatiri to sack Rogerio Lobato and Defence Minister Roque Rodrigues. Malaysia, Portugal and New Zealand also dispatched troops that combined would eventually total 2,250. The UN and diplomatic missions struggled to evacuate non-essential staff as gunfights erupted between police and military, and gangs of mostly loromonu, armed with machetes and “Ambonese arrows” (panah Ambon), a lethal form of slingshot, attacked lorosae neighbourhoods.

Fighting continued in the streets, and Dili residents sought shelter in church compounds, NGO offices and with friends and relatives outside the city. The UN estimated that more than 120,000 had fled their homes since April, and the numbers continued to rise. On 30 May, thugs raided the prosecutor-general’s office, strewing files around and making off with equipment and papers. Press reports focused on the fact that among the missing data were files from the Serious Crimes Unit on some of those indicted for the 1999 violence, including former Indonesian military commander Wiranto. There is no reason to believe, however, that the thugs made any distinction in what they wrecked or looted, and dark hints of Indonesian involvement have no basis."

OHCHR, 2 October 2006, p. 21;42

33. The first signs of the current crisis emerged with the advent of the group now known as the petitioners and the subsequent manner in which F-FDTL managed their allegations of discrimination within F-FDTL. A petition dated 9 January signed by 159 officers and other ranks of F-FDTL alleged mismanagement and discrimination within F-FDTL. The petitioners were drawn from almost every unit in the defence force. The petition, addressed to President Gusmão and copied to the Chief of the Defence Force and the Minister of Defence, was received by the President on 11 January 2006. As of 1 February no response had been received by the petitioners. On 3 February the petitioners abandoned their barracks, leaving their weapons behind. They gathered in Dili and sought an interview with the President on 7 February.

34. On 8 February 418 petitioners held a march at the Presidential Palácio das Cinzas. Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak refused the request of President Gusmão to attend the march and instead sent F-FDTL Chief of Staff Colonel Lere Annan Timor. The Minister of Defence attended
at the invitation of the President. President Gusmão ordered the petitioners to return to the F-FDTL training centre at Metinaro and to participate in a commission of investigation which would examine the allegations raised in the petition. On 10 February the Commission was established; it comprised F-FDTL officers and two Members of Parliament. The Commission conducted its activities from 12 to 17 February. The Commission failed to resolve the problems extant between the petitioners and the F-FDTL command. On 17 February the petitioners left their barracks after being granted leave. They elected not to return.

35. In mid-March Brigadier General Ruak announced the dismissal of 594 soldiers with retrospective effect as at 1 March. There is no evidence before the Commission of Inquiry that the dismissal was officially executed. The Commission notes that approximately 200 of the personnel dismissed were not petitioners, but officers and other ranks who had been chronically absent without leave in the months and years prior to March 2006. On 21 March the Prime Minister expressed his support for the decision. The dismissal was not accepted by the petitioners, who announced their intention to appeal the decision to President Gusmão.

36. On 23 March the President addressed the nation on the issue. He stated that the dismissal was within the competency of the Chief of the Defence Force, but also stated that the decision was unjust. In quoting the words of the petition, the President gave credence to the petitioners' claims that the problems within F-FDTL were due primarily to discrimination by easterners against westerners. The Commission does not question the intention of the President, but most interlocutors have told the Commission that his speech was perceived as being more divisive than helpful and as fostering rather than resolving communal conflict. Between 25 and 31 March multiple disturbances in Dili assumed an east versus west dynamic as youths from both regions became embroiled in the petitioner issue. On 3 April the petitioners moved to the place known as the Carantina in Taci Tolu. On 17 April the petitioners commenced preparations for a five-day protest.

...

100. Significant loss of life, injury and widespread property damage resulted from the events of April and May as examined as part of the mandate of the Commission. At the conclusion of its inquiries, the Commission had information that up to 38 people were killed: 23 civilians, 12 PNTL officers and 3 F-FDTL soldiers. The Commission repeats that there is no evidence of a massacre of 60 people at Taci Tolu having taken place on 28/29 April. The Commission also has information that 69 people suffered injuries: 37 civilians, 23 PNTL officers, 7 F-FDTL soldiers and 2 UNPOL officers. The Commission notes that such figures are difficult to confirm and accepts that there may be discrepancies in the exact numbers.

101. Further, the events and incidents considered in this report had a devastating impact on the community at large. In addition to those killed or injured, approximately 150,000 persons were displaced (some 73,000 persons in IDP camps in and around Dili and a further 78,000 having moved to districts outside Dili). While displacement built up progressively after 28 April, the largest increase in displacement occurred after the events of 25 May. The population of the IDP camps increased by 300 per cent in 24 hours. An estimated 1,650 houses were destroyed in the aftermath of events recounted here, with the majority occurring in late May and early June. The impact not only related to housing, but impeded men, women and children's enjoyment of a number of their economic and social rights, including to food, education, employment, and the highest attainable standard of health. According to UNICEF surveys, 15 per cent of children in the IDP camps needed immediate treatment for malnutrition; 57 per cent of respondents to a World Food Programme survey reported that they had ceased their primary income or livelihood activity. Shortages of food occurred both in camps and as a result of the pressure on extended family, who were hosting displaced persons outside Dili. In the case of the national medical hospital, access has been impeded by a perception that it is unsafe for western persons to go to the hospital. Freedom of movement has also been restricted. While there has been a well-
coordinated humanitarian response, involving collaborative work between Government and the NGO community, and many persons have returned to their employment, the affects of the incidents remain evident in the continued displacement and associated problems."

Renewed violence lead to the displacement of up to 8,000 people in early 2007 (July 2007)

OCHA, 17 July 2007, p. 10
"To date, instability and low-intensity violence remain a constant feature in Dili, limiting IDP returns. The situation is complicated by an estimated 8,000 people who were displaced following a renewed round of violence in February 2007 (the first since the beginning of the initial crisis)."

UN News Service, 21 March 2007
""Although recent violence in Timor-Leste appears to be abating, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the capital, Dili, continues to rise, prompting the United Nations mission to the South-East Asian country to warn today of possible food shortages.

Some 37,000 IDPs are now living in Dili, an increase of 8,000 since January, UN spokesperson Michele Montas told journalists in New York, citing recent informal studies.

She said the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) is concerned that this sharp rise in IDP numbers could cause shortages of food, especially rice, which could then also exacerbate the IDP situation.

Thousands of people have fled their homes in recent months because of renewed violence both in Dili and outside the capital, although UNMIT reported that the past week had witnessed the fewest violent incidents of the last two months. UN Police stepped up patrols of Dili earlier this year in response to the violence."

OCHA, 17 March 2007
"The security situation remains volatile and it is likely that spikes of violence will continue to occur with a potential to increase before the elections. The unresolved situation of fugitive Alfredo Reinaldo as well as continued rice shortage could cause protection and security concerns. The fault lines and motivations for violent demonstrations or fights seem to be changing. While as of November the East–West divide that had caused mass displacement last year seemed to loose importance and martial arts gang fights dominated, the recent violence seems to have united members of rivalling martial arts groups."

Kammen & Hayati, March 2007, p. 1
"Ten months after rioting, the distribution of weapons to civilians and armed clashes between the military and police plunged East Timor into political crisis, the situation in Dili has taken on a dire new face. In mid-February, rice shortages triggered a new wave of violence. In search of rice, angry Dili residents attempted to break into government warehouses – in one case looting 700 tons of rice. International peacekeeping forces sent to Timor in last May in response to the onset of the political crisis took to the streets to restore order. Over the course of three days, fifty UN vehicles were stoned, as too were countless more government vehicles. With no rice to be found for sale, anger grew. In late February the government initiated the sale of rice supplied by the World Food Program in Dili and announced that the program would be extended to the rest of the country.

Several days later, however, the already tense situation was exacerbated by a botched military operation ordered by President Gusmão to capture the former Commander of the Military Police, Alfredo Reinado. At the outset of the crisis in mid-2006 Reinado defected from the East Timor Defense Force and was involved in a shoot-out with the military. He was later arrested, then escaped from prison and for months has been at large in the mountains. Several days after the government rice program was initiated Reinado attacked a police station near the Indonesian border, stealing 25 automatic weapons. (He claims that the police gave him the weapons.) President Gusmão then issued a deadline for Reinado to surrender and ordered the international security force to surround Reinado’s hide-out in the town of Same, in the mountains south of Dili. When the deadline passed, the Australian-led force attacked, killing four of Reinado’s followers, but Reinado escaped unharmed.

The combination of rice shortages and the ill-timed military operation have triggered a new round of violence in Dili. While international attention is focused on Alfredo Reinado and youth burning tires on the streets of the capitol, the food crisis continues."

UN News Service, 1 March 2007
"More than 5,000 additional Timorese have fled to internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps over the past month or so because of the recent violence in the capital Dili, although this is now under control as more United Nations police are patrolling the streets, top UN officials said today. (…) The head of UN humanitarian assistance in Timor-Leste, and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Finn Reske-Nielsen, said most of the 5,000 or so people who fled to the IDP camps arrived last week because of the disturbances, adding that four new camps had been set up. (…) Reiterating that rice shortages were a contributing factor to last week’s violence, Mr. Reske-Nielsen said the Government, supported by the World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), were continuing the sale of rice that was begun last Friday."

OCHA, 23 February 2007
"In this context there has been an escalation of violence in Dili in the last two weeks, exacerbated by inter-gang rivalry. There are increased reports of incidences of assault, group fighting, gun shots, illegal check-points, arson, public disturbance and property damage including a tendency to target particularly UN and Government vehicles. In two weeks the security incidences increased from 95 to 113, with several houses set ablaze and some reported deaths, mainly in Dili. Bairo Pite, Fatuhada, Santa Cruz/Taibessi and Kampung Baru are the places with higher incidences of violence. In the districts incidents were reported in Liquica (2 houses burnt), Ermera (one person killed and two injured) and Baucau (one person injured).

As a result of the security incidents, at least 5,000 people have been displaced to new locations or to existing camps since January 2007, leading to significant overcrowding of camps and straining particularly the water and sanitation services."

**Announcement of the composition of the new government triggers new round of violence and displacement (August 2007)**

- On 6 August 2007, following the announcement of the formation of the new government, civil unrest accompanied by acts of violence, looting and burning of houses started outside of Dili, mainly affecting eastern districts.
- As a result of the unrest, an estimated 400 houses were destroyed or damaged and at least 5,000 people displaced, mainly in Baucau and Viqueque districts.

**Population displacement caused by civil unrest related to the announcement of the new government (14 August 2007)**

Source: OCHA, 14 August 2007

**Trocaire, 21 August 2007**

"The most recent wave of violence began on August 6th following the announcement of the formation of a new Government after national Parliamentary elections held on 30th June. The violence partly stems from ambiguity over the interpretation of the Constitution dealing with the formation of Government.

While Dili has been calm, tensions have risen outside of the capital. Of the 13 districts (similar to Irish counties) in Timor Leste, five are currently experiencing disturbances. According to an initial assessment carried out by a team from the Governments Ministry of Social Solidarity, in the past two weeks 323 houses have been reported burnt, 53 damaged and at least 5,000 persons are reported to have left their homes in the eastern towns of Viqueque and Baucau districts."

**OCHA, 13 August 2007**

"1. Civil unrest has been occurring in connection with the announcement of the new government on the 6th of August 2007 following the 30th of June parliamentary elections."
2. Viqueque and Baucau districts are most affected, while some incidents have also occurred in Dili, Manufahi, and Oecussi districts. The overall security situation in Timor-Leste during the last 24 hours has remained tense, particularly in Viqueque and Baucau districts, although there were no reports of major security incidents. United Nations Police Officers (UNPol) in conjunction with the national police of Timor-Leste (PNTL) and the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) remain fully deployed.

3. In Viqueque, around 270 houses have been burnt by violent groups since 6 August. Several villages have been severely damaged in Watulari sub-district, while villages around Viqueque town have also been affected. The functioning of public transport and schools has been disrupted and food, water and medical supplies are becoming short on the market. Road travel within and between the districts of Baucau and Viqueque remains restricted at the moment due to security concerns especially after the ambush on a UN convoy on 10 August.

4. In Baucau district, 53 houses have been destroyed this week in Venilale and Quelicai subdistricts. On 6 and 7 August, government, church, UN, and NGO facilities in Baucau district had been burnt or attacked. The functioning of schools, public transport, and markets have been disrupted. On 10 August, an orphanage in Baguia was reportedly attacked, a girl raped, and the orphanage and a primary school building damaged. A 16-year-old boy was arrested. 34 arrests have been made during the last two days for public disturbances, arson, illegal road blocking, and possession of illegal weapons.

HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES

5. At least 4,000 persons are reportedly displaced at the moment in Viqueque and Baucau districts. The displaced persons stay in the mountains around the affected areas, and in convents, schools and compounds that are considered safe. 323 houses have been reported burnt so far and 52 damaged in Viqueque and Baucau districts.

**Austcare, 11 August 2007**

"Tension and unease continues in East Timor with some fresh outbreaks of violence following the announcement of the new Timor-Leste National Government on 6 August 2007. At this time where the people and Government of Timor-Leste are engaged in building democracy in the world's newest nation, such tension was expected, and we urge Australians to respond. See Austcare's Media Release here.

While the security situation remained relatively calm in Dili over the first week, it was more volatile in the East. The UN Police confirmed on 10 August that 142 houses had been torched in Viqueque and Baucau districts since disturbances began. Other reports suggested up to 600 homes destroyed. On 10 August in Viqueque there were numerous cases of arson, fighting, stone throwing, and illegal road blocking, particularly in Watolari. In Baucau, there were also several cases of arson and stone throwing.

The situation has caused people in Viqueque and Baucau to flee for safety, some even leaving internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. People are on the move. Many have fled to the mountains, others to Dili, some under UN escort. Government buildings or organisations deemed to be in close association with the new government have been targeted; schools, churches and
Government buildings have been attacked and destroyed. The lack of secure options for displaced women, children and men is pressing."

ICG, 31 March 2008, p. 3
"Presidential and parliamentary elections in April-June 2007 passed relatively peacefully, though arson attacks in Ermera destroyed about 100 houses.8 Some families fled to the Ermera district capital, Gleno, and set up an IDP camp at the back of the district administration office. Others fled to Dili and set up their own IDP camp there.

After further violence in August 2007, President Ramos-Horta asked the Alliance for a Parliamentary Majority (AMP) coalition, under Gusmão, to form a government. FRETILIN, which had won a plurality in the parliamentary election, issued veiled threats if it was not given the first chance to do so. On 6 August, shortly after announcement of the AMP government, the customs building in Dili was incinerated, and there were tyre burnings and rock throwing throughout the city. On 7 August, Catholic NGO buildings were burnt down in Baucau, along with the agriculture ministry warehouse and some schools. On 9-10 August more than 400 houses were burned or damaged in Uatolari (Viqueque district) and Quelicai and Venilale (Baucau district). More than 5,000 fled to makeshift camps at schools, churches and police stations, or sought refuge in the mountains.9 Most of these have rebuilt their homes, but at least 600 remain displaced, living with relatives or in new IDP camps in Uatocarbau (Viqueque district).10 Some who left Dili during the 2006 crisis returned to swell the numbers in IDP camps there.

Other causes of displacement

Timor-leste is highly vulnerable to natural disasters (January 2008)

- Timor-Leste is a highly disaster-prone country. Disasters include including flooding, earthquakes, landslides, cyclones, tsunamis and drought.
- During 2007, drought and severe floods and landslides caused food shortages, infrastructure damage as well as displacement.

OCHA & UNMIT, 1 January 2008, p. 1
"On 1 and 2 January, flooding occurred in three sucos of Liquica district: Maumeta (Bazartete sub-district), Dato and Luculai (Liquica sub-district). Due to sedimentation, rivers changed their course and flooded residential areas with mud and boulders. According to the National Police (PNTL), around 100 houses were destroyed and 90 were damaged. Furthermore, 650 households are facing water shortage due to the damage to the water pipes. Some electrical poles have also collapsed and several areas are currently without electricity (the 'RSS' area in Liquica sub-district and Kaittehu in Bazartete sub-district).

Despite the high level of destruction in the affected areas no injuries or loss of life have been reported. PNTL had warned and helped to evacuate populations in the affected areas before the floods hit, which may have saved many lives. However, some families did not have the opportunity to save any of their belongings.
In total, around 300 families left their homes due to the destruction of their houses or fear thereof. Some are staying with host families, others are sheltering in schools.

**IFRC, 26 July 2007**

"The country has also faced drought in February-March this year and food scarcity throughout the country. Despite these difficulties, Timor-Leste successfully completed its presidential election and parliamentary election in June and July respectively. The process of instituting a new government is underway.

Timor-Leste experiences its heaviest rains during June and July each year. However, this year, the downpours have been more severe than usual, leading to flooding and landslides. This has led to at least one death, destroyed infrastructure, damaged livelihoods and made many people homeless. Overall, 243 families in six districts have been badly affected.

**UNICEF, 21 March 2007**

"In addition to these challenges, Timor-Leste is prone to natural disasters, especially floods and landslides during the rainy season, which starts around November every year. This year, the delayed rainy season yielded in low rainfall in some areas of the country resulting in pockets of droughts, which will exacerbate the food insecurity throughout the country."

**OCHA, 16 January 2007, p. 13**

"Timor-Leste is vulnerable to natural disasters and other emergencies including flooding, earthquakes, landslides, cyclones, tsunamis and drought. During January-February 2006, a powerful storm heavily affected the districts of Ainaro, Viqueque, Baucau, Ermera and Oecusse, where many farmers lost their standing crops, roofs of houses and schools were destroyed, and water supply sources damaged. Small-scale earthquakes are also frequent. The National Disaster Management Office (NDMO), based in the Ministry of the Interior, is working in close coordination with the MTRC and the humanitarian partners to finalise and verify the effectiveness of the National Contingency Plan for Flooding.

An Emergency Coordination Group has been established by MTRC / NDMO to oversee disaster response, incorporating key ministries, humanitarian organisations, UNPol, PNTL and F-FDTL. A Contingency Plan for drought / food shortages, earthquake / tsunami and conflict is also envisaged to be prepared by the NDMO with the technical support of humanitarian coordination partners. The Plan will also include a massive public information campaign throughout the country, to reduce the number of possible victims in case of emergency. UN Agencies, NGOs, IFRC and the Timorese Red Cross will provide the necessary support."
POPULATION FIGURES AND PROFILE

Global Figures

Between 35,000 and 40,000 people remain displaced in Timor-Leste (October 2008)

- In October 2008, it was estimated that 9,000 IDP families (out of 16,000 families registered for the return process) had accepted to receive the recovery/reintegration package in exchange for moving out of the camps and returning to their homes. Out of the 51 camps, 28 had been closed by then. An estimated 35,000 to 40,000 people remain displaced.
- As of April 2008, OCHA estimated the number of IDPs to stand at 100,000, the majority sheltered with friends and relatives in the districts.
- It should be noted that official IDP figures have since May 2006 been incomplete due to the absence of registration and distorted upwards by IDP-targeted food policies.
- During 2007, two separate rounds of violence in February and in August, displaced up to 8,000 and 4,000 people respectively.
- Between 150,000 and 178,000 people were forced from their homes in April-May 2006.
- Some 70,000 IDPs took shelter located in the capital Dili itself, while more than 100,000 people fled to the various districts of the country.

HOW MANY ARE CURRENTLY DISPLACED?

It is estimated that between 150,000 and 178,000 people were displaced by the violent events of April and May 2006. During 2007, fresh rounds of violence displaced at least 12,000 people. In February 2007, 8,000 were displaced mainly in Dili as a consequence of rice shortage-linked violence. In early August 2007, an estimated 4,000 people were displaced by violence linked to the announcement of the new government. As of April 2008, OCHA estimated that 100,000 people remained displaced. A third of the displaced were living in one of the 51 camps in Dili or Baucau district (7 camps) while the rest was living with host families in Dili and in the districts.

At the end of 2007, the government launched a new strategy to address the IDP issue within a broader national recovery programme. Hamutuk Hari’l Futuru (Together Building the Future) aims to get people back to their homes and help them reintegrate, while addressing the needs and rights of the wider community. While taking steps to close camps (28 camps closed as of October 2008), the government in April 2008 started distributing recovery packages to IDPs willing to return. 16,000 families (nearly 83,000 people) registered to take part, and more than half received the recovery package in the first six months, leaving an estimated 35,000 to 40,000 people still displaced as of October 2008.

-See map showing existing IDP camps and transitional shelters in Dili as of September 2008

Due to the absence of an initial registration, constant movements to and from the camps and a food distribution policy that covered all IDPs but not the rest of the population (and which inflated IDP figures), it has been impossible to know the exact number of people
currently displaced. Given the poor food security situation in the country, it is likely that many people also registered as IDPs to receive the food assistance.

**SOURCES:**

**OCHA & UNMIT, 30 October 2008, p.2**
"With the return of IDPs from Tasi-Tolu, Obrigado Barracks and Igreja Balide camps, more than 9000 IDP families will have received a recovery or reintegration package under the Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru National Recovery Strategy; 31 IDP camps have now closed according to MSS."

**IOM, 28 October 2008**
"According to the government, of the over 100,000 people believed to have been displaced as a result of the 2006 civil and political unrest, 7,700 families (nearly 40,000 people) have so far benefited from return and reintegration assistance under the National Recovery Strategy."

**WFP, 12 September 2008, p.9**
"The Government has made it a priority to resettle and reintegrate in their places of origin the remaining 40,000 IDPs in Timor-Leste. WFP plans to support this effort through a return package to assist the IDPs in facing food shortages, reintegrating into their communities and restoring their livelihoods."

**ICG, 31 March 2008, p. i**
"With 30,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in camps in the capital, Dili, the displaced are highly visible evidence of the failure to provide security and enforce the rule of law. As well as a humanitarian tragedy, they are a conflict risk in their own right. The 70,000 living outside camps, with families and friends, may be less visible but are a significant burden on their hosts."

**OCHA, 13 August 2007**
"1. Civil unrest has been occurring in connection with the announcement of the new government on the 6th of August 2007 following the 30th of June parliamentary elections.

(...) 5. At least 4,000 persons are reportedly displaced at the moment in Viqueque and Baucau districts. The displaced persons stay in the mountains around the affected areas, and in convents, schools and compounds that are considered safe. 323 houses have been reported burnt so far and 52 damaged in Viqueque and Baucau districts."

**OCHA, 17 July 2007, pp.1-10**
"The humanitarian situation in Timor-Leste remains complex and multi-dimensional. The challenges posed by the prolonged IDP crisis – which has now lasted over one year – represent the most critical and visible part of much deeper issues at stake for Timor-Leste. 100,000 people, a significant portion of the population, remain displaced, burdening the already precarious living conditions of host families in Dili and the Districts."

(...)
Accurate IDP figures remain very difficult to obtain. The problem has been compounded by the constant movement of people between Dili and the Districts, ongoing insecurity in the camps and among communities, (in Dili and the Districts), and the inter-linkages between IDP groups and wider vulnerable populations, which makes differentiation more problematic. However, until a comprehensive registration and verification process can be agreed and implemented, current planning figures are based on the assumption that over 100,000 people remain displaced in the country (with a minimum of 30,000 in Dili).

(...) To date, instability and low-intensity violence remain a constant feature in Dili, limiting IDP returns. The situation is complicated by an estimated 8,000 people who were displaced following a renewed round of violence in February 2007 (the first since the beginning of the initial crisis).  

(...) Corroborating the total number of IDPs is difficult due to the fluidity of the situation, which itself reflects a wider, volatile condition. While on the one hand four new camps have opened in Dili over the past months, with increased populations at Cathedral and Fatumeta camps, the MTRC also reports constant departures. The camps were established spontaneously and conditions have steadily deteriorated as the crisis has endured. The camps are likely to remain in existence for at least the next six months and provision of basic services, camp management, protection activities and replacement/upgrading of shelter and utility infrastructure including Watsan are desperately needed."

Kammen, Douglas & Hayati, S.W., March 2007, p. 2

"Under the coordination of the Ministry of Labor and Community Reinsertion (MLCR), the United Nations World Food Program together with international NGOs given responsibility for individual camps initiated a massive program to supply rice and other basic foods to registered refugees. By August, MLCR announced that there were 168,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), half in Dili and half having fled to their home areas. Charges soon surfaced that the number of IDPs was inflated, in part because IDPs were double and even triple registering, in part too because people who had not been displaced had managed to register. Additionally accusations emerged that humanitarian assistance was a major reason people refused to return to their homes."

OCHA, 16 January 2007, pp. 7-10

"An estimated 10% of the population remain displaced throughout Timor-Leste. Approximately 150,000 people were displaced at the height of the crisis in April and May 2006, and current government estimates indicate that 29,000 people are still living in camps in Dili and more than 70,000 are with host families in the districts.  

(...) The accuracy of IDP figures is highly questionable. Formal registration of IDPs has been prevented by the resistance of camp leaders to providing information, and by direct threats against humanitarian staff attempting to conduct registrations. The best available figures are based on food distribution data and information provided by Government entities."

OHCHR, 2 October 2006, p.42

"In addition to those killed or injured, approximately 150,000 persons were displaced (some 73,000 persons in IDP camps in and around Dili and a further 78,000 having moved to districts outside Dili). While displacement built up progressively after 28 April, the largest increase in displacement occurred after the events of 25 May. The population of the IDP camps increased by 300 per cent in 24 hours."
WHERE ARE THE DISPLACED LOCATED?

Initially, approximately 70,000 IDPs took refuge within the capital -Dili while an additional 80,000 people fled the capital to seek refuge in the districts (see map). As of March 2008, it was estimated that 30,000 people remained displaced in Dili (mainly in camps) while 70,000 people were displaced in the districts (mainly staying with friends and family). Those outside Dili staying in camps are mainly located in one of the 7 camps in Baucau, which are hosting a total of 1,533 IDPs. In addition, 634 IDPs displaced in August 2007 are still living in 3 camps in the sub-district of Uatocarbau.

The estimated 4,000 people displaced in early August 2007 due to the civil unrest related to the announcement of the new government are mainly located in Baucau and Viqueque district (see map).

SOURCES:

OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 5
"Estimated 30% of IDPs out of an estimated total of 100,000 continue to reside in 58 camps, mainly in the capital Dili (51 camps) and in Baucau District (7 camps)."

ICG, 31 March 2008
"At least 30,000 of the estimated 100,000 IDPs are in 51 camps in and around Dili, while more than 70,000 live with family or friends in Dili or the districts, burdening the already precarious conditions of their hosts. Humanitarian assistance is provided almost exclusively to camp-dwellers in Dili; IDPs with relatives or in the camps outside Dili receive negligible aid.

While the vast majority of IDPs are in Dili, there are 1,533 IDPs in seven camps in Baucau town, mostly displaced from Dili during the 2006 crisis. Most of the camps are in the back gardens of relatives. The government stopped providing assistance to the IDPs in Baucau in July 2007 (although it did give new tents in late 2007). As a result, many people moved back to Dili – to camps in Metinaro and Jardim. The 634 IDPs from the August 2007 violence in Uatolari, living in three camps in the neighbouring sub-district of Uatocarbau, have not received government help since November 2007."

UNSC, 1 February 2007, p. 16
"In June 2006, internally displaced persons were almost evenly distributed between Dili and the districts, but since then there has been a shift from Dili to the districts, with an estimated 29,000 persons remaining in camps in Dili and the rest staying with host families in the districts and in internally displaced persons' camps in Baucau."

A. IDPs IN DILI
**OCHA, 8 July 2008**

Existing IDP camps and transitional shelters in Dili (September 2008)

**OCHA, 16 January 2007, p. 10**

"The displaced populations are concentrated mainly at locations in Dili such as the airport, the national hospital, the seaport, the UN compound, Government buildings and churches. In June 2006 the Government put the number of IDPs at 150,000, with 50% at 56 camps in Dili. As of December 2006, the Government estimates that, although a number of families have moved to the districts or returned home, 29,000 IDPs remain in Dili and a further 70,000 within small camps and host communities in the districts. Other sources estimate that the current number of IDPs in Dili camps is closer to 35,000 people and food distribution figures are even higher."

**OCHA, 23 February 2007**

"In addition, following recent security incidents since January 2007, particularly during the last two weeks, 5,000 people have sought refuge in existing camps as well as in four new locations as follows (see attached map):

UIR - 655 persons (106 families)
RTK – 291 persons (48 families)
Cathedral - 882 persons
Tuana Laran – 29 persons
Bairo Pite Clinic – 62 persons (14 families)"

**B. IDPs IN THE DISTRICTS**

As shown in the table below, during 2006 Baucau district registered the largest population increase due to the influx of IDPs, followed by Viqueque and Liquica districts.

**FAO/WFP, 21 June 2007, p. 8**

"As shown in Table 1 below, population is steadily increasing, at an annual rate of around 3 percent. To be noted is the specific situation of Dili, which registers a substantial loss due to the high number of IDPs leaving it, while Baucau is on the contrary receiving a very substantial influx of IDPs, hence a sharp rise of 35 percent of its population."

**Estimated IDPs in the Districts (December 2006)**

Source: Timor-Leste government, December 2006

In early August 2007, an estimated 4,000 people were displaced by violence linked to the announcement of the new government.
Population displacement caused by civil unrest related to the announcement of the new government (14 August 2007)

Source: OCHA, 14 August 2007

The displaced are mainly from the east (March 2008)

- The majority of the displaced in camps in Dili are easterners or 'lorosea' who were forced from their homes by westerners or 'loromonu' during the unrest.
- Some have also joined the camps later from the districts are take advantage of the free shelter and food.

ICG, 31 March 2008, p. 4
"The population of the camps is a cross-section of Timorese society.

(...) The case of Angelina is typical. A civil servant, she fled her home in a Dili suburb because of security fears. After the violence subsided, in May 2006, she and her husband attempted to return home but were threatened by their mainly westerner (loromonu) neighbours because he is an easterner (lorosae). Someone scrawled the word “Irak” (a term sometimes used for lorosae) on their house. They lived with relatives in Manatuto while fighting continued in Dili but eventually moved to an IDP camp to be close to their work in Dili. Eighteen months later, their small children are living with relatives, and Angelina and her husband see no prospect of going home.

Some people became displaced for political reasons, such as Carlos – a high-profile member of FRETLIN with connections to the former interior minister, Rogerio Lobato – who fled Dili on 28 April 2006, because he was warned that political enemies were coming to kill him. Carlos moved to Baucau with his family. His house was only partially damaged, but all his possessions were stolen. In March 2007 he moved to Airport camp in Dili. Many became displaced because of differences between lorosae and loromonu. One is José, from Viqueque, who was living in a mixed part of Dili. The lorosae from his neighbourhood burnt down the houses of their loromonu neighbours. José was forced to flee because he was friends with some of the loromonu and tried to stop the destruction of their houses. His lorosae neighbours accused him of siding with the enemy. His house is intact, but he and his family are too frightened to return. José is now living in a tent at the back of a relative’s house near the Motael IDP camp with 32 members of his family.

Some of the displaced were victims of criminality and gang violence. Others, such as Augustu, were the victims of social jealousy. Augustu’s family, originally from Baucau, had been living in Dili since the 1970s. He had been friends with his neighbours’ children. When he returned from university in Indonesia and obtained employment in Dili, he did not have time to hang around all day with his old friends. They accused him of arrogance and during the violence in 2006 took the opportunity presented by the breakdown in law and order to destroy his family’s house and kiosk. Augustu’s family is now divided between an IDP camp and transitional housing in Becora.

Since August 2007, some non-church camps have also become home to large groups of young men who have come to Dili from the districts to study, look for work or simply to have fun in the largest city in the country. They stay in the IDP camps because they can get free accommodation, free food and a regular water supply. As the camps turn into permanent residences for these young men and conditions deteriorate, they risk becoming urban slums."
ISN, 7 August 2007
"The violent reaction to Ramos-Horta's announcement is deeply disturbing, albeit unsurprising, given the political and security stand-off since April 2006, when 100,000 people were displaced and almost half the army - mainly from the western part of East Timor - was sacked after it protested against alleged bias in favor of easterners.

This east-west divide later transferred to Dili's streets, permeating much of the ensuing violence, with army easterners firing on westerners from the police and accusing them of siding with the westerner army rebels, all leading to civilian reprisals.

Easterners comprise most of the 100,000 people who remain displaced since then, and FRETILIN draws most of its support from this region."

Engel, Rebecca, April 2007, p.1
"Ema Lorosae (people from the east), have borne the brunt of the suffering in the last year, as more than one hundred thousand men, women, and children were driven from their homes by youth gangs closely aligned with political elements operating in the country."

USDOS, 8 March 2007, c
"While all groups and levels of society were represented in the IDP population, humanitarian workers observed a greater proportion of easterners. By year's end a large number of IDPs had left the camps. Many returned to their homes, but many others lacking this option moved into houses with relatives, or in many cases returned to their home districts. It was not known to what extent the recent unrest resulted in a permanent reallocation of the population throughout the country. At year's end an estimated 25,000 IDPs remained in camps in Dili and as many as 70,000 remained displaced in the districts."

The Japan Times, 25 February 2007
"By June, amid the gathering chaos, roaming gangs had torched and looted their way around most of Dili and driven many easterners out of their homes into the refugee camps where many still remain."

ICG, 10 October 2006, p. 16
"Dili remained highly polarised and physically segregated, with makeshift camps for the displaced, most of them lorosae, dotted around the city. One of the main markets divided into two, one for loromonu, one for lorosae."
WFP, 30 June 2006, p.12
"There are usually three large markets in Dili: two remain closed and one is operational but at a much reduced size. The majority of shops are still closed as many of them were owned by Indonesians who have left the country. Also, traditionally, shop owners in Dili are from Baucau district in the east, and these are mainly the shops that have been looted and torched. An estimated 25,000 people have fled to Baukau of which some are shop owners.

Disaggregated data

Significant changes in the average number of IDP household members following displacement (June 2006)

- A WFP study conducted in the wake of the April/May unrest showed a change in the household structure following after displacement.
- Nearly one-quarter of the displaced report having to host more people.
- Nearly 10 per cent of the non-displaced families report having lost one family member as a result of the conflict.

WFP, 30 June 2006, p. 11
"The average number of household members in the Dili area according to the CFSVA is seven. 47% of those in sites and 30% of those in Aldeias reported that there has been a change in their household structure after 28 April (figure 3). Among the households that report a change, the difference is in both directions, without a large difference between sites and Aldeias. Noteworthy is that as many as 9% of all families in the Aldeias have lost one or more family members as a result of the conflict."
PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General

Most people displaced by the April/May 2006 unrest in Dili sought refuge in spontaneous camps (March 2008)

- Following the April-May unrest, an estimated 73,000 people sought refuge in spontaneous camps in Dili, while another 70,000 people moved outside the capital to seek shelter with friends a family
- Almost all people displaced to the districts are staying with host families.

ICG, 31 March 2008, p.2
"Approximately 150,000 persons were displaced in the face of widespread arson and looting. The government and international community responded by providing humanitarian assistance – shelter, sanitation and food. 73,000 people sought shelter in church compounds, non-governmental organisation (NGO) offices and other places in Dili where they felt safe. More than 50 IDP camps were set up in these locations. At least 70,000 people moved in with friends and relatives outside the capital. The humanitarian and economic impacts of the displacements were substantial."

OCHA, 17 July 2007, pp. 31-32
"The majority of IDPs displaced to Dili by the crisis found refuge in church or Government compounds, which were not designed for sheltering large numbers of people. While IDP numbers have reduced substantially over the past year, continued insecurity within Dili has meant that large numbers of people are still residing in these spontaneous camps, with even more living outside the camps in makeshift arrangements in or on property belonging to others. The camp-based IDPs are living primarily in tents, often in crowded and sub-standard conditions due to site constraints. Current data indicates that over 75% have had their homes damaged or destroyed and will be unable to leave the camps without additional housing assistance."
Majority of the 5,000 people displaced in February 2007 went to existing camps and 4 new locations (February 2007)

- Most people newly displaced in February 2007 sought shelter in existing IDP camps in Dili as well as in 4 new locations.

OCHA, 23 February 2007

"In addition, following recent security incidents since January 2007, particularly during the last two weeks, 5,000 people have sought refuge in existing camps as well as in four new locations as follows (see attached map):

UIR - 655 persons (106 families)
RTK – 291 persons (48 families)
Cathedral - 882 persons
Tuana Laran – 29 persons
Bairo Pite Clinic – 62 persons (14 families)"

People displaced in August 2007 are staying with host families or have fled to the mountains (August 2007)

- Most people displaced in the eastern districts of Baucau and Viqueque as a result of the unrest which followed the announcement of the new government in early August 2007 sought refuge in the mountains or in public buildings such as schools or churches.
- OCHA reports that the whereabouts of the displaced people are for the most part unaccounted for.
- The sub-district of Waturali in Viqueque is the most affected with 5 sucos out of 6, totaling a population of 17,250 people affected by the crisis.

Population displacement caused by civil unrest related to the announcement of the new government (14 August 2007)

Source: OCHA, 14 August 2007

OCHA, 21 August 2007

"5. At least 4,000 persons are reportedly displaced at the moment in Viqueque and Baucau districts. The displaced are remaining in the mountains around the affected areas, and in convents, schools and compounds that are considered safe. In total 323 houses have been reported burnt and 52 damaged in Viqueque and Baucau districts.

(...)"

10. Significant parts of the displaced population are reportedly scattered in forests and mountain areas, to which access is difficult. In order to gain access to these populations and provide
assistance, an inter-agency assessment mission with United Nations helicopters to Watulari and Uatucarbau was scheduled to take place on Saturday, 18 August 2007. As heavy rains had made the roads in the area impassable, the assessment mission had to be rescheduled to Thursday, 23 August."

**Trocaire, 21 August 2007**

"While Dili has been calm, tensions have risen outside of the capital. Of the 13 districts (similar to Irish counties) in Timor Leste, five are currently experiencing disturbances. According to an initial assessment carried out by a team from the Government’s Ministry of Social Solidarity, in the past two weeks 323 houses have been reported burnt, 53 damaged and at least 5,000 persons are reported to have left their homes in the eastern towns of Viqueque and Baucau districts.

There is a growing humanitarian concern for the 5,000 people including young children, pregnant women and elderly who have fled their homes. Some are now living in already overcrowded extended family homes while others have left for the safety of the mountains or are using trees for shelter. In the turmoil, public transport and schools have been disrupted and food, water and medical supplies shortages are emerging in the affected eastern districts of the country."

**OCHA, 17 August 2007**

"In Viqueque and Baucau more than 323 houses have reportedly been destroyed by violent groups, especially in the sub-district of Watulari in Viqueque. In the area around Venilale and in the Uatolari sub-district more than 4000 people are supposed to have been displaced. The whereabouts of the displaced are for the most parts unaccounted for, while unconfirmed reports tells of large groups of people seeking refuge in the mountains in the area."

**NDMO & MSS, 13 August 2007**

"Information is coming from a range of sources, UNPol, PNTL, People on the ground, NGOs, UN and the first Secretary of State for Social Security (formerly MTRC) mission that went to Viqueque on Sunday the 12th of August. There are a number of gaps, but what can be concluded so far is;

The most affected sub district is Watulari in Viqueque. Of its 6 sucos, 5, with a total population of 17,250 people are affected (Afaloicai, Babulo, Macadique, Matahoi, Uatame). The bulk of the displaced from Watulari Subdistrict fled to Babulo mountains. The numbers are yet to be confirmed.

Afaloicai has the highest number of burnt houses to date, 112

A number of IDP gatherings have been reported in Viqueque District (see table 2 below)

1000 people fled from 5 of the 8 sucos in Venilale subdistrict in Baucau to the bush surrounding Vanilale town. A total of 50 houses were reported burnt. Uataco and Uailaha suffered the most damage.

**Some returnees re-displaced upon return due to lack of preparation, threats from old neighbours and housing projects (September 2008)**

- Returnees, displaced people and squatters living on the ASPOL site are at risk of eviction because the land they use is state-owned and to be used for a housing project for the police.
• Some returnees are reported to go to the districts to sell some of their supply and then head back to Dili.
• In early June 2008, some IDPs returning to their homes from Jardim and Arte Moris camp in Dili have been threatened and unable to return or re-displaced.
• With many unresolved issues, in particular those linked to the prosecution of perpetrators of the 2006 violence, many IDPs still don't feel to return and are at risk of re-displacement if they do.

OCHA & UNMIT, 17 September 2008, p. 4
"On 1 September, PNTL and F-FDTL went to the Aspol site to commence the execution of an eviction order that had been issued by the Ministry of Justice on 12 May 2008. The reason for the eviction notice is that the land of the Aspol site is Government owned and is to be used for PNTL housing.

The Aspol/EDTL site gathers a mix of people:

a) Some who claim to have lived there since 1999,
b) Some who used to live there before the 2006 crisis, then moved to an IDP camp, before coming back recently once they received their recovery package because they consider this area their home, c) and those in the same situation as the latter but who have not yet received their recovery package.

In a letter addressed recently to the highest authorities of the Government, the representatives of the Aspol residents express their concern, and state that the eviction process and options available remain unclear.

According to MSS, 33 families returned to the site from IDP camps (including Jardim, Hospital and Sional) with the Hamutuk Hari'i Futuru programme’s Recovery Package. The remaining families (not registered as IDPs but living at the site) could be entitled to compensation. However, at this time, the exact nature of this compensation remains uncertain, and both the MSS and the Ministry of Justice are still discussing the nature of the compensation."

OCHA & UNMIT, 30 June 2008, p. 5
"According to CARE, a number of Aldeias within Bairo Pite continue to wait for Government support for dialogue processes. Chefe de Aldeias in Bairo Pite have reported that they are not receiving adequate information prior to a return, and often the time between when they are advised of the returns and the actual commencement of the process is too short to allow them to adequately prepare the community. CARE has similar concerns over the lack of preparation and very short time lines between the start of the process and the first IDPs being returned.

Austcare monitored the return of IDPs from Jardim camp into identified locations in Viqueque. One family of three members has arrived in Calerek Mutin and resettled in one of its aldeias. One other IDP family supposed to resettle in Calerek Mutin decided to sell the supplies they brought from Dili and returned to Dili after completing the sale. One IDP family, who arrived in Uamauain Kraik in Viqueque Vila, just left some of their belongings and also headed back to Dili. The concerned Chefe Sucos are requesting MSS to inform them of these arrivals so that they could assist in preparing the community for their return and in monitoring their needs while settling in."
In the past two weeks, SLS agencies have assisted the Government in the return and reintegration of IDPs from two camps: Jardim and Arte Moris. Whilst the return process for both camps was well organised and resulted in positive outcomes for the majority of those previously in the camp, it was not without challenges. These challenges are currently under consideration by the Government and the Government is taking steps to address the issues. It is known that some IDPs have been re-displaced or have been threatened upon return. Others were unable to return to their pre-Crisis communities of residence.

CARE has noted that members of the Bairo Pite community have raised concerns about the manner in which the returns are being conducted. They have asked for more focus to be placed on preparation and dialogue within receiving communities prior to returns being conducted. CARE has highlighted that a formalised system for addressing disputes over occupancy of housing has yet to be established. Current occupants of houses may be in danger of becoming IDPs themselves if they are forced to vacate their current residences. At the same time, former IDPs have, in some cases, been forced to negotiate a sum of money with those occupying their houses.

As a result of ongoing threats and intimidation, and an ineffective police force and justice system, most camp residents simply do not feel secure enough to return to their former communities in Dili. Violence against easterners in predominantly western suburbs and against westerners in predominantly eastern suburbs has not been dealt with by the security forces or the justice system; no house-burning cases have ever been brought to court. IDPs feel that their former communities do not want them back, and that, if they do return, their houses may be destroyed or damaged and they and their family may suffer violence. One IDP said his family had tried to rebuild its house in Becora, but the neighbours’ children – who had burnt it down in the first place – had thrown stones at them. IDPs from Ermera who were assisted to return to their village on 30 December 2007 were threatened by former neighbours, many of whom were responsible for the destruction of their homes in May 2007.
PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Physical security

Important protection concerns for returning IDPs (August 2008)

- Returnees in Ermera district expressed concern about security and the lack of police presence. Their sense of insecurity is fuelled by the lack of progress in bringing to justice suspects of house-burning in 2006, or older cases of violations.
- IDPs returning from camps or transitional shelters have been reported to have been re-displaced following threats from old neighbours upon return.
- The UN Transitional Strategy and Appeal (TSA), launched in April 2008, listed a number of protection needs priorities, including in particular: protection monitoring in the camps and areas of return and relocation, building capacity of support services to provide appropriate assistance to IDP victims of GBV, ensuring IDP children in camps and areas of return have access to education psychosocial support and establishment of a dispute land and property disputes resolution mechanism.

OCHA & UNMIT, 20 August 2008, p. 5
"UNMIT HRTJS field visit to Uraho, Ermera District: On 11 August, UNMIT HRTJS conducted a field visit to Uraho, Ermera District, in order to assess the situation for returnees. There was particular concern following the reported burning of two houses in Uraho in July and early August, and an incident on 4 August between an ex-Falintil member and an IDP returnee. This incident is currently under investigation.

During the visit the HRTJS met with the Ermera district UNMIT Police Commander, the Uraho village chief, the Uraho IDP Coordinator and five IDP families. Concerns were raised about the lack of police presence in Uraho. Although the cause of the fire in two houses has not been established, the returnees expressed concern about security and the lack of police presence. However, the returnees have started re-building their houses. Fourteen of the 43 families who returned still live in tents, while a number of other families live with relatives while they are rebuilding. Another issue which was raised was Justice for past crimes was also raised as an issue; there does not appear to have been progress in bringing to justice suspects of house-burnings in 2006, nor older cases of violations from 1999. Resolution of such cases is considered critical to resolving long-term tensions in the area."

OCHA & UNMIT, 16 July 2008, p. 4
"In the past two weeks, SLS and camp coordination agencies have assisted the Government in the return and reintegration of IDPs from six camps and transitional shelters. Whilst the return process for all IDP sites is resulting in positive outcomes for many of those previously in the camps, it is not without challenges. It is known that some IDPs have been re-displaced or have been threatened upon return. Others were unable to return to their pre-Crisis communities of residence. SLS working group members remain committed to assisting the Government to minimise potential conflicts, displacement and tensions arising from the return process."
"Summary of the protection needs in the Protection Sector until December 2008

- Recruitment of field protection staff for protection monitoring in the camps and areas of return and relocation.
- Building the capacity of support services to provide appropriate assistance to IDP victims of GBV. In particular, by strengthening the capacity of Women’s Committees and Child Protection focal points in IDP camps to monitor and report systematically on GBV and children’s situation.
- Increased support to the Vulnerable Persons Unit of the PNTL/UNPoL to provide specialized assistance to children and women victims of violence, exploitation and abuse.
- Ensuring all children in IDP camps and areas of return have access to education and to appropriate psychosocial support.
- Advocacy on land, housing and property rights of IDPs in accordance with the Pinheiro Principles, including for the establishment of a dispute resolution mechanism that is simple, fair and accessible to all vulnerable groups in society, including the IDPs.
- Provision of information and legal advice for IDPs and returnee communities on access to justice and available reintegration programmes.

Objectives

- Increase the field protection monitoring in camps and in areas of return to monitor IDPs’ return and reintegration in their communities.
- Strengthen Government institutions, and civil society organisations providing services to IDPs and other vulnerable populations (legal, health, psychosocial, education, etc.) especially those working in the social welfare and legal sectors.
- Support capacity building of the PNTL Vulnerable Persons Unit, particularly in addressing IDPs’ protection needs on crime related issues such as gender-based violence, particularly domestic violence, child abuse and juvenile justice.
- Establish community-based protection systems for vulnerable populations affected by the crisis, especially children and women, in Dili and the districts.
- Support participatory advocacy initiatives to raise awareness about the rights of IDPs and to increase IDP children and youth’s involvement in advocacy on issues affecting them.
- Ensure protection priorities are included in all IDP return/reintegration/ recovery programmes through effective community-based and national monitoring, reporting and advocacy.

Indicators

- Expanded protection monitoring coverage of all IDP communities in Dili and the districts.
- Coordinated field IDP protection monitoring and reporting systems in place.
- Strengthened referral mechanisms for victims of violence and abuse, in IDP camps and communities, resulting in an increased number of cases being reported and addressed.
- Increased number of IDPs and members of affected communities resorting to legal, health and psychosocial services.
- Access to legal aid services made available in all IDP camps, resulting in higher number of cases resolved (through the justice system or other means) and/or referred to appropriate service providers."

"Notwithstanding this, a number of important protection concerns remain. With regard to IDPs’ physical security, incidents have occurred in which community members attacked IDPs, sometimes as a result of private disputes or tensions between IDPs and host communities. An active posture by the police, through regular patrolling and timely responses, will remain critical, especially during periods of political tension. More generally, the level of politicisation has risen in certain camps, thereby increasing risks of intimidation as well as public order disturbances by more militant individuals in the camps concerned."
"As a result of ongoing threats and intimidation, and an ineffective police force and justice system, most camp residents simply do not feel secure enough to return to their former communities in Dili. Violence against easterners in predominantly western suburbs and against westerners in predominantly eastern suburbs has not been dealt with by the security forces or the justice system; no house-burning cases have ever been brought to court. IDPs feel that their former communities do not want them back, and that, if they do return, their houses may be destroyed or damaged and they and their family may suffer violence. One IDP said his family had tried to rebuild its house in Becora, but the neighbours' children – who had burnt it down in the first place – had thrown stones at them. IDPs from Ermera who were assisted to return to their village on 30 December 2007 were threatened by former neighbours, many of whom were responsible for the destruction of their homes in May 2007.

The government needs to give high priority to security sector reform, including building a professional, non-partisan police force. The failure to do this underlay the 2006 crisis, sparked by the sacking of military personnel. In particular, priority should be given to community policing, if IDPs are ever to feel safe returning to communities from where they have been driven by their neighbours. Women and the elderly – who may find their opinions on whether to return ignored by the man of the family – may especially need reassurance. The police Vulnerable Persons Unit has an important role to play.

It is also important to send a clear message that arson and displacement are unacceptable ways to settle political and personal disputes. This means bringing cases to court, not just individual arsonists, but also those accused of responsibility for the 2006 crisis by the UN's Commission of Inquiry and the government's Commission of Notables. Very few such persons have been tried; even the few individuals convicted by the Dili district court are not in jail. Some IDPs feel that Prime Minister Gusmão should apologise publicly for his role in the crisis, particularly his 23 March speech, which many blame for exacerbating the loromonu-lorosae division.

The origin of the east-west division is disputed: some claim it dates back to Portuguese times, others that it is a recent phenomenon exploited by politicians in 2006. Certainly, the arson, looting and communal attacks carried out by loromonu against lorosae and vice versa have deepened it. The displacement crisis has temporarily reduced tensions, as many communities have in effect segregated themselves, but problems can be expect to re-emerge when IDPs return home. With the loromonu-lorosae division dangerously vulnerable to political manipulation, the government needs to give urgent attention to the need for national reconciliation.

The problem of rebel Major Alfredo Reinado and the petitioners was cited by many IDPs as a reason to stay in the relative safety of the camps. As a member of parliament put it, "people were displaced because of the actions of the petitioners and Alfredo Reinado (among others), so there is no point in trying to resolve the IDP issue until Alfredo and the petitioners have been dealt with. The death of Reinado on 11 February 2008 may help alleviate these fears, though it is not yet clear to what extent his followers will continue to pose a threat to returning IDPs."

Need to strengthen field based monitoring and institutions providing protection (August 2008)

- The Provedor's office IDP team was revived in June 2008, but the opening of regional offices was posptoned due to financial limitations.
- Legal aid and victim support activities, particularly in the districts, and the Human Rights Monitoring Network (RMDH) required further strengthening

- The TSA identified as a priority to step up efforts in protection monitoring, which needs to be expanded and be made more systematic.

**UNMIT, 21 August 2008, p. 15**

"65. The Office of the Provedor for Human Rights and Justice played a key role in human rights monitoring and reporting during the state of siege and as such strengthened its role as a relevant national human rights mechanism. Cooperation with NGOs increased, but further steps would be welcome. The opening of regional offices was postponed due to budget constraints. On 30 June the Provedor’s Office issued its Annual Report. The revival of its IDP team in June 2008 was also a welcome development. In June, a joint session was held with the HRTJS to strengthen cooperation.

66. Civil society organizations had not yet signed and enacted the NGO Forum Code of Conduct for NGOs. Legal aid and victim support activities, particularly in the districts, and the Human Rights Monitoring Network (RMDH) required further strengthening. In addition, NGOs continued to enter cases into the Human Rights Violations Database, with a total of 323 cases entered since 2005."

**OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 30**

"Need for strengthened field based monitoring, reporting and analysis

Although protection monitoring is taking place, in particular by the SLS agencies whose main task is camp management, and by some UN and NGO staff, these efforts need to be expanded and be made more systematic. Even fewer mechanisms for monitoring IDPs in communities exist. There is a need to strengthen existing local monitoring structures including the IDP Monitoring Cell in the Provedor’s Office (PDHJ) and Women’s Committees facilitated by the local NGO Rede Feto. Funding problems have severely hampered these activities. Further, the reporting and coordination systems among field-based protection staff need to be improved. In the coming period, protection monitoring should also encompass: a) access to targeted food assistance, particularly for food insecure vulnerable categories, following the governments’ decision in February 2008 to reduce the blanket food rations; b) return or relocation processes on a voluntary basis and the impact on the right to physical integrity, house restitution and adequate standards of living.

Need for strengthening of institutions providing services to IDPs, particularly the Vulnerable Persons Unit of the police and referral pathway services responding to GBV.

The general weakness of some institutions providing protection services affects both IDPs and the general population. Still relatively few services are in place to ensure timely support to victims of violence or other forms of abuse. A Referral Pathway Group, consisting of NGOs and UN agencies, has made ongoing efforts to coordinate responses to GBV and raise awareness regarding services (emergency medical, psycho-social, counselling assistance and legal aid) available to victims of domestic violence, sexual assault and child abuse, both in Dili and the districts. These efforts, which have targeted camp managers, SLSs and GBV focal points in IDP camps and some surrounding communities, should be strengthened."

Long term displacement exposes IDPs and in particular children and women in camps to a variety of increased risks (October 2008)
- The extended stay in camps has led to an increase of incidences of incest, domestic violence and sexual harassment in some IDP camps.
- There is currently a lack of comprehensive IDP protection monitoring both in camps and in the districts.
- In February 2007, OCHA reported an increase of incidences of incest, domestic violence and sexual harassment in IDP camps, in particular Jardim, Tibar, Metinaro and Baucau.

**OCHA & UNMIT, 30 October 2008, p.2**

"Plan identified and responded to four critical child protection incidents in their project in IDP camps. Two of these cases were referred by Child Protection Focal Points (CPFP) who recently completed Plan Child Protection training. All cases have been referred to the MSS Child Protection Office and PNTL Vulnerable Persons Unit, and responses are being coordinated between Plan, UNICEF, UNMIT HRTJS, and local service providers."

**Plan, June 2008, p.111**

"To date, approximately 100,000 people remain homeless, either staying with relatives or in IDP camps scattered around the capital, Dili, as well as in other parts of the country. Girls and young women living in these camps continue to be at high risk of gender-based violence including incest and sexual harrassment. Domestic violence against girls and women is a major problem throughout Timor-Leste, with almost 50 per cent of women reporting abuse from their partner or husband.4

According to a 2005 UN study, over 40 per cent of children in Timor-Leste suffer from some form of violence. PRADET TL, a local NGO, completed a study for UNICEF which showed 30 per cent of documented cases being of sexual abuse, 26 per cent physical abuse, and neglect at 11 per cent. Eighty-five per cent of the documented cases in the study were girls."

**OCHA, 18 April 2008, pp. 7-30**

"Furthermore, women and children remain particularly vulnerable, especially in camps where they face risks of physical violence, gender based violence (GBV), trafficking and neglect. It will be critical to strengthen camp level prevention and response mechanisms, including with regard to sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) and other forms of abuse. The current limitations of the judicial system and the lack of public confidence have a significant negative impact on the sense of security felt by communities and IDPs alike. Limited funding has to date constrained the ability of the Government and international partners to properly and systematically monitor protection issues in the camps.

(...) Staying in the camps, in overcrowded and poor conditions, in an atmosphere of frustration and anxiety, also increases the vulnerability of especially women and girls to domestic and sexual violence. Although the precise extent of the problem remains unclear, notably as a result of under reporting by victims, there is an ongoing need to strengthen monitoring, information sharing, awareness raising and access to service provision for GBV victims. Another issue concerns the limited access to education for many children in IDP camps, which in part is due to fear of insecurity on the way to or at school. There are few vocational training and educational opportunities for young people. Further, reports from service providers indicate that due to the current climate of insecurity, poverty and weak service provision, children are exposed to risks of sexual and economic exploitation."
ICG, 31 March 2008, p. 5
"The camps are a particularly problematic environment for women and children. The overcrowded tents and toilet block provide little privacy. Rates of domestic violence and sexual assault are high throughout Timor-Leste, though there are no reliable statistics since the victims rarely report these crimes. Observers believe that, while the prevalence of violence against women in many IDP camps is similar to that elsewhere, domestic violence and sexual assault are higher in camps with particular security problems, notably Jardim and Airport. Children are exposed to risks related to inadequate shelter and living conditions, as well as bullying and brawling. In many cases, displacement has disrupted schooling. The camps have no schools or youth facilities; some children travel to schools in their “home” neighbourhood – risking violence from former neighbours – while others go to schools near the camps. Children, women, the elderly and other vulnerable groups are all at higher risk of exploitation for various forms of abuse – cases of forced prostitution and human trafficking have both been reported, for example."

OCHA, 17 July 2007, p. 10
"The camps were established spontaneously and conditions have steadily deteriorated as the crisis has endured. The camps are likely to remain in existence for at least the next six months and provision of basic services, camp management, protection activities and replacement/upgrading of shelter and utility infrastructure including Watsan are desperately needed.

As the IDP situation is prolonged there is a need for more effective and comprehensive protection monitoring, both in the camps and in the districts. There is a need for improved field-based protection capacity, with improved data collection relating to general IDP intent, where/why IDPs are relocating, in what numbers and what specific conditions they face, child protection activities, protection against Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) and provision of medical and psycho-social support. For future planning, it is clear that assistance activities should support and facilitate efforts to address protection concerns in the context of achieving durable solutions. In the broader context, protection needs to include a wide-ranging number of actors. It should build upon the existing capacity of local/district authorities with the understanding that prioritisation of humanitarian assistance (shelter, food, water/sanitation, education and health) provides legitimacy and continuity, even as it is eventually reduced. As the new Government increases its strength there will be an incremental hand-over of responsibility as the focus of assistance moves from operational to institutional support, which justifies renewed efforts with capacity-building activities. (…)

Many of the protection concerns which emerged in the IDP camps in 2006 related to assistance, with protection activities in large part focused on ensuring that basic needs were being met (food, Watsan, access to information, education and health services etc.) and, within the given space and other constraints, that appropriate gender and age sensitive site planning was undertaken (placement of latrines and lighting, establishment of play spaces, etc.). With the evolution of events since the onset of the crisis in April/May 2006, including the emergence in some camps of violent fringe elements who exercise power through intimidation, the situation in the camps has become considerably more complex. As such, in addition to assistance concerns, the protection issues which are likely to emerge in 2007/2008 are expected to be more difficult to address and will require careful handling through an increased presence of experienced national and international field-based protection staff."
As the IDP situation becomes increasingly entrenched, enhancing the protection field presence is vital to ensure that all prevention, response, transition, camp closure and return strategies are informed by the kind of in-depth understanding of the day-to-day realities faced by the displaced and other conflict-affected populations which can only be gained through a regular presence and interaction with camp and community populations. Improving the reporting systems and the coordination of an increased number of field-based protection staff will be vital to ensuring uniformity in coverage and approach, and to enhancing impact. Two themes in particular emerge.

A first concerns the ongoing efforts on the part of the SGBV sub-sector to raise awareness of the existence of the referral network of support services that provide emergency medical, psychosocial counselling care as well as legal services for victims of domestic violence, sexual assault and child abuse both in Dili and the districts. These efforts, which will be strengthened in the second half of 2007, have targeted camp managers, SLSs and gender-based violence (GBV) focal points from IDP camps and some surrounding communities. Information on human trafficking and how to recognize and prevent trafficking from taking place in the IDP camps has also been included in general awareness-raising activities on GBV.

A second is the unique series of protection challenges that children face in the current situation. Most children in IDP camps have been living there for up to twelve months, and as one of the most vulnerable groups within the broader population long term displacement exposes them to a variety of increased risks. These are associated with long-term exposure to inadequate shelter and living conditions, physical factors (e.g. fighting taking place in and around camps), predatory behaviour that often develops around displaced communities (e.g. trafficking) and, generally, inadequate health and hygiene conditions. Economic and other pressures mean that there are many more children engaged in street vending and begging around Dili, in turn increasing their vulnerability and risk of exploitation. Children’s exposure to gender-based violence, including domestic violence, is also exacerbated by ongoing insecurity, displacement, and chronic poverty and vulnerability in and around displaced people’s settings.

Most children in Dili have had their access to education severely disrupted, and many in camps are still unwilling or unable to resume regular schooling, in part because of fears associated with leaving the camps or being threatened on the way to, or at, the local school. In camps and other displaced communities, children are not able to re-establish patterns of normal childhood, with limited opportunities to play and disrupted networks of family and other relationships. Children are also disproportionately affected by the stress and psychosocial trauma associated with dislocation, violence and instability since this stress also impacts on how adults interact with those children in their care. Continued and strengthened efforts are urgently required to address violations of children’s protection, including increased capacity to deliver psychosocial, legal and other support services, advocacy for their rights at community and national levels, as well as the development and dissemination of policies and guidelines in line with international standards and principles."

UNICEF, 5 July 2007

*For over a year now, 13-year-old Zaquel Pinto and his cousins have been living in the Obrigado Barracks, a displacement camp set up in a parking lot. They fled their home in May 2006, after widespread violence broke out in the country’s capital.

The parking lot, which stands opposite the United Nations compound in Dili, was transformed into a camp for 7,000 people at the height of the crisis. About 800 people remain here today – their tents now augmented by plywood doors, beds and cupboards salvaged from their old homes.

(...)
Following civil unrest last year, Timor-Leste split between the eastern and western parts of the country. Soldiers fled with weapons into the mountains, where they remain a threat to security, leaving many Timorese unsure of what the future holds.

Children were not spared by the violence. Because his family came from the east, Zaquel was accosted by his own schoolmates and nearly stabbed in the stomach when he attempted to attend school last year.

A general calm has returned to Dili but sporadic violence still occurs. Due to the cramped living conditions in the camps, physical and sexual abuse may occur, especially for women and girls.

To help ease this sense of uncertainty and protect Timorese children from psychological distress, child protection teams have been set up in camps such as the Obrigado Barracks. Child-friendly spaces have been established and children have been provided with sports and recreation equipment.

**UNICEF, 21 March 2007**

"More than 40 per cent of the population in Timor-Leste live below the poverty line. The combined effects of poor environmental sanitation, frequent and severe infectious diseases, persistent malnutrition and parasites have led to an under-five mortality of 136 deaths per 1,000 live births. More than one in ten children is acutely malnourished and almost one in two suffers from chronic malnutrition. The 2006 WFP Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis showed 56 per cent of children under five to be under weight.

A significant number of the population is internally displaced and the resulting breakdown of social structures and services has seriously challenged the capacity of families, communities and the State to protect children. In addition to continued low-intensity conflict in Dili, natural disasters are common, especially floods and landslides during the rainy season. Due to poor drainage in highly congested camps, IDPs are at high risk of diarrhoea-related diseases.

A few schools remain closed in Dili due to the prevailing insecurity and in many places where schools are open, teachers do not report to work due to security concerns. Vandalism and looting have left most of the schools in the capital Dili without sufficient furniture, equipment and resources. Lack of water and sanitation is another problem mentioned by nearly all schools in Dili."

**OCHA, 23 February 2007**

"There has been increased reporting of incidences of incest, domestic violence and sexual harassment in some IDP camps, particularly in Jardim, Tibar, Metinaro and Baucau. Regarding Gender Based Violence, an area of concern is how to address these issues and encourage the victims to report. In some locations IDPs continue to be held hostage by camp managers and other IDPs."

**Persistent protection concerns and insufficient national police capacity require continued presence of international security forces (August 2008)**

- The increased role of the defense force in internal security is likely to continue to ensure stability, including in areas where IDPs are returning to.
• The 1,543-strong UN police force will be required to continue provide security and support to the national police until they can take over and guarantee Timor's internal security.

UNMIT, 21 August 2008, p.3
"3. The cooperation of the F-FDTL and PNTL, and the successful efforts to apprehend those wanted in connection with the attacks without resorting to use of force, were positive developments. At the end of June 2008, there were indications that the increased role of the F-FDTL in internal security may continue, including in providing security to internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have returned to their homes, and to address violence involving martial arts groups. Any role outside the legal remit of the F-FDTL blurs the functions and reporting lines between the police and the military forces and, therefore, is a cause for serious concern."

UNSC, 29 July 2008, p.5
"14. UNMIT police strength stayed about the same during this reporting period, with 1,542 officers (76 women) as at 8 July. Of these, 963 officers (including 140 in the Malaysian formed police unit, 140 in the Portuguese formed police unit, 38 in the Pakistani formed police unit, and 31 in the Bangladeshi formed police unit) were deployed in Dili and 579 to other districts, including 109 in the Bangladeshi unit (89 in Baucau and 20 in Viqueque) and 102 in the Pakistani unit (25 in Ermera and 77 in Bobonaro). They continued to perform the mandated task of interim law enforcement, while increasing efforts to support the training, institutional development and strengthening of the national police.

15. In order to ensure that the mandated responsibilities of UNMIT police under Security Council resolution 1704 (2006) and the “Policing Arrangement” (see S/2007/50, para. 33) were not adversely affected by the modalities of the Joint Command (see para. 5 above), my Special Representative confirmed in an exchange of letters with the Prime Minister on 21 February that those national police officers participating in Joint Command operations would not be under the direct supervision and responsibility of the UNMIT Police Commissioner. In practice, however, UNMIT police were not informed when and for how long individual officers would be participating in Joint Command operations, creating difficulties for the certification process and operational planning. Nevertheless, the redoubled efforts of UNMIT police and those national police officers who remained under UNMIT command after 11 February contributed significantly to maintaining a secure environment. International security forces also played a critical role in this regard, including through support to the police

The resumption of responsibility by the national police will be facilitated through a revised and streamlined mentoring programme, with mandatory training focusing on core competencies, developed and implemented jointly by UNMIT police and national police officers. This should allow final certification of 80 per cent of the national police by 1 October 2008. Before full reconstitution is completed, all officers with major disciplinary and/or criminal issues should be removed from the force and only certified officers should serve.

23. The resumption of responsibilities does not mean that the national police has successfully completed its development, nor that it is prepared to take on those responsibilities without continuing international assistance. Rather, it is another, more intensive phase of its professional development, where officers will learn by doing, while the United Nations is still available in strength to provide them with support and backup. It will lay the groundwork for the long-term process of developing an impartial and professional police service. It is, therefore, not proposed that the UNMIT police draw down their presence during the resumption of responsibilities by the national police. Rather, the UNMIT police will continue to play a crucial role of monitoring and reporting from all districts, while also being available to provide advice, as well as offer
Two IDPs shot by Australian soldiers (November 2007)

- On 23 February 2007, a clash between IDPs from a camp near the Dili airport and soldiers of the Australian-led ISF left two IDPs dead.
- According to the Australian government, the two IDPs had been threatening the soldiers who shot them in self-defence.
- According to the displaced, the violence started when the Australian soldiers started to arrest some IDPs guarding the camp. The displaced were reportedly resisting attempts by the soldiers to forcefully evict them from the camp.

UNMIT, 8 November 2007, p. 20
"There were two main incidents in which the ISF resorted to the use of lethal force. On 23 February 2007, two persons were fatally injured at an IDP site near Dili airport during ISF action. An investigation was carried out by the Prosecutor’s Office, but no conclusions had been reached as of August 2007. There were concerns that the ISF was not fully cooperating with the criminal investigation. The Australian army did, however, promptly initiate an investigation under its own military justice procedures, the outcome of which is still pending. On 4 March, five persons were shot dead in an armed confrontation involving the ISF when the latter tried but failed to arrest Reinado. No investigation was carried out by the authorities into these killings. There have also been some allegations of excessive use of force by ISF personnel during operations. According to the ISF, three soldiers were convicted of service offences under the Australian Defence Force Disciplinary Act and fined and/or reprimanded for the unlawful confiscation of Fretilin flags in Baucau in August 2007. The ISF command pledged to conduct disciplinary investigations into allegations brought to its attention. It is recommended that the ISF shares the outcome of any such investigations with the Timor-Leste authorities and UNMIT. HRTJS welcomes the fact that human rights officers are granted access to the ISF detention centre."

Aotearoa Independent Media Center, 22 March 2007
"The widespread misrepresentation of the events of the past month make the following document, which was composed up by 'Internally Displaced Persons' resident at a camp outside Dili, invaluable. The refugees' statement was written in the aftermath of the deadly Anzac attack on the camp on February the 23rd, and it moves from a vivid description of a series of human rights abuses to a clear call for Anzac forces to leave East Timor.

The refugees, who were displaced during last year's civil war, were attacked after resisting attempts by the government of Jose Ramos-Horta to force them to leave the huge encampment they had established near Dili airport. Despite the fact that the 8,000 people in the camp had nowhere else to go, Horta and East Timorese President Xanana Gusmao had set a deadline of last November the 20th for them to leave the land they had been occupying. Anzac forces were called in to the camp after the refugees built barricades and threw rocks at police trying to evict them."
"Despair peered at me through the chain-link fence separating the airport from a refugee camp of nearly 8,000 internally displaced people (IDP). From behind this forlorn facade of despair, angry IDPs threw rocks at security personnel and their vehicles guarding the air terminal. Visitors walking off the tarmac dashed to the safety of taxis with shattered windscreens and scarred bodywork amid a cacophony of projectiles pinging off metal.

My taxi driver explained that the government had declared the next day the deadline for the IDPs to leave the airport refugee camp.

It is a sign of the desperation in Dili that this miserable, flood-prone tent encampment along the fringe of the runway is deemed worth fighting for. It's more telling that those being asked to leave have nowhere to go.

The internally displaced were being encouraged to return to their homes or extended families, as the government worried that having settled in, the IDPs were becoming far too comfortable, with running water and regular meals at state expense."

IDPs of Airporto Presidente Nicolau Lobato, 28 February 2007
"Exactly on Friday, 23rd February 2007, at 07.40 (Time Timor Leste) the Australian troops were so violently runs after our colleague who was still waiting for transportation to go to school, work and some wanting to hospital. They blockaded until the front of IDPS main door, then Manuel Soares was captured and then laid him down to the ground and bit him by using stick until bleeding.

IDPS was shocked with these attitudes of mal- treatments of Australian troops. Therefore, some other IDPS wanted to come and witness their colleagues who were being arrested by Australian troops.

The airport IDPS who became victims in that incident. Their name as follows.

* Manuel do Carmo from District Baucau, Sub-District Laga, violently arrested by the Australian troops in front of the IDPS door, laid him down to the ground, beaten him by using guns and all his body was wounded, and also pulling him as animal and they threw him into Australian patrol vehicle.

* Delfin Sarmento from District Viqueque, sub district Uato-lari he was arrested, but then he escaped and he did not get into Australian vehicle, however the Australian troops pulled his T-shirt out of his body.

* Julio da Siva and Viriato Soares, from District Viqueque sub district Uato – Lari and Dilor they are both then went back into IDPS camp and spontaneously reacted against the Australian troops that were brutally assaulting into IDPS camp and at the time the Australian. Troops arrested Manuel do Carmo.

This incident got strong reaction from people and came out of the tent, against those attitudes of Australian troops in front of the entrance door.

Australian forces drove two tanks into by hitting IDPS door barricade which still unlocked and fueled the situation. The children, old man and women be suffered of tear-gas and resulted two seriously injured and two others were lightly injured and one got shot dead right away under IDPS tent by the Australian troops. The troops wanted to hide the dead bodies assuming he was shot
outside of the camp so they then pulled out of barbed wire and his hair stickled at the barbed wire. Then the Australian soldiers cover up the dead –body with black plastics and thrown into maize field. However, many of IDPS were seeing and shouted at them, and then they taken back the dead –body put into Australian military vehicle."

**UN News Service, 23 February 2007**

"United Nations police today in Timor-Leste are investigating deadly violence that erupted at a camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) near the capital's airport, in which one Timorese was killed and two injured.

"The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Atul Khare, has moved to reassure the people of Dili that the security situation at the IDP camp is under control," the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) said in a statement.

According to the International Security Forces (ISF), when they responded to a disturbance at the airport IDP camp, one ISF soldier "was attacked and defended himself by shooting the attacker, resulting in the death of one Timorese national."

**Reuters, 23 February 2007**

*A clash between Australian peacekeeping troops and East Timorese refugees camped near Dili airport on Friday left one civilian dead and three people injured, including an Australian soldier, officials said.

(...) The Australian military said the clash occurred after one of its soldiers was attacked and had to defend himself at the camp, resulting in the death of one Timorese civilian.

"During the incident an ADF (Australian Defence Force) soldier was attacked with steel arrows, which are potentially lethal weapons. He defended himself by shooting the attacker," it said in a statement.

(...) A refugee spokesman said the violence began after Australian soldiers tried to arrest some displaced people guarding a camp.

"They resisted by throwing rocks at the Australian soldiers who responded with shots and came inside the camp using an armoured vehicle. They dragged out those who were wounded and dead," Jose da Costa told reporters.

**Freedom of Movement**

**IDPs in some camps have limited freedom of movement due to threats from violent elements (July 2008)**

- There were concerns in July 2008 about the freedom of movement of IDPs in the Airport camp with the camp manager reported to have mobilised the youth to prevent people from moving out of the camp.
- In general, IDPs face no restrictions in freedom of movement.
ICG reported in March 2008 that violent elements have established control of certain camps, particularly those such as Jardim, Central Pharmacy and Airport camps.

HCC, 29 July 2008, p.2
"The problems at Airport camp raise questions about the freedom of movement of IDPs in this camp. It seems that the camp manager has mobilised the youth in the camp and it is unlikely that those among the population, who want to move, would confront him. Movement in the way that has been requested (bairro by bairro) could be seen as a reasonable request as it maybe that IDPs feel that there would be "strength in numbers", it would be difficult but not impossible. However, it would be good to try to avoid bringing back large numbers of people particularly if they would be belligerent with their communities of return. It may be good to ask for Fretilin’s support to tackle negotiations with the camp manager."

OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 30
"In the context of Timor-Leste, IDPs enjoy a number of fundamental rights. IDPs face no restrictions on their freedom of movement and many have continued their regular employment outside the camps. The camps have continued to provide a sense of security for many IDPs who are still unable to return home in safety and dignity. Meanwhile, the Government, supported by the international community, has provided basic humanitarian assistance including food delivery and basic health care."

ICG, 29 March 2008, p. 9
"Some individuals have developed a vested interest in the continued existence of the IDP camps. Violent elements have established control of certain ones, particularly those such as Jardim, Central Pharmacy and Airport camps where there is no landowner or other authority. Actual violence is less the problem than the threat of it, but those who are victims of violence are scared to go to the police. UNPol, which has had responsibility for law and order since the 2006 crisis, began to patrol the camps regularly only in January 2008.

In some cases, IDPs have been forcibly prevented from leaving camps. For instance, in March 2007 there was a hazardous chemical spill in the harbour in front of Jardim camp. The health of the residents was at risk because of the fumes, so efforts were made to move them to newly built transitional housing. However, a hardcore group refused to let anyone leave. There has been similar intimidation in the Airport and ex-Chinese Consulate camps. It has been less of a problem in camps near or within church or convent properties – such as Becora Church, Dom Bosco and Canossa Sisters camps – where priests and nuns have been able to exercise some moral authority. There are eighteen church camps (and one mosque camp), some of which have seen a significant reduction in numbers since July 2007. Canossa Sisters camp was closed after occupants moved to nearby transitional housing.

The bullying elements in the non-church camps have both political and economic reasons for maintaining the status quo. Some, as noted, have become in effect a mafia for reselling WFP food aid and know that lower numbers mean less food. Others argue that larger numbers give the IDPs greater political weight to push for compensation or re-housing."
SUBSISTENCE NEEDS

General

Support likely to be needed beyond 2008 for IDPs in camps; IDPs in districts largely neglected (April 2008)

- Despite encouraging return movements, many IDPs are likely to remain in camps beyond 2008 due to unresolved issues and the lack of housing available.
- Humanitarian assistance has been almost exclusively provided to camp-dwellers in Dili; IDPs with relatives or in the camps outside Dili have received negligible aid.

OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 25

"While it is estimated that between 25 and 30% of IDPs currently in IDP camps will choose one of the options of the NRS before the end of the year, the Government and the wider humanitarian community acknowledge that the majority of the IDPs currently in camps are likely still to be in camps at the end of 2008. Sizable fluctuations in the number, composition and movement patterns of IDPs are likely over the next 18 months as people previously displaced from the capital return to Dili to join family or to seek economic and employment opportunities, in some cases using camps as stepping stones to their return to permanent accommodation.

The lack of housing for more than 5,000 IDP households following the destruction in 2006, the unwillingness of some communities to accept returnees, and perceived political instability and insecurity are obstacles to return. Security threats (actual or perceived) could lead to additional displacement and prolong the reluctance of IDPs to leave the perceived relative safety of the camps.

Therefore, a concerted inter-agency approach is needed over the next nine months to ensure that basic infrastructures in the camps are maintained to at least minimum standards. Where possible, camp management agencies and service providers will continue to fill gaps in service delivery for general camp maintenance, such as the provision of lighting, maintenance of water and sanitation installations and fencing.

The envisioned return of IDPs to their communities or their relocation to transitional shelter or resettlement sites in the framework of the NRS will require close support and follow-up by camp management agencies to ensure that IDPs are able to make informed decisions about their options.

Strong in-camp support by camp management agencies is also essential to ensure that the safety and dignity of the IDP population is maintained while recovery solutions are implemented. The Government will continue to require assistance in facilitating communication between IDPs and communities. Camp management agencies play a fundamental role in identifying and managing potential conflict factors within camps, and between camps and host communities."

ICG, 31 March 2008, p. 3
"At least 30,000 of the estimated 100,000 IDPs are in 51 camps in and around Dili, while more than 70,000 live with family or friends in Dili or the districts, burdening the already precarious conditions of their hosts. Humanitarian assistance is provided almost exclusively to camp-dwellers in Dili; IDPs with relatives or in the camps outside Dili receive negligible aid."

**Up to 300,000 people in Timor-Leste are in need of urgent food assistance (April 2008)**

- Overall food security worsened during the first half of 2007, mainly due to a 25-30 per cent crop reduction due to adverse weather conditions.
- In addition to more than 100,000 vulnerable IDPs, more than 200,000 people in Timor-Leste are in need of urgent food assistance with only 36 per cent of households considered as food secure and global chronic malnutrition affecting 47 percent of the population countrywide.
- While most IDPs receive food assistance, very few subsistence farmers do.
- The presence of the displaced in host families in the districts is putting a strain on already overstretched resources.
- A study released by WFP in January 2006 showed that 43% of the population is either food insecure or highly vulnerable to food insecurity, mainly because of poor access to food, poverty, limited access to adequate farmland and underdeveloped agricultural markets.

**OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 10**

"Chronic food insecurity is widespread throughout Timor-Leste. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and WFP’s Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (December 2005/January 2006) estimated that 20% of the population (some 213,000 persons) is food-insecure, and that a further 23% (some 244,000 persons) is highly vulnerable to becoming food insecure. The study demonstrates that the most food-insecure groups are subsistence farmers, female headed households, and households vulnerable to sudden setbacks. Some of the underlying causes of food insecurity in the country include low purchasing power, poor access to adequate farmland and irrigation, and limited access to non-agricultural income generating activities and employment. Food insecurity is compounded by high population growth rates (estimated at 3.4% annually) and the recent mass displacement.

The long term presence of IDPs in host families in the districts further burdens already strained households’ income and subsistence coping mechanisms. Household food insecurity is also compounded by a range of recurrent natural disasters such as droughts, floods, and other agricultural risks, including the outbreaks of locusts. Reduced agricultural production hits subsistence farmers directly, and the subsequent rise on food prices affects vulnerable households the most."

**OCHA, 17 July 2007, p. 10**

"Food security has worsened during the past six months, with malnutrition a chronic problem in Timor-Leste. 42.6% of children below five years of age are underweight and 46.7% of children “too short” or stunted. A World Food Programme (WFP)/Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM) carried out in March and April showed a reduction of 25-30% in crop production due to delayed rains, low rainfall, and reduced cultivation due to seed shortages and locust infestation. More than 200,000 people are now in need of urgent food assistance, in addition to the displaced population who are particularly vulnerable. The precariousness of the food security situation was highlighted in February and March this year. A shortage of rice and a major imbalance in supply and demand caused a drastic increase in rice prices, accompanied by outbreaks of violence."
Food assistance now needs to be provided to meet acute food gaps among the most food-insecure population during the hunger season and reduce malnutrition among the most vulnerable populations. The ongoing safety net programme (Maternal and Child Health and School Feeding) and assistance to rehabilitate the agriculture sector and to boost crop production through Food for Work/Assets (FFW/A) activities will significantly help to address malnutrition, short term hunger, and food insecurity in the districts.

FAO/WFP, 21 June 2007, pp. 5-6

"Food security in Timor-Leste is a key component of national security at large since only 36 percent of households are considered food secure, and global chronic malnutrition affects 47 percent of the population countrywide. Household food security is highly heterogeneous across districts, despite the fact that food insecurity is generally more pronounced in rural upland areas, where subsistence farmers are not able to engage in other activities. Food insecurity is positively correlated with the lean season, since the depletion of the vulnerable households' stocks is then particularly rapid. It is worth noting that this depletion of stocks added to the contraction of output is occurring after two years of reduced crops. Together with flaws in food security policy, these factors can help explain why stocks were very scarce at the beginning of the recent rice crisis, and why the disruptions thus caused were so deep.

Food security also continues to be hampered by (1) limited market access, with villages being on average 20 miles away from the nearest market, (2) lack of effective demand by subsistence farmers in rural areas and impoverished city dwellers, Dili in particular, (3) very high post-harvest losses, (4) shortages of secure onfarm storage capacity, as well as (5) absence of policies to promote domestic production in the face of strong international competition, especially for rice.

Vulnerability analysis indicates that the total number of persons in prioritized districts in need of food assistance is 210 000-220 000 countrywide. It is worth noting that while most IDPs receive food aid, only a small proportion of subsistence farmers benefit from it. In addition to this, households up-country often accommodate IDPs from the cities, mainly Dili, a situation which further strains their already stressed resources. A better targeting of the needy and commensurate allocation of food aid may help in addressing the tensions created by what is often perceived as an unfair treatment by some population groups.

School-feeding (now called Food for Education) is an efficient tool to build up food security as it combines many advantages: (1) child under- and malnutrition problems are directly addressed, with all subsequent benefits when they grow, (2) it is an incentive to attend school, hence is conducive to sustainable development and (3) takes off a burden from their parents' shoulders both in terms of time to prepare food and, obviously helps provide sufficient food for the children. Mother and Child Health programmes (MCH) are also needed to safeguard pregnant women and children from deterioration of nutrition situation."

OCHA, 16 January 2007, p. 21

"A Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) carried out by WFP across Timor-Leste in January 2006 provided the first ever nationwide baseline on food security and vulnerability. It showed that 43% of the population is either food insecure or highly vulnerable to food insecurity, and that food insecure households are found throughout the country. The key underlying causes of food insecurity were identified as inter alia poor access to food, prevalent poverty, limited access to adequate farmland and underdeveloped agricultural markets.

Food security is also becoming an increasing problem as the population expands at a rate of 3.4% annually, while the country’s steep terrain and generally poor soils limit agriculture
expansion. Furthermore, Timor-Leste is not only a food deficit country with regards to production, but even with the current level of imports, the country is still unable to meet the populations' requirements."

Source: OCHA, December 2006

**WFP, 30 June 2006, pp. 5-12**

"Two thirds of the rural population, almost 600,000 people, experience food shortages at some time during the year and malnutrition rates are amongst the highest in Asia. WFP carried out a Comprehensive Food Security & Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) at the end of 2005 with the main information extracted below. Most of Timor Leste suffers from food shortages for about four months of a normal year: October-November and February-March. Food insecure households are found throughout the country. However, there are some geographic patterns to the prevalence of food insecure households and to child under-nutrition.

Looking at the geographic distribution of the prevalence of the food insecure as determined by food access and dietary diversity/frequency, mapped out below, the most food secure areas are the urban and peri-urban areas of Dili (VAM 6 zone 5), where 29% of the households are considered food insecure or highly vulnerable. The most food insecure areas are VAM zone 3, located in the northeast quadrant of the country, where 51% of households are considered food insecure/highly vulnerable, and Oceussi, where 49% of households are considered food insecure/highly vulnerable. The least food insecure area is VAM zone 1, located in the southern half of the country, where 40% of the households, nevertheless almost half the population, are considered to be food insecure/highly vulnerable (table 1).

Among the main livelihood groups identified in the CFSVA, farmers were the most food insecure, particularly those that did not have livestock as part of their main livelihood activities. The skilled labourers, traders, petty traders, and wage earners were the most food secure among the livelihood profiles Nationally, 20% of households are considered to be food insecure, 23% to be highly vulnerable, 21% to be moderately vulnerable, and 36% to be food secure.

(...) In the ECHO-funded 'Timor Leste Market Profile', carried out by WFP in late 2005, it is stated that all regions in Timor Leste are often in a food deficit situation, but that food insecurity is more prevalent in upland rural areas, especially between November and March as determined by the timing of the production season. Five districts out of 13 in the country attained minimal cereal requirements through their own production in 2004/05 while eight districts did not. The cereal production in the country in 2005 declined significantly as a result of severe nationwide drought.

The country's cereal import dependency increased from 20 percent in 1990 to some 30 percent currently. Under the new system, private traders have gradually replaced the BULOG (subsidized rice programme during the Indonesian reign) and are performing well in rice imports and domestic distribution to markets in Dili and in all districts and sub-districts of the country. Imported rice marketing at the sub-district level is done through many small traders who buy rice directly from importers in Dili and then sell to local consumers. Free trade has increased food availability during the lean season and during periods of significant domestic production failure due to natural disasters.

In Timor Leste, food security is closely tied to availability of maize and rice. Many rural households face food shortages between the rice and the maize harvest as detailed in the figure below."
Food

Food security and nutritional status of vulnerable groups has further deteriorated in 2008 due to natural disasters and increasing food prices (October 2008)

- Oxfam baseline food survey shows food insecurity in Timor-Leste is a serious problem with 70% of households to be moderately to severely food insecure.
- During 2007, rice shortages and a poor harvest led to a sharp increase in food prices and made the country increasingly reliant on imports.
- In March 2008, the consumer price index (CPI) had increased by almost 20 per cent since 2006, with higher food and fuel prices accounting for most of the increase.

Oxfam, 16 October 2008, p.1
"The findings show that the food insecurity in Timor-Leste is a serious problem with 70% of households to be moderately to severely food insecure. The causes of this epidemic are multifaceted, and while some causes are common to Timor Leste as a whole, many of the root causes vary by region.

(...)
Food insecurity is prevalent in Covalima and Oecusse Districts, with 80% of households surveyed in Covalima (N=128) and 70% (N=105) in Oecusse categorized as moderately or severely food insecure at the time of survey (based on FANTA Household Food Insecurity Access Scale Scores (HFIAS) and household estimation of maize and rice production). In a normal year, a period of food shortage also referred to as a hunger period is experienced at least 2-3 months before harvesting maize in February-March and rice in April. In 2007, late and insufficient rainfall and drought as well as locust damage to maize and rice crops in Covalima reduced maize and rice yields, extending the food shortage period to 5-6 months.

The most severe food shortage was projected to occur between the months of October (2007) and February (2008)."

OCHA & UNMIT, 17 September 2008, p.1
"WFP monitoring reports show that the overall food security situation, especially with regard to food availability, is cause for concern. Rice prices remain high at 85 cents to $1/kg in Dili, Baucau, Covalima and Oecussi markets."

UNSC, 29 July 2008, p.13
"44. As Timor-Leste is a net food importer, the global rise in food commodity prices is of particular concern. An inter-agency group led by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Food Programme and the World Bank has been providing technical advice to the Government regarding possible actions to alleviate the effects of world market developments. These include the continuation of subsidies for rice and ensuring the availability of supplies and, most importantly, making more funds available to purchase rice regionally or internationally to avoid a rice shortage in the immediate future, as the in-country rice stock is sufficient for a couple of months only. With the support of FAO, the Government is planning to
encourage second-crop planting through seed distribution and guaranteed Government purchase of second crops."

**Overall deterioration of the food security situation in Timor severely impact IDPs and host communities in the districts (October 2008)**

- Districts are often hardest hit by food shortages and providing assistance is hampered by logistical problems to villages often cut off by floodwaters or landslides.
- During discussion with IDPs in the districts, one of the main concern related to poor access to food. Participants regretted the absence of food distribution to IDPs and host communities in the districts since 2007. Moreover, the fact that food distribution was still occurring in Dili was perceived as unfair and unjustified.

_IRIN, 16 October 2008_

"The UN World Food Programme (WFP) is helping the government of Timor-Leste to boost food security by giving two warehouses a facelift and building a third, to be operational by December.

For years President Jose Ramos-Horta has pledged to make Timor food secure, but every year the government finds itself struggling to transport food to villages cut off by floodwaters or landslides.

These warehouses should allow the government to provide food to the neediest first. Though one of the refurbished warehouses is in Dili, the capital, another is in Lautem in the east and one will be built in Same, in the south. These district capitals and their satellite communities are often hardest hit by food shortages and these three warehouses could provide food for more than 100,000 people — about a tenth of the population."

**OCHA & UNMIT, 30 June 2008, p.2**

"Community members in Bairo Pite informed CARE’s Community Outreach team that they had significant concerns over the increasing prices of commodities, particularly rice and petroleum based products. Reports from CARE are that prices of locally produced foodstuffs, sold at the local markets have increased, as has construction materials. Additionally, former IDPs reported to CARE that they were using portions of their return package to buy food due to concerns over the Government’s capacity to address the issue. Some community members indicated that their children and infants were not receiving adequate nutritional intakes due to the reliance on cheaper food products."

**OCHA & UNMIT, 2 June 2008, p. 6**

"Over the last three weeks, Public Outreach Meetings on humanitarian support in Timor-Leste were held in Dili and the Districts. These meetings, organised by UNMIT’s Public Information Office, are an opportunity for the civil society, NGOs, and Timorese stakeholders to be briefed on the activities of the international community in the field of humanitarian assistance and to interact and raise concerns, in particular at the district level.

Such meetings have already taken place in Dili and the four Regional Public Outreach Offices in Baucau, Maliana, Oecussi and Suai. Around 20 to 30 participants were gathered each time from local and international NGOs, UN agencies as well as local authorities (Suco chiefs). Participants
took the opportunity to ask many questions to the representative of the Integrated Humanitarian Coordination Team who made the presentation.

The main concern repeatedly raised across the visited districts related to food. Participants regretted the absence of food distribution to IDPs and host communities in the districts since 2007. Moreover, the fact that food distribution was still occurring in Dili was perceived as unfair and unjustified. Access to food in the Districts was emphasised as being difficult and the major concern of the population. Furthermore, the high price of rice was underlined, as well as its consequences, such as the restricted access to rice for many people who cannot afford it. In this regard, insufficient access to subsidised rice in the Districts was also pointed out by participants.

OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 10
"Chronic food insecurity is widespread throughout Timor-Leste. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and WFP’s Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (December 2005/January 2006) estimated that 20% of the population (some 213,000 persons) is food-insecure, and that a further 23% (some 244,000 persons) is highly vulnerable to becoming food insecure.

(...) The long term presence of IDPs in host families in the districts further burdens already strained households’ income and subsistence coping mechanisms. Household food insecurity is also compounded by a range of recurrent natural disasters such as droughts, floods, and other agricultural risks, including the outbreaks of locusts. Reduced agricultural production hits subsistence farmers directly, and the subsequent rise on food prices affects vulnerable households the most."

OCHA, 17 July 2007, pp. 16-17
"Given the overall deterioration in the food security situation, many host families will be unable to feed IDPs due to limited household food stocks. Many food-insecure households that had encountered crop failure will start their lean period much earlier this year and seeds will be consumed as food. Furthermore, unless IDPs identify alternative sources of income, they will not be able to cope by themselves. It is thus extremely important to provide agriculture assistance in terms of inputs to rehabilitate local production capacity.

A number of factors limit agricultural production and food security including:
Low quality seed varieties. Seed stocks have been severely affected by the current crisis, largely because people eat them as a last resort in the absence of other food.
Lack of post-harvest storage. Post-harvest machineries, such as maize壳ers, rice thrashers, and milling machines are very scarce and significant amounts of food stock is lost during this labour-intensive preparation prior to storage.
Low skilled farmers and lack of extension facilities. Government officials in the Districts are in need of technical training, extension facilities and transport.
Lack of markets. Many villages are without a food market, so surplus maize is often not sold.
Rural to urban migration. Reduces the labour pool at the community level, particularly during land preparation and harvesting times.
Insufficient irrigation/water management. Many community irrigation schemes are not properly maintained and farmers do not coordinate their use of water resources.
Limited income generation through livestock production. Most animal holdings are only for household consumption and religious ceremonies.
The agricultural sector is in general very much under-exploited. There has been a marked reduction in planted areas in all Districts and very limited use of agricultural technology."
A large influx of people into the Districts. This strained food supplies, is jeopardising food security for thousands of households, and affects basic services of receiving communities and IDPs alike.

The most important needs over the next six months will include improved food security through expanded agricultural production; provide good quality seed and other inputs; introduce conservation agriculture as a concept for farming and gardening, with increased production diversity to better handle the lean months; expand home gardens for vegetable and fruit tree production and support school gardening; improve food storage and processing activities; provision of post-harvest machinery to address pre-storage losses and labour shortages; provide nutrition education and training and ensure systematic linkages with the social sector; and preparedness for locust infestations.

The target population for assistance comprises vulnerable persons including IDPs and their hosts, with a focus on subsistence farmers and those with limited non-farming income generating activities. FAO is also coordinating its efforts with the Government of Timor-Leste and other partners and working with all concerned to ensure efficient and effective delivery of seeds and other agricultural inputs, training and monitoring. The agriculture sector plans to undertake a number of programmes to strategically address the most immediate needs and issues related to the severe shortfall of food production this year, while at the same time addressing root causes of food insecurity in Timor-Leste.

FAO/WFP, 21 June 2007, p. 18
"The type of farmers that have been identified as being more vulnerable than the other farmers are those who do not have other income sources. These farmers are called ordinary farmers (see above).

Six districts have been identified for priority purposes where the food security situation is slightly worse than the other districts. These districts are; Baucau, Bobonaro, Ermera, Lautem, Manatuto and Oecussi. There is no difference in vulnerability between IDPs and local population and e.g. in Oecussi the IDPs are called returnees as they all have their proper homes there.

As mentioned earlier, the livelihood group that is most affected by the crop failure and the locusts are the farmers that are solely dependent on their agricultural production (called ordinary farmers in the CFSVA 2005) and do not have other income sources like livestock, small trade or handicraft. Based on the above analysis and prioritization of the worst affected districts from both locust infestation and drought like climatic change that greatly hampered the maize harvest, it is estimated that between 210 000 and 220 000 people are in need of food assistance until the next harvest.

Dili city is not included in the above estimation of people in need of assistance as assessing the needs of the IDPs who have received food aid since May 2006 is beyond the capacity and the TOR of this Mission."

ECHO, 21 February 2007, p. 3
"Out of the estimated 70,000 people that have fled from Dili to seek refuge in the districts, more than 8,000 are currently living in camps in the districts of Baucau, Liquica and Ermera. Their humanitarian needs are the same as the ones of the IDPs living in the camps in Dili."
Relatives, friends and local communities are hosting the majority of the people who fled from Dili to the districts. These people, who have been equally affected by the crisis and the shortage of food, have received rather limited humanitarian assistance compared to the IDPs in the camps, because they are more difficult to identify, and because of access and security constraints. The already low food security level of the host communities has significantly deteriorated because of the interruption of the support that was coming from relatives having an income in Dili before the crisis, and because of the drain caused by additional mouths to be fed and taken care of.

A sustained process of assistance and rehabilitation measures for all displaced people, whether they are currently staying in camps or with host communities, is necessary, with the objectives of enticing their return, helping their reintegration in the communities, and restarting an economic life.”

OCHA, 16 January 2007, pp. 10-16

"UN agencies, NGOs and the Timorese Red Cross conducted a multi-sector rapid joint assessment of IDPs in the districts in June 2006. The assessment revealed that 96% of IDPs in the districts were living with host families and that the main concern was food security due to the sudden increase in the population. The assessment further revealed chronic water shortages in district capitals, limited availability of medical supplies, some disruptions to schools and universities, and rising tensions between IDPs and host communities regarding aid distributions.

(...) The agricultural sector is currently in a crisis situation. The large influx of people into the districts has strained food supplies and is jeopardising food security for many thousands of host families. The monsoon, which was expected during the first week of November, is more than a month late and has further exacerbated the situation.

The emergency food assistance needs to be complemented with agriculture support to eventually wean people from external food aid and enhance local production capacity. The burden the host families are facing with the increased number of IDP members in their families needs to be reduced through enhanced food production. Strengthening homestead food production through sustainable use of locally available resources, combined with appropriate nutrition education, is essential to rehabilitation and recovery. Meanwhile, with the success of complementing WFP’s school feeding programme in the past through school gardening, it is also very important to continue to support school gardening to supplement school meals with vegetables. This appeal will strive to enhance food security in the districts through the provision of agriculture inputs and additional initiatives to reduce post-harvest losses.

(...) Food insecurity persists due to the high price of fuel, harvest losses and localised population increase caused by displacement. Food insecurity is particularly high in the districts, while in Dili it has improved due to the resumption of economic activities since the early days of the crisis. It has been agreed that general food distribution in Dili will end on 31 December 2006 and will be limited to the most vulnerable populations, as assessed by the Government. Food distribution to IDPs and host communities in the districts will continue, with the aim of reducing malnutrition rates and encouraging agricultural production. There is a need to ensure the continuation of food assistance during the lean season and possibly additional assistance due to high potential for drought caused by delayed rains. There is limited access to agricultural equipment and expertise. The WFP conducted food security assessments before and after the current crisis began.22 Pre-crisis data indicate that approximately 213,000 people (20% of the total population) are food-insecure, with an additional 468,000 people (44% of the total population) vulnerable to food insecurity. The second post-crisis assessment found that vulnerability has increased, including
among IDPs cut off from their livelihoods and host families feeling the strain of additional household members.

(...)

Lingering civil unrest and the planned national elections will most likely keep the IDPs staying with their host families through the better part of 2007, if not until 2008. As indicated by the Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA), IDPs in the districts plan to cope in the coming months by relying on host families (27%), selling assets (17%) and farming more land (14%). Given the overall food security situation in the districts, host families will, for the most part, not be able to feed the IDPs. Furthermore, unless the IDPs identify alternative sources of income, they will not be able to cope by themselves. It is thus extremely important to provide agriculture assistance in terms of inputs to enhance local production capacity.

The large influx of people into the districts has strained food supplies, is jeopardising food security for many thousands of households, and affects basic services of the receiving communities and IDPs alike. “

Displaced people living in camps not found to be among the most vulnerable (April 2008)

• WFP's food assessment security conducted in September 2007 in Dili showed that food insecurity was widespread among the population and by far not limited to IDPs who were not worse off than the rest of the population.
• While 42% of the population had a problem accessing food, an estimated 24% were in need of immediate food assistance and at risk of a deterioration of their health status.
• The causes of food insecurity in Dili are mainly related to problems with accessing food
• The difference in terms of being at risk to lives or livelihoods between the IDPs and residents is minimal.
• 25,000 people are at risk to lives, representing 24 percent of the population surveyed, and need immediate assistance
• 41,000 people are at risk to livelihoods (41,000 / 7 = 5,860), representing 41 percent of the population surveyed, and also need assistance
• According to WFP, the current targeting of IDPs for food assistance is no longer addressing the need of the most vulnerable households

OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 6

"In September 2007, the World Food Programme (WFP) completed a food security assessment in Dili, based on a random sampling of both local communities and IDP camps. The study concluded that:

• About 42% of the population is currently having a problem accessing food, as they cannot afford to purchase the minimum food basket;
• 25,000 people are at risk to lives i.e. at risk of deterioration of their nutrition and health status, representing 24% of the population surveyed, and need immediate assistance. They have poor food consumption and low income resulting in severe food insecurity;
• 41,000 people are at risk to livelihoods i.e. required to consume or sell assets essential to their livelihoods, representing 41% of the population surveyed, also need assistance. While their current food consumption is slightly better than the previous category, they have difficulty accessing food. In addition, their coping strategies will affect their future livelihoods;
• 11% of children under-five suffer from moderate acute malnutrition;
• About 8% of women are moderately emaciated and 1.3% is severely wasted.
The study revealed that, while 50% of the IDPs were found to be food insecure, the remaining 50% who also receive food assistance were not. In addition, 50% of the general populations, who do not receive food assistance, were found to be food insecure.

There is therefore a risk of entrenching a fragile correlation between displacement and food insecurity, which has not been supported by empirical evidence. Blanket food assistance has provided a substitute answer to more complex and sensitive political and social issues, therefore contributing to a “pull” factor for assistance. Thus, although implemented as an immediate response to the crisis, continued blanket food assistance in camps in particular is no longer a viable and adequate answer. Following a Government policy decision, WFP began distributing half rations to beneficiaries registered in camps in Dili as from February 2008, which is seen as an important step towards delinking the notion that food insecurity results necessarily from displacement or residence in an IDP camp. Current efforts in this regard include the development of a system that is able to identify chronically vulnerable people who would need continuous support under a government-resourced and managed social safety net system."

WFP, September 2007, pp.3-4

“The Emergency Food Security Assessment’s (EFSA) purpose was to assess the food security situation in Dili 18 months after the events, determine how the different livelihood groups are coping with the situation, estimate the number of food insecure people, and identify appropriate response options and possibilities for recovery and longer-term food security assistance. The assessment was based on an analysis of available secondary data and on data collected at household level and at Dili markets in September 2007. In total, 613 randomly selected households (50 percent in the camps, 50 percent in Sucos/neighborhoods) and 117 traders were interviewed. The Mid Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) was measured on children under 5 years and women in the households interviewed.

The causes of food insecurity in Dili are mainly related to problems with accessing food. The market operations are slowly recovering but the situation is not yet back to normal. Market recovery is slowed down by:

- the lack of market infrastructure. Most of the reopened markets are in temporary locations, lacking adequate space or storage facility;
- the volatility of the security situation;
- the lack of supplier credit, high cost of credit and inability to arrange for consumer credit for retail sales (only 3 out of 9 micro finance institutions are still operating);
- the increase of transaction costs contributing to general inflation; real prices of food have increased by 12 percent since 2006; and
- the irregularity of supplies (wholesale traders for dry food have difficulties supplying the markets).

The primary reason for the slow market recovery mentioned by traders is low purchasing power. Therefore, the ability of households (especially people at risk to lives and livelihoods) to access food may be undermined by continued market price increases and declining income per capita. Household production is very limited with most depending on the market for food. In addition, household food access is undermined by the rising price of food commodities. About 42 percent of the population is currently having a problem accessing food, as they cannot cover the cost of a minimum food basket.

There has been a remarkable reduction of the productive assets, small livestock, and poultry owned by households, particularly among IDPs. Some 88 percent of households in the camps have had their homes either destroyed or damaged and this is the main reason for remaining in
the camps. Repairing destroyed or damaged houses is often mentioned as a priority by households.

Globally, only 4 percent of the households (15 percent among those at risk to lives) have poor food consumption. This is an improvement compared not only with previous months but also with the baseline assessment in 2005. However, a direct comparison must be done with caution as the three assessments were carried out during different times of the year.

The causes of food insecurity among households in Dili are essentially chronic (low food production, lack of assets and income) and the current political crisis has resulted in further deterioration. Poor food access is the result of long-term structural issues such as the lack of employment opportunities and market weaknesses contributing to increases in food market prices that go back to 2002.

Conclusions
25,000 people are at risk to lives, representing 24 percent of the population surveyed, and need immediate assistance. They have poor food consumption and low income resulting in severe food insecurity. Their coping strategies, such as reducing the number of meals/per day or meal size are highly detrimental to their health and nutritional status. 3,900 of these could receive assistance through MCH programme and some 3,500 people could be included in a government supported safety net programme for vulnerable groups. (25,000 - 3,900 - 3,500) = 2,500 households remain.

41,000 people are at risk to livelihoods (41,000 / 7 = 5,860), representing 41 percent of the population surveyed, and also need assistance. While their current food consumption is slightly better, they have difficulty accessing food. In addition, their coping strategies will affect their future livelihoods.

11 percent of children under 5 suffer from moderate acute malnutrition (with mid-upper arm circumference MUAC between 11.0 and 12.5 cm). About 8 percent of women are moderately emaciated (MUAC between 21.0 and 22.5 cm) and 1.3 percent are severely wasted (MUAC below 21 cm).

The difference in terms of being at risk to lives or livelihoods between the IDPs and residents is minimal.

The people whose lives are at risk are essentially groups whose main income comes from government allowances and the sale of firewood. People in cash-for-work schemes and unskilled workers also fall into this category.

The groups with the highest percentage of people at risk to livelihoods are the beneficiaries of church assistance, petty traders, people receiving remittances and unskilled wage labourers.

Recommendations
The following response options are recommended:
Provide immediate Cash/Food for work for 2,500 households whose lives are at risk.
Implement livelihood support activities such as cash/food for work for 5,800 households whose livelihoods are at risk. Cash/voucher/food for work is the recommended response. Sustainable self-employment opportunities could be initiated in combination with vocational/skills training.
Provide support to repair houses to returning IDPs (3 month food rations and building materials). It is estimated that 1,000 IDP households would be willing to return to their homes if the proper support is given. Support to livestock restoration could also be envisaged. Some 3,500 vulnerable individuals (orphans, chronically ill, disabled) should be prioritized by government safety net programmes. These people fall into the group of households at risk to lives. Implement a targeted Mother and Child Health programme for 3,900 children under five and for pregnant/lactating women. These people fall into the group of households at risk to lives. Support market recovery. While cash options would support markets on the demand side, effort is required to support supplies by providing credit schemes to petty traders and retailers, and to reopen market buildings to address the lack of adequate storage facilities. Long-term sustainable self employment/job creation is needed, including micro credit opportunities as well as vocational/skills training.

Targeting criteria:  
A revision of the targeting criteria is recommended as the current targeting of IDPs for food assistance is no longer addressing the need of the most vulnerable households. The large inclusion and exclusion errors found in this assessment advocate for a refinement in the criteria.

Health

Despite improvements of conditions in camps since 2006, many IDPs remain vulnerable to flooding and disease outbreaks (October 2008)

- With a number of IDP camps likely to remain open beyond 2008, measures need to be taken to mitigate the effects of the upcoming rainy season which often results in flooding in landslides heightening risks of health problems for camp residents.
- Upper respiratory tract infection, malaria and worms reported as the most frequent health issues in the 3 main IDP camps in March 2008
- Despite efforts to improve conditions in the camps, these remain vulnerable to flooding. However, no major outbreak of disease recorded since 2006.
- Despite being aware of the health hazards, no action has been taken by the government over camps identified in May and July 2007 studies as high priorities to be closed on grounds of poor sanitation, security or risk of flooding
- The prolonged displacement crisis is increasing the risks of disease outbreaks, in particular in overcrowded IDP camps.
- There is a lack of an effective health surveillance system.
- Despite one of the highest rate of malnutrition in the world, the nutrition situation in the camps appeared under control in early 2007.

IRIN, 10 October 2008

"Tens of thousands of people are preparing for their third bout of flooding since 2006 in camps for internally displaced people (IDPs) as the rainy season once again descends on Timor-Leste. The government has so far helped over 7,500 families return home in 2008 and is planning to close more camps soon, but many IDPs will face heavy flooding once again and in some cases landslides in the coming months."
"Our idea is to prepare for the rainy season as if the current camps are going to be there for the duration of it," the country director for the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Luis Vieira, told IRIN. IOM and other aid agencies, along with the government, are in the process of assessing the needs of each camp with the aim of developing an action plan.

"Some work has been done to raise tents above the ground to reduce potential flooding... but some tents have deteriorated and are coming to the end of their useful lifespans, so we will have to purchase more tarpaulins," Viera said.

The largest remaining IDP camp in Metinaro, 25km east of Dili, and home to almost 10,000 people, is one of the most vulnerable. Situated at the bottom of a hill near the coast, the area is prone to flooding and in past rainy seasons dwellings built near run-off areas have been destroyed by landslides.

Risk of disease
Loss of property is a concern, but along with the rain comes an increase in health risks.

"We have a lot of health problems because there are so many people crowded together," vice camp manager Infalito Pinto told IRIN. Around 60 percent of health problems in IDP camps are attributable to water-borne diseases such as dysentery, diarrhoea, malaria and dengue, said health authorities.

"If there is a flood tomorrow, stagnant water in and around the camp might create a spate of epidemics which could spread to the camps quickly, creating another disaster," Suresh Pokharel, water and environmental sanitation adviser with Plan International, told IRIN. Roads cut off by floods can also cause major problems as drinking water for the camp is trucked in daily, said Pokharel."

OCHA & UNMIT, 9 May 2008, p. 2
"Disease Surveillance in IDP camps: The Disease Surveillance Unit reported that from 30 March to 3 May, the most frequent health issues in the three main IDP camps were: upper respiratory tract infection, suspected malaria and worms. This was interpreted as a normal incidence and there are no indications of outbreaks or unusual events. In addition, dengue continues to be reported in Timor-Leste in general. During the last two weeks, there were three cases of dengue reported to the Ministry of Health (MoH). Thus, since January 2008 to date, the total number of dengue cases reported to the MoH was 171 nationally. This constitutes a threat to the population, even if it has not reached an alarming level."

OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 6
"The international community together with the Government provide a wide range of basic humanitarian assistance in the IDP camps. The Government and the humanitarian community have also conducted significant work to prepare the camps as much as possible, for any potential impact of the rainy season. However, the capacity to bring about adequate conditions in the camps has been limited by the reluctance of some IDPs to relocate, the location of the camps and their natural vulnerability to flooding. The current rainy season which is predicted to continue into the middle of the year due to La Niña, has presented renewed challenges. So far no major outbreak of disease in camps has been recorded."
However, the general conditions in the camps have improved since the beginning of the crisis in 2006. This is due to sustained support to the maintenance of shelter, water and sanitation infrastructure."

ICG, 31 March 2008, p. 4
"During the initial crisis, people fled to where they felt secure (such as the airport, the hospital, schools and the area in front of the port), although those locations lacked the capacity to house them. Others took refuge on or near church property. The ministry of labour and community reinsertion, international agencies and NGOs responded by providing food, shelter and sanitation, and these locations became IDP camps. Some of the now 51 camps in Dili (some of the Farol NGO camps), have fewer than twenty residents; some have thousands (eg, Airport camp). Most have hundreds.

Many camps have been occupied continuously since May 2006 and are a crowded and unhealthy living environment. The UN reports that the displacements have been accompanied by increased incidence of respiratory diseases, malaria, diarrhea and malnutrition – though the latter is ameliorated in the camps by the food distribution program. During the rains, some camps flood, while in others toilet blocks leak or overflow. Improving conditions requires infrastructure investment, but successive governments have been reluctant to send a message that would encourage long-term habitation. That has begun to change: a program to replace tents began in October 2007, and by January 2008, more than 1,800 new tents and 4,500 new tarpaulins had been distributed in 31 camps by the government, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and NGOs. However, no action has been taken over camps identified in May and July 2007 studies as high priorities to be closed on grounds of poor sanitation, security or risk of flooding."

OCHA, 17 July 2007, p. 10-26
"Displacement poses increased risks to public health, with higher than usual cases of respiratory tract infections, diarrhoeal diseases, malnutrition, and malaria. There is an urgent need to reinforce health surveillance systems and strengthen health service delivery while building local capacity.

(...) With a prolonged crisis, the risk of disease outbreaks is high – especially in camps such as the Dili National Hospital. IDPs are particularly vulnerable to public health risks and the major disease threats among the IDPs, particularly in the Districts, are malaria, dengue, respiratory infection, and diarrhoeal diseases. Absence of an appropriate and consistent control of vector borne diseases and inappropriate use of insecticides increase the likelihood of malaria and dengue epidemics. This situation is further compounded by the crowded and unhealthy living conditions in IDP camps. Effective vector control systems should be established immediately to mitigate the high risks in the IDP camps.

Malnutrition is a serious chronic problem in Timor-Leste with 42.6% of children below five years of age found to be underweight, and 46.7% of children “too short” or stunted. Only 60% of newborns and 20% of infants up to five months of age are exclusively breastfed. Food insecurity plays a significant contribution to cases of malnutrition. The length of time which this humanitarian crisis has lasted will increase the risk of more serious malnutrition. Timor-Leste has the highest fertility rate in the world, currently estimated at 5.6%. This is consistent with extremely short birth intervals, which has implications on the nutritional status of mothers and their children. The recent Demographic Health Survey (DHS) indicated that over 60% of women and 70% of men failed to recognise any common contraception methods. Timor-Leste also has unacceptably high maternal
mortality rates of up to 860 deaths for every 100,000 live births. The poor physical state of the majority of expectant mothers stems from a combination of malnutrition, close spaced births, malaria, and other diseases or conditions. There is a need for un-interrupted services in the area of reproductive health, especially when expecting mothers are exposed to the vulnerable situations in the camps or displaced in the districts, but without the normal stability."

OCHA, 16 January 2007, pp. 12-23
"Socio-economic factors and the volatile security situation have reduced access to basic health services. Feeding habits and food insecurity have contributed to one of the highest rates of malnutrition among children in the world: 47% chronic and 12% acute. However, in IDP camps in Dili, the nutrition situation does not seem to be critical. The screening of more than 3,000 children under five years of age at 52 IDP camps in Dili in June and July 2006 identified 121 moderately malnourished (4%) and only 7 severely malnourished children. Of these, 10 were referred to hospital for treatment. Infant mortality is estimated at 60 per 1,000 live births, while maternal mortality is as high as 420 to 800 per 100,000 live births. Key priorities for this sector include maternal and reproductive health support as well as the establishment of an effective vector control system to mitigate a possible disease outbreak in IDP camps during the rainy season. (...) Health indicators in Timor-Leste are similar to other developing countries, with priority areas being communicable diseases, childhood illnesses, under-nutrition and maternal health. Tuberculosis, malaria, dengue, diarrhoeal diseases, Japanese encephalitis, intestinal parasitic infections, filariasis and leprosy remain the major health problems. HIV/AIDS prevalence, while small in comparison with the above diseases, is of concern despite being confined primarily to high-risk populations. Malnutrition, in particular undernutrition resulting from food insecurity, continues to be a matter of concern for the majority of the population."

Source: OCHA, December 2006

Very high malnutrition rates already prior to the April/May 2006 unrest (September 2008)

- Nutritional impact of the unrest and the erratic rains is unknown

WFP, 12 September 2008, p.2
"The 2007 Timor-Leste Survey of Living Standards revealed that between 2003 and 2007 the prevalence of underweight among children had increased from 45.8 percent to 50.3, of stunting from 49.4 percent to 49.9 percent and of wasting from 12.4 percent to 18.8 percent. The efficiency of primary education is low due to high rates of drop-out (25 percent) and repetition (16 percent), resulting in only 46 percent of children who enter grade 1 eventually reaching grade 6.4 (...) The malnutrition rates remain at unacceptably high levels in Timor-Leste: one out of two children under 5 are chronically malnourished, 46 percent underweight and 12 percent wasted; the prevalence of malnutrition is significantly higher among children between the ages of 6 and 23 months.10 Moreover, there are widespread vitamin A, iron and iodine deficiencies among children.11"
FOA/WFP, 21 June 2007, p. 19
"The nutritional impact of the unrest and the erratic rains is unknown as no survey has been done and no surveillance system is yet in place 11 months after the onset of the conflict. What is known is that the nutritional situation was very alarming prior to the crisis and has most likely not improved.

The team observed both moderate and severely malnourished children during the field visits but it was of course impossible to assess the magnitude. Mothers in the focus groups reported that many of their children had lost weight during the past months.

Table 6 shows results from previous anthropometric surveys indicating that the level of malnutrition in Timor-Leste would call for blanket supplementary feeding to all children under the age of 5 and to all pregnant and lactating women. Malnutrition rates are un acceptably high and demand a multi sectoral approach in reducing both acute and chronic malnutrition.

There is an overall low utilization of health services – in particular for preventive services, one of the biggest challenges of the health sector. Despite the poor health status of the population, only one in ten people seek outpatient care when sick. Only one in four deliveries is attended by skilled health staff, and immunization coverage of children under one year is unacceptably low."

UNDP, January 2006, p. 2
"Health standards are also compromised by a lack of food. Many rural households go short of food during the lean months from November to February. Currently, 64% of the population suffer from food insecurity. Food insecurity is partly the result of low levels of food production – a consequence of poor land and the generally low levels of technology, combined with high crop losses, both pre- and post-harvest. Another problem is distribution: many farmers lack storage capacity and find it difficult to get their produce to markets."

Psychosocial needs of IDPs returning may not be responded to adequately (September 2008)

OCHA & UNMIT, 2 September 2008, p. 4
"During the return and reintegration process, some SLS agencies have identified people who appear to be in need of psycho-social support. The SLS Working Group is concerned for the welfare of these individuals once they return (and are no longer part of camp population), and is concerned whether there is an adequate response in the community."

Displacement has increased risk for epidemic diseases and vulnerability to malnutrition (April 2008)

- The 2006 massive population displacement has caused a drastic increase in risk for epidemic diseases and increased vulnerability to malnutrition, especially among children and pregnant/lactating women.
- The main health concerns among the IDPs are respiratory tract infections, diarrhoea diseases including cholera, childhood illnesses, malaria, dengue, malnutrition and maternal health.
- The government's response is constrained by poor finances and limited capacity.

OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 28
"The population displacement caused by the violence in 2006 continues to pose increased risks to public health and nutrition. The major health concerns among the IDPs are respiratory tract infections, diarrhoea diseases including cholera, childhood illnesses, malaria, dengue, malnutrition and maternal health.

The health indicators in Timor-Leste, similar to other less developed countries, point to serious challenges related to communicable diseases such as malaria, dengue, and diarrhoeal diseases, childhood illnesses, malnutrition and maternal health. Insufficient vector control activities including inadequate use of insecticides, increases the likelihood of epidemics of vector control diseases like malaria and dengue.

The Ministry of Health (MoH), with the support of the World Health Organization (WHO) and NGOs implemented activities in 2007. However, the intervention activities are inadequate due to financial constraints. The massive internal displacement resulting from the 2006 crisis has caused a drastic increase in risk for epidemic diseases and increased vulnerability to malnutrition, especially among children and pregnant/lactating women.

There is also a need for intensified Health Promotion activities in order to prevent the development of diseases to those who are exposed to the unhygienic conditions, the population concentration in the IDP camps and for communities receiving IDPs.

The health system is well structured, but has only a limited number of experienced health personnel. The MoH is providing leadership for health services delivery with the support of UN agencies and NGOs, but has limited human resource, logistic, management and coordination capacity to reach all vulnerable people, especially when exposed to additional problems, such as massive displacement of people, so external resources are needed to respond to all these challenges.

Specific nutrition activities, focusing on reducing the risks for further deterioration of nutrition status for children under five and pregnant/lactating women and treatment of severely malnourished children is also needed. The MoH is addressing these issues, but still has limited resources to reach all vulnerable persons and external resources are needed to respond to all challenges."

Water and sanitation

Inadequate access to clean water cited as a problem in the districts for IDPs as well as host communities (June 2008)

- Inadequate access to clean water was identified as a general problem in the Districts. IDPs as well as host communities must walk sometimes several kilometers to the few water points available. Consequently, sanitation facilities are also poor which could lead to issues in terms of health.
- It was reported during 2008 that some returning IDPs faced difficulties accessing water in areas where the water systems were destroyed as a result of the crisis.
- Only 39% of primary schools have access to safe and reliable water supply and to sanitary latrines throughout the year.
- More than 50% of the rural population do not have access to safe water supply.
- According to a UNICEF assessment, 60 per cent of the villages hosting IDPs who fled the 2006 violence are without sufficient water supply.
"Over the last three weeks, Public Outreach Meetings on humanitarian support in Timor-Leste were held in Dili and the Districts. These meetings, organised by UNMIT’s Public Information Office, are an opportunity for the civil society, NGOs, and Timorese stakeholders to be briefed on the activities of the international community in the field of humanitarian assistance and to interact and raise concerns, in particular at the district level.

Such meetings have already taken place in Dili and the four Regional Public Outreach Offices in Baucau, Maliana, Oecussi and Suai. Around 20 to 30 participants were gathered each time from local and international NGOs, UN agencies as well as local authorities (Suco chiefs). Participants took the opportunity to ask many questions to the representative of the Integrated Humanitarian Coordination Team who made the presentation.

(...)

The inadequate access to clean water was also underlined by participants as a general problem in the Districts. IDPs as well as host communities must walk sometimes several kilometers to the few water points available. Consequently, sanitation facilities are also poor which could lead to issues in terms of health. In general, participants wished to emphasise the necessity for GoTL and the international community to pay as much attention to the people living in the Districts as to those in Dili. Furthermore, some participants were under the impression that assistance was solely provided to IDPs and not the most vulnerable, such as orphans, widows and pregnant.

"The Water and Sanitation WG discussed the WatSan implications of the national recovery strategy and noted that some returning IDPs may face difficulties accessing water in areas where the water systems were destroyed as a result of the crisis, such as in Manleuana. The two significant conclusions from the meeting were that DNSAS will require additional funds to repair water systems where significant damage has occurred and that effective dialogue with communities is a key factor in improving water access/distribution. DNSAS has only one staff allocated to dialogue in Dili and will require additional support in this area if areas of return are to be addressed. CRS assisted DNSAS conduct the dialogue needed to being addressing the water issues in Manleuana, and will provide the group with lessons learned from this model. This issue will be raised to be approached coherently within the Social Protection and Socio-Economic Development pillars."

"A recent water and sanitation assessment shows that only 39% of primary schools (58 out of 148 cases studied) have access to safe and reliable water supply and to sanitary latrines throughout the year. The projects in this sector propose to address basic water and sanitation needs in camps and communities hosting IDPs, and to improve drainage conditions in eleven IDP camps at high risk of flooding and disease outbreak in Dili. Priority districts for this sector are Dili, Baucau and Liquica. Although hygiene kits have been distributed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNICEF and other partners in some districts, there remains a need to support the remaining ones. More than 50% of the rural population do not have access to safe water supply. This sector is particularly critical due to recurrent floods and droughts that usually affect a number of districts. National contingency planning is currently underway and is expected to make recommendations regarding water and sanitation support."
UNICEF, 3 August 2006

"UNICEF and four local partner organizations have also conducted a rapid assessment of the water and sanitation situation in the camps and villages hosting those who have fled violence. According to the assessment, 60 per cent of the villages are without sufficient water supply.

To help alleviate the problem, UNICEF has supported the government’s water and sanitation services by delivering water to Baucau District, home to more than 25,000 displaced people.

UNICEF also has distributed family water kits, which include items such as water containers and water purification tablets, to the displaced communities in Liquiça District."

UNDP, January 2006, p. 1

"Health standards are still very low. Life expectancy in 2004 was estimated at only 55.5 years – 54.0 years for males and 56.6 years for females. The people of Timor-Leste remain vulnerable to respiratory and diarrhoeal diseases as well as malaria, dengue fever, TB and leprosy. They do not yet face a widespread epidemic of HIV/AIDS, but few people are aware of the threat it poses and fewer still know how to prevent it. People suffer from poor health partly because they cannot get ready access to health services. But water supplies and sanitation are also deficient: half the population do not have access to safe drinking water, and 60% do not have adequate sanitation."

Most camps require constant water and sanitation support (October 2008)

- In May, the WWG updated their camp closure priority ranking and recommended the urgent closure of Herat Port IDP camp, the national hospital, Jardim and the Aiport
- Many camps are overcrowded and require constant and on-going support in terms of sanitation, hygiene promotion, and vector control.
- Watsan assistance is currently provided in 50 camps in Dili, 12 camps in Baucau district and 4 transitional sites.
- An assessment of 13 high-risk countries, conducted in March 2007, identified 6 camps that needed immediate and significant improvement or closure. An additional 7 camps were identified as of ‘moderate risk’ but needing significant improvement in the short term.
- An estimated 5,000 families currently living in 62 camps (in Dili and Baucau) will require ongoing shelter and Watsan support until barriers to their return are resolved.
- In September/October 2006, the following high-risk camps were identified: Canossa Lecidere, National Hospital, Balide Igereja, Jardim, Farol Belums Office, Motael Church and Clinic, Obrigado Barracks Parking Lot, Central Pharmacy, Airport, Hera Port and Hera Bedik.
- In August 2006, the WSWG recommended the closure of the following camps mainly due to the poor sanitation conditions: Farol Belun’s office (both sites) (239 people), Parking Lot Obrigado Barracks (6,338 people) and Central National Pharmacy (731 people).

OCHA & UNMIT, 30 October 2008, p.5

"Building on the efforts of 2007 rainy season preparedness, the water and sanitation working group, the SLS working group and the health sector are currently reviewing critical issues for
remaining IDP camps during the rainy season. The working groups are reviewing the flood risk for the remaining camps and needs for drainage clearance inside and outside of IDP camps, securing and emptying septic tanks, shelter needs for tarpaulins, tent elevation, disease surveillance and referral mechanisms, anti-mosquito spraying of tents, and the delivery of health promotion messages. At the same time OCHA/UNMIT IHCT is also compiling an updated inventory of contingency stocks in country.

**OCHA & UNMIT, 9 May 2008, p.2**

"The WWG have updated that camp closure priority rankings to contribute a voice, based on professional technical opinion, to the Government’s process in managing IDPs (especially in relation to priorities for the recovery strategy which may lead to camp closure). Due to recent flooding and landowner restrictions on building further infrastructure, Hera Port IDP camp has moved from moderate risk to high risk on the ranking. The la Nina wet season has lead higher rains, this combined with high tides has led to extensive flooding in the camp. Due to the high flooding risk and resulting risk of loss of assets, injury or death, this camp is recommended for urgent implementation of the recovery strategy and closure. Other camps recommended for urgent closure include the national hospital (in process), Jardim and the Airport."

**OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 7**

"Most of the IDP camps were established in perceived safe areas such as sites near security forces, within church or Government compounds. For this reason, many camps are overcrowded. In a number of cases, sanitation facilities are limited by space and other constraints of the site. The environment in which the IDP camps are established requires constant and on-going support in terms of sanitation, hygiene promotion, and vector control. Due to inadequacies of existing water and sanitation systems, technical support is an on going necessity. A Water and Sanitation Working Group assessment (May 2007) identified 13 IDP camps as at “highest risk” and recommended six camps for immediate closure or significant improvement due to poor conditions. The remaining seven were deemed to be of “moderate” risk. It is vital that water and sanitation provision continues in the camps as a deterioration of conditions would result in a high risk of increased illness for both IDPs and nearby residents. In addition, the threat of morbidity and mortality associated with the outbreaks of communicable and vector-borne diseases including malaria, dengue, diarrhoeal diseases, and cholera is increasing due to a higher density of population in IDP camps as well as natural disasters.

(...) Since May 2006, international agencies under the leadership of the WSWG have been providing water and sanitation (Watsan) services to IDPs in Timor-Leste. Currently 52 camps in Dili, seven in Baucau, one in Liquica, one in Ermera and four transitional shelter sites are receiving water and sanitation assistance from members of the WSWG.

It is estimated that currently there are more than 5,000 families living in IDP camps and Transitional Shelters in Dili, Baucau, Liquica, and Ermera who require ongoing water and sanitation support until the barriers to return to their homes are resolved. While a range of efforts are in place to support IDPs to return home or seek interim alternatives to the IDP camps, it is expected that there will be a residual population remaining in the camps for, at least, the next 12 months. Additionally, Timor-Leste is currently experiencing a La Nina year resulting in heavy winds and rains which can worsen the conditions in the camps. It is vital that water and sanitation provision continues in the camps as a deterioration in sanitation conditions in the camps would result in a high risk of increased incidence of illnesses. The WSWG continues to work together to make water and sanitation facilities in camps more sustainable, where possible promoting IDP
management of systems and to integrate support to the camps into the DNSAS operational structure.

The WSWG, led by the National Directorate of Water and Sanitation has two major objectives: to improve sectoral coordination for effective delivery of water and sanitation services to IDPs; and, to strengthen the capacity of DNSAS for the mainstreaming of the humanitarian response, including current IDP response and future emergencies, into DNSAS regular operations.

The WSWG has worked with DNSAS to develop a strategy to handover and integrate key activities (revised in January 2008) which outlines the process by which the implementing partners aim to upgrade water and sanitation facilities and then gradually integrate the provision of water and sanitation services to the camps into the DNSAS regular programme. Since February 2007, DNSAS has taken over the rubbish collection and septic tank emptying responsibilities in Dili and more recently in Baucau. NGOs and UN agencies coordinate support to DNSAS through the secondment of staff to DNSAS, including an expatriate technical advisor and work teams for repairs and maintenance.

Ongoing support to DNSAS is essential to ensure that DNSAS continue its role in providing services to IDP camps and for the gradual handover of activities to DNSAS. The support to DNSAS will complement the activities of the recently recruited Watsan Focal Point (Nov 2007), with the overall goal to better coordinate services to IDPs.

In March 2007 and August 2007 the WSWG conducted assessments to review the standards of water and sanitation conditions in the highest risk camps. The results categorised camps into high, medium, and low risk camps and made recommendations for camp closure due to environmental constraints or significant upgrades of facilities originally built for the short-term emergency. At this stage none of the seven high risk camps have closed and there remains a need to improve the facilities in the majority of these camps."

OCHA & UNMIT, 20 December 2007, p. 3

"The WSWG has conducted a preliminary assessment of the flooding risk of IDP camps in Dili District. This information has been circulated to the humanitarian community to assist with contingency plans. The camps at high risk of flooding include: 1.2 Canossa Lecidere, 1.5 National Hospital G Valadares, 2.3 Balide Igreja, 3.2 Farol Escola Primaria, 3.5 Jardim Nicolao Lobato, 3.9 Moteal Church & Clinic, 4.3 Parking Lot Obrigado Barraks, 7.1 Central National Pharmacy, 10.4 Airport, 0.1 Metinaro and 0.2 Hera Port."

WSWG, 18 October 2007

"The camps that are currently ranked High risk include:

• 1.5 National Hospital G Valadares
• 3.5 Jardim Nicolao Lobato
• 10.4 Airport

Moderate sites include:

• 1.2 Canossa Lecidere
• 2.3 Balide Igreja
• 3.2 Farol Escola Primaria
• 3.9 Moteal Church & Clinic
• 4.3 Parking Lot Obrigado Barracks

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Some success was had in improving the conditions of the camp so that they fell down a rank. For example, improvements to the water supply at Fatumeta bought its ranking down from high to moderate. The Becora Salaun Igreja camp and Dom Bosco have also decreased in ranking due to improvements to the water supply. UIR is now ranked as low due to improvements in drainage, water supply and additional latrine provision. The central pharmacy and Balide Cannossiana sites have moved from high to moderate due to population decreases and increase in the number of facilities available. However, Hera has been added to the list of moderate sites due to landowner restrictions that do not allow the building of further latrines.

As mentioned in the previous assessment, there are some camps that will remain in an unsatisfactory WatSan condition despite conducting major works due to space, capacity and environmental limitations. It is these camps that the WatSan working group wishes to draw attention to for either closure, prioritization of IDPs for transitional shelter or methods that lead to a dramatic decrease in IDP population.

The sites that will remain high risk after any possible remediation work is complete have been assessed as:

- 1.5 National Hospital G. Valadares
- 10.4 Airport

Sites that will remain moderate risk after any possible remediation work is complete have been assessed as:

- 1.2 Canossa Lecidere
- 2.3 Balide Igreja
- 3.2 Farol Escola Primaria
- 3.5 Jardim
- 4.7 Balide Cannossiana
- 7.1 Central National Pharmacy
- 9.1 Has Laran Canossa School
- 0.2 Hera Port
- Tibar

**OCHA, 17 July 2007, p. 33**

“The Water and Sanitation Working Group (WSWG) has been providing Watsan services to IDPs in Timor-Leste since April 2006. Watsan assistance is currently being provided at 50 IDP camps in Dili, 12 camps in Baucau, and four transitional shelter sites. The WSWG, led by the National Directorate of Water and Sanitation (DNAS), has two major objectives:
• Improve sectoral coordination for effective delivery of Watsan services to IDPs, in particular vulnerable groups such as women and children;
• Strengthen DNAS capacity to mainstream humanitarian responses, including current IDP response and future emergencies, into the Government’s regular operations.

The WSWG worked with DNAS to develop a Government integration strategy in December 2006, outlining the process by which implementing partners aimed to upgrade WATSAN facilities to international standards and integrate WATSAN services into the DNAS regular programme. DNAS has taken over the rubbish collection and septic tank emptying responsibilities in Dili and has also made budgetary allocations to provide IDP support services in Dili in the Districts in the next financial year (2007-2008).

The Government requested that camps be upgraded in March 2007 as it became clearer that closing the camps would take significant time. The WSWG subsequently conducted assessments of the Watsan conditions in the 13 highest risk camps in May 2007. The results of this assessment recommended six IDP camps for significant improvement or closure due to poor Watsan conditions. A further seven camps were determined to be of moderate risk needing significant improvement in the short-term. The facilities in a number of other camps also require improvement as they were built for the short-term emergency period.

The WSWG continues to work to make facilities more sustainable while recognising that the camps are a temporary measure, and where possible to promote IDP management of systems and to integrate support to the camps into the DNAS operational structure. It is estimated that approximately 5,000 families currently living in 62 camps (in Dili and Baucau) will require ongoing shelter and Watsan support until barriers to their return are resolved. It is expected that there will be a significant population remaining in the camps until at least December 2007. Given the high risk of illness if a deterioration of sanitation conditions occurs, it is vital that Watsan provision continues in the camps."

WSWG, May 2007, pp. 1-3
"In Sept/Oct 2006, the WSWG (then WASH-WG) developed a list of high-risk camps based on the anticipated risk of flooding, which was considered to be the critical water and sanitation issue at that time. There were eleven high risk sites identified: Canossa Lecidere, National Hospital, Balide Igereja, Jardim, Farol Belums Office, Motael Church and Clinic, Obrigado Barracks Parking Lot, Central Pharmacy, Airport, Hera Port and Hera Bedik. See Attachment 4: High Risk Camps - Water, Sanitation and Drainage Assessment of Dili Camps (Oct 2006).

Later in the wet season, the list was amended to include Metinaro camp. As Hera Bedik camp had closed by that time, the total number of high risk sites remained at eleven.

As alternative shelter options become available, the WSWG identified the need to reassess the sites based on the broader WatSan criteria including water, sanitation, drainage and the management of WatSan facilities, in order to make more sound recommendations about priorities for camp closure and priorities for movement to transitional shelters.

(…)
Camp Closure Priority Ranking
This assessment covers the access to water, sanitation, drainage and the management of WatSan facilities. The assessment ranks sites as:
High risk: Camp is in need of immediate and significant improvement of WatSan facilities or requires closure;
Moderate risk: Camp is in need of significant improvement in the near future;
Low risk: Camp WatSan standards have met Sphere standards and have a sustainable /
acceptable level of service.

The camps that are currently ranked High risk include:
1.5 National Hospital G Valadares
3.5 Jardim Nicolão Lobato
4.7 Balide Cannossiana Sisters
7.1 Central National Pharmacy
5.3 Fatumeta Seminario
10.4 Airport

Moderate sites include:
1.2 Canossa Lecidere
2.3 Balide Igreja
2.5 Becora Salaun Igreja
3.2 Farol Escola Primaria
3.9 Motael Church & Clinic
4.3 Parking Lot Obrigado Barracks
9.1 Has Laran Canossa School
10.1 Comoro, Dom Bosco
10.3 Comoro Police Academy
0.1 Metinaro
Tibar
Ex-Chinese Consulate
UIR

These results have been used by agencies to develop and prioritise future works plans and
submit funding requests under the CAP and through other donors. However, there are some
camps that will remain in an unsatisfactory WatSan condition despite conducting major works due
to space, capacity and environmental limitations. It is these camps that the WatSan working
group wishes to draw attention to for either closure, prioritization of IDPs for transitional shelter or
methods that lead to a dramatic decrease in IDP population.

The sites that will remain high risk after any possible remediation work is complete have been
assessed as:
1.5 National Hospital G. Valadares
10.4 Airport
7.1 Central National Pharmacy
4.7 Balide Cannossiana (not recommended for closure, but reduction of numbers)

Sites that will remain moderate risk after any possible remediation work is complete have been
assessed as:
3.5 Jardim
10.3 Police Academy (depending on number and timeframe of cadets returning)
4.3 Parking Lot Obrigado Barracks"

WSWG, 1 August 2006
“The WASH-WG has assessed the sanitation and drainage conditions in the Dili camps. This
assessment summarises the least viable camps (from a sanitation and drainage perspective).
The assessment was undertaken using the Sphere Guidelines (2004) and UNHCR Handbook for
Emergencies (2000).
The following recommendations are made:

1  Three camps are prioritized for closure due to the difficulty in meeting even the lowest standards of sanitation. The total population affected is approximately 7,300 people. It is noted the population figures are inflated, reflecting the return home of many people during the day and people possibly ‘holding’ a position in the camp due to ongoing security concerns. These camps may be able to support a significantly reduced population. The camps recommended for closure/relocation are:

   o 3.1 Farol Belun’s office (both sites) (239 people)
   o 4.3 Parking Lot Obrigado Barracks (6,338 people)
   o 7.1 Central National Pharmacy (731 people)

2  The Stadium should not be opened as a camp due to very poor drainage and regular flooding in the rainy season. The WASH-WG considers that the stadium would be best used for sporting and social activities that will enhance the reintegration process during the coming months.

2  Twelve camps are assessed as being medium risk, requiring additional sanitation and drainage work prior to the rainy season. These camps must be re-assessed and closely monitored to ensure the standards of sanitation and drainage are improved. If there is a very heavy rainy season in 2006/07 then these camps will no longer be safe. It should be noted that two camps with large populations require drainage work to be done prior to the rainy season; Dom Bosco (population 14,150) and the Airport (population 5,500).

3  It was agreed at the WASH-WG meeting on 28th July that DNAS would coordinate with the Ministry of Public Works to arrange for the clearing of the city drainage network to proceed, giving priority to those drains which serve the camps identified as high and medium risk. An as-built layout of the city’s drainage network is held by DNAS, and this will be used to plan this work. In relation to the camps identified as having conditions that put people’s health at risk, people must be supported, and not forced, to re-locate to an alternative site which provides them with security and a healthy living environment. The WASH-WG acknowledge the importance of people choosing where they reside, and have the right to seek safety and not be forcibly moved. People have the right to both security and a healthy living environment.”

**Shelter and non-food items**

NRC suggests building transitional shelters transformable into permanent basic housing for all house-insecure groups (October 2008)

- NRC is to build transitional shelters that can be later transformed into permanent basic housing. These “Transformable Transitional Shelters” would not be limited to IDPs but would also be available for other housing-insecure groups

HCC, 7 October 2008, p. 3

“The concept of transferable Transitional Shelters is based on looking towards the future in terms of permanent housing options while addressing current Transitional Shelter needs. This would provide permanent housing solutions for IDPs that can not return to their homes. The model for the shelters is designed with the idea that they could be combined with another to produce a housing unit. The size of each shelter would be 20 sq m which could be combined with a kitchen and a bathroom to create a basic house of 50 sq m. This area would then be extended so that the
unit would have space around to create a block size of 150 sq m. The idea is to promote this structure for future housing and meet the immediate term needs. There will be issues with determining who the beneficiaries will be and which site will be used.

One site has been put forward for building these shelters (there is need for land for additional Transitional Shelters regardless of whether these are turned into basic houses) which is Asgor site in Dili. The concept was presented to the Inter- Ministerial committee two weeks ago and was positively received but there are still land issues surrounding the site and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) was not present at the meeting. The cost estimate for the construction of these shelters will be given in due course as the prices of construction materials are currently rising."

**Need to develop emergency or short-term shelter sites and to repair damaged houses (July 2007)**

- Transitional shelters is to provide a temporary solution to the displaced but its implementation is still hampered by social tensions, security concerns and lack of consultation with IDPs.
- Unaddressed land and property issues, lack of reconstruction and unresolved political issues will keep the displaced in camps for some time and in continuing needs of shelter.

**OCHA, 17 July 2007, p. 10**
"Although permanent shelter solutions remain far off, transitional shelter is beginning to provide midterm solutions to those whose displacement is likely to be protracted. However, Government allocation of transitional shelter has been constrained by social tensions, security concerns and lack of consultation with IDPs. Progress will be necessary in three key areas: repair and/or construction of damaged or destroyed houses; establishment of arbitration/restitution mechanisms; and legal recognition of property rights."

**UNSC, 1 February 2007, p. 16**
"52. It is likely that the crisis with regard to internally displaced persons will continue for some time owing to a number of underlying factors. More than 2,200 houses have been destroyed and more than 1,600 damaged. This means that, in the near future, more than 20,000 persons will remain without a home to return to. The Government has designed transitional shelter plans for families whose houses have been destroyed and will assist with construction material for damaged houses. However, current construction plans address only a small percentage of shelter needs, and complex land and property issues complicate the return and reintegration, as does the verification of compensation claims. Furthermore, until the underlying causes of the situation of insecurity and political crisis are resolved, the potential for durable solutions will remain uncertain given the persistence of genuine fear among internally displaced persons about security in areas of return."

**OCHA, 16 January 2007, p. 12**
"Shelter is a key issue in this context. Emergency shelter has been provided to IDPs in the form of tents and plastic sheeting. However, with the end of the emergency assistance phase, shelter will need to be addressed in a more sustainable way. While the Government makes progress with its plans to rebuild transitional shelter for IDPs whose houses have been destroyed, there is a need to develop emergency or short-term shelter sites to temporarily accommodate or resettle those who cannot return, and others who need to be relocated due to flooding of their current camps. The humanitarian community is seeking to establish a focal point to provide technical support to the revised Shelter Working Group. Although shelter assistance has been provided mainly in Dili, because of the concentration of camps in the capital, assistance will now be
refocused on the districts. For the purpose of this Appeal, shelter assistance has been included in the Multi-Sector section. Damaged infrastructure will have to be rehabilitated in the mid- to longer-term, within the framework of a transition to development programme.”

**Persistence of IDP problem calls for a gradual transition from IDP camps to transitional shelter camps (July 2007)**

- New strategy acknowledges that displacement is likely to persist into 2008 and requires efforts to improve conditions in the existing camps.
- The upgrading of camps will be complemented by a continuation of the strategy to relocate people in transitional camps.

**OCHA, 17 July 2007, p. 18**

"The Government and the wider humanitarian community have officially acknowledged that the displacement situation is likely to persist into 2008 and agreed that efforts should be made to improve conditions in the camps. The likely prolongation of people’s displacement and the uncertain political and security environment will mean the Government will continue to require assistance in facilitating exchanges of communication between IDPs and communities. Camp management agencies also play a fundamental role in identifying and managing potential conflict factors within camps, and between camps and host communities which could have wider political and security consequences. The focus of the sector for the next six months will be to review the camp management response of the Site Liaison Support (SLS) system, and to assist the Government in developing a strategy to strengthen the management roles of Government and local camp managers. International camp management agencies need to define exit strategies, with the Government increasingly assuming camp management responsibilities. The sector strategy therefore foresees that discussions and planning aimed at a gradual transition will take place once the new Government is formed. Any planning to that end will be done within a realistic framework of existing Government capacity, and, importantly, the impact of the transition on the IDP population.

Over the next six months a concerted inter-agency approach is needed for implementation of significant upgrades to camps. The planned relocation of IDPs to transitional shelter sites will require close support and follow-up by camp management agencies to ensure that IDPs are able to make informed decisions about movement to upgraded shelter arrangements. Furthermore, camp management agencies must continue to fill gaps in service delivery for general camp maintenance and upkeep, such as the provision of lighting, maintenance of Watsan installations, as well as fencing.

Sizable fluctuations in the number, composition and movement patterns of IDPs are expected over the next 18 months. Periodic gang violence and political uncertainty in the post-Parliamentary election period could lead to additional displacement. Camp numbers routinely fluctuate as persons displaced from Dili to the districts use Dili camps as a stepping stone for return to Dili. The delayed reconstruction of over 5,000 houses, the unwillingness of several communities to accept returns, and the perception of insecurity by IDPs are all factors presenting obstacles to return. Strong in-camp support by camp management agencies is thus essential to ensure that the safety and dignity of the IDP population is maintained while durable solutions are sought.

Camp management agencies will also continue to play a pivotal role in assisting IDPs to take informed decisions about their return and reintegration options. As has been the case during the past six months, agencies will continue to encourage dialogue and discussions between IDPs and members of their former communities. This will be done through facilitation of visits to the
communities, support for dialogue between local and IDP leaders, youth, and sporting activities that encourage positive interaction between IDPs and their communities."

IOM, 28 February 2007, p.1
"At the beginning of the crisis in April/May 2006 many displaced families were accommodated in religious institutions, schools or stand alone camps. Many displaced families are unable to return to their places of origin for a variety of reasons e.g: increased security incidences; either their homes are damaged or burnt; and furthermore present camps are also the target of several security problems and the viability of managing these camps in their current location are no longer sustainable. Therefore, the Government is pursuing several options one of which is the relocation of displaced families to transitional shelters as an interim measure while seeking durable solutions for the displaced population. To this end the assessment was carried out.

The objective of the transitional shelter sites is that at the end of the emergency assistance phase, shelter will need to be addressed in a more sustainable way. The sites will thus be used for the purposes of accommodating IDPs who will be relocated from various camps in Dili."
ACCESS TO EDUCATION

General

Few educational opportunities for IDP children (April 2008)

- The displacement of thousands of persons has resulted in reduced access by IDP children to regular education services as a significant percentage of them do not feel safe to attend school at/near their community of displacement.
- Returnees in Ermera district reported to refuse to send their children to school due to poor conditions in the schools.

OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 30

"Another issue concerns the limited access to education for many children in IDP camps, which in part is due to fear of insecurity on the way to or at school. There are few vocational training and educational opportunities for young people. Further, reports from service providers indicate that due to the current climate of insecurity, poverty and weak service provision, children are exposed to risks of sexual and economic exploitation.

(...) Education provides similar large scale challenges to the Government of Timor-Leste. As is the case with improved food security, education is a clear Government priority and the sector has received substantial attention from the Government and development partners. That said access to education and other psycho-social support remains limited. As is the case with pre-existing vulnerabilities in other sectors, the 2006 crisis, the mass displacement and the impact on community perceptions of safety and security have had substantial negative consequences in the sector. The displacement of thousands of persons has resulted in reduced access by IDP children to regular education services as a significant percentage of them do not feel safe to attend school at/near their community of displacement. Where security is less of a concern, existing schools and resources have been overwhelmed by the influx of students. While the Government and its partners have focused on the issue and have established, for example, child friendly spaces in some camps, it is clear that more support is required."

HCC, 22 April 2008, p.3

"Human Rights monitoring, particularly relating to returnees in Urahau, Ermera District has reported no major problems although some living conditions not ideal in that some people are still living in tents. However, there is concern that returnees are not sending their children to local schools citing that the schools are in a poor condition as the reason. This has obvious implications for the integration of the returnees into the community."

High demand for literacy courses among displaced people (May 2007)

- In response to a pressing demand for displaced people, literacy classes were stereotyped in several IDP camps.
- A majority of East Timorese are illiterate.
- Primary school net enrollment rate improved from 51 percent in 2000-2001 to 80 percent in 2004-2005,
UNICEF, 8 May 2007
"The Metinaro camp for displaced persons is 30 km east of Dili, the capital of Timor-Leste. When widespread violence broke out in Dili in 2006, Metinaro was lined with tents sheltering thousands who had lost their homes or were afraid to return.

A year later, almost 1,440 families remain. Their homes now have thatched roofs and some have zinc plates as walls, affording more shelter and privacy.

Life is tough here, but 75 women and adolescents are finding relief from their daily routine. Three times a week, they attend literacy classes supported by UNICEF.

(...) Literacy classes were started in three major camps late last year in response to an overwhelming demand from the displaced population. UNICEF funds the classes and supplies materials such as literacy manuals and tents for the adolescent and adult learners.

(...) The country’s 2004 census revealed that only 32 per cent of people over 15 years of age were able to speak, read and write the official language, Tetum. More than 40,000 young people are estimated to be out of school or illiterate."

WB, 19 June 2007
"While important improvements have been made in Timor-Leste’s education sector, since it achieved independence in 2002, most notably increasing the primary school net enrollment rate from 51 percent in 2000-2001 to 80 percent in 2004-2005, serious challenges remain. Over 40 percent of adults are illiterate; the basic mathematic ability of students is low with girls performing worse than boys; schools have few textbooks and other instructional materials; school drop-out rates are high, particularly during the first three years of schooling and in the final grades of pre-secondary school. Timorese society is also young with more than 50 percent of its population under 15 and with one of the highest fertility rates in the world, this is placing further stress on an already challenged education system."

UNDP, January 2006, p. 1
"Education standards too are poor. In 2004 the adult literacy rate was only 50.1% – 56.3% for males and 43.9% for females. The situation should improve as more children go to school. But too many children are still missing out: between 10% and 30% of primary school-age children are not in school – particularly those from the poorest families. Even when they do enrol, pupils tend to do so late and then have to repeat classes or drop out; fewer than half of children entering primary school complete six years of education.

There is also very little education outside the normal school ages: only around 2% of children under five attend any kind of pre-school or playschool. At the other end of the age scale, few adults attend literacy classes, whether organized by the Government or NGOs."

All children at school age affected by the crisis (July 2007)

- Most educational facilities were destroyed during 1999 and most teachers returned to Indonesia.
The 2006 crisis has affected all children, IDPs or not. Most schools closed down and only some reopened in early 2007.

Violence in February-March 2007 forced many schools to close down.

Most school-aged children in camps do attend regular schools.

Most classes remain overcrowded due to lack of sufficient teachers and classrooms.

OCHA, 17 July 2007, p. 23

"Education in Timor-Leste was severely affected during the 1999 departure of the Indonesian forces. Most educational facilities were destroyed and more than 50% of teachers were Indonesian nationals who opted to leave. The past years has seen the focus on the rehabilitation of school infrastructure as well as on training of teachers -both qualified and unqualified – and on the development of a new curriculum and teaching materials in the two national languages, Tetum and Portuguese.

The crisis in Dili has affected all children at school age, regardless of whether or not they live in IDP camps. Nearly all schools closed at the onset of the crisis in late April 2006, and some only reopened in January 2007. The continued violence in various parts of the city continues to affect the functioning of the schools; five primary schools and two secondary schools had to completely close down for two months in February/March due to trouble in their neighbourhoods. Nearly all other schools in Dili see drops in attendance of students and teachers whenever violence breaks out in their vicinity.

The majority of Dili's schools face extreme hardship as classrooms, water sources, and toilets are damaged, furniture broken or looted, and school materials stolen. In addition, there continue to be security concerns around schools, which affect regular attendance by teachers and children. The majority of school-aged children living in camps attend regular schools and have voiced their desire to attend a "normal school". For two camps with larger populations of school aged children (primarily grade 1 and 2) not attending school, temporary schooling has been established in consultation with the Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth and Sports (MECYS) and the camp managements."

OCHA, 23 February 2007

"The current security situation in Dili has led to temporary closure of some schools and drop in school attendance. However, primary school attendance seems to have recently increased with the distribution of 199,385 back packs containing stationery items by UNICEF throughout the country, along with 5,566 teachers bags with teaching materials. A number of schools and IDP camps in Dili and vicinity also received tents and additional learning support materials.

The WFP-assisted School Feeding (SF) programme continues to provide mid-morning meals to primary school children in Atauro sub-district, Ainaro, Baucau, Bobonaro, Covalima, Liquica and Oecussi districts, resulting in an increase in primary schools enrolment from 11,000 to 14,000 pupils in Ainaro district. The programme now covers 66,082 children, including 33,546 boys and 32,536 girls in 301 schools. During the past week there has been cases of attacks and theft of food intended for the SF programme in Liquca and Baucau districts. Security of the food was highlighted as the biggest problem facing the implementation of the SF programme at 12 schools in Maucatar, Suai Kota, Tilimar and Zulamai sub districts in Covalima district."

OCHA, 16 January 2007, p. 12
"The situation in this sector remains critical despite a number of ongoing initiatives. While most children in Dili are now attending school, classes are overcrowded due to lack of sufficient teachers and classrooms. The arrival of IDPs in the districts such as Baucau and Liquica has worsened the situation. There is also a need to strengthen Government-led coordination in Dili and the districts.

(...) Education in Timor-Leste was severely affected during the 1999 departure of the Indonesian forces, as most educational facilities were destroyed and more than 50% of the teaching force was Indonesian nationals who opted to leave. Over the past years the focus has been on the rehabilitation of the school infrastructure as well as on training of teachers - both qualified and unqualified – and on the development of a new curriculum and teaching learning materials in the two national languages, Tetum and Portuguese.

The crisis in Dili has affected all children at school age, regardless of whether or not they live in IDP camps. Nearly all schools closed at the onset of the crisis in late April 2006, and despite efforts to resume education, many schools still provide normal services, while others remain closed due to extensive damage or threats to teachers and children. The majority of Dili’s schools have reopened, but most face extreme hardship as classrooms, water sources, toilets are damaged, furniture broken or looted, and school materials stolen. In addition, there continue to be security concerns around schools, which affect regular attendance by teachers and children. The majority of school-aged children living in camps attend regular schools. For camps with large populations of school aged children not attending school, temporary schooling has been established in consultation with the Ministry of Education.

The Ministry of Education, UNICEF and partners responded to the crisis by conducting first a rapid assessment, and then an in-depth assessment to identify displaced children at school age and to identify their needs. In August 2006, an Emergency Education Working Group was formed in the Ministry of Education to coordinate all educational activities and provide consolidated feedback to the overall relief coordination forum. This working group includes representatives from UNICEF, IOM, PLAN, CARE, Christian Children’s Fund (CCF), Peace Winds as well as bilateral donors such as New Zealand and Brazil. It coordinates actions and the provision of services such as teachers training, school supplies, and monitoring of schools and IDP camp educational activities.

Support is being provided to the Ministry of Education to conduct a nationwide registration of all teachers and students in primary, pre-secondary and secondary schools. This data will provide a clear idea of the extent of the displacement of children at school age, the location of teachers as well as the impact of the crisis in terms of school dropout. A psychosocial training of teachers in IDP camps affected by the crisis is currently being implemented and is expected to continue in 2007. UNICEF is presently seeking funding from SIDA to develop capacity in the Ministry of Education for the preparation of national and district level emergency preparedness plans. The Ministry of Education has also committed to including a Ministry-level budget for rapid emergency response as of 2008, and to look into strengthening their ability to access the Prime Minister’s relief fund for emergency education in 2007."
ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Self-reliance

Mixed situation with regards to employment situation in camps while majority report significant losses of household assets (March 2008)

- Like many other Timorese, a high number of IDPs in camps are unemployed and are at risk of becoming involved in criminal activities.
- There are also many who appear to have a regular job with the government, private sector or with international agencies.
- The April/May unrest had a significant and immediate impact on the livelihoods and household food security of the population of Dili.
- 70 per cent of IDP interviewed reported significant losses of household assets such as stored food, poultry, pigs, money and other goods (e.g. radios, TVs and stoves).
- More than 30 per cent of respondents reported a looted or destroyed house.
- 20 per cent of households in Dili lost significant household assets, while 15 per cent lost radio, TV and stove.
- Nearly 50% of households that previously had poultry no longer have any.

ICG, 31 March 2008, p. 3
"The population of the camps is a cross-section of Timorese society. As in the population at large, unemployment levels are extremely high. Many camp dwellers in Dili, however, have regular jobs, including relatively well-paid ones with the government, private sector or international agencies. Each IDP with work is likely to be supporting a substantial number of relatives. For those without regular employment, little structured activity is available beyond participation in criminal and martial arts gangs."

WFP, 30 June 2006, pp. 4-10
"The initial findings of the EFSA indicate that the recent civil and political unrest has had a significant and immediate impact on the livelihoods and household food security of the population of Dili. Over 63,000 people have been displaced and are living in IDP sites within Dili; while a further 78,000 people have sought refuge in the outside districts, living mainly with relatives but also in sites in three districts.

(…)
70% of respondents report significant losses of household assets such as stored food, poultry, pigs, money and other goods (e.g. radios, TVs and stoves).
The unrest has had a large impact on housing with more than 30% of the assessed households reporting their homes have been looted or torched.

(…)

The figure below shows the limited assets that households in Dili owned before 28 April. 20% of households have lost essential household assets such as beds and tables. 15% have lost their radio, TV and stove.
The most commonly owned livestock before the conflict were pigs and poultry (figure 2). In Timor Leste, animals are a form of savings that are sold when money is needed. Nearly 50% of households that previously had poultry no longer have any. The questionnaire did not cover possible reasons for lost animal assets. For households to replace lost savings in the form of husbandry will take time as they also have to replace lost household assets mentioned above."

Almost all groups in Timor are in need of livelihood assistance (April 2008)

- An estimated 42% of the population is below the national poverty line of $0.55 per day, that a total population of 430,000. In 2001, the number of poor was estimated at 345,000.
- In the context of a worsening economy and high levels of unemployment, in particular for youth, almost the entire population is in need of support for resuming sustainable livelihoods. Only when this country-wide assistance will be forthcoming, can the IDP problem be solved.

OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 10
"Beyond food insecurity, both urban and rural livelihoods are fragile and create the potential for social and economic migration (districts to the capital) and subsequent bottlenecks created by the challenges of urbanisation e.g. increased pressures on the availability of sufficient land, housing and work opportunities.

Timor-Leste is ranked 150 out of 177 countries in the 2007/2008 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) and, as the Working Group on Poverty Reduction’s United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) discussion paper notes, “informal estimates suggest that as much as 42% of the population is now below the national poverty line of $0.55 per day. The implication is that as many as 430,000 people are below the poverty line, compared with about 345,000 at the time the last poverty survey was undertaken in 2001.4”

An annual economic growth rate of 7% is required to reduce poverty significantly. Agriculture dominates the economy and the livelihood of the majority of people. This sector makes up 30% of the non-petroleum gross domestic product (GDP). About 80% of the population is dependent on forestry and fisheries for their livelihoods. A third of Timorese households rely on subsistence agriculture exclusively, they are thus unable to meet their basic food needs or have access to good health or education and are vulnerable to volatile year-to year growth, natural disasters and social crises. The challenge is to raise production, productivity and income of the rural poor as well as to initiate policies and incentives for agro-industrial development as nearly 84% of the population is dependent on fragile and fast depleting natural resources.

Certainly the structural socio-economic weaknesses outlined above predate the 2006 crisis and may have been exacerbated by it. The Government’s NRS explicitly recognises that transition initiatives as outlined in the TSA are not a substitute for long-term development initiatives required to meet the long standing challenges. The Government equally recognises structural constraints. These include high illiteracy rates, the lack of economic opportunities and resulting high unemployment, especially among the youth, the basic and insufficient infrastructure, eroding coping mechanisms and unsustainable livelihoods. All these may trigger further conflict or exacerbate tensions and consequently require immediate attention."
“In addition to massive displacement, the crisis in Timor-Leste caused widespread devastation of private and commercial property, leading to a dramatic decline in the economy and a sharp increase in unemployment and poverty. The latest assessments show that 3,119 houses were destroyed and 2,242 damaged. Apart from IDPs as a group, other vulnerable groups were also severely affected. Youth unemployment has increased significantly.

Shelter assistance and the promotion of community dialogue must be coupled with the provision of support for resuming sustainable livelihoods across the country if a settlement of the IDP situation is to be achieved. The provision of livelihood assistance will need, however, to target both returning IDPs and the members of the host community, especially those with socio-economic profiles similar to those of the IDPs. Vulnerable groups such as female-headed households will need to be accorded high priority. This is essential if the return of IDPs is not to lead to tensions and conflict in the communities. The uneven treatment of IDPs and equally poor people in communities was a recurrent theme of concern raised by Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) and Suco chiefs during a recent UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) mission to Baucau. Equally important, the planning and implementation of livelihood actions will need to be undertaken in close collaboration with community leaders and elders.”

Dili offers the best economic opportunities in Timor for displaced and non-displaced people alike (March 2008)

- Dili is the country’s only economic centre of any significance, the location of most commercial and government activity as well as spending by foreign agencies and is the best hope of economic advancement for IDPs but also the rest of the population.

“The IDP camps, unpleasant as they are, are in some ways more attractive than the alternative – as evidenced by the arrival since August 2007 of young men from outside Dili who are not IDPs but are simply looking for somewhere to live while they study or seek employment. Chief among the attractions is free food, but the availability of accommodation close to the heart of the capital is another important consideration, given the chronic housing shortage (see below). This is particularly so for those with jobs in the city or looking for them. Dili is the country’s only economic centre of any significance, the location of most commercial and government activity as well as spending by foreign agencies. Despite sky-high unemployment, it offers the best hope of economic advancement. Economic activity in the districts is minimal, other than subsistence agriculture and fishing.

Until the government addresses this disparity, Dili in general and IDP camps in particular will continue to be the more attractive option. A sizeable job-creation program, particularly outside Dili, in labour-intensive activities such as road building, reforestation and housing should be a priority. The World Bank and Asian Development Bank could be approached to provide concessional loans: they have previously indicated a willingness to extend concessional lending facilities, but the government has been reluctant to take on foreign debt.”

Public participation
**Need for IDP children and youth to be able to participate in programmes affecting them (April 2008)**

**OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 30**

"Need for increased protection measures and participation of IDP children and youth. Most children in IDP camps have been living there for well over 18 months. They face risks associated with long-term exposure to inadequate living conditions. There is an urgent need for increased capacity to deliver psychosocial, legal and other support services. There should also be increased advocacy for the rights of the child at community and national levels, including the dissemination of policies and guidelines in accordance with international principles and standards. Importantly, there is a need for increased opportunities for IDP children and youth to participate in decision making processes and in advocacy initiatives and programmes directly affecting them."

**Hundreds of IDPs in camps unable to participate in the elections due to lack of voting cards (May 2007)**

- Around 300 IDPs from Metinaro camp were unable to take part in the first round of the presidential elections in April 2007 because they lacked a voter's card or passport.
- An unknown number of IDPs might have decided not to take part in the election because they had to leave the camps to vote and didn't feel secure enough to do so.

**MTRC, 9 May 2007, p. 5**

"At the meeting the SRSG spoke about the second round of the Presidential election, and security plans for Metinaro to make camp residents feel safe in leaving the camp to vote. The camp manager reported that in the first round of the Presidential election approximately 300 people from Metinaro did not vote because they did not have a voter's card or passport."

**UNDP, 30 April 2007, p. 2**

"Currently in Dili, there are three information teams who are working in the field to maintain the continual flow of timely information regarding health and sanitation issues, humanitarian assistance, current security and district news as well as to deliver messages to and from the Information Service Centre established within the Ministry of Labour and Community Reinsertion. The information distributed by the project comes from different sources but is always disseminated in close collaboration with other humanitarian agencies.

As the Presidential election looms ever closer, these information teams have been supporting the Timorese electoral process by helping to distribute voter education materials at the IDP camps. Press releases from the Government of Timor-Leste, STAE, the CNE and UNMIT concerning the elections, posters and pamphlets have all been posted on the notice boards to increase public awareness of the electoral process. In addition the teams have been using mobile sound systems installed in their vehicles to transmit voter information through radio broadcasts and music when visiting each of the IDP camps. "This is especially important because IDP’s are no longer in their own neighbourhoods and as such many are cut off from accessing their usual sources of information", observed Carolyn.

Having accompanied one of the project’s information teams as they visited an IDP camp at Dili National Hospital in Toko Baru last week, it appears some of the information has been filtering down to the ground and although nervous about their personal security, all the people we spoke with intend to vote in the Presidential election next Monday, 9 April 2007."
Access to land

WFP survey shows IDPs have generally less access to land and smaller livestocks than non-displaced residents (September 2007)

- WFP survey shows a significant difference between IDP households and households that remained in the Sucos and access to land. Only some 10 percent of IDP household have access to land whilst nearly a forth of the families in the Sucos have land.
- Whilst a large majority of households had small livestock in the past, only approximately half still own some today. There is a huge difference between the IDPs and residents where less than 25 percent of the IDPs own livestock today.

"Only 17 percent of the sampled households reported having access to agricultural land (103 families) but 90 families of these were able to cultivate their land. Twenty one percent of the households report having access to kitchen garden and slightly fewer households are able to cultivate/maintain it now. There is a remarkable difference between IDP households and households that remained in the Sucos and access to land. Only some 10 percent of IDP household have access to land whilst nearly a forth of the families in the Sucos have land. The difference between access to kitchen garden is even greater. Only one in ten families living in the IDP camps whilst one in three families amongst the Suco residents have access to kitchen garden.

Small livestock
The assessed households owned mainly poultry or pigs. Ownership for other livestock was very limited. The ownership of small livestock (pigs and poultry) has dramatically reduced since the onset of the conflict. Whilst a large majority of households had small livestock in the past, only approximately half still own some today. There is a huge difference between the IDPs and residents where less than 25 percent of the IDPs own livestock today. There has also been a remarkable reduction in households who have chickens today compared to before the crisis.

Productive assets
Also in terms of productive assets there has been a large reported reduction where only a third of the IDPs still have some productive asset. Also residents have lost assets as shown in the graph but not at the same degree.
PROPERTY ISSUES

General

Absence of a land regulation, registration and titling system continues to cause uncertainty over property rights (August 2008)

- As of August 2008, the Parliament had not debated or adopted laws on land and property rights.
- Since 2002, efforts have been made by the government to create a legal and regulatory framework governing land and property ownership, but has been delayed by a lack of capacity and slow decision-making.
- Absence of a land regulation, registration and titling system in Timor-Leste continues to cause uncertainty over property rights.
- Land titling system has been underway but its implementation has been hampered by complex unresolved conflicts over land titles

UNMIT, 21 August 2008, p. 14
"60. The National Parliament had not debated or adopted laws on land and property rights, witness protection and domestic violence. The Law on the Status and Profession of Private Lawyers is in the process of being adopted. USAID began the implementation of a five-year project to support the Government on property rights, including by assisting in the drafting of land and property laws and implementing regulations and institutional mechanisms. Parliament allocated funding to the Post-CAVR Secretariat to continue its activities."

WB, June 2006, p.15
"48. The Government has been working since independence on the creation of a legal and regulatory framework governing land and property ownership, with substantial support from the USAID Land Law Project since 2003. The work done to date includes the preparation of a set of policy recommendations on leasing of state property, land dispute mediation, land rights and title restitution, and analysis on the Dili rental market and State agricultural land. An Immovable Property (umbrella) Law was promulgated (Law 01/2003), and Laws have been prepared on the Leasing of State Property (promulgated December 2004), Leasing between private parties (passed by Parliament May 2005) Land Dispute Mediation Decree-Law (draft with Ministry of Justice), Property System, Land Transfer and Registration, Pre-Existing Land Rights and Title Restitution (Draft), and Decree-Law for Control of Illegal Construction and Informal Settlements (Draft). Regulations for the promulgated laws have been drafted as have operational manuals and processes.

49. However the absence of a land regulation, registration and titling system in Timor-Leste continues to cause uncertainty over property rights and is one of the major constraints in the business environment. Lack of land title makes it very difficult to secure collateral for bank loans for personal or business purposes. Timor-Leste ranks 125 worldwide on the Doing Business Property Registration indicator, mainly because of the complexity and incompleteness of the legal and regulatory framework and the lack of capacity in the Land and Property Department."
Experience around the world shows the major benefits of formalizing title for getting credit, for investing and for growth. This is a critical constraint which requires addressing as a top priority.

50. Although preparatory work on a land titling system has been underway in Timor-Leste for several years, the requirements are still complex and full implementation will depend on the resolution of conflicts over titles obtained during various periods in Timor-Leste’s history. These include traditional land ownership structures dating back centuries, changes effected during the Portuguese and Indonesian occupations, the enforced uprooting of large sections of the population in 1999, and decisions taken during the UN transitional administration and under the rule of the present independent government. These uncertainties can be expected to continue until a new land titling system is fully designed and implemented. This will depend in turn on the completion of a cadastre, but progress on this so far has been very limited.

51. Completion of this complex framework has been subject to long delays, because of lack of capacity combined with slow decision making and the need to accommodate the different views of the many stakeholders. Three draft laws remain to be approved. The Directorate of Land and Property has been given full responsibility for land titling by Government but its capacity is limited and until the Pre-existing Land Rights and Title Restitution Law is approved it will not have sufficient jurisdictional authority to do its job.

52. Importantly, as with other aspects of the legal and regulatory framework, even when the legal and regulatory framework is complete, until the court system is functional, civil cases such as land disputes and contract enforcement are unlikely to be given priority over criminal cases by the court system.

Majority of IDPs cannot rebuild their homes as these are subject to ownership disputes (March 2008)

- Only IDPs with no competing claims over land and property can rebuild their homes. Those in dispute will have to wait until the justice ministry decides what to do about the land laws – a significant limitation, as the majority of cases fall into this category.
- Without new land laws and a registry, conflicting claims will continue to be a source of conflict and insecurity.

ICG, 29 March 2008, p. 14

“"This pillar [building homes] aims to help IDPs return home where it is safe and possible and to provide new houses where it is not. An operational plan is still being drawn up, but the intention is to work with the databases compiled during the Levantamento de Dados and Levantamento de Campos exercises. In the former, conducted in October 2006, more than 5,000 IDPs registered their destroyed or damaged houses. In the latter, data collectors worked with village chiefs to verify the claims. The next stage will be to examine global information system (GIS) maps to make sure the houses have been correctly identified and ownership is not disputed. Only those with no competing claims can be rebuilt. Those in dispute will have to wait until the justice ministry decides what to do about the land laws – a significant limitation, as the majority of cases fall into this category.

The government will build new basic houses for people who are afraid to return to their former houses or are unable to do so for some other reason. However, the justice ministry is yet to allocate government land or purchase private land on which to build these houses.

There are a number of problems with this component of the recovery strategy. Without new land laws and a registry, conflicting claims will continue to be a source of conflict and insecurity. This is a critical challenge for reasons beyond the IDP crisis. Long-term stability and economic growth
depend on addressing fundamental housing and land needs, correcting ownership inequities and instituting a predictable, law-based property regime."

**Between 5,000 and 8,229 houses destroyed or damaged since 2006 (March 2008)**

- According to the UN, 8,229 households in Dili and 3 districts have registered a damaged or destroyed house with the government since 2006
- According to ICG, the number of houses destroyed during the March-June 2006 unrest did not exceed 1,650.
- UNDP assessment showed 3,119 houses destroyed, 2,242 damaged by 2006 unrest and many other houses illegally occupied, leaving an estimated 30,000 people homeless.
- For IDPs, priority has to be given to addressing land and property rights issues including the establishment of adequate compensation and property restitution mechanisms in the context of wider land law reform
- 75% of IDPs in tents have had their homes destroyed or damaged
- An overwhelmed and non-functioning judicial system is increasing the sense of impunity

**OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 6**
"Since 2006, 8,229 households in Dili and three districts have been registered through the Government's Levantamento de Dados, data gathering system, indicating that their house has been destroyed or damaged. At the same time, 5,621 houses in Dili have been assessed under a field-level damage assessment system called Levantamento de Campos."

**ICG, 31 March 2008, p.2**
"Up to 38 people were killed and at least 1,650 houses destroyed in the events of March-June 2006. Approximately 150,000 persons were displaced in the face of widespread arson and looting."

**UNMIT, 8 November 2007, p.13**
"The violence sparked during the 2006 crisis resulted in the internal displacement of more than a hundred thousand persons who moved to IDP camps scattered around the country, or to host families. Since April 2006 around 5,300 houses were destroyed or damaged in the violence. A slight decrease of the IDP population staying in camps has been noted since then, although with renewed violence linked to gang fighting in the beginning of 2007, more people arrived in the camps. Many more houses were destroyed or damaged during disturbances in May-June and in August, leading to new displacement in Ermera and Viqueque districts."

**OCHA, 17 July 2007, pp. 7-31**
"Government/United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) assessments3 show that 3,119 houses were destroyed, 2,242 were damaged and many more undamaged but illegally occupied, leaving an estimated 30,000 people homeless4.

(...) One of the key issues for IDPs or other vulnerable groups at risk relates to land and property rights including the establishment of adequate compensation and property restitution mechanisms in the context of wider land law reform. Significant progress is yet to be made with
addressing these entrenched elements. For most of the displaced population, returning to their homes is not yet an option. The UNDP December 2006 assessment of 4,000 families in IDP camps5 revealed that 45% had their homes completely destroyed and a further 33% damaged. Further assessments (see table below) have added to the picture. 

The majority of IDPs displaced to Dili by the crisis found refuge in church or Government compounds, which were not designed for sheltering large numbers of people. While IDP numbers have reduced substantially over the past year, continued insecurity within Dili has meant that large numbers of people are still residing in these spontaneous camps, with even more living outside the camps in makeshift arrangements in or on property belonging to others. The camp-based IDPs are living primarily in tents, often in crowded and sub-standard conditions due to site constraints. Current data indicates that over 75% have had their homes damaged or destroyed and will be unable to leave the camps without additional housing assistance."

**OCHA, 16 January 2007, pp. 8-9**

"According to an ongoing comprehensive assessment of damaged houses, at least 3,197 homes are known to have been destroyed (1,846) or damaged (1,351) in Dili during the crisis. The same survey will now be carried out in the districts. Estimates suggest that some 14,000 of those currently displaced in Dili no longer have homes to return to. There is also a considerable number of land and property disputes that the legal system has been unable to address. The judicial system is generally overwhelmed due to limited human resources, structural constraints and a significant increase in criminal cases arising from the crisis. The backlog of cases awaiting prosecution, which was a concern even before the crisis, has now surpassed 2,500. This, combined with significant gaps in legislation, increases the sense of impunity and widespread lack of confidence in the judicial system."

**WFP, 30 June 2006, p. 9**

"In terms of housing the current unrest has had a huge impact, which will have long-term effects on the household economy and their capacity to rebuild their livelihoods. Amongst the 256 households included in this assessment:

13% of households in the sample report their home had been torched
  6% of households in the camps
  23% of households in the Aldeias

36% of households in the sample report their home had been looted
  30% of households in camps
  42% of households in Aldeias"

**Overwhelming majority of IDPs surveyed have had their homes destroyed or damaged (September 2007)**

- An estimated 85 per cent of IDPs surveyed have had their houses destroyed or damaged.
- Almost a quarter of the residents surveyed also had their homes damaged or destroyed.
- Only 10 per cent of the affected homes have been rebuilt 15 months later.
- Some 85 per cent of the IDPs have had their homes looted.
- Some 75 per cent of IDPs said that unrepaired homes was their main reason for not returning
"One question asked to the households related to whether their home had been affected in the conflict. The table below shows that only 6.5 percent of the IDP homes have escaped being affected at all. Some 6 percent of homes are illegally occupied by somebody else. It is clear that IDP families have seen their homes being destroyed or damaged to a greater degree than those families remaining in the Sucos. However, almost one of four houses among the Suco households has seen their homes damaged. Only 10 percent of the affected homes have been rebuilt or rehabilitated in both groups.

Some 85 percent of the IDPs have seen their homes being looted since the conflict whilst 20 percent of the families remaining in the Sucos were looted.

When households in the camps were asked about the main reason for remaining in the camp was, the majority reported that it was linked to their housing situation at home. 75 percent said that it was because un-repaired home.

Illegal occupancy of property regularized by 'special lease' agreements (December 2005)

- An archive of Land Claims and Disputes was opened in 2003 and recorded a total of 12,329 claims, the majority of which were lodged by foreigners. Most East Timorese did not lodge claim to property they believed to be theirs.
- To address the problem of illegal occupancy, widespread in Dili, illegal occupants have been invited since 2004 to submit application to the government and were able to obtain 'special' lease agreements, resulting in the regularisation of their situation. Between 2004 and December 2005, 2,700 people out of 6,000 candidates received a lease.
- A cadastre of ownership registration was underway at the end of 2005.

De Sousa Xavier, Pedro, December 2005, pp. 5-9

"After the promulgation of Law 1/2003, it was possible to create an archive of Land Claims and Disputes in East Timor. The law provided a period for presentation of documents claiming rights over land and property. This period was open for all citizens (national and foreigners), and resulted 5781 claims being lodged in East Timor and 6548 claims lodged in Indonesia, with small numbers in other countries (e.g. Australia, Portugal). Analysis of the claims recorded in East Timor, it was observed that the majority of the claimants are foreigners' individuals (72%). The percentage of national individual claimants is 26%, and from companies 2% of the total number of claims. Figure 2 presents these results.

It should be noted that many East Timorese did not lodge claim their own property, believing themselves to be the rightful and undisputed owner. In essence, the claims process was to set a deadline for claims by non-residents, in order that the government could then address such issues, and not have new (and perhaps conflicting) claims arriving over time."
According to some, the Constitution is not clear regarding the (pre-existing) rights available to foreign land owners. The resolution of the apparent uncertainty within the Constitution in relation to land owned by foreign citizens (in the majority Indonesian and Portuguese) is the subject of the forthcoming Land Titles legislation.

Given the constitutional prohibition, foreigners with pre-existing land rights could be offered some land right being less than an ownership right, although it may be more definitive to provide foreign owners with a period to comply with the Constitution, by allowing them to sell property, or take out citizenship.

Normal Lease Agreements
The National Directorate of Land and Property celebrates, based on Law 1/2003, the lease agreements of State property. The celebrated lease agreements (about 400 at the present moment) render US$ 1.8 million per year. As few property records exist there is the need for research, investigation and survey of each property prior to the government offering a binding lease to a tenant. In addition, there is no issued power of delegation to the National Director of Land and Property to actually authorise leases, and thus the Minister of Justice actually signs every Lease Agreement. The whole process sees lease agreements taking two to four months to be complete. The lack of competent technical staff and insufficient staff members, as well as the process, reflects the delay in the celebration of the Agreements.

Special Lease Agreements
The same Law (1/2003) defined, illegal occupancy. In this way, it recognised that the illegal occupants of State property or property under State administration could be regularised in the short term to overcome the problem of illegal occupancy, and give some comfort to those illegally, but necessarily, occupying property for need of shelter or business. After the promulgation of the law, approximately 6000 ‘illegal’ occupants submitted applications to DNTP for regularization of illegal occupation. This regularization is undertaken by the celebration of a lease agreement with the State. The lack of technical staff to proceed to the elaboration of normal lease agreements evidenced that it would be impossible to solve the situation of illegal occupancy in a short time period.

It was, therefore, necessary to create an alternative process, similar to the normal lease agreements procedures, but with a modification in some of the steps, replacing them for simpler and faster procedures. In this way, a process of establishment of ‘special lease agreements’ was determined. [Ilyas, 2005].

The requisites to celebrate a special lease agreement are:
- Residential Use;
- National citizen;
- Property occupancy since 2000;
- Developed property (there is no special lease agreement on vacant land);
- Automatic Monthly rent of US$ 10 (ten American dollars);
- 1 (one) year lease agreement, with automatically renewal for more one year.

(...) Since the beginning of this ‘Special Lease’ project, in July 2004, to the present date, more than 2700 lease agreements have been entered, reverting about US$86,000 to the State. There is an extremely high number of non-paying tenants (many tenants have no employment and use such properties for shelter [their own properties having been destroyed]) and whilst this is of some concern, DNTP is satisfied with the process, and will continue to pursue this practice across the whole country. One very redeeming factor of the Special Lease process is that the mere submission of an application form by a tenant is recognition that the tenant is not the owner and thus is an indication that such property will ultimately be one for DNTP to properly lease or
dispose of when Land Registration takes place. There is also recognition by the community that DNTP is the responsible authority in such matters, and this cements the authority of DNTP when later issues arise.

This Special Lease procedure is simple, without the need for substantial resources or staff. It continues to solve the situation of illegal occupancy that thousands of nationals citizens were facing. At the present, the project has been completed in one sub-district of Dili only, but is being extended to encompass all Dili sub-districts and, in the future, the entire country.

**Future**
The management of State Property is being undertaken by the National Directorate of Land and Property, and for the most part, processes are in place. From now forward, it is necessary to solve the issue of private property.

As referred previously, land titles issued during the previous administrations are in various forms, and different to those envisaged for the future. These ownership rights need to be integrated in to the new system, with the respective equivalence, but minding the nationality of the citizens.

How to return private property titles in East Timor?
The first step in private land rights is the promulgation of the Law which will decide how, when and what titles will be returned. It’s expected that the law will be promulgated within the next the twelve months..

The proposed property system will be a set of cadastre and ownership registration, undertaken together. The cadastre will begin with the use of orthophotomaps, obtaining and defining parcels identifiable from features visible marks on the maps. Areas without visible markers on the orthophotomaps, will be identified by conventional survey methods. Following orthophoto identification, and simple field verification of boundaries the material will be transferred to digital data, in the office, and maps prepared for public display.

As with other countries, the process of public display allows all people to see the boundaries of their own and neighbours properties, in a public and transparent process. All potential owners will be invited to present whatever documents and witness statements they have that can contribute as evidence of any land rights (mostly these persons will be those who did not submit claims previously). The data presented to DNTP will be scanned and saved in the archive of the National Directorate of Land and Property. This data will be matched and cross checked in reference to land parcels claimed, and subsequently used in the restitution of the titles, after the promulgation of the Law. The properties with boundary claims or disputed claims will be analysed and resolved by reference to the Land Commission. Disputes will be kept out of the regular court system, to ensure skilled land based decisions, and so as not to further clog the overburdened legal system.”

**Widespread destruction of houses in the wake of the 1999 independence vote (September 2000)**

- Approximately 70 per cent of the buildings in Dili, both public and private, were destroyed and made uninhabitable
- Many have migrated to Dili in search of economic opportunities and have occupied houses previously inhabited by Indonesian settlers or soldiers who have fled
- Massive shortage of housing and widespread occupation of abandoned homes throughout East Timor is creating a serious threat to peace and stability
“East Timor’s overall housing conditions are nothing short of deplorable. In Dili, Baucau, Aliau and other urban areas and towns which suffered damage, where concrete was used as a primary building material, all that remains standing in most houses are the four charred walls; the roof, doors, windows and contents have all been destroyed or looted. In Dili, approximately 70 per cent of the buildings, both public and private, were destroyed and made uninhabitable. The scale of the damage is difficult to imagine. Even compared to other post-conflict situations, the housing stock of East Timor has been utterly decimated. Although many have flocked to Dili in search of work and economic opportunities, much of the town itself still resembles a wasteland even a full year after the destruction.

In some neighbourhoods, street after street are comprised of nothing more than destroyed, burned out shells of buildings which were once home to thousands of Dili residents. Despite the destruction, however, where possible people have returned to their own houses even when heavily damaged. Others have occupied houses previously inhabited by Indonesian settlers or soldiers who have fled.

The occupation of abandoned homes is widespread throughout East Timor, and especially so in Dili given the scale of housing destruction there. The takeover of homes can create serious tensions, and if not handled properly by the authorities can result in unpleasant episodes when the original owner or tenant returns home to find their homes occupied by others with nowhere else to go. While it is accepted that original owners or tenants (insofar as they are officially recognised as such) must have a right to the eventual restitution of their homes, the occupation of their homes now is essentially humanitarian in nature, and a side-effect of a much larger problem that needs desperately to be addressed. Although there has been some abuse (some reports assert that a single family may be occupying up to five (or more) houses in the hope of eventually ‘selling’ or ‘renting’ the premises to persons and families in need), there is little malicious about most of the housing occupations that have taken place over the past year. People are simply creating their own housing solutions in an environment of severe housing shortages. Above all, it provides graphic evidence of a massive shortage of affordable, adequate and accessible housing. As in all other parts of the world, when affordable and adequate housing is not available people solve their own housing needs by whichever method they can. In East Timor this is done through one of the only means of self-help - occupying abandoned homes.

The massive shortage of adequate housing in East Timor is not only resulting in an overall national housing crisis, but it is also a serious threat to peace and stability. Many allegations have been made by returning families that large (and unaffordable) payment demands are commonly made by those currently occupying housing belonging to the returning owners for ‘caring for the house’ or for ‘improvements made’. Some are taking an advance rent for two years from foreigners, who in turn are expected to repair and renovate the house, and use it as offices or residences. If the returning family either does not or cannot pay, the secondary occupants often refuse to leave.

Finding a fair and sustainable way of dealing with these issues before they become serious is a major challenge facing UNTAET. Under the proposed Land and Property Commission claimants can invoke legal procedures to secure the restitution of their homes and official recognition of residency rights. However, enforcing restitution decisions will be very difficult unless UNTAET embraces its housing rights duties and includes official competencies in the area of housing, and acts as the guarantor of housing rights in the country. Many current occupants told COHRE that they will be willing to move from homes claimed by the original occupants if they can maintain their dignity and are guaranteed by UNTAET some form of re-housing, resettlement to alternative land or the provision of compensation.
There are many policy options open to UNTAET for dealing effectively with the occupation of homes by squatters. To cite but one of many alternatives, when houses occupied by new occupants or where the housing in question was formerly utilised as military housing goes unclaimed, the dwelling could reasonably be treated by UNTAET as public property, with the occupants allowed to remain and eventually conferred tenure or ownership rights.

In rural areas the housing issues are somewhat different from those plaguing Dili and other small towns. Throughout the countryside of East Timor, where the majority of the population live without basic services and largely within a subsistence economy, houses are generally made from traditional building materials – bamboo, wood, and thatch. Such materials remain abundant and people generally repair their houses every few years, as they see fit. Traditional slash and burn farming, logging and use of trees for shelter and fuel have slowly depleted primary forests, however, and reforestation projects are clearly required in the country. Given the nature of the building materials used in rural areas, the militias had little trouble torching the easily inflammable houses of many tens of thousands of people. The first form of international assistance came in the form of plastic sheets and food. These measures were then followed by steps by UNHCR and others to provide emergency shelter kits to those who lost their homes during the militia rampage. Due to supply and accessibility problems, however, many people are still waiting for shelter kits. As a result, in some areas people have already rebuilt their houses using thatch and bamboo."
PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

Policy and programmes

The national recovery strategy and its five pillars (2008)

- The National Recovery Strategy (NRS) was launched at the end of 2007 and aims at promoting national recovery including addressing the IDP problem through five components: shelter and housing, social protection, security and stability, socio-economic development, and confidence building and reconciliation.
- Those willing and able to return home can receive a cash recovery grant based on the extent of damage to their property and up to a maximum of $4,500, or a basic house plus $1,500 should their own have been damaged beyond repair.
- Those unable or unwilling to return can either use the cash recovery grant to build a house on state-owned land, or they can choose to settle in a basic house on a resettlement site.
- Temporary relocation to a transitional shelter site is offered to those willing but unable to return immediately.
- IDP who had been tenants in the house they were living in, but had had their property looted during 2006 were initially ignored by the strategy but later offered a $200 “reintegration package”

OCHA & UNMIT, 23 July 2008, p.1
"The National Recovery Strategy (NRS) or Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru (HHF) was endorsed by the Government of Timor-Leste on 12 December 2007 in order to adopt a new vision toward national recovery; one that not only promotes mutual acceptance but strengthens communities, local economies, stability and the relationship between the Government and the people of Timor-Leste whom they serve. A key component of the NRS is focused on bringing to fruition, the pursuit of efforts over the past two years to address the needs and rights of IDPs in Dili and other districts of Timor-Leste."

OCHA & UNMIT, 7 April 2008

ICG, 29 March 2008, p. 13
"Presenting the government’s 2008 budget to parliament on 18 December 2007, Prime Minister Gusmão listed the IDP issue as one of his three priorities for the year, alongside resolving the Reinado and petitioners problems. Proposing an allocation of $15 million to support the displaced, he said:

The subject of displaced persons is a very sensitive subject for our society....We all know how complex this issue is with its political, social and economic features. It is imperative to put an end to the displaced camps, but it is also the duty of the State to respect human rights and to protect those who are most vulnerable."
The next day, the vice prime minister launched Hamutuk Hari'i Futuru (Together Building the Future), an inter-ministerial initiative to promote national recovery including addressing the IDP problem. It has five components:

Hamutuk Hari'i Uma (Together Building Homes);
Hamutuk Hari'i Protesaun (Together Building Protection);
Hamutuk Hari'i Estabilia (Together Building Stability);
Hamutuk Hari'i Ekonomia Sosial (Together Building Social Economy); and
Hamutuk Hari'i Confiansa (Together Building Trust). 91

The program offers help to families to rebuild their homes. Those whose houses were largely or totally destroyed can choose between a cash grant of $3,000 to $4,500, or a new government-built house plus $1,500. Smaller sums will be paid to those whose homes were only partially destroyed. The grants are to be paid in instalments, with recipients required to show they have made efforts to rebuild before receiving the next one. Support is limited to IDPs who registered damage or destruction that occurred between April 2006 and October 2007.92

Hamutuk Hari'i Futuru – though it goes beyond the IDP problem – is the most comprehensive proposal to date for dealing with IDPs. It recognises that a long-term solution requires addressing several elements, including housing, security, livelihoods and a sense of national identity. In view of the weakness of government machinery, it is a very ambitious agenda, requiring action and a high degree of coordination from several ministries, working to a common agenda. The first task is to publicise and explain the strategy to the IDPs, many of whom are unaware of or confused about the options. Previous attempts to persuade them to return home have been undermined by lack of clarity about policy. There have been cases where IDPs who went home did not receive the help they believed they had been promised. Many are reluctant to leave the camps in case a better package is offered subsequently. The government has to make clear that this is the best and final offer, and IDPs who do not accept it may miss out."

HCC, 22 May 2008, p. 2

"The content of the recovery package offered to those IDPs leaving the camp for the districts is uncertain at this time. An estimated 45 families have occupied homes according to MSS – they will remain in the camp until a solution can be found. An estimated 360 families have registered to receive the recovery package and a US$ 200 package for the rest (as a subsistence allowance to help them move elsewhere of their own choosing) is being discussed with the Secretary of State (for example, those renting houses prior to becoming IDPs and those who have not come to live in the camp as a result of the crisis)."

Government's "Building Houses Together" programme aims at providing IDPs with a variety of viable options that allow for their durable return or resettlement (April 2008)

- For those willing and able to return to their former homes there are two options: a cash recovery grant based on the level of destruction of the house; or a basic house if it is uninhabitable.
- For those unable to return, the two options are: either build a house on a self-identified State approved land with a cash recovery grant; or choose to settle in a basic house in a State allocated new settlement site.
- For IDPs who wish to return but are unable to do so immediately, there is the option of relocation to transitional shelter sites
“Developed out of the retreat in Dare in October 2007, Hamutuk Harii Uma (Building Houses Together) is one of the five pillars of Timor-Leste’s NRS – ‘Hamutuk Harii Futuru’ (Building a Future Together). The thematic working group was established following the 28 February 2008 retreat in Dili. The objective of Hamutuk Harii Uma is to provide IDPs with a variety of viable options that allow for their durable return or resettlement. The programme was developed with due respect for their rights and dignity and in accordance with international standards such as the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

The Government of Timor-Leste offers two possibilities to IDPs who are willing and able to return to their former homes: a cash recovery grant based on the level of destruction of the house; or a basic house if it is uninhabitable. There are also two options provided for IDPs unable to return: they can either build a house on a self-identified State approved land with a cash recovery grant; or choose to settle in a basic house in a State allocated new settlement site. For IDPs who wish to return but are unable to do so immediately, there is the option of relocation to transitional shelter sites accompanied by further dialogue concerning relocation options. Under the coordination of the Vice Prime Minister’s Office, the MSS is the lead Government agency for Hamutuk Harii Uma with a high level of support provided by the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Ministry of Justice. MSS has full implementation responsibility for the disbursement of the cash recovery grants which are based on assessments undertaken by the Ministry of Infrastructure on the level of damage to IDP houses. New settlement areas require coordination between the Ministry of Justice, which will identify available land and the Ministry of Infrastructure, which will facilitate the infrastructure implementation.

The Government has allocated $15m to the Hamutuk Harii Futuru Programme with $2.75m going to the establishment of new settlements and $10m to the cash disbursement programme.

IDPs able to return
A claims expert was seconded to MSS to facilitate the establishment of transparent and efficient administrative procedures. These systems are currently being piloted and will require further strengthening and staff development. A database for monitoring return and reintegration has been developed and is currently being trialled. In terms of challenges in this regard, MSS faces a lack of physical resources, including computers, to implement the database system on a large scale and there is also a need for increased human resource capacity. It is expected that some families choosing to rebuild or rehabilitate their homes with the assistance of the cash recovery grant will require technical assistance to ensure the safety and durability of the houses.

IDPs intending to Return but currently unable to do so
Over 600 transitional shelter units have been constructed in and around Dili. It is envisaged that the IDP families wishing to return but feeling unable to do so in the immediate future, will be able to relocate from IDP camps to more safe and sustainable shelter structures while they await mediation and dialogue. It is estimated that 500 additional shelters may be required to temporarily house IDPs. The Government currently has no allocated funds for this additional need. Therefore there is a funding gap for 500 transitional shelter units.

Concerns
It is vital that a number of issues and are considered. There will be a need for strategies to prevent the inflation of the price of construction materials and a need to establish programmes contributing to community infrastructure in areas of high returns to assist those rebuilding as well as to prevent social jealousy. There may be land and property constraints and a need to guarantee the environmental sustainability of new settlement sites and construction materials. There is also a need to address particular gender concerns as well, for example specific women’s needs in the IDP and host communities.”
Social support particularly needed during the return and reintegration phase for returnees and communities alike (April 2008)

- The government social protection pillar seeks to view and respond to the vulnerability of IDPs within broader context of other pre-existing vulnerabilities not restricted to them.
- There is limited government capacity to address the sheer range and depth of needs across relevant sectors such as food security, psycho-social support, education and support to at-risk youth.
- Food insecurity is widespread throughout Timor-Leste, particularly affecting subsistence farmers, female headed households, and households that are struck by sudden setbacks.
- Pre-existing vulnerabilities in the country go much beyond those experienced by the displaced. There exists therefore an imperative to respond to the social protection needs of IDPs, returnees and communities alike.

OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 35

"Hamutuk Hari’i Protesaun Sosial: Social Protection within the context of the NRS.

The HHPS has as its objective: to ‘Create a response to vulnerability among the population attributing due attention to the specific necessities of internally displaced’. As stated in its objective, the HHPS seeks to view and respond to the vulnerability of IDPs within broader context of other pre-existing vulnerabilities not restricted to them. The Strategy recognises that the 2006 crisis exacerbated preexisting and serious vulnerabilities faced by the country’s population.

The Government of Timor-Leste is indeed fully aware that the challenges faced by the country’s population are many and that its ability to effectively respond to their social protection needs remain limited. Government capacity in that regard is constrained the by lack of specialised staff and formal social protection structures within Government agencies and the sheer range and depth of needs across relevant sectors such as food security, psycho-social support, education and support to at-risk youth. The food security and education sectors are illustrative of the challenges faced by Government and partners as both work together within the context of the HHPS to meet the social protection needs of the population.

As previously noted, food insecurity is widespread throughout Timor-Leste, particularly affecting subsistence farmers, female headed households, and households that are struck by sudden setbacks. Food insecurity is compounded by high population growth rates of 5.3% annually. The Government’s capacity to effectively intervene in support of vulnerable or food-insecure populations has been lately further impacted by soaring food prices on the world market, which have resulted in export bans or restrictions among some traditional exporters.

In analysing pre-existing vulnerabilities, the Government, understands that the availability of food is normally hampered by low agricultural productivity, which is also compounded by a range of agricultural risks such as droughts, floods, strong winds and locust infestations. Reduced agricultural production hits subsistence farmers directly, and the subsequent increases in local food prices particularly affect vulnerable households. Recent research underlines the cyclical nature of food insecurity in the country – the WFP/FAO Crop and Food Supply Mission (CFSM) in April 2007 estimated that cereals production in 2007 was reduced by 25-30% compared with the average level of the last few years.

Low levels of productivity, period droughts and other natural phenomena are compounded by difficulties relative to access to food caused by, inter-alia, extremely low purchasing power (which
results from lack of employment opportunities) and limited access to adequate farm land and irrigation. Not surprisingly, the country’s household food insecurity is mirrored in its malnutrition rate among vulnerable groups, especially among young children and women. The malnutrition rates remain at unacceptably high levels, with one out of two being chronically malnourished, an estimated 46 percent stunted and 12% wasted.10 

(...) 
As the brief analysis of the food security and education sectors clearly demonstrate, the pre-existing vulnerabilities in the country go much beyond those experienced by the displaced. There exists therefore an imperative to respond to the social protection needs of IDPs, returnees and communities alike. The HHPS Group is keenly aware that the development of long-term social protection systems goes beyond the scope of the NRS. It has nonetheless deemed it essential to take the initial steps to develop systems and implement programmes that meet the most pressing social protection needs of a population with substantial needs. As illustrated by the examples above, pre-existing social protection needs within communities at large must be addressed in conjunction with those of the displaced, lest the imbalance support result in additional social jealousy and/or violent conflict. The continued provision of food support to the displaced or a focus on education for children in camps must be matched by a similar strong response at the community-level. The HHPS Pillar strategy is premised on the understanding that programmes and systems created within its parameters should be as soon as possible integrated into a long-term national Social Protection Strategy. The Government also views the establishment of effective social protection programmes and interventions as an important element of its efforts to strengthen the trust of citizens in their Government.

The Government and other HHPS stakeholders recognise that many measures have already been taken by this young country to meet the needs of vulnerable populations. The most recent Government Retreat on the NRS indeed identified a series of interventions already undertaken in that regard, such as, the Government’s response to mass displacement of 2006, its ongoing support to school feeding programmes, ‘food-for-work’, immediate support to victims of flooding and the strengthening of the Vulnerable Persons Unit (VPU). That said, despite ongoing efforts by Government and its partners to improve the response to the multitude of vulnerabilities among the population, all concerned realise the need to ensure additional targeted and well-coordinated responses. The need for improved response is particularly acute within the context of the initial return and reintegration and recovery period. The HHPS working group has, for example, highlighted the need to take the first critical steps to ensure a policy and system for the provision of needed social support to IDPs and communities is taken in tandem with the Government’s decision to discontinue generalised food distribution sometime within 2008. The return and reintegration process will also likely increase the vulnerability of certain groups such as women and children in both the receiving and returnee communities.

The HHPS strategy foresees that the Government and its partners will undertake two types of activities in support of its objective. The Pillar will seek to: Address the food security needs of the food insecure, and to provide psycho-social and other support as required together with food security strategy. In that regard the HHPS working group, under the leadership of the Ministry of Social Solidarity, relevant government agencies and other partners will coordinate specific responses that will include, inter-alia, the development of an initial Social Protection Policy focusing on food support to targeted food insecure groups, support to women and children among the returnee and receiving community and strengthening of psycho-social support networks.

The Government is responding to the need for the strengthening and in some cases establishment and/or formalisation of social protection systems. In so doing and in recognition of the link between the work of the HHPS Pillar and those of the remaining four elements of the National Recovery Strategy, the Government will endeavour to ensure that Government and other initiatives are taken into due consideration and integrate a social protection lens into their strategies. The linkages are particularly important in relation to the HHPS and ‘Ekonomia Social’
National recovery plan recognises need to increase sense of security by developing community policing and continuing security reform (March 2008)

- This component recognises that increased police posts and patrols in troubled neighbourhoods are important, both to allow IDPs to return home in safety and to help prevent future displacements.
- There is however no money in the 2008 budget for it, and donor help is required.

ICG, 29 March 2008, p. 15

"This component [building stability] aims to address security concerns, to create an environment "conducive to the return or resettlement of IDPs", including trying to resolve the case of the petitioners, developing a response to the problem of martial arts groups and working with communities to identify and address sources of conflict. Locally, the biggest challenge is to ensure communities will accept the IDPs’ return. The social solidarity ministry’s dialogue processes should resume (as is contemplated) in Dili and other districts where violence displaced many – Ermera, Baucau, Viqueque. The increased dialogue should focus on obtaining community agreement to return, resettlement and reintegration. However, no additional funds have been provided in the budget to expand and strengthen the ministry’s human, technical and material resources to facilitate it.

As Crisis Group has previously recommended, the government should continue with its security sector reform, so as to build a professional police force that can provide effective community policing in Dili and the districts. Meanwhile, it should ensure, with the UN, a 24-hour police presence in areas where there have been displacements, in order to improve the sense of security. New police posts should be established in particularly problematic suburbs of Dili, with regular patrols so that police can get to know the residents. These patrols should be done by Timorese police, with UNPol back-up where appropriate. Community policing – with locally based officers stressing crime prevention as much as response – is not yet a familiar idea in Timor-Leste, either to the police or to the wider population. The government and police leadership should work to develop a Timorese concept of it, which then must be communicated to the people.

The Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru strategy does recognise that such increased police posts and patrols in troubled neighbourhoods are important, both to allow IDPs to return home in safety and to help prevent future displacements. Once again, however, there is no money in the 2008 budget for it, and donor help is required."

Government's economic recovery plan too focused on short-term jobs and largely under-funded (April 2008)

- The government economic recovery pillar aims at creating an enabling environment for the return of IDPs, which minimises the potential of conflict that could be triggered by social jealousy in receiving communities.
• According to ICG, this pillar of the strategy is too poorly funded and one of its main weaknesses is that it focuses on creating only short-term jobs only.

OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 40
"The NRS Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru (HHF) recognises the close link between local socio-economic development and promoting a durable solution for the return or re-integration of IDPs. The Hamutuk Hari’i Ekonomia Sosial (HHES) component aims to ‘Create livelihood opportunities throughout the country that have short, medium and long term benefits for communities and their members, including special attention to the promotion of economic activities that contribute to the reintegration of displaced persons’. This comprehensive approach of creating an enabling environment for the return of IDPs, which minimises the potential of conflict that could be triggered by social jealousy in receiving communities, requires close coordination among different ministries. Accordingly, the government-led retreat on the implementation of the NRS Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru launched the HHES thematic working group under the chairmanship of the Ministry of Economy and Development.

The HHES Working Group agrees that it is imperative not only to begin addressing livelihood needs in general to rebuild trust in the Government and hope in a better future but also to ensure that the reintegration of IDPs is not hampered by a perception of competition for scarce employment, income and other livelihood opportunities. The Government acknowledges as well that the development of a long-term economic development plan goes well beyond the scope of the NRS. It is, nonetheless, deemed essential to launch programmes that lay the early foundations for local economic development to support on-going efforts facilitating the return or reintegration of IDPs in their chosen communities, and thereby for the success of the remaining four pillars of the HHF. The HHES strategy is based on the understanding that programmes and systems should be inclusive and integrated as soon as possible in existing government schemes and programmes (labour intensive infrastructure rehabilitation, reforestation, disaster risk reduction and agricultural programmes) that constitute an integral part of the future National Development Plan. This highlights the need for reinforcing inter-ministerial coordination at the operational level to ensure substantive progress in the implementation of the HHES pillar as identified by the HHES thematic working group."

ICG, 29 March 2008, p. 15
"This pillar aims to create livelihood opportunities and improve conditions in the villages for all, which should help reduce social jealousy of returning IDPs. It envisages three-month job-generation schemes in infrastructure, agriculture and fisheries, environmental protection and disaster preparedness and mitigation. It recognises the need to create livelihoods both in areas of return and for the young, unemployed people who have migrated to Dili, as well as the need for a balanced approach between Dili and the districts. However, no ministry has budgeted for livelihood creation in its 2008 budget. This component is also weak in that it focuses on creating only short-term jobs. To prevent future conflict, the government needs to foster creation of permanent occupations with reasonable salaries for young people, as well as invest in training and promotion of entrepreneurship."

Government’s peace and reconciliation programme (September 2008)
OCHA & UNMIT, 17 September 2008, p. 6
"Six dialogue teams recruited by MSS under the project have been in place since mid-July and in the past six weeks have facilitated mediation for 177 families relocating from IDP camps in Dili. At
this point the team have approved funding for three community dialogue events to take place in the coming weeks and are supporting partners to accompany IDPs from camps in Baucau on ‘go and see’ visits to their former homes in Dili.

An additional Dialogue Team has been selected to be based in Baucau, from where they will cover activities across the district as well as in the districts of Viqueque and Lautem; they will begin working as soon as the team is fully equipped. In Ermera, recruitment has begun for an eighth team after consultation with local administration, police and Church representatives indicated a strong demand for community dialogue to secure ongoing stability in areas which were among the first to receive returning IDPs from Dili.

Most recently, the Dialogue Teams worked closely with partner organisations to facilitate the return of the IDPs living in the Dom Bosco IDP camp. Several problematic cases were solved successfully. Further coordination between the MSS dialogue teams and partners supporting the Government is paramount and will be supported through interactions between MSS representatives, UNDP project staff and an array of stakeholders and involved actors in the regular meetings of the Hamutuk Hari’i Konfiansa working group."

**OCHA \& UNMIT, 20 August 2008, p. 2**

"During the reporting period, SLS and camp management agencies have assisted the Government in preparations for the return and reintegration of IDPs from the Airport Camp and from Seminario Minor Balide, as well as the returns themselves. SLS agencies worked closely with the Government and organisations involved in the return and reintegration process to resolve as many problems related to return as possible before the actual movement begins. The Airport camp, as one of the largest and most complex camps in Timor-Leste, required substantial dialogue and mediation prior to its closure.

The Government and organisations participating in the return and reintegration process attempted to resolve situations involving occupied houses, reluctance on the part of receiving communities to accept returning IDPs and IDPs fears over returning to communities in which they have not lived for a very long period of time.

Prior to the return and reintegration of IDPs from the Airport Camp, SLS agencies and organizations working in peace-building programmes worked with the Government towards the return and reintegration of seven camps and Transitional Shelters since the beginning of June."

**OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 42**

"The Hamutuk Hari’i Konfiansa (HHK) thematic working group was established as part of a Government-led retreat on the Government of Timor-Leste NRS Hamutuk Hari’i Futuro. The HHK constitutes one of five elements identified in the NRS as essential to the strategy’s aim of promoting and supporting durable IDP return, relocation and resettlement. Indeed, dialogue will be the key to securing the stability and understanding that will be central to the relocation and integration of IDPs currently displaced across Timor-Leste. In doing so it also recognises that HHK is an essential component of all of the other elements of the recovery strategy given that ‘All elements of the Strategy are to a large extent dependent on the strengthening of trust throughout society and, crucially, between the citizens and their Government.’"

At this stage the Government has made significant progress in developing mechanisms by which IDPs can receive support to return to their former homes, including recovery packages geared
towards supporting the repair and reconstruction of damaged and destroyed housing. Additionally, mechanisms are being developed by which IDPs can be offered viable options for relocation to new housing. Central to processes of return and relocation, however, will be the need for a range of programmes that can support short, mid- and long-term needs associated with the different stages of IDP resettlement. Community relations that were severed must be repaired and new ones must be established. As such, there will be a high demand for a dialogue-based process, particularly crucial in supporting the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation of housing envisaged by the ‘Hamutuk Hari’i Uma’ element of the NRS.

In the short-term there is a clear need for assistance to help minimise tensions, fears and potential conflict associated with IDPs leaving camps as well as to promote good relations between IDP camps and adjacent neighbouring communities. On arrival in the community into which IDPs wish to reintegrate, mid-term programmatic support needs to be made available. There will be a need to promote community cohesion and stability and ensure the durability of return as well as to help returning/relocating IDPs resolve any outstanding disputes or other obstacles to their social inclusion. Longer term needs span key areas such as support for monitoring, which will be critical in order to ensure that communities are maintaining harmonious relations. Wider consultations will be needed to identify and meet broader community needs and thus demonstrate that not only IDPs are supported in the recovery process. Training and capacity building programmes are essential to better equip community leadership to mitigate against the negative effects of future crises.

The Government is responding to the need for promotion of intra and inter community trust-building and the need for reinforcing communication between the State and its citizens. They are proposing to significantly expanding the size, scope and capacity of community dialogue carried out by the MSS.

Central to the success of the proposal will be the degree to which it can interface and interact with other agencies engaged in this critical work. Reflected in all of the proposals submitted under the Hamutuk Hari’i Konfiansa submission to the TSA is therefore their linkages with Government programmes and their role in supporting the broader NRS.*

**IOM leads a post-return monitoring survey to identify general trends in return (October 2008)**

- IOM’s first post-return monitoring report showed that “while many communities did not raise specific concerns, some communities reported perceived challenges in absorbing IDPs. These tended to be related to unresolved conflicts between community members and returned IDPs or to tensions arising over land and access to basic resources.”
- IOM’s post-return monitoring programme, which started in July 2008, aims to visit all the aldeias in Dili once a month to gather information on how the return process is working. The idea is to organise an early warning system to identify issues bringing about increased tensions in the community and how they relate to the returns.
- IOM staff will gather and disseminate information on the impact of returns on conflict and community dynamics, access to basic services and livelihood opportunities. Focusing on identifying general trends, the programme will provide information to the Government and to development partners while complementing efforts of IOM and others to monitor and follow-up on individual cases of concern.
- CARE, CRS, JRS and Belun all take part in IOM’s project.

**IOM, 28 October 2008**
"IOM has released the first report of its Community-based Return Monitoring Project. The project aims to measure the effect on communities of recent large-scale return and reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

The report is based on a survey of more than five hundred chefe aldeia (village chiefs), women, returning IDPs and other community members across 144 communities in Dili. It focuses primarily on the effects on communities of population movements, stability, perceptions of access to services and livelihoods and ongoing assistance provided.

(...) The results showed that, while many communities did not raise specific concerns, some communities reported perceived challenges in absorbing IDPs. These tended to be related to unresolved conflicts between community members and returned IDPs or to tensions arising over land and access to basic resources.

(…) In the second phase of monitoring, which began in mid-September, IOM has partnered with four NGOs - CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) and BELUN - to cover all 222 conflict-affected aldeias in Dili District.

Monthly monitoring is complemented by referrals of individual cases of concern. These cases, which are often related to occupied houses or protection issues, are directly referred to agencies capable of immediate response and follow-up."

OCHA & UNMIT, 1 October 2008, p.4
"CARE’s Community Outreach Team commenced the first round of monitoring activities in Bairo Pite in support of IOM’s Post-Return Monitoring project. This involved a baseline survey with all 32 Chefe Aldeias. Preliminary figures indicate that the population of Bairo Pite is approximately 28,200; the 2004 census placed the population at around 26,000. It should be noted that these figures are based to a certain extent on the estimates from various Chefe Aldeias concerning the population in their area.

IOM, CRS, CARE, JRS, and Belun have commenced the September round of monitoring in 222 aldeias in Dili (excluding Atauro). All monitoring teams were re-trained to implement Phase II monitoring, as the monitoring will now be conducted using household surveys rather than group interviews. To date, 200 chefes de aldeias have been surveyed. Teams are beginning this week with community and returnee surveys, which are based on a 2% calculation of the aldeia population as reported by the chefes de aldeias. IOM has received approval from MSS to use the Government lists to identify returnees for interviews within the aldeias. All names on the list are kept confidential by monitoring teams and used only for the purpose of identification for interviews. IOM continues to refer cases of concern identified by the monitoring teams to appropriate agencies, such as, MSS Dialogue and IOM's Return and Reintegration teams. IOM is in the process of developing a 'referral' list for cases reported within communities that can be passed on to relevant agencies, such as cases of re-displacement or requests for mediation. IOM will share this list with partners and the Hamutuk Hariri Konfiansa group (Trust-building Working Group) when developed. IOM continues to use the data from the first and second rounds of monitoring to inform the development of the 'follow-up' form and focus group methodology, which will be implemented after October. IOM is also finalising a short report of the first round of monitoring data which it will provide to relevant partners upon completion.

In addition, the IOM return and reintegration team continues to visit sensitive areas where returns have taken place; most recently visits have been concentrated in Baya Leste, Fatuhada and Camea."
HCC, 29 July 2008, p. 3
"IOM have received funding from ECHO for post-return monitoring and discussions are ongoing with partner organisations, CARE, CRS, JRS and Belun and have discussed the methodology with the Office of the ombudsman. The project is to visit all the aldeias in Dili once a month to gather information on the return process is working. The idea is to organise an early warning system to identify issues bringing about increased tensions in the community and how they relate to the returns. The programme is focussed on identifying general trends and providing the information to the Government and to development partners. To date in the initial stage, IOM and Belun teams have visited 100 aldeias beginning two weeks ago. A database has been set up and the information gathered has started to be entered into it. Thus far, there has been a good reception in communities that have been visited. Concerns have been raised in relation to interviewing solely IDPs but community members and leaders are also being interviewed and this monitoring is not meant to replace individual monitoring of cases of concern. The process is already in place by which, as a result of tent to tent visits, cases of concern are identified and the information is provided to UNPOL/PNTL for follow up. There is thus some framework of support for individual cases."

OCHA & UNMIT, 16 June 2008, p. 4
"In July, IOM will begin work on an extensive Return Monitoring Project aims to support the sustainability of ongoing return and reintegration initiatives. The Project aims to monitor returns, with a focus on obtaining information on the impact of returns at the community level. The Project will regularly monitor 222 aldeias in Dili through an initial assessment and follow-up monthly monitoring visits and will compliment the efforts of IOM and others to monitor and follow-up on individual cases of concern. IOM staff will gather and disseminate information on the impact of returns on conflict and community dynamics, access to basic services and livelihood opportunities. With this information, IOM will provide the Government of Timor-Leste, relevant local actors and international and nongovernmental organisations with crucial, timely and well-analysed community-level information. It is intended that information provided by the Project will be of use for programming in areas ranging from case-specific IDP return monitoring to short and medium-term conflict mitigation, to development activities.

The Project, which was submitted under Timor-Leste’s Transitional Strategy and Appeal (TSA), has secured funding from the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO) for an 11-month period. Preparations for the launch of the Project are well underway. IOM is in the process of hiring the necessary dedicated staff, including a Geographic Information System (GIS) and database expert. IOM has held extensive consultations with Government and local and international partners on survey design to maximise the utility of information for partners working in the return and reintegration process. IOM is in the process of consulting with local and international NGOs on joint implementation of the survey. Final preparations this month also include review of survey design and qualitative data collection methodology from both a social science and migration perspective. The Project’s onemonth preparation phase also includes extensive testing of the survey design and methodology within a wide variety of IDP and community contexts.

IOM also plays a key role in return preparations in the camps and case by case monitoring in the communities. The IOM Return and Reintegration Unit, in cooperation with MSS and the other members of the Hamutuk Hari’i Konfiansa (Trust-building) Working Group assists IDPs to take
informed decisions about their return options, facilitates dialogue or mediation with the return community when needed, accompanies them to their destination on the day of the movement and visits the returnees after their return or resettlement. Information gathered by IOM during this process is provided to relevant actors such as the UN Police, the Ombudsman for Human Rights, the UNMIT Human Rights and Transitional Justice Section, and NGOs supporting community-based peacebuilding initiatives."

HCC, 4 June 2008, p.2
"Return Monitoring: IOM, through their SLS work has been monitoring IDP movements and sharing any problems observed on a case-by-case basis with the Provedor’s office and UNMIT HRTJS for follow up as well as MSS and UNPOL. This is a useful mechanism. MSS recognises they are under resourced in this area. In Hamutuk Hari’i Konfiansa (HHK) meetings, discussions on return monitoring have recognised that the Provedor’s office should be taking the lead and they are actively seeing support to establish a returns monitoring team. NGOs interested in developing programmes in this regard are invited to submit to proposals for the Ausaid fund for Konfiansa. It is wise to draw the distinction between monitoring the movement of individual families and the monitoring of infrastructure gaps in return communities, for example, the level of Watsan facilities. Those areas that have witnessed high levels of destruction will need backstopping. IOM had developed a different returns monitoring project to visit every village in Dili to collect information on issues that are arising from the returns (e.g. infrastructure gaps, political affiliation etc). This project is expected to get underway shortly and teams should be going village by village and passing any issues into the HHK group to try to mitigate tensions. There are concerns over a lack of monitoring of returns to the Districts since monitoring is often Dili focused.

IOM’s return & reintegration unit assists with the preparation of returns (October 2008)

- IOM works in close coordination with CRS, CARE, Belun and all the MSS sub-district dialogue team to assist displaced families in preparing for their return and reintegration and conducts case-by-case monitoring in communities.
- The Return and Reintegration Unit helps IDPs make informed decisions about their return options, facilitates dialogue or mediation with the return community when needed, accompanies them to their destination on the day of the movement and visits the returnees after their return or resettlement.
- IOM to address gender-specific challenges of female returnees

IOM, 28 October 2008
"IOM also continues to play a key role in helping displaced families to prepare for their return and reintegration and conducting case-by-case monitoring in communities.

The IOM Return and Reintegration Unit, in cooperation with government and other partners, helps IDPs to make informed decisions about their return options, facilitates dialogue or mediation with the return community when needed, accompanies them to their destination on the day of the movement and visits the returnees after their return or resettlement.

Information gathered by IOM during this process is provided to relevant actors including the UN Police, the Ombudsman for Human Rights, the UNMIT Human Rights and Transitional Justice Section, the Ministry of Social Solidarity’s (MSS) UNDP-supported Dialogue Teams and NGOs supporting community-based peacebuilding initiatives. IOM also provides technical advisory and administrative support to MSS in the implementation of the National Recovery Strategy."
OCHA & UNMIT, 15 October 2008, p. 4

"IOM will begin a new project designed to increase support to the Government of Timor-Leste, IDPs and beneficiaries of the return and reintegration component of the Government’s Hamutuk Hari’l Futuru National Recovery Strategy. The Project is generously funded by the People and Government of the Czech Republic, and will allow IOM to increase its support to female IDPs and returnees to maximise the sustainability and durability of the return and reintegration programme and address gender-specific challenges related to return and reintegration. IOM will undertake a multi-faceted programme to improve women’s access to information and to support systems for returning women who are either victims, or at risk of becoming victims, of gender-based violence; to support activities that improve access to essential services such as education, health and livelihood support for displaced women, those that have left the camps and women in communities receiving returning IDPs; and to support the rehabilitation of community infrastructure in areas to which IDPs have returned and that are considered to be at high risk of renewed conflict or increased community tensions."

OCHA & UNMIT, 1 October 2008, p. 3

"The IOM return and reintegration team has been supporting the preparations for the dialogue in Terminal and Fatuk Francisco communities. The team has been active in ensuring the participation of the population presently living in Hera Port and Metinaro IDP camps as well as supporting the MSS dialogue teams working in Cristo Rei sub-district. The most recent tent-by-tent visit to ascertain the return intentions of IDPs residing in the camp was conducted at Metinaro IDP camp in the week beginning 15 September.

The IOM return and reintegration team also works in close coordination with CRS, CARE, Belun and all the MSS sub-district dialogue teams in support of community preparations for the return of IDPs from camps scheduled to benefit from the Government’s facilitated return and reintegration assistance. This has applied most recently to Obrigado Barracks, Canossa Balide and Tibar Matadouro and Turleu. The IOM team ensures that every NGO and sub-district dialogue team is provided with the joint list of people registered with MSS and/or the list compiled as a result of IOM return intentions assessments. The teams meet with all the relevant local authorities to inform them of upcoming returns and request their feedback about the families that are due to go back. The data collected is compiled into a single document that is shared with relevant partners. This process, when complemented by pre-return tent-by-tent visits, allows MSS, IOM and partners to identify families that may face challenges upon return as well as communities reluctant to receive IDPs generally. Based on this the appropriate referrals and interventions are organised in cooperation with the dialogue teams and the NGOs in order to address the potential return issues prior the return movement."

HCC, 4 June 2008, p. 2

"Movement Preparation: Once the verification of the state of the homes of IDPs living in a camp has taken place (MSS visits every house to check the level of destruction and local authorities determine whether or not each IDP family lived in the house they have identified as theirs), an estimation of the final amount the family will receive is made, and a list of those likely to take part in the move is produced. This list is then organised into the sub-village level and sent to a list of organisations working in that area. Those can then discuss to the Chefe de Aldeia and gage the communities’ ability to receive the IDPs. Whether the house is already occupied is also checked. If so, MSS staff tries to mediate directly with the occupiers so that they can vacate the property on
terms that are acceptable to them. With regard to Jardim, most problem cases were identified prior to the movement although there were some surprise problem cases. MSS spends a long period engaging with the camp communities and every day they are conducting face to face mediation between IDPs and occupiers. From an SLS perspective, interviews are conducted in the camps to enable MSS to match the information from the people on the ground with their own information. During the Jardim movement, IOM tried to ensure that every return was accompanied by either their staff or the staff of other organisations – this pattern is set to continue. The possibility of a last minute ‘go-and-see’ visit in a car to identify any final problems has also improved the process."

MSS/UNDP teams facilitate mediation between returning families and house occupants (October 2008)

- Since July 2008 there have been MSS/UNDP dialogue teams working in each of the five sub-districts of Dili.
- There have been over 150 mediations between families wishing to return and families either opposed to their return or occupying their former homes.
- About 60% of these cases have been resolved amicably between the parties with dialogue staff playing a facilitation role, whilst the remainder have required negotiated settlement with the parties formalising their agreement in the form of an accord.

OCHA & UNMIT, 15 October 2008, p.4
"Over the past two weeks the six MSS/UNDP dialogue teams currently working across Dili have been supporting the return and reintegration of IDPs relocating from the Matadouro, Turleu and Ismaik camps in Tibar as well as undertaking preparatory work for the imminent movement of IDPs from Obrigado Barracks camp. In total the teams have now facilitated over 150 mediations between families wishing to return and families either opposed to their return or occupying their former homes. About 60% of these cases have been resolved amicably between the parties with dialogue staff playing a facilitation role, whilst the remainder have required negotiated settlement with the parties formalising their agreement in the form of an accord.

On 4 October the Cristo Rei dialogue team supported the community of Mota Ulun to facilitate a dialogue meeting which included a cross-section of the local community and participation from IDPs recently returned from Hera Port IDP camp, as well as others yet to return from transitional housing in UNITAL I & II and Igreja Becora camp. The Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters attended along with other MSS representatives and partner organisations.

The two regional teams that will be based in Baucau and Ermera have now begun work. The eight staff involved in the two teams began their contracts on 6 October and will work initially on consultation with local authorities and other organisations active in the peace-building/conflict resolution areas to develop work-plans and clear operational targets in their areas. As well as Local Government, Church and Security Forces, the teams are expected to link strongly with projects being implemented under the Small Grants Fund established by AusAid and managed by UNDP in collaboration with MSS. These include IDP reintegration projects run by Austcare and CRS in the Eastern districts and with local NGO’s including Rekuperasaun Sosial Comunitaria (RENETIL), the Rural Community Development Society (RCDS) and the Liquica sub-commission for Justice and Peace in the Western part of the country."

MSS, 9 October 2008
"Since July 2008 there have been MSS/UNDP dialogue teams working in each of the five sub-districts of Dili with a central coordination team based in the Ministry of Social Solidarity. In October 2008 two regional dialogue teams also started working in Baucau and Ermera.

The MSS/UNDP dialogue teams have been strenuously promoting dialogue as a means to addressing community conflict and have also been heavily engaged in supporting mediation in support of IDP reintegration and return. The MSS/UNDP dialogue teams have been working with Chefe Aldeias, Chefe Sucos and youth representatives in the receiving communities to try to ensure that the situation in areas of return remains peaceful.

The MSS/UNDP dialogue teams have helped organize preparatory meetings at camps to support the return of IDPs. The teams work closely with SLS (Site Liaison Support) agencies in the camps to pre-identify groups willing to return and prioritise cases requiring third-party support (such as secondary occupancy, land and property issues, broader tensions with the community).

Working alongside local authorities, youth representatives, and partner agencies (such as IOM, CRS, CARE, Austcare, and Belun), the MSS/UNDP dialogue teams have organized 10 dialogue meetings to support IDP reintegration in Cristo Rei, Metinaro, and Vera Cruz, and sucos Becora, Fatuhada, and Camea."

**Return movements**

New government measures encouraged some 9,000 families to move out of the camps during 2008 (October 2008)

- Between January and October 2008, new government measures, including the reduction by half of food rations in camps and the distribution of recovery packages, convinced some 9,000 families to move out of the camps out of a total of 16,000 families who registered to take part in the programme. 28 camps have been closed.
- As of July 2008, an estimated 1,400 families had moved out of the camp from a total of 13,500 families who have registered with the government to benefit from the return package.
- As of July 2007, nearly 5,000 IDPs have been assisted by the government to move out of the camps.
- As of February 2007, it was estimated that 40,000 people had returned to their homes.
- The remaining 100,000 IDPs are likely to remain displaced for some time or even resettle in the east.
"With the return of IDPs from Tasi-Tolu, Obrigado Barracks and Igreja Balide camps, more than 9000 IDP families will have received a recovery or reintegration package under the Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru National Recovery Strategy; 31 IDP camps have now closed according to MSS."

"With the return of IDPs from Sao Jose, Hera Port and the Tibar camps, more than 7700 IDP families will have received a recovery or reintegration package under the Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru National Recovery Strategy; 28 IDP camps have now closed according to MSS. A breakdown of information relating to the latest IDP movements is as follows:

The return and reintegration of IDPs from Hera Port IDP camp has been completed (it commenced on 22 September), with a total of 366 families assisted. The camp is now closed.

Movement out of Tibar Turleu IDP camp commenced on 3 October. A total of 70 families were assisted. The camp is now closed. Movement out of Tibar Ismaik Transitional Shelter site commenced on 6 October and was completed on 8 October. A total of 208 families were assisted.

Movement out of Tibar Matadouro IDP camp is expected to commence on 14 October. 27 families are registered as living in the camp.

Socialisation of the amount of recovery package each family will receive in Obrigado Barracks IDP camp is expected to commence on 13 October. Movement out of the camp is expected to commence around 20 October.

The verification process has been completed for Tasi Tolu Transitional Shelter site. The verification process is ongoing for Canossa Balide, Igreja Balide, Farol Primary School, Belun and Fokupers IDP camps."

"To date, 7,129 IDP families have received a recovery or reintegration package under the Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru (National Recovery Strategy) Programme.

A total of 16,000 families (including families already reintegrated/ resettled) have been registered for the recovery package. Registration and other administrative processes including final registration are ongoing.

The return and reintegration of IDPs from Colegio Sao Jose IDP camp was completed on 17 September, with a total of 97 families assisted. The camp is now closed.

Movement out of Hera Port IDP camp commenced on 22 September. As of Thursday 25 September, 298 families (of 368 registered for the recovery package) had moved. Seven families moved independently to the Hera Transitional Shelter Site. A long-term solution for those families is being sought by the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS) and partners. Ten families remain in the camp and ongoing dialogue/ mediation activities are underway to address their return and reintegration needs. It is expected that the return movement from this camp will be completed within the next two weeks."
Assistance to the return and reintegration of IDPs from the three Tibar camps (Matadouro, Turleo and Ismaik) is expected to commence next week, upon completion of the verification and socialisation processes."

Source: OCHA, 23 September 2008

**OCHA & UNMIT, 17 September 2008, p. 4**

"Movement out of Dom Bosco camp commenced on 8 September and progressed smoothly with 10 families out of 628 registered to move remaining as of 12 September.

With the return of the IDPs from Dom Bosco camp a total of more than 6,500 IDP families will have received a recovery or reintegration package under the Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru National Recovery Strategy programme.

Movement out of San Jose is expected to begin on 15 September with 97 families registered to move.

Verification of Hera Port Camp is ongoing as is verification of Tibar and Tasi Tolu Transitional Shelters."

**OCHA & UNMIT, 2 September 2008, p. 1**

"Camp Movements: Movements out of Airport IDP Camp and Seminario Minor Balide camp took place during the reporting period, and almost all IDPs were relocated to their area of origin. The next movement will take place out of Dom Bosco camp and is scheduled for the first week of September. To date, 5,116 families (out of a total of approximately 15,500 families registered by MSS nation wide) have received the reintegration and recovery packages, which amounts to a disbursement by the Government of Timor-Leste of approximately US$ 10 million so far (out of a total envelope of 35 million USD budgeted for 2008)."

**OCHA & UNMIT, 20 August 2008, p. 3**

"Airport Camp: The Airport camp closed from 15 August. All former residents of the camp have received their reintegration or recuperation packages. MSS had issued a press release on 6 August stating that 903 families from Airport camp would be assisted to return home.

Seminario Minor Balide Camp: On 14 August, MSS issued a press release stating that 432 families would be assisted to return home. There are nine families left at Seminario Minor Balide. MSS dialogue teams are working together with IOM to try and resolve the issues of these remaining nine families. It is hoped these cases can be resolved in the coming week, and if not, the families may have the option of Transitional Shelter units.

Baucau and Viqueque Districts: During the week of 11 August, MSS also socialised the amounts that will be paid to the victims of the 2007 violence in Baucau and Viqueque districts. MSS will commence payments to these people later in the month of August.

Dom Bosco Camp: This will be the next camp that MSS will assist to move. More than 50 per cent of the camp residents’ houses have been verified. Once the verification process is complete and the results socialised, the reintegration of the camp will commence."
With the return of the IDPs from Seminario Balide camp a total of more than 5,400 IDP families will have received a recovery package or a reintegration package under the Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru National Recovery Strategy programme.

UNSC, 29 July 2008, p.13
"45. The Government decided to reduce blanket food distribution to internally displaced persons in Dili to half rations starting in February 2008, so as to encourage more returns. Since the beginning of the year, some progress has been made and more than 1,400 families moved out of the camps of internally displaced persons, having received a recovery package under the Government's National Recovery Strategy. Eleven such camps in Dili have closed, including some of the larger ones. To date, approximately 13,500 families have registered their intention to return with the Ministry of Social Solidarity. The widespread perception among the internally displaced that prospects for their security improved with the death of Reinado and the surrender of Salsinha contributed to an acceleration of returns."

OCHA & UNMIT, 16 June 2008, p. 3
"Jardim: The closure of Jardim began on 21 May, and was finalised on 7 June. In total, 742 families left the camp, many of which received support from the IOM, CARE International, Plan International, Belun and CRS. The NRC also assisted some IDPs to relocate to NRC-managed Transitional Shelter sites, where IDPs unable to immediately return home benefit from a significant improvement in living conditions over those in traditional camps.

Arte Moris: The closure of Arte Moris began on 7 June, approximately 20 families returning home through 11 June. Whilst this represents significant progress in the return and reintegration of the camp’s population, 20 families from the camp remain registered with MSS for return assistance.

Ex-USAID: Movement out of the Ex-USAID camp began on 7 June. As of the 13 June, 21 families had received assistance under the Government's National Recovery Strategy.

CARE’s Community Outreach and Peacebuilding Project, based in Bairo Pite, assisted MSS and IOM with the Sional IDP Camp return last week by verifying the status of Sional IDPs wishing to return to Bairo Pite Suco (42 families in total). CARE will also assist in the return process by providing community outreach and assistance to MSS in addressing challenges in the return process.

The following is a tentative schedule from MSS of camp closures in Dili to January 2009 as of 3 June:

Death of fugitive Reinado may have increased IDPs' confidence in peace and security and increased rate of IDP return (July 2008)

- Reinado’s death in February 2008, during an attack against both Prime Minister Horta and President Gusmao, left many questions unanswered but did certainly help to make conditions more conducive to the return of the displaced
7. The death of Reinado, who had played a significant role in the intractability of the issues of the F-FDTL “petitioners” (see S/2008/26, para. 6) and the internally displaced persons, opened up new possibilities for addressing these two remaining consequences of the crisis of 2006. In response to a call from the Government to gather for a dialogue, on 8 February, a small number of petitioners had begun arriving at a camp in Aitarak Laran, Dili. After the attacks of 11 February, the rate of arrivals accelerated, reaching 709 by the end of May. On 4 June, the Government adopted a legislative decree that offered financial compensation packages for those petitioners who decided to return to civilian life, who are the great majority. While the underlying grievances which sparked the original desertion by the petitioners, and eventually culminated in the 2006 crisis, are yet to be addressed, the packages agreed to by the petitioners are a positive development. By the beginning of March, returns of internally displaced persons had also markedly accelerated.

Of major concern to the IDPs were the unresolved issues of Alfredo Reinado and the petitioners, without the solution of which they did not feel secure enough to return or reintegrate. As perpetrators are still at large, there is fear to return to the communities. There was much fear regarding the presence of weapons. Some IDPs voiced that they feared for their personal security independent of the high-level political issues, while others saw a link between the two. The assistance planned in the National Recovery Strategy was seen as only a small part of the solution, while the security concerns were the major obstacle to return. The Prime Minister briefed on the efforts to establish an all-party committee to look at the resolution of the Reinado, petitioner and IDP issues.

Reduction by half of free food rations distributed to IDPs and vulnerable people in Dili hoped to encourage IDPs to move out the camps (April 2008)

The May 2006 crisis led to the displacement of about 150,000 people in Timor-Leste. Humanitarian food aid was provided to these IDPs throughout 2006 and since June 2007, the general food distribution has been scaled down and focused only on those IDPs who have been living in Dili IDP camps in line with the Government’s IDP food assistance policy.

The Inter-Ministerial Committee of the Government of Timor-Leste approved the food assistance policy to IDPs on 12 July 2007. The general food distribution to IDPs in Dili camps was extended for another three months, through September 2007, which was later extended through December 2007. The period of food assistance was further extended through March 2008, albeit at reduced rations for February and March. There is no provision under the WFP regular programme for continued feeding for IDPs after March 2008. The WFP country-wide programme was extended until the end of June 2008, with a provision of IDP feeding through March only as per the Government’s policy at the time.

The Government, with support from WFP, UNDP and IOM, is currently working on an operational framework to identify the most vulnerable IDPs, who would need continued food assistance under a Government social safety net. However, this will take time to materialise. In addition, it will take more time to identify and operationalise alternative assistance programmes that improve people’s livelihoods. In order not to risk to contribute to the already fragile security situation compounded
by the risk for increasing food prices, the Deputy SRSG has made a special appeal to donors for resources for another three months of IDP feeding from April to June 2008, over and above the already planned or pledged donor contributions for WFP’s regular programme. It is expected that during that period, vulnerable IDPs will have been identified, and implementation of alternative programmes will have started."

ICG, 32 March 2008, p.8

"The WFP distributes food to all registered occupants of IDP camps. There are 65,000 recipients in Dili, though only 30,000 live in the camps. Some in the humanitarian community describe the program as “politicised food distribution”, because it is intended to placate IDPs and reduce the risk of violence. The government has tried to stop it several times but has always extended it for another three months for political as well as food security reasons. In 2006, government data collectors trying to check registration of camp-dwellers were threatened, because some feared a reduction of food aid.

Free food makes living in an IDP camp economically attractive and has attracted new residents, including IDPs from outside Dili (where food distribution has stopped) and even some of the urban poor. It has some perverse effects, however. It strengthens the position of the camp managers who manage the distribution and removes the incentive for unemployed youths to seek work, freeing up more time for them to drink or be involved in gang violence. There is a thriving market for selling the food on to third parties, controlled in some camps by a “rice mafia”. A camp manager said, “people sell the rice because they are poor and have no other source of income”.

The program is also an inefficient form of aid. There are many poor and needy people outside the camps who receive no assistance, while IDPs get food regardless of need. A WFP food security assessment in September 2007 found no difference between IDPs and their neighbours in terms of food security: 50 per cent of households in the camps (where there is food aid) and 50 per cent of households in nearby villages (where there is no food aid) were food insecure. Universal food distribution in IDP camps, therefore, misses many of the most vulnerable, while feeding others who do not need it. The WFP assessment concluded that IDP status should be delinked from food entitlement, and a social safety net should be introduced for all vulnerable people, though carefully to avoid political problems.

Beginning in February 2007 and on government instructions, WFP reduced its universal food distribution program from 8kg of rice per person per month to 4kg. Several camps, including Airport and Obrigado Barracks, initially refused to accept the half rations. Camp residents who tried to pick up their rations were threatened by camp leaders for breaking solidarity. Despite concerns that the killing of Reinado would increase anger, the government has not backed down from its half-rations policy. Five camps have continued to refuse the half rations. The government plans to cease universal food distribution entirely by June 2008, although this seems to be predicated on unrealistic expectations about the speed of IDP returns. UNDP’s planned cash-for-work schemes in Dili should help some IDPs earn the food they previously received for free. As noted below, feeding programs will continue for the most vulnerable."

Most of the 11,000 IDPs who fled Dili in 2006 to seek refuge in Lautem district returned to Dili but decided to stay in camps instead of returning to their homes (April 2008)

OCHA & UNMIT, 25 April 2008, p. 5
"Austcare protection teams in the Eastern districts (Baucau, Viqueque and Lautem) have been monitoring IDP numbers and locations in order to update currently available data. They have started with Lautem district.

Based on the data collected by the Lautem Protection Team, the following update on the number and location of IDPs in Lautem District was derived:

This data from Lautem shows that some 93% of the people who moved to Lautem District from Dili during the conflict have returned to Dili. However, most of them are staying in the IDP camps in Dili instead of going back to their homes. Limited access to humanitarian assistance, work and educational opportunities in the districts have driven these IDPs back to Dili."

**Temporary relocation to transitional shelters**

**A total of 667 transitional shelter units built since 2006 (October 2008)**

- For those unable to return, 667 transitional shelters have been built on seven sites by NRC and the government since 2006. The houses are basic but offer much better conditions than camps with electricity, cooking facilities, latrines and tap stands. As of October 2008, the shelters had an 88 per cent occupancy rate accommodating a total of 3,125 people

OCHA & UNMIT, 1 October 2008, p.3

"The following table shows the current occupancy levels of the Transitional Shelter (TS) in Timor Leste:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rooms</th>
<th>Occupants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours from the village which flooded eight months ago, six by families from Hera Port.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not counting occupants of Hera.</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>According to the latest agreement (12 September) between MSS and the camp community, for food distribution purposes, the population has been set at 1460 individuals, divided by 200 household. Notice: For camp management purposes, The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) calculates the daily population to be = 500. Some few families are using two rooms.</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OCHA, 23 september 2008

OCHA & UNMIT, 17 September 2008, p. 5

"To date, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has built a total of 597 Transitional Shelters located in Tibar, Tasi-Tulu, Becora Unital, Becora Market and Hera. The Government has built 72 transitional shelters in Karantina, bringing the total of transitional shelters to 667 shelter units. See the table below for additional details. Excluding Hera, the current occupancy rate is approx. 85 "."
OCHA & UNMIT, 7 April 2008, p. 10

"On 3 April 2008, 137 new transitional shelter units of the Bekora Market Transitional Shelter site were handed over to the Government of Timor-Leste. These shelters will be assigned with priority to IDPs, who are currently sheltering at the Dili National Hospital, in order to mitigate public health risks at the hospital and to offer a safer and friendlier environment to the IDPs.

All shelters are equipped with electricity. Cooking facilities, latrines, and tap stands are provided on the site, with two families sharing one bathroom. A police station is housed within the site in order to ensure the safety and security of the inhabitants. Funding for the construction had been provided by the Government of Timor-Leste, Norway, the European Commission, and France. The construction of the units within the former Bekora Market was undertaken by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). The water and sanitation infrastructure was provided by Triangle Génération Humanitaire (TGH). A second phase of shelter unit construction at Bekora Market is envisaged, which could bring the number of units to 205."

Many IDPs reluctant to relocate to transitional shelters in areas where they are not always welcome (April 2008)

- As of April 2008, a total of 504 transitional housing units have been built for people unable to return home. Of these 446 units were inhabited.
- Basic transitional housing was set up in five Dili locations in 2007, but it has proved difficult to convince IDPs to move there.

OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 6

"For many IDPs, return and/or resettlement are not yet viable options as the issue of land and property rights is complex and largely unresolved. A number of transitional housing units have been built for a small number of IDPs (446 units inhabited out of 504 built) but significant efforts are nonetheless required before longer term solutions can be found for the large number of remaining IDPs. The Government and the international community are currently working on efforts to facilitate and actively support voluntary resettlement of IDP families where possible, and explore transitional shelter options for the most complex cases. However, it should be noted that the presence of IDPs in host families in the districts has been another burden on households’ income and subsistence coping mechanisms for the last two years."

ICG, 31 March 2008, p. 5

"Basic transitional housing was set up in five Dili locations in 2007. It has proved difficult to encourage people to move, however, as they have felt the new locations were not safe or were too far from public facilities, or they feared they would get stuck there permanently and never get a proper house. Some of the camps and transitional housing have become a burden on host communities, leading to tension. Neighbours have objected to sharing scarce water, grazing land and other resources and to the burden placed on local schools and health facilities. In one area, IDP students from a camp were attacked by members of the host community who complained that increased student numbers had adversely affected the quality of the local school."

OCHA, 17 July 2007, p. 18
"Over the next six months a concerted inter-agency approach is needed for implementation of significant upgrades to camps. The planned relocation of IDPs to transitional shelter sites will require close support and follow-up by camp management agencies to ensure that IDPs are able to make informed decisions about movement to upgraded shelter arrangements. Furthermore, camp management agencies must continue to fill gaps in service delivery for general camp maintenance and upkeep, such as the provision of lighting, maintenance of Watsan installations, as well as fencing.

Sizable fluctuations in the number, composition and movement patterns of IDPs are expected over the next 18 months. Periodic gang violence and political uncertainty in the post-Parliamentary election period could lead to additional displacement. Camp numbers routinely fluctuate as persons displaced from Dili to the districts use Dili camps as a stepping stone for return to Dili. The delayed reconstruction of over 5,000 houses, the unwillingness of several communities to accept returns, and the perception of insecurity by IDPs are all factors presenting obstacles to return. Strong in-camp support by camp management agencies is thus essential to ensure that the safety and dignity of the IDP population is maintained while durable solutions are sought."

OCHA, 14 March 2007

"In addition to the existing 337 transitional shelter units, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has capacity to build another 160. The Inter-Ministerial Committee is considering the construction of transitional shelters for IDPs in Metinaro, and will therefore start negotiations with the surrounding communities regarding the use of the land for this purpose for 1-2 years."

OCHA, 14 March 2007

IOM, 28 February 2007, p. 1

"At the beginning of the crisis in April/May 2006 many displaced families were accommodated in religious institutions, schools or stand alone camps. Many displaced families are unable to return to their places of origin for a variety of reasons e.g: increased security incidences; either their homes are damaged or burnt; and furthermore present camps are also the target of several security problems and the viability of managing these camps in their current location are no longer sustainable. Therefore, the Government is pursuing several options one of which is the relocation of displaced families to transitional shelters as an interim measure while seeking durable solutions for the displaced population. To this end the assessment was carried out.

The objective of the transitional shelter sites is that at the end of the emergency assistance phase, shelter will need to be addressed in a more sustainable way. The sites will thus be used for the purposes of accommodating IDPs who will be relocated from various camps in Dili."

UNSC, 1 February 2007, p. 16

"52. It is likely that the crisis with regard to internally displaced persons will continue for some time owing to a number of underlying factors. More than 2,200 houses have been destroyed and more than 1,600 damaged. This means that, in the near future, more than 20,000 persons will remain without a home to return to. The Government has designed transitional shelter plans for families whose houses have been destroyed and will assist with construction material for damaged houses. However, current construction plans address only a small percentage of shelter needs, and complex land and property issues complicate the return and reintegration, as does the verification of compensation claims. Furthermore, until the underlying causes of the situation of insecurity and political crisis are resolved, the potential for durable solutions will remain uncertain given the persistence of genuine fear among internally displaced persons about security in areas of return."
IDP families move to transitional shelters (July 2007)

NRC, 17 July 2007
"95 internally displaced families have now moved out of poor shelter conditions from the IDP camp inside the only national hospital in Timor Leste, to the transitional shelter in Becora, Dili.

After a year living as IDPs in a poor shelter, with almost nothing, 95 families like Juvita Soares are now a little bit closer to a solution, even though the deep problems of Timor Leste are not easy to solve.

(...)
The shelters are all constructed by the Norwegian Refugee Council with funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Additionally, NRC is building seven camps like the one where Juvita Soares is living, in order for several hundred families to move out of poor tents to temporary homes, while durable solutions are sought."

OCHA, 23 February 2007
"Transitional Shelter units built by the Norwegian Refugee Council in Tasitolu, Hera, and Tibar have been handed over to the Government, while the transitional shelter in Becora is being finalised. The Shelter Working Group has proposed to identify additional transitional shelter sites to accommodate IDPs living in the most critical camps such as those posing security threats or at risk of flooding.

Some families have moved to Quarantina site at Tacitolu and arrangements for other IDPs to move to the transitional shelter sites are being finalised. A 24/7 UNPOL presence at the site is being established, in order to ensure that IDPs find them a better option than staying in IDP camps. After the spontaneous partial occupation of the transitional shelter units in Tibar, MTRC is planning an assessment to ensure its allocation in accordance with vulnerability criteria."

Obstacles to return and resettlement

Four main obstacles to the return of the displaced (March 2008)

- According to ICG, the four main obstacles preventing the return of the displaced are: 1) protection concerns with many IDPs afraid of further violence upon return, 2) the combination of free shelter/food distribution and widespread poverty which makes life in the camps attractive for many Timorese, displaced or not, 3) lack of free movement of IDPs in some camps which are controled by people who have a vested interest in maintaining the camps, and 4) the lack of houses to return to due to slow progress with the rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged/destroyed homes and the absence of land and property ownership disputes settling mechanisms.

ICG, 31 March 2008, p.i
"Four main obstacles prevent the IDPs from going home. First, many continue to fear further violence from their neighbours and do not trust the security forces to guarantee their safety. This needs to be tackled by speeding up security sector reform, including prioritising community policing; prosecuting arsonists and violent criminals; and promoting a process of local and
national dialogue and reconciliation. Still, in some cases, it will not be possible for people to return to their original community, and alternatives will need to be provided.

The attacks on 11 February 2008 on President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão, which left the former seriously injured, showed why many people fear further violence. However, the death of rebel leader Alfredo Reinado may help reduce fear, particularly if his remaining fighters can be dealt with. His death has not sparked the unrest among his urban supporters and sympathisers that many predicted, though there is still potential for trouble after the curfew and state of siege are lifted. But Reinado was a manifestation, not the cause, of Timor’s divisions. The government needs to address fundamental drivers of conflict, such as communal tensions, problems within the security forces and lack of economic opportunities – before the next Reinado appears.

Secondly, the provision of free food and shelter makes life in a camp in some respects more attractive than the alternatives. A further factor that makes IDPs from the countryside reluctant to leave the camps in Dili is that the capital offers many more economic opportunities. Thirdly, some of the camps are in effect run by individuals and groups that have vested interests in keeping numbers high, either because they control the black market for reselling food aid or because they believe greater numbers give them more political weight. In a few instances, they have intimidated or prevented people from leaving.

Finally, many displaced do not have homes to go back to. Destroyed or damaged houses have not been rebuilt, and others are subject to ownership disputes that cannot be settled under Timor-Leste’s incomplete and inadequate system of land law. More generally, housing stock is simply not sufficient for the country’s population. Unless more houses are built and systems introduced for resolving ownership disputes and providing secure tenure, the sheer demand for homes will continue to be an impediment to resettling displaced persons and a driver for further displacements.”

Risks of social jealousy need to be mitigated by addressing needs of the broader community (August 2008)

- Serious protection concerns for returnees have been reported since the return process started in April 2008.
- The return of displaced people to their homes with money or other benefits has inevitably led to social tensions and feelings of jealousy.

HCC, 12 August 2008, p.3

"Issues Related to IDP Returns: UNMIT HRTJS expressed concern over cases reported by their monitors in Urahou; all five returnee families are reportedly afraid to rebuild their houses due to house burnings in the area over the last two months. All indications are that the house burnings are unrelated to IDP returns but they impact on their feelings of safety, these issues need to be addressed.”

OCHA & UNMIT, 23 July 2008, p. 6

"Issues of the impact of the programme on perceptions of fairness and equity must be carefully considered. Timor-Leste is unfortunately still a country suffering from high levels of poverty. In this regard, activities under the HHF Vulnerabilities and Social Protection Pillar would need to address food security. Every effort must be made to ensure that a well-meaning Government initiative to provide essential financial support to people affected by the crisis does not lead to
unforeseen negative consequences. The Government’s commitment to supporting extensive community dialogue and trust-building activities is pertinent in this regard. However, all must remain alert to the potential for conflict arising from issues of social jealousy between returning IDPs and their community. In this regard, there is further need for a focus on the HHF Local Economic Development Pillar. The NRS recognises that, in order to ameliorate social jealousy resulting from IDPs returning with their recovery packages, it is essential that broader community vulnerabilities are addressed. Furthermore, there is need for the development of community infrastructure with the full participation of the MOED and MOINF."

OCHA & UNMIT, 30 June 2008, p. 6

"The 101 families in the Aliambata area who have received construction materials during the last visit of President Jose Ramos Horta in January have not used them to repair their burnt houses. These people are afraid that doing so would anger 213 other families who have not received the same materials promised them by the President. The MSS has completed the registration of the victims of the August 2007 conflict in Uatulari (and the whole of Viqueque) and is processing claims for benefits. There is a need to verify whether the value of the materials received by the 101 families will be deducted from whatever compensation benefits they will get from the MSS, assuming that the 213 others will not get their materials soon. It is recommended that MSS should address this issue to prevent any incidence of conflict among the local population."

ICG, 31 March 2008, p. 13

"Returning IDPs to their communities with large quantities of cash and rice also risks provoking social jealousy. This is what happened when 37 families (190 people) were assisted to return to their remote village in Ermera from Borga da Costa camp in Dili on 30 December 2007. They returned with two months of rice and up to $3,000 in cash per household – more money than anyone in that village had seen in their lives – to rebuild their burnt houses. Jealous villagers chased them away, and some fled to Gleno or back to Dili. The social solidarity ministry tried to mollify the angry neighbours by asking WFP to give the rest of the village two months’ free rice. Word of what happened got back to IDPs in Dili, and some say they will not go home until the government can guarantee security. There is also a risk the program will attract IDPs who have already gone home to return to the camps to claim the money."

Incomplete registration process prevent IDPs from receiving the recovery package (June 2008)

- Most IDPs in Lautem district have not been registered by MSS and could therefore not receive the MSS recovery package

OCHA & UNMIT, 30 June 2008, p. 3

"A workshop highlighting all IDP protection issues raised in previous five workshops in Lautem was conducted at the district level with 26 participants. District level representatives from the health, education and NGO sectors, along with IDP representatives from the five subdistricts and sub-district officials came to the workshop to revisit subdistrict level issues. Discussions revolved around key issues relating to housing and questions as to how IDPs could immediately receive the MSS recovery package since most IDPs in Lautem have not been registered by MSS. The need to identify and register the real IDPs vis-à-vis vulnerable populations, e.g. students and day workers affected by the conflict was also acknowledged. (These students and workers are
included in the original list of IDPs (presented by Austcare in a previous Humanitarian Update) making up the total of more than 11,000 IDPs in the Lautem District.) Questions were also raised relating to the process of claiming compensation for burnt assets for people living with other families and those in rented accommodation in Dili.”

**Lack of preparation in the return process undermines sustainability of returns (June 2008)**

- Although the government planned for pre-return dialogue with all parties involved, in the rush to resolve the IDP situation this has been always been done.
- Communities in return areas have often complained about insufficient preparatory work by the government and the lack of information given to them prior to the return of the displaced.

**OCHA & UNMIT, 30 June 2008, p. 5**

"According to CARE, a number of Aldeias within Bairo Pite continue to wait for Government support for dialogue processes. Chefe de Aldeias in Bairo Pite have reported that they are not receiving adequate information prior to a return, and often the time between when they are advised of the returns and the actual commencement of the process is too short to allow them to adequately prepare the community. CARE has similar concerns over the lack of preparation and very short time lines between the start of the process and the first IDPs being returned.

Austcare monitored the return of IDPs from Jardim camp into identified locations in Viqueque. One family of three members has arrived in Calerek Mutin and resettled in one of its aldeias. One other IDP family supposed to resettle in Calerek Mutin decided to sell the supplies they brought from Dili and returned to Dili after completing the sale. One IDP family, who arrived in Umuain Kraik in Viqueque Vila, just left some of their belongings and also headed back to Dili. The concerned Chefe Sucos are requesting MSS to inform them of these arrivals so that they could assist in preparing the community for their return and in monitoring their needs while settling in.

(...) According to CARE, a number of former IDPs in Bairo Pite informed CARE’s Community Outreach team that they had limited access to water and sanitation and were relying on their neighbours for assistance. In some cases, former IDPs from the Fatu Meta camp closure operation were still without adequate access to water and sanitation services. They expressed concern over the hygiene implications, particularly for their children. In CARE’s view, the lack of post-return monitoring activities means that Agencies do not have enough information to determine the previous level of access, or the efficiency in which access is restored."

**OCHA & UNMIT, 16 June 2008, p.2**

"In the past two weeks, SLS agencies have assisted the Government in the return and reintegration of IDPs from two camps: Jardim and Arte Moris. Whilst the return process for both camps was well organised and resulted in positive outcomes for the majority of those previously in the camp, it was not without challenges. These challenges are currently under consideration by the Government and the Government is taking steps to address the issues. It is known that some IDPs have been re-displaced or have been threatened upon return. Others were unable to return to their pre-Crisis communities of residence.

(...) CARE has noted that members of the Bairo Pite community have raised concerns about the manner in which the returns are being conducted. They have asked for more focus to be placed on preparation and dialogue within receiving communities prior to returns being conducted."
CARE has highlighted that a formalised system for addressing disputes over occupancy of housing has yet to be established. Current occupants of houses may be in danger of becoming IDPs themselves if they are forced to vacate their current residences. At the same time, former IDPs have, in some cases, been forced to negotiate a sum of money with those occupying their houses.

HCC, 22 May 2008, p.2
"MSS has been engaged in preparations for the Jardim movement for the last 10 days. It is recognised that with previous movements there were some flaws in the process, for example some Chefes de Aldeias not being informed of returns."

HCC, 6 May 2008, p.2
"HCC members regretted the rush in the recent movement out of the Fatumeta Seminario Maior IDP camp and the lack of socialisation and dialogue with IDPs and host communities. Partners who were in the vicinity of the host communities were only informed the day before the movement took place, when they could have supported and socialised it more. In sum, insufficient time and preparation led to incidents between IDPs and communities that could maybe have been avoided otherwise."

HCC members agreed to ask the Government for a calendar / plan of movements out of the camps in order to better prepare for the upcoming movements. Questions were raised regarding conditions under which HCC members would have to cease supporting the Government in order not to violate international principles should the process not improve."

Continued violence, poverty and lack of progress with reconciliation and justice hamper return of IDPs (January 2007)

- Damaged or destroyed houses and continuing violence are major obstacles for the return of the displaced.
- In October 2006, the government proposed a plan to assist IDPs wishing to leave current IDP camps, which included six options: return to the place of former habitual residency; move to other existing camps; move to a newly established short-term shelter site; move to transitional shelter for persons whose homes have been destroyed; temporary or permanently move to another district; or move to another site or host family in Dili.
- The main obstacles to return are: volatile security situation, lack of progress with reconciliation and justice, destroyed/damaged houses and unresolved land and property disputes, perceived divide between east and west, Socio-economic factors.

OCHA, 7 January 2007, pp. 10-11
"Continuing violence in Dili, although at much lower levels of intensity, has failed to reassure many of the displaced people, and a significant number of them are unable to return because their homes were destroyed or damaged during the violence. There have been incidents of attacks on IDPs in camps and gang violence has been fuelled within the camps themselves. Besides, ten IDP camps in Dili have been identified as being at high risk of flooding and vulnerable to disease outbreaks. The Government maintains that violence against IDP camps is of a criminal rather than political nature, and plans to close down the four most critical camps for security and public health reasons."
Although significant secondary movements between camps and communities of origin and between Dili and the districts continue to be observed, IDPs are generally reluctant to return, relocate or resettle elsewhere, alleging security reasons and requesting compensation for lost property. In order to facilitate this exercise, an "Operational Plan" for assistance to IDPs wishing to leave current IDP camps was developed by the Government in October, in close consultation with the IASC, UNMIT and the International Security Forces.

The plan provides six options for IDPs wishing to leave their current place of displacement including: return to the place of former habitual residency; move to other existing camps; move to a newly established short-term shelter site; move to transitional shelter for persons whose homes have been destroyed; temporary or permanently move to another district; or move to another site or host family in Dili. The Operational Plan, which started being implemented in December with the onset of the wet season, also contains a detailed return or relocation package.

Despite all ongoing efforts to promote the return, resettlement and reintegration of IDPs, this issue is far from resolved, as the majority are expected to remain displaced for the next months to come. IDPs reluctance or inability to return, relocate or resettle in other sites or districts, is substantiated by a number of reasons, some of which are outlined below:

a) Volatile security situation. Despite the establishment of police stations and posts throughout Dili and 24-hour patrolling, and the presence of PNTL in the districts, violence between gangs of youths continues on an almost daily basis. There is a high risk of escalation of the conflict in the run up to the elections, particularly in Dili.

b) Lack of progress with reconciliation and justice. Although the Simu Malu process has resulted in some returns, community reconciliation requires more time. Most IDPs remain cautious and are waiting to see results before they have the confidence to return. There is also a lack of confidence in the judicial system and a widespread sense of impunity.

c) Destroyed/damaged houses and unresolved land and property disputes. At least 1,846 houses were destroyed and 1,351 damaged in Dili during the crisis. According to the Government, 20% of the displaced population have no homes to return to. House ownership changed during the Portuguese and Indonesian occupations, leading to unresolved property disputes, illegal occupation of houses, and more recently to retaliation acts including burning of entire compounds. Conflicts between neighbouring communities persist, with a critical lack of legislation in this area. There are reported cases of returnees who go back to camps to improve their chances of property compensation, encouraged in some cases by camp leadership.

d) Perceived divide between east and west. The crisis came to a head in May 2006 when F-FDTL petitioners alleged discrimination on the basis of their origins. Lack of trust between the two communities persists.

e) Socio-economic factors. Limited access to basic social infrastructures and services, lack of employment opportunities, income generation and other activities in the areas of return are a great impediment to IDP return. There is an urgent need for sustainable actions in order to reduce dependency on humanitarian assistance, facilitate the reintegration of displaced populations, and foster peaceful co-existence with hosting communities.

OCHA, 6 September 2006

"As noted over the previous weeks, a large number of IDPs only spend the night in the camps and run their normal business during the day, with families returning to their homes. It is not known how many IDP families have returned to their former homes, as most families still keep a
‘sit’ in the camps as a safety net in case the situation deteriorates again in their home area. Some had gone back to their areas but returned to camps as they were either threatened or attacked by their former neighbours. After several attacks in and around the camps, more than two thirds of the IDPs sheltered at the Obrigado Barracks camp opposite the UNMIT headquarters in Dili left the camp (2,000-3,000); some went home and some joined other camps in Dili.

5. As a result of the unstable security situation, most of the IDPs do not feel safe enough to return home. IDPs continue to express their disappointment that the main issues behind the April/May crisis have not been resolved: justice, impunity, weapons among the civilian population, unresolved land and property issues; all those issues influence the perception of the East-West divide."

**OCHA, 9 August 2006**

"It is estimated that about 72,000 people are receiving food aid in Dili camps as of early August. It is not clear how many IDPs are still in the districts with host families or in camps outside of Dili, including in Baucau. There are many reasons why IDPs have not yet voluntarily returned home. The principal one is that the IDPs do not believe that the root causes of the conflict including land and property disputes, have been resolved. Furthermore, damage to the residential areas, continuing East/West divide, and rumours of illegal weapons still unaccounted for adds to the sense of insecurity. Therefore only few have returned to Dili from the districts, leaving part of the family (women/children), behind while others overnight in IDP camps while accessing their day jobs in Dili. Other families are awaiting more favourable conditions before they return, postponing their movement even until after the elections, scheduled for May 2007."

**Lack of free movement of IDPs in some camps prevents their return (July 2008)**

- There were concerns in July 2008 about the freedom of movement of IDPs in the Airport camp with the camp manager reported to have mobilised the youth to prevent people from moving out of the camp.

**HCC, 29 July 2008, p.2**

"The problems at Airport camp raise questions about the freedom of movement of IDPs in this camp. It seems that the camp manager has mobilised the youth in the camp and it is unlikely that those among the population, who want to move, would confront him. Movement in the way that has been requested (bairro by bairro) could be seen as a reasonable request as it maybe that IDPs feel that there would be “strength in numbers”, it would be difficult but not impossible. However, it would be good to try to avoid bringing back large numbers of people particularly if they would be belligerent with their communities of return. It may be good to ask for Fretilin’s support to tackle negotiations with the camp manager."

**ICG, 29 March 2008, p. 9**

"Some individuals have developed a vested interest in the continued existence of the IDP camps. Violent elements have established control of certain ones, particularly those such as Jardim, Central Pharmacy and Airport camps where there is no landowner or other authority. Actual violence is less the problem than the threat of it, but those who are victims of violence are scared to go to the police. UNPol, which has had responsibility for law and order since the 2006 crisis, began to patrol the camps regularly only in January 2008."
In some cases, IDPs have been forcibly prevented from leaving camps. For instance, in March 2007 there was a hazardous chemical spill in the harbour in front of Jardim camp. The health of the residents was at risk because of the fumes, so efforts were made to move them to newly built transitional housing. However, a hardcore group refused to let anyone leave. There has been similar intimidation in the Airport and ex-Chinese Consulate camps. It has been less of a problem in camps near or within church or convent properties – such as Becora Church, Dom Bosco and Canossa Sisters camps – where priests and nuns have been able to exercise some moral authority. There are eighteen church camps (and one mosque camp), some of which have seen a significant reduction in numbers since July 2007. Canossa Sisters camp was closed after occupants moved to nearby transitional housing.

The bullying elements in the non-church camps have both political and economic reasons for maintaining the status quo. Some, as noted, have become in effect a mafia for reselling WFP food aid and know that lower numbers mean less food. Others argue that larger numbers give the IDPs greater political weight to push for compensation or re-housing."

Lack of reconstruction efforts and new urban regulations prevent the return of IDPs to their homes (July 2008)

- Many people displaced in 2006 are still unable to return to their homes two years later because their houses were destroyed or damaged during the violence and little has been done to rebuild or repair them.
- Many areas where IDPs used to live have now been classified as "non-residential" and IDPs are not allowed to rebuild their homes there.
- Moreover, many IDPs are not considered by the government as permanent residents of Dili in a hope that they would return to the district, a prospect which appears very unlikely.
- More than two years after their initial displacement, many people are still unable to return to their homes due to unresolved land and property disputes.
- An estimated 30,000 are homeless because their homes have been destroyed or damaged during the 2006 unrest.

OCHA & UINMIT, 23 July 2008, p.5

"Land & Property issues remain a critical obstacle to achieving durable solutions for the IDPs. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some IDPs are reluctant to use their benefit package for its intended purpose as they are unsure of the final land allocation by the Government. In that regard a decision about a proposed urban plan would seem to be highly beneficial.

The eventual definition and agreement on the pending Land and Property Law would be equally important. In the shorter term, it is imperative that the MOJ prioritise the allocation of land for additional Transitional Housing sites (see paragraph below) and clear guidelines on occupied homes need to be developed. Furthermore, allotting land for social housing in the longer-term as highlighted below, is critical.

The necessity and utility of Transitional Shelters is witnessed by the fact that all available units were quickly occupied by people unable to return to their former homes. While the current process has been certainly a success, we must ensure alternatives are available for those unable to return. As noted above, more land is therefore required for Transitional Shelters.

As outlined by the Durable Solutions Report seeking solutions to the 2006 IDP crisis compiled by the UN Country Team, which was presented to the Government in September 2007, the lack of sufficient housing stock in Dili (and in the country generally) constitutes another major constraint.
The Report was used as a guide to the development and the drafting of the NRS. Indeed, social housing for IDPs and other vulnerable communities at large is urgently required."

ICG, 29 March 2008, p.10
"Little has been done to rebuild IDPs' houses destroyed or damaged in the recent violence. By September 2006, more than 5,000 IDPs had registered their houses as destroyed or damaged. More houses were destroyed in March 2007. However, partly due to capacity problems with budget execution and procurement that affect the whole of government, the infrastructure ministry has rebuilt just two houses, as a pilot project.

Another hindrance to rebuilding has been the Dili Urban Plan, which designates many areas where IDPs previously lived as non-residential. For instance, it forbids housing within 500m of the airport, 20m of a river, 300m of the foot of hills and 50m of the sea – all currently residential areas and a large proportion of the limited habitable land in Dili. Under the Ramos-Horta governments, the public works ministry was not permitted to rebuild IDP houses in those areas. The Dili and Baucau urban plans were drafted by architecture students working for GERTIL, a Portuguese NGO, after minimal consultation with the relevant ministries, groups in the field or the public. Dili desperately needs urban planning, but GERTIL's plan is widely agreed to be unsuitable for its current stage of demographic development, particularly considering the urgent IDP problem. A more flexible approach is needed: it is not fair to prevent IDPs from rebuilding unless they receive alternative land. 69 There should be consultation on and review of the Dili and Baucau plans, as well as of the draft spatial planning legislation.

A further issue is government reluctance to acknowledge the IDPs as permanent residents of Dili. Between 1999 and 2004 the city's population doubled. Many of those driven across the border in September 1999 returned to Dili rather than to their district of origin, and the capital was further swollen by people in search of jobs. These people – many of whom are now IDPs – are most unlikely ever to return to their "home" districts, whatever the preferences of politicians. The government needs to accept that Dili is now a city of nearly 200,000 – and growing fast – and plan accordingly to provide adequate housing and basic services."

OCHA, 17 July 2007, pp. 7-31
"Government/United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) assessments show that 3,119 houses were destroyed, 2,242 were damaged and many more undamaged but illegally occupied, leaving an estimated 30,000 people homeless4.

(...) One of the key issues for IDPs or other vulnerable groups at risk relates to land and property rights including the establishment of adequate compensation and property restitution mechanisms in the context of wider land law reform. Significant progress is yet to be made with addressing these entrenched elements. For most of the displaced population, returning to their homes is not yet an option. The UNDP December 2006 assessment of 4,000 families in IDP camps5 revealed that 45% had their homes completely destroyed and a further 33% damaged. Further assessments (see table below) have added to the picture.

(...) The majority of IDPs displaced to Dili by the crisis found refuge in church or Government compounds, which were not designed for sheltering large numbers of people. While IDP numbers have reduced substantially over the past year, continued insecurity within Dili has meant that large numbers of people are still residing in these spontaneous camps, with even more living outside the camps in makeshift arrangements in or on property belonging to others. The camp-based IDPs are living primarily in tents, often in crowded and sub-standard conditions due to site
constraints. Current data indicates that over 75% have had their homes damaged or destroyed and will be unable to leave the camps without additional housing assistance."

OCHA, 16 January 2007, pp. 8-9
"According to an ongoing comprehensive assessment of damaged houses, at least 3,197 homes are known to have been destroyed (1,846) or damaged (1,351) in Dili during the crisis. The same survey will now be carried out in the districts. Estimates suggest that some 14,000 of those currently displaced in Dili no longer have homes to return to. There is also a considerable number of land and property disputes that the legal system has been unable to address. The judicial system is generally overwhelmed due to limited human resources, structural constraints and a significant increase in criminal cases arising from the crisis. The backlog of cases awaiting prosecution, which was a concern even before the crisis, has now surpassed 2,500. This, combined with significant gaps in legislation, increases the sense of impunity and widespread lack of confidence in the judicial system."

Land and property disputes rooted in the country's inadequate land and property regimes continue to prevent IDP's return two years later (July 2008)

- More than two years after their initial displacement, many people are still unable to return to their homes due to land and property disputes rooted in the country's inadequate land and property regimes lacking a land register, a clear system for issuing titles and a functional dispute settlement mechanism.
- Many IDPs have no formal claim to the property they fled and have no legal way of evicting squatters.
- Many people, including politicians, may be found to have no legal claim to the property they occupy. For them, continuing legal uncertainty is preferable.

UNSC, 29 July 2008, p.13
"46. A number of obstacles faced by internally displaced persons continue to be of major concern, however, including unresolved issues with the communities to which they return, such as land and property disputes. The humanitarian community is encouraging the Government to maintain a comprehensive approach to the return, resettlement and reinsertion of internally displaced persons, consistent with the five pillars of the Government's National Recovery Strategy (housing, community trust-building, security and stability, social protection, and local socio-economic development). Under this approach, the return, resettlement and reinsertion options would be offered in a systematic, sustainable, timely and verifiable manner."

ICG, 29 March 2008, p. 10
"Timor-Leste's land and property regimes are wholly inadequate and a major barrier to resolving the IDP crisis and thereby guarding against a repetition. There is a large number of active land and property ownership disputes, many involving IDPs, which are hard to resolve for lack of a comprehensive land register, a clear system for issuing titles and a functional dispute settlement mechanism. Ownership disputes were responsible for some of the 2006 displacements, as people took advantage of the chaos to chase neighbours out and occupy their property. Many IDPs admit they do not have a formal claim to the property they fled. After the conflict subsided, those who returned to their communities often found squatters in their homes or burned
out shells. Lack of a comprehensive land and property regime means there is no legal way to evict squatters. Under the Ramos-Horta government (until April 2007), the public works ministry was not permitted to rebuild houses subject to ownership disputes.

A functioning land and property regime will need to reconcile four separate sources of ownership: traditional land rights, titles issued under the Portuguese, titles issued under Indonesia and de facto occupation since 1999. Under Lisbon's rule, Portuguese law applied, though during the whole 400 years only about 2,000 titles were granted, mostly in Dili and the coffee-growing areas of Ermera and Liquica. Indonesian law replaced Portuguese law from 1976, but customary land use practice continued in many areas. Both colonial regimes (and the Japanese) also redistributed land and transferred population; buildings belonging to people who fled Timor, and some former Portuguese government buildings, were expropriated or simply seized during the Indonesian occupation.

The situation was further confused in 1999 by the forced displacement of large numbers of East Timorese, together with the mass destruction of property. Records were destroyed by the withdrawing Indonesian security forces, while many Indonesians sold their properties in late 1999, often without documentation. In the subsequent months and years, people returning from West Timor and from exile overseas moved into whatever accommodation was available, including former Indonesian civil servants' houses and temporarily abandoned houses.

This complex history presents difficult challenges. In many cases, Portuguese and Indonesian titles overlap, and many people occupying property since 1999 lack any formal claim. The government needs to reconcile these competing claims under a single, cohesive land rights system and set processing guidelines. It will be important to address the particular tenure needs of women, including joint ownership rights for couples.

This is a sensitive issue. Many people, including politicians, may be found to have no legal claim to the property they occupy. For them, continuing legal uncertainty is preferable. Social justice requires that a comprehensive property regime involve an element of redistribution, but there are large landowners in both the government and FRETILIN – including former Prime Minister Alkatiri. Some believe that, as a member of PSD, a party with large landholding families such as the Carrascalaos at the helm, Justice Minister Lucia Lobato is unlikely to support a regime that does not protect their interests. While the justice ministry has drafted a number of land laws to replace the current complicated mix of Indonesian and post-independence legislation and regulations issued during UN administration, only three have been passed. Further bills were presented to the government in 2004 but were not discussed by the Council of Ministers, because “land issues were too controversial”.

A claims procedure and dispute resolution mechanism are key elements in regularising the ownership regime. Law 1/2003 set a March 2003 deadline for lodging land claims. But few people knew or understood the process, so only some 13,500 claims were made – 90 per cent by Indonesian citizens who lived in Timor-Leste during the occupation. The justice ministry thus proposes to reopen the deadline and run an information campaign in each village and IDP camp. Ministry mediation forums will try to resolve disputed claims; if mediation does not work, a case will go to arbitration – but legislation is required to establish an arbitration process. Moreover, according to the former head of the land and property directorate, it will not be possible to determine competing property claims without first doing a comprehensive land register. A new project, funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), will begin this five-year project in 2009."
Rushed return process and absence of return monitoring raises concern about the sustainability of returns (May 2008)

- In May, the HCC decided to send a letter to the government to ask for a slowing down of the return process due to concerns that it was rushed and could take place to the detriment of a voluntary, sustainable, safe and monitored return and therefore violate international principles.
- In the absence of a proper return monitoring, the HCC expressed the opinion that these movements cannot be labelled as return as it is unclear whether people return sustainable once they have left the camps.

HCC, 22 May 2008, p.2
"The decision at the last HCC meeting to send a letter, drafted by IOM, to the Vice Prime Minister from the HCC regarding concerns about current movements out of IDP camps was not implemented following IOM’s positive discussions with MSS on the same issues and the proposal to therefore not send a letter.

(...) It seems that the Government is focusing on the closure of the camps. The challenge is to approach the Government regarding the problematic cases, for example; students who have come to live in the camp in order to study in Dili, IDPs whose homes are occupied, and IDPs who will not be accepted back by their communities. The Government understands the need to slow down the process and prioritise those cases who are willing and able to return."

HCC, 6 May 2008, p. 2
"There is a common agreement regarding the need to monitor the quality and sustainability of movements of IDPs out of the camps. Furthermore, considering that so far there is no proper return monitoring, these movements cannot be labelled as return as it is unclear whether people return sustainable once they have left the camps.

- HCC members agreed to ask the Government for a calendar / plan of movements out of the camps in order to better prepare for the upcoming movements. Questions were raised regarding conditions under which HCC members would have to cease supporting the Government in order not to violate international principles should the process not improve.
- It was suggested that the HCC, in its advocacy role, sends a letter to the Government to congratulate it on its efforts to tackle the IDP issue while at the same time raising concerns regarding the tight timeframe of the process and offering support to ensure a smoother process. The humanitarian partners understand that the MSS is under a lot of pressure to close camps quickly, but would like to point out that this must not be followed to the detriment of a voluntary, sustainable, safe and monitored return. Furthermore, the utmost must be done to strengthen the other pillars of the Hamutuk Hari’i Futuro strategy in order to enable a durable and dignified solution. Efforts must be put towards finalising the other options and recovery packages, so the ‘return home’ does not remain the only option that can be accessed."

IDP returnees to be evicted to make way for a police housing (October 2008)

- Returnees, displaced people and squatters living on the ASPOL site are at risk of eviction because the land they use is state-owned and to be used for a housing project for the police.
"At present, no Governmental decision has been made regarding allocation of land and compensation for those currently living at ASPOL site. The eviction process has not yet begun."

"On 1 September, PNTL and F-FDTL went to the ASPOL site to commence the execution of an eviction order that had been issued by the Ministry of Justice on 12 May 2008. The reason for the eviction notice is that the land of the ASPOL site is Government owned and is to be used for PNTL housing.

The Aspol/EDTL site gathers a mix of people:

a) Some who claim to have lived there since 1999,
b) Some who used to live there before the 2006 crisis, then moved to an IDP camp, before coming back recently once they received their recovery package because they consider this area their home, c) and those in the same situation as the latter but who have not yet received their recovery package.

In a letter addressed recently to the highest authorities of the Government, the representatives of the ASPOL residents express their concern, and state that the eviction process and options available remain unclear.

According to MSS, 33 families returned to the site from IDP camps (including Jardim, Hospital and Sional) with the Hamutuk Hari’i Futuru programme’s Recovery Package. The remaining families (not registered as IDPs but living at the site) could be entitled to compensation. However, at this time, the exact nature of this compensation remains uncertain, and both the MSS and the Ministry of Justice are still discussing the nature of the compensation."
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

General

UN agencies and NGOs targeted in new round of violence (August 2007)

OCHA, 21 August 2007
"10. Significant parts of the displaced population are reportedly scattered in forests and mountain areas, to which access is difficult. In order to gain access to these populations and provide assistance, an inter-agency assessment mission with United Nations helicopters to Watulari and Uatucarbau was scheduled to take place on Saturday, 18 August 2007. As heavy rains had made the roads in the area impassable, the assessment mission had to be rescheduled to Thursday, 23 August."

Trocaire, 21 August 2007
"With enhanced security in place, movement for international agencies into these areas has been restricted and this will make it more difficult to deliver humanitarian relief by road.

There have been attacks on stores of food, equipment to assist local farmers and the offices of both local and international NGOs. This has included Trócaire's local partners. In Baucau, the office and preschool premises of the Caritas organisation was attacked forcing a temporary closure and the office of Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Trócaire's sister US organisation was also burnt and destroyed."

UNAMET, 11 August 2007
"The ambush on three UN vehicles was perpetrated by a group of people between the villages of Fatumaka and Gariuai. Personnel travelling in the convoy included four UNPol officers, two national police of Timor-Leste (PNTL) officers, an UNPol language assistant, two national staff members and an NGO worker.

During the incident, which involved stone throwing and reported gunshots at UN vehicles, one UNPol vehicle was also set ablaze by the criminal elements. There were no injuries."

OCHA, 11 August 2007
"3. In Baucau, 24 buildings have been destroyed this week. On 6 and 7 August, government, church, UN, and NGO facilities in Baucau district had been burnt and attacked. The situation remains tense and government offices, schools and shops are closed. In Venilale sub-district, 11 houses burnt to the ground, in Quelicai, 3 houses were destroyed.

4. Between Baucau and Viqueque, a convoy of 3 UN vehicles was ambushed yesterday. The incident involved stone throwing and gunshots at the vehicles. One UNPol vehicle was set
Illegal roadblocks between Baucau and Viqueque had been erected since the beginning of the week.

(…)

8. Due to the tense security situation in Baucau and Viqueque access to the displaced populations is limited at the present time. Preparations are being made by the humanitarian community for a timely humanitarian response to the affected populations as soon as the security situation allows. Aid organizations are monitoring the situation of humanitarian needs and indications of further displacement.

9. Today, OCHA and IOM were able to reach the area by helicopter for a rapid preliminary assessment. The Government of Timor-Leste has provided 5mt of rice to be distributed in Viqueque and Uatucaubau tomorrow morning. The United Nations (UNMIT, WFP, OCHA) are providing air transport and facilitation. A preliminary food needs assessment will be undertaken.

**Volatile security situation reduces humanitarian access (March 2007)**

**OCHA, 14 March 2007**

"With the deterioration of the security situation, humanitarian access for NGO and UN operations had been significantly reduced, which raised serious concerns. The provision of essential services to IDP camps as well as movement to districts and rice deliveries to address the rice shortages in the markets had been limited. Due to the improvement in the security situation, operations resumed during the course of the week. The potential for further violence raises concerns regarding humanitarian access, security and protection for both IDPs and humanitarian staff."

**OCHA, 23 February 2007**

"The escalation of violence has on several occasions hampered access to IDP camps and affected mainly the provision of water and sanitation services, thus making water trucking more expensive, as very few camps have their own sources of water."

**Herald Sun, 26 May 2006**

"GANGS of armed youths were threatening to attack compounds in East Timor's capital Dili where thousands of refugees were sheltering, aid agency World Vision said today. World Vision chief executive Tim Costello said lawless gangs armed with knives, bows and arrows and possibly guns were blockading at least two compounds containing people who had fled the violence in Dili.

"The situation is extremely volatile and there are fears that the violence is continuing to spread," he said. "There has been constant gunfire around World Vision's headquarters in Dili, greatly restricting our ability to deliver aid."

Mr Costello said there were also grave fears held for the safety of a national staff member who might have been killed in the recent fighting. World Vision is working in three compounds with up to 25,000 internally displaced people.

Mr Costello said two of these compounds – the Don Bosco School and Community Centre and the Cannossian Convent, in the Balide District of Dili – were being blockaded by the armed gangs."
Unstable security situation compounded by limited international presence outside Dili (January 2007)

ECHO, 21 February 2007, p. 3
"The international and Timorese police and military forces have not proved able to contain the violence so far. There are many unsafe areas in the capital Dili, where frequent clashes happen. IDP camps are regularly attacked and violence between gangs of youths continues on an almost daily basis. The humanitarian workers are not completely safe either, as evidenced by the stabbing to death of a UN interpreter on 10 December 2006.

This adverse security situation is likely to continue in the run-up to the elections in mid 2007 due to political tensions, increasing inter-gang rivalry, criminality, a general climate of impunity, and weaknesses of the judicial system. A worsening of the security situation would have a negative impact on the capacity of humanitarian actors to reach and provide assistance to the displaced and affected communities, especially in the districts."

OCHA, 16 January 2007, p. 7
"Following a request by the Government, international forces were deployed to Timor-Leste on 25 May 2006 and have remained in the country since that time. In August, the UN Security Council voted to establish the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and a 1,600-strong international police force began to replace the Australian-led military force. The mission is mandated "to facilitate the provision of relief and recovery assistance and access to the Timorese people in need, with a particular focus on the segment of society in the most vulnerable situation, including internally displaced and women and children" 3.

UNMIT is responsible for overall security in Timor-Leste, with PNTL still active in several districts. Policing in Dili is the responsibility of UN Police (UNPol), accompanied by screened PNTL and supported by international security forces. A UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry was established to investigate the events leading up to the conflict and reached the conclusion that "the fragility of various state institutions and the weakness of the rule of law were the underlining factors that contributed to the crisis."4 Recommendations were made regarding prosecutions and areas requiring investigation.

The fragile security situation could worsen in the run-up to the elections due to political tension, intergang rivalry, criminality, a culture of impunity, weaknesses in the judicial system and delays in the implementation of the recommendations made by the Commission of Inquiry report. The situation is confounded by the absence of a comprehensive government public information strategy and the limited presence of UNMIT and humanitarian partners in the districts. There are fears that greater humanitarian actions in the districts in the coming year may expose staff and programmes to greater security risks."
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

National response

The government's initial strategy to deal with the displacement crisis rested on the assumption that all IDPs would return once the security situation had stabilised. The response therefore mainly focused on meeting the immediate humanitarian needs of the displaced, mainly in camps, while starting a community dialogue programme (Simu Malu) to restore security and trust between communities which proved inadequate and ineffective (OCHA, 16 January 2007, p.8). By the end of 2006 it became clear that returns were not taking place as expected despite threats by the government to cut off assistance (Kammen/Hayati, March 2007, p.2). Acknowledging that more efforts were needed to assist IDPs to return or relocate, a comprehensive assistance package consisting of food, shelter, construction materials and transport was offered to IDPs agreeing to leave the camps (MTRC, 24 November 2006, pp.1-3). By July 2007 however, only 4,800 IDPs had taken advantage of government assistance to move out of the camps (MTRC, 17 July 2007).

The failure of the government to convince the IDPs to return is explained both by its lack of institutional and operational capacity to properly implement its return and reintegration strategy, and also by displaced people lack of trust in the government’s ability or willingness to address underlying causes of the 2006 unrest, such as the politicised security sector, the weak rule of law, the housing stock deficit or the land and property disputes. Many IDPs were unwilling to return in an environment of persistent instability and impunity in which the renegade leader of the "petitioners" Major Reinado, seen by many IDPs as the cause of their displacement, was still free after mysteriously walking out of prison in August 2006 (ICG, 31 March 2008, p.7; BBC, 31 August 2006). Reinado’s death in February 2008 during an attack against both Prime Minister Horta and President Gusmao, who the rebel had designated a few weeks before as the mastermind of the 2006 crisis and subsequent regime change, left many questions unanswered but did certainly help to make conditions more conducive to the return of the displaced (Reuters, 13 August 2008; John Martinkus, 15 February 2008; BBC, 11 February 2008).

Since 2008, the government has started implementing the national recovery strategy, Hamutuk Hari'I Futuru. The strategy aims to address the challenges of reconstruction and recovery with a particular focus on the solving of the displacement crisis. The plan’s main weakness is the lack of funding for implementation. The government has committed a total of $15 million in 2008 to address the needs of the displaced, but this is far from sufficient to even cover the cost of the first pillar on housing, let alone the four others. That international donors are expected to complement missing funds leaves much of the strategy up in the air (ICG, 31 March 2008, p.13). Ten months into the programme, of the five pillars of the strategy, only two—the housing and the confidence-building- are functioning (HCC, 3 October 2008, p. 1). Capacity within government ministries remains limited at all levels resulting in poor management and implementation of activities (WFP, 12 September 2008, p. 6). This is a cause for concern in a context of transition between emergency humanitarian assistance and early recovery/development where the government is precisely expected to take on increasing ownership and responsibility for all aspects of assistance and recovery (OCHA, 18 April 2008, p. 21).
While most of the secondary occupancy disputes in the current return process have reportedly been resolved on a case-by-case basis through dialogue and negotiation, the absence of a legal and regulatory framework governing land and property ownership continues to cause uncertainties over property rights and therefore to prevent the resolution of the land and property disputes. Establishing a comprehensive land register, a clear titling system and a functional dispute settlement mechanism in a country where most land is unregistered and governed by customary law will be a complex and daunting challenge that the government must meet if it is to enable durable solutions for the displaced population.

Responsibility for the monitoring and protection of the displaced lies with the Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice (the “Provedor”), which has been operational since March 2006 but remains of very limited capacity. In 2007, the Provedor’s Office scaled down IDP monitoring activities which it was conducting with assistance from UNMIT and the Human Rights Monitoring Network (RMDH), a network of Timorese NGOs, due to lack of funds (OCHA, 17 August 2007, p.2). Budgetary constraints prevented the opening of offices outside of Dili and only in June 2008 was the IDP cell re-activated (UNMIT, 21 August 2008, p.15). Overall, the capacity of state institutions to provide protection services to IDPs or the general population remained extremely limited (OCHA, 18 April 2008, p.30). Supported by UNMIT and the Center on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), a Housing Rights Network consisting of 23 members, was developed during 2008. The objective of the Network is to contribute to better monitoring and reporting on housing rights issues, particularly on forced evictions and secondary occupants while also supporting the government to develop a land and property rights law (OCHA & UNMIT, 6 August 2008, p.5).

Widespread impunity and lack of accountability must be addressed as a matter of priority if the government’s credibility is to be restored both in the eyes of the international community and citizens, in particular those victims of the 2006 civil unrest. Those responsible for burning the houses, looting the properties and forcing people out of their homes must be prosecuted if the displaced are to put their trust in the return and reintegration process. There are reasons to believe that this will not be easily achieved. Following the February 2008 attack, a three-month “state of siege” was declared during which the number of reports of ill-treatment and human right violations against civilians by security forces increased significantly. Although those responsible for the violations were identified, none were brought to justice (UNMIT, 21 August 2008, p.3). In July 2008, 94 prisoners received a presidential pardon, including former Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato who had been sentenced in 2007 to seven years for distributing arms to civilians in 2006. This was widely criticised by church officials and human right activists who said this move was undermining the rule of law and further weakening people’s faith in the justice system (ABC, 8 September 2008). On 13 October 2008, President Ramos-Horta asked the UN to drop its investigation into the 1999 violence, in order to maintain good relations with Indonesia (Reuters, 13 October 2008). The capacity of the judicial system remains very limited despite the increase in human resources and technical support from the UN Justice Working Group: the backlog of cases has continued to grow now reaching 4,700 criminal cases (UNSC, 29 July 2008, p. 10)

International response

International response

The immediate response of the international community to the civil unrest of May 2006 was the mobilisation of a 3,000-strong military and police force led by Australia to restore of law and order. This was followed by the establishment in August of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) with a broad mandate to provide support in the humanitarian, security,
political and development sector. Following Timor-Leste's independence in 2002, UN support had continued until May 2006, first through the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMIT) and from April 2005 through the UN Office for Timor-Leste (UNOTIL). UNMIT's mandate has already been renewed twice and is now to run until at least February 2009 (UNSC, 25 February 2008).

From 2006 to 2008, the UN launched two successive Consolidated Appeal Processes (CAPs) requesting a total of $58 million to address the humanitarian needs of IDPs and the vulnerable population and help them find durable solutions through return, resettlement or reintegration (OCHA, 17 July 2007, p.1). The response by donors in 2007 was mixed with two-thirds of the CAP funded but critical sectors such as health, water and sanitation, protection and human rights as well as economic recovery remaining largely underfunded (UNMIT & OCHA, 18 February 2008, p. 9; OCHA, 20 October 2008). While re-affirming its commitment to continue providing emergency assistance to IDPs in camps, the Transitional Strategy and Appeal (TSA) launched by the international community in March 2008 also offered strong support to the government recovery strategy recognizing that early recovery initiatives now needed if the displaced were ever to return home. A third strategic priority of the TSA is to strengthen the government's capacity to manage disaster risks (OCHA, 18 April 2008 p. 19). Eight month after its launch, 59 per cent of the $28 million requested has been funded, with economic recovery, protection and health largely underfunded.

In the past two years, Australia, the US, the European Commission and Japan have been the main humanitarian donors accounting for 63 per cent of all contributions (OCHA, 29 October 2008). A project to evaluate the humanitarian assistance provided to IDPs in Timor-Leste since 2006 was proposed by OXFAM and included in the TSA in March 2008. The assessment would provide a useful tool for identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the response, suggesting improvements and ensuring accountability of the humanitarian community (HCC, 6 May 2008, p.4). As of October 2008, however, no funding has been made available.

The Humanitarian Coordination Committee (HCC), established in September 2007 and chaired by the Humanitarian Coordinator/ Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, regularly bring all international actors involved in the assistance and recovery efforts together and is the main forum to discuss humanitarian issues and elaborate policies. The existing coordination structures informally follow the cluster leadership arrangements. While issues of protection policies may also be discussed in the HCC, the Protection Working group is the primary fora for coordinating the protection response to the IDP situation in Timor-Leste. Since the departure of UNHCR in July 2007, the lead on the protection sector has been shared between UNMIT’s Human Rights Unit and UNICEF. It remains unclear who will take the lead after the departure of UNICEF’s IDP adviser at the end of October. Discussions are currently ongoing about a possible rolling out of the cluster approach in Timor-Leste. Problems related to the coordination of assistance have been reported and linked to several factors, including the triple hat of the Humanitarian Coordinator, who is also head of UNDP and chief of the UN's political mission and OCHA's high staff turnover. Similarly, staff turnover and lack of resources is reported to have constrained UNDP's capacity to lead (ICG, 31 March 2008, p. 31).

In parallel to its humanitarian plan, the international community is also involved in an International Compact recovery and development programme, which provides a common platform for coordinating international assistance in key areas such as the public and security sector reform, justice, governance, the rule of law, youth employment and human resource development. In March 2008, a development partners meeting was held in Dili during which the government officially launched the Compact or national priorities for 2008 which are a) public safety and security; b) social protection and solidarity; c) youth needs; d) employment; e) social service delivery and f) governance (UNSC, 29 July 2008, p. 11). The UN and the World Bank are actively supporting the monitoring of progress to meet these objectives. In August 2008, the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) was signed by the government and UNMIT.
UNDAF includes programmes ranging from the provision of basic social services to the building and strengthening of state institutions providing totalling US$ 314 for the period 2009-2013 (OCHA & UNMIT, 20 August 2008, p.1)

**Assistance to IDPs in the camps**
The Ministry Social Solidarity is responsible for coordinating the provision of assistance in the camps with support from OCHA. Most camps are managed by one single agency, usually an international NGO, that provides a liaison officer to facilitate access to humanitarian services. A camp manager is elected by each camp and is responsible for liaising with the government and aid agencies and for representing the camp at meetings (ICG, 31 March 2008, p. 5).

**Monitoring of human rights violations**
Agencies involved in post-return monitoring include the Provedor’s Office, UNMIT’s HRTJS, the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) and IOM. The Human Rights and Transitional Justice Section of UNMIT (HRTJS) provides technical advice to the Office of the Provedor for Human Rights and Justice to strengthen its capacity as well as to other initiatives contributing to better monitoring and reporting of human rights violations, such as the Housing Rights Network which focuses on forced evictions and secondary occupants (OCHA & UNMIT, 6 August 2008, p.5). UNIFEM has also provided training to the Provedor on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, with specific focus on gender-based violence (UNSC, 29 July 2008, p. 9).

**List of agencies and NGOs assisting the displaced**

**Avocat sans Frontières**: its main objective is to raise awareness about the formal justice system and to enhance the access to justice at grassroots level, especially for the most vulnerable groups such as IDPs, returnees and those living in rural areas (OCHA & UNMIT, 16 July 2008, p. 7)

**Catholic Relief Services**
CRS is currently the Site Liaison Support (SLS) for six camps in Dili and ten camps in Baucau. CRS provides regular monitoring, liaison with technical support agencies and general support to camp management. CRS provides direct assistance in the general upkeep and maintenance of camp facilities, distribution of hygiene kits, health/hygiene promotion and preventive services (larvaciding and water testing), and enhancement of basic security. CRS is also responsible for health/hygiene promotion at Airport camp and the provision of hygiene kits for eleven IOM camps and three NRC transitional shelter sites, with a total population of over 20,000. (OCHA & UNMIT, 1 January 2008, p.4)

**IOM**
IOM is involved in camp management as well as in the return & reintegration phase. IOM helps to prepare the returns of the displaced as well as monitor their impact on the wider community. IOM also provides transportation, logistical and dialogue support to the Government and IDPs.

**Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)**: NRC is the the camp management agency for all transitional shelters. It plays an integral role in the return and reintegration process of the returning populations.

**Plan International**
Plan Timor-Leste works in five main sectors: early childhood care and development, water and environmental sanitation, child rights/child protection, youth participation in society and youth
livelihoods. Its development programs are focused in Aileu and Lautem districts. Since May 2006, Plan has provided a range of emergency response services, including water and sanitation, child protection, informal education for children, and management support to the internally displaced people in camps across Dili. Plan’s child protection staff conduct ongoing visits to monitor child protection issues in IDP camps around Dili. (OCHA & UNMIT, 1 January 2008, p.4)
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