BURUNDI:

Internally displaced Burundians should not be forgotten during the peacebuilding process

A profile of the internal displacement situation

19 May, 2008

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The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council, is the leading international body monitoring conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide.

Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.

Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre also carries out training activities to enhance the capacity of local actors to respond to the needs of internally displaced people. In its work, the Centre cooperates with and provides support to local and national civil society initiatives.

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OVERVIEW

Internally displaced Burundians should not be forgotten during the peacebuilding process

Despite a marked improvement in the security situation in Burundi in recent years, some 100,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) remain in settlements throughout the country, in addition to an unknown number living with host families. Many IDPs seem to have to a large extent integrated into the communities of neighbouring towns and villages, but there is little information on their situation, their needs or their aspirations.

In the 1990s, hundreds of thousands of Burundians fled their homes to escape fighting between the government and Hutu rebel groups seeking to put an end to the political dominance of the Tutsi minority. Many others, predominantly Hutus, were forcibly displaced into camps by the government in the second half of the 1990s. Following the signing of a ceasefire between the government and a major rebel group in 2003, as well as the voting into power of a national unity government in 2005, hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs returned to their homes.

The last remaining rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL, signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in 2006, but sporadic attacks continued. In April 2008, heavy fighting between the Palipehutu-FNL and the government occurred in and around the capital, causing the death of more than 30 people and the temporary displacement of many more.

Since 2006, the UN Peace Building Commission has been working with the Burundian government to support post-conflict recovery, including the recovery of people affected by the country’s internal armed conflicts. In a briefing to the Commission, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights said that peacebuilding success could be measured by the successful return and full integration of refugees and IDPs. So far however, the situation of long-term IDPs has not improved markedly. Success in responding to the needs of these people will depend on a coordinated approach as well as on more accurate information on IDPs’ needs and aspirations. OCHA is planning to leave the country in June 2008, and it is important for UNHCR or another agency to take the lead on IDPs.

Background of displacement and political developments

Since the independence of their country in 1962, hundreds of thousands of Hutu and Tutsi Burundians have been killed in massacres carried out by members of the Hutu majority or the Tutsi elite minority. Millions more have at various times fled their homes for fear of the killing. The violence has been fuelled by regional and ethnic tensions, as well as economic inequalities. In 1993, large-scale displacement followed the assassination of the first elected president, Melchior Ndadaye, and subsequent massacres. At first, the majority of IDPs were ethnic Tutsi, particularly in the northern and central provinces, who feared retaliation from neighbours following the assassination of the Hutu president. From 1996, as conflict escalated, both ethnic Tutsi and Hutu found refuge in settlements, especially in the south. The Tutsi-led government also ordered the relocation of hundreds of thousands of (mostly Hutu) civilians into “regroupment camps” twice in the late 1990s, as part of a military strategy against the rebel groups. The number of IDPs peaked in 1999, with over 800,000 displaced, or around 12 per cent of the population (UN CAP, November 1999, p.6).
While regroupment camps were dismantled in 2000 following international pressure, other IDP settlements remained. The same year, a peace agreement was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, by the government, opposition parties and opposition armed groups. Large-scale displacement continued, however, as the army continued to fight two rebel groups which had not joined the peace process. In 2003, the bigger of the two remaining groups, the Forces for the Defence of Democracy-National Coalition for the Defence of Democracy (Forces pour la défense de la démocratie-Coalition nationale pour la défense de la démocratie, FDD-CNDD), signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burundian government. Improved security allowed for the return of tens of thousands of IDPs to their homes (OCHA, 26 May 2005).

A national unity government headed by President Pierre Nkurunziza, a Hutu and former head of the rebel movement FDD, was elected in August 2005 in the first democratic election since the start of the conflict in 1993. The last remaining rebel group, the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People-National Liberation Forces (Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu-Forces nationales de libération, Palipehutu- FNL), fought on before finally signing a comprehensive ceasefire agreement with the government in September 2006. Security improved following the agreement, but worsened again in mid-2007, when the Palipehutu-FNL withdrew from the mechanism established to monitor the ceasefire, alleging bias on the part of the facilitator, a South African minister. In April 2008, the Palipehutu-FNL was brought back to the negotiating table after intense diplomatic pressure from the international community, but continued to fight against the government (ISS, 3 April 2008).

**New displacement**

Since the ceasefire agreement in 2006, several thousand people have been displaced, most of them temporarily, by fighting between government forces (FDN) and the Palipehutu-FNL. The Palipehutu-FNL has mostly caused insecurity in its strongholds of the provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural. Early in 2008, at least 8,000 people were displaced in the north-western province of Bubanza (IRIN, 14 January 2008). In mid-April 2008, outside the capital, residents were spending the nights in the bush for fear of being caught in Palipehutu-FNL attacks on military positions in and around Bujumbura which killed more than 30 people (IRIN, 23 April 2008).

Several thousand people were temporarily displaced by natural disasters in 2006 and 2007, in particular due to drought leading to food shortages, and floods. In addition, at least 20,000 Burundians who had been living in Tanzania for years without being recognised as refugees have been expelled to Burundi, many of them without a home to go back to (OCHA, 3 October 2007).

**Long-term IDPs**

Some 100,000 people remained displaced as of the end of April 2008. This estimate is based on the last comprehensive IDP survey undertaken by the UN in 2005 (OCHA, 23 June 2005). According to the survey, some 117,000 IDPs were in settlements, many of which had grown to become like villages. This number did not take into account people living with host families, particularly in urban centres and in Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza Provinces. The majority of IDPs were living in the northern and central provinces.

According to a survey on IDPs in southern provinces released by UNHCR in January 2008, the majority of people still in settlements fled armed clashes between 1993 and 2000. Others include those who fled due to natural disasters (floods and drought), returnees from Tanzania, as well as Batwa communities who found better living conditions and access to land in the settlements (UNHCR, 1 January 2008). Except for this recent survey, current information on IDPs in Burundi is only anecdotal. In order to devise durable solutions, the conditions facing IDPs in the
settlements and dispersed in the countryside need to be re-evaluated, focusing on their current needs and aspirations. At least 389,000 Burundian refugees had returned to Burundi by March 2008 (UNHCR, 1 April 2008). Many of them are landless and do not have a home to return to (UNHCR, 31 March 2008). Meanwhile, according to local observers, few long-term IDPs have returned home over the past two years. Many of them have reportedly integrated into communities in neighbouring towns and villages to a large extent, and their living conditions may now be better than prior to displacement. The major exception is women-headed households, which are generally still extremely vulnerable. Remaining obstacles to return or to resettlement include the reported impunity of many who have killed civilians and still allegedly live in the IDPs’ places of origin; continued insecurity and difficult economic conditions in areas of origin; and the high population density of the country (UNHCR, 1 January 2008; OCHA, 26 May 2005, 3 October 2007).

Testimony of Colleta Cimpaye, 54, displaced from her home since 1993, following the assassination of President Ndadaye (ActionAid, 17 March 2008)

“Someone looked out and saw people running towards us with machetes, knives and guns,” Fourteen years later she still lives with her five children in a camp for internally displaced people (IDPs).

“I've lost so many people I can hardly count,” says Colleta. “My husband. My brother. His wife. Their children. My sister. Her eight children. We once were 12 brothers and sisters. Now we are only two.”

Physical security

Overall, the physical security of IDPs has improved significantly since the height of the conflict. But IDPs, like other people, remain subject to high level of violence by both armed men in uniform and civilian gangs. Some 80 per cent of households in the capital and in other large towns possess small arms, a significant factor in the continuing high level of violence (UNSC, 27 October 2006; UNDP, November 2004).

The UN estimates that 19 per cent of Burundian adolescent girls and women have been victims of sexual violence (OCHA, 2006, p13). Minors are particularly at risk. In December 2006, 60 per cent of reported rapes were committed against children (AI, 9 October 2007). Both rebel groups and the government have recruited child soldiers, many of them displaced children. Some 3,000 child soldiers were demobilised from 2003 to 2006, but according to a UN report to the UN Security Council, reports of rape, sexual violence, abduction and detention of children and child recruitment by the Palipehutu-FNL increased in 2006/2007 (UNSC, 28 November 2007).

Humanitarian conditions

The humanitarian needs of IDPs are now very similar to those of other vulnerable Burundians. Limitations to their access to basic services are due to financial constraints rather than the fact of having been displaced. Some 600,000 Burundians remain in need of food aid in 2008 (IRIN, 7 March 2008). The first cause of mortality in Burundi is malaria, while respiratory infections and diarrhoea also claim the lives of many children under five. Another leading killer among IDPs and others is HIV/AIDS. In 2006, a new policy of free medical care for all Burundian mothers and children caused existing medical structures to be overwhelmed by a wave of demand. Thanks to significant donor support to this initiative, however, crude mortality indicators then showed some improvement (Burundian MoH, December 2006).
Primary school fees were abolished in 2005, resulting in a 50 per cent increase in enrolment for first graders in all provinces compared to the previous school year. Some 150,000 first graders were left out, as classes were too crowded to accommodate them (OCHA, 2006; UN, 30 November 2006). In 2007, the lack of space in classes and distances to reach schools still limited access to education for many displaced and other children (UNHCR, 1 January 2008).

Land issues

Land for most Burundians is not only essential economically – it is the first national economic resource – but also culturally, as the family plot is generally viewed as the symbol of ethnic and family identity. The return of IDPs and refugees to their land is made difficult by existing problems such as the high density of the population, the division of land plots into smaller lots and their poor productivity, and the exploitation of land by new occupants.

While the vast majority of IDPs in Burundi continue to access and cultivate their original land plots, unsolved land issues still complicate the return process of refugees and, to a lesser extent, of IDPs. The value of land has gone up following the improvement of insecurity, and rich individuals have bought more land, while the land available to returning IDPs and refugees has become more scarce (Mbura Kamungi et al., June 2005). IDPs also often face the theft of their crops, due to the distance between the settlements and their fields (UNSC, 18 December 2006).

Land ownership in displacement areas is especially complicated. The majority of IDPs live on state-owned, private or church-owned property, and the status of the IDPs on these properties remains unclear (UNHCR, 1 January 2008). This has led to disputes with the original owners, for example when repatriated refugees find IDPs settled on their land. In order to deal with land and property issues resulting from years of conflict, the Burundian government set up a National Land Commission in July 2006. According to local accounts, the Commission has started to deal with individual complaints, but so far it has solved very few cases.

National and international response

A Directorate General for Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration of Displaced and Repatriated Persons was created at the Ministry of National Solidarity, Human Rights and Gender in March 2006 (IDD, 3 June 2006). The Ministry also supervises PARESI, a UNHCR-financed project which provides basic housing and infrastructure to returning IDPs and refugees, as well as to Burundians expelled from Tanzania. According to local observers however, the government is aware of the situation of long-term IDPs, but does not seem to have made the issue a priority.

The UN Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator for Burundi is responsible for ensuring a strategic and coordinated response to internal displacement in the country. He also heads the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), which was established in January 2007, after the mandate of the peacekeeping mission in the country ended. OCHA is currently the focal point on IDP issues, but it is expected to leave Burundi in June 2008. It is not clear at this point whether UNHCR or any other agency will then take the lead on IDPs. In practice, most IDP-related activities undertaken by UN agencies and NGOs are integrated into general humanitarian programmes addressing food security, health, psycho-social assistance, housing and education.

In July 2007, a Steering Commission for the Repatriation and Reintegration of Returnees was established in Burundi. The Commission comprises representatives of four ministries, donors, BINUB, UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF, with OCHA and UNDP providing its secretariat. The Commission aims to provide a coherent and integrated response to the basic needs of the returnees and displaced and expelled persons, as well as the needs of the host communities, including the promotion of cohesion and reconciliation (UNSC, 23 November 2007).
NGOs including Ligue ITEKA, Search for Common Ground, Global Rights, Accord and NRC provide legal support and conflict mediation for IDPs and returning refugees to solve land issues in a peaceful way.

Having assessed that Burundi no longer faced an acute humanitarian crisis, the government and the UN agreed not to launch a Consolidated Appeal Process for Burundi in 2008 (UNSC, 23 November 2007). The main source of funding to improve the situation of IDPs and returnees is now the UN Peace Building Commission (PBC), created in 2006. The UN Secretary-General approved the allocation of $35 million for Burundi, based on the “Strategic Framework for Burundi” endorsed in June 2007 (UNSC, 17 May 2007; PBC, 22 July 2007). In a briefing to the PBC, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, said that peacebuilding success could be measured by the successful return and full integration of refugees and internally displaced persons (UNGA, 30 May 2007). One of the key objectives of the Strategic Framework is to find “sustainable solutions to the land issue and to socioeconomic recovery of populations affected by the war and conflicts,” and the Peacebuilding Fund will contribute $2 million to projects for their recovery (Government of Burundi/UN, 31 December 2007). Whether these projects will make a difference in IDPs’ lives remains to be seen.

(May 2008)

IDP estimates 1999 – 2004

- UN OCHA IDP estimated that 281,600 IDPs were living in camps in 2003
- An additional 100,000 or more were estimated to live with host families, public buildings or in the bush
- Decrease of IDP population in sites from 281,628 in 2002 to 145,034 in 2004
- An additional 30,000 to 40,000 were temporarily displaced every month as of late 2004


OCHA 15 August 2003, p6:
"Further IDPs have been temporarily displaced from their homes for short periods of time and are not included above. IDP figures exclude a possible further 100,000 IDPs, and possibly more, dispersed following the closure of some regroupement camps in 2002 and who may not have been able to return to their homes."

SCF 16 August 2001:
"According to the NGO Save the Children Fund (SCF), the bulk of dispersed IDPs live in Bujumbura Rural."

UNICEF 29 May 2002
"UNICEF reported in May 2002 that there were 180,000 IDP children in camps."

UN estimated that 100,000 people are affected every month by temporary displacement (Nov 02)

OCHA 19 November 2002:
"The intensification of conflict, particularly in Bujumbura Rural and the border provinces, has led to increased temporary displacement affecting up to 100,000 people every month.

Over 109,720 people are displaced in Bujumbura Rural alone, while a further 20,000 have been forced from their homes in Ruyigi and Makamba. Such temporary displacement, sometimes forced by military action, has in some cases lasted months, severely disrupting all aspects of life for the population, diminishing or destroying their small reserves and placing additional strains upon already vulnerable host populations."

2003

In September 2002, UNFPA did a socio-economic survey on IDPs in Burundi. Preliminary results available in January 2003 stated that the total number of IDPs in camps was now 281,052, down more than a hundred thousand from July 2002.

OCHA, 14 March 2003: In March 2003, UN OCHA reported a total of over 525,000 IDPs in the country, of whom 387,499 were registered in 226 sites (and more than 800,000 Burundians living as refugees in the region).

OCHA, 3 June 2003: In June 2003, UN OCHA adopted the same IDP figure reported by UNFPA in January 2003: 281,000 IDPs in permanent sites, and another 100,000 temporarily displaced every month.

According to UNFPA's draft survey,
UNFPA Draft, 2003, p11: "Parmi les 106.417 individus que OCHA-UNICEF-PCAC ont de plus que nous, 26.553 personnes (soit ¼) constituent la population des sites des déplacés que nous avons exclus du recensement du fait qu'ils étaient soit démantelés, soit des sites de nuit, soit des sites de rapatriés ou d'une autre nature comme celui de Buterere. Le reste (79.868 individus, soit ¾) pourrait s'expliquer par la surestimation éventuelle des chiffres par certains responsables administratifs et chefs de site pour la raison évoquée plus haut."

2004

OCHA August 2004:
"The IDP population has decreased dramatically from 281,628 displaced persons living in 230 sites in 2002 to 145,034 persons in 170 sites in 2004. In other words, half of the IDP population returned to their zones of origin within this two-year period, with the most accelerated rate of return taking place between late 2003 and early 2004 following significant improvements in the political and security situation in the country."

RÉSUMÉ DU PROFIL EN FRANÇAIS

Burundi : les personnes déplacées à long terme attendent toujours des solutions durables malgré une amélioration de la situation sécuritaire

Malgré une amélioration notable de la situation sécuritaire au Burundi, quelque 100 000 personnes déplacées à l'intérieur de leur pays (« personnes déplacées » ou « déplacés ») restent oubliées dans des sites disséminés à travers le pays, en plus d'un nombre indéterminé de personnes vivant dans des familles d'accueil. Il existe peu d'informations sur la situation des personnes déplacées à long terme ou sur leurs besoins. Nombreux déplacés semblent s'être en grande partie intégrés dans les villes et villages voisins. D'autres expriment leur souhait de rentrer, mais l'absence de perspectives économiques, la destruction de leurs foyers et la confiance limitée entre les communautés dans les zones de retour les empêchent de le faire. Les sites qui accueillent des déplacés incluent désormais des personnes déplacées par les conflits et
les catastrophes naturelles, mais également celles qui ont quitté leurs foyers à cause de la pénurie de terres et de l’insécurité alimentaire, ainsi que des réfugiés rapatriés.


En 2006, la Commission de consolidation de la paix des Nations Unies a commencé à coopérer avec le gouvernement burundais pour soutenir le rétablissement de la paix au lendemain du conflit. Le retour des déplacés et des réfugiés constitue l’une des questions que le gouvernement envisage de traiter dans ce contexte. Il reste à voir si ce processus va se traduire par des améliorations tangibles pour les personnes déplacées.

Contexte des déplacements et évolutions politiques


Si les camps de regroupement ont été démantelés en 2000 sous la pression internationale, d’autres sites de personnes déplacées sont restés. La même année, un accord de paix a été signé à Arusha par le gouvernement, les partis d’opposition et les groupes d’opposition armés. Les déplacements à grande échelle ont cependant continué, car les troupes gouvernementales et deux mouvements rebelles qui n’avaient pas adhéré au processus de paix ont continué de s’affronter. En 2003, le plus important des deux mouvements qui restaient, les FDD-CNDD (Forces pour la défense de la démocratie – Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie), ont signé un accord de cessez-le-feu avec le gouvernement burundais. En raison de l’amélioration de la situation sécuritaire, des dizaines de milliers de déplacés sont rentrés chez eux et 30 sites ont été démantelés, principalement dans le sud du pays (OCHA, 26 mai 2005 ; 11 novembre 2004).

Un gouvernement d’union nationale dirigé par le président Pierre Nkurunziza, un Hutu qui était auparavant à la tête du mouvement rebelle FDD, a pris le pouvoir par les urnes en août 2005 au cours des premières élections démocratiques depuis le début du conflit en 1993. Le dernier groupe rebelle qui restait, les FNL (Forces nationales de libération), ont continué de combattre, avant de finir par signer un accord global de cessez-le-feu avec le gouvernement en septembre

De mi-2004 à fin 2006, près de 5 000 membres des forces de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies étaient présents au Burundi. Leur mandat avait été adopté sur la base des recommandations du gouvernement burundais compte tenu de ce qu'il considérait comme étant une amélioration notable de la situation sécuritaire globale.

**Nouveaux déplacements**

Depuis la signature de l'accord de cessez-le-feu entre le gouvernement et les FNL en septembre 2006, aucun déplacement provoqué par des conflits n'a été signalé au Burundi. Avant cet accord, des combats sporadiques ont eu lieu dans les provinces de Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza, Kayanza et Cibitoke, provoquant le déplacement de milliers de personnes en 2006. Plusieurs milliers de familles se sont également déplacées de nuit pour se mettre en sécurité à proximité des infrastructures gouvernementales ou militaires (OCHA, 10 septembre 2006).

Plusieurs milliers de personnes ont été temporairement déplacées par des catastrophes naturelles en 2006 et début 2007, en particulier à cause de la sécheresse qui a conduit à des pénuries de nourriture et à des inondations (OCHA, 5 mars 2006 ; AFP, 16 janvier 2007). En outre, quelque 6 000 Burundais qui vivaient depuis des années en Tanzanie sans avoir été reconnus réfugiés ont été expulsés vers le Burundi en 2006, alors que la plupart d’entre eux n’avaient plus de foyer où rentrer (NRC, novembre 2006 ; PARESI, janvier 2007).

**Retours limités**

Selon les Nations Unies, quelque 100 000 personnes restaient déplacées dans des sites fin 2006, car très peu sont rentrées chez elles au cours de l’année. Selon les Nations Unies, la lenteur de ce rythme de retour peut s’expliquer par la situation économique difficile dans les zones de retour, le manque de moyens pour reconstruire les maisons, le climat de confiance limité entre les communautés et les nouvelles opportunités trouvées dans les zones de déplacement (Nations Unies, 30 novembre 2006). De nombreuses personnes déplacées à long terme se seraient en grande partie intégrées dans les villes et villages voisins et certaines d’entre elles se sont par exemple fait élíre lors des élections locales de 2005 (OCHA, 25 juillet 2006). Selon les observateurs locaux, il se peut que les conditions de vie des personnes déplacées à long terme soient actuellement meilleures qu’avant leur déplacement, ce qui peut également expliquer le faible taux de retour. Des personnes déplacées plus récemment, comme celles qui se trouvent à Gatumba, entre la capitale et la frontière avec la République démocratique du Congo, sont confrontées à une situation plus difficile. Elles doivent louer des logements et n’ont pas toutes les compétences requises pour gagner leur vie maintenant qu’elles ne peuvent plus compter sur une agriculture de subsistance (NRC, 31 janvier 2007).

La dernière enquête effectuée par les Nations Unies sur les personnes déplacées remonte à mi-2005 et rares sont les nouvelles informations à ce sujet depuis lors. Selon cette enquête, quelque 117 000 personnes déplacées se trouvaient dans des sites, dont nombreux ressemblent plus à de véritables villages qu’à des sites précaires. Ce chiffre ne tient pas compte des personnes qui vivent dans des familles d’accueil, en particulier dans les centres urbains et dans les provinces de Bujumbura Rural et de Bubanza. Environ 58 % de la population déplacée dans des sites au Burundi se concentrent dans les provinces de Gitega, Muyinga, Ngozi, Kayanza et Kirundo, au nord et au centre du pays (OCHA, 23 juin 2005). D’après l’enquête, un obstacle essentiel au retour mentionné par de nombreuses personnes déplacées au nord et à l’est du Burundi serait l’impunité dont jouiraient les auteurs de massacres de civils qui vivaient encore près des foyers

Certains sites de personnes déplacées accueillent aujourd’hui également les rapatriés de Tanzanie, dont les maisons doivent encore être reconstruites ou qui se sentent davantage en sécurité dans des sites (OCHA, 12 décembre 2006 ; 26 mai 2005). Plus d’un tiers des ménages déplacés dans des sites sont dirigés par des femmes, dont la plupart ont plus de 60 ans. Ces ménages figurent parmi les plus vulnérables et parmi les plus susceptibles de rester indéfiniment dans les sites où ils résident actuellement (OCHA, août 2004, 26 mai 2005).

**Sécurité physique**

D’une manière générale, la sécurité physique des personnes déplacées s’est nettement améliorée depuis le sommet du conflit. Cependant, les déplacés, comme les autres civils, restent soumis à un niveau élevé de violence (banditisme armé, violence sexuelle) de la part à la fois d’hommes armés en uniforme et de gangs civils. Près de 80 % des foyers de la capitale et d’autres grandes villes possèdent des armes légères, ce qui constitue un facteur très important dans le climat de grande violence qui subsiste (Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, 27 octobre 2006 ; PNUD, novembre 2004). Les personnes déplacées sont également souvent confrontées au vol de leurs récoltes, du fait de la distance entre les sites et leurs champs. Dans la province de Bujumbura Rural, l’extorsion forcée de fonds par les FNL à l’encontre de la population a fortement diminué depuis l’accord de cessez-le-feu. Dans les provinces de Bubanza et Cibitoke, certaines sources rapportent que les FNL avaient cependant encore recours à la force pour obtenir de la nourriture et d’autres produits fin 2006 (Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, 18 décembre 2006).


**Situation humanitaire**

de mortalité, parmi les personnes déplacées et les autres. Selon UNAIDS, le Burundi figure parmi les 15 pays les plus touchés par cette maladie (ECOSOC, 27 juin 2005). En 2006, une nouvelle politique de soins médicaux gratuits pour toutes les mères et les enfants burundais a tout d’abord engorgé les structures médicales existantes. Grâce à un soutien important des donateurs pour cette initiative, les indicateurs de mortalité ont cependant montré quelques améliorations par la suite (Burundian MoH, décembre 2006).

Les personnes déplacées qui sont récemment rentrées chez elles ont également des besoins urgents. Environ 70% des déplacés et des réfugiés qui rentrent n’ont pas de maisons ou retrouvent leurs maisons détruites, selon le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (OCHA, 2006). Une étude réalisée par le Conseil Norvégien pour les Réfugiés (NRC) a estimé que les personnes déplacées qui rentraient dans des régions situées dans la province de Makamba – dont la plupart sont rentrées sans assistance – avaient besoin de protection physique, d’aide juridique, d’hébergement, d’eau et d’éducation (NRC, septembre 2005).


Questions foncières

Tandis que la grande majorité des déplacés au Burundi continuent d’avoir accès et de cultiver leurs parcelles d’origine, des conflits fonciers non résolus compliquent encore le processus de retour des réfugiés et – dans une moindre mesure – des déplacés. La valeur de la terre a augmenté suite à l’amélioration de la situation sécuritaire et de riches particuliers ont accru la surface ou le nombre de leurs parcelles, tandis que les terres disponibles pour les déplacés et les réfugiés de retour diminuaient (Mbura Kamungi et al., juin 2005). De nombreux déplacés vivent sur des terres appartenant à l’État, au secteur privé ou à l’Église, et leur statut reste confus. Cela a conduit à des conflits avec les propriétaires d’origine (Delrue, août 2006). Par exemple, des conflits apparaissent quand des réfugiés rapatriés trouvent des personnes déplacées installées sur leurs terres, comme ce fut le cas à Nyanza-Lac, dans la province de Makamba, en 2005 (OCHA, 25 septembre 2005). Afin de régler les questions de terre et de propriété résultant de plusieurs années de conflit, le gouvernement burundais a mis en place une Commission foncière nationale en juillet 2006.

Réponse nationale

explique en partie le fait que les donateurs n’aient versé que 15 % du montant de 168 millions de dollars demandés (Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, 25 octobre 2006).

Réponse internationale


Depuis le début de la crise en 1993, les donateurs semblent réticents à apporter des financements pour répondre aux besoins des Burundais. La Procédure d’appel global des Nations Unies pour 2007 sollicite près de 132 millions de dollars et prévoit de se concentrer sur les groupes vulnérables, notamment les personnes déplacées. Il n’est pas acquis que cet appel bénéficiera de davantage de financements que le précédent, lequel n’avait reçu que 47 % des montants demandés.

Une autre source de financement pour améliorer la situation des déplacés et des rapatriés devrait être la Commission de consolidation de la paix des Nations Unies récemment créée, laquelle prévoit de mettre à disposition 25 millions de dollars pour le Burundi, sur un total de 142 millions (Nations Unies, 30 novembre 2006). Le retour des déplacés et des réfugiés a été spécifiquement mentionné comme l’une des priorités du gouvernement dans les plans élaborés dans le cadre de ce processus et il est considéré comme étroitement lié aux questions plus larges de justice, de réforme foncière et de redressement socio-économique (HCR, décembre 2006).
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Conflict and displacement: background and development

Ethnic background and pre-colonial times

- Total population: 7.1 million
- Composite population comprising Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%) and Batwa (1%)(colonial census)
- Numerous interrelations between the ethnic groups (marriage, language, common monarchy)
- The Batwa are most likely the most ancient ethnic group in Burundi but they are marginalized in Burundi society

AFP 25 February 2005:
“GEOGRAPHY: Landlocked in central Africa, bounded by Rwanda in the north, Tanzania to the east and south, and the vast Democratic Republic of Congo to the west. One of the smallest states on the African continent, Burundi covers 27,834 square kilometers (10,747 square miles).

- POPULATION: 7.1 million, of which around 85 percent are Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi. The remaining one percent of the population are pygmies called Twas. One of the most densely populated African countries.

- CAPITAL: Bujumbura (population 300,000)

- LANGUAGES: Kirundi (national), French (administrative), Swahili (local)

- RELIGION: Christian (70 percent); Animist (15 percent); Muslim (15 percent).”

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 15-17:
“Burundi is situated in Central Africa, along Lake Tanganyika and shares borders with Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. […] According to statistics dating back to the 1930s, 85 per cent of the population are Hutu, 14 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Batwa. The Hutu are considered to originate from Chad and the Niger, while the Tutsi, of Nilo-ethiopian origin, are thought to come from eastern Africa. The Batwa originate from the Congo Basin (Pygmies). This breakdown does not take into account the Ganwa (those of princely origin), nor a handful of other immigrant communities, nor those of mixed origins (mixed marriages having been common in the past). […] It also does not take into account the fact that within both groups there existed historically rankings of status nor that passage from one group to another, for instance becoming Tutsi from Hutu or Ganwa, was also possible. The Burundians all speak the same language, Kirundi, which is both the national and the official language. Other languages, as provided for in the Constitution, are also spoken. […] Despite ethnic differences, the Burundians live intermingled on the thousands of hills of the country without distinction on account of ethnicity. They are therefore inextricably bound to one another and cannot contemplate any notions of separation.

Although settlements have always been mixed, society in Burundi […] was built along a ‘class’ and ‘caste’ system. […] While their distinctions were not rigidly determined along ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ lines, […] there was significant correlation between class and ethnicity, with the Tutsis associated with the upper class and the Hutus with the lower class. This did not mean that all Tutsis were
upper class nor all Hutus lower class. Both class and the ethnic correlations were also dynamic. A Hutu could rise economically and socially and become a 'Tutsi'.

Hutu and Tutsi relationships were in the past cemented by their shared loyalty to common institutions. Kingship was such an institution; patron-client ties constituted another powerful socio-political institution. Patrons were expected to offer protection and gifts in exchange for services and offerings in kind. As social and political roles that once gave meaning and cohesion to membership in the community vanished, the use of the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' with ethnic connotations became more rigid. […] Today the use of the term 'Hutu' describes an ethnic group which is poorer and powerless, whereas the Tutsi, especially the Hima (a Tutsi subgroup), are the pre-eminent power holders. […] Nevertheless, the impression should not be created that the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' are figments as the "official truth" during the Bagaza period (1976-1987) would have it. This stance restricted discussion on the underlying problems of ethnicity and expression of ethnic differences without solving them."

CHR 19 March 2001, para. 100:
"La situation de la minorité twa mérite une attention particulière que malheureusement elle ne reçoit pas toujours. Les Twas sont sans doute le noyau le plus ancien de la population burundaise, comme dans d'autres pays des Grands Lacs; ils constituent aujourd'hui environ 1 % de la population."

Colonial rule and military regimes (1899-1992)

- 1962: Burundi becomes independent
- 25 years of a Tutsi dominated military dictatorship
- The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power
- 1980: creation of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu) by activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community in refugee camps in Tanzania

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 19-24:
"The transition from traditional power structures to 'modern' politics has by no means been an easy one. Two Ganwa (princely) dynasties continued fighting for control during the era of the colonial Powers, (first Germany from 1889 to 1918, then Belgium until 1962) as they had done during the pre-colonial era. The Party of Unity and National Progress (Uprona) was dominated by the Ganwa Bezi, while the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was led by the Ganwa Batare. In the legislative elections of September 1961 Uprona won, with Prince Rwagasoré as Prime Minister designate. A month later, however, Rwagasaré was assassinated. The political game switched from Ganwa to Hutu and Tutsi hands for the first time.

Burundi gained its independence from Belgium in July 1962. Until 1966 the crown continued to stabilize the situation. Violent incidents erupted after the elections in 1966, following which the Prime Minister, Michel Micombero, a Tutsi of the Hima group from Bururi, […] overthrew the monarchy and declared a republic, concentrating power in the army. The National Assembly was dissolved and later replaced with a committee of officers, which, by 1971, was made up of 24 Tutsi and 3 Hutu, and Uprona was declared the sole party. Serious intra-Tutsi rivalries for power emerged. At this time Hutu were already being systematically purged from the army. The transition from a Ganwa-run kingdom to a Tutsi-dominated military dictatorship to the exclusion of Hutus caused more violence. For the next 25 years Tutsi factions fought over control, turning the Hutu into scapegoats whenever the Hutu would rise up and demand more equitable power-
sharing. On the other hand, whenever efforts towards power-sharing were made, extremists from both groups would resort to violence, to delay or cancel them.

Massacres had taken place in 1965 and 1967, but the most serious ones took place in 1972 triggered by Hutu militants from the Burundian refugee community in Tanzania. Hundreds if not thousands of Tutsi were killed and there is widespread fear that what had happened to Rwanda’s Tutsi, namely, systematic subjection and extermination, would happen to them too. The Tutsi retaliation and repression that followed were instant. The first victims were Hutus with education: secondary school and university students, teachers, nurses, doctors, priests, pastors, drivers, headmasters, businessmen, shopkeepers, civil servants, bank clerks, professors. Most Hutu families lost members. Hutu widows moved to the city outskirts when their houses were seized by Tutsi. Many Tutsis also fled. Many left the interior, where they felt frightened among Hutu neighbours, and moved to Bujumbura to fill the many jobs now vacant. Others rushed to occupy the flat, fertile, palm-oil-producing strip of lake shore south of Bujumbura, after the flight of very many Hutu who had been living there. Reports have spoken of genocidal acts and of hundreds of thousands of Hutus killed. […]

These events had great reverberations in Burundi; yet, nothing was ever done about the massacres. There has never been an official inquiry into them, an accounting, or any effort to bring to justice those responsible for the killings. Thereafter there was no question of Hutus entering the army, and many refused to send their children to school, fearing they were exposing them to a future massacre. Those at school had no role models. The educated, competent, urbane were all Tutsi. That there was a "lost" Hutu generation is still evident today in the political life of the country.

There was little power-sharing following the massacres, even after Micombero was overthrown by his deputy chief of staff, Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, also a Hima (Tutsi subgroup). There were no massacres during Bagaza's 11-year rule and many refugees returned home. Bagaza reportedly hoped development would push his country through the ethnic deadlock. Observers note that he engaged in a series of reforms, without, however, addressing the ethnic issue. […] All provincial governors were Tutsi and most judges, university and school teachers, magistrates and heads of hospitals were Tutsi too. Uprona remained a Tutsi party and its members were the ones to benefit mostly from Bagaza's management of the economy. In the last years of the Bagaza regime corruption and nepotism reportedly flourished. […] In the meantime, in 1980 activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community formed the Palipehutu, or the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People, in refugee camps in Tanzania. Bagaza was himself deposed in 1987 by a group of army officers and a cousin of his and nephew of Micombero, Major Pierre Buyoya, became President.

In August 1988 frustrated Hutu hopes for an improvement were at the root of hundreds of ethnic killings. Thousands were killed. This time the regions most affected were Ntega commune in Kirundo province and Marangara commune in Ngozi province, both bordering Rwanda. Palipehutu members from Rwanda had been infiltrating into Burundi and sporadic fights were taking place until Hutus turned against the Tutsi community, many of them Rwandan refugees. The army pursued those assumed responsible (although it is unclear how much resistance these people who had no guns put up against the soldiers) […] and in the next eight days it reportedly killed large numbers of civilians, including women and children. More than 60,000 people poured into Rwanda across the swamps and the Akanyaru river. Others took refuge within Burundi in swamp areas. The massacres were surprising even to the Burundians. Hutu had to face the fact that the army was still prepared to use maximum force and Tutsi that Hutu could still massacre many Tutsi before soldiers reached the scene."

ACTS 30 September 2004:
“Despite the popular conception of the conflict as a Hutu-Tutsi struggle, most scholars agree that the protracted conflict is structural in nature, though articulated in ethnic terms. The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power.’ Governance practices by successive regimes galvanized political power and state control in the hands of a small elite group within the Tutsi community from particular parts of the country, who have since sustained their hold on power through repressive policies. Efforts by the Tutsi elite to retain political control and associated patronage networks, and violent counter-strategies of the Hutu political and armed groups have precipitated ethnic massacres and retaliatory radicalism marked by acts of genocide.”

Civil war and Peace Process in Burundi (1993-2008)

- 1993: Assassination of elected President Ndadaye triggers large-scale inter-ethnic violence
- 1996: Coup installs President Buyoya; sanctions imposed by neighbouring countries
- Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi signed in August 2000
- 2005: signing of ceasefire agreement between FNL and government; adoption of new constitution
- Local, legislative and presidential elections was held in various phases in 2005
- Security sector was profoundly restructured and the army is now ethnically balanced (2006)
- Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDFDD and FRODEBU – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence (2006)
- As of April 2008: the FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement

AFP 1 June 2005, factfile:
“...The civil war begun in 1993 has killed an estimated 300,000 people. […]

Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu president, elected in June 1993, was assassinated on October 21 of the same year during a failed coup organized by Tutsi military officers.

His successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira -- another Hutu -- was killed in April 1994 at the same time as then Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana died under suspicious circumstances when his plane was shot down over Kigali, sparking the genocide of up to a million Tutsis and Hutu moderates in Rwanda.

Ntaryamira's successor, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, also a Hutu, was overthrown in a non-violent coup in July 1996, and [Pierre " Buyoya returned to power.
In 1998, Buyoya reformed the constitution to create a transition government and began peace talks with Hutu and Tutsi opposition groups.

In August 2000 a peace agreement including a power-sharing deal was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, but the two main armed rebel groups refused to participate in the talks. Civil war continued to rage.

In November 2001, Buyoya took over as transitional leader for a period of 18 months, seconded by a Hutu vice-president whose signature is required on all presidential texts pertaining to security and the armed forces.
A 26-member power-sharing government was also sworn in to oversee the three-year transition. Buyoya was succeeded at the head of the transition government in May 2003 by his vice president Domitien Ndayizeye, who is seconded by a Tutsi, Alphonse Marie Kadage.

A ceasefire agreement was signed in December 2002 by the government and the main Hutu rebel movement, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), which finally entered government in November 2003.

A second Hutu armed group, the National Liberation Forces (FNL), finally signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on May 15, but the details of how this be implemented have still not yet been resolved.

A new constitution was adopted at the end of February, aimed at bringing about a peaceful democracy and ending the reign of the Tutsie tribe in power. Opposition has been voiced only by Tutsis concerned at losing too much power.

HRW 4 November 2005:
"Elections in 2005 were the final chapter in the transitional process established by the Arusha Accords of 2000. In the intervening period a government including the Hutu-dominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu), the Tutsi-dominated National Unity and Progress Party (Uprona), and a number of smaller parties ruled the country. In late 2003 this government signed the Pretoria Protocol making peace with the CNDDFDD and starting the process of integrating the former rebels into the army and the administration."

For more detailed information on 1993 events, see "Profile in displacement" (Report of the Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, 28 November 1994), paras. 29-36) [External link]

ICG 30 November 2006:
"In elections held between June and August 2005, the voters of Burundi elected their first democratic government since 1993. This marked an end to the transitional government established by the Arusha Agreement in 2001. The mainly Hutu former rebels of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), led by Pierre Nkurunziza, won a resounding victory and hold 58 per cent of the seats in parliament and 57 per cent in the communal councils, as well as twelve of the twenty government ministries. Nkurunziza was inaugurated as president on 26 August 2005.

The elections radically reconfigured politics. Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence. In the run-up to the elections, rebel forces were integrated into the national army, police and intelligence service. For the first time in Burundian history, these forces were ethnically balanced. Nkurunziza's government faced considerable challenges. Foremost was the process of transforming the CNDDFDD from a rebel movement into a democratic political party in power – one whose members had little civil administration experience. The government had to reconstruct an economy devastated by more than a decade of civil war and economic embargo, during which per capita income fell by 35 per cent and the number of people living below the poverty line doubled. During its first year it also had to deal with security problems in the capital and surrounding provinces caused by the remaining rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL. Unfortunately, the government's response to these challenges has increasingly manifested itself in disregard for the rule of law."

UNSC 28 November 2007:
“The signing of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the armed group Palipehutu-Forces nationales de libération (FNL) led by Agathon Rwasa on 7 September 2006 was a decisive step in the peace process in Burundi. However, its implementation remains difficult owing to persisting disagreements among the parties. The Agreement, which was the outcome of determined efforts of regional States united under the auspices of the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, addresses a number of issues including the integration of FNL ex-combatants into the Burundian National Defence Forces (FDN) and security forces, the participation of FNL elements in the institutions of the country and the rapid demobilization and reintegration of children associated with this armed group into their respective families and communities. Under the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism was established to oversee the demobilization of FNL combatants.

The signing of the Agreement was followed at first by a significant improvement in the security situation, characterized notably by a decrease both in the number of abuses perpetrated by armed groups and in the number of alleged FNL militants arrested by the National Defence Forces and the National Police of Burundi.”

PBC, 19 March 2008:
“[T]he Palipehutu-FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. In response, a Political Directorate had been established to assist the Mechanism in efforts to regain FNL's participation.”

IRIN, 14 January 2008:
“The FNL, the last rebel movement still active in Burundi, has resumed fighting government forces, especially in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza, where it is most active.

Though the movement signed a ceasefire accord with the government in September 2006, it has not been fully implemented. The joint verification and monitoring mechanism, which oversees its implementation, suspended activities in July 2007 after the FNL delegates walked out of talks over security concerns. They have since been accusing the facilitator, South African safety minister Charles Nqakula, of bias.”

ISS 3 April 2008:
“After intense diplomatic pressure from regional governments and the international community Burundi’s last rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL, has been brought back to the negotiating table that drew up a new roadmap designed to end the standoff by the end of June 2008. This breakthrough was reached in a February 23 meeting in Cape Town, South Africa. The meeting was attended by special envoys to Burundi from Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa, as well as representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.

The Cape Town meeting had been called to save the Burundi peace process after the FNL withdrew from its implementation, alleging bias on the part of the facilitator, South Africa’s Security Minister Charles Nqakula. To help address this challenge Minister Nqakula has followed the example of other peace processes by establishing a Group of Special Envoys for Burundi (GSEB), representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.”

Delrue August 2006:
“The success of Burundi’s transition to peace hinges on how its new government (elected in August 2005 and headed by former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza) and the international community deal with such post- displacement issues as land and property claims, reconciliation and transitional justice.
The link between displacement, return, reconciliation and successful transition towards a consolidated peace is frequently either underestimated or neglected by the international community."

For a comprehensive analysis of the political situation in Burundi, see

HRW, 12 March 2008:
"Several opposition politicians have been threatened and targeted for violence during the last 18 months. Nzomukunda, then second vice-president of the republic, fled Burundi in September 2006 after issuing a letter critical of the government; she returned in March 2007. Five parliamentarians from the opposition party Front for Democracy in Burundi (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi, Frodebu) and from a dissident wing of the CNDD-FDD, including Mpawenayo, were targeted in a set of grenade attacks in August 2007 that injured several bystanders. Pancrase Cimpaye, Frodebu spokesperson, was detained after suggesting the ruling party bore responsibility for the August attacks; after being released, he briefly left the country. In February 2008, a local Frodebu official was killed, while another was seriously injured in a grenade attack which killed his wife and child."

See also:
IRIN, BURUNDI: Government of consensus formed, 15 November 2007 [Internet]
ICG, 28 August 2007, Burundi: Finalising peace with the FNL [Internet]
Secretary-General welcomes signing of Burundi ceasefire agreement, United Nations Secretary General, 8 September 2006 [Internet]

Progress in regard to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (2005-2008)

- Reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression
- About 5,000 UN peacekeepers were in Burundi from June 2004 to the end of 2006, to monitor the country's transition to democracy, with South Africa contributing the majority of troops.
- The new Burundian government saw the peacekeepers as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible (2006)
- A new UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) continued the process of peace consolidation and of coordinating the UN system’s activities in Burundi from 2007

ISS 13 October 2006:
"In Burundi, reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, signed in August 2000 by 17 political parties, the National
Assembly and the government and the 2003 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Burundi and the principal rebel group, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), do include important provisions on the organization, structure, mandates and composition of postconflict security forces that will act professionally and apolitically, adhere to human rights norms, and provide defence and security to all Burundians.[…]

Although the Arusha Accords were signed in August 2000, the implementation of the security sector reform process they articulate was largely delayed until 2003, mainly because of continued warfare throughout most of Burundi. Indeed, the most active rebel movements in the field were marginalized throughout the Arusha negotiations and were thus not signatories to the Accord. Accordingly, it was not until the signing of a ceasefire between the government and the main rebel group – the CNDD-FDD – in 2003 that the reform process was set in motion. By July 2006, however, the reform of the defence and security forces had reached an advanced stage and had achieved most of its structural objectives (i.e. the integration of several armed groups into a single military and single police force), despite various financial- and material-related challenges.

The process of integrating the former rebel groups and the FAB into a new national defence force, the Forces de Défense Nationale (FDN), has been completed – largely to the satisfaction of the government and international donors – despite its late start due to disagreements on the definition of combatant and on the harmonization of rank between the rebel movements and the regular army.[…]

Despite this progress, a preliminary assessment of the reform of the FDN and the PNB and progress in the domain of social and economic reintegration and re-insertion of former combatants suggests that serious challenges remain in these critical areas. The local media frequently report human rights violations perpetrated by on-duty military or police or by demobilized combatants.

**Tufts University 30 July 2006:**
“The new Burundian government saw ONUB as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible. This perception was aggravated by two unfortunate choices made by leaders of the UN mission: to support Frodebu and former President Ndayizeye during the electoral campaign and proposing to coordinate the transition from humanitarian aid to development through a “Partners Council” deliberating without the government.”

**UNSC 18 December 2006:**
“Meanwhile, as delays in the start of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants have continued, criminal activities against the population, reportedly committed by FNL combatants, have increased since late October. Skirmishes between the national security forces and alleged FNL combatants and detentions of FNL elements and supporters have reportedly resumed in the north-western provinces. FNL recruitment, including of youths, has also been reported, particularly in Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural provinces.[…]

Once deployed, the AU special task force would therefore be expected to assume the responsibilities that were allocated to ONUB under the ceasefire agreement, namely: (a) protection of designated assembly areas for FNL combatants; (b) provision of engineering, logistical and administrative support for the establishment of the assembly areas; (c) disarmament of combatants; (d) storage of weapons collected from the disarmament process and their subsequent destruction; (e) transportation of disarmed FNL combatants from assembly areas to the designated demobilization centre or integration facilities of the National Defence Forces; and (f) protection of the demobilization centres. […]
Further delays in the agreement’s implementation, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants, are likely to lead to more friction between these combatants and the population and the national security services. In addition, there was an increase in localized conflicts involving the small FNL faction led by Jean Bosco Sindayigaya, which did not sign the ceasefire agreement.”

DPKO 20 December 2006:
“A new United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), authorized by Security Council resolution 1719 earlier this year, will continue the process of peace consolidation and be in charge of coordinating the United Nations system’s activities in Burundi for an initial period of one year.”

The mandate of BINUB is extended until 31 December 2008 (UNSC, 19 December 2007).

See also:
Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 31 Aug 2006
A technical analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - a case study from Burundi [Internet]


- Peace Building Commission approved in December 2007 a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation

UNSC 18 December 2006, para.22:
“Significant progress has been made in the establishment of peacebuilding coordination mechanisms between the Government and the United Nations. On 7 November, the Government created an Inter-Ministerial Peacebuilding Steering Committee, which will work with the United Nations, within the framework of an initial joint mechanism, in preparing the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission and the peacebuilding priority plan to be submitted to the Peacebuilding Fund. The inaugural meeting of the Government-United Nations joint mechanism was held on 16 November [2006], followed by several sessions at the policy and working levels. As a result, a common understanding was reached on the steps to be taken by the Government, with United Nations support, to secure resources from the Peacebuilding Fund. Progress was also made in developing the Government’s presentation to the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission. The mission of the Peacebuilding Support Office to Burundi in mid-November [2006] and the meetings it had with the United Nations and the Government’s Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee contributed significantly to this process.”

UNGA 5 December 2007:
“With a long-awaited conflict-recovery and development strategy for Burundi now in place, the Peacebuilding Commission today approved a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation -- both locally and in New York -- in priority areas
such as justice and security sector reform, generating jobs and making radical improvements to governance.

Meeting in its special “Burundi Configuration”, the Commission adopted the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism (MTM) of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. That Framework -- in place since June -- is the country-led integrated peacebuilding strategy now guiding the engagement and dialogue between Bujumbura, the United Nations and other international partners.

The Framework identified key objectives, major challenges and threats to peace, especially the implementation of a stagnant ceasefire agreement between Burundi and the National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL). Promoting inclusive growth, employment, transparency and human rights were among its other top priorities.”

See also:
Brookings Institution, 13 March 2008, The Role of Civil Society in Ending Displacement and Peacebuilding, by Elizabeth Ferris [Internet]

United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI), 12 Dec 2006 [Link below]

Peacebuilding Commission holds day-long discussion on Burundi, agrees on fund’s use to bolster government’s priority plan [Internet]

Challenges facing Burundi, requiring international help, indicated at country-specific meetings of Peacebuilding Commission [Internet]

Burundi government signs Nairobi pact including protocol on IDPs (December 2006)

MONUC 18 December 2006:  
“With the signing of the Nairobi pact this Friday December 15 2006 by DRC, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, it paves the way for security, stability and development in the region, after years of conflict.

Many African state leaders, including DRC president Joseph Kabila were in Nairobi Kenya for the two day summit that will go a long way to bringing the region out of the vicious cycle of humanitarian disaster, poverty, and repeated conflict.

The Great Lakes pact includes a $225 million security action plan to disarm rebel groups in Eastern DRC, and along border areas in Sudan, Kenya and Uganda.

Ms. Besida Tonwe, the Head of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in Central and East Africa, said that the conference was a long process of consultations in helping the Great Lakes Region to reconcile, rehabilitate, and reconstruct their societies in a politically delicate process.

‘It is also a process which in the future will continue to require financial support from the donor community and coherent assistance from the humanitarian community. It is now of utmost importance that there is a follow-up on the national implementation of the legal protocols adopted with the pact,’ she said.
‘The three protocols on humanitarian and social issues addressing sexual violence against women and children, property rights of returning persons, and the protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), are of the utmost importance,’ she concluded.”

IDMC 14 December 2006:
“The Pact is a culmination of more than four years of regional negotiations among States. It contains a package of measures which promises to enhance the lives of the forcibly displaced, including a regional protocol on protection and assistance for internally displaced, which when signed, will be the first legally binding regional instrument specifically dealing with IDPs anywhere in the world. A regional protocol on property rights of returning populations, and protocols which address some of the root causes of flight in the Great Lakes are also key elements of the Pact.”


- Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development

ISS 27 May 2005:
“Aside from calling for a cessation to violent conflict, the Arusha Accords [Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 28 August 2000]. provide comprehensive recommendations for stabilising and rehabilitating a highly polarised Burundian nation. The agreement is composed of five protocols each dedicated to a particular theme intended to move the process from peace-making to peace-building. These themes consist of an outline of the nature of the conflict; democracy and good governance; peace and security; reconstruction and development; and guarantees on the implementation of the agreement.

Importantly, the accords acknowledge that the Burundian ‘conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions… and stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power.’

Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development. It is therefore the ‘litmus test’ against which the performance of the transitional government (and other actors) as it relates to Arusha’s recommendations can be assessed.

Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Refugees and Sinistrés

The main conclusion and recommendations of Protocol IV states that:

‘Through the Burundi Peace Negotiations at Arusha it has been possible to assess how seriously the political and ethnic crisis that has torn Burundi apart since independence has affected Burundian society. Hundreds of thousands of Burundians are refugees, some of them for more than 25 years.

Hundreds of thousands more are forced to live in camps where conditions are appalling…. All Burundians are aware that a lasting peace is impossible so long as a definitive solution is not found to the problem of refugees and sinistrés. Likewise, peace is impossible so long as the country’s wealth is not shared equitably. Burundi cannot help the sinistrés rebuild destroyed property and restore its economy without the assistance of the international community.’
The UN concluded that there was a strong indication that the FLN had not acted alone in the massacre of Congolese refugees (2004-2005)

- One year of after the Gatumba massacre, those responsible remain free

**IRIN 5 Jan 2005:**
“The FNL claimed responsibility for a massacre in August of 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees at Gatumba transit camp on the Burundi side of the border with the DRC. The UN is continuing to investigate whether armed groups on the DRC side of the border, which are aligned to FNL, also took part.”

**UNSC 15 November 2004:**
“As requested by the Security Council by its presidential statement of 15 August 2004 (S/PRST/2004/30), ONUB, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights conducted a joint investigation into the massacre on 13 August of 152 Congolese refugees at the Gatumba refugee camp, located close to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The results of the investigation were transmitted to the Council by my letter to the President of the Council dated 15 October (S/2004/821). Despite extensive investigation, there is no clear evidence of who organized, carried out and financed that gross atrocity. The FNL (Rwasa) claim of responsibility has been supported by witness statements and led United Nations investigators to believe that the group did, indeed, participate in the attack. There is however, a strong indication that FNL (Rwasa) did not act alone. Unfortunately, the dearth of verifiable information and limited cooperation by the Burundian authorities hampered the formulation of a definitive report. A national investigation is still ongoing.”

**AI 18 August 2005:**
“On the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre, which took place in August 2004, Amnesty International calls on the forthcoming government of Burundi and the international community to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.

‘The new government should undertake to set up an independent and impartial body to investigate this and other massacres and those found to be responsible should be held to account,’ Amnesty International said today.

During the night of 13 August 2004, the refugee camp of Gatumba, located near the Congolese border, was attacked by an armed group. More than 160 Congolese refugees, predominantly children and women members of the Banyamulenge ethnic group from South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (DRC), were deliberately and systematically killed. On 14 August, the Palipehutu-FNL (Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu – Forces nationales de libération) claimed responsibility for the killings. The same day, the governments of Burundi and Rwanda and delegates of the Banyamulenge communities accused Congolese and Rwandese armed political groups based in the DRC of involvement in the massacre. According to UN investigators, evidence of the presence of ‘other groups’ was credible, but they were not able to categorically identify them.

Human rights organizations and the United Nations have strongly condemned this massacre and called for an independent, impartial and comprehensive investigation. Given the alleged involvement of armed political groups based in the DRC, there was concern that the killing could lead to a military intervention in the DRC by Burundi and Rwanda. Such an intervention could have led to further human rights abuses in the DRC.
Since then, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Burundian authorities have moved a few refugees to the Mwaro province, farther away from the border, others have returned to the DRC, while many others have moved to Bujumbura. So far, despite the indication from the Burundian Minister of Justice that the national investigation into the Gatumba massacre was completed, the United Nations Operations in Burundi stressed in a recent statement that, 'no investigation report has been issued by the government [of Burundi] and the authors of the attack remain free’.”

See also United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 13 Aug 2005
Burundi: Statement on the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre [Internet]

Causes of displacement


United Nations Resident Coordinator System for Burundi 1998, p. 5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronology of Population Movements</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>An estimated 200,000 Burundians flee from progroms and communal violence; many seek refuge in Tanzania, where most remain to this day.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>To escape the violence that broke out following the assassination of President Ndadaye, nearly 200,000 people leave the hills to seek protection in sites grouped around military posts. A vast majority are still there.</td>
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<td>1994-1996</td>
<td>The escalation of the civil conflict sparks massive population movements; the northwestern province of Cibitoke, sandwiched between the rebel bases in the mountainous Kibira forest and in neighboring Kivu, is particularly unstable. Large numbers seek refuge in neighboring Zaire (150,000) and Tanzania (250,000). Up to 400,000 congregate in sites inside the country.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>In the wake of the conquest of Zaire by the Kabila-led alliance, most of the refugees in Kivu return to Burundi, where they swell the numbers living in the displaced camps on the north-western provinces, particularly Cibitoke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>As a military strategy to regain control of rebel-held territory, the authorities forcibly regroup 250,000 civilians in Karuzi, Kanyanza and Muramvya provinces. Nearly all of them return home by the end of 1997, but the policy of controlled population movements continues to be implemented in other, more short-term forms elsewhere in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>Following the loss of their bases in the Kivu, the rebels regroup in Tanzania, and the main theatre of operations shifts to the southwest, along the ridge of the Nile-Congo watershed that is the main conduit into and out of the country for guerrilla groups. The ensuing destabilization leads to large scale displacement to new sites, again mainly along the main tarmac roads of the western plain, not only...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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in Makamba and Bururi provinces but also as far as north as Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza.

| 1997-1998 | As the military gradually established control in certain areas, the authorities begin to dismantle the big sites near main roads or major towns and create smaller, decentralized sites grouped around advanced military positions in the hills (Cibitoke, parts of Bururi, Bubanza). Elsewhere, short-term regroupment operations continue to be implemented in response to localized destabilization (Bujumbura Rural). |
| 1998     | Nearly all the sites in Cibitoke province, for so long the most unstable part of the country, are dismantled by June and the people return to their hills. At almost the same time, the crisis in neighboring Congo produces an influx of some eleven thousand people, which continues up to present. |

Causes of internal displacement: an analysis by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (1998)

- Pervasive psychology of "flee or be killed" is a lasting legacy of the 1972 massacres and the 1993 upheavals
- Displacement has also been used as a deliberate goal of violence since 1993
- Massive retaliation by the armed forces
- Suspicion towards the displaced population creates more displacement
- Use of violence and displacement as a way to achieve political or economical objectives

USCR 1998a, pp. 32-33:
"A history of massacres has taught the people of Burundi, regardless of their ethnicity, that their personal survival hinges on their ability to flee and seek a safer place temporarily. For many peasant Burundians, the lesson of the past is that violence can erupt suddenly and can rapidly become all-encompassing. It is a lesson handed down from generation to generation. Some of the underlying causes of internal displacement in Burundi follow:
First, a pervasive psychology of 'flee or be killed' has become the lasting legacy of the 1972 slaughter and the 1993 upheaval. The 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda has reinforced the psychology of flight in Burundi.
Second, the smaller massacres that have occurred almost daily since 1994 serve to validate the historical lessons of fear and mistrust. Fear is also ingrained that large number of Burundians have learned to flee their homes not only in reaction to danger but also in anticipation of it.
Third, much of Burundi’s displacement since 1993 has been caused by «ethnic cleansing.» Displacement is no longer merely as accidental by-product of violence; it has become a deliberate goal of violence.
Fourth, both ethnic groups of Burundi regard themselves as vulnerable. The sense of vulnerability has become an important part of the self-identity. Hutu are demographically dominant but see themselves as vulnerable to the political and military power of Tutsi. Tutsi are politically and militarily powerful but view themselves as vulnerable to the demographic dominance of Hutu. Members of both ethnic groups regard themselves as victims, despite the fact that many massacres in Burundian history have been largely one-sided.
Fifth, a pattern is evident in many violent eruptions over the decades: regardless of how violence begins, there is almost always massive retaliation against the Hutu by the Tutsi-dominated
military. As a result, many Hutu instinctively flee at the mere sight of soldiers or at the distant sound of their vehicles. The country's forces of order, unfortunately, create new disorder and displacement – deliberately in some cases, inadvertently in others.

Sixth, population displacement in Burundi often exacerbates rather than alleviates the conflict. Uprooted Burundians of one ethnic group are often regarded as dangerous by members of the other ethnic group. The military suspects that many internally displaced Hutu are rebels. Many Hutu suspect that camps of displaced Tutsi are bases for militia activity. There is some truth to these mutual suspicions. The result is that displacement at times begets more violence, causing still more people to flee. In short – at least in Burundi – displacement causes more displacement.

These are only partial explanations of the population displacement in Burundi, of course. This review of Burundi's history indicates that some actors create violence and displacement as a way to achieve political control by force that they are unable to achieve or maintain through nonviolent means. Some elements in Burundi create violence and displacement for the economic rewards it brings them through banditry, confiscation of property, and skimming of relief aid. Still other Burundians commits violence and force displacement based on pure fear or hate, reinforced by decades of grievances, real or imagined."


- 1996: government policy to move civilian populations into "regroupment" camps
- 1997: end of the large-scale, long-term "regroupment" policy
- 1998: short-term forced movement of populations continues, particularly in unstable western provinces
- Since September 1999, over 350,000 people were forcibly moved by government forces to 53 regroupment camps to deprive insurgent groups of local support
- Government explained that regroupment camps were established to protect civilians from the rebels
- Dismantlement of regroupment camps was precondition to peace negotiations and camps were dismantled by mid-2000

**USCR 2000 "regroupment"**

"Burundian authorities have pursued two waves of forced population relocation, or regroupment. The first regroupment wave occurred during 1996-98 when the government moved at least a quarter-million Hutu into 50 camps scattered throughout the country. Some observers estimated that up to 800,000 persons lived in the regroupment camps at that time. Most regroupment sites closed during 1998, allowing occupants to return home."

**HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":**


"In July and August 1999, the rebels launched increasingly frequent and damaging raids in and around Bujumbura, killing dozens of civilians as well as some soldiers. The army retaliated with attacks that killed more than one hundred civilians as well as combatants and the government tightened an existing curfew. These measures failed to satisfy Tutsi extremists in Bujumbura who demanded more drastic action to protect the city and to repress the rebellion. With rumors circulating of a possible coup and of violence being organized by extremists, the government decided to impose a policy of regroupment on most of Bujumbura-rural, particularly on areas inhabited largely by Hutu and near the city."

**HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":**
"In mid-1999, it [the government] had revived the regroupment policy in parts of southeastern Burundi before deciding to extend it to the area of the capital in September."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"The Tutsi-dominated government of Burundi, combating rebellions among the Hutu majority, began forcing civilians in the area around the capital into so-called "protection sites" or "regroupment camps" beginning in late September 1999. Burundian authorities claimed the measure was intended to protect the civilians, most of them Hutu, from attack by the rebel National Liberation Forces (Forces Nationales pour la Libération, FNL) who were becoming increasingly well-entrenched in the area. In fact, they meant to deprive the FNL of support from local people who helped them, sometimes willingly, sometimes under duress. By removing civilian support, the authorities hoped to isolate the FNL and thus reduce its increasingly frequent attacks on the capital. They hoped also to quiet Tutsi extremists who accused them of weakness in confronting the rebel threat."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"By the end of 1999, authorities had obliged some 80 percent of the population of the province of Bujumbura-rural-some 350,000 people-to live in fifty-three camps. Although regroupment helped reduce attacks on the capital city, rebels remained firmly established in rural areas. They simply shifted from one place to another when attacked by the army, which had insufficient troops available to control the whole region at the same time. Rebels continued to live off the crops of local people and even to inhabit the houses of those forced to live in the camps."

USCR 2000, "Regroupment":
"The country included at least three types of internal displacement: up to 200,000 people, primarily rural Tutsi, who have lived for six years in designated camps protected by government soldiers and thousands, who have become displaced in the countryside or at makeshift sites for varying lengths of time; and nearly 350,000 Hutu whom the government required to live in so-called 'regroupment' camps."

Dismantlement of regroupment camps (2000)

USCR 2000, "Regroupment":
"Government authorities argued that the camps were a temporary measure to protect civilians from attack and deprive rebel groups of food and lodging in rural areas. Burundian officials urged international humanitarian organizations to provide food, water, sanitation, and medical care to the sites. Burundian President Pierre Buyoya visited several sites in October [1999] and stated that conditions there were better than portrayed by aid agencies. The regroupment camps were 'no dramatic situation,' he assured."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"The international community severely criticized the policy of regroupment. In January 2000, the Burundian government promised to begin closing the camps but it made little progress in doing so until early June. At that time, rebel leaders made closing the camps a precondition for peace negotiations and former South African President Nelson Mandela, facilitator for the negotiations, condemned the regroupment sites as 'concentration camps.' Under this pressure, President Pierre Buyoya agreed that everyone in the camps would be allowed to return home by the end of July."

For an analysis on how forced displacement in 2000 of 350,000 civilians was carried out in violation of international law, including the Un Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, see HRW June 2000 "Violation of international law & Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" [link below]
See also "Policy of the international humanitarian community regarding provision assistance in the context of forced relocation (1999-2000)" [Internal link]

Fighting between FNL and army displaced thousands in Bujumbura Rural (2004-2008)

- Combatants of FNL fought so called FNL "dissidents", causing displacement in October 2007
- FNL is the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government
- Population displacement reduced in 2005 compared to 2003-2004
- Little population displacement in 2006, but the populations of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural, have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL

IRIN 23 April 2008:
"The resumption of violence in and around Bujumbura is causing panic in the country. Outside the capital, residents spend their nights in the bush for fear of being attacked, as the death toll rose to 33. A bomb destroyed part of the Vatican embassy compound and a dining hall in the Kiriri University campus on 22 April [2008].
"We call on the army to remove its heavy arms from our campus," a student said, reacting to the installation of rocket launchers aimed at rebuffing attacks by the rebel FNL. On 18 April, attacks were launched on military positions in Gihosha, Kanyosha, Kamenge and Musaga areas."

NRC, May 2008:
In April 2008 serious violations of the 6 September 2006 ceasefire between the Burundian Army (FDN) and the rebel group Palipehutu-FNL (FNL) occurred. The most reported events took place in the capital city, Bujumbura, where three attacks took place on April 17, 18 and 22. Violence sprung in several provinces around the country (Bujumbura Rurale, Bubanza, Cibitoke and Kayanza), but Bujumbura Rurale province has been the most affected province, witnessing displacements of population.[...]

At the peak of displacement it was reported that there were:
- 4,050 households displaced in Isale commune or 20,100 people out of 83,000 inhabitants concentrated mostly in 6 sites in the centre of the commune, Rushubi on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 5,102 households displaced in Muyira and Kirombwe, both at Kanyosha commune on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 4,305 households displaced in Kabezi centre in three different sites on May 7 (data Kabezi local administration).
- 3,166 households displaced in Gitaza centre and 1,100 in Rutongo, both at Muhuta commune (data Muhuta local administration).
- And fewer numbers of IDPs registered in Bugarama, Mutambu and Nyabiraba communes (several hundreds of households)."

IRIN, 25 October 2007:
"Fighters of Burundi's last active rebel group have for the second time in one week attacked a position occupied by a break-away faction, forcing villagers to flee their homes, a senior military official said."
The evening raid by combatants of the Front National de Liberation (FNL), led by Agathon Rwasa, took place on 24 October [2007] evening on a site where the so-called FNL "dissidents" have gathered in Gakungwe village of Kabezi commune in Bujumbura Rural province.

It forced hundreds of people from surrounding villages to run away as the army sent reinforcements to the area to guard the splinter faction's settlement, residents said.

"There has indeed been such an attack and the heavy exchange of gunfire was heard," deputy army chief of staff Major General Godefroid Niyuhire told IRIN on 25 October. There were, however, no casualties during the attack, he said.

The "dissidents" say they fought with Rwasa for the FNL, but Rwasa's supporters have denied their claims and accused the government of creating a faction within the FNL. Rwasa has said these men, who intend to join the country's peace process, are not even party to a 2006 ceasefire agreement signed between the government and the FNL.

**OCHA 23 June 2005:**
"Population displacement due to insecurity and armed conflict reduced markedly in the first months of the year [2005] and as compared to the period 2003-2004. Populations in the province of Bujumbura rural, where recurrent waves of displacement had taken place throughout 2004, are gradually resettling and returning to zones of origin and no sizeable population movements were registered in the first semester of the year."

**IRIN 4 January 2005:**
"Thousands of civilians have been displaced following fierce fighting on Saturday in Burundi's western province of Bujumbura Rural.

The internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not received aid, the governor of the province, Ignace Ntawembarira, said.

Fighting was reported in the communes of Isale, Nyabiraba and Kanyosha, east of the capital, Bujumbura, between the rebel faction Forces nationales de libération (FNL) of Agathon Rwasa, and a coalition of the Burundian army and troops loyal to Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the former largest rebel faction in the country, the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces de defense pour la democratie (CNDD-FDD)."

**UNSC 27 October 2006:**
"In the period under review [August 2005-September 2006], the security situation was characterized by renewed clashes between FDN and FNL, mainly in the north-western provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural. The populations of these provinces have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL. In 2006, 107 cases of attacks and looting by FNL were reported."

**Fighting between government and FLN troops causes the displacement of thousands in Bubanza Province (2008)**

- FNL - the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government – caused displacement at the end of 2007

**IRIN 14 January 2008:**
About 1,400 families (8,400 people) displaced in Musigati commune in the northwestern province of Bubanza, following fighting between government forces and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), desperately need help, according to local officials.

Laurent Kagamba, adviser to the Musigati administrator, said that since the simultaneous attacks on three military positions on 28 December [2007] and another on 9 January [2008] in the same commune, residents had fled their homes. Some sought refuge in Musigati parish, others at Musigati and Kabere trade centres, as well as Busiga coffee factory, he said.

IRIN 10 September 2007:
“Residents of 700 households, or about 4,000 people, have fled their homes in the northwest Burundi province of Bubanza following raids by suspected members of the country's last active rebel group, a government official said.

‘For the time being, security is not good at all. Some residents have been beaten, while others have had their property looted,' the governor of Bubanza, Pascal Nyabenda, told IRIN.’

He said Forces nationales de libération (FNL) fighters had raided homes in Bubanza from their hideouts in the nearby Kibira and Rukoko forests. Those displaced were spending the nights in the compound of a local parish, venturing out for a few hours during the day to work in their fields, Nyabenda said.

For information on displacement by fighting between government and FNL troops in Bubanza Province in previous years, see:
ITEKA, 9 August 2006, Burundi: Des perones armées et des combattants du Palipehutu_Fnl mènent des attaues répétées dans certaines communes de Bubanza
ITEKA, 24 August 2005, Burundi: Des déplacés de guerre en commune Musigati sans assistance [Link below]
IRIN, 14 June 2005, Burundi: Thousands displaced in Bubanza [Link below]

Some of the Burundian refugees expelled from Tanzania have no house or land (2006)

UN 30 November 2006:
Over 3,000 Burundians who had found refuge in Tanzania were forced to return in 2006: “Many new arrivals report others being forced to leave and the 3,000 who have come back so far, only seem to be the tip of the iceberg. Nobody knows for sure how many Burundians live in Tanzania without having regularized their stay, but most estimate around 150,000 persons. This will remain a key challenge in 2007, especially since the new arrivals need assistance and in particular so-called sans addresses like Elias, who hopes that “the Burundian Government can find us a plot of land where I can build a house and send my children to school.”"

NRC November 2006:
“Since June 2006, Tanzania has been implementing a national plan for the repatriation of refugees from Tanzania. In this framework, persons without refugee status or any other legal status in Tanzania have been forcibly removed from Tanzania. This year, more than 4000 Burundians have been expelled from Tanzania, mainly from Ngara district towards Muyinga province.”

See also:
UNHCR, 23 Oct 2006, Growing numbers of Burundians return home from the DRC [Internet]
Other causes of displacement

Tens of thousands were displaced due to floods (2007)

- Since November 2006, close to 300,000 people were affected by the heavy floods

IRIN 9 February 2007:

Les pluies diluviennes qui tombent depuis novembre 2006 ont détruit les cultures et infrastructures de plusieurs régions, obligeant le gouvernement à mettre en place un fonds de solidarité pour venir en aide aux déplacés victimes des inondations dans les provinces de Muyinga, Kirundo, Cankuzo, Karuzi, Kayanza, Ngozi et Muyinga. »

IRIN 15 January 2007:
“Thousands of people in northwestern Burundi, displaced after days of heavy rainfall, urgently need relief aid, officials said on Monday.

"The rains have rendered more than 3,000 residents homeless," said Prosper Banzambe, the chief of Gatumba Zone, one of the affected areas in Mitumbuzi Commune, Bujumbura Rural Province.

He said the displaced, some of whom had sought shelter in a local church, needed food and other non-food aid such as blankets, jerry cans, soap and mosquito nets.

The rains, which pounded the area at the weekend, destroyed at least 500 homes. The flooding of the nearby River Kiziba contributed to the houses’ collapse.

Banzambe expressed concern that the continuing rains could cause more damage in Gatumba and appealed for a temporary shelter for the displaced.

He urged humanitarian organisations to help the displaced, saying the local administration was unable to "adequately meet their needs". […]

On 4 January [2007], the government set up a national solidarity fund to support people affected by floods in seven provinces. In a decree, President Pierre Nkurunziza declared the provinces of Kayanza in the north, Muramvya and Karuzi in the central part of the country, Ruyigi in the east, and Bubanza and Cibitoke in the northwest, as "hunger-stricken following floods".

He also announced the establishment of the solidarity fund, to which every Burundian must contribute for four months from the end of January.”

AFP 16 January 2007:
“Heavy rains pounding Burundi’s capital and outlying areas have killed at least four people and left about 23,000 homeless since the downpours began last month, officials said Tuesday."
They said the situation was "catastrophic" after the floods destroyed farmlands, sparking fears of food shortages and disease outbreaks in the tiny central African nation emerging from more than a decade of civil strife."

**Famine in north and east causes internal displacement (2005-2006)**

- Many of the people who flee due to food insecurity are newly repatriated refugees

**OCHA 16 January 2005:**

"[R]esidents of Northern provinces continue to flee inside and outside Burundi due to food insecurity. As of 14 January [2005], a joint visit conducted by OCHA Ruyigi sub office and the provincial administration authorities confirmed the presence in Kabuyenge IDP site, in Gisuru Commune, of 63 families who fled Busoni and Bugabira communes (Kirundo Province) in search of food. OCHA, in collaboration with the administration authorities convened a meeting with humanitarian actors in the province to discuss an emergency response."

**OCHA 23 June 2005:**

"Cycles of drought periods, loss of staple crops, poor yields during three consecutive agriculture seasons and fragile nutritional conditions were particularly important in the northern Burundian provinces, which were also affected by waves of population movements both internal and across the border into Rwanda."

**OCHA 5 March 2005:**

"Despite food aid distributed by WFP and partners, the food security situation remains disconcerting mainly in Northern and Eastern provinces. Continuous internal and cross-border displacement of the population continues to be part of the coping strategies. Around 7,900 Burundian asylum seekers were reported in Tanzania. Meanwhile, 131 internally displaced persons were registered in Cankuzo coming from Kirundo. However, many more internal movements remain unrecorded."

**ITEKA 21 February 2006:**

"La plupart de ces migrants sont de nouveaux rapatriés qui n'ont pas eu où s'installer. Ils sont en train de migrer à la quête de quoi manger. Malheureusement, la population de la province de Cankuzo a également faim et ne peut pas les aider. Les prix des vivres montent chaque jour."
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Conflict and displacement: background and development

Ethnic background and pre-colonial times

- Total population: 7.1 million
- Composite population comprising Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%) and Batwa (1%)(colonial census)
- Numerous interrelations between the ethnic groups (marriage, language, common monarchy)
- The Batwa are most likely the most ancient ethnic group in Burundi but they are marginalized in Burundi society

AFP 25 February 2005:
“GEOGRAPHY: Landlocked in central Africa, bounded by Rwanda in the north, Tanzania to the east and south, and the vast Democratic Republic of Congo to the west. One of the smallest states on the African continent, Burundi covers 27,834 square kilometers (10,747 square miles).

- POPULATION: 7.1 million, of which around 85 percent are Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi. The remaining one percent of the population are pygmies called Twas. One of the most densely populated African countries.

- CAPITAL: Bujumbura (population 300,000)

- LANGUAGES: Kirundi (national), French (administrative), Swahili (local)

- RELIGION: Christian (70 percent); Animist (15 percent); Muslim (15 percent).”

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 15-17:
"Burundi is situated in Central Africa, along Lake Tanganyika and shares borders with Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. [...] According to statistics dating back to the 1930s, 85 per cent of the population are Hutu, 14 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Batwa. The Hutu are considered to originate from Chad and the Niger, while the Tutsi, of Nilo-ethiopian origin, are thought to come from eastern Africa. The Batwa originate from the Congo Basin (Pygmies). This breakdown does not take into account the Ganwa (those of princely origin), nor a handful of other immigrant communities, nor those of mixed origins (mixed marriages having been common in the past). [...] It also does not take into account the fact that within both groups there existed historically rankings of status nor that passage from one group to another, for instance becoming Tutsi from Hutu or Ganwa, was also possible. The Burundians all speak the same language, Kirundi, which is both the national and the official language. Other languages, as provided for in the Constitution, are also spoken. [...] Despite ethnic differences, the Burundians live intermingled on the thousands of hills of the country without distinction on account of ethnicity. They are therefore inextricably bound to one another and cannot contemplate any notions of separation.

Although settlements have always been mixed, society in Burundi [...] was built along a 'class' and 'caste' system. [...] While their distinctions were not rigidly determined along 'ethnic' or 'tribal' lines, [...] there was significant correlation between class and ethnicity, with the Tutsis associated with the upper class and the Hutus with the lower class. This did not mean that all Tutsis were
upper class nor all Hutus lower class. Both class and the ethnic correlations were also dynamic. A Hutu could rise economically and socially and become a 'Tutsi'.

Hutu and Tutsi relationships were in the past cemented by their shared loyalty to common institutions. Kingship was such an institution; patron-client ties constituted another powerful socio-political institution. Patrons were expected to offer protection and gifts in exchange for services and offerings in kind. As social and political roles that once gave meaning and cohesion to membership in the community vanished, the use of the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' with ethnic connotations became more rigid. [...] Today the use of the term 'Hutu' describes an ethnic group which is poorer and powerless, whereas the Tutsi, especially the Hima (a Tutsi subgroup), are the pre-eminent power holders. [...] Nevertheless, the impression should not be created that the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' are figments as the "official truth" during the Bagaza period (1976-1987) would have it. This stance restricted discussion on the underlying problems of ethnicity and expression of ethnic differences without solving them."

CHR 19 March 2001, para. 100:
"La situation de la minorité twa mérite une attention particulière que malheureusement elle ne reçoit pas toujours. Les Twas sont sans doute le noyau le plus ancien de la population burundaise, comme dans d'autres pays des Grands Lacs; ils constituent aujourd'hui environ 1 % de la population."

Colonial rule and military regimes (1899-1992)

- 1962: Burundi becomes independent
- 25 years of a Tutsi dominated military dictatorship
- The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power
- 1980: creation of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu) by activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community in refugee camps in Tanzania

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 19-24:
"The transition from traditional power structures to 'modern' politics has by no means been an easy one. Two Ganwa (princely) dynasties continued fighting for control during the era of the colonial Powers, (first Germany from 1889 to 1918, then Belgium until 1962) as they had done during the pre-colonial era. The Party of Unity and National Progress (Uprona) was dominated by the Ganwa Bezi, while the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was led by the Ganwa Batare. In the legislative elections of September 1961 Uprona won, with Prince Rwagasoré as Prime Minister designate. A month later, however, Rwagasoré was assassinated. The political game switched from Ganwa to Hutu and Tutsi hands for the first time.

Burundi gained its independence from Belgium in July 1962. Until 1966 the crown continued to stabilize the situation. Violent incidents erupted after the elections in 1966, following which the Prime Minister, Michel Micombero, a Tutsi of the Hima group from Bururi, [...] overthrew the monarchy and declared a republic, concentrating power in the army. The National Assembly was dissolved and later replaced with a committee of officers, which, by 1971, was made up of 24 Tutsi and 3 Hutu, and Uprona was declared the sole party. Serious intra-Tutsi rivalries for power emerged. At this time Hutu were already being systematically purged from the army. The transition from a Ganwa-run kingdom to a Tutsi-dominated military dictatorship to the exclusion of Hutus caused more violence. For the next 25 years Tutsi factions fought over control, turning the Hutu into scapegoats whenever the Hutu would rise up and demand more equitable power-
sharing. On the other hand, whenever efforts towards power-sharing were made, extremists from both groups would resort to violence, to delay or cancel them.

Massacres had taken place in 1965 and 1967, but the most serious ones took place in 1972 triggered by Hutu militants from the Burundian refugee community in Tanzania. Hundreds if not thousands of Tutsi were killed and there is widespread fear that what had happened to Rwanda’s Tutsi, namely, systematic subjection and extermination, would happen to them too. The Tutsi retaliation and repression that followed were instant. The first victims were Hutus with education: secondary school and university students, teachers, nurses, doctors, priests, pastors, drivers, headmasters, businessmen, shopkeepers, civil servants, bank clerks, professors. Most Hutu families lost members. Hutu widows moved to the city outskirts when their houses were seized by Tutsi. Many Tutsis also fled. Many left the interior, where they felt frightened among Hutu neighbours, and moved to Bujumbura to fill the many jobs now vacant. Others rushed to occupy the flat, fertile, palm-oil-producing strip of lake shore south of Bujumbura, after the flight of very many Hutu who had been living there. Reports have spoken of genocidal acts and of hundreds of thousands of Hutus killed. […]

These events had great reverberations in Burundi; yet, nothing was ever done about the massacres. There has never been an official inquiry into them, an accounting, or any effort to bring to justice those responsible for the killings. Thereafter there was no question of Hutus entering the army, and many refused to send their children to school, fearing they were exposing them to a future massacre. Those at school had no role models. The educated, competent, urbane were all Tutsi. That there was a "lost" Hutu generation is still evident today in the political life of the country.

There was little power-sharing following the massacres, even after Micombero was overthrown by his deputy chief of staff, Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, also a Hima (Tutsi subgroup). There were no massacres during Bagaza's 11-year rule and many refugees returned home. Bagaza reportedly hoped development would push his country through the ethnic deadlock. Observers note that he engaged in a series of reforms, without, however, addressing the ethnic issue. […] All provincial governors were Tutsi and most judges, university and school teachers, magistrates and heads of hospitals were Tutsi too. Upronca remained a Tutsi party and its members were the ones to benefit mostly from Bagaza's management of the economy. In the last years of the Bagaza regime corruption and nepotism reportedly flourished. […] In the meantime, in 1980 activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community formed the Palipehutu, or the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People, in refugee camps in Tanzania. Bagaza was himself deposed in 1987 by a group of army officers and a cousin of his and nephew of Micombero, Major Pierre Buyoya, became President.

In August 1988 frustrated Hutu hopes for an improvement were at the root of hundreds of ethnic killings. Thousands were killed. This time the regions most affected were Ntega commune in Kirundo province and Marangara commune in Ngozi province, both bordering Rwanda. Palipehutu members from Rwanda had been infiltrating into Burundi and sporadic fights were taking place until Hutus turned against the Tutsi community, many of them Rwandan refugees. The army pursued those assumed responsible (although it is unclear how much resistance these people who had no guns put up against the soldiers) […] and in the next eight days it reportedly killed large numbers of civilians, including women and children. More than 60,000 people poured into Rwanda across the swamps and the Akanyaru river. Others took refuge within Burundi in swamp areas. The massacres were surprising even to the Burundians. Hutu had to face the fact that the army was still prepared to use maximum force and Tutsi that Hutu could still massacre many Tutsi before soldiers reached the scene."

**ACTS 30 September 2004:**
“Despite the popular conception of the conflict as a Hutu-Tutsi struggle, most scholars agree that the protracted conflict is structural in nature, though articulated in ethnic terms. The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power.’ Governance practices by successive regimes galvanized political power and state control in the hands of a small elite group within the Tutsi community from particular parts of the country, who have since sustained their hold on power through repressive policies. Efforts by the Tutsi elite to retain political control and associated patronage networks, and violent counter-strategies of the Hutu political and armed groups have precipitated ethnic massacres and retaliatory radicalism marked by acts of genocide.”

Civil war and Peace Process in Burundi (1993-2008)

- 1993: Assassination of elected President Ndadaye triggers large-scale inter-ethnic violence
- 1996: Coup installs President Buyoya; sanctions imposed by neighbouring countries
- Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi signed in August 2000
- 2005: signing of ceasefire agreement between FNL and government; adoption of new constitution
- Local, legislative and presidential elections was held in various phases in 2005
- Security sector was profoundly restructured and the army is now ethnically balanced (2006)
- Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and FRODEBU – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence (2006)
- As of April 2008: the FNL had withdrawn
  - from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement

AFP 1 June 2005, factfile:
“...The civil war begun in 1993 has killed an estimated 300,000 people.[...]

Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu president, elected in June 1993, was assassinated on October 21 of the same year during a failed coup organized by Tutsi military officers.

His successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira -- another Hutu -- was killed in April 1994 at the same time as then Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana died under suspicious circumstances when his plane was shot down over Kigali, sparking the genocide of up to a million Tutsis and Hutu moderates in Rwanda.

Ntaryamira's successor, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, also a Hutu, was overthrown in a non-violent coup in July 1996, and [Pierre " Buyoya returned to power.

In 1998, Buyoya reformed the constitution to create a transition government and began peace talks with Hutu and Tutsi opposition groups.

In August 2000 a peace agreement including a power-sharing deal was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, but the two main armed rebel groups refused to participate in the talks. Civil war continued to rage.

In November 2001, Buyoya took over as transitional leader for a period of 18 months, seconded by a Hutu vice-president whose signature is required on all presidential texts pertaining to security and the armed forces.
A 26-member power-sharing government was also sworn in to oversee the three-year transition. Buyoya was succeeded at the head of the transition government in May 2003 by his vice president Domitien Ndayizeye, who is seconded by a Tutsi, Alphonse Marie Kadage.

A ceasefire agreement was signed in December 2002 by the government and the main Hutu rebel movement, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), which finally entered government in November 2003.

A second Hutu armed group, the National Liberation Forces (FNL), finally signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on May 15, but the details of how this be implemented have still not yet been resolved.

A new constitution was adopted at the end of February, aimed at bringing about a peaceful democracy and ending the reign of the Tutsie tribe in power. Opposition has been voiced only by Tutsis concerned at losing too much power.”

HRW 4 November 2005:
“Elections in 2005 were the final chapter in the transitional process established by the Arusha Accords of 2000. In the intervening period a government including the Hutudominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu), the Tutsi-dominated National Unity and Progress Party (Uprona), and a number of smaller parties ruled the country. In late 2003 this government signed the Pretoria Protocol making peace with the CNDDFDD and starting the process of integrating the former rebels into the army and the administration.”

For more detailed information on 1993 events, see “Profile in displacement” (Report of the Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, 28 November 1994), paras. 29-36) [External link]

ICG 30 November 2006:
“In elections held between June and August 2005, the voters of Burundi elected their first democratic government since 1993. This marked an end to the transitional government established by the Arusha Agreement in 2001. The mainly Hutu former rebels of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), led by Pierre Nkurunziza, won a resounding victory and hold 58 per cent of the seats in parliament and 57 per cent in the communal councils, as well as twelve of the twenty government ministries. Nkurunziza was inaugurated as president on 26 August 2005.

The elections radically reconfigured politics. Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence. In the run-up to the elections, rebel forces were integrated into the national army, police and intelligence service. For the fist time in Burundian history, these forces were ethnically balanced. Nkurunziza’s government faced considerable challenges. Foremost was the process of transforming the CNDDFDD from a rebel movement into a democratic political party in power – one whose members had little civil administration experience. The government had to reconstruct an economy devastated by more than a decade of civil war and economic embargo, during which per capita income fell by 35 per cent and the number of people living below the poverty line doubled. During its first year it also had to deal with security problems in the capital and surrounding provinces caused by the remaining rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL. Unfortunately, the government’s response to these challenges has increasingly manifested itself in disregard for the rule of law.”

UNSC 28 November 2007:
“The signing of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the armed group Palipehutu-Forces nationales de libération (FNL) led by Agathon Rwasa on 7 September 2006 was a decisive step in the peace process in Burundi. However, its implementation remains difficult owing to persisting disagreements among the parties. The Agreement, which was the outcome of determined efforts of regional States united under the auspices of the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, addresses a number of issues including the integration of FNL ex-combatants into the Burundian National Defence Forces (FDN) and security forces, the participation of FNL elements in the institutions of the country and the rapid demobilization and reintegration of children associated with this armed group into their respective families and communities. Under the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism was established to oversee the demobilization of FNL combatants.

The signing of the Agreement was followed at first by a significant improvement in the security situation, characterized notably by a decrease both in the number of abuses perpetrated by armed groups and in the number of alleged FNL militants arrested by the National Defence Forces and the National Police of Burundi.”

PBC, 19 March 2008:
“[T]he Palipehutu-FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. In response, a Political Directorate had been established to assist the Mechanism in efforts to regain FNL's participation.”

IRIN, 14 January 2008:
“The FNL, the last rebel movement still active in Burundi, has resumed fighting government forces, especially in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza, where it is most active.

Though the movement signed a ceasefire accord with the government in September 2006, it has not been fully implemented. The joint verification and monitoring mechanism, which oversees its implementation, suspended activities in July 2007 after the FNL delegates walked out of talks over security concerns. They have since been accusing the facilitator, South African safety minister Charles Nqakula, of bias.”

ISS 3 April 2008:
“After intense diplomatic pressure from regional governments and the international community Burundi’s last rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL, has been brought back to the negotiating table that drew up a new roadmap designed to end the standoff by the end of June 2008. This breakthrough was reached in a February 23 meeting in Cape Town, South Africa. The meeting was attended by special envoys to Burundi from Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa, as well as representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.

The Cape Town meeting had been called to save the Burundi peace process after the FNL withdrew from its implementation, alleging bias on the part of the facilitator, South Africa’s Security Minister Charles Nqakula. To help address this challenge Minister Nqakula has followed the example of other peace processes by establishing a Group of Special Envoys for Burundi (GSEB), representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.”

Delrue August 2006:
“The success of Burundi’s transition to peace hinges on how its new government (elected in August 2005 and headed by former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza) and the international community deal with such post-displacement issues as land and property claims, reconciliation and transitional justice.
The link between displacement, return, reconciliation and successful transition towards a consolidated peace is frequently either underestimated or neglected by the international community.

For a comprehensive analysis of the political situation in Burundi, see

HRW, 12 March 2008:
“Several opposition politicians have been threatened and targeted for violence during the last 18 months. Nzomukunda, then second vice-president of the republic, fled Burundi in September 2006 after issuing a letter critical of the government; she returned in March 2007. Five parliamentarians from the opposition party Front for Democracy in Burundi (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi, Frodebu) and from a dissident wing of the CNDD-FDD, including Mpawenayo, were targeted in a set of grenade attacks in August 2007 that injured several bystanders. Pancrace Cimpaye, Frodebu spokesperson, was detained after suggesting the ruling party bore responsibility for the August attacks; after being released, he briefly left the country. In February 2008, a local Frodebu official was killed, while another was seriously injured in a grenade attack which killed his wife and child.”

See also:
IRIN, BURUNDI: Government of consensus formed, 15 November 2007 [Internet]

ICG, 28 August 2007, Burundi: Finalising peace with the FNL [Internet]


Secretary-General welcomes signing of Burundi ceasefire agreement, United Nations Secretary General, 8 September 2006 [Internet]

Progress in regard to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (2005-2008)

- Reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression
- About 5,000 UN peacekeepers were in Burundi from June 2004 to the end of 2006, to monitor the country's transition to democracy, with South Africa contributing the majority of troops.
- The new Burundian government saw the peacekeepers as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible (2006)
- A new UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) continued the process of peace consolidation and of coordinating the UN system’s activities in Burundi from 2007

ISS 13 October 2006:
*In Burundi, reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, signed in August 2000 by 17 political parties, the National
Assembly and the government and the 2003 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Burundi and the principal rebel group, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), do include important provisions on the organization, structure, mandates and composition of postconflict security forces that will act professionally and apolitically, adhere to human rights norms, and provide defence and security to all Burundians.[…]

Although the Arusha Accords were signed in August 2000, the implementation of the security sector reform process they articulate was largely delayed until 2003, mainly because of continued warfare throughout most of Burundi. Indeed, the most active rebel movements in the field were marginalized throughout the Arusha negotiations and were thus not signatories to the Accord. Accordingly, it was not until the signing of a ceasefire between the government and the main rebel group – the CNDD-FDD – in 2003 that the reform process was set in motion. By July 2006, however, the reform of the defence and security forces had reached an advanced stage and had achieved most of its structural objectives (i.e. the integration of several armed groups into a single military and single police force), despite various financial- and material-related challenges.

The process of integrating the former rebel groups and the FAB into a new national defence force, the Forces de Défense Nationale (FDN), has been completed – largely to the satisfaction of the government and international donors – despite its late start due to disagreements on the definition of combatant and on the harmonization of rank between the rebel movements and the regular army.[…]

Despite this progress, a preliminary assessment of the reform of the FDN and the PNB and progress in the domain of social and economic reintegration and re-insertion of former combatants suggests that serious challenges remain in these critical areas. The local media frequently report human rights violations perpetrated by on-duty military or police or by demobilized combatants."

Tufts University 30 July 2006:
“The new Burundian government saw ONUB as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible. This perception was aggravated by two unfortunate choices made by leaders of the UN mission: to support Frodebu and former President Ndayizeye during the electoral campaign and proposing to coordinate the transition from humanitarian aid to development through a “Partners Council” deliberating without the government.”

UNSC 18 December 2006:
“Meanwhile, as delays in the start of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants have continued, criminal activities against the population, reportedly committed by FNL combatants, have increased since late October. Skirmishes between the national security forces and alleged FNL combatants and detentions of FNL elements and supporters have reportedly resumed in the north-western provinces. FNL recruitment, including of youths, has also been reported, particularly in Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural provinces.[…]

Once deployed, the AU special task force would therefore be expected to assume the responsibilities that were allocated to ONUB under the ceasefire agreement, namely: (a) protection of designated assembly areas for FNL combatants; (b) provision of engineering, logistical and administrative support for the establishment of the assembly areas; (c) disarmament of combatants; (d) storage of weapons collected from the disarmament process and their subsequent destruction; (e) transportation of disarmed FNL combatants from assembly areas to the designated demobilization centre or integration facilities of the National Defence Forces; and (f) protection of the demobilization centres. […]
Further delays in the agreement’s implementation, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants, are likely to lead to more friction between these combatants and the population and the national security services. In addition, there was an increase in localized conflicts involving the small FNL faction led by Jean Bosco Sindayigaya, which did not sign the ceasefire agreement.”

**DPKO 20 December 2006:**
“A new United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), authorized by Security Council resolution 1719 earlier this year, will continue the process of peace consolidation and be in charge of coordinating the United Nations system’s activities in Burundi for an initial period of one year.”

The mandate of BINUB is extended until 31 December 2008 (UNSC, 19 December 2007).

See also:
Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 31 Aug 2006
A technical analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - a case study from Burundi [Internet]


**Peace Building Commission and Burundi (2006-2008)**

- Peace Building Commission approved in December 2007 a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation

**UNSC 18 December 2006, para.22:**
“Significant progress has been made in the establishment of peacebuilding coordination mechanisms between the Government and the United Nations. On 7 November, the Government created an Inter-Ministerial Peacebuilding Steering Committee, which will work with the United Nations, within the framework of an initial joint mechanism, in preparing the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission and the peacebuilding priority plan to be submitted to the Peacebuilding Fund. The inaugural meeting of the Government-United Nations joint mechanism was held on 16 November [2006], followed by several sessions at the policy and working levels. As a result, a common understanding was reached on the steps to be taken by the Government, with United Nations support, to secure resources from the Peacebuilding Fund. Progress was also made in developing the Government’s presentation to the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission. The mission of the Peacebuilding Support Office to Burundi in mid-November [2006] and the meetings it had with the United Nations and the Government’s Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee contributed significantly to this process.”

**UNGA 5 December 2007:**
“With a long-awaited conflict-recovery and development strategy for Burundi now in place, the Peacebuilding Commission today approved a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation -- both locally and in New York -- in priority areas
such as justice and security sector reform, generating jobs and making radical improvements to governance.

Meeting in its special “Burundi Configuration”, the Commission adopted the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism (MTM) of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. That Framework -- in place since June -- is the country-led integrated peacebuilding strategy now guiding the engagement and dialogue between Bujumbura, the United Nations and other international partners.

The Framework identified key objectives, major challenges and threats to peace, especially the implementation of a stagnant ceasefire agreement between Burundi and the National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL). Promoting inclusive growth, employment, transparency and human rights were among its other top priorities.”

See also:
Brookings Institution, 13 March 2008, The Role of Civil Society in Ending Displacement and Peacebuilding, by Elizabeth Ferris [Internet]

United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI), 12 Dec 2006 [Link below]

Peacebuilding Commission holds day-long discussion on Burundi, agrees on fund’s use to bolster government’s priority plan [Internet]

Challenges facing Burundi, requiring international help, indicated at country-specific meetings of Peacebuilding Commission [Internet]

**Burundi government signs Nairobi pact including protocol on IDPs (December 2006)**

**MONUC 18 December 2006:**

“With the signing of the Nairobi pact this Friday December 15 2006 by DRC, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, it paves the way for security, stability and development in the region, after years of conflict.

Many African state leaders, including DRC president Joseph Kabila were in Nairobi Kenya for the two day summit that will go a long way to bringing the region out of the vicious cycle of humanitarian disaster, poverty, and repeated conflict.[…]

The Great Lakes pact includes a $225 million security action plan to disarm rebel groups in Eastern DRC, and along border areas in Sudan, Kenya and Uganda.[…]

Ms. Besida Tonwe, the Head of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in Central and East Africa, said that the conference was a long process of consultations in helping the Great Lakes Region to reconcile, rehabilitate, and reconstruct their societies in a politically delicate process.

‘It is also a process which in the future will continue to require financial support from the donor community and coherent assistance from the humanitarian community. It is now of utmost importance that there is a follow-up on the national implementation of the legal protocols adopted with the pact,’ she said.
‘The three protocols on humanitarian and social issues addressing sexual violence against women and children, property rights of returning persons, and the protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), are of the utmost importance,’ she concluded.

**IDMC 14 December 2006:**

“The Pact is a culmination of more than four years of regional negotiations among States. It contains a package of measures which promises to enhance the lives of the forcibly displaced, including a regional protocol on protection and assistance for internally displaced, which when signed, will be the first legally binding regional instrument specifically dealing with IDPs anywhere in the world. A regional protocol on property rights of returning populations, and protocols which address some of the root causes of flight in the Great Lakes are also key elements of the Pact.”

**Arusha Accords: Challenges of implementing Protocol IV (2005)**

- Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development.

**ISS 27 May 2005:**

“Aside from calling for a cessation to violent conflict, the Arusha Accords [Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 28 August 2000] provide comprehensive recommendations for stabilising and rehabilitating a highly polarised Burundian nation. The agreement is composed of five protocols each dedicated to a particular theme intended to move the process from peace-making to peace-building. These themes consist of an outline of the nature of the conflict; democracy and good governance; peace and security; reconstruction and development; and guarantees on the implementation of the agreement.

Importantly, the accords acknowledge that the Burundian ‘conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions… and stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power.’

Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development. It is therefore the ‘litmus test’ against which the performance of the transitional government (and other actors) as it relates to Arusha’s recommendations can be assessed.

**Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Refugees and Sinistrés**

The main conclusion and recommendations of Protocol IV states that:

‘Through the Burundi Peace Negotiations at Arusha it has been possible to assess how seriously the political and ethnic crisis that has torn Burundi apart since independence has affected Burundian society. Hundreds of thousands of Burundians are refugees, some of them for more than 25 years.

Hundreds of thousands more are forced to live in camps where conditions are appalling…. All Burundians are aware that a lasting peace is impossible so long as a definitive solution is not found to the problem of refugees and sinistrés. Likewise, peace is impossible so long as the country’s wealth is not shared equitably. Burundi cannot help the sinistrés rebuild destroyed property and restore its economy without the assistance of the international community.’"
The UN concluded that there was a strong indication that the FLN had not acted alone in the massacre of Congolese refugees (2004-2005)

- One year of after the Gatumba massacre, those responsible remain free

**IRIN 5 Jan 2005:**
"The FNL claimed responsibility for a massacre in August of 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees at Gatumba transit camp on the Burundi side of the border with the DRC. The UN is continuing to investigate whether armed groups on the DRC side of the border, which are aligned to FNL, also took part."

**UNSC 15 November 2004:**
"As requested by the Security Council by its presidential statement of 15 August 2004 (S/PRST/2004/30), ONUB, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights conducted a joint investigation into the massacre on 13 August of 152 Congolese refugees at the Gatumba refugee camp, located close to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The results of the investigation were transmitted to the Council by my letter to the President of the Council dated 15 October (S/2004/821). Despite extensive investigation, there is no clear evidence of who organized, carried out and financed that gross atrocity. The FNL (Rwasa) claim of responsibility has been supported by witness statements and led United Nations investigators to believe that the group did, indeed, participate in the attack. There is however, a strong indication that FNL (Rwasa) did not act alone. Unfortunately, the dearth of verifiable information and limited cooperation by the Burundian authorities hampered the formulation of a definitive report. A national investigation is still ongoing."

**AI 18 August 2005:**
"On the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre, which took place in August 2004, Amnesty International calls on the forthcoming government of Burundi and the international community to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.

'The new government should undertake to set up an independent and impartial body to investigate this and other massacres and those found to be responsible should be held to account,' Amnesty International said today.

During the night of 13 August 2004, the refugee camp of Gatumba, located near the Congolese border, was attacked by an armed group. More than 160 Congolese refugees, predominantly children and women members of the Banyamulenge ethnic group from South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (DRC), were deliberately and systematically killed. On 14 August, the Palipehutu-FNL (Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu -- Forces nationales de libération) claimed responsibility for the killings. The same day, the governments of Burundi and Rwanda and delegates of the Banyamulenge communities accused Congolese and Rwandese armed political groups based in the DRC of involvement in the massacre. According to UN investigators, evidence of the presence of 'other groups' was credible, but they were not able to categorically identify them.

Human rights organizations and the United Nations have strongly condemned this massacre and called for an independent, impartial and comprehensive investigation. Given the alleged involvement of armed political groups based in the DRC, there was concern that the killing could lead to a military intervention in the DRC by Burundi and Rwanda. Such an intervention could have led to further human rights abuses in the DRC.
Since then, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Burundian authorities have moved a few refugees to the Mwaro province, farther away from the border, others have returned to the DRC, while many others have moved to Bujumbura. So far, despite the indication from the Burundian Minister of Justice that the national investigation into the Gatumba massacre was completed, the United Nations Operations in Burundi stressed in a recent statement that, ‘no investigation report has been issued by the government [of Burundi] and the authors of the attack remain free’.

See also United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 13 Aug 2005
Burundi: Statement on the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre [Internet]

Causes of displacement


United Nations Resident Coordinator System for Burundi 1998, p. 5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronology of Population Movements</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>An estimated 200,000 Burundians flee from progroms and communal violence; many seek refuge in Tanzania, where most remain to this day.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>To escape the violence that broke out following the assassination of President Ndadaye, nearly 200,000 people leave the hills to seek protection in sites grouped around military posts. A vast majority are still there.</td>
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<td>1994-1996</td>
<td>The escalation of the civil conflict sparks massive population movements; the northwestern province of Cibitoke, sandwiched between the rebel bases in the mountainous Kibira forest and in neighboring Kivu, is particularly unstable. Large numbers seek refuge in neighboring Zaire (150,000) and Tanzania (250,000). Up to 400,000 congregate in sites inside the country.</td>
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<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>In the wake of the conquest of Zaire by the Kabila-led alliance, most of the refugees in Kivu return to Burundi, where they swell the numbers living in the displaced camps on the north-western provinces, particularly Cibitoke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>As a military strategy to regain control of rebel-held territory, the authorities forcibly regroup 250,000 civilians in Karuzi, Kanyanza and Muramvya provinces. Nearly all of them return home by the end of 1997, but the policy of controlled population movements continues to be implemented in other, more short-term forms elsewhere in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>Following the loss of their bases in the Kivu, the rebels regroup in Tanzania, and the main theatre of operations shifts to the southwest, along the ridge of the Nile-Congo watershed that is the main conduit into and out of the country for guerrilla groups. The ensuing destabilization leads to large scale displacement to new sites, again mainly along the main tarmac roads of the western plain, not only</td>
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in Makamba and Bururi provinces but also as far as north as Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza.

**1997-1998**

As the military gradually established control in certain areas, the authorities begin to dismantle the big sites near main roads or major towns and create smaller, decentralized sites grouped around advanced military positions in the hills (Cibitoke, parts of Bururi, Bubanza). Elsewhere, short-term regroupment operations continue to be implemented in response to localized destabilization (Bujumbura Rural).

**1998**

Nearly all the sites in Cibitoke province, for so long the most unstable part of the country, are dismantled by June and the people return to their hills. At almost the same time, the crisis in neighboring Congo produces an influx of some eleven thousand people, which continues up to present.

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**Causes of internal displacement: an analysis by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (1998)**

- Pervasive psychology of “flee or be killed” is a lasting legacy of the 1972 massacres and the 1993 upheavals
- Displacement has also been used as a deliberate goal of violence since 1993
- Massive retaliation by the armed forces
- Suspicion towards the displaced population creates more displacement
- Use of violence and displacement as a way to achieve political or economical objectives

**USCR 1998a, pp. 32-33:**

“A history of massacres has taught the people of Burundi, regardless of their ethnicity, that their personal survival hinges on their ability to flee and seek a safer place temporarily. For many peasant Burundians, the lesson of the past is that violence can erupt suddenly and can rapidly become all-encompassing. It is a lesson handed down from generation to generation. Some of the underlying causes of internal displacement in Burundi follow:

First, a pervasive psychology of ‘flee or be killed’ has become the lasting legacy of the 1972 slaughter and the 1993 upheaval. The 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda has reinforced the psychology of flight in Burundi.

Second, the smaller massacres that have occurred almost daily since 1994 serve to validate the historical lessons of fear and mistrust. Fear is also ingrained that large number of Burundians have learned to flee their homes not only in reaction to danger but also in anticipation of it.

Third, much of Burundi’s displacement since 1993 has been caused by «ethnic cleansing.» Displacement is no longer merely as accidental by-product of violence; it has become a deliberate goal of violence.

Fourth, both ethnic groups of Burundi regard themselves as vulnerable. The sense of vulnerability has become an important part of the self-identity. Hutu are demographically dominant but see themselves as vulnerable to the political and military power of Tutsi. Tutsi are politically and militarily powerful but view themselves as vulnerable to the demographic dominance of Hutu. Members of both ethnic groups regard themselves as victims, despite the fact that many massacres in Burundian history have been largely one-sided.

Fifth, a pattern is evident in many violent eruptions over the decades: regardless of how violence begins, there is almost always massive retaliation against the Hutu by the Tutsi-dominated
military. As a result, many Hutu instinctively flee at the mere sight of soldiers or at the distant sound of their vehicles. The country's forces of order, unfortunately, create new disorder and displacement – deliberately in some cases, inadvertently in others. Sixth, population displacement in Burundi often exacerbates rather than alleviates the conflict. Uprooted Burundians of one ethnic group are often regarded as dangerous by members of the other ethnic group. The military suspects that many internally displaced Hutu are rebels. Many Hutu suspect that camps of displaced Tutsi are bases for militia activity. There is some truth to these mutual suspicions. The result is that displacement at times begets more violence, causing still more people to flee. In short – at least in Burundi – displacement causes more displacement.

These are only partial explanations of the population displacement in Burundi, of course. This review of Burundi’s history indicates that some actors create violence and displacement as a way to achieve political control by force that they are unable to achieve or maintain through nonviolent means. Some elements in Burundi create violence and displacement for the economic rewards it brings them through banditry, confiscation of property, and skimming of relief aid. Still other Burundians commits violence and force displacement based on pure fear or hate, reinforced by decades of grievances, real or imagined.”


- 1996: government policy to move civilian populations into "regroupment" camps
- 1997: end of the large-scale, long-term "regroupment" policy
- 1998: short-term forced movement of populations continues, particularly in unstable western provinces
- Since September 1999, over 350,000 people were forcibly moved by government forces to 53 regroupment camps to deprive insurgent groups of local support
- Government explained that regroupment camps were established to protect civilians from the rebels
- Dismantlement of regroupment camps was precondition to peace negotiations and camps were dismantled by mid-2000

**USCR 2000 "regroupment"**

“Burundian authorities have pursued two waves of forced population relocation, or regroupment. The first regroupment wave occurred during 1996-98 when the government moved at least a quarter-million Hutu into 50 camps scattered throughout the country. Some observers estimated that up to 800,000 persons lived in the regroupment camps at that time. Most regroupment sites closed during 1998, allowing occupants to return home.”

**HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":**

*Renewed Regroupment (1999-2000)*

“*In July and August 1999, the rebels launched increasingly frequent and damaging raids in and around Bujumbura, killing dozens of civilians as well as some soldiers. The army retaliated with attacks that killed more than one hundred civilians as well as combatants and the government tightened an existing curfew. These measures failed to satisfy Tutsi extremists in Bujumbura who demanded more drastic action to protect the city and to repress the rebellion. With rumors circulating of a possible coup and of violence being organized by extremists, the government decided to impose a policy of regroupment on most of Bujumbura-rural, particularly on areas inhabited largely by Hutu and near the city."
"In mid-1999, it [the government] had revived the regroupment policy in parts of southeastern Burundi before deciding to extend it to the area of the capital in September."

**HRW June 2000, "Summary":**
"The Tutsi-dominated government of Burundi, combating rebellions among the Hutu majority, began forcing civilians in the area around the capital into so-called "protection sites" or "regroupment camps" beginning in late September 1999. Burundian authorities claimed the measure was intended to protect the civilians, most of them Hutu, from attack by the rebel National Liberation Forces (Forces Nationales pour la Libération, FNL) who were becoming increasingly well-entrenched in the area. In fact, they meant to deprive the FNL of support from local people who helped them, sometimes willingly, sometimes under duress. By removing civilian support, the authorities hoped to isolate the FNL and thus reduce its increasingly frequent attacks on the capital. They hoped also to quiet Tutsi extremists who accused them of weakness in confronting the rebel threat."

**HRW June 2000, "Summary":**
"By the end of 1999, authorities had obliged some 80 percent of the population of the province of Bujumbura-rural-some 350,000 people-to live in fifty-three camps. Although regroupment helped reduce attacks on the capital city, rebels remained firmly established in rural areas. They simply shifted from one place to another when attacked by the army, which had insufficient troops available to control the whole region at the same time. Rebels continued to live off the crops of local people and even to inhabit the houses of those forced to live in the camps."

**USCR 2000, "Regroupment":**
"The country included at least three types of internal displacement: up to 200,000 people, primarily rural Tutsi, who have lived for six years in designated camps protected by government soldiers and thousands, who have become displaced in the countryside or at makeshift sites for varying lengths of time; and nearly 350,000 Hutu whom the government required to live in so-called 'regroupment' camps."


**USCR 2000, "Regroupment":**
"Government authorities argued that the camps were a temporary measure to protect civilians from attack and deprive rebel groups of food and lodging in rural areas. Burundian officials urged international humanitarian organizations to provide food, water, sanitation, and medical care to the sites. Burundian President Pierre Buyoya visited several sites in October [1999] and stated that conditions there were better than portrayed by aid agencies. The regroupment camps were 'no dramatic situation,' he assured."

**HRW June 2000, "Summary":**
"The international community severely criticized the policy of regroupment. In January 2000, the Burundian government promised to begin closing the camps but it made little progress in doing so until early June. At that time, rebel leaders made closing the camps a precondition for peace negotiations and former South African President Nelson Mandela, facilitator for the negotiations, condemned the regroupment sites as 'concentration camps.' Under this pressure, President Pierre Buyoya agreed that everyone in the camps would be allowed to return home by the end of July."

*For an analysis on how forced displacement in 2000 of 350,000 civilians was carried out in violation of international law, including the Un Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, see HRW June 2000 "Violation of international law & Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" [link below]*
Fighting between FNL and army displaced thousands in Bujumbura Rural (2004-2008)

- Combatants of FNL fought so called FNL "dissidents", causing displacement in October 2007
- FNL is the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government
- Population displacement reduced in 2005 compared to 2003-2004
- Little population displacement in 2006, but the populations of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural, have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL

IRIN 23 April 2008:
"The resumption of violence in and around Bujumbura is causing panic in the country. Outside the capital, residents spend their nights in the bush for fear of being attacked, as the death toll rose to 33.
A bomb destroyed part of the Vatican embassy compound and a dining hall in the Kiriri University campus on 22 April [2008].
"We call on the army to remove its heavy arms from our campus," a student said, reacting to the installation of rocket launchers aimed at rebuffing attacks by the rebel FNL.
On 18 April, attacks were launched on military positions in Gihosha, Kanyosha, Kamenge and Musaga areas.”

NRC, May 2008:
In April 2008 serious violations of the 6 September 2006 ceasefire between the Burundian Army (FDN) and the rebel group Palipehutu-FNL (FNL) occurred. The most reported events took place in the capital city, Bujumbura, where three attacks took place on April 17, 18 and 22. Violence sprung in several provinces around the country (Bujumbura Rurale, Bubanza, Cibitoke and Kayanza), but Bujumbura Rurale province has been the most affected province, witnessing displacements of population.[...]

At the peak of displacement it was reported that there were:
· 4,050 households displaced in Isale commune or 20,100 people out of 83,000 inhabitants concentrated mostly in 6 sites in the centre of the commune, Rushubi on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
· 5,102 households displaced in Muyira and Kirombwe, both at Kanyosha commune on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
· 4,305 households displaced in Kabezi centre in three different sites on May 7 (data Kabezi local administration).
· 3,166 households displaced in Gitaza centre and 1,100 in Rutongo, both at Muhuta commune (data Muhuta local administration).
· And fewer numbers of IDPs registered in Bugarama, Mutambu and Nyabiraba communes (several hundreds of households)."

IRIN, 25 October 2007:
"Fighters of Burundi's last active rebel group have for the second time in one week attacked a position occupied by a break-away faction, forcing villagers to flee their homes, a senior military official said.
The evening raid by combatants of the Front National de Liberation (FNL), led by Agathon Rwasa, took place on 24 October [2007] evening on a site where the so-called FNL "dissidents" have gathered in Gakungwe village of Kabezi commune in Bujumbura Rural province.

It forced hundreds of people from surrounding villages to run away as the army sent reinforcements to the area to guard the splinter faction's settlement, residents said.

"There has indeed been such an attack and the heavy exchange of gunfire was heard," deputy army chief of staff Major General Godefroid Niyuhire told IRIN on 25 October. There were, however, no casualties during the attack, he said.

The "dissidents" say they fought with Rwasa for the FNL, but Rwasa's supporters have denied their claims and accused the government of creating a faction within the FNL. Rwasa has said these men, who intend to join the country's peace process, are not even party to a 2006 ceasefire agreement signed between the government and the FNL.

OCHA 23 June 2005:
"Population displacement due to insecurity and armed conflict reduced markedly in the first months of the year [2005] and as compared to the period 2003-2004. Populations in the province of Bujumbura rural, where recurrent waves of displacement had taken place throughout 2004, are gradually resettling and returning to zones of origin and no sizeable population movements were registered in the first semester of the year."

IRIN 4 January 2005:
"Thousands of civilians have been displaced following fierce fighting on Saturday in Burundi's western province of Bujumbura Rural.

The internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not received aid, the governor of the province, Ignace Ntawembarira, said.

Fighting was reported in the communes of Isale, Nyabiraba and Kanyosha, east of the capital, Bujumbura, between the rebel faction Forces nationales de libération (FNL) of Agathon Rwasa, and a coalition of the Burundian army and troops loyal to Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the former largest rebel faction in the country, the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces de defense pour la democratie (CNDD-FDD)."

UNSC 27 October 2006:
"In the period under review [August 2005-September 2006], the security situation was characterized by renewed clashes between FDN and FNL, mainly in the north-western provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural. The populations of these provinces have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL. In 2006, 107 cases of attacks and looting by FNL were reported."

Fighting between government and FLN troops causes the displacement of thousands in Bubanza Province (2008)

- FNL - the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government – caused displacement at the end of 2007

IRIN 14 January 2008:
“About 1,400 families (8,400 people) displaced in Musigati commune in the northwestern province of Bubanza, following fighting between government forces and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), desperately need help, according to local officials.

Laurent Kagamba, adviser to the Musigati administrator, said that since the simultaneous attacks on three military positions on 28 December [2007] and another on 9 January [2008] in the same commune, residents had fled their homes. Some sought refuge in Musigati parish, others at Musigati and Kabere trade centres, as well as Busiga coffee factory, he said.”

IRIN 10 September 2007:
“Residents of 700 households, or about 4,000 people, have fled their homes in the northwest Burundi province of Bubanza following raids by suspected members of the country’s last active rebel group, a government official said.

‘For the time being, security is not good at all. Some residents have been beaten, while others have had their property looted,’ the governor of Bubanza, Pascal Nyabenda, told IRIN.’

He said Forces nationales de libération (FNL) fighters had raided homes in Bubanza from their hideouts in the nearby Kibira and Rukoko forests. Those displaced were spending the nights in the compound of a local parish, venturing out for a few hours during the day to work in their fields, Nyabenda said.”

For information on displacement by fighting between government and FNL troops in Bubanza Province in previous years, see:
ITEKA, 9 August 2006, Burundi: Des perennes armées et des combattants du Palipehutu_Fnl mènent des attaues répétées dans certaines communes de Bubanza
ITEKA, 24 August 2005, Burundi: Des déplacés de guerre en commune Musigati sans assistance
IRIN, 14 June 2005, Burundi: Thousands displaced in Bubanza

Some of the Burundian refugees expelled from Tanzania have no house or land (2006)

UN 30 November 2006:
Over 3,000 Burundians who had found refuge in Tanzania were forced to return in 2006: “Many new arrivals report others being forced to leave and the 3,000 who have come back so far, only seem to be the tip of the iceberg. Nobody knows for sure how many Burundians live in Tanzania without having regularized their stay, but most estimate around 150,000 persons. This will remain a key challenge in 2007, especially since the new arrivals need assistance and in particular so-called sans addresses like Elias, who hopes that “the Burundian Government can find us a plot of land where I can build a house and send my children to school.”"

NRC November 2006:
“Since June 2006, Tanzania has been implementing a national plan for the repatriation of refugees from Tanzania. In this framework, persons without refugee status or any other legal status in Tanzania have been forcibly removed from Tanzania. This year, more than 4000 Burundians have been expelled from Tanzania, mainly from Ngara district towards Muyinga province.”

See also:
UNHCR, 23 Oct 2006, Growing numbers of Burundians return home from the DRC [Internet]
Other causes of displacement

Tens of thousands were displaced due to floods (2007)

- Since November 2006, close to 300,000 people were affected by the heavy floods

IRIN 9 February 2007:

Les pluies diluviennes qui tombent depuis novembre 2006 ont détruit les cultures et infrastructures de plusieurs régions, obligeant le gouvernement à mettre en place un fonds de solidarité pour venir en aide aux déplacés victimes des inondations dans les provinces de Muyinga, Kirundo, Cankuzo, Karuzi, Kayanza, Ngozi et Muyinga. »

IRIN 15 January 2007:
“Thousands of people in northwestern Burundi, displaced after days of heavy rainfall, urgently need relief aid, officials said on Monday.

"The rains have rendered more than 3,000 residents homeless," said Prosper Banzambe, the chief of Gatumba Zone, one of the affected areas in Mitumbuzi Commune, Bujumbura Rural Province.

He said the displaced, some of whom had sought shelter in a local church, needed food and other non-food aid such as blankets, jerry cans, soap and mosquito nets.

The rains, which pounded the area at the weekend, destroyed at least 500 homes. The flooding of the nearby River Kiziba contributed to the houses’ collapse.

Banzambe expressed concern that the continuing rains could cause more damage in Gatumba and appealed for a temporary shelter for the displaced.

He urged humanitarian organisations to help the displaced, saying the local administration was unable to “adequately meet their needs”. […]

On 4 January [2007], the government set up a national solidarity fund to support people affected by floods in seven provinces. In a decree, President Pierre Nkurunziza declared the provinces of Kayanza in the north, Muramvya and Karuzi in the central part of the country, Ruyigi in the east, and Bubanza and Cibitoke in the northwest, as "hunger-stricken following floods".

He also announced the establishment of the solidarity fund, to which every Burundian must contribute for four months from the end of January.”

AFP 16 January 2007:
“Heavy rains pounding Burundi’s capital and outlying areas have killed at least four people and left about 23,000 homeless since the downpours began last month, officials said Tuesday.”
They said the situation was "catastrophic" after the floods destroyed farmlands, sparking fears of food shortages and disease outbreaks in the tiny central African nation emerging from more than a decade of civil strife.”

Famine in north and east causes internal displacement (2005-2006)

- Many of the people who flee due to food insecurity are newly repatriated refugees

**OCHA 16 January 2005:**
“[R]esidents of Northern provinces continue to flee inside and outside Burundi due to food insecurity. As of 14 January [2005], a joint visit conducted by OCHA Ruyigi sub office and the provincial administration authorities confirmed the presence in Kabuyenge IDP site, in Gisuru Commune, of 63 families who fled Busoni and Bugabira communes (Kirundo Province) in search of food. OCHA, in collaboration with the administration authorities convened a meeting with humanitarian actors in the province to discuss an emergency response.”

**OCHA 23 June 2005:**
“Cycles of drought periods, loss of staple crops, poor yields during three consecutive agriculture seasons and fragile nutritional conditions were particularly important in the northern Burundian provinces, which were also affected by waves of population movements both internal and across the border into Rwanda.”

**OCHA 5 March 2005:**
“Despite food aid distributed by WFP and partners, the food security situation remains disconcerting mainly in Northern and Eastern provinces. Continuous internal and cross-border displacement of the population continues to be part of the coping strategies. Around 7,900 Burundian asylum seekers were reported in Tanzania. Meanwhile, 131 internally displaced persons were registered in Cankuzo coming from Kirundo. However, many more internal movements remain unrecorded.”

**ITEKA 21 February 2006:**
“La plupart de ces migrants sont de nouveaux rapatriés qui n'ont pas eu où s'installer. Ils sont en train de migrer à la quête de quoi manger. Malheureusement, la population de la province de Cankuzo a également faim et ne peut pas les aider. Les prix des vivres montent chaque jour.”
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Conflict and displacement: background and development

Ethnic background and pre-colonial times

- Total population: 7.1 million
- Composite population comprising Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%) and Batwa (1%)(colonial census)
- Numerous interrelations between the ethnic groups (marriage, language, common monarchy)
- The Batwa are most likely the most ancient ethnic group in Burundi but they are marginalized in Burundi society

AFP 25 February 2005:
“GEOGRAPHY: Landlocked in central Africa, bounded by Rwanda in the north, Tanzania to the east and south, and the vast Democratic Republic of Congo to the west. One of the smallest states on the African continent, Burundi covers 27,834 square kilometers (10,747 square miles).

- POPULATION: 7.1 million, of which around 85 percent are Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi. The remaining one percent of the population are pygmies called Twas. One of the most densely populated African countries.

- CAPITAL: Bujumbura (population 300,000)

- LANGUAGES: Kirundi (national), French (administrative), Swahili (local)

- RELIGION: Christian (70 percent); Animist (15 percent); Muslim (15 percent).”

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 15-17:
“Burundi is situated in Central Africa, along Lake Tanganyika and shares borders with Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. [...] According to statistics dating back to the 1930s, 85 per cent of the population are Hutu, 14 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Batwa. The Hutu are considered to originate from Chad and the Niger, while the Tutsi, of Nilo-ethiopian origin, are thought to come from eastern Africa. The Batwa originate from the Congo Basin (Pygmies). This breakdown does not take into account the Ganwa (those of princely origin), nor a handful of other immigrant communities, nor those of mixed origins (mixed marriages having been common in the past). [...] It also does not take into account the fact that within both groups there existed historically rankings of status nor that passage from one group to another, for instance becoming Tutsi from Hutu or Ganwa, was also possible. The Burundians all speak the same language, Kirundi, which is both the national and the official language. Other languages, as provided for in the Constitution, are also spoken. [...] Despite ethnic differences, the Burundians live intermingled on the thousands of hills of the country without distinction on account of ethnicity. They are therefore inextricably bound to one another and cannot contemplate any notions of separation.

Although settlements have always been mixed, society in Burundi [...] was built along a ‘class’ and ‘caste’ system. [...] While their distinctions were not rigidly determined along ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ lines, [...] there was significant correlation between class and ethnicity, with the Tutsis associated with the upper class and the Hutus with the lower class. This did not mean that all Tutsis were
upper class nor all Hutus lower class. Both class and the ethnic correlations were also dynamic. A Hutu could rise economically and socially and become a 'Tutsi'.

Hutu and Tutsi relationships were in the past cemented by their shared loyalty to common institutions. Kingship was such an institution; patron-client ties constituted another powerful socio-political institution. Patrons were expected to offer protection and gifts in exchange for services and offerings in kind. As social and political roles that once gave meaning and cohesion to membership in the community vanished, the use of the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' with ethnic connotations became more rigid. [...] Today the use of the term 'Hutu' describes an ethnic group which is poorer and powerless, whereas the Tutsi, especially the Hima (a Tutsi subgroup), are the pre-eminent power holders. [...] Nevertheless, the impression should not be created that the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' are figments as the "official truth" during the Bagaza period (1976-1987) would have it. This stance restricted discussion on the underlying problems of ethnicity and expression of ethnic differences without solving them.

CHR 19 March 2001, para. 100:
"La situation de la minorité twa mérite une attention particulière que malheureusement elle ne reçoit pas toujours. Les Twas sont sans doute le noyau le plus ancien de la population burundaise, comme dans d'autres pays des Grands Lacs; ils constituent aujourd'hui environ 1 % de la population."

Colonial rule and military regimes (1899-1992)

- 1962: Burundi becomes independent
- 25 years of a Tutsi dominated military dictatorship
- The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power
- 1980: creation of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu) by activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community in refugee camps in Tanzania

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 19-24:
"The transition from traditional power structures to 'modern' politics has by no means been an easy one. Two Ganwa (princely) dynasties continued fighting for control during the era of the colonial Powers, (first Germany from 1889 to 1918, then Belgium until 1962) as they had done during the pre-colonial era. The Party of Unity and National Progress (Uprona) was dominated by the Ganwa Bezi, while the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was led by the Ganwa Batare. In the legislative elections of September 1961 Uprona won, with Prince Rwagasoré as Prime Minister designate. A month later, however, Rwagazaré was assassinated. The political game switched from Ganwa to Hutu and Tutsi hands for the first time.

Burundi gained its independence from Belgium in July 1962. Until 1966 the crown continued to stabilize the situation. Violent incidents erupted after the elections in 1966, following which the Prime Minister, Michel Micombero, a Tutsi of the Hima group from Bururi, [...] overthrew the monarchy and declared a republic, concentrating power in the army. The National Assembly was dissolved and later replaced with a committee of officers, which, by 1971, was made up of 24 Tutsi and 3 Hutu, and Uprona was declared the sole party. Serious intra-Tutsi rivalries for power emerged. At this time Hutu were already being systematically purged from the army. The transition from a Ganwa-run kingdom to a Tutsi-dominated military dictatorship to the exclusion of Hutus caused more violence. For the next 25 years Tutsi factions fought over control, turning the Hutu into scapegoats whenever the Hutu would rise up and demand more equitable power-
sharing. On the other hand, whenever efforts towards power-sharing were made, extremists from both groups would resort to violence, to delay or cancel them.

Massacres had taken place in 1965 and 1967, but the most serious ones took place in 1972 triggered by Hutu militants from the Burundian refugee community in Tanzania. Hundreds if not thousands of Tutsi were killed and there is widespread fear that what had happened to Rwanda’s Tutsi, namely, systematic subjection and extermination, would happen to them too. The Tutsi retaliation and repression that followed were instant. The first victims were Hutus with education: secondary school and university students, teachers, nurses, doctors, priests, pastors, drivers, headmasters, businessmen, shopkeepers, civil servants, bank clerks, professors. Most Hutu families lost members. Hutu widows moved to the city outskirts when their houses were seized by Tutsi. Many Tutsis also fled. Many left the interior, where they felt frightened among Hutu neighbours, and moved to Bujumbura to fill the many jobs now vacant. Others rushed to occupy the flat, fertile, palm-oil-producing strip of lake shore south of Bujumbura, after the flight of very many Hutu who had been living there. Reports have spoken of genocidal acts and of hundreds of thousands of Hutus killed. […]

These events had great reverberations in Burundi; yet, nothing was ever done about the massacres. There has never been an official inquiry into them, an accounting, or any effort to bring to justice those responsible for the killings. Thereafter there was no question of Hutus entering the army, and many refused to send their children to school, fearing they were exposing them to a future massacre. Those at school had no role models. The educated, competent, urbane were all Tutsi. That there was a "lost" Hutu generation is still evident today in the political life of the country.

There was little power-sharing following the massacres, even after Micombero was overthrown by his deputy chief of staff, Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, also a Hima (Tutsi subgroup). There were no massacres during Bagaza’s 11-year rule and many refugees returned home. Bagaza reportedly hoped development would push his country through the ethnic deadlock. Observers note that he engaged in a series of reforms, without, however, addressing the ethnic issue. […] All provincial governors were Tutsi and most judges, university and school teachers, magistrates and heads of hospitals were Tutsi too. Uprona remained a Tutsi party and its members were the ones to benefit mostly from Bagaza’s management of the economy. In the last years of the Bagaza regime corruption and nepotism reportedly flourished. […] In the meantime, in 1980 activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community formed the Palipehutu, or the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People, in refugee camps in Tanzania. Bagaza was himself deposed in 1987 by a group of army officers and a cousin of his and nephew of Micombero, Major Pierre Buyoya, became President.

In August 1988 frustrated Hutu hopes for an improvement were at the root of hundreds of ethnic killings. Thousands were killed. This time the regions most affected were Ntega commune in Kirundo province and Marangara commune in Ngozi province, both bordering Rwanda. Palipehutu members from Rwanda had been infiltrating into Burundi and sporadic fights were taking place until Hutus turned against the Tutsi community, many of them Rwandan refugees. The army pursued those assumed responsible (although it is unclear how much resistance these people who had no guns put up against the soldiers) […] and in the next eight days it reportedly killed large numbers of civilians, including women and children. More than 60,000 people poured into Rwanda across the swamps and the Akanyaru river. Others took refuge within Burundi in swamp areas. The massacres were surprising even to the Burundians. Hutu had to face the fact that the army was still prepared to use maximum force and Tutsi that Hutu could still massacre many Tutsi before soldiers reached the scene."

ACTS 30 September 2004:
“Despite the popular conception of the conflict as a Hutu-Tutsi struggle, most scholars agree that the protracted conflict is structural in nature, though articulated in ethnic terms. The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power.’ Governance practices by successive regimes galvanized political power and state control in the hands of a small elite group within the Tutsi community from particular parts of the country, who have since sustained their hold on power through repressive policies. Efforts by the Tutsi elite to retain political control and associated patronage networks, and violent counter-strategies of the Hutu political and armed groups have precipitated ethnic massacres and retaliatory radicalism marked by acts of genocide.”

Civil war and Peace Process in Burundi (1993-2008)

- 1993: Assassination of elected President Ndadaye triggers large-scale inter-ethnic violence
- 1996: Coup installs President Buyoya; sanctions imposed by neighbouring countries
- Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi signed in August 2000
- 2005: signing of ceasefire agreement between FNL and government; adoption of new constitution
- Local, legislative and presidential elections was held in various phases in 2005
- Security sector was profoundly restructured and the army is now ethnically balanced (2006)
- Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and FRODEBU – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence (2006)
- As of April 2008: the FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement

AFP 1 June 2005, factfile:

“The civil war begun in 1993 has killed an estimated 300,000 people.[…]

Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu president, elected in June 1993, was assassinated on October 21 of the same year during a failed coup organized by Tutsi military officers.

His successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira -- another Hutu -- was killed in April 1994 at the same time as then Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana died under suspicious circumstances when his plane was shot down over Kigali, sparking the genocide of up to a million Tutsis and Hutu moderates in Rwanda.

Ntaryamira’s successor, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, also a Hutu, was overthrown in a non-violent coup in July 1996, and [Pierre " Buyoya returned to power.

In 1998, Buyoya reformed the constitution to create a transition government and began peace talks with Hutu and Tutsi opposition groups.

In August 2000 a peace agreement including a power-sharing deal was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, but the two main armed rebel groups refused to participate in the talks. Civil war continued to rage.

In November 2001, Buyoya took over as transitional leader for a period of 18 months, seconded by a Hutu vice-president whose signature is required on all presidential texts pertaining to security and the armed forces.
A 26-member power-sharing government was also sworn in to oversee the three-year transition. Buyoya was succeeded at the head of the transition government in May 2003 by his vice president Domitien Ndayizeye, who is seconded by a Tutsi, Alphonse Marie Kadage.

A ceasefire agreement was signed in December 2002 by the government and the main Hutu rebel movement, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), which finally entered government in November 2003.

A second Hutu armed group, the National Liberation Forces (FNL), finally signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on May 15, but the details of how this be implemented have still not yet been resolved.

A new constitution was adopted at the end of February, aimed at bringing about a peaceful democracy and ending the reign of the Tutsie tribe in power. Opposition has been voiced only by Tutsis concerned at losing too much power.”

HRW 4 November 2005:
“Elections in 2005 were the final chapter in the transitional process established by the Arusha Accords of 2000. In the intervening period a government including the Hutudominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu), the Tutsi-dominated National Unity and Progress Party (Uprona), and a number of smaller parties ruled the country. In late 2003 this government signed the Pretoria Protocol making peace with the CNDDFDD and starting the process of integrating the former rebels into the army and the administration.”

For more detailed information on 1993 events, see “Profile in displacement” (Report of the Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, 28 November 1994), paras. 29-36) [External link]

ICG 30 November 2006:
“In elections held between June and August 2005, the voters of Burundi elected their first democratic government since 1993. This marked an end to the transitional government established by the Arusha Agreement in 2001. The mainly Hutu former rebels of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), led by Pierre Nkurunziza, won a resounding victory and hold 58 per cent of the seats in parliament and 57 per cent in the communal councils, as well as twelve of the twenty government ministries. Nkurunziza was inaugurated as president on 26 August 2005.

The elections radically reconfigured politics. Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence. In the run-up to the elections, rebel forces were integrated into the national army, police and intelligence service. For the first time in Burundian history, these forces were ethnically balanced. Nkurunziza’s government faced considerable challenges. Foremost was the process of transforming the CNDDFDD from a rebel movement into a democratic political party in power – one whose members had little civil administration experience. The government had to reconstruct an economy devastated by more than a decade of civil war and economic embargo, during which per capita income fell by 35 per cent and the number of people living below the poverty line doubled. During its first year it also had to deal with security problems in the capital and surrounding provinces caused by the remaining rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL. Unfortunately, the government’s response to these challenges has increasingly manifested itself in disregard for the rule of law.”

UNSC 28 November 2007:
“The signing of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the armed group Palipehutu-Forces nationales de libération (FNL) led by Agathon Rwasa on 7 September 2006 was a decisive step in the peace process in Burundi. However, its implementation remains difficult owing to persisting disagreements among the parties. The Agreement, which was the outcome of determined efforts of regional States united under the auspices of the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, addresses a number of issues including the integration of FNL ex-combatants into the Burundian National Defence Forces (FDN) and security forces, the participation of FNL elements in the institutions of the country and the rapid demobilization and reintegration of children associated with this armed group into their respective families and communities. Under the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism was established to oversee the demobilization of FNL combatants.

The signing of the Agreement was followed at first by a significant improvement in the security situation, characterized notably by a decrease both in the number of abuses perpetrated by armed groups and in the number of alleged FNL militants arrested by the National Defence Forces and the National Police of Burundi.”

PBC, 19 March 2008:
“[T]he Palipehutu-FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. In response, a Political Directorate had been established to assist the Mechanism in efforts to regain FNL's participation.”

IRIN, 14 January 2008:
“The FNL, the last rebel movement still active in Burundi, has resumed fighting government forces, especially in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza, where it is most active.

Though the movement signed a ceasefire accord with the government in September 2006, it has not been fully implemented. The joint verification and monitoring mechanism, which oversees its implementation, suspended activities in July 2007 after the FNL delegates walked out of talks over security concerns. They have since been accusing the facilitator, South African safety minister Charles Nqakula, of bias.”

ISS 3 April 2008:
“After intense diplomatic pressure from regional governments and the international community Burundi’s last rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL, has been brought back to the negotiating table that drew up a new roadmap designed to end the standoff by the end of June 2008. This breakthrough was reached in a February 23 meeting in Cape Town, South Africa. The meeting was attended by special envoys to Burundi from Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa, as well as representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.

The Cape Town meeting had been called to save the Burundi peace process after the FNL withdrew from its implementation, alleging bias on the part of the facilitator, South Africa’s Security Minister Charles Nqakula. To help address this challenge Minister Nqakula has followed the example of other peace processes by establishing a Group of Special Envoys for Burundi (GSEB), representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.”

Delrue August 2006:
“The success of Burundi’s transition to peace hinges on how its new government (elected in August 2005 and headed by former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza) and the international community deal with such post- displacement issues as land and property claims, reconciliation and transitional justice.
The link between displacement, return, reconciliation and successful transition towards a consolidated peace is frequently either underestimated or neglected by the international community.

For a comprehensive analysis of the political situation in Burundi, see Swiss Peace Foundation, 25 Oct 2006 FAST Country Risk Profile Burundi: Burundi's endangered transition [Internet]

HRW, 12 March 2008:
“Several opposition politicians have been threatened and targeted for violence during the last 18 months. Nsonga, then second vice-president of the republic, fled Burundi in September 2006 after issuing a letter critical of the government; she returned in March 2007. Five parliamentarians from the opposition party Front for Democracy in Burundi (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi, Frodebu) and from a dissident wing of the CNDD-FDD, including Mpawenayo, were targeted in a set of grenade attacks in August 2007 that injured several bystanders. Pancrace Cimpaye, Frodebu spokesperson, was detained after suggesting the ruling party bore responsibility for the August attacks; after being released, he briefly left the country. In February 2008, a local Frodebu official was killed, while another was seriously injured in a grenade attack which killed his wife and child.”

See also:
IRIN, BURUNDI: Government of consensus formed, 15 November 2007 [Internet]
ICG, 28 August 2007, Burundi: Finalising peace with the FNL [Internet]
Secretary-General welcomes signing of Burundi ceasefire agreement, United Nations Secretary General, 8 September 2006 [Internet]

Progress in regard to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (2005-2008)

- Reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression
- About 5,000 UN peacekeepers were in Burundi from June 2004 to the end of 2006, to monitor the country's transition to democracy, with South Africa contributing the majority of troops.
- The new Burundian government saw the peacekeepers as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible (2006)
- A new UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) continued the process of peace consolidation and of coordinating the UN system's activities in Burundi from 2007

ISS 13 October 2006:
“In Burundi, reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, signed in August 2000 by 17 political parties, the National
Assembly and the government and the 2003 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Burundi and the principal rebel group, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), do include important provisions on the organization, structure, mandates and composition of postconflict security forces that will act professionally and apolitically, adhere to human rights norms, and provide defence and security to all Burundians.[…]

Although the Arusha Accords were signed in August 2000, the implementation of the security sector reform process they articulate was largely delayed until 2003, mainly because of continued warfare throughout most of Burundi. Indeed, the most active rebel movements in the field were marginalized throughout the Arusha negotiations and were thus not signatories to the Accord. Accordingly, it was not until the signing of a ceasefire between the government and the main rebel group – the CNDD-FDD – in 2003 that the reform process was set in motion. By July 2006, however, the reform of the defence and security forces had reached an advanced stage and had achieved most of its structural objectives (i.e. the integration of several armed groups into a single military and single police force), despite various financial- and material-related challenges.

The process of integrating the former rebel groups and the FAB into a new national defence force, the Forces de Défense Nationale (FDN), has been completed – largely to the satisfaction of the government and international donors – despite its late start due to disagreements on the definition of combatant and on the harmonization of rank between the rebel movements and the regular army.[…]

Despite this progress, a preliminary assessment of the reform of the FDN and the PNB and progress in the domain of social and economic reintegration and re-insertion of former combatants suggests that serious challenges remain in these critical areas. The local media frequently report human rights violations perpetrated by on-duty military or police or by demobilized combatants.

Tufts University 30 July 2006:
“The new Burundian government saw ONUB as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible. This perception was aggravated by two unfortunate choices made by leaders of the UN mission: to support Frodebu and former President Ndayizeye during the electoral campaign and proposing to coordinate the transition from humanitarian aid to development through a “Partners Council” deliberating without the government.”

UNSC 18 December 2006:
“Meanwhile, as delays in the start of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants have continued, criminal activities against the population, reportedly committed by FNL combatants, have increased since late October. Skirmishes between the national security forces and alleged FNL combatants and detentions of FNL elements and supporters have reportedly resumed in the north-western provinces. FNL recruitment, including of youths, has also been reported, particularly in Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural provinces.[…]

Once deployed, the AU special task force would therefore be expected to assume the responsibilities that were allocated to ONUB under the ceasefire agreement, namely: (a) protection of designated assembly areas for FNL combatants; (b) provision of engineering, logistical and administrative support for the establishment of the assembly areas; (c) disarmament of combatants; (d) storage of weapons collected from the disarmament process and their subsequent destruction; (e) transportation of disarmed FNL combatants from assembly areas to the designated demobilization centre or integration facilities of the National Defence Forces; and (f) protection of the demobilization centres. […]

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Further delays in the agreement’s implementation, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants, are likely to lead to more friction between these combatants and the population and the national security services. In addition, there was an increase in localized conflicts involving the small FNL faction led by Jean Bosco Sindayigaya, which did not sign the ceasefire agreement.”

**DPKO 20 December 2006:**
“A new United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), authorized by Security Council resolution 1719 earlier this year, will continue the process of peace consolidation and be in charge of coordinating the United Nations system’s activities in Burundi for an initial period of one year.”

The mandate of BINUB is extended until 31 December 2008 (UNSC, 19 December 2007).

See also:
Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 31 Aug 2006
A technical analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - a case study from Burundi [Internet]


**Peace Building Commission and Burundi (2006-2008)**

- Peace Building Commission approved in December 2007 a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation

**UNSC 18 December 2006, para.22:**
“Significant progress has been made in the establishment of peacebuilding coordination mechanisms between the Government and the United Nations. On 7 November, the Government created an Inter-Ministerial Peacebuilding Steering Committee, which will work with the United Nations, within the framework of an initial joint mechanism, in preparing the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission and the peacebuilding priority plan to be submitted to the Peacebuilding Fund. The inaugural meeting of the Government-United Nations joint mechanism was held on 16 November [2006], followed by several sessions at the policy and working levels. As a result, a common understanding was reached on the steps to be taken by the Government, with United Nations support, to secure resources from the Peacebuilding Fund. Progress was also made in developing the Government’s presentation to the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission. The mission of the Peacebuilding Support Office to Burundi in mid-November [2006] and the meetings it had with the United Nations and the Government’s Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee contributed significantly to this process.”

**UNGA 5 December 2007:**
“With a long-awaited conflict-recovery and development strategy for Burundi now in place, the Peacebuilding Commission today approved a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation — both locally and in New York — in priority areas
such as justice and security sector reform, generating jobs and making radical improvements to governance.

Meeting in its special “Burundi Configuration”, the Commission adopted the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism (MTM) of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. That Framework -- in place since June -- is the country-led integrated peacebuilding strategy now guiding the engagement and dialogue between Bujumbura, the United Nations and other international partners.

The Framework identified key objectives, major challenges and threats to peace, especially the implementation of a stagnant ceasefire agreement between Burundi and the National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL). Promoting inclusive growth, employment, transparency and human rights were among its other top priorities.”

See also:
Brookings Institution, 13 March 2008, The Role of Civil Society in Ending Displacement and Peacebuilding, by Elizabeth Ferris [Internet]

United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI), 12 Dec 2006 [Link below]

Peacebuilding Commission holds day-long discussion on Burundi, agrees on fund’s use to bolster government’s priority plan [Internet]

Challenges facing Burundi, requiring international help, indicated at country-specific meetings of Peacebuilding Commission [Internet]

Burundi government signs Nairobi pact including protocol on IDPs (December 2006)

MONUC 18 December 2006:
“With the signing of the Nairobi pact this Friday December 15 2006 by DRC, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, it paves the way for security, stability and development in the region, after years of conflict.

Many African state leaders, including DRC president Joseph Kabila were in Nairobi Kenya for the two day summit that will go a long way to bringing the region out of the vicious cycle of humanitarian disaster, poverty, and repeated conflict.[…]

The Great Lakes pact includes a $225 million security action plan to disarm rebel groups in Eastern DRC, and along border areas in Sudan, Kenya and Uganda.[…]

Ms. Besida Tonwe, the Head of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in Central and East Africa, said that the conference was a long process of consultations in helping the Great Lakes Region to reconcile, rehabilitate, and reconstruct their societies in a politically delicate process.

‘It is also a process which in the future will continue to require financial support from the donor community and coherent assistance from the humanitarian community. It is now of utmost importance that there is a follow-up on the national implementation of the legal protocols adopted with the pact,’ she said.
'The three protocols on humanitarian and social issues addressing sexual violence against women and children, property rights of returning persons, and the protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), are of the utmost importance,' she concluded.

**IDMC 14 December 2006:**

“The Pact is a culmination of more than four years of regional negotiations among States. It contains a package of measures which promises to enhance the lives of the forcibly displaced, including a regional protocol on protection and assistance for internally displaced, which when signed, will be the first legally binding regional instrument specifically dealing with IDPs anywhere in the world. A regional protocol on property rights of returning populations, and protocols which address some of the root causes of flight in the Great Lakes are also key elements of the Pact.”

**Arusha Accords: Challenges of implementing Protocol IV (2005)**

- Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development

**ISS 27 May 2005:**

“Aside from calling for a cessation to violent conflict, the Arusha Accords [Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 28 August 2000], provide comprehensive recommendations for stabilising and rehabilitating a highly polarised Burundian nation. The agreement is composed of five protocols each dedicated to a particular theme intended to move the process from peace-making to peace-building. These themes consist of an outline of the nature of the conflict; democracy and good governance; peace and security; reconstruction and development; and guarantees on the implementation of the agreement.

Importantly, the accords acknowledge that the Burundian ‘conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions… and stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power.’

Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development. It is therefore the ‘litmus test’ against which the performance of the transitional government (and other actors) as it relates to Arusha’s recommendations can be assessed.

**Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Refugees and Sinistrés**

The main conclusion and recommendations of Protocol IV states that:

“Through the Burundi Peace Negotiations at Arusha it has been possible to assess how seriously the political and ethnic crisis that has torn Burundi apart since independence has affected Burundian society. Hundreds of thousands of Burundians are refugees, some of them for more than 25 years.

Hundreds of thousands more are forced to live in camps where conditions are appalling…. All Burundians are aware that a lasting peace is impossible so long as a definitive solution is not found to the problem of refugees and sinistrés. Likewise, peace is impossible so long as the country’s wealth is not shared equitably. Burundi cannot help the sinistrés rebuild destroyed property and restore its economy without the assistance of the international community.”
The UN concluded that there was a strong indication that the FLN had not acted alone in the massacre of Congolese refugees (2004-2005)

- One year of after the Gatumba massacre, those responsible remain free

**IRIN 5 Jan 2005:**

“The FNL claimed responsibility for a massacre in August of 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees at Gatumba transit camp on the Burundi side of the border with the DRC. The UN is continuing to investigate whether armed groups on the DRC side of the border, which are aligned to FNL, also took part.”

**UNSC 15 November 2004:**

“As requested by the Security Council by its presidential statement of 15 August 2004 (S/PRST/2004/30), ONUB, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights conducted a joint investigation into the massacre on 13 August of 152 Congolese refugees at the Gatumba refugee camp, located close to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The results of the investigation were transmitted to the Council by my letter to the President of the Council dated 15 October (S/2004/821). Despite extensive investigation, there is no clear evidence of who organized, carried out and financed that gross atrocity. The FNL (Rwasa) claim of responsibility has been supported by witness statements and led United Nations investigators to believe that the group did, indeed, participate in the attack. There is however, a strong indication that FNL (Rwasa) did not act alone. Unfortunately, the dearth of verifiable information and limited cooperation by the Burundian authorities hampered the formulation of a definitive report. A national investigation is still ongoing.”

**AI 18 August 2005:**

“On the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre, which took place in August 2004, Amnesty International calls on the forthcoming government of Burundi and the international community to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.

‘The new government should undertake to set up an independent and impartial body to investigate this and other massacres and those found to be responsible should be held to account,’ Amnesty International said today.

During the night of 13 August 2004, the refugee camp of Gatumba, located near the Congolese border, was attacked by an armed group. More than 160 Congolese refugees, predominantly children and women members of the Banyamulenge ethnic group from South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (DRC), were deliberately and systematically killed. On 14 August, the Palipehutu-FNL (Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu -- Forces nationales de libération) claimed responsibility for the killings. The same day, the governments of Burundi and Rwanda and delegates of the Banyamulenge communities accused Congolese and Rwandese armed political groups based in the DRC of involvement in the massacre. According to UN investigators, evidence of the presence of ‘other groups’ was credible, but they were not able to categorically identify them.

Human rights organizations and the United Nations have strongly condemned this massacre and called for an independent, impartial and comprehensive investigation. Given the alleged involvement of armed political groups based in the DRC, there was concern that the killing could lead to a military intervention in the DRC by Burundi and Rwanda. Such an intervention could have led to further human rights abuses in the DRC.
Since then, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Burundian authorities have moved a few refugees to the Mwaro province, farther away from the border, others have returned to the DRC, while many others have moved to Bujumbura. So far, despite the indication from the Burundian Minister of Justice that the national investigation into the Gatumba massacre was completed, the United Nations Operations in Burundi stressed in a recent statement that, "no investigation report has been issued by the government [of Burundi] and the authors of the attack remain free."

See also United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 13 Aug 2005
Burundi: Statement on the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre [Internet]

Causes of displacement


United Nations Resident Coordinator System for Burundi 1998, p. 5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronology of Population Movements</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>An estimated 200,000 Burundians flee from progroms and communal violence; many seek refuge in Tanzania, where most remain to this day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>To escape the violence that broke out following the assassination of President Ndadaye, nearly 200,000 people leave the hills to seek protection in sites grouped around military posts. A vast majority are still there.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994-1996</td>
<td>The escalation of the civil conflict sparks massive population movements; the northwestern province of Cibitoke, sandwiched between the rebel bases in the mountainous Kibira forest and in neighboring Kivu, is particularly unstable. Large numbers seek refuge in neighboring Zaire (150,000) and Tanzania (250,000). Up to 400,000 congregate in sites inside the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>In the wake of the conquest of Zaire by the Kabila-led alliance, most of the refugees in Kivu return to Burundi, where they swell the numbers living in the displaced camps on the north-western provinces, particularly Cibitoke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>As a military strategy to regain control of rebel-held territory, the authorities forcibly regroup 250,000 civilians in Karuzi, Kanyanza and Muramvya provinces. Nearly all of them return home by the end of 1997, but the policy of controlled population movements continues to be implemented in other, more short-term forms elsewhere in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>Following the loss of their bases in the Kivu, the rebels regroup in Tanzania, and the main theatre of operations shifts to the southwest, along the ridge of the Nile-Congo watershed that is the main conduit into and out of the country for guerrilla groups. The ensuing destabilization leads to large scale displacement to new sites, again mainly along the main tarmac roads of the western plain, not only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Causes of internal displacement: an analysis by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (1998)

- Pervasive psychology of "flee or be killed" is a lasting legacy of the 1972 massacres and the 1993 upheavals
- Displacement has also been used as a deliberate goal of violence since 1993
- Massive retaliation by the armed forces
- Suspicion towards the displaced population creates more displacement
- Use of violence and displacement as a way to achieve political or economical objectives

USCR 1998a, pp. 32-33:
"A history of massacres has taught the people of Burundi, regardless of their ethnicity, that their personal survival hinges on their ability to flee and seek a safer place temporarily. For many peasant Burundians, the lesson of the past is that violence can erupt suddenly and can rapidly become all-encompassing. It is a lesson handed down from generation to generation. Some of the underlying causes of internal displacement in Burundi follow:
First, a pervasive psychology of 'flee or be killed' has become the lasting legacy of the 1972 slaughter and the 1993 upheaval. The 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda has reinforced the psychology of flight in Burundi.
Second, the smaller massacres that have occurred almost daily since 1994 serve to validate the historical lessons of fear and mistrust. Fear is also ingrained that large number of Burundians have learned to flee their homes not only in reaction to danger but also in anticipation of it.
Third, much of Burundi's displacement since 1993 has been caused by «ethnic cleansing.» Displacement is no longer merely as accidental by-product of violence; it has become a deliberate goal of violence.
Fourth, both ethnic groups of Burundi regard themselves as vulnerable. The sense of vulnerability has become an important part of the self-identity. Hutu are demographically dominant but see themselves as vulnerable to the political and military power of Tutsi. Tutsi are politically and militarily powerful but view themselves as vulnerable to the demographic dominance of Hutu. Members of both ethnic groups regard themselves as victims, despite the fact that many massacres in Burundian history have been largely one-sided.
Fifth, a pattern is evident in many violent eruptions over the decades: regardless of how violence begins, there is almost always massive retaliation against the Hutu by the Tutsi-dominated
military. As a result, many Hutu instinctively flee at the mere sight of soldiers or at the distant sound of their vehicles. The country's forces of order, unfortunately, create new disorder and displacement – deliberately in some cases, inadvertently in others. Sixth, population displacement in Burundi often exacerbates rather than alleviates the conflict. Uprooted Burundians of one ethnic group are often regarded as dangerous by members of the other ethnic group. The military suspects that many internally displaced Hutu are rebels. Many Hutu suspect that camps of displaced Tutsi are bases for militia activity. There is some truth to these mutual suspicions. The result is that displacement at times begets more violence, causing still more people to flee. In short – at least in Burundi – displacement causes more displacement.

These are only partial explanations of the population displacement in Burundi, of course. This review of Burundi’s history indicates that some actors create violence and displacement as a way to achieve political control by force that they are unable to achieve or maintain through nonviolent means. Some elements in Burundi create violence and displacement for the economic rewards it brings them through banditry, confiscation of property, and skimming of relief aid. Still other Burundians commits violence and force displacement based on pure fear or hate, reinforced by decades of grievances, real or imagined.”


- 1996: government policy to move civilian populations into "regroupment" camps
- 1997: end of the large-scale, long-term "regroupment" policy
- 1998: short-term forced movement of populations continues, particularly in unstable western provinces
- Since September 1999, over 350,000 people were forcibly moved by government forces to 53 regroupment camps to deprive insurgent groups of local support
- Government explained that regroupment camps were established to protect civilians from the rebels
- Dismantlement of regroupment camps was precondition to peace negotiations and camps were dismantled by mid-2000

**USCR 2000 "regroupment"**
“Burundian authorities have pursued two waves of forced population relocation, or regroupment. The first regroupment wave occurred during 1996-98 when the government moved at least a quarter-million Hutu into 50 camps scattered throughout the country. Some observers estimated that up to 800,000 persons lived in the regroupment camps at that time. Most regroupment sites closed during 1998, allowing occupants to return home.”

**HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":**
*Renewed Regroupment (1999-2000)*
“In July and August 1999, the rebels launched increasingly frequent and damaging raids in and around Bujumbura, killing dozens of civilians as well as some soldiers. The army retaliated with attacks that killed more than one hundred civilians as well as combatants and the government tightened an existing curfew. These measures failed to satisfy Tutsi extremists in Bujumbura who demanded more drastic action to protect the city and to repress the rebellion. With rumors circulating of a possible coup and of violence being organized by extremists, the government decided to impose a policy of regroupment on most of Bujumbura-rural, particularly on areas inhabited largely by Hutu and near the city.”

**HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":**
"In mid-1999, it [the government] had revived the regroupment policy in parts of southeastern Burundi before deciding to extend it to the area of the capital in September."

**HRW June 2000, "Summary":**

"The Tutsi-dominated government of Burundi, combating rebellions among the Hutu majority, began forcing civilians in the area around the capital into so-called "protection sites" or "regroupment camps" beginning in late September 1999. Burundian authorities claimed the measure was intended to protect the civilians, most of them Hutu, from attack by the rebel National Liberation Forces (Forces Nationales pour la Libération, FNL) who were becoming increasingly well-entrenched in the area. In fact, they meant to deprive the FNL of support from local people who helped them, sometimes willingly, sometimes under duress. By removing civilian support, the authorities hoped to isolate the FNL and thus reduce its increasingly frequent attacks on the capital. They hoped also to quiet Tutsi extremists who accused them of weakness in confronting the rebel threat."

**HRW June 2000, "Summary":**

"By the end of 1999, authorities had obliged some 80 percent of the population of the province of Bujumbura-rural-some 350,000 people-to live in fifty-three camps. Although regroupment helped reduce attacks on the capital city, rebels remained firmly established in rural areas. They simply shifted from one place to another when attacked by the army, which had insufficient troops available to control the whole region at the same time. Rebels continued to live off the crops of local people and even to inhabit the houses of those forced to live in the camps."

**USCR 2000, "Regroupment":**

"The country included at least three types of internal displacement: up to 200,000 people, primarily rural Tutsi, who have lived for six years in designated camps protected by government soldiers and thousands, who have become displaced in the countryside or at makeshift sites for varying lengths of time; and nearly 350,000 Hutu whom the government required to live in so-called 'regroupment' camps."


**USCR 2000, "Regroupment":**

"Government authorities argued that the camps were a temporary measure to protect civilians from attack and deprive rebel groups of food and lodging in rural areas. Burundian officials urged international humanitarian organizations to provide food, water, sanitation, and medical care to the sites. Burundian President Pierre Buyoya visited several sites in October [1999] and stated that conditions there were better than portrayed by aid agencies. The regroupment camps were 'no dramatic situation,' he assured."

**HRW June 2000, "Summary":**

"The international community severely criticized the policy of regroupment. In January 2000, the Burundian government promised to begin closing the camps but it made little progress in doing so until early June. At that time, rebel leaders made closing the camps a precondition for peace negotiations and former South African President Nelson Mandela, facilitator for the negotiations, condemned the regroupment sites as 'concentration camps.' Under this pressure, President Pierre Buyoya agreed that everyone in the camps would be allowed to return home by the end of July."

*For an analysis on how forced displacement in 2000 of 350,000 civilians was carried out in violation of international law, including the Un Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, see HRW June 2000 "Violation of international law & Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" [link below]*
Fighting between FNL and army displaced thousands in Bujumbura Rural (2004-2008)

- Combatants of FNL fought so called FNL "dissidents", causing displacement in October 2007
- FNL is the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government
- Population displacement reduced in 2005 compared to 2003-2004
- Little population displacement in 2006, but the populations of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural, have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL

IRIN 23 April 2008:
"The resumption of violence in and around Bujumbura is causing panic in the country. Outside the capital, residents spend their nights in the bush for fear of being attacked, as the death toll rose to 33.
A bomb destroyed part of the Vatican embassy compound and a dining hall in the Kiriri University campus on 22 April [2008].

"We call on the army to remove its heavy arms from our campus," a student said, reacting to the installation of rocket launchers aimed at rebuffing attacks by the rebel FNL.
On 18 April, attacks were launched on military positions in Gihosha, Kanyosha, Kamenge and Musaga areas."

NRC, May 2008:
In April 2008 serious violations of the 6 September 2006 ceasefire between the Burundian Army (FDN) and the rebel group Palipehutu-FNL (FNL) occurred. The most reported events took place in the capital city, Bujumbura, where three attacks took place on April 17, 18 and 22. Violence sprung in several provinces around the country (Bujumbura Rurale, Bubanza, Cibitoke and Kayanza), but Bujumbura Rurale province has been the most affected province, witnessing displacements of population.[...]

At the peak of displacement it was reported that there were:
- 4,050 households displaced in Isale commune or 20,100 people out of 83,000 inhabitants concentrated mostly in 6 sites in the centre of the commune, Rushubi on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 5,102 households displaced in Muyira and Kirombwe, both at Kanyosha commune on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 4,305 households displaced in Kabezi centre in three different sites on May 7 (data Kabezi local administration).
- 3,166 households displaced in Gitaza centre and 1,100 in Rutongo, both at Muhuta commune (data Muhuta local administration).
- And fewer numbers of IDPs registered in Bugarama, Mutambu and Nyabiraba communes (several hundreds of households)."

IRIN, 25 October 2007:
"Fighters of Burundi's last active rebel group have for the second time in one week attacked a position occupied by a break-away faction, forcing villagers to flee their homes, a senior military official said.
The evening raid by combatants of the Front National de Liberation (FNL), led by Agathon Rwasa, took place on 24 October [2007] evening on a site where the so-called FNL "dissidents" have gathered in Gakungwe village of Kabezi commune in Bujumbura Rural province.

It forced hundreds of people from surrounding villages to run away as the army sent reinforcements to the area to guard the splinter faction's settlement, residents said.

"There has indeed been such an attack and the heavy exchange of gunfire was heard," deputy army chief of staff Major General Godefroid Niyuhire told IRIN on 25 October. There were, however, no casualties during the attack, he said.

The "dissidents" say they fought with Rwasa for the FNL, but Rwasa's supporters have denied their claims and accused the government of creating a faction within the FNL. Rwasa has said these men, who intend to join the country's peace process, are not even party to a 2006 ceasefire agreement signed between the government and the FNL."

**OCHA 23 June 2005:**
"Population displacement due to insecurity and armed conflict reduced markedly in the first months of the year [2005] and as compared to the period 2003-2004. Populations in the province of Bujumbura rural, where recurrent waves of displacement had taken place throughout 2004, are gradually resettling and returning to zones of origin and no sizeable population movements were registered in the first semester of the year."

**IRIN 4 January 2005:**
"Thousands of civilians have been displaced following fierce fighting on Saturday in Burundi's western province of Bujumbura Rural.

The internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not received aid, the governor of the province, Ignace Ntawembarira, said.

Fighting was reported in the communes of Isale, Nyabiraba and Kanyosha, east of the capital, Bujumbura, between the rebel faction Forces nationales de libération (FNL) of Agathon Rwasa, and a coalition of the Burundian army and troops loyal to Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the former largest rebel faction in the country, the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces de defense pour la democratie (CNDD-FDD)."

**UNSC 27 October 2006:**
"In the period under review [August 2005-September 2006], the security situation was characterized by renewed clashes between FDN and FNL, mainly in the north-western provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural. The populations of these provinces have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL. In 2006, 107 cases of attacks and looting by FNL were reported."

**Fighting between government and FLN troops causes the displacement of thousands in Bubanza Province (2008)**

- FNL - the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government – caused displacement at the end of 2007

**IRIN 14 January 2008:**
“About 1,400 families (8,400 people) displaced in Musigati commune in the northwestern province of Bubanza, following fighting between government forces and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), desperately need help, according to local officials.

Laurent Kagamba, adviser to the Musigati administrator, said that since the simultaneous attacks on three military positions on 28 December [2007] and another on 9 January [2008] in the same commune, residents had fled their homes. Some sought refuge in Musigati parish, others at Musigati and Kabere trade centres, as well as Busiga coffee factory, he said."

IRIN 10 September 2007:
“Residents of 700 households, or about 4,000 people, have fled their homes in the northwest Burundi province of Bubanza following raids by suspected members of the country's last active rebel group, a government official said.

‘For the time being, security is not good at all. Some residents have been beaten, while others have had their property looted,’ the governor of Bubanza, Pascal Nyabenda, told IRIN.'

He said Forces nationales de libération (FNL) fighters had raided homes in Bubanza from their hideouts in the nearby Kibira and Rukoko forests. Those displaced were spending the nights in the compound of a local parish, venturing out for a few hours during the day to work in their fields, Nyabenda said.”

For information on displacement by fighting between government and FNL troops in Bubanza Province in previous years, see:
ITEKA, 9 August 2006, Burundi: Des personnes armées et des combattants du Palipehutu_Fnl mènent des attaques répétées dans certaines communes de Bubanza
ITEKA, 24 August 2005, Burundi: Des déplacés de guerre en commune Musigati sans assistance [Link below]
IRIN, 14 June 2005, Burundi: Thousands displaced in Bubanza [Link below]

Some of the Burundian refugees expelled from Tanzania have no house or land (2006)

UN 30 November 2006:
Over 3,000 Burundians who had found refuge in Tanzania were forced to return in 2006: “Many new arrivals report others being forced to leave and the 3,000 who have come back so far, only seem to be the tip of the iceberg. Nobody knows for sure how many Burundians live in Tanzania without having regularized their stay, but most estimate around 150,000 persons. This will remain a key challenge in 2007, especially since the new arrivals need assistance and in particular so-called sans addresses like Elias, who hopes that “the Burundian Government can find us a plot of land where I can build a house and send my children to school.”"

NRC November 2006:
“Since June 2006, Tanzania has been implementing a national plan for the repatriation of refugees from Tanzania. In this framework, persons without refugee status or any other legal status in Tanzania have been forcibly removed from Tanzania. This year, more than 4000 Burundians have been expelled from Tanzania, mainly from Ngara district towards Muyinga province.”

See also:
UNHCR, 23 Oct 2006, Growing numbers of Burundians return home from the DRC [Internet]
Other causes of displacement

Tens of thousands were displaced due to floods (2007)

- Since November 2006, close to 300,000 people were affected by the heavy floods

IRIN 9 February 2007:

Les pluies diluvienes qui tombent depuis novembre 2006 ont détruit les cultures et infrastructures de plusieurs régions, obligeant le gouvernement à mettre en place un fonds de solidarité pour venir en aide aux déplacés victimes des inondations dans les provinces de Muyinga, Kirundo, Cankuzo, Karuzi, Kayanza, Ngozi et Muyinga. »

IRIN 15 January 2007:
"Thousands of people in northwestern Burundi, displaced after days of heavy rainfall, urgently need relief aid, officials said on Monday.

"The rains have rendered more than 3,000 residents homeless," said Prosper Banzambe, the chief of Gatumba Zone, one of the affected areas in Mitumbuzi Commune, Bujumbura Rural Province.

He said the displaced, some of whom had sought shelter in a local church, needed food and other non-food aid such as blankets, jerry cans, soap and mosquito nets.

The rains, which pounded the area at the weekend, destroyed at least 500 homes. The flooding of the nearby River Kiziba contributed to the houses’ collapse.

Banzambe expressed concern that the continuing rains could cause more damage in Gatumba and appealed for a temporary shelter for the displaced.

He urged humanitarian organisations to help the displaced, saying the local administration was unable to "adequately meet their needs". […]

On 4 January [2007], the government set up a national solidarity fund to support people affected by floods in seven provinces. In a decree, President Pierre Nkurunziza declared the provinces of Kayanza in the north, Muramvya and Karuzi in the central part of the country, Ruyigi in the east, and Bubanza and Cibitoke in the northwest, as "hunger-stricken following floods".

He also announced the establishment of the solidarity fund, to which every Burundian must contribute for four months from the end of January.”

AFP 16 January 2007:
“Heavy rains pounding Burundi’s capital and outlying areas have killed at least four people and left about 23,000 homeless since the downpours began last month, officials said Tuesday.
They said the situation was "catastrophic" after the floods destroyed farmlands, sparking fears of food shortages and disease outbreaks in the tiny central African nation emerging from more than a decade of civil strife.”

Famine in north and east causes internal displacement (2005-2006)

- Many of the people who flee due to food insecurity are newly repatriated refugees

OCHA 16 January 2005:
“[R]esidents of Northern provinces continue to flee inside and outside Burundi due to food insecurity. As of 14 January [2005], a joint visit conducted by OCHA Ruyigi sub office and the provincial administration authorities confirmed the presence in Kabuyenge IDP site, in Gisuru Commune, of 63 families who fled Busoni and Bugabira communes (Kirundo Province) in search of food. OCHA, in collaboration with the administration authorities convened a meeting with humanitarian actors in the province to discuss an emergency response.”

OCHA 23 June 2005:
“Cycles of drought periods, loss of staple crops, poor yields during three consecutive agriculture seasons and fragile nutritional conditions were particularly important in the northern Burundian provinces, which were also affected by waves of population movements both internal and across the border into Rwanda.”

OCHA 5 March 2005:
“Despite food aid distributed by WFP and partners, the food security situation remains disconcerting mainly in Northern and Eastern provinces. Continuous internal and cross-border displacement of the population continues to be part of the coping strategies. Around 7,900 Burundian asylum seekers were reported in Tanzania. Meanwhile, 131 internally displaced persons were registered in Cankuzo coming from Kirundo. However, many more internal movements remain unrecorded.”

ITEKA 21 February 2006:
“La plupart de ces migrants sont de nouveaux rapatriés qui n'ont pas eu où s'installer. Ils sont en train de migrer à la quête de quoi manger. Malheureusement, la population de la province de Cankuzo a également faim et ne peut pas les aider. Les prix des vivres montent chaque jour.”
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Conflict and displacement: background and development

Ethnic background and pre-colonial times

- Total population: 7.1 million
- Composite population comprising Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%) and Batwa (1%)(colonial census)
- Numerous interrelations between the ethnic groups (marriage, language, common monarchy)
- The Batwa are most likely the most ancient ethnic group in Burundi but they are marginalized in Burundi society

AFP 25 February 2005:

“GEOGRAPHY: Landlocked in central Africa, bounded by Rwanda in the north, Tanzania to the east and south, and the vast Democratic Republic of Congo to the west. One of the smallest states on the African continent, Burundi covers 27,834 square kilometers (10,747 square miles).

- POPULATION: 7.1 million, of which around 85 percent are Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi. The remaining one percent of the population are pygmies called Twas. One of the most densely populated African countries.

- CAPITAL: Bujumbura (population 300,000)

- LANGUAGES: Kirundi (national), French (administrative), Swahili (local)

- RELIGION: Christian (70 percent); Animist (15 percent); Muslim (15 percent).”

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 15-17:

"Burundi is situated in Central Africa, along Lake Tanganyika and shares borders with Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. [...] According to statistics dating back to the 1930s, 85 per cent of the population are Hutu, 14 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Batwa. The Hutu are considered to originate from Chad and the Niger, while the Tutsi, of Nilo-ethiopian origin, are thought to come from eastern Africa. The Batwa originate from the Congo Basin (Pygmies). This breakdown does not take into account the Ganwa (those of princely origin), nor a handful of other immigrant communities, nor those of mixed origins (mixed marriages having been common in the past). [...] It also does not take into account the fact that within both groups there existed historically rankings of status nor that passage from one group to another, for instance becoming Tutsi from Hutu or Ganwa, was also possible. The Burundians all speak the same language, Kirundi, which is both the national and the official language. Other languages, as provided for in the Constitution, are also spoken. [...] Despite ethnic differences, the Burundians live intermingled on the thousands of hills of the country without distinction on account of ethnicity. They are therefore inextricably bound to one another and cannot contemplate any notions of separation.

Although settlements have always been mixed, society in Burundi [...] was built along a ‘class’ and ‘caste’ system. [...] While their distinctions were not rigidly determined along ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ lines, [...] there was significant correlation between class and ethnicity, with the Tutsis associated with the upper class and the Hutus with the lower class. This did not mean that all Tutsis were
upper class nor all Hutus lower class. Both class and the ethnic correlations were also dynamic. A Hutu could rise economically and socially and become a 'Tutsi'.

Hutu and Tutsi relationships were in the past cemented by their shared loyalty to common institutions. Kingship was such an institution; patron-client ties constituted another powerful socio-political institution. Patrons were expected to offer protection and gifts in exchange for services and offerings in kind. As social and political roles that once gave meaning and cohesion to membership in the community vanished, the use of the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' with ethnic connotations became more rigid. [...] Today the use of the term 'Hutu' describes an ethnic group which is poorer and powerless, whereas the Tutsi, especially the Hima (a Tutsi subgroup), are the pre-eminent power holders. [...] Nevertheless, the impression should not be created that the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' are figments as the "official truth" during the Bagaza period (1976-1987) would have it. This stance restricted discussion on the underlying problems of ethnicity and expression of ethnic differences without solving them."

CHR 19 March 2001, para. 100:
"La situation de la minorité twa mérite une attention particulière que malheureusement elle ne reçoit pas toujours. Les Twas sont sans doute le noyau le plus ancien de la population burundaise, comme dans d'autres pays des Grands Lacs; ils constituent aujourd'hui environ 1 % de la population."

Colonial rule and military regimes (1899-1992)

- 1962: Burundi becomes independent
- 25 years of a Tutsi dominated military dictatorship
- The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power
- 1980: creation of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu) by activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community in refugee camps in Tanzania

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 19-24:
"The transition from traditional power structures to 'modern' politics has by no means been an easy one. Two Ganwa (princely) dynasties continued fighting for control during the era of the colonial Powers, (first Germany from 1889 to 1918, then Belgium until 1962) as they had done during the pre-colonial era. The Party of Unity and National Progress (Uprona) was dominated by the Ganwa Bezi, while the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was led by the Ganwa Batare. In the legislative elections of September 1961 Uprona won, with Prince Rwagasoré as Prime Minister designate. A month later, however, Rwagasaré was assassinated. The political game switched from Ganwa to Hutu and Tutsi hands for the first time.

Burundi gained its independence from Belgium in July 1962. Until 1966 the crown continued to stabilize the situation. Violent incidents erupted after the elections in 1966, following which the Prime Minister, Michel Micombero, a Tutsi of the Hima group from Bururi, [...] overthrew the monarchy and declared a republic, concentrating power in the army. The National Assembly was dissolved and later replaced with a committee of officers, which, by 1971, was made up of 24 Tutsi and 3 Hutu, and Uprona was declared the sole party. Serious intra-Tutsi rivalries for power emerged. At this time Hutu were already being systematically purged from the army. The transition from a Ganwa-run kingdom to a Tutsi-dominated military dictatorship to the exclusion of Hutus caused more violence. For the next 25 years Tutsi factions fought over control, turning the Hutu into scapegoats whenever the Hutu would rise up and demand more equitable power-
sharing. On the other hand, whenever efforts towards power-sharing were made, extremists from both groups would resort to violence, to delay or cancel them.

Massacres had taken place in 1965 and 1967, but the most serious ones took place in 1972 triggered by Hutu militants from the Burundian refugee community in Tanzania. Hundreds if not thousands of Tutsi were killed and there is widespread fear that what had happened to Rwanda’s Tutsi, namely, systematic subjection and extermination, would happen to them too. The Tutsi retaliation and repression that followed were instant. The first victims were Hutus with education: secondary school and university students, teachers, nurses, doctors, priests, pastors, drivers, headmasters, businessmen, shopkeepers, civil servants, bank clerks, professors. Most Hutu families lost members. Hutu widows moved to the city outskirts when their houses were seized by Tutsi. Many Tutsis also fled. Many left the interior, where they felt frightened among Hutu neighbours, and moved to Bujumbura to fill the many jobs now vacant. Others rushed to occupy the flat, fertile, palm-oil-producing strip of lake shore south of Bujumbura, after the flight of very many Hutu who had been living there. Reports have spoken of genocidal acts and of hundreds of thousands of Hutus killed. […]

These events had great reverberations in Burundi; yet, nothing was ever done about the massacres. There has never been an official inquiry into them, an accounting, or any effort to bring to justice those responsible for the killings. Thereafter there was no question of Hutus entering the army, and many refused to send their children to school, fearing they were exposing them to a future massacre. Those at school had no role models. The educated, competent, urbane were all Tutsi. That there was a "lost" Hutu generation is still evident today in the political life of the country.

There was little power-sharing following the massacres, even after Micombero was overthrown by his deputy chief of staff, Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, also a Hima (Tutsi subgroup). There were no massacres during Bagaza's 11-year rule and many refugees returned home. Bagaza reportedly hoped development would push his country through the ethnic deadlock. Observers note that he engaged in a series of reforms, without, however, addressing the ethnic issue. […] All provincial governors were Tutsi and most judges, university and school teachers, magistrates and heads of hospitals were Tutsi too. Uprona remained a Tutsi party and its members were the ones to benefit mostly from Bagaza's management of the economy. In the last years of the Bagaza regime corruption and nepotism reportedly flourished. […] In the meantime, in 1980 activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community formed the Palipehutu, or the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People, in refugee camps in Tanzania. Bagaza was himself deposed in 1987 by a group of army officers and a cousin of his and nephew of Micombero, Major Pierre Buyoya, became President.

In August 1988 frustrated Hutu hopes for an improvement were at the root of hundreds of ethnic killings. Thousands were killed. This time the regions most affected were Ntenga commune in Kirundo province and Marangara commune in Ngozi province, both bordering Rwanda. Palipehutu members from Rwanda had been infiltrating into Burundi and sporadic fights were taking place until Hutus turned against the Tutsi community, many of them Rwandan refugees. The army pursued those assumed responsible (although it is unclear how much resistance these people who had no guns put up against the soldiers) […] and in the next eight days it reportedly killed large numbers of civilians, including women and children. More than 60,000 people poured into Rwanda across the swamps and the Akanyaru river. Others took refuge within Burundi in swamp areas. The massacres were surprising even to the Burundians. Hutu had to face the fact that the army was still prepared to use maximum force and Tutsi that Hutu could still massacre many Tutsi before soldiers reached the scene."

ACTS 30 September 2004:
“Despite the popular conception of the conflict as a Hutu-Tutsi struggle, most scholars agree that the protracted conflict is structural in nature, though articulated in ethnic terms. The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power.’ Governance practices by successive regimes galvanized political power and state control in the hands of a small elite group within the Tutsi community from particular parts of the country, who have since sustained their hold on power through repressive policies. Efforts by the Tutsi elite to retain political control and associated patronage networks, and violent counter-strategies of the Hutu political and armed groups have precipitated ethnic massacres and retaliatory radicalism marked by acts of genocide.”

Civil war and Peace Process in Burundi (1993-2008)

- 1993: Assassination of elected President Ndadaye triggers large-scale inter-ethnic violence
- 1996: Coup installs President Buyoya; sanctions imposed by neighbouring countries
- Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi signed in August 2000
- 2005: signing of ceasefire agreement between FNL and government; adoption of new constitution
- Local, legislative and presidential elections was held in various phases in 2005
- Security sector was profoundly restructured and the army is now ethnically balanced (2006)
- Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and FRODEBU – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence (2006)
- As of April 2008: the FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement

AFP 1 June 2005, factfile:
“The civil war begun in 1993 has killed an estimated 300,000 people.[…]

Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu president, elected in June 1993, was assassinated on October 21 of the same year during a failed coup organized by Tutsi military officers.

His successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira -- another Hutu -- was killed in April 1994 at the same time as then Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana died under suspicious circumstances when his plane was shot down over Kigali, sparking the genocide of up to a million Tutsis and Hutu moderates in Rwanda.

Ntaryamira's successor, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, also a Hutu, was overthrown in a non-violent coup in July 1996, and [Pierre " Buyoya returned to power.

In 1998, Buyoya reformed the constitution to create a transition government and began peace talks with Hutu and Tutsi opposition groups.

In August 2000 a peace agreement including a power-sharing deal was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, but the two main armed rebel groups refused to participate in the talks. Civil war continued to rage.

In November 2001, Buyoya took over as transitional leader for a period of 18 months, seconded by a Hutu vice-president whose signature is required on all presidential texts pertaining to security and the armed forces.
A 26-member power-sharing government was also sworn in to oversee the three-year transition. Buyoya was succeeded at the head of the transition government in May 2003 by his vice president Domitien Ndayizeye, who is seconded by a Tutsi, Alphonse Marie Kadage.

A ceasefire agreement was signed in December 2002 by the government and the main Hutu rebel movement, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), which finally entered government in November 2003.

A second Hutu armed group, the National Liberation Forces (FNL), finally signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on May 15, but the details of how this be implemented have still not yet been resolved.

A new constitution was adopted at the end of February, aimed at bringing about a peaceful democracy and ending the reign of the Tutsie tribe in power. Opposition has been voiced only by Tutsis concerned at losing too much power."

HRW 4 November 2005:
"Elections in 2005 were the final chapter in the transitional process established by the Arusha Accords of 2000. In the intervening period a government including the Hutudominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu), the Tutsi-dominated National Unity and Progress Party (Uprona), and a number of smaller parties ruled the country. In late 2003 this government signed the Pretoria Protocol making peace with the CNDDFDD and starting the process of integrating the former rebels into the army and the administration."

For more detailed information on 1993 events, see "Profile in displacement" (Report of the Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, 28 November 1994), paras. 29-36) [External link]

ICG 30 November 2006:
"In elections held between June and August 2005, the voters of Burundi elected their first democratic government since 1993. This marked an end to the transitional government established by the Arusha Agreement in 2001. The mainly Hutu former rebels of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), led by Pierre Nkurunziza, won a resounding victory and hold 58 per cent of the seats in parliament and 57 per cent in the communal councils, as well as twelve of the twenty government ministries. Nkurunziza was inaugurated as president on 26 August 2005.

The elections radically reconfigured politics. Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence. In the run-up to the elections, rebel forces were integrated into the national army, police and intelligence service. For the first time in Burundian history, these forces were ethnically balanced. Nkurunziza’s government faced considerable challenges. Foremost was the process of transforming the CNDDFDD from a rebel movement into a democratic political party in power – one whose members had little civil administration experience. The government had to reconstruct an economy devastated by more than a decade of civil war and economic embargo, during which per capita income fell by 35 per cent and the number of people living below the poverty line doubled. During its first year it also had to deal with security problems in the capital and surrounding provinces caused by the remaining rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL. Unfortunately, the government’s response to these challenges has increasingly manifested itself in disregard for the rule of law."

UNSC 28 November 2007:
“The signing of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the armed group Palipehutu-Forces nationales de libération (FNL) led by Agathon Rwasa on 7 September 2006 was a decisive step in the peace process in Burundi. However, its implementation remains difficult owing to persisting disagreements among the parties. The Agreement, which was the outcome of determined efforts of regional States united under the auspices of the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, addresses a number of issues including the integration of FNL ex-combatants into the Burundian National Defence Forces (FDN) and security forces, the participation of FNL elements in the institutions of the country and the rapid demobilization and reintegration of children associated with this armed group into their respective families and communities. Under the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism was established to oversee the demobilization of FNL combatants.

The signing of the Agreement was followed at first by a significant improvement in the security situation, characterized notably by a decrease both in the number of abuses perpetrated by armed groups and in the number of alleged FNL militants arrested by the National Defence Forces and the National Police of Burundi.”

PBC, 19 March 2008:
“[T]he Palipehutu-FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. In response, a Political Directorate had been established to assist the Mechanism in efforts to regain FNL's participation.”

IRIN, 14 January 2008:
“[T]he FNL, the last rebel movement still active in Burundi, has resumed fighting government forces, especially in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza, where it is most active.

Though the movement signed a ceasefire accord with the government in September 2006, it has not been fully implemented. The joint verification and monitoring mechanism, which oversees its implementation, suspended activities in July 2007 after the FNL delegates walked out of talks over security concerns. They have since been accusing the facilitator, South African safety minister Charles Nqakula, of bias.”

ISS 3 April 2008:
“After intense diplomatic pressure from regional governments and the international community Burundi’s last rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL, has been brought back to the negotiating table that drew up a new roadmap designed to end the standoff by the end of June 2008. This breakthrough was reached in a February 23 meeting in Cape Town, South Africa. The meeting was attended by special envoys to Burundi from Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa, as well as representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.

The Cape Town meeting had been called to save the Burundi peace process after the FNL withdrew from its implementation, alleging bias on the part of the facilitator, South Africa’s Security Minister Charles Nqakula. To help address this challenge Minister Nqakula has followed the example of other peace processes by establishing a Group of Special Envoys for Burundi (GSEB), representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.”

Delrue August 2006:
“The success of Burundi’s transition to peace hinges on how its new government (elected in August 2005 and headed by former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza) and the international community deal with such post-displacement issues as land and property claims, reconciliation and transitional justice.
The link between displacement, return, reconciliation and successful transition towards a consolidated peace is frequently either underestimated or neglected by the international community.

For a comprehensive analysis of the political situation in Burundi, see

HRW, 12 March 2008:
“Several opposition politicians have been threatened and targeted for violence during the last 18 months. Nzomukunda, then second vice-president of the republic, fled Burundi in September 2006 after issuing a letter critical of the government; she returned in March 2007. Five parliamentarians from the opposition party Front for Democracy in Burundi (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi, Frodebu) and from a dissident wing of the CNDD-FDD, including Mpawenayo, were targeted in a set of grenade attacks in August 2007 that injured several bystanders. Pancrace Cimpaye, Frodebu spokesperson, was detained after suggesting the ruling party bore responsibility for the August attacks; after being released, he briefly left the country. In February 2008, a local Frodebu official was killed, while another was seriously injured in a grenade attack which killed his wife and child.”

See also:
IRIN, BURUNDI: Government of consensus formed, 15 November 2007 [Internet]

ICG, 28 August 2007, Burundi: Finalising peace with the FNL [Internet]


Secretary-General welcomes signing of Burundi ceasefire agreement, United Nations Secretary General, 8 September 2006 [Internet]

Progress in regard to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (2005-2008)

- Reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression
- About 5,000 UN peacekeepers were in Burundi from June 2004 to the end of 2006, to monitor the country's transition to democracy, with South Africa contributing the majority of troops.
- The new Burundian government saw the peacekeepers as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible (2006)
- A new UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) continued the process of peace consolidation and of coordinating the UN system’s activities in Burundi from 2007

ISS 13 October 2006:
“In Burundi, reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, signed in August 2000 by 17 political parties, the National
Assembly and the government and the 2003 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Burundi and the principal rebel group, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), do include important provisions on the organization, structure, mandates and composition of postconflict security forces that will act professionally and apolitically, adhere to human rights norms, and provide defence and security to all Burundians.[…]

Although the Arusha Accords were signed in August 2000, the implementation of the security sector reform process they articulate was largely delayed until 2003, mainly because of continued warfare throughout most of Burundi. Indeed, the most active rebel movements in the field were marginalized throughout the Arusha negotiations and were thus not signatories to the Accord. Accordingly, it was not until the signing of a ceasefire between the government and the main rebel group – the CNDD-FDD – in 2003 that the reform process was set in motion. By July 2006, however, the reform of the defence and security forces had reached an advanced stage and had achieved most of its structural objectives (i.e. the integration of several armed groups into a single military and single police force), despite various financial- and material-related challenges.

The process of integrating the former rebel groups and the FAB into a new national defence force, the Forces de Défense Nationale (FDN), has been completed – largely to the satisfaction of the government and international donors – despite its late start due to disagreements on the definition of combatant and on the harmonization of rank between the rebel movements and the regular army.[…]

Despite this progress, a preliminary assessment of the reform of the FDN and the PNB and progress in the domain of social and economic reintegration and re-insertion of former combatants suggests that serious challenges remain in these critical areas. The local media frequently report human rights violations perpetrated by on-duty military or police or by demobilized combatants.

**Tufts University 30 July 2006:**

“…The new Burundian government saw ONUB as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible. This perception was aggravated by two unfortunate choices made by leaders of the UN mission: to support Frodebu and former President Ndayizeye during the electoral campaign and proposing to coordinate the transition from humanitarian aid to development through a “Partners Council” deliberating without the government.”

**UNSC 18 December 2006:**

“…Meanwhile, as delays in the start of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants have continued, criminal activities against the population, reportedly committed by FNL combatants, have increased since late October. Skirmishes between the national security forces and alleged FNL combatants and detentions of FNL elements and supporters have reportedly resumed in the north-western provinces. FNL recruitment, including of youths, has also been reported, particularly in Bubanaza and Bujumbura Rural provinces.[…]

Once deployed, the AU special task force would therefore be expected to assume the responsibilities that were allocated to ONUB under the ceasefire agreement, namely: (a) protection of designated assembly areas for FNL combatants; (b) provision of engineering, logistical and administrative support for the establishment of the assembly areas; (c) disarmament of combatants; (d) storage of weapons collected from the disarmament process and their subsequent destruction; (e) transportation of disarmed FNL combatants from assembly areas to the designated demobilization centre or integration facilities of the National Defence Forces; and (f) protection of the demobilization centres. […]
Further delays in the agreement’s implementation, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants, are likely to lead to more friction between these combatants and the population and the national security services. In addition, there was an increase in localized conflicts involving the small FNL faction led by Jean Bosco Sindayigaya, which did not sign the ceasefire agreement.

DPKO 20 December 2006:
“A new United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), authorized by Security Council resolution 1719 earlier this year, will continue the process of peace consolidation and be in charge of coordinating the United Nations system’s activities in Burundi for an initial period of one year.”

The mandate of BINUB is extended until 31 December 2008 (UNSC, 19 December 2007).

See also:
Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 31 Aug 2006
A technical analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - a case study from Burundi [Internet]


• Peace Building Commission approved in December 2007 a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation

UNSC 18 December 2006, para.22:
“Significant progress has been made in the establishment of peacebuilding coordination mechanisms between the Government and the United Nations. On 7 November, the Government created an Inter-Ministerial Peacebuilding Steering Committee, which will work with the United Nations, within the framework of an initial joint mechanism, in preparing the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission and the peacebuilding priority plan to be submitted to the Peacebuilding Fund. The inaugural meeting of the Government-United Nations joint mechanism was held on 16 November [2006], followed by several sessions at the policy and working levels. As a result, a common understanding was reached on the steps to be taken by the Government, with United Nations support, to secure resources from the Peacebuilding Fund. Progress was also made in developing the Government's presentation to the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission. The mission of the Peacebuilding Support Office to Burundi in mid-November [2006] and the meetings it had with the United Nations and the Government's Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee contributed significantly to this process.”

UNGA 5 December 2007:
“With a long-awaited conflict-recovery and development strategy for Burundi now in place, the Peacebuilding Commission today approved a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation -- both locally and in New York -- in priority areas
such as justice and security sector reform, generating jobs and making radical improvements to governance.

Meeting in its special “Burundi Configuration”, the Commission adopted the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism (MTM) of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. That Framework -- in place since June -- is the country-led integrated peacebuilding strategy now guiding the engagement and dialogue between Bujumbura, the United Nations and other international partners.

The Framework identified key objectives, major challenges and threats to peace, especially the implementation of a stagnant ceasefire agreement between Burundi and the National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL). Promoting inclusive growth, employment, transparency and human rights were among its other top priorities."

See also:
Brookings Institution, 13 March 2008, The Role of Civil Society in Ending Displacement and Peacebuilding, by Elizabeth Ferris [Internet]

United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI), 12 Dec 2006 [Link below]

Peacebuilding Commission holds day-long discussion on Burundi, agrees on fund’s use to bolster government’s priority plan [Internet]

Challenges facing Burundi, requiring international help, indicated at country-specific meetings of Peacebuilding Commission [Internet]

Burundi government signs Nairobi pact including protocol on IDPs (December 2006)

MONUC 18 December 2006:
"With the signing of the Nairobi pact this Friday December 15 2006 by DRC, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, it paves the way for security, stability and development in the region, after years of conflict.

Many African state leaders, including DRC president Joseph Kabila were in Nairobi Kenya for the two day summit that will go a long way to bringing the region out of the vicious cycle of humanitarian disaster, poverty, and repeated conflict.[…]

The Great Lakes pact includes a $225 million security action plan to disarm rebel groups in Eastern DRC, and along border areas in Sudan, Kenya and Uganda.[…]

Ms. Besida Tonwe, the Head of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in Central and East Africa, said that the conference was a long process of consultations in helping the Great Lakes Region to reconcile, rehabilitate, and reconstruct their societies in a politically delicate process.

'It is also a process which in the future will continue to require financial support from the donor community and coherent assistance from the humanitarian community. It is now of utmost importance that there is a follow-up on the national implementation of the legal protocols adopted with the pact,’ she said.
‘The three protocols on humanitarian and social issues addressing sexual violence against women and children, property rights of returning persons, and the protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), are of the utmost importance,’ she concluded.”

IDMC 14 December 2006:
“The Pact is a culmination of more than four years of regional negotiations among States. It contains a package of measures which promises to enhance the lives of the forcibly displaced, including a regional protocol on protection and assistance for internally displaced, which when signed, will be the first legally binding regional instrument specifically dealing with IDPs anywhere in the world. A regional protocol on property rights of returning populations, and protocols which address some of the root causes of flight in the Great Lakes are also key elements of the Pact.”


- Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development

ISS 27 May 2005:
“Aside from calling for a cessation to violent conflict, the Arusha Accords [Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 28 August 2000]. provide comprehensive recommendations for stabilising and rehabilitating a highly polarised Burundian nation. The agreement is composed of five protocols each dedicated to a particular theme intended to move the process from peace-making to peace-building. These themes consist of an outline of the nature of the conflict; democracy and good governance; peace and security; reconstruction and development; and guarantees on the implementation of the agreement.

Importantly, the accords acknowledge that the Burundian ‘conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions… and stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power.’

Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development. It is therefore the ‘litmus test’ against which the performance of the transitional government (and other actors) as it relates to Arusha’s recommendations can be assessed.

Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Refugees and Sinistrés
The main conclusion and recommendations of Protocol IV states that:

‘Through the Burundi Peace Negotiations at Arusha it has been possible to assess how seriously the political and ethnic crisis that has torn Burundi apart since independence has affected Burundian society. Hundreds of thousands of Burundians are refugees, some of them for more than 25 years.

Hundreds of thousands more are forced to live in camps where conditions are appalling…. All Burundians are aware that a lasting peace is impossible so long as a definitive solution is not found to the problem of refugees and sinistrés. Likewise, peace is impossible so long as the country’s wealth is not shared equitably. Burundi cannot help the sinistrés rebuild destroyed property and restore its economy without the assistance of the international community.’”
The UN concluded that there was a strong indication that the FLN had not acted alone in the massacre of Congolese refugees (2004-2005)

- One year of after the Gatumba massacre, those responsible remain free

IRIN 5 Jan 2005:
“The FNL claimed responsibility for a massacre in August of 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees at Gatumba transit camp on the Burundi side of the border with the DRC. The UN is continuing to investigate whether armed groups on the DRC side of the border, which are aligned to FNL, also took part.”

UNSC 15 November 2004:
“As requested by the Security Council by its presidential statement of 15 August 2004 (S/PRST/2004/30), ONUB, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights conducted a joint investigation into the massacre on 13 August of 152 Congolese refugees at the Gatumba refugee camp, located close to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The results of the investigation were transmitted to the Council by my letter to the President of the Council dated 15 October (S/2004/821). Despite extensive investigation, there is no clear evidence of who organized, carried out and financed that gross atrocity. The FNL (Rwasa) claim of responsibility has been supported by witness statements and led United Nations investigators to believe that the group did, indeed, participate in the attack. There is however, a strong indication that FNL (Rwasa) did not act alone. Unfortunately, the dearth of verifiable information and limited cooperation by the Burundian authorities hampered the formulation of a definitive report. A national investigation is still ongoing.”

AI 18 August 2005:
“On the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre, which took place in August 2004, Amnesty International calls on the forthcoming government of Burundi and the international community to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.

‘The new government should undertake to set up an independent and impartial body to investigate this and other massacres and those found to be responsible should be held to account,’ Amnesty International said today.

During the night of 13 August 2004, the refugee camp of Gatumba, located near the Congolese border, was attacked by an armed group. More than 160 Congolese refugees, predominantly children and women members of the Banyamulenge ethnic group from South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (DRC), were deliberately and systematically killed. On 14 August, the Palipehutu-FNL (Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu -- Forces nationales de libération) claimed responsibility for the killings. The same day, the governments of Burundi and Rwanda and delegates of the Banyamulenge communities accused Congolese and Rwandese armed political groups based in the DRC of involvement in the massacre. According to UN investigators, evidence of the presence of ‘other groups’ was credible, but they were not able to categorically identify them.

Human rights organizations and the United Nations have strongly condemned this massacre and called for an independent, impartial and comprehensive investigation. Given the alleged involvement of armed political groups based in the DRC, there was concern that the killing could lead to a military intervention in the DRC by Burundi and Rwanda. Such an intervention could have led to further human rights abuses in the DRC.
Since then, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Burundian authorities have moved a few refugees to the Mwaro province, farther away from the border, others have returned to the DRC, while many others have moved to Bujumbura. So far, despite the indication from the Burundian Minister of Justice that the national investigation into the Gatumba massacre was completed, the United Nations Operations in Burundi stressed in a recent statement that, ‘no investigation report has been issued by the government [of Burundi] and the authors of the attack remain free’.

See also United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 13 Aug 2005
Burundi: Statement on the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre [Internet]

Causes of displacement


United Nations Resident Coordinator System for Burundi 1998, p. 5:

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<td>1972</td>
<td>An estimated 200,000 Burundians flee from progroms and communal violence; many seek refuge in Tanzania, where most remain to this day.</td>
<td>To escape the violence that broke out following the assassination of President Ndadaye, nearly 200,000 people leave the hills to seek protection in sites grouped around military posts. A vast majority are still there.</td>
<td>The escalation of the civil conflict sparks massive population movements; the northwestern province of Cibitoke, sandwiched between the rebel bases in the mountainous Kibira forest and in neighboring Kivu, is particularly unstable. Large numbers seek refuge in neighboring Zaire (150,000) and Tanzania (250,000). Up to 400,000 congregate in sites inside the country.</td>
<td>In the wake of the conquest of Zaire by the Kabila-led alliance, most of the refugees in Kivu return to Burundi, where they swell the numbers living in the displaced camps on the north-western provinces, particularly Cibitoke.</td>
<td>As a military strategy to regain control of rebel-held territory, the authorities forcibly regroup 250,000 civilians in Karuzi, Kanyanza and Muramvya provinces. Nearly all of them return home by the end of 1997, but the policy of controlled population movements continues to be implemented in other, more short-term forms elsewhere in the country.</td>
<td>Following the loss of their bases in the Kivu, the rebels regroup in Tanzania, and the main theatre of operations shifts to the southwest, along the ridge of the Nile-Congo watershed that is the main conduit into and out of the country for guerrilla groups. The ensuing destabilization leads to large scale displacement to new sites, again mainly along the main tarmac roads of the western plain, not only</td>
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<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>As the military gradually established control in certain areas, the authorities begin to dismantle the big sites near main roads or major towns and create smaller, decentralized sites grouped around advanced military positions in the hills (Cibitoke, parts of Bururi, Bubanza). Elsewhere, short-term regroupment operations continue to be implemented in response to localized destabilization (Bujumbura Rural)</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>Nearly all the sites in Cibitoke province, for so long the most unstable part of the country, are dismantled by June and the people return to their hills. At almost the same time, the crisis in neighboring Congo produces an influx of some eleven thousand people, which continues up to present.</td>
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**Causes of internal displacement: an analysis by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (1998)**

- Pervasive psychology of "flee or be killed" is a lasting legacy of the 1972 massacres and the 1993 upheavals
- Displacement has also been used as a deliberate goal of violence since 1993
- Massive retaliation by the armed forces
- Suspicion towards the displaced population creates more displacement
- Use of violence and displacement as a way to achieve political or economical objectives

**USCR 1998a, pp. 32-33:**

"A history of massacres has taught the people of Burundi, regardless of their ethnicity, that their personal survival hinges on their ability to flee and seek a safer place temporarily. For many peasant Burundians, the lesson of the past is that violence can erupt suddenly and can rapidly become all-encompassing. It is a lesson handed down from generation to generation. Some of the underlying causes of internal displacement in Burundi follow:

First, a pervasive psychology of 'flee or be killed' has become the lasting legacy of the 1972 slaughter and the 1993 upheaval. The 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda has reinforced the psychology of flight in Burundi. Second, the smaller massacres that have occurred almost daily since 1994 serve to validate the historical lessons of fear and mistrust. Fear is also ingrained that large number of Burundians have learned to flee their homes not only in reaction to danger but also in anticipation of it. Third, much of Burundi's displacement since 1993 has been caused by «ethnic cleansing.» Displacement is no longer merely as accidental by-product of violence; it has become a deliberate goal of violence. Fourth, both ethnic groups of Burundi regard themselves as vulnerable. The sense of vulnerability has become an important part of the self-identity. Hutu are demographically dominant but see themselves as vulnerable to the political and military power of Tutsi. Tutsi are politically and militarily powerful but view themselves as vulnerable to the demographic dominance of Hutu. Members of both ethnic groups regard themselves as victims, despite the fact that many massacres in Burundian history have been largely one-sided. Fifth, a pattern is evident in many violent eruptions over the decades: regardless of how violence begins, there is almost always massive retaliation against the Hutu by the Tutsi-dominated
military. As a result, many Hutu instinctively flee at the mere sight of soldiers or at the distant sound of their vehicles. The country's forces of order, unfortunately, create new disorder and displacement – deliberately in some cases, inadvertently in others.

Sixth, population displacement in Burundi often exacerbates rather than alleviates the conflict. Uprooted Burundians of one ethnic group are often regarded as dangerous by members of the other ethnic group. The military suspects that many internally displaced Hutu are rebels. Many Hutu suspect that camps of displaced Tutsi are bases for militia activity. There is some truth to these mutual suspicions. The result is that displacement at times begets more violence, causing still more people to flee. In short – at least in Burundi – displacement causes more displacement.

These are only partial explanations of the population displacement in Burundi, of course. This review of Burundi’s history indicates that some actors create violence and displacement as a way to achieve political control by force that they are unable to achieve or maintain through nonviolent means. Some elements in Burundi create violence and displacement for the economic rewards it brings them through banditry, confiscation of property, and skimming of relief aid. Still other Burundians commits violence and force displacement based on pure fear or hate, reinforced by decades of grievances, real or imagined."


- 1996: government policy to move civilian populations into "regroupment" camps
- 1997: end of the large-scale, long-term "regroupment" policy
- 1998: short-term forced movement of populations continues, particularly in unstable western provinces
- Since September 1999, over 350,000 people were forcibly moved by government forces to 53 regroupment camps to deprive insurgent groups of local support
- Government explained that regroupment camps were established to protect civilians from the rebels
- Dismantlement of regroupment camps was precondition to peace negotiations and camps were dismantled by mid-2000

**USCR 2000 “regroupment”**

"Burundian authorities have pursued two waves of forced population relocation, or regroupment. The first regroupment wave occurred during 1996-98 when the government moved at least a quarter-million Hutu into 50 camps scattered throughout the country. Some observers estimated that up to 800,000 persons lived in the regroupment camps at that time. Most regroupment sites closed during 1998, allowing occupants to return home."

**HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":**

*Renewed Regroupment (1999-2000)*

"In July and August 1999, the rebels launched increasingly frequent and damaging raids in and around Bujumbura, killing dozens of civilians as well as some soldiers. The army retaliated with attacks that killed more than one hundred civilians as well as combatants and the government tightened an existing curfew. These measures failed to satisfy Tutsi extremists in Bujumbura who demanded more drastic action to protect the city and to repress the rebellion. With rumors circulating of a possible coup and of violence being organized by extremists, the government decided to impose a policy of regroupment on most of Bujumbura-rural, particularly on areas inhabited largely by Hutu and near the city."

**HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":**
"In mid-1999, it [the government] had revived the regroupment policy in parts of southeastern Burundi before deciding to extend it to the area of the capital in September."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"The Tutsi-dominated government of Burundi, combating rebellions among the Hutu majority, began forcing civilians in the area around the capital into so-called "protection sites" or "regroupment camps" beginning in late September 1999. Burundian authorities claimed the measure was intended to protect the civilians, most of them Hutu, from attack by the rebel National Liberation Forces (Forces Nationales pour la Libération, FNL) who were becoming increasingly well-entrenched in the area. In fact, they meant to deprive the FNL of support from local people who helped them, sometimes willingly, sometimes under duress. By removing civilian support, the authorities hoped to isolate the FNL and thus reduce its increasingly frequent attacks on the capital. They hoped also to quiet Tutsi extremists who accused them of weakness in confronting the rebel threat."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"By the end of 1999, authorities had obliged some 80 percent of the population of the province of Bujumbura-rural-some 350,000 people-to live in fifty-three camps. Although regroupment helped reduce attacks on the capital city, rebels remained firmly established in rural areas. They simply shifted from one place to another when attacked by the army, which had insufficient troops available to control the whole region at the same time. Rebels continued to live off the crops of local people and even to inhabit the houses of those forced to live in the camps.

USCR 2000, "Regroupment":
"The country included at least three types of internal displacement: up to 200,000 people, primarily rural Tutsi, who have lived for six years in designated camps protected by government soldiers and thousands, who have become displaced in the countryside or at makeshift sites for varying lengths of time; and nearly 350,000 Hutu whom the government required to live in so-called 'regroupment' camps."

Dismantlement of regroupment camps (2000)

USCR 2000, "Regroupment":
"Government authorities argued that the camps were a temporary measure to protect civilians from attack and deprive rebel groups of food and lodging in rural areas. Burundian officials urged international humanitarian organizations to provide food, water, sanitation, and medical care to the sites. Burundian President Pierre Buyoya visited several sites in October [1999] and stated that conditions there were better than portrayed by aid agencies. The regroupment camps were 'no dramatic situation,' he assured."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"The international community severely criticized the policy of regroupment. In January 2000, the Burundian government promised to begin closing the camps but it made little progress in doing so until early June. At that time, rebel leaders made closing the camps a precondition for peace negotiations and former South African President Nelson Mandela, facilitator for the negotiations, condemned the regroupment sites as 'concentration camps.' Under this pressure, President Pierre Buyoya agreed that everyone in the camps would be allowed to return home by the end of July."

For an analysis on how forced displacement in 2000 of 350,000 civilians was carried out in violation of international law, including the Un Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, see HRW June 2000 "Violation of international law & Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" [link below]
Fighting between FNL and army displaced thousands in Bujumbura Rural (2004-2008)

- Combatants of FNL fought so called FNL “dissidents”, causing displacement in October 2007
- FNL is the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government
- Population displacement reduced in 2005 compared to 2003-2004
- Little population displacement in 2006, but the populations of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural, have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL

IRIN 23 April 2008:
“The resumption of violence in and around Bujumbura is causing panic in the country. Outside the capital, residents spend their nights in the bush for fear of being attacked, as the death toll rose to 33.
A bomb destroyed part of the Vatican embassy compound and a dining hall in the Kiriri University campus on 22 April [2008].

"We call on the army to remove its heavy arms from our campus," a student said, reacting to the installation of rocket launchers aimed at rebuffing attacks by the rebel FNL.
On 18 April, attacks were launched on military positions in Gihosha, Kanyosha, Kamenge and Musaga areas.”

NRC, May 2008:
In April 2008 serious violations of the 6 September 2006 ceasefire between the Burundian Army (FDN) and the rebel group Palipehutu-FNL (FNL) occurred. The most reported events took place in the capital city, Bujumbura, where three attacks took place on April 17, 18 and 22. Violence sprung in several provinces around the country (Bujumbura Rurale, Bubanza, Cibitoke and Kayanza), but Bujumbura Rurale province has been the most affected province, witnessing displacements of population.[...]

At the peak of displacement it was reported that there were:
- 4,050 households displaced in Isale commune or 20,100 people out of 83,000 inhabitants concentrated mostly in 6 sites in the centre of the commune, Rushubi on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 5,102 households displaced in Muyira and Kirombwe, both at Kanyosha commune on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 4,305 households displaced in Kabezi centre in three different sites on May 7 (data Kabezi local administration).
- 3,166 households displaced in Gitaza centre and 1,100 in Rutongo, both at Muhuta commune (data Muhuta local administration).
- And fewer numbers of IDPs registered in Bugarama, Mutambu and Nyabiraba communes (several hundreds of households)."

IRIN, 25 October 2007:
“Fighters of Burundí’s last active rebel group have for the second time in one week attacked a position occupied by a break-away faction, forcing villagers to flee their homes, a senior military official said.”
The evening raid by combatants of the Front National de Liberation (FNL), led by Agathon Rwasa, took place on 24 October [2007] evening on a site where the so-called FNL "dissidents" have gathered in Gakungwe village of Kabezi commune in Bujumbura Rural province.

It forced hundreds of people from surrounding villages to run away as the army sent reinforcements to the area to guard the splinter faction's settlement, residents said.

"There has indeed been such an attack and the heavy exchange of gunfire was heard," deputy army chief of staff Major General Godefroid Niyuhire told IRIN on 25 October. There were, however, no casualties during the attack, he said.

The "dissidents" say they fought with Rwasa for the FNL, but Rwasa's supporters have denied their claims and accused the government of creating a faction within the FNL. Rwasa has said these men, who intend to join the country's peace process, are not even party to a 2006 ceasefire agreement signed between the government and the FNL."

**OCHA 23 June 2005:**

"Population displacement due to insecurity and armed conflict reduced markedly in the first months of the year [2005] and as compared to the period 2003-2004. Populations in the province of Bujumbura rural, where recurrent waves of displacement had taken place throughout 2004, are gradually resettling and returning to zones of origin and no sizeable population movements were registered in the first semester of the year."

**IRIN 4 January 2005:**

"Thousands of civilians have been displaced following fierce fighting on Saturday in Burundi's western province of Bujumbura Rural.

The internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not received aid, the governor of the province, Ignace Ntawembarira, said.

Fighting was reported in the communes of Isale, Nyabiraba and Kanyosha, east of the capital, Bujumbura, between the rebel faction Forces nationales de libération (FNL) of Agathon Rwasa, and a coalition of the Burundian army and troops loyal to Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the former largest rebel faction in the country, the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces de defense pour la democratie (CNDD-FDD)."

**UNSC 27 October 2006:**

"In the period under review [August 2005-September 2006], the security situation was characterized by renewed clashes between FDN and FNL, mainly in the north-western provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural. The populations of these provinces have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL. In 2006, 107 cases of attacks and looting by FNL were reported."

**Fighting between government and FLN troops causes the displacement of thousands in Bubanza Province (2008)**

- FNL - the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government – caused displacement at the end of 2007

**IRIN 14 January 2008:**
“About 1,400 families (8,400 people) displaced in Musigati commune in the northwestern province of Bubanza, following fighting between government forces and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), desperately need help, according to local officials.

Laurent Kagamba, adviser to the Musigati administrator, said that since the simultaneous attacks on three military positions on 28 December [2007] and another on 9 January [2008] in the same commune, residents had fled their homes. Some sought refuge in Musigati parish, others at Musigati and Kabere trade centres, as well as Busiga coffee factory, he said.”

IRIN 10 September 2007:
“Residents of 700 households, or about 4,000 people, have fled their homes in the northwest Burundi province of Bubanza following raids by suspected members of the country's last active rebel group, a government official said.

‘For the time being, security is not good at all. Some residents have been beaten, while others have had their property looted,’ the governor of Bubanza, Pascal Nyabenda, told IRIN.

He said Forces nationales de libération (FNL) fighters had raided homes in Bubanza from their hideouts in the nearby Kibira and Rukoko forests. Those displaced were spending the nights in the compound of a local parish, venturing out for a few hours during the day to work in their fields, Nyabenda said.”

For information on displacement by fighting between government and FNL troops in Bubanza Province in previous years, see:
ITEKA, 9 August 2006, Burundi: Des personnes armées et des combattants du Palipehutu_Fnl mènent des attaues répétées dans certaines communes de Bubanza
ITEKA, 24 August 2005, Burundi: Des déplacés de guerre en commune Musigati sans assistance [Link below]
IRIN, 14 June 2005, Burundi: Thousands displaced in Bubanza [Link below]

Some of the Burundian refugees expelled from Tanzania have no house or land (2006)

UN 30 November 2006:
Over 3,000 Burundians who had found refuge in Tanzania were forced to return in 2006: “Many new arrivals report others being forced to leave and the 3,000 who have come back so far, only seem to be the tip of the iceberg. Nobody knows for sure how many Burundians live in Tanzania without having regularized their stay, but most estimate around 150,000 persons. This will remain a key challenge in 2007, especially since the new arrivals need assistance and in particular so-called sans addresses like Elias, who hopes that “the Burundian Government can find us a plot of land where I can build a house and send my children to school.”"

NRC November 2006:
“Since June 2006, Tanzania has been implementing a national plan for the repatriation of refugees from Tanzania. In this framework, persons without refugee status or any other legal status in Tanzania have been forcibly removed from Tanzania. This year, more than 4000 Burundians have been expelled from Tanzania, mainly from Ngara district towards Muyinga province.”

See also:
UNHCR, 23 Oct 2006, Growing numbers of Burundians return home from the DRC [Internet]
Other causes of displacement

Tens of thousands were displaced due to floods (2007)

- Since November 2006, close to 300,000 people were affected by the heavy floods

IRIN 9 February 2007:

Les pluies diluvienes qui tombent depuis novembre 2006 ont détruit les cultures et infrastructures de plusieurs régions, obligeant le gouvernement à mettre en place un fonds de solidarité pour venir en aide aux déplacés victimes des inondations dans les provinces de Muyinga, Kirundo, Cankuzo, Karuzi, Kayanza, Ngozi et Muyinga. »

IRIN 15 January 2007:
"Thousands of people in northwestern Burundi, displaced after days of heavy rainfall, urgently need relief aid, officials said on Monday.

"The rains have rendered more than 3,000 residents homeless," said Prosper Banzambe, the chief of Gatumba Zone, one of the affected areas in Mitumbuzi Commune, Bujumbura Rural Province.

He said the displaced, some of whom had sought shelter in a local church, needed food and other non-food aid such as blankets, jerry cans, soap and mosquito nets.

The rains, which pounded the area at the weekend, destroyed at least 500 homes. The flooding of the nearby River Kiziba contributed to the houses’ collapse.

Banzambe expressed concern that the continuing rains could cause more damage in Gatumba and appealed for a temporary shelter for the displaced.

He urged humanitarian organisations to help the displaced, saying the local administration was unable to "adequately meet their needs". […]"

On 4 January [2007], the government set up a national solidarity fund to support people affected by floods in seven provinces. In a decree, President Pierre Nkurunziza declared the provinces of Kayanza in the north, Muramvya and Karuzi in the central part of the country, Ruyigi in the east, and Bubanza and Cibitoke in the northwest, as "hunger-stricken following floods".

He also announced the establishment of the solidarity fund, to which every Burundian must contribute for four months from the end of January."

AFP 16 January 2007:
"Heavy rains pounding Burundi's capital and outlying areas have killed at least four people and left about 23,000 homeless since the downpours began last month, officials said Tuesday."
They said the situation was "catastrophic" after the floods destroyed farmlands, sparking fears of food shortages and disease outbreaks in the tiny central African nation emerging from more than a decade of civil strife.”

Famine in north and east causes internal displacement (2005-2006)

• Many of the people who flee due to food insecurity are newly repatriated refugees

OCHA 16 January 2005:
“[R]esidents of Northern provinces continue to flee inside and outside Burundi due to food insecurity. As of 14 January [2005], a joint visit conducted by OCHA Ruyigi sub office and the provincial administration authorities confirmed the presence in Kabuyenye IDP site, in Gisuru Commune, of 63 families who fled Busoni and Bugabira communes (Kirundo Province) in search of food. OCHA, in collaboration with the administration authorities convened a meeting with humanitarian actors in the province to discuss an emergency response.”

OCHA 23 June 2005:
“Cycles of drought periods, loss of staple crops, poor yields during three consecutive agriculture seasons and fragile nutritional conditions were particularly important in the northern Burundian provinces, which were also affected by waves of population movements both internal and across the border into Rwanda.”

OCHA 5 March 2005:
“Despite food aid distributed by WFP and partners, the food security situation remains disconcerting mainly in Northern and Eastern provinces. Continuous internal and cross-border displacement of the population continues to be part of the coping strategies. Around 7,900 Burundian asylum seekers were reported in Tanzania. Meanwhile, 131 internally displaced persons were registered in Cankuzo coming from Kirundo. However, many more internal movements remain unrecorded.”

ITEKA 21 February 2006:
“La plupart de ces migrants sont de nouveaux rapatriés qui n'ont pas eu où s'installer. Ils sont en train de migrer à la quête de quoi manger. Malheureusement, la population de la province de Cankuzo a également faim et ne peut pas les aider. Les prix des vivres montent chaque jour.”
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Conflict and displacement: background and development

Ethnic background and pre-colonial times

- Total population: 7.1 million
- Composite population comprising Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%) and Batwa (1%)(colonial census)
- Numerous interrelations between the ethnic groups (marriage, language, common monarchy)
- The Batwa are most likely the most ancient ethnic group in Burundi but they are marginalized in Burundi society

AFP 25 February 2005:
"GEOGRAPHY: Landlocked in central Africa, bounded by Rwanda in the north, Tanzania to the east and south, and the vast Democratic Republic of Congo to the west. One of the smallest states on the African continent, Burundi covers 27,834 square kilometers (10,747 square miles).

- POPULATION: 7.1 million, of which around 85 percent are Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi. The remaining one percent of the population are pygmies called Twas. One of the most densely populated African countries.

- CAPITAL: Bujumbura (population 300,000)

- LANGUAGES: Kirundi (national), French (administrative), Swahili (local)

- RELIGION: Christian (70 percent); Animist (15 percent); Muslim (15 percent)."

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 15-17:
"Burundi is situated in Central Africa, along Lake Tanganyika and shares borders with Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. [...] According to statistics dating back to the 1930s, 85 per cent of the population are Hutu, 14 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Batwa. The Hutu are considered to originate from Chad and the Niger, while the Tutsi, of Nilo-ethiopian origin, are thought to come from eastern Africa. The Batwa originate from the Congo Basin (Pygmies). This breakdown does not take into account the Ganwa (those of princely origin), nor a handful of other immigrant communities, nor those of mixed origins (mixed marriages having been common in the past). [...] It also does not take into account the fact that within both groups there existed historically rankings of status nor that passage from one group to another, for instance becoming Tutsi from Hutu or Ganwa, was also possible. The Burundians all speak the same language, Kirundi, which is both the national and the official language. Other languages, as provided for in the Constitution, are also spoken. [...] Despite ethnic differences, the Burundians live intermingled on the thousands of hills of the country without distinction on account of ethnicity. They are therefore inextricably bound to one another and cannot contemplate any notions of separation.

Although settlements have always been mixed, society in Burundi [...] was built along a 'class' and 'caste' system. [...] While their distinctions were not rigidly determined along 'ethnic' or 'tribal' lines, [...] there was significant correlation between class and ethnicity, with the Tutsis associated with the upper class and the Hutus with the lower class. This did not mean that all Tutsis were
upper class nor all Hutus lower class. Both class and the ethnic correlations were also dynamic. A Hutu could rise economically and socially and become a 'Tutsi'.

Hutu and Tutsi relationships were in the past cemented by their shared loyalty to common institutions. Kingship was such an institution; patron-client ties constituted another powerful socio-political institution. Patrons were expected to offer protection and gifts in exchange for services and offerings in kind. As social and political roles that once gave meaning and cohesion to membership in the community vanished, the use of the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' with ethnic connotations became more rigid. [...] Today the use of the term 'Hutu' describes an ethnic group which is poorer and powerless, whereas the Tutsi, especially the Hima (a Tutsi subgroup), are the pre-eminent power holders. [...] Nevertheless, the impression should not be created that the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' are figments as the "official truth" during the Bagaza period (1976-1987) would have it. This stance restricted discussion on the underlying problems of ethnicity and expression of ethnic differences without solving them."

CHR 19 March 2001, para. 100:
"La situation de la minorité twa mérite une attention particulière que malheureusement elle ne reçoit pas toujours. Les Twas sont sans doute le noyau le plus ancien de la population burundaise, comme dans d'autres pays des Grands Lacs; ils constituent aujourd'hui environ 1 % de la population."

Colonial rule and military regimes (1899-1992)

- 1962: Burundi becomes independent
- 25 years of a Tutsi dominated military dictatorship
- The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power
- 1980: creation of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu) by activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community in refugee camps in Tanzania

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 19-24:
"The transition from traditional power structures to 'modern' politics has by no means been an easy one. Two Ganwa (princely) dynasties continued fighting for control during the era of the colonial Powers, (first Germany from 1889 to 1918, then Belgium until 1962) as they had done during the pre-colonial era. The Party of Unity and National Progress (Uprona) was dominated by the Ganwa Bezi, while the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was led by the Ganwa Batare. In the legislative elections of September 1961 Uprona won, with Prince Rwagasoré as Prime Minister designate. A month later, however, Rwagasoné was assassinated. The political game switched from Ganwa to Hutu and Tutsi hands for the first time.

Burundi gained its independence from Belgium in July 1962. Until 1966 the crown continued to stabilize the situation. Violent incidents erupted after the elections in 1966, following which the Prime Minister, Michel Micombero, a Tutsi of the Hima group from Bururi, [...] overthrew the monarchy and declared a republic, concentrating power in the army. The National Assembly was dissolved and later replaced with a committee of officers, which, by 1971, was made up of 24 Tutsi and 3 Hutu, and Uprona was declared the sole party. Serious intra-Tutsi rivalries for power emerged. At this time Hutu were already being systematically purged from the army. The transition from a Ganwa-run kingdom to a Tutsi-dominated military dictatorship to the exclusion of Hutus caused more violence. For the next 25 years Tutsi factions fought over control, turning the Hutu into scapegoats whenever the Hutu would rise up and demand more equitable power-
sharing. On the other hand, whenever efforts towards power-sharing were made, extremists from both groups would resort to violence, to delay or cancel them.

Massacres had taken place in 1965 and 1967, but the most serious ones took place in 1972 triggered by Hutu militants from the Burundian refugee community in Tanzania. Hundreds if not thousands of Tutsi were killed and there is widespread fear that what had happened to Rwanda’s Tutsi, namely, systematic subjection and extermination, would happen to them too. The Tutsi retaliation and repression that followed were instant. The first victims were Hutus with education: secondary school and university students, teachers, nurses, doctors, priests, pastors, drivers, headmasters, businessmen, shopkeepers, civil servants, bank clerks, professors. Most Hutu families lost members. Hutu widows moved to the city outskirts when their houses were seized by Tutsi. Many Tutsis also fled. Many left the interior, where they felt frightened among Hutu neighbours, and moved to Bujumbura to fill the many jobs now vacant. Others rushed to occupy the flat, fertile, palm-oil-producing strip of lake shore south of Bujumbura, after the flight of very many Hutu who had been living there. Reports have spoken of genocidal acts and of hundreds of thousands of Hutus killed. […]

These events had great reverberations in Burundi; yet, nothing was ever done about the massacres. There has never been an official inquiry into them, an accounting, or any effort to bring to justice those responsible for the killings. Thereafter there was no question of Hutus entering the army, and many refused to send their children to school, fearing they were exposing them to a future massacre. Those at school had no role models. The educated, competent, urbane were all Tutsi. That there was a “lost” Hutu generation is still evident today in the political life of the country.

There was little power-sharing following the massacres, even after Micombero was overthrown by his deputy chief of staff, Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, also a Hima (Tutsi subgroup). There were no massacres during Bagaza’s 11-year rule and many refugees returned home. Bagaza reportedly hoped development would push his country through the ethnic deadlock. Observers note that he engaged in a series of reforms, without, however, addressing the ethnic issue. […] All provincial governors were Tutsi and most judges, university and school teachers, magistrates and heads of hospitals were Tutsi too. Uprona remained a Tutsi party and its members were the ones to benefit mostly from Bagaza’s management of the economy. In the last years of the Bagaza regime corruption and nepotism reportedly flourished. […] In the meantime, in 1980 activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community formed the Palipehutu, or the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People, in refugee camps in Tanzania. Bagaza was himself deposed in 1987 by a group of army officers and a cousin of his and nephew of Micombero, Major Pierre Buyoya, became President.

In August 1988 frustrated Hutu hopes for an improvement were at the root of hundreds of ethnic killings. Thousands were killed. This time the regions most affected were Ntega commune in Kirundo province and Marangara commune in Ngozi province, both bordering Rwanda. Palipehutu members from Rwanda had been infiltrating into Burundi and sporadic fights were taking place until Hutus turned against the Tutsi community, many of them Rwandan refugees. The army pursued those assumed responsible (although it is unclear how much resistance these people who had no guns put up against the soldiers) […] and in the next eight days it reportedly killed large numbers of civilians, including women and children. More than 60,000 people poured into Rwanda across the swamps and the Akanyaru river. Others took refuge within Burundi in swamp areas. The massacres were surprising even to the Burundians. Hutu had to face the fact that the army was still prepared to use maximum force and Tutsi that Hutu could still massacre many Tutsi before soldiers reached the scene.

**ACTS 30 September 2004:**
“Despite the popular conception of the conflict as a Hutu-Tutsi struggle, most scholars agree that the protracted conflict is structural in nature, though articulated in ethnic terms. The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power.” Governance practices by successive regimes galvanized political power and state control in the hands of a small elite group within the Tutsi community from particular parts of the country, who have since sustained their hold on power through repressive policies. Efforts by the Tutsi elite to retain political control and associated patronage networks, and violent counter-strategies of the Hutu political and armed groups have precipitated ethnic massacres and retaliatory radicalism marked by acts of genocide.”

Civil war and Peace Process in Burundi (1993-2008)

- 1993: Assassination of elected President Ndadaye triggers large-scale inter-ethnic violence
- 1996: Coup installs President Buyoya; sanctions imposed by neighbouring countries
- Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi signed in August 2000
- 2005: signing of ceasefire agreement between FNL and government; adoption of new constitution
- Local, legislative and presidential elections was held in various phases in 2005
- Security sector was profoundly restructured and the army is now ethnically balanced (2006)
- Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and FRODEBU – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence (2006)
- As of April 2008: the FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement

AFP 1 June 2005, factfile:
“The civil war begun in 1993 has killed an estimated 300,000 people. [...]”

Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu president, elected in June 1993, was assassinated on October 21 of the same year during a failed coup organized by Tutsi military officers.

His successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira -- another Hutu -- was killed in April 1994 at the same time as then Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana died under suspicious circumstances when his plane was shot down over Kigali, sparking the genocide of up to a million Tutsis and Hutu moderates in Rwanda.

Ntaryamira’s successor, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, also a Hutu, was overthrown in a non-violent coup in July 1996, and [Pierre " Buyoya returned to power.

In 1998, Buyoya reformed the constitution to create a transition government and began peace talks with Hutu and Tutsi opposition groups.

In August 2000 a peace agreement including a power-sharing deal was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, but the two main armed rebel groups refused to participate in the talks. Civil war continued to rage.

In November 2001, Buyoya took over as transitional leader for a period of 18 months, seconded by a Hutu vice-president whose signature is required on all presidential texts pertaining to security and the armed forces.
A 26-member power-sharing government was also sworn in to oversee the three-year transition. Buyoya was succeeded at the head of the transition government in May 2003 by his vice president Domitien Ndayizeye, who is seconded by a Tutsi, Alphonse Marie Kadage.

A ceasefire agreement was signed in December 2002 by the government and the main Hutu rebel movement, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), which finally entered government in November 2003.

A second Hutu armed group, the National Liberation Forces (FNL), finally signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on May 15, but the details of how this be implemented have still not yet been resolved.

A new constitution was adopted at the end of February, aimed at bringing about a peaceful democracy and ending the reign of the Tutsie tribe in power. Opposition has been voiced only by Tutsis concerned at losing too much power."

**HRW 4 November 2005:**
"Elections in 2005 were the final chapter in the transitional process established by the Arusha Accords of 2000. In the intervening period a government including the Hutu-dominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu), the Tutsi-dominated National Unity and Progress Party (Uprona), and a number of smaller parties ruled the country. In late 2003 this government signed the Pretoria Protocol making peace with the CNDDFDD and starting the process of integrating the former rebels into the army and the administration.”

*For more detailed information on 1993 events, see “Profile in displacement“ (Report of the Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, 28 November 1994), paras. 29-36) [External link]*

**ICG 30 November 2006:**
“In elections held between June and August 2005, the voters of Burundi elected their first democratic government since 1993. This marked an end to the transitional government established by the Arusha Agreement in 2001. The mainly Hutu former rebels of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), led by Pierre Nkurunziza, won a resounding victory and hold 58 per cent of the seats in parliament and 57 per cent in the communal councils, as well as twelve of the twenty government ministries. Nkurunziza was inaugurated as president on 26 August 2005.

The elections radically reconfigured politics. Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence. In the run-up to the elections, rebel forces were integrated into the national army, police and intelligence service. For the first time in Burundian history, these forces were ethnically balanced. Nkurunziza’s government faced considerable challenges. Foremost was the process of transforming the CNDDFDD from a rebel movement into a democratic political party in power – one whose members had little civil administration experience. The government had to reconstruct an economy devastated by more than a decade of civil war and economic embargo, during which per capita income fell by 35 per cent and the number of people living below the poverty line doubled. During its first year it also had to deal with security problems in the capital and surrounding provinces caused by the remaining rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL. Unfortunately, the government’s response to these challenges has increasingly manifested itself in disregard for the rule of law.”

**UNSC 28 November 2007:**
"The signing of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the armed group Palipehutu-Forces nationales de libération (FNL) led by Agathon Rwasa on 7 September 2006 was a decisive step in the peace process in Burundi. However, its implementation remains difficult owing to persisting disagreements among the parties. The Agreement, which was the outcome of determined efforts of regional States united under the auspices of the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, addresses a number of issues including the integration of FNL ex-combatants into the Burundian National Defence Forces (FDN) and security forces, the participation of FNL elements in the institutions of the country and the rapid demobilization and reintegration of children associated with this armed group into their respective families and communities. Under the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism was established to oversee the demobilization of FNL combatants.

The signing of the Agreement was followed at first by a significant improvement in the security situation, characterized notably by a decrease both in the number of abuses perpetrated by armed groups and in the number of alleged FNL militants arrested by the National Defence Forces and the National Police of Burundi."

PBC, 19 March 2008:
"[T]he Palipehutu-FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. In response, a Political Directorate had been established to assist the Mechanism in efforts to regain FNL's participation."

IRIN, 14 January 2008:
"The FNL, the last rebel movement still active in Burundi, has resumed fighting government forces, especially in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza, where it is most active.

Though the movement signed a ceasefire accord with the government in September 2006, it has not been fully implemented. The joint verification and monitoring mechanism, which oversees its implementation, suspended activities in July 2007 after the FNL delegates walked out of talks over security concerns. They have since been accusing the facilitator, South African safety minister Charles Nqakula, of bias."

ISS 3 April 2008:
"After intense diplomatic pressure from regional governments and the international community Burundi’s last rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL, has been brought back to the negotiating table that drew up a new roadmap designed to end the standoff by the end of June 2008. This breakthrough was reached in a February 23 meeting in Cape Town, South Africa. The meeting was attended by special envoys to Burundi from Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa, as well as representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.

The Cape Town meeting had been called to save the Burundi peace process after the FNL withdrew from its implementation, alleging bias on the part of the facilitator, South Africa’s Security Minister Charles Nqakula. To help address this challenge Minister Nqakula has followed the example of other peace processes by establishing a Group of Special Envoys for Burundi (GSEB), representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations."

Delrue August 2006:
"The success of Burundi’s transition to peace hinges on how its new government (elected in August 2005 and headed by former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza) and the international community deal with such post-displacement issues as land and property claims, reconciliation and transitional justice."
The link between displacement, return, reconciliation and successful transition towards a consolidated peace is frequently either underestimated or neglected by the international community."

For a comprehensive analysis of the political situation in Burundi, see

HRW, 12 March 2008:  
“Several opposition politicians have been threatened and targeted for violence during the last 18 months. Nzomukunda, then second vice-president of the republic, fled Burundi in September 2006 after issuing a letter critical of the government; she returned in March 2007. Five parliamentarians from the opposition party Front for Democracy in Burundi (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi, Frodebu) and from a dissident wing of the CNDD-FDD, including Mpawenayo, were targeted in a set of grenade attacks in August 2007 that injured several bystanders. Pancrace Cimpaye, Frodebu spokesperson, was detained after suggesting the ruling party bore responsibility for the August attacks; after being released, he briefly left the country. In February 2008, a local Frodebu official was killed, while another was seriously injured in a grenade attack which killed his wife and child.”

See also:  
IRIN, BURUNDI: Government of consensus formed, 15 November 2007 [Internet]

ICG, 28 August 2007, Burundi: Finalising peace with the FNL [Internet]


Secretary-General welcomes signing of Burundi ceasefire agreement, United Nations Secretary General, 8 September 2006 [Internet]

Progress in regard to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (2005-2008)

- Reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression
- About 5,000 UN peacekeepers were in Burundi from June 2004 to the end of 2006, to monitor the country's transition to democracy, with South Africa contributing the majority of troops.
- The new Burundian government saw the peacekeepers as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible (2006)
- A new UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) continued the process of peace consolidation and of coordinating the UN system’s activities in Burundi from 2007

ISS 13 October 2006:
"In Burundi, reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, signed in August 2000 by 17 political parties, the National
Assembly and the government and the 2003 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Burundi and the principal rebel group, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), do include important provisions on the organization, structure, mandates and composition of postconflict security forces that will act professionally and apolitically, adhere to human rights norms, and provide defence and security to all Burundians.[...]

Although the Arusha Accords were signed in August 2000, the implementation of the security sector reform process they articulate was largely delayed until 2003, mainly because of continued warfare throughout most of Burundi. Indeed, the most active rebel movements in the field were marginalized throughout the Arusha negotiations and were thus not signatories to the Accord. Accordingly, it was not until the signing of a ceasefire between the government and the main rebel group – the CNDD-FDD – in 2003 that the reform process was set in motion. By July 2006, however, the reform of the defence and security forces had reached an advanced stage and had achieved most of its structural objectives (i.e. the integration of several armed groups into a single military and single police force), despite various financial- and material-related challenges.

The process of integrating the former rebel groups and the FAB into a new national defence force, the Forces de Défense Nationale (FDN), has been completed – largely to the satisfaction of the government and international donors – despite its late start due to disagreements on the definition of combatant and on the harmonization of rank between the rebel movements and the regular army.[...]

Despite this progress, a preliminary assessment of the reform of the FDN and the PNB and progress in the domain of social and economic reintegration and re-insertion of former combatants suggests that serious challenges remain in these critical areas. The local media frequently report human rights violations perpetrated by on-duty military or police or by demobilized combatants.

Tufts University 30 July 2006:
“The new Burundian government saw ONUB as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible. This perception was aggravated by two unfortunate choices made by leaders of the UN mission: to support Frodebu and former President Ndayizeye during the electoral campaign and proposing to coordinate the transition from humanitarian aid to development through a “Partners Council” deliberating without the government.”

UNSC 18 December 2006:
“Meanwhile, as delays in the start of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants have continued, criminal activities against the population, reportedly committed by FNL combatants, have increased since late October. Skirmishes between the national security forces and alleged FNL combatants and detentions of FNL elements and supporters have reportedly resumed in the north-western provinces. FNL recruitment, including of youths, has also been reported, particularly in Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural provinces.[...]

Once deployed, the AU special task force would therefore be expected to assume the responsibilities that were allocated to ONUB under the ceasefire agreement, namely: (a) protection of designated assembly areas for FNL combatants; (b) provision of engineering, logistical and administrative support for the establishment of the assembly areas; (c) disarmament of combatants; (d) storage of weapons collected from the disarmament process and their subsequent destruction; (e) transportation of disarmed FNL combatants from assembly areas to the designated demobilization centre or integration facilities of the National Defence Forces; and (f) protection of the demobilization centres. [...]

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Further delays in the agreement’s implementation, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants, are likely to lead to more friction between these combatants and the population and the national security services. In addition, there was an increase in localized conflicts involving the small FNL faction led by Jean Bosco Sindayigaya, which did not sign the ceasefire agreement.

**DPKO 20 December 2006:**
“A new United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), authorized by Security Council resolution 1719 earlier this year, will continue the process of peace consolidation and be in charge of coordinating the United Nations system’s activities in Burundi for an initial period of one year.”

The mandate of BINUB is extended until 31 December 2008 (UNSC, 19 December 2007).

See also:
Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 31 Aug 2006
A technical analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - a case study from Burundi


**Peace Building Commission and Burundi (2006-2008)**

- Peace Building Commission approved in December 2007 a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation

**UNSC 18 December 2006, para.22:**
“Significant progress has been made in the establishment of peacebuilding coordination mechanisms between the Government and the United Nations. On 7 November, the Government created an Inter-Ministerial Peacebuilding Steering Committee, which will work with the United Nations, within the framework of an initial joint mechanism, in preparing the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission and the peacebuilding priority plan to be submitted to the Peacebuilding Fund. The inaugural meeting of the Government-United Nations joint mechanism was held on 16 November [2006], followed by several sessions at the policy and working levels. As a result, a common understanding was reached on the steps to be taken by the Government, with United Nations support, to secure resources from the Peacebuilding Fund. Progress was also made in developing the Government's presentation to the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission. The mission of the Peacebuilding Support Office to Burundi in mid-November [2006] and the meetings it had with the United Nations and the Government's Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee contributed significantly to this process.”

**UNGA 5 December 2007:**
“With a long-awaited conflict-recovery and development strategy for Burundi now in place, the Peacebuilding Commission today approved a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation -- both locally and in New York -- in priority areas
such as justice and security sector reform, generating jobs and making radical improvements to governance.

Meeting in its special “Burundi Configuration”, the Commission adopted the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism (MTM) of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. That Framework -- in place since June -- is the country-led integrated peacebuilding strategy now guiding the engagement and dialogue between Bujumbura, the United Nations and other international partners.

The Framework identified key objectives, major challenges and threats to peace, especially the implementation of a stagnant ceasefire agreement between Burundi and the National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL). Promoting inclusive growth, employment, transparency and human rights were among its other top priorities.”

**See also:**
Brookings Institution, 13 March 2008, The Role of Civil Society in Ending Displacement and Peacebuilding, by Elizabeth Ferris [Internet]

United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI), 12 Dec 2006 [Link below]

Peacebuilding Commission holds day-long discussion on Burundi, agrees on fund’s use to bolster government’s priority plan [Internet]

Challenges facing Burundi, requiring international help, indicated at country-specific meetings of Peacebuilding Commission [Internet]

**Burundi government signs Nairobi pact including protocol on IDPs (December 2006)**

**MONUC 18 December 2006:**
"With the signing of the Nairobi pact this Friday December 15 2006 by DRC, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, it paves the way for security, stability and development in the region, after years of conflict.

Many African state leaders, including DRC president Joseph Kabila were in Nairobi Kenya for the two day summit that will go a long way to bringing the region out of the vicious cycle of humanitarian disaster, poverty, and repeated conflict.[…]

The Great Lakes pact includes a $225 million security action plan to disarm rebel groups in Eastern DRC, and along border areas in Sudan, Kenya and Uganda.[…]

Ms. Besida Tonwe, the Head of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in Central and East Africa, said that the conference was a long process of consultations in helping the Great Lakes Region to reconcile, rehabilitate, and reconstruct their societies in a politically delicate process.

'It is also a process which in the future will continue to require financial support from the donor community and coherent assistance from the humanitarian community. It is now of utmost importance that there is a follow-up on the national implementation of the legal protocols adopted with the pact,' she said.
‘The three protocols on humanitarian and social issues addressing sexual violence against women and children, property rights of returning persons, and the protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), are of the utmost importance,’ she concluded.

**IDMC 14 December 2006:**

“The Pact is a culmination of more than four years of regional negotiations among States. It contains a package of measures which promises to enhance the lives of the forcibly displaced, including a regional protocol on protection and assistance for internally displaced, which when signed, will be the first legally binding regional instrument specifically dealing with IDPs anywhere in the world. A regional protocol on property rights of returning populations, and protocols which address some of the root causes of flight in the Great Lakes are also key elements of the Pact.”

**Arusha Accords: Challenges of implementing Protocol IV (2005)**

- Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development.

**ISS 27 May 2005:**

“Aside from calling for a cessation to violent conflict, the Arusha Accords [Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 28 August 2000] provide comprehensive recommendations for stabilising and rehabilitating a highly polarised Burundian nation. The agreement is composed of five protocols each dedicated to a particular theme intended to move the process from peace-making to peace-building. These themes consist of an outline of the nature of the conflict; democracy and good governance; peace and security; reconstruction and development; and guarantees on the implementation of the agreement.

Importantly, the accords acknowledge that the Burundian ‘conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions… and stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power.’

Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development. It is therefore the ‘litmus test’ against which the performance of the transitional government (and other actors) as it relates to Arusha’s recommendations can be assessed.

**Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Refugees and Sinistrés**

The main conclusion and recommendations of Protocol IV states that:

“Through the Burundi Peace Negotiations at Arusha it has been possible to assess how seriously the political and ethnic crisis that has torn Burundi apart since independence has affected Burundian society. Hundreds of thousands of Burundians are refugees, some of them for more than 25 years.

Hundreds of thousands more are forced to live in camps where conditions are appalling…. All Burundians are aware that a lasting peace is impossible so long as a definitive solution is not found to the problem of refugees and sinistrés. Likewise, peace is impossible so long as the country’s wealth is not shared equitably. Burundi cannot help the sinistrés rebuild destroyed property and restore its economy without the assistance of the international community.’’"
The UN concluded that there was a strong indication that the FLN had not acted alone in the massacre of Congolese refugees (2004-2005)

- One year of after the Gatumba massacre, those responsible remain free

**IRIN 5 Jan 2005:**

“The FNL claimed responsibility for a massacre in August of 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees at Gatumba transit camp on the Burundi side of the border with the DRC. The UN is continuing to investigate whether armed groups on the DRC side of the border, which are aligned to FNL, also took part.”

**UNSC 15 November 2004:**

“As requested by the Security Council by its presidential statement of 15 August 2004 (S/PRST/2004/30), ONUB, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights conducted a joint investigation into the massacre on 13 August of 152 Congolese refugees at the Gatumba refugee camp, located close to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The results of the investigation were transmitted to the Council by my letter to the President of the Council dated 15 October (S/2004/821). Despite extensive investigation, there is no clear evidence of who organized, carried out and financed that gross atrocity. The FNL (Rwasa) claim of responsibility has been supported by witness statements and led United Nations investigators to believe that the group did, indeed, participate in the attack. There is however, a strong indication that FNL (Rwasa) did not act alone. Unfortunately, the dearth of verifiable information and limited cooperation by the Burundian authorities hampered the formulation of a definitive report. A national investigation is still ongoing.”

**AI 18 August 2005:**

“On the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre, which took place in August 2004, Amnesty International calls on the forthcoming government of Burundi and the international community to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.

‘The new government should undertake to set up an independent and impartial body to investigate this and other massacres and those found to be responsible should be held to account,’ Amnesty International said today.

During the night of 13 August 2004, the refugee camp of Gatumba, located near the Congolese border, was attacked by an armed group. More than 160 Congolese refugees, predominantly children and women members of the Banyamulenge ethnic group from South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (DRC), were deliberately and systematically killed. On 14 August, the Palipehutu-FNL (Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu -- Forces nationales de libération) claimed responsibility for the killings. The same day, the governments of Burundi and Rwanda and delegates of the Banyamulenge communities accused Congolese and Rwandese armed political groups based in the DRC of involvement in the massacre. According to UN investigators, evidence of the presence of ‘other groups’ was credible, but they were not able to categorically identify them.

Human rights organizations and the United Nations have strongly condemned this massacre and called for an independent, impartial and comprehensive investigation. Given the alleged involvement of armed political groups based in the DRC, there was concern that the killing could lead to a military intervention in the DRC by Burundi and Rwanda. Such an intervention could have led to further human rights abuses in the DRC.
Since then, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Burundian authorities have moved a few refugees to the Mwaro province, farther away from the border, others have returned to the DRC, while many others have moved to Bujumbura. So far, despite the indication from the Burundian Minister of Justice that the national investigation into the Gatumba massacre was completed, the United Nations Operations in Burundi stressed in a recent statement that, 'no investigation report has been issued by the government [of Burundi] and the authors of the attack remain free'.

See also United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 13 Aug 2005
Burundi: Statement on the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre [Internet]

Causes of displacement


United Nations Resident Coordinator System for Burundi 1998, p. 5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronology of Population Movements</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>An estimated 200,000 Burundians flee from pogroms and communal violence; many seek refuge in Tanzania, where most remain to this day.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>To escape the violence that broke out following the assassination of President Ndadaye, nearly 200,000 people leave the hills to seek protection in sites grouped around military posts. A vast majority are still there.</td>
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<td>1994-1996</td>
<td>The escalation of the civil conflict sparks massive population movements; the northwestern province of Cibitoke, sandwiched between the rebel bases in the mountainous Kibira forest and in neighboring Kivu, is particularly unstable. Large numbers seek refuge in neighboring Zaire (150,000) and Tanzania (250,000). Up to 400,000 congregate in sites inside the country.</td>
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<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>In the wake of the conquest of Zaire by the Kabila-led alliance, most of the refugees in Kivu return to Burundi, where they swell the numbers living in the displaced camps on the north-western provinces, particularly Cibitoke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>As a military strategy to regain control of rebel-held territory, the authorities forcibly regroup 250,000 civilians in Karuzi, Kanyanza and Muramvya provinces. Nearly all of them return home by the end of 1997, but the policy of controlled population movements continues to be implemented in other, more short-term forms elsewhere in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>Following the loss of their bases in the Kivu, the rebels regroup in Tanzania, and the main theatre of operations shifts to the southwest, along the ridge of the Nile-Congo watershed that is the main conduit into and out of the country for guerrilla groups. The ensuing destabilization leads to large scale displacement to new sites, again mainly along the main tarmac roads of the western plain, not only</td>
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</table>
in Makamba and Bururi provinces but also as far as north as Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza.

1997-1998

As the military gradually established control in certain areas, the authorities begin to dismantle the big sites near main roads or major towns and create smaller, decentralized sites grouped around advanced military positions in the hills (Cibitoke, parts of Bururi, Bubanza). Elsewhere, short-term regroupment operations continue to be implemented in response to localized destabilization (Bujumbura Rural).

1998

Nearly all the sites in Cibitoke province, for so long the most unstable part of the country, are dismantled by June and the people return to their hills. At almost the same time, the crisis in neighboring Congo produces an influx of some eleven thousand people, which continues up to present.

Causes of internal displacement: an analysis by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (1998)

- Pervasive psychology of "flee or be killed" is a lasting legacy of the 1972 massacres and the 1993 upheavals
- Displacement has also been used as a deliberate goal of violence since 1993
- Massive retaliation by the armed forces
- Suspicion towards the displaced population creates more displacement
- Use of violence and displacement as a way to achieve political or economical objectives

USCR 1998a, pp. 32-33:

“A history of massacres has taught the people of Burundi, regardless of their ethnicity, that their personal survival hinges on their ability to flee and seek a safer place temporarily. For many peasant Burundians, the lesson of the past is that violence can erupt suddenly and can rapidly become all-encompassing. It is a lesson handed down from generation to generation. Some of the underlying causes of internal displacement in Burundi follow:

First, a pervasive psychology of 'flee or be killed' has become the lasting legacy of the 1972 slaughter and the 1993 upheaval. The 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda has reinforced the psychology of flight in Burundi.

Second, the smaller massacres that have occurred almost daily since 1994 serve to validate the historical lessons of fear and mistrust. Fear is also ingrained that large number of Burundians have learned to flee their homes not only in reaction to danger but also in anticipation of it.

Third, much of Burundi's displacement since 1993 has been caused by «ethnic cleansing.» Displacement is no longer merely as accidental by-product of violence; it has become a deliberate goal of violence.

Fourth, both ethnic groups of Burundi regard themselves as vulnerable. The sense of vulnerability has become an important part of the self-identity. Hutu are demographically dominant but see themselves as vulnerable to the political and military power of Tutsi. Tutsi are politically and militarily powerful but view themselves as vulnerable to the demographic dominance of Hutu. Members of both ethnic groups regard themselves as victims, despite the fact that many massacres in Burundian history have been largely one-sided.

Fifth, a pattern is evident in many violent eruptions over the decades: regardless of how violence begins, there is almost always massive retaliation against the Hutu by the Tutsi-dominated
military. As a result, many Hutu instinctively flee at the mere sight of soldiers or at the distant sound of their vehicles. The country's forces of order, unfortunately, create new disorder and displacement – deliberately in some cases, inadvertently in others. Sixth, population displacement in Burundi often exacerbates rather than alleviates the conflict. Uprooted Burundians of one ethnic group are often regarded as dangerous by members of the other ethnic group. The military suspects that many internally displaced Hutu are rebels. Many Hutu suspect that camps of displaced Tutsi are bases for militia activity. There is some truth to these mutual suspicions. The result is that displacement at times begets more violence, causing still more people to flee. In short – at least in Burundi – displacement causes more displacement.

These are only partial explanations of the population displacement in Burundi, of course. This review of Burundi's history indicates that some actors create violence and displacement as a way to achieve political control by force that they are unable to achieve or maintain through nonviolent means. Some elements in Burundi create violence and displacement for the economic rewards it brings them through banditry, confiscation of property, and skimming of relief aid. Still other Burundians commits violence and force displacement based on pure fear or hate, reinforced by decades of grievances, real or imagined.”


- 1996: government policy to move civilian populations into "regroupment" camps
- 1997: end of the large-scale, long-term "regroupment" policy
- 1998: short-term forced movement of populations continues, particularly in unstable western provinces
- Since September 1999, over 350,000 people were forcibly moved by government forces to 53 regroupment camps to deprive insurgent groups of local support
- Government explained that regroupment camps were established to protect civilians from the rebels
- Dismantlement of regroupment camps was precondition to peace negotiations and camps were dismantled by mid-2000

**USCR 2000 "regroupment"**

"Burundian authorities have pursued two waves of forced population relocation, or regroupment. The first regroupment wave occurred during 1996-98 when the government moved at least a quarter-million Hutu into 50 camps scattered throughout the country. Some observers estimated that up to 800,000 persons lived in the regroupment camps at that time. Most regroupment sites closed during 1998, allowing occupants to return home."


"In July and August 1999, the rebels launched increasingly frequent and damaging raids in and around Bujumbura, killing dozens of civilians as well as some soldiers. The army retaliated with attacks that killed more than one hundred civilians as well as combatants and the government tightened an existing curfew. These measures failed to satisfy Tutsi extremists in Bujumbura who demanded more drastic action to protect the city and to repress the rebellion. With rumors circulating of a possible coup and of violence being organized by extremists, the government decided to impose a policy of regroupment on most of Bujumbura-rural, particularly on areas inhabited largely by Hutu and near the city."

**HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":**
“In mid-1999, it [the government] had revived the regroupment policy in parts of southeastern Burundi before deciding to extend it to the area of the capital in September.”

**HRW June 2000, "Summary":**
“The Tutsi-dominated government of Burundi, combating rebellions among the Hutu majority, began forcing civilians in the area around the capital into so-called "protection sites" or "regroupment camps" beginning in late September 1999. Burundian authorities claimed the measure was intended to protect the civilians, most of them Hutu, from attack by the rebel National Liberation Forces (Forces Nationales pour la Libération, FNL) who were becoming increasingly well-entrenched in the area. In fact, they meant to deprive the FNL of support from local people who helped them, sometimes willingly, sometimes under duress. By removing civilian support, the authorities hoped to isolate the FNL and thus reduce its increasingly frequent attacks on the capital. They hoped also to quiet Tutsi extremists who accused them of weakness in confronting the rebel threat.”

**HRW June 2000, "Summary":**
“By the end of 1999, authorities had obliged some 80 percent of the population of the province of Bujumbura-rural-some 350,000 people-to live in fifty-three camps. Although regroupment helped reduce attacks on the capital city, rebels remained firmly established in rural areas. They simply shifted from one place to another when attacked by the army, which had insufficient troops available to control the whole region at the same time. Rebels continued to live off the crops of local people and even to inhabit the houses of those forced to live in the camps.

**USCR 2000, "Regroupment":**
“The country included at least three types of internal displacement: up to 200,000 people, primarily rural Tutsi, who have lived for six years in designated camps protected by government soldiers and thousands, who have become displaced in the countryside or at makeshift sites for varying lengths of time; and nearly 350,000 Hutu whom the government required to live in so-called 'regroupment' camps.”


**USCR 2000, "Regroupment":**
"Government authorities argued that the camps were a temporary measure to protect civilians from attack and deprive rebel groups of food and lodging in rural areas. Burundian officials urged international humanitarian organizations to provide food, water, sanitation, and medical care to the sites. Burundian President Pierre Buyoya visited several sites in October [1999] and stated that conditions there were better than portrayed by aid agencies. The regroupment camps were 'no dramatic situation,' he assured."

**HRW June 2000, "Summary":**
“The international community severely criticized the policy of regroupment. In January 2000, the Burundian government promised to begin closing the camps but it made little progress in doing so until early June. At that time, rebel leaders made closing the camps a precondition for peace negotiations and former South African President Nelson Mandela, facilitator for the negotiations, condemned the regroupment sites as 'concentration camps.' Under this pressure, President Pierre Buyoya agreed that everyone in the camps would be allowed to return home by the end of July.”

*For an analysis on how forced displacement in 2000 of 350,000 civilians was carried out in violation of international law, including the Un Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, see HRW June 2000 "Violation of international law & Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" [link below]*
Fighting between FNL and army displaced thousands in Bujumbura Rural (2004-2008)

- Combatants of FNL fought so called FNL “dissidents”, causing displacement in October 2007
- FNL is the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government
- Population displacement reduced in 2005 compared to 2003-2004
- Little population displacement in 2006, but the populations of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural, have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL

IRIN 23 April 2008:
“The resumption of violence in and around Bujumbura is causing panic in the country. Outside the capital, residents spend their nights in the bush for fear of being attacked, as the death toll rose to 33.
A bomb destroyed part of the Vatican embassy compound and a dining hall in the Kiriri University campus on 22 April [2008].

"We call on the army to remove its heavy arms from our campus," a student said, reacting to the installation of rocket launchers aimed at rebuffing attacks by the rebel FNL.
On 18 April, attacks were launched on military positions in Gihosha, Kanyosha, Kamenge and Musaga areas."

NRC, May 2008:
In April 2008 serious violations of the 6 September 2006 ceasefire between the Burundian Army (FDN) and the rebel group Palipehutu-FNL (FNL) occurred. The most reported events took place in the capital city, Bujumbura, where three attacks took place on April 17, 18 and 22. Violence sprung in several provinces around the country (Bujumbura Rurale, Bubanza, Cibitoke and Kayanza), but Bujumbura Rurale province has been the most affected province, witnessing displacements of population.[...]

At the peak of displacement it was reported that there were:
- 4,050 households displaced in Isale commune or 20,100 people out of 83,000 inhabitants concentrated mostly in 6 sites in the centre of the commune, Rushubi on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 5,102 households displaced in Muyira and Kirombwe, both at Kanyosha commune on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 4,305 households displaced in Kabezi centre in three different sites on May 7 (data Kabezi local administration).
- 3,166 households displaced in Gitaza centre and 1,100 in Rutongo, both at Muhuta commune (data Muhuta local administration).
- And fewer numbers of IDPs registered in Bugarama, Mutambu and Nyabiraba communes (several hundreds of households)."

IRIN, 25 October 2007:
“Fighters of Burundi’s last active rebel group have for the second time in one week attacked a position occupied by a break-away faction, forcing villagers to flee their homes, a senior military official said."
The evening raid by combatants of the Front National de Liberation (FNL), led by Agathon Rwasa, took place on 24 October [2007] evening on a site where the so-called FNL "dissidents" have gathered in Gakungwe village of Kabezi commune in Bujumbura Rural province.

It forced hundreds of people from surrounding villages to run away as the army sent reinforcements to the area to guard the splinter faction's settlement, residents said.

"There has indeed been such an attack and the heavy exchange of gunfire was heard," deputy army chief of staff Major General Godefroid Niyuhire told IRIN on 25 October. There were, however, no casualties during the attack, he said.

The "dissidents" say they fought with Rwasa for the FNL, but Rwasa's supporters have denied their claims and accused the government of creating a faction within the FNL. Rwasa has said these men, who intend to join the country's peace process, are not even party to a 2006 ceasefire agreement signed between the government and the FNL."

**OCHA 23 June 2005:**
"Population displacement due to insecurity and armed conflict reduced markedly in the first months of the year [2005] and as compared to the period 2003-2004. Populations in the province of Bujumbura rural, where recurrent waves of displacement had taken place throughout 2004, are gradually resettling and returning to zones of origin and no sizeable population movements were registered in the first semester of the year."

**IRIN 4 January 2005:**
"Thousands of civilians have been displaced following fierce fighting on Saturday in Burundi's western province of Bujumbura Rural.

The internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not received aid, the governor of the province, Ignace Ntawembarira, said.

Fighting was reported in the communes of Isale, Nyabiraba and Kanyosha, east of the capital, Bujumbura, between the rebel faction Forces nationales de libération (FNL) of Agathon Rwasa, and a coalition of the Burundian army and troops loyal to Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the former largest rebel faction in the country, the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces de defense pour la democratie (CNDD-FDD)."

**UNSC 27 October 2006:**
"In the period under review [August 2005-September 2006], the security situation was characterized by renewed clashes between FDN and FNL, mainly in the north-western provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural. The populations of these provinces have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL. In 2006, 107 cases of attacks and looting by FNL were reported."

**Fighting between government and FLN troops causes the displacement of thousands in Bubanza Province (2008)**

- FNL - the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government – caused displacement at the end of 2007

**IRIN 14 January 2008:**
“About 1,400 families (8,400 people) displaced in Musigati commune in the northwestern province of Bubanza, following fighting between government forces and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), desperately need help, according to local officials.

Laurent Kagamba, adviser to the Musigati administrator, said that since the simultaneous attacks on three military positions on 28 December [2007] and another on 9 January [2008] in the same commune, residents had fled their homes. Some sought refuge in Musigati parish, others at Musigati and Kabere trade centres, as well as Busiga coffee factory, he said.”

IRIN 10 September 2007:
“Residents of 700 households, or about 4,000 people, have fled their homes in the northwest Burundi province of Bubanza following raids by suspected members of the country's last active rebel group, a government official said.

'For the time being, security is not good at all. Some residents have been beaten, while others have had their property looted,' the governor of Bubanza, Pascal Nyabenda, told IRIN.'

He said Forces nationales de libération (FNL) fighters had raided homes in Bubanza from their hideouts in the nearby Kibira and Rukoko forests. Those displaced were spending the nights in the compound of a local parish, venturing out for a few hours during the day to work in their fields, Nyabenda said."

For information on displacement by fighting between government and FNL troops in Bubanz Province in previous years, see:
ITEKA, 9 August 2006, Burundi: Des personnes armées et des combattants du Palipehutu_Fnl mènent des attaques répétées dans certaines communes de Bubanza
ITEKA, 24 August 2005, Burundi: Des déplacés de guerre en commune Musigati sans assistance [Link below]
IRIN, 14 June 2005, Burundi: Thousands displaced in Bubanza [Link below]

Some of the Burundian refugees expelled from Tanzania have no house or land (2006)

UN 30 November 2006:
Over 3,000 Burundians who had found refuge in Tanzania were forced to return in 2006: "Many new arrivals report others being forced to leave and the 3,000 who have come back so far, only seem to be the tip of the iceberg. Nobody knows for sure how many Burundians live in Tanzania without having regularized their stay, but most estimate around 150,000 persons. This will remain a key challenge in 2007, especially since the new arrivals need assistance and in particular so-called sans addresses like Elias, who hopes that “the Burundian Government can find us a plot of land where I can build a house and send my children to school.”"

NRC November 2006:
"Since June 2006, Tanzania has been implementing a national plan for the repatriation of refugees from Tanzania. In this framework, persons without refugee status or any other legal status in Tanzania have been forcibly removed from Tanzania. This year, more than 4000 Burundians have been expelled from Tanzania, mainly from Ngara district towards Muyinga province."

See also:
UNHCR, 23 Oct 2006, Growing numbers of Burundians return home from the DRC [Internet]
Other causes of displacement

Tens of thousands were displaced due to floods (2007)

- Since November 2006, close to 300,000 people were affected by the heavy floods

IRIN 9 February 2007:
« Près de 300 000 Burundais, victimes des inondations qui touchent le pays depuis novembre 2006, vont recevoir une aide alimentaire du Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM) des Nations Unies et des semences de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture (FAO), a indiqué un responsable du PAM. […]

Les pluies diluviennes qui tombent depuis novembre 2006 ont détruit les cultures et infrastructures de plusieurs régions, obligeant le gouvernement à mettre en place un fonds de solidarité pour venir en aide aux déplacés victimes des inondations dans les provinces de Muyinga, Kirundo, Cankuzo, Karuzi, Kayanza, Ngozi et Muyinga. »

IRIN 15 January 2007:
"Thousands of people in northwestern Burundi, displaced after days of heavy rainfall, urgently need relief aid, officials said on Monday.

"The rains have rendered more than 3,000 residents homeless," said Prosper Banzambe, the chief of Gatumba Zone, one of the affected areas in Mitumbuzi Commune, Bujumbura Rural Province.

He said the displaced, some of whom had sought shelter in a local church, needed food and other non-food aid such as blankets, jerry cans, soap and mosquito nets.

The rains, which pounded the area at the weekend, destroyed at least 500 homes. The flooding of the nearby River Kiziba contributed to the houses’ collapse.

Banzambe expressed concern that the continuing rains could cause more damage in Gatumba and appealed for a temporary shelter for the displaced.

He urged humanitarian organisations to help the displaced, saying the local administration was unable to "adequately meet their needs".[…]

On 4 January [2007], the government set up a national solidarity fund to support people affected by floods in seven provinces. In a decree, President Pierre Nkurunziza declared the provinces of Kayanza in the north, Muramvya and Karuzi in the central part of the country, Ruyigi in the east, and Bubanza and Cibitoke in the northwest, as "hunger-stricken following floods".

He also announced the establishment of the solidarity fund, to which every Burundian must contribute for four months from the end of January."

AFP 16 January 2007:
"Heavy rains pounding Burundi's capital and outlying areas have killed at least four people and left about 23,000 homeless since the downpours began last month, officials said Tuesday."
They said the situation was "catastrophic" after the floods destroyed farmlands, sparking fears of food shortages and disease outbreaks in the tiny central African nation emerging from more than a decade of civil strife."

**Famine in north and east causes internal displacement (2005-2006)**

- Many of the people who flee due to food insecurity are newly repatriated refugees

**OCHA 16 January 2005:**
"[R]esidents of Northern provinces continue to flee inside and outside Burundi due to food insecurity. As of 14 January [2005], a joint visit conducted by OCHA Ruyigi sub office and the provincial administration authorities confirmed the presence in Kabuyenge IDP site, in Gisuru Commune, of 63 families who fled Busoni and Bugabira communes (Kirundo Province) in search of food. OCHA, in collaboration with the administration authorities convened a meeting with humanitarian actors in the province to discuss an emergency response."

**OCHA 23 June 2005:**
"Cycles of drought periods, loss of staple crops, poor yields during three consecutive agriculture seasons and fragile nutritional conditions were particularly important in the northern Burundian provinces, which were also affected by waves of population movements both internal and across the border into Rwanda."

**OCHA 5 March 2005:**
"Despite food aid distributed by WFP and partners, the food security situation remains disconcerting mainly in Northern and Eastern provinces. Continuous internal and cross-border displacement of the population continues to be part of the coping strategies. Around 7,900 Burundian asylum seekers were reported in Tanzania. Meanwhile, 131 internally displaced persons were registered in Cankuzo coming from Kirundo. However, many more internal movements remain unrecorded."

**ITEKA 21 February 2006:**
"La plupart de ces migrants sont de nouveaux rapatriés qui n'ont pas eu où s'installer. Ils sont en train de migrer à la quête de quoi manger. Malheureusement, la population de la province de Cankuzo a également faim et ne peut pas les aider. Les prix des vivres montent chaque jour."
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Conflict and displacement: background and development

Ethnic background and pre-colonial times

- Total population: 7.1 million
- Composite population comprising Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%) and Batwa (1%)(colonial census)
- Numerous interrelations between the ethnic groups (marriage, language, common monarchy)
- The Batwa are most likely the most ancient ethnic group in Burundi but they are marginalized in Burundi society

AFP 25 February 2005:

"GEOGRAPHY: Landlocked in central Africa, bounded by Rwanda in the north, Tanzania to the east and south, and the vast Democratic Republic of Congo to the west. One of the smallest states on the African continent, Burundi covers 27,834 square kilometers (10,747 square miles).

- POPULATION: 7.1 million, of which around 85 percent are Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi. The remaining one percent of the population are pygmies called Twas. One of the most densely populated African countries.

- CAPITAL: Bujumbura (population 300,000)

- LANGUAGES: Kirundi (national), French (administrative), Swahili (local)

- RELIGION: Christian (70 percent); Animist (15 percent); Muslim (15 percent)."

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 15-17:

"Burundi is situated in Central Africa, along Lake Tanganyika and shares borders with Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaïre. [...] According to statistics dating back to the 1930s, 85 per cent of the population are Hutu, 14 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Batwa. The Hutu are considered to originate from Chad and the Niger, while the Tutsi, of Nilo-ethiopian origin, are thought to come from eastern Africa. The Batwa originate from the Congo Basin (Pygmies). This breakdown does not take into account the Ganwa (those of princely origin), nor a handful of other immigrant communities, nor those of mixed origins (mixed marriages having been common in the past). [...] It also does not take into account the fact that within both groups there existed historically rankings of status nor that passage from one group to another, for instance becoming Tutsi from Hutu or Ganwa, was also possible. The Burundians all speak the same language, Kirundi, which is both the national and the official language. Other languages, as provided for in the Constitution, are also spoken. [...] Despite ethnic differences, the Burundians live intermingled on the thousands of hills of the country without distinction on account of ethnicity. They are therefore inextricably bound to one another and cannot contemplate any notions of separation.

Although settlements have always been mixed, society in Burundi [...] was built along a 'class' and 'caste' system. [...] While their distinctions were not rigidly determined along 'ethnic' or 'tribal' lines, [...] there was significant correlation between class and ethnicity, with the Tutsis associated with the upper class and the Hutus with the lower class. This did not mean that all Tutsis were
upper class nor all Hutus lower class. Both class and the ethnic correlations were also dynamic. A Hutu could rise economically and socially and become a 'Tutsi'.

Hutu and Tutsi relationships were in the past cemented by their shared loyalty to common institutions. Kingship was such an institution; patron-client ties constituted another powerful socio-political institution. Patrons were expected to offer protection and gifts in exchange for services and offerings in kind. As social and political roles that once gave meaning and cohesion to membership in the community vanished, the use of the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' with ethnic connotations became more rigid. [...] Today the use of the term 'Hutu' describes an ethnic group which is poorer and powerless, whereas the Tutsi, especially the Hima (a Tutsi subgroup), are the pre-eminent power holders. [...] Nevertheless, the impression should not be created that the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' are figments as the "official truth" during the Bagaza period (1976-1987) would have it. This stance restricted discussion on the underlying problems of ethnicity and expression of ethnic differences without solving them.

CHR 19 March 2001, para. 100:
"La situation de la minorité twa mérite une attention particulière que malheureusement elle ne reçoit pas toujours. Les Twas sont sans doute le noyau le plus ancien de la population burundaise, comme dans d'autres pays des Grands Lacs; ils constituent aujourd'hui environ 1 % de la population."

Colonial rule and military regimes (1899-1992)

- 1962: Burundi becomes independent
- 25 years of a Tutsi dominated military dictatorship
- The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power
- 1980: creation of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu) by activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community in refugee camps in Tanzania

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 19-24:
"The transition from traditional power structures to 'modern' politics has by no means been an easy one. Two Ganwa (princely) dynasties continued fighting for control during the era of the colonial Powers, (first Germany from 1889 to 1918, then Belgium until 1962) as they had done during the pre-colonial era. The Party of Unity and National Progress (Uprona) was dominated by the Ganwa Bezi, while the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was led by the Ganwa Batare. In the legislative elections of September 1961 Uprona won, with Prince Rwagasoré as Prime Minister designate. A month later, however, Rwagasoré was assassinated. The political game switched from Ganwa to Hutu and Tutsi hands for the first time.

Burundi gained its independence from Belgium in July 1962. Until 1966 the crown continued to stabilize the situation. Violent incidents erupted after the elections in 1966, following which the Prime Minister, Michel Micombero, a Tutsi of the Hima group from Bururi, [...] overthrew the monarchy and declared a republic, concentrating power in the army. The National Assembly was dissolved and later replaced with a committee of officers, which, by 1971, was made up of 24 Tutsi and 3 Hutu, and Uprona was declared the sole party. Serious intra-Tutsi rivalries for power emerged. At this time Hutu were already being systematically purged from the army. The transition from a Ganwa-run kingdom to a Tutsi-dominated military dictatorship to the exclusion of Hutus caused more violence. For the next 25 years Tutsi factions fought over control, turning the Hutu into scapegoats whenever the Hutu would rise up and demand more equitable power-
sharing. On the other hand, whenever efforts towards power-sharing were made, extremists from both groups would resort to violence, to delay or cancel them.

Massacres had taken place in 1965 and 1967, but the most serious ones took place in 1972 triggered by Hutu militants from the Burundian refugee community in Tanzania. Hundreds if not thousands of Tutsi were killed and there is widespread fear that what had happened to Rwanda’s Tutsi, namely, systematic subjection and extermination, would happen to them too. The Tutsi retaliation and repression that followed were instant. The first victims were Hutu with education: secondary school and university students, teachers, nurses, doctors, priests, pastors, drivers, headmasters, businessmen, shopkeepers, civil servants, bank clerks, professors. Most Hutu families lost members. Hutu widows moved to the city outskirts when their houses were seized by Tutsi. Many Tutsis also fled. Many left the interior, where they felt frightened among Hutu neighbours, and moved to Bujumbura to fill the many jobs now vacant. Others rushed to occupy the flat, fertile, palm-oil-producing strip of lake shore south of Bujumbura, after the flight of very many Hutu who had been living there. Reports have spoken of genocidal acts and of hundreds of thousands of Hutus killed. […]

These events had great reverberations in Burundi; yet, nothing was ever done about the massacres. There has never been an official inquiry into them, an accounting, or any effort to bring to justice those responsible for the killings. Thereafter there was no question of Hutus entering the army, and many refused to send their children to school, fearing they were exposing them to a future massacre. Those at school had no role models. The educated, competent, urbane were all Tutsi. That there was a "lost" Hutu generation is still evident today in the political life of the country.

There was little power-sharing following the massacres, even after Micombero was overthrown by his deputy chief of staff, Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, also a Hima (Tutsi subgroup). There were no massacres during Bagaza's 11-year rule and many refugees returned home. Bagaza reportedly hoped development would push his country through the ethnic deadlock. Observers note that he engaged in a series of reforms, without, however, addressing the ethnic issue. […] All provincial governors were Tutsi and most judges, university and school teachers, magistrates and heads of hospitals were Tutsi too. Uprona remained a Tutsi party and its members were the ones to benefit mostly from Bagaza's management of the economy. In the last years of the Bagaza regime corruption and nepotism reportedly flourished. […] In the meantime, in 1980 activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community formed the Palipehutu, or the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People, in refugee camps in Tanzania. Bagaza was himself deposed in 1987 by a group of army officers and a cousin of his and nephew of Micombero, Major Pierre Buyoya, became President.

In August 1988 frustrated Hutu hopes for an improvement were at the root of hundreds of ethnic killings. Thousands were killed. This time the regions most affected were Ntega commune in Kirundo province and Marangara commune in Ngozi province, both bordering Rwanda. Palipehutu members from Rwanda had been infiltrating into Burundi and sporadic fights were taking place until Hutus turned against the Tutsi community, many of them Rwandan refugees. The army pursued those assumed responsible (although it is unclear how much resistance these people who had no guns put up against the soldiers) […] and in the next eight days it reportedly killed large numbers of civilians, including women and children. More than 60,000 people poured into Rwanda across the swamps and the Akanyaru river. Others took refuge within Burundi in swamp areas. The massacres were surprising even to the Burundians. Hutu had to face the fact that the army was still prepared to use maximum force and Tutsi that Hutu could still massacre many Tutsi before soldiers reached the scene."

**ACTS 30 September 2004:**
“Despite the popular conception of the conflict as a Hutu-Tutsi struggle, most scholars agree that the protracted conflict is structural in nature, though articulated in ethnic terms. The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power.’ Governance practices by successive regimes galvanized political power and state control in the hands of a small elite group within the Tutsi community from particular parts of the country, who have since sustained their hold on power through repressive policies. Efforts by the Tutsi elite to retain political control and associated patronage networks, and violent counter-strategies of the Hutu political and armed groups have precipitated ethnic massacres and retaliatory radicalism marked by acts of genocide.”

Civil war and Peace Process in Burundi (1993-2008)

- 1993: Assassination of elected President Ndadaye triggers large-scale inter-ethnic violence
- 1996: Coup installs President Buyoya; sanctions imposed by neighbouring countries
- Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi signed in August 2000
- 2005: signing of ceasefire agreement between FNL and government; adoption of new constitution
- Local, legislative and presidential elections was held in various phases in 2005
- Security sector was profoundly restructured and the army is now ethnically balanced (2006)
- Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and FRODEBU – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence (2006) As of April 2008: the FNL had withdrawn
- from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement

AFP 1 June 2005, factfile:
*The civil war begun in 1993 has killed an estimated 300,000 people.[…]*

Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu president, elected in June 1993, was assassinated on October 21 of the same year during a failed coup organized by Tutsi military officers.

His successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira -- another Hutu -- was killed in April 1994 at the same time as then Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana died under suspicious circumstances when his plane was shot down over Kigali, sparking the genocide of up to a million Tutsis and Hutu moderates in Rwanda.

Ntaryamira's successor, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, also a Hutu, was overthrown in a non-violent coup in July 1996, and [Pierre " Buyoya returned to power.

In 1998, Buyoya reformed the constitution to create a transition government and began peace talks with Hutu and Tutsi opposition groups.

In August 2000 a peace agreement including a power-sharing deal was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, but the two main armed rebel groups refused to participate in the talks. Civil war continued to rage.

In November 2001, Buyoya took over as transitional leader for a period of 18 months, seconded by a Hutu vice-president whose signature is required on all presidential texts pertaining to security and the armed forces.
A 26-member power-sharing government was also sworn in to oversee the three-year transition. Buyoya was succeeded at the head of the transition government in May 2003 by his vice president Domitien Ndayizeye, who is seconded by a Tutsi, Alphonse Marie Kadage.

A ceasefire agreement was signed in December 2002 by the government and the main Hutu rebel movement, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), which finally entered government in November 2003.

A second Hutu armed group, the National Liberation Forces (FNL), finally signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on May 15, but the details of how this be implemented have still not yet been resolved.

A new constitution was adopted at the end of February, aimed at bringing about a peaceful democracy and ending the reign of the Tutsie tribe in power. Opposition has been voiced only by Tutsis concerned at losing too much power."

**HRW 4 November 2005:**

"Elections in 2005 were the final chapter in the transitional process established by the Arusha Accords of 2000. In the intervening period a government including the Hutudominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu), the Tutsi-dominated National Unity and Progress Party (Uprona), and a number of smaller parties ruled the country. In late 2003 this government signed the Pretoria Protocol making peace with the CNDDFDD and starting the process of integrating the former rebels into the army and the administration."

For more detailed information on 1993 events, see "Profile in displacement" (Report of the Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, 28 November 1994), paras. 29-36) [External link]

**ICG 30 November 2006:**

"In elections held between June and August 2005, the voters of Burundi elected their first democratic government since 1993. This marked an end to the transitional government established by the Arusha Agreement in 2001. The mainly Hutu former rebels of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), led by Pierre Nkurunziza, won a resounding victory and hold 58 per cent of the seats in parliament and 57 per cent in the communal councils, as well as twelve of the twenty government ministries. Nkurunziza was inaugurated as president on 26 August 2005.

The elections radically reconfigured politics. Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence. In the run-up to the elections, rebel forces were integrated into the national army, police and intelligence service. For the first time in Burundian history, these forces were ethnically balanced. Nkurunziza’s government faced considerable challenges. Foremost was the process of transforming the CNDDFDD from a rebel movement into a democratic political party in power – one whose members had little civil administration experience. The government had to reconstruct an economy devastated by more than a decade of civil war and economic embargo, during which per capita income fell by 35 per cent and the number of people living below the poverty line doubled. During its first year it also had to deal with security problems in the capital and surrounding provinces caused by the remaining rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL. Unfortunately, the government’s response to these challenges has increasingly manifested itself in disregard for the rule of law."

**UNSC 28 November 2007:**
“The signing of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the armed group Palipehutu-Forces nationales de libération (FNL) led by Agathon Rwasa on 7 September 2006 was a decisive step in the peace process in Burundi. However, its implementation remains difficult owing to persisting disagreements among the parties. The Agreement, which was the outcome of determined efforts of regional States united under the auspices of the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, addresses a number of issues including the integration of FNL ex-combatants into the Burundian National Defence Forces (FDN) and security forces, the participation of FNL elements in the institutions of the country and the rapid demobilization and reintegration of children associated with this armed group into their respective families and communities. Under the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism was established to oversee the demobilization of FNL combatants.

The signing of the Agreement was followed at first by a significant improvement in the security situation, characterized notably by a decrease both in the number of abuses perpetrated by armed groups and in the number of alleged FNL militants arrested by the National Defence Forces and the National Police of Burundi.”

PBC, 19 March 2008:
“[T]he Palipehutu-FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. In response, a Political Directorate had been established to assist the Mechanism in efforts to regain FNL's participation.”

IRIN, 14 January 2008:
“The FNL, the last rebel movement still active in Burundi, has resumed fighting government forces, especially in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza, where it is most active.

Though the movement signed a ceasefire accord with the government in September 2006, it has not been fully implemented. The joint verification and monitoring mechanism, which oversees its implementation, suspended activities in July 2007 after the FNL delegates walked out of talks over security concerns. They have since been accusing the facilitator, South African safety minister Charles Nqakula, of bias.”

ISS 3 April 2008:
“After intense diplomatic pressure from regional governments and the international community Burundi’s last rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL, has been brought back to the negotiating table that drew up a new roadmap designed to end the standoff by the end of June 2008. This breakthrough was reached in a February 23 meeting in Cape Town, South Africa. The meeting was attended by special envoys to Burundi from Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa, as well as representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.

The Cape Town meeting had been called to save the Burundi peace process after the FNL withdrew from its implementation, alleging bias on the part of the facilitator, South Africa’s Security Minister Charles Nqakula. To help address this challenge Minister Nqakula has followed the example of other peace processes by establishing a Group of Special Envoys for Burundi (GSEB), representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.”

Delrue August 2006:
“The success of Burundi’s transition to peace hinges on how its new government (elected in August 2005 and headed by former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza) and the international community deal with such post-displacement issues as land and property claims, reconciliation and transitional justice.
The link between displacement, return, reconciliation and successful transition towards a consolidated peace is frequently either underestimated or neglected by the international community.

For a comprehensive analysis of the political situation in Burundi, see

HRW, 12 March 2008:
“Several opposition politicians have been threatened and targeted for violence during the last 18 months. Njomukunda, then second vice-president of the republic, fled Burundi in September 2006 after issuing a letter critical of the government; she returned in March 2007. Five parliamentarians from the opposition party Front for Democracy in Burundi (Front pour la Déémocratie au Burundi, Frodebu) and from a dissident wing of the CNDD-FDD, including Mpawenayo, were targeted in a set of grenade attacks in August 2007 that injured several bystanders. Pancrase Cimpaye, Frodebu spokesperson, was detained after suggesting the ruling party bore responsibility for the August attacks; after being released, he briefly left the country. In February 2008, a local Frodebu official was killed, while another was seriously injured in a grenade attack which killed his wife and child.”

See also:
IRIN, BURUNDI: Government of consensus formed, 15 November 2007 [Internet]

ICG, 28 August 2007, Burundi: Finalising peace with the FNL [Internet]


Secretary-General welcomes signing of Burundi ceasefire agreement, United Nations Secretary General, 8 September 2006 [Internet]

Progress in regard to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (2005-2008)

- Reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression
- About 5,000 UN peacekeepers were in Burundi from June 2004 to the end of 2006, to monitor the country's transition to democracy, with South Africa contributing the majority of troops.
- The new Burundian government saw the peacekeepers as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible (2006)
- A new UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) continued the process of peace consolidation and of coordinating the UN system's activities in Burundi from 2007

ISS 13 October 2006:
"In Burundi, reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, signed in August 2000 by 17 political parties, the National
Assembly and the government and the 2003 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Burundi and the principal rebel group, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), do include important provisions on the organization, structure, mandates and composition of postconflict security forces that will act professionally and apolitically, adhere to human rights norms, and provide defence and security to all Burundians.[…]

Although the Arusha Accords were signed in August 2000, the implementation of the security sector reform process they articulate was largely delayed until 2003, mainly because of continued warfare throughout most of Burundi. Indeed, the most active rebel movements in the field were marginalized throughout the Arusha negotiations and were thus not signatories to the Accord. Accordingly, it was not until the signing of a ceasefire between the government and the main rebel group – the CNDD-FDD – in 2003 that the reform process was set in motion. By July 2006, however, the reform of the defence and security forces had reached an advanced stage and had achieved most of its structural objectives (i.e. the integration of several armed groups into a single military and single police force), despite various financial- and material-related challenges.

The process of integrating the former rebel groups and the FAB into a new national defence force, the Forces de Défense Nationale (FDN), has been completed – largely to the satisfaction of the government and international donors – despite its late start due to disagreements on the definition of combatant and on the harmonization of rank between the rebel movements and the regular army.[…]

Despite this progress, a preliminary assessment of the reform of the FDN and the PNB and progress in the domain of social and economic reintegration and re-insertion of former combatants suggests that serious challenges remain in these critical areas. The local media frequently report human rights violations perpetrated by on-duty military or police or by demobilized combatants.

**Tufts University 30 July 2006:**

“The new Burundian government saw ONUB as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible. This perception was aggravated by two unfortunate choices made by leaders of the UN mission: to support Frodebu and former President Ndayizeye during the electoral campaign and proposing to coordinate the transition from humanitarian aid to development through a “Partners Council” deliberating without the government.”

**UNSC 18 December 2006:**

“Meanwhile, as delays in the start of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants have continued, criminal activities against the population, reportedly committed by FNL combatants, have increased since late October. Skirmishes between the national security forces and alleged FNL combatants and detentions of FNL elements and supporters have reportedly resumed in the north-western provinces. FNL recruitment, including of youths, has also been reported, particularly in Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural provinces.[…]

Once deployed, the AU special task force would therefore be expected to assume the responsibilities that were allocated to ONUB under the ceasefire agreement, namely: (a) protection of designated assembly areas for FNL combatants; (b) provision of engineering, logistical and administrative support for the establishment of the assembly areas; (c) disarmament of combatants; (d) storage of weapons collected from the disarmament process and their subsequent destruction; (e) transportation of disarmed FNL combatants from assembly areas to the designated demobilization centre or integration facilities of the National Defence Forces; and (f) protection of the demobilization centres. […]
Further delays in the agreement’s implementation, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants, are likely to lead to more friction between these combatants and the population and the national security services. In addition, there was an increase in localized conflicts involving the small FNL faction led by Jean Bosco Sindayigaya, which did not sign the ceasefire agreement.”

DPKO 20 December 2006:
“A new United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), authorized by Security Council resolution 1719 earlier this year, will continue the process of peace consolidation and be in charge of coordinating the United Nations system’s activities in Burundi for an initial period of one year.”

The mandate of BINUB is extended until 31 December 2008 (UNSC, 19 December 2007).

See also:
Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 31 Aug 2006
A technical analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - a case study from Burundi [Internet]


- Peace Building Commission approved in December 2007 a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation

UNSC 18 December 2006, para.22:
“Significant progress has been made in the establishment of peacebuilding coordination mechanisms between the Government and the United Nations. On 7 November, the Government created an Inter-Ministerial Peacebuilding Steering Committee, which will work with the United Nations, within the framework of an initial joint mechanism, in preparing the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission and the peacebuilding priority plan to be submitted to the Peacebuilding Fund. The inaugural meeting of the Government-United Nations joint mechanism was held on 16 November [2006], followed by several sessions at the policy and working levels. As a result, a common understanding was reached on the steps to be taken by the Government, with United Nations support, to secure resources from the Peacebuilding Fund. Progress was also made in developing the Government’s presentation to the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission. The mission of the Peacebuilding Support Office to Burundi in mid-November [2006] and the meetings it had with the United Nations and the Government’s Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee contributed significantly to this process.”

UNGA 5 December 2007:
“With a long-awaited conflict-recovery and development strategy for Burundi now in place, the Peacebuilding Commission today approved a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation -- both locally and in New York -- in priority areas
such as justice and security sector reform, generating jobs and making radical improvements to governance.

Meeting in its special “Burundi Configuration”, the Commission adopted the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism (MTM) of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. That Framework -- in place since June -- is the country-led integrated peacebuilding strategy now guiding the engagement and dialogue between Bujumbura, the United Nations and other international partners.

The Framework identified key objectives, major challenges and threats to peace, especially the implementation of a stagnant ceasefire agreement between Burundi and the National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL). Promoting inclusive growth, employment, transparency and human rights were among its other top priorities.”

See also:
Brookings Institution, 13 March 2008, The Role of Civil Society in Ending Displacement and Peacebuilding, by Elizabeth Ferris [Internet]

United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI), 12 Dec 2006 [Link below]
Peacebuilding Commission holds day-long discussion on Burundi, agrees on fund’s use to bolster government’s priority plan [Internet]

Challenges facing Burundi, requiring international help, indicated at country-specific meetings of Peacebuilding Commission [Internet]

Burundi government signs Nairobi pact including protocol on IDPs (December 2006)

MONUC 18 December 2006:
“With the signing of the Nairobi pact this Friday December 15 2006 by DRC, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, it paves the way for security, stability and development in the region, after years of conflict.

Many African state leaders, including DRC president Joseph Kabila were in Nairobi Kenya for the two day summit that will go a long way to bringing the region out of the vicious cycle of humanitarian disaster, poverty, and repeated conflict.[...]

The Great Lakes pact includes a $225 million security action plan to disarm rebel groups in Eastern DRC, and along border areas in Sudan, Kenya and Uganda.[...]

Ms. Besida Tonwe, the Head of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in Central and East Africa, said that the conference was a long process of consultations in helping the Great Lakes Region to reconcile, rehabilitate, and reconstruct their societies in a politically delicate process.

‘It is also a process which in the future will continue to require financial support from the donor community and coherent assistance from the humanitarian community. It is now of utmost importance that there is a follow-up on the national implementation of the legal protocols adopted with the pact,’ she said.
‘The three protocols on humanitarian and social issues addressing sexual violence against women and children, property rights of returning persons, and the protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), are of the utmost importance,’ she concluded.”

IDMC 14 December 2006:
“The Pact is a culmination of more than four years of regional negotiations among States. It contains a package of measures which promises to enhance the lives of the forcibly displaced, including a regional protocol on protection and assistance for internally displaced, which when signed, will be the first legally binding regional instrument specifically dealing with IDPs anywhere in the world. A regional protocol on property rights of returning populations, and protocols which address some of the root causes of flight in the Great Lakes are also key elements of the Pact.”


- Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development

ISS 27 May 2005:
“Aside from calling for a cessation to violent conflict, the Arusha Accords [Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 28 August 2000] provide comprehensive recommendations for stabilising and rehabilitating a highly polarised Burundian nation. The agreement is composed of five protocols each dedicated to a particular theme intended to move the process from peace-making to peace-building. These themes consist of an outline of the nature of the conflict; democracy and good governance; peace and security; reconstruction and development; and guarantees on the implementation of the agreement.

Importantly, the accords acknowledge that the Burundian ‘conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions… and stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power.’

Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development. It is therefore the ‘litmus test’ against which the performance of the transitional government (and other actors) as it relates to Arusha’s recommendations can be assessed.

Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Refugees and Sinistrés
The main conclusion and recommendations of Protocol IV states that:

‘Through the Burundi Peace Negotiations at Arusha it has been possible to assess how seriously the political and ethnic crisis that has torn Burundi apart since independence has affected Burundian society. Hundreds of thousands of Burundians are refugees, some of them for more than 25 years.

Hundreds of thousands more are forced to live in camps where conditions are appalling…. All Burundians are aware that a lasting peace is impossible so long as a definitive solution is not found to the problem of refugees and sinistrés. Likewise, peace is impossible so long as the country’s wealth is not shared equitably. Burundi cannot help the sinistrés rebuild destroyed property and restore its economy without the assistance of the international community.’"
The UN concluded that there was a strong indication that the FLN had not acted alone in the massacre of Congolese refugees (2004-2005)

- One year of after the Gatumba massacre, those responsible remain free

**IRIN 5 Jan 2005:**
“The FNL claimed responsibility for a massacre in August of 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees at Gatumba transit camp on the Burundi side of the border with the DRC. The UN is continuing to investigate whether armed groups on the DRC side of the border, which are aligned to FNL, also took part.”

**UNSC 15 November 2004:**
“As requested by the Security Council by its presidential statement of 15 August 2004 (S/PRST/2004/30), ONUB, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights conducted a joint investigation into the massacre on 13 August of 152 Congolese refugees at the Gatumba refugee camp, located close to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The results of the investigation were transmitted to the Council by my letter to the President of the Council dated 15 October (S/2004/821). Despite extensive investigation, there is no clear evidence of who organized, carried out and financed that gross atrocity. The FNL (Rwasa) claim of responsibility has been supported by witness statements and led United Nations investigators to believe that the group did, indeed, participate in the attack. There is however, a strong indication that FNL (Rwasa) did not act alone. Unfortunately, the dearth of verifiable information and limited cooperation by the Burundian authorities hampered the formulation of a definitive report. A national investigation is still ongoing.”

**AI 18 August 2005:**
“On the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre, which took place in August 2004, Amnesty International calls on the forthcoming government of Burundi and the international community to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.

‘The new government should undertake to set up an independent and impartial body to investigate this and other massacres and those found to be responsible should be held to account,’ Amnesty International said today.

During the night of 13 August 2004, the refugee camp of Gatumba, located near the Congolese border, was attacked by an armed group. More than 160 Congolese refugees, predominantly children and women members of the Banyamulenge ethnic group from South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (DRC), were deliberately and systematically killed. On 14 August, the Palipehutu-FNL (Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu -- Forces nationales de libération) claimed responsibility for the killings. The same day, the governments of Burundi and Rwanda and delegates of the Banyamulenge communities accused Congolese and Rwandese armed political groups based in the DRC of involvement in the massacre. According to UN investigators, evidence of the presence of ‘other groups’ was credible, but they were not able to categorically identify them.

Human rights organizations and the United Nations have strongly condemned this massacre and called for an independent, impartial and comprehensive investigation. Given the alleged involvement of armed political groups based in the DRC, there was concern that the killing could lead to a military intervention in the DRC by Burundi and Rwanda. Such an intervention could have led to further human rights abuses in the DRC.
Since then, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Burundian authorities have moved a few refugees to the Mwaro province, farther away from the border, others have returned to the DRC, while many others have moved to Bujumbura. So far, despite the indication from the Burundian Minister of Justice that the national investigation into the Gatumba massacre was completed, the United Nations Operations in Burundi stressed in a recent statement that, ‘no investigation report has been issued by the government [of Burundi] and the authors of the attack remain free’.

See also United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 13 Aug 2005
Burundi: Statement on the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre [Internet]

Causes of displacement


United Nations Resident Coordinator System for Burundi 1998, p. 5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronology of Population Movements</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>An estimated 200,000 Burundians flee from progroms and communal violence; many seek refuge in Tanzania, where most remain to this day.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>To escape the violence that broke out following the assassination of President Ndadaye, nearly 200,000 people leave the hills to seek protection in sites grouped around military posts. A vast majority are still there.</td>
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<td>1994-1996</td>
<td>The escalation of the civil conflict sparks massive population movements; the northwestern province of Cibitoke, sandwiched between the rebel bases in the mountainous Kibira forest and in neighboring Kivu, is particularly unstable. Large numbers seek refuge in neighboring Zaire (150,000) and Tanzania (250,000). Up to 400,000 congregate in sites inside the country.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>In the wake of the conquest of Zaire by the Kabila-led alliance, most of the refugees in Kivu return to Burundi, where they swell the numbers living in the displaced camps on the north-western provinces, particularly Cibitoke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>As a military strategy to regain control of rebel-held territory, the authorities forcibly regroup 250,000 civilians in Karuzi, Kanyanza and Muramvya provinces. Nearly all of them return home by the end of 1997, but the policy of controlled population movements continues to be implemented in other, more short-term forms elsewhere in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>Following the loss of their bases in the Kivu, the rebels regroup in Tanzania, and the main theatre of operations shifts to the southwest, along the ridge of the Nile-Congo watershed that is the main conduit into and out of the country for guerrilla groups. The ensuing destabilization leads to large scale displacement to new sites, again mainly along the main tarmac roads of the western plain, not only</td>
</tr>
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in Makamba and Bururi provinces but also as far as north as Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza.

1997-1998

As the military gradually established control in certain areas, the authorities begin to dismantle the big sites near main roads or major towns and create smaller, decentralized sites grouped around advanced military positions in the hills (Cibitoke, parts of Bururi, Bubanza). Elsewhere, short-term regroupment operations continue to be implemented in response to localized destabilization (Bujumbura Rural).

1998

Nearly all the sites in Cibitoke province, for so long the most unstable part of the country, are dismantled by June and the people return to their hills. At almost the same time, the crisis in neighboring Congo produces an influx of some eleven thousand people, which continues up to present.

Causes of internal displacement: an analysis by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (1998)

- Pervasive psychology of "flee or be killed" is a lasting legacy of the 1972 massacres and the 1993 upheavals
- Displacement has also been used as a deliberate goal of violence since 1993
- Massive retaliation by the armed forces
- Suspicion towards the displaced population creates more displacement
- Use of violence and displacement as a way to achieve political or economical objectives

USCR 1998a, pp. 32-33:
“...A history of massacres has taught the people of Burundi, regardless of their ethnicity, that their personal survival hinges on their ability to flee and seek a safer place temporarily. For many peasant Burundians, the lesson of the past is that violence can erupt suddenly and can rapidly become all-encompassing. It is a lesson handed down from generation to generation. Some of the underlying causes of internal displacement in Burundi follow:
First, a pervasive psychology of ‘flee or be killed’ has become the lasting legacy of the 1972 slaughter and the 1993 upheaval. The 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda has reinforced the psychology of flight in Burundi.
Second, the smaller massacres that have occurred almost daily since 1994 serve to validate the historical lessons of fear and mistrust. Fear is also ingrained that large number of Burundians have learned to flee their homes not only in reaction to danger but also in anticipation of it.
Third, much of Burundi’s displacement since 1993 has been caused by «ethnic cleansing.» Displacement is no longer merely as accidental by-product of violence; it has become a deliberate goal of violence.
Fourth, both ethnic groups of Burundi regard themselves as vulnerable. The sense of vulnerability has become an important part of the self-identity. Hutu are demographically dominant but see themselves as vulnerable to the political and military power of Tutsi. Tutsi are politically and militarily powerful but view themselves as vulnerable to the demographic dominance of Hutu.
Members of both ethnic groups regard themselves as victims, despite the fact that many massacres in Burundian history have been largely one-sided.
Fifth, a pattern is evident in many violent eruptions over the decades: regardless of how violence begins, there is almost always massive retaliation against the Hutu by the Tutsi-dominated
military. As a result, many Hutu instinctively flee at the mere sight of soldiers or at the distant sound of their vehicles. The country's forces of order, unfortunately, create new disorder and displacement – deliberately in some cases, inadvertently in others.

Sixth, population displacement in Burundi often exacerbates rather than alleviates the conflict. Uprooted Burundians of one ethnic group are often regarded as dangerous by members of the other ethnic group. The military suspects that many internally displaced Hutu are rebels. Many Hutu suspect that camps of displaced Tutsi are bases for militia activity. There is some truth to these mutual suspicions. The result is that displacement at times begets more violence, causing still more people to flee. In short – at least in Burundi – displacement causes more displacement.

These are only partial explanations of the population displacement in Burundi, of course. This review of Burundi's history indicates that some actors create violence and displacement as a way to achieve political control by force that they are unable to achieve or maintain through nonviolent means. Some elements in Burundi create violence and displacement for the economic rewards it brings them through banditry, confiscation of property, and skimming of relief aid. Still other Burundians commits violence and force displacement based on pure fear or hate, reinforced by decades of grievances, real or imagined."


- 1996: government policy to move civilian populations into "regroupment" camps
- 1997: end of the large-scale, long-term "regroupment" policy
- 1998: short-term forced movement of populations continues, particularly in unstable western provinces
- Since September 1999, over 350,000 people were forcibly moved by government forces to 53 regroupment camps to deprive insurgent groups of local support
- Government explained that regroupment camps were established to protect civilians from the rebels
- Dismantlement of regroupment camps was precondition to peace negotiations and camps were dismantled by mid-2000

USCR 2000 "regroupment"
"Burundian authorities have pursued two waves of forced population relocation, or regroupment. The first regroupment wave occurred during 1996-98 when the government moved at least a quarter-million Hutu into 50 camps scattered throughout the country. Some observers estimated that up to 800,000 persons lived in the regroupment camps at that time. Most regroupment sites closed during 1998, allowing occupants to return home."

HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":
Renewed Regroupment (1999-2000)
"In July and August 1999, the rebels launched increasingly frequent and damaging raids in and around Bujumbura, killing dozens of civilians as well as some soldiers. The army retaliated with attacks that killed more than one hundred civilians as well as combatants and the government tightened an existing curfew. These measures failed to satisfy Tutsi extremists in Bujumbura who demanded more drastic action to protect the city and to repress the rebellion. With rumors circulating of a possible coup and of violence being organized by extremists, the government decided to impose a policy of regroupment on most of Bujumbura-rural, particularly on areas inhabited largely by Hutu and near the city."

HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":
"In mid-1999, it [the government] had revived the regroupment policy in parts of southeastern Burundi before deciding to extend it to the area of the capital in September."

**HRW June 2000, "Summary":**

"The Tutsi-dominated government of Burundi, combating rebellions among the Hutu majority, began forcing civilians in the area around the capital into so-called "protection sites" or "regroupment camps" beginning in late September 1999. Burundian authorities claimed the measure was intended to protect the civilians, most of them Hutu, from attack by the rebel National Liberation Forces (Forces Nationales pour la Libération, FNL) who were becoming increasingly well-entrenched in the area. In fact, they meant to deprive the FNL of support from local people who helped them, sometimes willingly, sometimes under duress. By removing civilian support, the authorities hoped to isolate the FNL and thus reduce its increasingly frequent attacks on the capital. They hoped also to quiet Tutsi extremists who accused them of weakness in confronting the rebel threat."

**HRW June 2000, "Summary":**

"By the end of 1999, authorities had obliged some 80 percent of the population of the province of Bujumbura-rural-some 350,000 people-to live in fifty-three camps. Although regroupment helped reduce attacks on the capital city, rebels remained firmly established in rural areas. They simply shifted from one place to another when attacked by the army, which had insufficient troops available to control the whole region at the same time. Rebels continued to live off the crops of local people and even to inhabit the houses of those forced to live in the camps."

**USCR 2000, "Regroupment":**

"The country included at least three types of internal displacement: up to 200,000 people, primarily rural Tutsi, who have lived for six years in designated camps protected by government soldiers and thousands, who have become displaced in the countryside or at makeshift sites for varying lengths of time; and nearly 350,000 Hutu whom the government required to live in so-called 'regroupment' camps."

*Dismantlement of regroupment camps (2000)*

**USCR 2000, "Regroupment":**

"Government authorities argued that the camps were a temporary measure to protect civilians from attack and deprive rebel groups of food and lodging in rural areas. Burundian officials urged international humanitarian organizations to provide food, water, sanitation, and medical care to the sites. Burundian President Pierre Buyoya visited several sites in October [1999] and stated that conditions there were better than portrayed by aid agencies. The regroupment camps were 'no dramatic situation,' he assured."

**HRW June 2000, "Summary":**

"The international community severely criticized the policy of regroupment. In January 2000, the Burundian government promised to begin closing the camps but it made little progress in doing so until early June. At that time, rebel leaders made closing the camps a precondition for peace negotiations and former South African President Nelson Mandela, facilitator for the negotiations, condemned the regroupment sites as 'concentration camps.' Under this pressure, President Pierre Buyoya agreed that everyone in the camps would be allowed to return home by the end of July."

*For an analysis on how forced displacement in 2000 of 350,000 civilians was carried out in violation of international law, including the Un Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, see HRW June 2000 "Violation of international law & Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement"* [link below]
See also "Policy of the international humanitarian community regarding provision assistance in the context of forced relocation (1999-2000)"

Fighting between FNL and army displaced thousands in Bujumbura Rural (2004-2008)

- Combatants of FNL fought so called FNL "dissidents", causing displacement in October 2007
- FNL is the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government
- Population displacement reduced in 2005 compared to 2003-2004
- Little population displacement in 2006, but the populations of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural, have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL

IRIN 23 April 2008:
"The resumption of violence in and around Bujumbura is causing panic in the country. Outside the capital, residents spend their nights in the bush for fear of being attacked, as the death toll rose to 33.
A bomb destroyed part of the Vatican embassy compound and a dining hall in the Kiriri University campus on 22 April [2008].

"We call on the army to remove its heavy arms from our campus," a student said, reacting to the installation of rocket launchers aimed at rebuffing attacks by the rebel FNL.
On 18 April, attacks were launched on military positions in Gihosha, Kanyosha, Kamenge and Musaga areas."

NRC, May 2008:
In April 2008 serious violations of the 6 September 2006 ceasefire between the Burundian Army (FDN) and the rebel group Palipehutu-FNL (FNL) occurred. The most reported events took place in the capital city, Bujumbura, where three attacks took place on April 17, 18 and 22. Violence sprung in several provinces around the country (Bujumbura Rurale, Bubanza, Cibitoke and Kayanza), but Bujumbura Rurale province has been the most affected province, witnessing displacements of population.[...]

At the peak of displacement it was reported that there were:
- 4,050 households displaced in Isale commune or 20,100 people out of 83,000 inhabitants concentrated mostly in 6 sites in the centre of the commune, Rushubi on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 5,102 households displaced in Muyira and Kirombwe, both at Kanyosha commune on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 4,305 households displaced in Kabezi centre in three different sites on May 7 (data Kabezi local administration).
- 3,166 households displaced in Gitaza centre and 1,100 in Rutongo, both at Muhuta commune (data Muhuta local administration).
- And fewer numbers of IDPs registered in Bugarama, Mutambu and Nyabiraba communes (several hundreds of households)."

IRIN, 25 October 2007:
"Fighters of Burundi's last active rebel group have for the second time in one week attacked a position occupied by a break-away faction, forcing villagers to flee their homes, a senior military official said."
The evening raid by combatants of the Front National de Liberation (FNL), led by Agathon Rwasa, took place on 24 October [2007] evening on a site where the so-called FNL "dissidents" have gathered in Gakungwe village of Kabezi commune in Bujumbura Rural province.

It forced hundreds of people from surrounding villages to run away as the army sent reinforcements to the area to guard the splinter faction's settlement, residents said.

"There has indeed been such an attack and the heavy exchange of gunfire was heard," deputy army chief of staff Major General Godefroid Niyuhire told IRIN on 25 October. There were, however, no casualties during the attack, he said.

The "dissidents" say they fought with Rwasa for the FNL, but Rwasa's supporters have denied their claims and accused the government of creating a faction within the FNL. Rwasa has said these men, who intend to join the country's peace process, are not even party to a 2006 ceasefire agreement signed between the government and the FNL.

OCHA 23 June 2005:
"Population displacement due to insecurity and armed conflict reduced markedly in the first months of the year [2005] and as compared to the period 2003-2004. Populations in the province of Bujumbura rural, where recurrent waves of displacement had taken place throughout 2004, are gradually resettling and returning to zones of origin and no sizeable population movements were registered in the first semester of the year."

IRIN 4 January 2005:
"Thousands of civilians have been displaced following fierce fighting on Saturday in Burundi's western province of Bujumbura Rural.

The internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not received aid, the governor of the province, Ignace Ntawembarira, said.

Fighting was reported in the communes of Isale, Nyabiraba and Kanyosha, east of the capital, Bujumbura, between the rebel faction Forces nationales de libération (FNL) of Agathon Rwasa, and a coalition of the Burundian army and troops loyal to Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the former largest rebel faction in the country, the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces de defense pour la democratie (CNDD-FDD)."

UNSC 27 October 2006:
"In the period under review [August 2005-September 2006], the security situation was characterized by renewed clashes between FDN and FNL, mainly in the north-western provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural. The populations of these provinces have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL. In 2006, 107 cases of attacks and looting by FNL were reported."

Fighting between government and FLN troops causes the displacement of thousands in Bubanza Province (2008)

- FNL - the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government – caused displacement at the end of 2007

IRIN 14 January 2008:
“About 1,400 families (8,400 people) displaced in Musigati commune in the northwestern province of Bubanza, following fighting between government forces and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), desperately need help, according to local officials.

Laurent Kagamba, adviser to the Musigati administrator, said that since the simultaneous attacks on three military positions on 28 December [2007] and another on 9 January [2008] in the same commune, residents had fled their homes. Some sought refuge in Musigati parish, others at Musigati and Kabere trade centres, as well as Busiga coffee factory, he said.”

IRIN 10 September 2007:
“Residents of 700 households, or about 4,000 people, have fled their homes in the northwest Burundi province of Bubanza following raids by suspected members of the country’s last active rebel group, a government official said.

‘For the time being, security is not good at all. Some residents have been beaten, while others have had their property looted,’ the governor of Bubanza, Pascal Nyabenda, told IRIN.’

He said Forces nationales de libération (FNL) fighters had raided homes in Bubanza from their hideouts in the nearby Kibira and Rukoko forests. Those displaced were spending the nights in the compound of a local parish, venturing out for a few hours during the day to work in their fields, Nyabenda said.”

For information on displacement by fighting between government and FNL troops in Bubanza Province in previous years, see:
ITEKA, 9 August 2006, Burundi: Des personnes armées et des combattants du Palipehutu_Fnl mènent des attaques répétées dans certaines communes de Bubanza
ITEKA, 24 August 2005, Burundi: Des déplacés de guerre en commune Musigati sans assistance [Link below]
IRIN, 14 June 2005, Burundi: Thousands displaced in Bubanza [Link below]

Some of the Burundian refugees expelled from Tanzania have no house or land (2006)

UN 30 November 2006:
Over 3,000 Burundians who had found refuge in Tanzania were forced to return in 2006: “Many new arrivals report others being forced to leave and the 3,000 who have come back so far, only seem to be the tip of the iceberg. Nobody knows for sure how many Burundians live in Tanzania without having regularized their stay, but most estimate around 150,000 persons. This will remain a key challenge in 2007, especially since the new arrivals need assistance and in particular so-called sans addresses like Elias, who hopes that “the Burundian Government can find us a plot of land where I can build a house and send my children to school.”"

NRC November 2006:
“Since June 2006, Tanzania has been implementing a national plan for the repatriation of refugees from Tanzania. In this framework, persons without refugee status or any other legal status in Tanzania have been forcibly removed from Tanzania. This year, more than 4000 Burundians have been expelled from Tanzania, mainly from Ngara district towards Muyinga province.”

See also:
UNHCR, 23 Oct 2006, Growing numbers of Burundians return home from the DRC [Internet]
Other causes of displacement

Tens of thousands were displaced due to floods (2007)

- Since November 2006, close to 300,000 people were affected by the heavy floods

IRIN 9 February 2007:

Les pluies diluvienes qui tombent depuis novembre 2006 ont détruit les cultures et infrastructures de plusieurs régions, obligeant le gouvernement à mettre en place un fonds de solidarité pour venir en aide aux déplacés victimes des inondations dans les provinces de Muyinga, Kirundo, Cankuzo, Karuzi, Kayanza, Ngozi et Muyinga. »

IRIN 15 January 2007:
"Thousands of people in northwestern Burundi, displaced after days of heavy rainfall, urgently need relief aid, officials said on Monday.

"The rains have rendered more than 3,000 residents homeless," said Prosper Banzambe, the chief of Gatumba Zone, one of the affected areas in Mitumbuzi Commune, Bujumbura Rural Province.

He said the displaced, some of whom had sought shelter in a local church, needed food and other non-food aid such as blankets, jerry cans, soap and mosquito nets.

The rains, which pounded the area at the weekend, destroyed at least 500 homes. The flooding of the nearby River Kiziba contributed to the houses’ collapse.

Banzambe expressed concern that the continuing rains could cause more damage in Gatumba and appealed for a temporary shelter for the displaced.

He urged humanitarian organisations to help the displaced, saying the local administration was unable to "adequately meet their needs". […]

On 4 January [2007], the government set up a national solidarity fund to support people affected by floods in seven provinces. In a decree, President Pierre Nkurunziza declared the provinces of Kayanza in the north, Muramvya and Karuzi in the central part of the country, Ruyigi in the east, and Bubanza and Cibitoke in the northwest, as "hunger-stricken following floods".

He also announced the establishment of the solidarity fund, to which every Burundian must contribute for four months from the end of January."

AFP 16 January 2007:
"Heavy rains pounding Burundi’s capital and outlying areas have killed at least four people and left about 23,000 homeless since the downpours began last month, officials said Tuesday."
They said the situation was "catastrophic" after the floods destroyed farmlands, sparking fears of food shortages and disease outbreaks in the tiny central African nation emerging from more than a decade of civil strife."

Famine in north and east causes internal displacement (2005-2006)

- Many of the people who flee due to food insecurity are newly repatriated refugees

OCHA 16 January 2005:
"[R]esidents of Northern provinces continue to flee inside and outside Burundi due to food insecurity. As of 14 January [2005], a joint visit conducted by OCHA Ruyigi sub office and the provincial administration authorities confirmed the presence in Kabuyenge IDP site, in Gisuru Commune, of 63 families who fled Busoni and Bugabira communes (Kirundo Province) in search of food. OCHA, in collaboration with the administration authorities convened a meeting with humanitarian actors in the province to discuss an emergency response."

OCHA 23 June 2005:
"Cycles of drought periods, loss of staple crops, poor yields during three consecutive agriculture seasons and fragile nutritional conditions were particularly important in the northern Burundian provinces, which were also affected by waves of population movements both internal and across the border into Rwanda."

OCHA 5 March 2005:
"Despite food aid distributed by WFP and partners, the food security situation remains disconcerting mainly in Northern and Eastern provinces. Continuous internal and cross-border displacement of the population continues to be part of the coping strategies. Around 7,900 Burundian asylum seekers were reported in Tanzania. Meanwhile, 131 internally displaced persons were registered in Cankuzo coming from Kirundo. However, many more internal movements remain unrecorded."

ITEKA 21 February 2006:
"La plupart de ces migrants sont de nouveaux rapatriés qui n'ont pas eu où s'installer. Ils sont en train de migrer à la quête de quoi manger. Malheureusement, la population de la province de Cankuzo a également faim et ne peut pas les aider. Les prix des vivres montent chaque jour."
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Conflict and displacement: background and development

Ethnic background and pre-colonial times

- Total population: 7.1 million
- Composite population comprising Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%) and Batwa (1%)(colonial census)
- Numerous interrelations between the ethnic groups (marriage, language, common monarchy)
- The Batwa are most likely the most ancient ethnic group in Burundi but they are marginalized in Burundi society

AFP 25 February 2005:

“GEOGRAPHY: Landlocked in central Africa, bounded by Rwanda in the north, Tanzania to the east and south, and the vast Democratic Republic of Congo to the west. One of the smallest states on the African continent, Burundi covers 27,834 square kilometers (10,747 square miles).

- POPULATION: 7.1 million, of which around 85 percent are Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi. The remaining one percent of the population are pygmies called Twas. One of the most densely populated African countries.

- CAPITAL: Bujumbura (population 300,000)

- LANGUAGES: Kirundi (national), French (administrative), Swahili (local)

- RELIGION: Christian (70 percent); Animist (15 percent); Muslim (15 percent).”

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 15-17:

"Burundi is situated in Central Africa, along Lake Tanganyika and shares borders with Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. […] According to statistics dating back to the 1930s, 85 per cent of the population are Hutu, 14 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Batwa. The Hutu are considered to originate from Chad and the Niger, while the Tutsi, of Nilo-ethiopian origin, are thought to come from eastern Africa. The Batwa originate from the Congo Basin (Pygmies). This breakdown does not take into account the Ganwa (those of princely origin), nor a handful of other immigrant communities, nor those of mixed origins (mixed marriages having been common in the past). […] It also does not take into account the fact that within both groups there existed historically rankings of status nor that passage from one group to another, for instance becoming Tutsi from Hutu or Ganwa, was also possible. The Burundians all speak the same language, Kirundi, which is both the national and the official language. Other languages, as provided for in the Constitution, are also spoken. […] Despite ethnic differences, the Burundians live intermingled on the thousands of hills of the country without distinction on account of ethnicity. They are therefore inextricably bound to one another and cannot contemplate any notions of separation.

Although settlements have always been mixed, society in Burundi […] was built along a 'class' and 'caste' system. […] While their distinctions were not rigidly determined along 'ethnic' or 'tribal' lines, […] there was significant correlation between class and ethnicity, with the Tutsis associated with the upper class and the Hutus with the lower class. This did not mean that all Tutsis were
upper class nor all Hutus lower class. Both class and the ethnic correlations were also dynamic. A Hutu could rise economically and socially and become a 'Tutsi'.

Hutu and Tutsi relationships were in the past cemented by their shared loyalty to common institutions. Kingship was such an institution; patron-client ties constituted another powerful socio-political institution. Patrons were expected to offer protection and gifts in exchange for services and offerings in kind. As social and political roles that once gave meaning and cohesion to membership in the community vanished, the use of the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' with ethnic connotations became more rigid. [...] Today the use of the term 'Hutu' describes an ethnic group which is poorer and powerless, whereas the Tutsi, especially the Hima (a Tutsi subgroup), are the pre-eminent power holders. [...] Nevertheless, the impression should not be created that the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' are figments as the "official truth" during the Bagaza period (1976-1987) would have it. This stance restricted discussion on the underlying problems of ethnicity and expression of ethnic differences without solving them."

CHR 19 March 2001, para. 100:
"La situation de la minorité twa mérite une attention particulière que malheureusement elle ne reçoit pas toujours. Les Twas sont sans doute le noyau le plus ancien de la population burundaise, comme dans d'autres pays des Grands Lacs; ils constituent aujourd'hui environ 1 % de la population. "

Colonial rule and military regimes (1899-1992)

- 1962: Burundi becomes independent
- 25 years of a Tutsi dominated military dictatorship
- The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power
- 1980: creation of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu) by activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community in refugee camps in Tanzania

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 19-24:
"The transition from traditional power structures to 'modern' politics has by no means been an easy one. Two Ganwa (princely) dynasties continued fighting for control during the era of the colonial Powers, (first Germany from 1889 to 1918, then Belgium until 1962) as they had done during the pre-colonial era. The Party of Unity and National Progress (Uprona) was dominated by the Ganwa Bezi, while the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was led by the Ganwa Batare. In the legislative elections of September 1961 Uprona won, with Prince Rwagasoré as Prime Minister designate. A month later, however, Rwagarsore was assassinated. The political game switched from Ganwa to Hutu and Tutsi hands for the first time.

Burundi gained its independence from Belgium in July 1962. Until 1966 the crown continued to stabilize the situation. Violent incidents erupted after the elections in 1966, following which the Prime Minister, Michel Micombero, a Tutsi of the Hima group from Bururi, [...] overthrew the monarchy and declared a republic, concentrating power in the army. The National Assembly was dissolved and later replaced with a committee of officers, which, by 1971, was made up of 24 Tutsi and 3 Hutu, and Uprona was declared the sole party. Serious intra-Tutsi rivalries for power emerged. At this time Hutu were already being systematically purged from the army. The transition from a Ganwa-run kingdom to a Tutsi-dominated military dictatorship to the exclusion of Hutus caused more violence. For the next 25 years Tutsi factions fought over control, turning the Hutu into scapegoats whenever the Hutu would rise up and demand more equitable power-
sharing. On the other hand, whenever efforts towards power-sharing were made, extremists from both groups would resort to violence, to delay or cancel them.

Massacres had taken place in 1965 and 1967, but the most serious ones took place in 1972 triggered by Hutu militants from the Burundian refugee community in Tanzania. Hundreds if not thousands of Tutsi were killed and there is widespread fear that what had happened to Rwanda’s Tutsi, namely, systematic subjection and extermination, would happen to them too. The Tutsi retaliation and repression that followed were instant. The first victims were Hutus with education: secondary school and university students, teachers, nurses, doctors, priests, pastors, drivers, headmasters, businessmen, shopkeepers, civil servants, bank clerks, professors. Most Hutu families lost members. Hutu widows moved to the city outskirts when their houses were seized by Tutsi. Many Tutsis also fled. Many left the interior, where they felt frightened among Hutu neighbours, and moved to Bujumbura to fill the many jobs now vacant. Others rushed to occupy the flat, fertile, palm-oil-producing strip of lake shore south of Bujumbura, after the flight of very many Hutu who had been living there. Reports have spoken of genocidal acts and of hundreds of thousands of Hutus killed. […]

These events had great reverberations in Burundi; yet, nothing was ever done about the massacres. There has never been an official inquiry into them, an accounting, or any effort to bring to justice those responsible for the killings. Thereafter there was no question of Hutus entering the army, and many refused to send their children to school, fearing they were exposing them to a future massacre. Those at school had no role models. The educated, competent, urbane were all Tutsi. That there was a "lost" Hutu generation is still evident today in the political life of the country.

There was little power-sharing following the massacres, even after Micombero was overthrown by his deputy chief of staff, Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, also a Hima (Tutsi subgroup). There were no massacres during Bagaza's 11-year rule and many refugees returned home. Bagaza reportedly hoped development would push his country through the ethnic deadlock. Observers note that he engaged in a series of reforms, without, however, addressing the ethnic issue. […] All provincial governors were Tutsi and most judges, university and school teachers, magistrates and heads of hospitals were Tutsi too. Uprona remained a Tutsi party and its members were the ones to benefit mostly from Bagaza's management of the economy. In the last years of the Bagaza regime corruption and nepotism reportedly flourished. […] In the meantime, in 1980 activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community formed the Palipehutu, or the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People, in refugee camps in Tanzania. Bagaza was himself deposed in 1987 by a group of army officers and a cousin of his and nephew of Micombero, Major Pierre Buyoya, became President.

In August 1988 frustrated Hutu hopes for an improvement were at the root of hundreds of ethnic killings. Thousands were killed. This time the regions most affected were Ntega commune in Kirundo province and Marangara commune in Ngozi province, both bordering Rwanda. Palipehutu members from Rwanda had been infiltrating into Burundi and sporadic fights were taking place until Hutus turned against the Tutsi community, many of them Rwandan refugees. The army pursued those assumed responsible (although it is unclear how much resistance these people who had no guns put up against the soldiers) […] and in the next eight days it reportedly killed large numbers of civilians, including women and children. More than 60,000 people poured into Rwanda across the swamps and the Akanyaru river. Others took refuge within Burundi in swamp areas. The massacres were surprising even to the Burundians. Hutu had to face the fact that the army was still prepared to use maximum force and Tutsi that Hutu could still massacre many Tutsi before soldiers reached the scene."

ACTS 30 September 2004:
“Despite the popular conception of the conflict as a Hutu-Tutsi struggle, most scholars agree that the protracted conflict is structural in nature, though articulated in ethnic terms. The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power.” Governance practices by successive regimes galvanized political power and state control in the hands of a small elite group within the Tutsi community from particular parts of the country, who have since sustained their hold on power through repressive policies. Efforts by the Tutsi elite to retain political control and associated patronage networks, and violent counter-strategies of the Hutu political and armed groups have precipitated ethnic massacres and retaliatory radicalism marked by acts of genocide.”

Civil war and Peace Process in Burundi (1993-2008)

- 1993: Assassination of elected President Ndadaye triggers large-scale inter-ethnic violence
- 1996: Coup installs President Buyoya; sanctions imposed by neighbouring countries
- Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi signed in August 2000
- 2005: signing of ceasefire agreement between FNL and government; adoption of new constitution
- Local, legislative and presidential elections was held in various phases in 2005
- Security sector was profoundly restructured and the army is now ethnically balanced (2006)
- Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and FRODEBU – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence (2006)
- As of April 2008: the FNL had withdrawn
- From the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement

AFP 1 June 2005, factfile:
“The civil war begun in 1993 has killed an estimated 300,000 people.[…]

Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu president, elected in June 1993, was assassinated on October 21 of the same year during a failed coup organized by Tutsi military officers.

His successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira -- another Hutu -- was killed in April 1994 at the same time as then Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana died under suspicious circumstances when his plane was shot down over Kigali, sparking the genocide of up to a million Tutsis and Hutu moderates in Rwanda.

Ntaryamira's successor, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, also a Hutu, was overthrown in a non-violent coup in July 1996, and Pierre Buyoya returned to power.

In 1998, Buyoya reformed the constitution to create a transition government and began peace talks with Hutu and Tutsi opposition groups.

In August 2000 a peace agreement including a power-sharing deal was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, but the two main armed rebel groups refused to participate in the talks. Civil war continued to rage.

In November 2001, Buyoya took over as transitional leader for a period of 18 months, seconded by a Hutu vice-president whose signature is required on all presidential texts pertaining to security and the armed forces.
A 26-member power-sharing government was also sworn in to oversee the three-year transition. Buyoya was succeeded at the head of the transition government in May 2003 by his vice president Domitien Ndayizeye, who is seconded by a Tutsi, Alphonse Marie Kadage.

A ceasefire agreement was signed in December 2002 by the government and the main Hutu rebel movement, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), which finally entered government in November 2003.

A second Hutu armed group, the National Liberation Forces (FNL), finally signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on May 15, but the details of how this be implemented have still not yet been resolved.

A new constitution was adopted at the end of February, aimed at bringing about a peaceful democracy and ending the reign of the Tutsie tribe in power. Opposition has been voiced only by Tutsis concerned at losing too much power.

**HRW 4 November 2005:**
“Elections in 2005 were the final chapter in the transitional process established by the Arusha Accords of 2000. In the intervening period a government including the Hutudominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu), the Tutsi-dominated National Unity and Progress Party (Uprona), and a number of smaller parties ruled the country. In late 2003 this government signed the Pretoria Protocol making peace with the CNDDFDD and starting the process of integrating the former rebels into the army and the administration.”

*For more detailed information on 1993 events, see “Profile in displacement” (Report of the Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, 28 November 1994), paras. 29-36) [External link]*

**ICG 30 November 2006:**
“In elections held between June and August 2005, the voters of Burundi elected their first democratic government since 1993. This marked an end to the transitional government established by the Arusha Agreement in 2001. The mainly Hutu former rebels of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), led by Pierre Nkurunziza, won a resounding victory and hold 58 per cent of the seats in parliament and 57 per cent in the communal councils, as well as twelve of the twenty government ministries. Nkurunziza was inaugurated as president on 26 August 2005.

The elections radically reconfigured politics. Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence. In the run-up to the elections, rebel forces were integrated into the national army, police and intelligence service. For the first time in Burundian history, these forces were ethnically balanced. Nkurunziza’s government faced considerable challenges. Foremost was the process of transforming the CNDDFDD from a rebel movement into a democratic political party in power – one whose members had little civil administration experience. The government had to reconstruct an economy devastated by more than a decade of civil war and economic embargo, during which per capita income fell by 35 per cent and the number of people living below the poverty line doubled. During its first year it also had to deal with security problems in the capital and surrounding provinces caused by the remaining rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL. Unfortunately, the government’s response to these challenges has increasingly manifested itself in disregard for the rule of law.”

**UNSC 28 November 2007:**
“The signing of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the armed group Palipehutu-Forces nationales de libération (FNL) led by Agathon Rwasa on 7 September 2006 was a decisive step in the peace process in Burundi. However, its implementation remains difficult owing to persisting disagreements among the parties. The Agreement, which was the outcome of determined efforts of regional States united under the auspices of the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, addresses a number of issues including the integration of FNL ex-combatants into the Burundian National Defence Forces (FDN) and security forces, the participation of FNL elements in the institutions of the country and the rapid demobilization and reintegration of children associated with this armed group into their respective families and communities. Under the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism was established to oversee the demobilization of FNL combatants.

The signing of the Agreement was followed at first by a significant improvement in the security situation, characterized notably by a decrease both in the number of abuses perpetrated by armed groups and in the number of alleged FNL militants arrested by the National Defence Forces and the National Police of Burundi.”

PBC, 19 March 2008:
“[T]he Palipehutu-FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. In response, a Political Directorate had been established to assist the Mechanism in efforts to regain FNL's participation.”

IRIN, 14 January 2008:
“The FNL, the last rebel movement still active in Burundi, has resumed fighting government forces, especially in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza, where it is most active.

Though the movement signed a ceasefire accord with the government in September 2006, it has not been fully implemented. The joint verification and monitoring mechanism, which oversees its implementation, suspended activities in July 2007 after the FNL delegates walked out of talks over security concerns. They have since been accusing the facilitator, South African safety minister Charles Nqakula, of bias.”

ISS 3 April 2008:
“After intense diplomatic pressure from regional governments and the international community Burundi’s last rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL, has been brought back to the negotiating table that drew up a new roadmap designed to end the standoff by the end of June 2008. This breakthrough was reached in a February 23 meeting in Cape Town, South Africa. The meeting was attended by special envoys to Burundi from Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa, as well as representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.

The Cape Town meeting had been called to save the Burundi peace process after the FNL withdrew from its implementation, alleging bias on the part of the facilitator, South Africa’s Security Minister Charles Nqakula. To help address this challenge Minister Nqakula has followed the example of other peace processes by establishing a Group of Special Envoys for Burundi (GSEB), representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.”

Delrue August 2006:
“The success of Burundi’s transition to peace hinges on how its new government (elected in August 2005 and headed by former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza) and the international community deal with such post- displacement issues as land and property claims, reconciliation and transitional justice.
The link between displacement, return, reconciliation and successful transition towards a consolidated peace is frequently either underestimated or neglected by the international community."

For a comprehensive analysis of the political situation in Burundi, see

HRW, 12 March 2008:
“Several opposition politicians have been threatened and targeted for violence during the last 18 months. Nizomukunda, then second vice-president of the republic, fled Burundi in September 2006 after issuing a letter critical of the government; she returned in March 2007. Five parliamentarians from the opposition party Front for Democracy in Burundi (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi, Frodebu) and from a dissident wing of the CNDD-FDD, including Mpawenayo, were targeted in a set of grenade attacks in August 2007 that injured several bystanders. Pancrace Cimpaye, Frodebu spokesperson, was detained after suggesting the ruling party bore responsibility for the August attacks; after being released, he briefly left the country. In February 2008, a local Frodebu official was killed, while another was seriously injured in a grenade attack which killed his wife and child.”

See also:
IRIN, BURUNDI: Government of consensus formed, 15 November 2007 [Internet]

ICG, 28 August 2007, Burundi: Finalising peace with the FNL [Internet]


Secretary-General welcomes signing of Burundi ceasefire agreement, United Nations Secretary General, 8 September 2006 [Internet]

Progress in regard to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (2005-2008)

- Reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression
- About 5,000 UN peacekeepers were in Burundi from June 2004 to the end of 2006, to monitor the country's transition to democracy, with South Africa contributing the majority of troops.
- The new Burundian government saw the peacekeepers as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible (2006)
- A new UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) continued the process of peace consolidation and of coordinating the UN system’s activities in Burundi from 2007

ISS 13 October 2006:
"In Burundi, reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, signed in August 2000 by 17 political parties, the National
Assembly and the government and the 2003 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Burundi and the principal rebel group, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), do include important provisions on the organization, structure, mandates and composition of postconflict security forces that will act professionally and apolitically, adhere to human rights norms, and provide defence and security to all Burundians.[…]

Although the Arusha Accords were signed in August 2000, the implementation of the security sector reform process they articulate was largely delayed until 2003, mainly because of continued warfare throughout most of Burundi. Indeed, the most active rebel movements in the field were marginalized throughout the Arusha negotiations and were thus not signatories to the Accord. Accordingly, it was not until the signing of a ceasefire between the government and the main rebel group – the CNDD-FDD – in 2003 that the reform process was set in motion. By July 2006, however, the reform of the defence and security forces had reached an advanced stage and had achieved most of its structural objectives (i.e. the integration of several armed groups into a single military and single police force), despite various financial- and material-related challenges.

The process of integrating the former rebel groups and the FAB into a new national defence force, the Forces de Défense Nationale (FDN), has been completed – largely to the satisfaction of the government and international donors – despite its late start due to disagreements on the definition of combatant and on the harmonization of rank between the rebel movements and the regular army.[…]

Despite this progress, a preliminary assessment of the reform of the FDN and the PNB and progress in the domain of social and economic reintegration and re-insertion of former combatants suggests that serious challenges remain in these critical areas. The local media frequently report human rights violations perpetrated by on-duty military or police or by demobilized combatants.

*Tufts University 30 July 2006:*

“The new Burundian government saw ONUB as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible. This perception was aggravated by two unfortunate choices made by leaders of the UN mission: to support Frodebu and former President Ndayizeye during the electoral campaign and proposing to coordinate the transition from humanitarian aid to development through a “Partners Council” deliberating without the government.”

*UNSC 18 December 2006:*

“Meanwhile, as delays in the start of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants have continued, criminal activities against the population, reportedly committed by FNL combatants, have increased since late October. Skirmishes between the national security forces and alleged FNL combatants and detentions of FNL elements and supporters have reportedly resumed in the north-western provinces. FNL recruitment, including of youths, has also been reported, particularly in Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural provinces.[…]

Once deployed, the AU special task force would therefore be expected to assume the responsibilities that were allocated to ONUB under the ceasefire agreement, namely: (a) protection of designated assembly areas for FNL combatants; (b) provision of engineering, logistical and administrative support for the establishment of the assembly areas; (c) disarmament of combatants; (d) storage of weapons collected from the disarmament process and their subsequent destruction; (e) transportation of disarmed FNL combatants from assembly areas to the designated demobilization centre or integration facilities of the National Defence Forces; and (f) protection of the demobilization centres. […]
Further delays in the agreement’s implementation, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants, are likely to lead to more friction between these combatants and the population and the national security services. In addition, there was an increase in localized conflicts involving the small FNL faction led by Jean Bosco Sindayigaya, which did not sign the ceasefire agreement.”

**DPKO 20 December 2006:**
“A new United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), authorized by Security Council resolution 1719 earlier this year, will continue the process of peace consolidation and be in charge of coordinating the United Nations system’s activities in Burundi for an initial period of one year.”

The mandate of BINUB is extended until 31 December 2008 (UNSC, 19 December 2007).

See also:
Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 31 Aug 2006
A technical analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - a case study from Burundi [Internet]


**Peace Building Commission and Burundi (2006-2008)**

- Peace Building Commission approved in December 2007 a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation

**UNSC 18 December 2006, para.22:**
“Significant progress has been made in the establishment of peacebuilding coordination mechanisms between the Government and the United Nations. On 7 November, the Government created an Inter-Ministerial Peacebuilding Steering Committee, which will work with the United Nations, within the framework of an initial joint mechanism, in preparing the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission and the peacebuilding priority plan to be submitted to the Peacebuilding Fund. The inaugural meeting of the Government-United Nations joint mechanism was held on 16 November [2006], followed by several sessions at the policy and working levels. As a result, a common understanding was reached on the steps to be taken by the Government, with United Nations support, to secure resources from the Peacebuilding Fund. Progress was also made in developing the Government's presentation to the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission. The mission of the Peacebuilding Support Office to Burundi in mid-November [2006] and the meetings it had with the United Nations and the Government's Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee contributed significantly to this process.”

**UNGA 5 December 2007:**
“With a long-awaited conflict-recovery and development strategy for Burundi now in place, the Peacebuilding Commission today approved a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation -- both locally and in New York -- in priority areas
such as justice and security sector reform, generating jobs and making radical improvements to governance.

Meeting in its special “Burundi Configuration”, the Commission adopted the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism (MTM) of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. That Framework -- in place since June -- is the country-led integrated peacebuilding strategy now guiding the engagement and dialogue between Bujumbura, the United Nations and other international partners.

The Framework identified key objectives, major challenges and threats to peace, especially the implementation of a stagnant ceasefire agreement between Burundi and the National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL). Promoting inclusive growth, employment, transparency and human rights were among its other top priorities.”

**See also:**
Brookings Institution, 13 March 2008, The Role of Civil Society in Ending Displacement and Peacebuilding, by Elizabeth Ferris [Internet]

United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI), 12 Dec 2006 [Link below]

Peacebuilding Commission holds day-long discussion on Burundi, agrees on fund’s use to bolster government’s priority plan [Internet]

Challenges facing Burundi, requiring international help, indicated at country-specific meetings of Peacebuilding Commission [Internet]

**Burundi government signs Nairobi pact including protocol on IDPs (December 2006)**

**MONUC 18 December 2006:**

With the signing of the Nairobi pact this Friday December 15 2006 by DRC, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, it paves the way for security, stability and development in the region, after years of conflict.

Many African state leaders, including DRC president Joseph Kabila were in Nairobi Kenya for the two day summit that will go a long way to bringing the region out of the vicious cycle of humanitarian disaster, poverty, and repeated conflict.[...]

The Great Lakes pact includes a $225 million security action plan to disarm rebel groups in Eastern DRC, and along border areas in Sudan, Kenya and Uganda.[...]

Ms. Besida Tonwe, the Head of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in Central and East Africa, said that the conference was a long process of consultations in helping the Great Lakes Region to reconcile, rehabilitate, and reconstruct their societies in a politically delicate process.

‘It is also a process which in the future will continue to require financial support from the donor community and coherent assistance from the humanitarian community. It is now of utmost importance that there is a follow-up on the national implementation of the legal protocols adopted with the pact,’ she said.
'The three protocols on humanitarian and social issues addressing sexual violence against women and children, property rights of returning persons, and the protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), are of the utmost importance,’ she concluded.”

**IDMC 14 December 2006:**

“The Pact is a culmination of more than four years of regional negotiations among States. It contains a package of measures which promises to enhance the lives of the forcibly displaced, including a regional protocol on protection and assistance for internally displaced, which when signed, will be the first legally binding regional instrument specifically dealing with IDPs anywhere in the world. A regional protocol on property rights of returning populations, and protocols which address some of the root causes of flight in the Great Lakes are also key elements of the Pact.”

**Arusha Accords: Challenges of implementing Protocol IV (2005)**

- Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development

**ISS 27 May 2005:**

“Aside from calling for a cessation to violent conflict, the Arusha Accords [Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 28 August 2000]. provide comprehensive recommendations for stabilising and rehabilitating a highly polarised Burundian nation. The agreement is composed of five protocols each dedicated to a particular theme intended to move the process from peace-making to peace-building. These themes consist of an outline of the nature of the conflict; democracy and good governance; peace and security; reconstruction and development; and guarantees on the implementation of the agreement.

Importantly, the accords acknowledge that the Burundian ‘conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions... and stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power.’

Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development. It is therefore the ‘litmus test’ against which the performance of the transitional government (and other actors) as it relates to Arusha’s recommendations can be assessed.

**Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Refugees and Sinistrés**

The main conclusion and recommendations of Protocol IV states that:

“Through the Burundi Peace Negotiations at Arusha it has been possible to assess how seriously the political and ethnic crisis that has torn Burundi apart since independence has affected Burundian society. Hundreds of thousands of Burundians are refugees, some of them for more than 25 years.

Hundreds of thousands more are forced to live in camps where conditions are appalling…. All Burundians are aware that a lasting peace is impossible so long as a definitive solution is not found to the problem of refugees and sinistrés. Likewise, peace is impossible so long as the country’s wealth is not shared equitably. Burundi cannot help the sinistrés rebuild destroyed property and restore its economy without the assistance of the international community.”
The UN concluded that there was a strong indication that the FLN had not acted alone in the massacre of Congolese refugees (2004-2005)

- One year of after the Gatumba massacre, those responsible remain free

IRIN 5 Jan 2005:
“The FNL claimed responsibility for a massacre in August of 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees at Gatumba transit camp on the Burundi side of the border with the DRC. The UN is continuing to investigate whether armed groups on the DRC side of the border, which are aligned to FNL, also took part.”

UNSC 15 November 2004:
“As requested by the Security Council by its presidential statement of 15 August 2004 (S/PRST/2004/30), ONUB, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights conducted a joint investigation into the massacre on 13 August of 152 Congolese refugees at the Gatumba refugee camp, located close to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The results of the investigation were transmitted to the Council by my letter to the President of the Council dated 15 October (S/2004/821). Despite extensive investigation, there is no clear evidence of who organized, carried out and financed that gross atrocity. The FNL (Rwasa) claim of responsibility has been supported by witness statements and led United Nations investigators to believe that the group did, indeed, participate in the attack. There is however, a strong indication that FNL (Rwasa) did not act alone. Unfortunately, the dearth of verifiable information and limited cooperation by the Burundian authorities hampered the formulation of a definitive report. A national investigation is still ongoing.”

Al 18 August 2005:
“On the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre, which took place in August 2004, Amnesty International calls on the forthcoming government of Burundi and the international community to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.

‘The new government should undertake to set up an independent and impartial body to investigate this and other massacres and those found to be responsible should be held to account,’ Amnesty International said today.

During the night of 13 August 2004, the refugee camp of Gatumba, located near the Congolese border, was attacked by an armed group. More than 160 Congolese refugees, predominantly children and women members of the Banyamulenge ethnic group from South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (DRC), were deliberately and systematically killed. On 14 August, the Palipehutu-FNL (Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu -- Forces nationales de libération) claimed responsibility for the killings. The same day, the governments of Burundi and Rwanda and delegates of the Banyamulenge communities accused Congolese and Rwandese armed political groups based in the DRC of involvement in the massacre. According to UN investigators, evidence of the presence of ‘other groups’ was credible, but they were not able to categorically identify them.

Human rights organizations and the United Nations have strongly condemned this massacre and called for an independent, impartial and comprehensive investigation. Given the alleged involvement of armed political groups based in the DRC, there was concern that the killing could lead to a military intervention in the DRC by Burundi and Rwanda. Such an intervention could have led to further human rights abuses in the DRC.
Since then, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Burundian authorities have moved a few refugees to the Mwaro province, farther away from the border, others have returned to the DRC, while many others have moved to Bujumbura. So far, despite the indication from the Burundian Minister of Justice that the national investigation into the Gatumba massacre was completed, the United Nations Operations in Burundi stressed in a recent statement that, ‘no investigation report has been issued by the government [of Burundi] and the authors of the attack remain free’.

See also United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 13 Aug 2005
Burundi: Statement on the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre [Internet]

Causes of displacement


United Nations Resident Coordinator System for Burundi 1998, p. 5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronology of Population Movements</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>An estimated 200,000 Burundians flee from progroms and communal violence; many seek refuge in Tanzania, where most remain to this day.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>To escape the violence that broke out following the assassination of President Ndadaye, nearly 200,000 people leave the hills to seek protection in sites grouped around military posts. A vast majority are still there.</td>
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<td>1994-1996</td>
<td>The escalation of the civil conflict sparks massive population movements; the northwestern province of Cibitoke, sandwiched between the rebel bases in the mountainous Kibira forest and in neighboring Kivu, is particularly unstable. Large numbers seek refuge in neighboring Zaire (150,000) and Tanzania (250,000). Up to 400,000 congregate in sites inside the country.</td>
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<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>In the wake of the conquest of Zaire by the Kabila-led alliance, most of the refugees in Kivu return to Burundi, where they swell the numbers living in the displaced camps on the north-western provinces, particularly Cibitoke.</td>
</tr>
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<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>As a military strategy to regain control of rebel-held territory, the authorities forcibly regroup 250,000 civilians in Karuzi, Kanyanza and Muramva provinces. Nearly all of them return home by the end of 1997, but the policy of controlled population movements continues to be implemented in other, more short-term forms elsewhere in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>Following the loss of their bases in the Kivu, the rebels regroup in Tanzania, and the main theatre of operations shifts to the southwest, along the ridge of the Nile-Congo watershed that is the main conduit into and out of the country for guerrilla groups. The ensuing destabilization leads to large scale displacement to new sites, again mainly along the main tarmac roads of the western plain, not only</td>
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in Makamba and Bururi provinces but also as far as north as Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza.

| 1997-1998 | As the military gradually established control in certain areas, the authorities begin to dismantle the big sites near main roads or major towns and create smaller, decentralized sites grouped around advanced military positions in the hills (Cibitoke, parts of Bururi, Bubanza). Elsewhere, short-term regroupment operations continue to be implemented in response to localized destabilization (Bujumbura Rural) |
| 1998 | Nearly all the sites in Cibitoke province, for so long the most unstable part of the country, are dismantled by June and the people return to their hills. At almost the same time, the crisis in neighboring Congo produces an influx of some eleven thousand people, which continues up to present. |

**Causes of internal displacement: an analysis by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (1998)**

- Pervasive psychology of "flee or be killed" is a lasting legacy of the 1972 massacres and the 1993 upheavals
- Displacement has also been used as a deliberate goal of violence since 1993
- Massive retaliation by the armed forces
- Suspicion towards the displaced population creates more displacement
- Use of violence and displacement as a way to achieve political or economical objectives

**USCR 1998a, pp. 32-33:**

"A history of massacres has taught the people of Burundi, regardless of their ethnicity, that their personal survival hinges on their ability to flee and seek a safer place temporarily. For many peasant Burundians, the lesson of the past is that violence can erupt suddenly and can rapidly become all-encompassing. It is a lesson handed down from generation to generation. Some of the underlying causes of internal displacement in Burundi follow:

First, a pervasive psychology of 'flee or be killed' has become the lasting legacy of the 1972 slaughter and the 1993 upheaval. The 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda has reinforced the psychology of flight in Burundi.

Second, the smaller massacres that have occurred almost daily since 1994 serve to validate the historical lessons of fear and mistrust. Fear is also ingrained that large number of Burundians have learned to flee their homes not only in reaction to danger but also in anticipation of it.

Third, much of Burundi's displacement since 1993 has been caused by «ethnic cleansing.» Displacement is no longer merely as accidental by-product of violence; it has become a deliberate goal of violence.

Fourth, both ethnic groups of Burundi regard themselves as vulnerable. The sense of vulnerability has become an important part of the self-identity. Hutu are demographically dominant but see themselves as vulnerable to the political and military power of Tutsi. Tutsi are politically and militarily powerful but view themselves as vulnerable to the demographic dominance of Hutu. Members of both ethnic groups regard themselves as victims, despite the fact that many massacres in Burundian history have been largely one-sided.

Fifth, a pattern is evident in many violent eruptions over the decades: regardless of how violence begins, there is almost always massive retaliation against the Hutu by the Tutsi-dominated
military. As a result, many Hutu instinctively flee at the mere sight of soldiers or at the distant sound of their vehicles. The country's forces of order, unfortunately, create new disorder and displacement — deliberately in some cases, inadvertently in others.

Sixth, population displacement in Burundi often exacerbates rather than alleviates the conflict. Uprooted Burundians of one ethnic group are often regarded as dangerous by members of the other ethnic group. The military suspects that many internally displaced Hutu are rebels. Many Hutu suspect that camps of displaced Tutsi are bases for militia activity. There is some truth to these mutual suspicions. The result is that displacement at times begets more violence, causing still more people to flee. In short – at least in Burundi – displacement causes more displacement.

These are only partial explanations of the population displacement in Burundi, of course. This review of Burundi's history indicates that some actors create violence and displacement as a way to achieve political control by force that they are unable to achieve or maintain through nonviolent means. Some elements in Burundi create violence and displacement for the economic rewards it brings them through banditry, confiscation of property, and skimming of relief aid. Still other Burundians commits violence and force displacement based on pure fear or hate, reinforced by decades of grievances, real or imagined."


- 1996: government policy to move civilian populations into "regroupment" camps
- 1997: end of the large-scale, long-term "regroupment" policy
- 1998: short-term forced movement of populations continues, particularly in unstable western provinces
- Since September 1999, over 350,000 people were forcibly moved by government forces to 53 regroupment camps to deprive insurgent groups of local support
- Government explained that regroupment camps were established to protect civilians from the rebels
- Dismantlement of regroupment camps was precondition to peace negotiations and camps were dismantled by mid-2000

**USCR 2000 "regroupment"**

"Burundian authorities have pursued two waves of forced population relocation, or regroupment. The first regroupment wave occurred during 1996-98 when the government moved at least a quarter-million Hutu into 50 camps scattered throughout the country. Some observers estimated that up to 800,000 persons lived in the regroupment camps at that time. Most regroupment sites closed during 1998, allowing occupants to return home."

**HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":**

*Renewed Regroupment (1999-2000)*

"In July and August 1999, the rebels launched increasingly frequent and damaging raids in and around Bujumbura, killing dozens of civilians as well as some soldiers. The army retaliated with attacks that killed more than one hundred civilians as well as combatants and the government tightened an existing curfew. These measures failed to satisfy Tutsi extremists in Bujumbura who demanded more drastic action to protect the city and to repress the rebellion. With rumors circulating of a possible coup and of violence being organized by extremists, the government decided to impose a policy of regroupment on most of Bujumbura-rural, particularly on areas inhabited largely by Hutu and near the city."

**HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":**
“In mid-1999, it [the government] had revived the regroupment policy in parts of southeastern Burundi before deciding to extend it to the area of the capital in September.”

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"The Tutsi-dominated government of Burundi, combating rebellions among the Hutu majority, began forcing civilians in the area around the capital into so-called "protection sites" or "regroupment camps" beginning in late September 1999. Burundian authorities claimed the measure was intended to protect the civilians, most of them Hutu, from attack by the rebel National Liberation Forces (Forces Nationales pour la Libération, FNL) who were becoming increasingly well-entrenched in the area. In fact, they meant to deprive the FNL of support from local people who helped them, sometimes willingly, sometimes under duress. By removing civilian support, the authorities hoped to isolate the FNL and thus reduce its increasingly frequent attacks on the capital. They hoped also to quiet Tutsi extremists who accused them of weakness in confronting the rebel threat."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"By the end of 1999, authorities had obliged some 80 percent of the population of the province of Bujumbura-rural-some 350,000 people-to live in fifty-three camps. Although regroupment helped reduce attacks on the capital city, rebels remained firmly established in rural areas. They simply shifted from one place to another when attacked by the army, which had insufficient troops available to control the whole region at the same time. Rebels continued to live off the crops of local people and even to inhabit the houses of those forced to live in the camps.

USCR 2000, "Regroupment":
"The country included at least three types of internal displacement: up to 200,000 people, primarily rural Tutsi, who have lived for six years in designated camps protected by government soldiers and thousands, who have become displaced in the countryside or at makeshift sites for varying lengths of time; and nearly 350,000 Hutu whom the government required to live in so-called 'regroupment' camps."

Dismantlement of regroupment camps (2000)

USCR 2000, "Regroupment":
"Government authorities argued that the camps were a temporary measure to protect civilians from attack and deprive rebel groups of food and lodging in rural areas. Burundian officials urged international humanitarian organizations to provide food, water, sanitation, and medical care to the sites. Burundian President Pierre Buyoya visited several sites in October [1999] and stated that conditions there were better than portrayed by aid agencies. The regroupment camps were 'no dramatic situation,' he assured."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"The international community severely criticized the policy of regroupment. In January 2000, the Burundian government promised to begin closing the camps but it made little progress in doing so until early June. At that time, rebel leaders made closing the camps a precondition for peace negotiations and former South African President Nelson Mandela, facilitator for the negotiations, condemned the regroupment sites as 'concentration camps.' Under this pressure, President Pierre Buyoya agreed that everyone in the camps would be allowed to return home by the end of July."

For an analysis on how forced displacement in 2000 of 350,000 civilians was carried out in violation of international law, including the Un Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, see HRW June 2000 "Violation of international law & Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" [link below]
Fighting between FNL and army displaced thousands in Bujumbura Rural (2004-2008)

- Combatants of FNL fought so called FNL “dissidents”, causing displacement in October 2007
- FNL is the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government
- Population displacement reduced in 2005 compared to 2003-2004
- Little population displacement in 2006, but the populations of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural, have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL

IRIN 23 April 2008:
“The resumption of violence in and around Bujumbura is causing panic in the country. Outside the capital, residents spend their nights in the bush for fear of being attacked, as the death toll rose to 33. A bomb destroyed part of the Vatican embassy compound and a dining hall in the Kiriri University campus on 22 April [2008].

“We call on the army to remove its heavy arms from our campus,” a student said, reacting to the installation of rocket launchers aimed at rebuffing attacks by the rebel FNL. On 18 April, attacks were launched on military positions in Gihosha, Kanyosha, Kamenge and Musaga areas.”

NRC, May 2008:
In April 2008 serious violations of the 6 September 2006 ceasefire between the Burundian Army (FDN) and the rebel group Palipehutu-FNL (FNL) occurred. The most reported events took place in the capital city, Bujumbura, where three attacks took place on April 17, 18 and 22. Violence sprung in several provinces around the country (Bujumbura Rurale, Bubanza, Cibitoke and Kayanza), but Bujumbura Rurale province has been the most affected province, witnessing displacements of population.[...]

At the peak of displacement it was reported that there were:
- 4,050 households displaced in Isale commune or 20,100 people out of 83,000 inhabitants concentrated mostly in 6 sites in the centre of the commune, Rushubi on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 5,102 households displaced in Muyira and Kirombwe, both at Kanyosha commune on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 4,305 households displaced in Kabezi centre in three different sites on May 7 (data Kabezi local administration).
- 3,166 households displaced in Gitaza centre and 1,100 in Rutongo, both at Muhuta commune (data Muhuta local administration).
- And fewer numbers of IDPs registered in Bugarama, Mutambu and Nyabiraba communes (several hundreds of households)."

IRIN, 25 October 2007:
“Fighters of Burundi’s last active rebel group have for the second time in one week attacked a position occupied by a break-away faction, forcing villagers to flee their homes, a senior military official said.”
The evening raid by combatants of the Front National de Liberation (FNL), led by Agathon Rwasa, took place on 24 October [2007] evening on a site where the so-called FNL "dissidents" have gathered in Gakungwe village of Kabezi commune in Bujumbura Rural province.

It forced hundreds of people from surrounding villages to run away as the army sent reinforcements to the area to guard the splinter faction's settlement, residents said.

"There has indeed been such an attack and the heavy exchange of gunfire was heard," deputy army chief of staff Major General Godefroid Niyuhire told IRIN on 25 October. There were, however, no casualties during the attack, he said.

The "dissidents" say they fought with Rwasa for the FNL, but Rwasa's supporters have denied their claims and accused the government of creating a faction within the FNL. Rwasa has said these men, who intend to join the country's peace process, are not even party to a 2006 ceasefire agreement signed between the government and the FNL."

**OCHA 23 June 2005:**
"Population displacement due to insecurity and armed conflict reduced markedly in the first months of the year [2005] and as compared to the period 2003-2004. Populations in the province of Bujumbura rural, where recurrent waves of displacement had taken place throughout 2004, are gradually resettling and returning to zones of origin and no sizeable population movements were registered in the first semester of the year."

**IRIN 4 January 2005:**
"Thousands of civilians have been displaced following fierce fighting on Saturday in Burundi's western province of Bujumbura Rural.

The internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not received aid, the governor of the province, Ignace Ntawembarira, said.

Fighting was reported in the communes of Isale, Nyabiraba and Kanyosha, east of the capital, Bujumbura, between the rebel faction Forces nationales de libération (FNL) of Agathon Rwasa, and a coalition of the Burundian army and troops loyal to Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the former largest rebel faction in the country, the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces de defense pour la democratie (CNDD-FDD)."

**UNSC 27 October 2006:**
"In the period under review [August 2005-September 2006], the security situation was characterized by renewed clashes between FDN and FNL, mainly in the north-western provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural. The populations of these provinces have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL. In 2006, 107 cases of attacks and looting by FNL were reported."

**Fighting between government and FLN troops causes the displacement of thousands in Bubanza Province (2008)**

- FNL - the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government – caused displacement at the end of 2007

**IRIN 14 January 2008:**
“About 1,400 families (8,400 people) displaced in Musigati commune in the northwestern province of Bubanza, following fighting between government forces and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), desperately need help, according to local officials.

Laurent Kagamba, adviser to the Musigati administrator, said that since the simultaneous attacks on three military positions on 28 December [2007] and another on 9 January [2008] in the same commune, residents had fled their homes. Some sought refuge in Musigati parish, others at Musigati and Kabere trade centres, as well as Busiga coffee factory, he said.”

IRIN 10 September 2007:
“Residents of 700 households, or about 4,000 people, have fled their homes in the northwest Burundi province of Bubanza following raids by suspected members of the country's last active rebel group, a government official said.

'For the time being, security is not good at all. Some residents have been beaten, while others have had their property looted,' the governor of Bubanza, Pascal Nyabenda, told IRIN.'

He said Forces nationales de libération (FNL) fighters had raided homes in Bubanza from their hideouts in the nearby Kibira and Rukoko forests. Those displaced were spending the nights in the compound of a local parish, venturing out for a few hours during the day to work in their fields, Nyabenda said.”

For information on displacement by fighting between government and FNL troops in Bubanza Province in previous years, see:
ITEKA, 9 August 2006, Burundi: Des perennes armées et des combattants du Palipehutu_Fnl mènent des attaues répétées dans certaines communes de Bubanza
ITEKA, 24 August 2005, Burundi: Des déplacés de guerre en commune Musigati sans assistance [Link below]
IRIN, 14 June 2005, Burundi: Thousands displaced in Bubanza [Link below]

Some of the Burundian refugees expelled from Tanzania have no house or land (2006)

UN 30 November 2006:
Over 3,000 Burundians who had found refuge in Tanzania were forced to return in 2006: “Many new arrivals report others being forced to leave and the 3,000 who have come back so far, only seem to be the tip of the iceberg. Nobody knows for sure how many Burundians live in Tanzania without having regularized their stay, but most estimate around 150,000 persons. This will remain a key challenge in 2007, especially since the new arrivals need assistance and in particular so-called sans addresses like Elias, who hopes that “the Burundian Government can find us a plot of land where I can build a house and send my children to school.”"

NRC November 2006:
“Since June 2006, Tanzania has been implementing a national plan for the repatriation of refugees from Tanzania. In this framework, persons without refugee status or any other legal status in Tanzania have been forcibly removed from Tanzania. This year, more than 4000 Burundians have been expelled from Tanzania, mainly from Ngara district towards Muyinga province.”

See also:
UNHCR, 23 Oct 2006, Growing numbers of Burundians return home from the DRC [Internet]
Other causes of displacement

Tens of thousands were displaced due to floods (2007)

- Since November 2006, close to 300,000 people were affected by the heavy floods

IRIN 9 February 2007:

Les pluies diluviennes qui tombent depuis novembre 2006 ont détruit les cultures et infrastructures de plusieurs régions, obligeant le gouvernement à mettre en place un fonds de solidarité pour venir en aide aux déplacés victimes des inondations dans les provinces de Muyinga, Kirundo, Cankuzo, Karuzi, Kayanza, Ngozi et Muyinga. »

IRIN 15 January 2007:
"Thousands of people in northwestern Burundi, displaced after days of heavy rainfall, urgently need relief aid, officials said on Monday.

"The rains have rendered more than 3,000 residents homeless," said Prosper Banzambe, the chief of Gatumba Zone, one of the affected areas in Mitumbuzi Commune, Bujumbura Rural Province.

He said the displaced, some of whom had sought shelter in a local church, needed food and other non-food aid such as blankets, jerry cans, soap and mosquito nets.

The rains, which pounded the area at the weekend, destroyed at least 500 homes. The flooding of the nearby River Kiziba contributed to the houses’ collapse.

Banzambe expressed concern that the continuing rains could cause more damage in Gatumba and appealed for a temporary shelter for the displaced.

He urged humanitarian organisations to help the displaced, saying the local administration was unable to "adequately meet their needs".[…]

On 4 January [2007], the government set up a national solidarity fund to support people affected by floods in seven provinces. In a decree, President Pierre Nkurunziza declared the provinces of Kayanza in the north, Muramvya and Karuzi in the central part of the country, Ruyigi in the east, and Bubanza and Cibitoke in the northwest, as "hunger-stricken following floods".

He also announced the establishment of the solidarity fund, to which every Burundian must contribute for four months from the end of January."

AFP 16 January 2007:
"Heavy rains pounding Burundi's capital and outlying areas have killed at least four people and left about 23,000 homeless since the downpours began last month, officials said Tuesday."
They said the situation was “catastrophic” after the floods destroyed farmlands, sparking fears of food shortages and disease outbreaks in the tiny central African nation emerging from more than a decade of civil strife.”

Famine in north and east causes internal displacement (2005-2006)

- Many of the people who flee due to food insecurity are newly repatriated refugees

OCHA 16 January 2005:
“[R]esidents of Northern provinces continue to flee inside and outside Burundi due to food insecurity. As of 14 January [2005], a joint visit conducted by OCHA Ruyigi sub office and the provincial administration authorities confirmed the presence in Kabuyenge IDP site, in Gisuru Commune, of 63 families who fled Busoni and Bugabira communes (Kirundo Province) in search of food. OCHA, in collaboration with the administration authorities convened a meeting with humanitarian actors in the province to discuss an emergency response.”

OCHA 23 June 2005:
“Cycles of drought periods, loss of staple crops, poor yields during three consecutive agriculture seasons and fragile nutritional conditions were particularly important in the northern Burundian provinces, which were also affected by waves of population movements both internal and across the border into Rwanda.”

OCHA 5 March 2005:
“Despite food aid distributed by WFP and partners, the food security situation remains disconcerting mainly in Northern and Eastern provinces. Continuous internal and cross-border displacement of the population continues to be part of the coping strategies. Around 7,900 Burundian asylum seekers were reported in Tanzania. Meanwhile, 131 internally displaced persons were registered in Cankuzo coming from Kirundo. However, many more internal movements remain unrecorded.”

ITEKA 21 February 2006:
“La plupart de ces migrants sont de nouveaux rapatriés qui n'ont pas eu où s'installer. Ils sont en train de migrer à la quête de quoi manger. Malheureusement, la population de la province de Cankuzo a également faim et ne peut pas les aider. Les prix des vivres montent chaque jour.”
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Conflict and displacement: background and development

Ethnic background and pre-colonial times

- Total population: 7.1 million
- Composite population comprising Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%) and Batwa (1%)(colonial census)
- Numerous interrelations between the ethnic groups (marriage, language, common monarchy)
- The Batwa are most likely the most ancient ethnic group in Burundi but they are marginalized in Burundi society

AFP 25 February 2005:
“GEOGRAPHY: Landlocked in central Africa, bounded by Rwanda in the north, Tanzania to the east and south, and the vast Democratic Republic of Congo to the west. One of the smallest states on the African continent, Burundi covers 27,834 square kilometers (10,747 square miles).

- POPULATION: 7.1 million, of which around 85 percent are Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi. The remaining one percent of the population are pygmies called Twas. One of the most densely populated African countries.
- CAPITAL: Bujumbura (population 300,000)
- LANGUAGES: Kirundi (national), French (administrative), Swahili (local)
- RELIGION: Christian (70 percent); Animist (15 percent); Muslim (15 percent).”

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 15-17:
"Burundi is situated in Central Africa, along Lake Tanganyika and shares borders with Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. [...] According to statistics dating back to the 1930s, 85 per cent of the population are Hutu, 14 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Batwa. The Hutu are considered to originate from Chad and the Niger, while the Tutsi, of Nilo-ethiopian origin, are thought to come from eastern Africa. The Batwa originate from the Congo Basin (Pygmies). This breakdown does not take into account the Ganwa (those of princely origin), nor a handful of other immigrant communities, nor those of mixed origins (mixed marriages having been common in the past). [...] It also does not take into account the fact that within both groups there existed historically rankings of status nor that passage from one group to another, for instance becoming Tutsi from Hutu or Ganwa, was also possible. The Burundians all speak the same language, Kirundi, which is both the national and the official language. Other languages, as provided for in the Constitution, are also spoken. [...] Despite ethnic differences, the Burundians live intermingled on the thousands of hills of the country without distinction on account of ethnicity. They are therefore inextricably bound to one another and cannot contemplate any notions of separation.

Although settlements have always been mixed, society in Burundi [...] was built along a ‘class’ and ‘caste’ system. [...] While their distinctions were not rigidly determined along ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ lines, [...] there was significant correlation between class and ethnicity, with the Tutsis associated with the upper class and the Hutus with the lower class. This did not mean that all Tutsis were
upper class nor all Hutus lower class. Both class and the ethnic correlations were also dynamic. A Hutu could rise economically and socially and become a 'Tutsi'.

Hutu and Tutsi relationships were in the past cemented by their shared loyalty to common institutions. Kingship was such an institution; patron-client ties constituted another powerful socio-political institution. Patrons were expected to offer protection and gifts in exchange for services and offerings in kind. As social and political roles that once gave meaning and cohesion to membership in the community vanished, the use of the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' with ethnic connotations became more rigid. [...] Today the use of the term 'Hutu' describes an ethnic group which is poorer and powerless, whereas the Tutsi, especially the Hima (a Tutsi subgroup), are the pre-eminent power holders. [...] Nevertheless, the impression should not be created that the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' are figments as the "official truth" during the Bagaza period (1976-1987) would have it. This stance restricted discussion on the underlying problems of ethnicity and expression of ethnic differences without solving them."

CHR 19 March 2001, para. 100:
"La situation de la minorité twa mérite une attention particulière que malheureusement elle ne reçoit pas toujours. Les Twas sont sans doute le noyau le plus ancien de la population burundaise, comme dans d'autres pays des Grands Lacs; ils constituent aujourd'hui environ 1 % de la population."

Colonial rule and military regimes (1899-1992)

- 1962: Burundi becomes independent
- 25 years of a Tutsi dominated military dictatorship
- The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power
- 1980: creation of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu) by activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community in refugee camps in Tanzania

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 19-24:
"The transition from traditional power structures to 'modern' politics has by no means been an easy one. Two Ganwa (princely) dynasties continued fighting for control during the era of the colonial Powers, (first Germany from 1889 to 1918, then Belgium until 1962) as they had done during the pre-colonial era. The Party of Unity and National Progress (Uprona) was dominated by the Ganwa Bezi, while the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was led by the Ganwa Batare. In the legislative elections of September 1961 Uprona won, with Prince Rwagasoré as Prime Minister designate. A month later, however, Rwagasoré was assassinated. The political game switched from Ganwa to Hutu and Tutsi hands for the first time.

Burundi gained its independence from Belgium in July 1962. Until 1966 the crown continued to stabilize the situation. Violent incidents erupted after the elections in 1966, following which the Prime Minister, Michel Micombero, a Tutsi of the Hima group from Bururi, [...] overthrew the monarchy and declared a republic, concentrating power in the army. The National Assembly was dissolved and later replaced with a committee of officers, which, by 1971, was made up of 24 Tutsi and 3 Hutu, and Uprona was declared the sole party. Serious intra-Tutsi rivalries for power emerged. At this time Hutu were already being systematically purged from the army. The transition from a Ganwa-run kingdom to a Tutsi-dominated military dictatorship to the exclusion of Hutus caused more violence. For the next 25 years Tutsi factions fought over control, turning the Hutu into scapegoats whenever the Hutu would rise up and demand more equitable power-
sharing. On the other hand, whenever efforts towards power-sharing were made, extremists from both groups would resort to violence, to delay or cancel them.

Massacres had taken place in 1965 and 1967, but the most serious ones took place in 1972 triggered by Hutu militants from the Burundian refugee community in Tanzania. Hundreds if not thousands of Tutsi were killed and there is widespread fear that what had happened to Rwanda's Tutsi, namely, systematic subjection and extermination, would happen to them too. The Tutsi retaliation and repression that followed were instant. The first victims were Hutu with education: secondary school and university students, teachers, nurses, doctors, priests, pastors, drivers, headmasters, businessmen, shopkeepers, civil servants, bank clergers, professors. Most Hutu families lost members. Hutu widows moved to the city outskirts when their houses were seized by Tutsi. Many Tutsis also fled. Many left the interior, where they felt frightened among Hutu neighbours, and moved to Bujumbura to fill the many jobs now vacant. Others rushed to occupy the flat, fertile, palm-oil-producing strip of lake shore south of Bujumbura, after the flight of very many Hutu who had been living there. Reports have spoken of genocidal acts and of hundreds of thousands of Hutus killed. […]

These events had great reverberations in Burundi; yet, nothing was ever done about the massacres. There has never been an official inquiry into them, an accounting, or any effort to bring to justice those responsible for the killings. Thereafter there was no question of Hutu entering the army, and many refused to send their children to school, fearing they were exposing them to a future massacre. Those at school had no role models. The educated, competent, urbane were all Tutsi. That there was a "lost" Hutu generation is still evident today in the political life of the country.

There was little power-sharing following the massacres, even after Micombero was overthrown by his deputy chief of staff, Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, also a Hima (Tutsi subgroup). There were no massacres during Bagaza's 11-year rule and many refugees returned home. Bagaza reportedly hoped development would push his country through the ethnic deadlock. Observers note that he engaged in a series of reforms, without, however, addressing the ethnic issue. […] All provincial governors were Tutsi and most judges, university and school teachers, magistrates and heads of hospitals were Tutsi too. Uprona remained a Tutsi party and its members were the ones to benefit mostly from Bagaza's management of the economy. In the last years of the Bagaza regime corruption and nepotism reportedly flourished. […] In the meantime, in 1980 activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community formed the Palipehutu, or the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People, in refugee camps in Tanzania. Bagaza was himself deposed in 1987 by a group of army officers and a cousin of his and nephew of Micombero, Major Pierre Buyoya, became President.

In August 1988 frustrated Hutu hopes for an improvement were at the root of hundreds of ethnic killings. Thousands were killed. This time the regions most affected were Ntega commune in Kirundo province and Marangara commune in Ngozi province, both bordering Rwanda. Palipehutu members from Rwanda had been infiltrating into Burundi and sporadic fights were taking place until Hutus turned against the Tutsi community, many of them Rwandan refugees. The army pursued those assumed responsible (although it is unclear how much resistance these people who had no guns put up against the soldiers) […] and in the next eight days it reportedly killed large numbers of civilians, including women and children. More than 60,000 people poured into Rwanda across the swamps and the Akanyaru river. Others took refuge within Burundi in swamp areas. The massacres were surprising even to the Burundians. Hutu had to face the fact that the army was still prepared to use maximum force and Tutsi that Hutu could still massacre many Tutsi before soldiers reached the scene."

ACTS 30 September 2004:
“Despite the popular conception of the conflict as a Hutu-Tutsi struggle, most scholars agree that the protracted conflict is structural in nature, though articulated in ethnic terms. The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power.’ Governance practices by successive regimes galvanized political power and state control in the hands of a small elite group within the Tutsi community from particular parts of the country, who have since sustained their hold on power through repressive policies. Efforts by the Tutsi elite to retain political control and associated patronage networks, and violent counter-strategies of the Hutu political and armed groups have precipitated ethnic massacres and retaliatory radicalism marked by acts of genocide.”

**Civil war and Peace Process in Burundi (1993-2008)**

- 1993: Assassination of elected President Ndadaye triggers large-scale inter-ethnic violence
- 1996: Coup installs President Buyoya; sanctions imposed by neighbouring countries
- Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi signed in August 2000
- 2005: signing of ceasefire agreement between FNL and government; adoption of new constitution
- Local, legislative and presidential elections was held in various phases in 2005
- Security sector was profoundly restructured and the army is now ethnically balanced (2006)
- Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and FRODEBU – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence (2006)
- As of April 2008: the FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement

**AFP 1 June 2005, factfile:**

“The civil war begun in 1993 has killed an estimated 300,000 people.[…]

Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu president, elected in June 1993, was assassinated on October 21 of the same year during a failed coup organized by Tutsi military officers.

His successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira -- another Hutu -- was killed in April 1994 at the same time as then Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana died under suspicious circumstances when his plane was shot down over Kigali, sparking the genocide of up to a million Tutsis and Hutu moderates in Rwanda.

Ntaryamira's successor, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, also a Hutu, was overthrown in a non-violent coup in July 1996, and [Pierre “ Buyoya returned to power.

In 1998, Buyoya reformed the constitution to create a transition government and began peace talks with Hutu and Tutsi opposition groups.

In August 2000 a peace agreement including a power-sharing deal was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, but the two main armed rebel groups refused to participate in the talks. Civil war continued to rage.

In November 2001, Buyoya took over as transitional leader for a period of 18 months, seconded by a Hutu vice-president whose signature is required on all presidential texts pertaining to security and the armed forces.
A 26-member power-sharing government was also sworn in to oversee the three-year transition. Buyoya was succeeded at the head of the transition government in May 2003 by his vice president Domitien Ndayizeye, who is seconded by a Tutsi, Alphonse Marie Kadage.

A ceasefire agreement was signed in December 2002 by the government and the main Hutu rebel movement, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), which finally entered government in November 2003.

A second Hutu armed group, the National Liberation Forces (FNL), finally signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on May 15, but the details of how this be implemented have still not yet been resolved.

A new constitution was adopted at the end of February, aimed at bringing about a peaceful democracy and ending the reign of the Tutsie tribe in power. Opposition has been voiced only by Tutsis concerned at losing too much power.”

HRW 4 November 2005:
“Elections in 2005 were the final chapter in the transitional process established by the Arusha Accords of 2000. In the intervening period a government including the Hutu-dominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu), the Tutsi-dominated National Unity and Progress Party (Uprona), and a number of smaller parties ruled the country. In late 2003 this government signed the Pretoria Protocol making peace with the CNDDFDD and starting the process of integrating the former rebels into the army and the administration.”

For more detailed information on 1993 events, see “Profile in displacement” (Report of the Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, 28 November 1994), paras. 29-36) [External link]

ICG 30 November 2006:
“In elections held between June and August 2005, the voters of Burundi elected their first democratic government since 1993. This marked an end to the transitional government established by the Arusha Agreement in 2001. The mainly Hutu former rebels of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), led by Pierre Nkurunziza, won a resounding victory and hold 58 per cent of the seats in parliament and 57 per cent in the communal councils, as well as twelve of the twenty government ministries. Nkurunziza was inaugurated as president on 26 August 2005.

The elections radically reconfigured politics. Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence. In the run-up to the elections, rebel forces were integrated into the national army, police and intelligence service. For the first time in Burundian history, these forces were ethnically balanced. Nkurunziza’s government faced considerable challenges. Foremost was the process of transforming the CNDDFDD from a rebel movement into a democratic political party in power – one whose members had little civil administration experience. The government had to reconstruct an economy devastated by more than a decade of civil war and economic embargo, during which per capita income fell by 35 per cent and the number of people living below the poverty line doubled. During its first year it also had to deal with security problems in the capital and surrounding provinces caused by the remaining rebel group, the Palipehuti-FNL. Unfortunately, the government’s response to these challenges has increasingly manifested itself in disregard for the rule of law.”

UNSC 28 November 2007:
The signing of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the armed group Palipehutu-Forces nationales de libération (FNL) led by Agathon Rwasa on 7 September 2006 was a decisive step in the peace process in Burundi. However, its implementation remains difficult owing to persisting disagreements among the parties. The Agreement, which was the outcome of determined efforts of regional States united under the auspices of the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, addresses a number of issues including the integration of FNL ex-combatants into the Burundian National Defence Forces (FDN) and security forces, the participation of FNL elements in the institutions of the country and the rapid demobilization and reintegration of children associated with this armed group into their respective families and communities. Under the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism was established to oversee the demobilization of FNL combatants.

The signing of the Agreement was followed at first by a significant improvement in the security situation, characterized notably by a decrease both in the number of abuses perpetrated by armed groups and in the number of alleged FNL militants arrested by the National Defence Forces and the National Police of Burundi.

PBC, 19 March 2008:
"[T]he Palipehutu-FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. In response, a Political Directorate had been established to assist the Mechanism in efforts to regain FNL's participation."

IRIN, 14 January 2008:
"The FNL, the last rebel movement still active in Burundi, has resumed fighting government forces, especially in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza, where it is most active.

Though the movement signed a ceasefire accord with the government in September 2006, it has not been fully implemented. The joint verification and monitoring mechanism, which oversees its implementation, suspended activities in July 2007 after the FNL delegates walked out of talks over security concerns. They have since been accusing the facilitator, South African safety minister Charles Nqakula, of bias."

ISS 3 April 2008:
"After intense diplomatic pressure from regional governments and the international community Burundi’s last rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL, has been brought back to the negotiating table that drew up a new roadmap designed to end the standoff by the end of June 2008. This breakthrough was reached in a February 23 meeting in Cape Town, South Africa. The meeting was attended by special envoys to Burundi from Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa, as well as representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.

The Cape Town meeting had been called to save the Burundi peace process after the FNL withdrew from its implementation, alleging bias on the part of the facilitator, South Africa’s Security Minister Charles Nqakula. To help address this challenge Minister Nqakula has followed the example of other peace processes by establishing a Group of Special Envoys for Burundi (GSEB), representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations."

Delrue August 2006:
"The success of Burundi’s transition to peace hinges on how its new government (elected in August 2005 and headed by former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza) and the international community deal with such post- displacement issues as land and property claims, reconciliation and transitional justice.
The link between displacement, return, reconciliation and successful transition towards a consolidated peace is frequently either underestimated or neglected by the international community."

For a comprehensive analysis of the political situation in Burundi, see

HRW, 12 March 2008:
“Several opposition politicians have been threatened and targeted for violence during the last 18 months. Nzomukunda, then second vice-president of the republic, fled Burundi in September 2006 after issuing a letter critical of the government; she returned in March 2007. Five parliamentarians from the opposition party Front for Democracy in Burundi (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi, Frodebu) and from a dissident wing of the CNDD-FDD, including Mpawenayo, were targeted in a set of grenade attacks in August 2007 that injured several bystanders. Pancrace Cimpaye, Frodebu spokesperson, was detained after suggesting the ruling party bore responsibility for the August attacks; after being released, he briefly left the country. In February 2008, a local Frodebu official was killed, while another was seriously injured in a grenade attack which killed his wife and child.”

See also:
IRIN, BURUNDI: Government of consensus formed, 15 November 2007 [Internet]
ICG, 28 August 2007, Burundi: Finalising peace with the FNL [Internet]


Secretary-General welcomes signing of Burundi ceasefire agreement, United Nations Secretary General, 8 September 2006 [Internet]

Progress in regard to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (2005-2008)

- Reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression
- About 5,000 UN peacekeepers were in Burundi from June 2004 to the end of 2006, to monitor the country's transition to democracy, with South Africa contributing the majority of troops.
- The new Burundian government saw the peacekeepers as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible (2006)
- A new UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) continued the process of peace consolidation and of coordinating the UN system’s activities in Burundi from 2007

ISS 13 October 2006:
"In Burundi, reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, signed in August 2000 by 17 political parties, the National
Assembly and the government and the 2003 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Burundi and the principal rebel group, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), do include important provisions on the organization, structure, mandates and composition of postconflict security forces that will act professionally and apolitically, adhere to human rights norms, and provide defence and security to all Burundians.[…]

Although the Arusha Accords were signed in August 2000, the implementation of the security sector reform process they articulate was largely delayed until 2003, mainly because of continued warfare throughout most of Burundi. Indeed, the most active rebel movements in the field were marginalized throughout the Arusha negotiations and were thus not signatories to the Accord. Accordingly, it was not until the signing of a ceasefire between the government and the main rebel group – the CNDD-FDD – in 2003 that the reform process was set in motion. By July 2006, however, the reform of the defence and security forces had reached an advanced stage and had achieved most of its structural objectives (i.e. the integration of several armed groups into a single military and single police force), despite various financial- and material-related challenges.

The process of integrating the former rebel groups and the FAB into a new national defence force, the Forces de Défense Nationale (FDN), has been completed – largely to the satisfaction of the government and international donors – despite its late start due to disagreements on the definition of combatant and on the harmonization of rank between the rebel movements and the regular army.[…]

Despite this progress, a preliminary assessment of the reform of the FDN and the PNB and progress in the domain of social and economic reintegration and re-insertion of former combatants suggests that serious challenges remain in these critical areas. The local media frequently report human rights violations perpetrated by on-duty military or police or by demobilized combatants.

Tufts University 30 July 2006:
“The new Burundian government saw ONUB as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible. This perception was aggravated by two unfortunate choices made by leaders of the UN mission: to support Frodebu and former President Ndayizeye during the electoral campaign and proposing to coordinate the transition from humanitarian aid to development through a “Partners Council” deliberating without the government.”

UNSC 18 December 2006:
“Meanwhile, as delays in the start of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants have continued, criminal activities against the population, reportedly committed by FNL combatants, have increased since late October. Skirmishes between the national security forces and alleged FNL combatants and detentions of FNL elements and supporters have reportedly resumed in the north-western provinces. FNL recruitment, including of youths, has also been reported, particularly in Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural provinces.[…]

Once deployed, the AU special task force would therefore be expected to assume the responsibilities that were allocated to ONUB under the ceasefire agreement, namely: (a) protection of designated assembly areas for FNL combatants; (b) provision of engineering, logistical and administrative support for the establishment of the assembly areas; (c) disarmament of combatants; (d) storage of weapons collected from the disarmament process and their subsequent destruction; (e) transportation of disarmed FNL combatants from assembly areas to the designated demobilization centre or integration facilities of the National Defence Forces; and (f) protection of the demobilization centres. […]
Further delays in the agreement’s implementation, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegrations of FNL combatants, are likely to lead to more friction between these combatants and the population and the national security services. In addition, there was an increase in localized conflicts involving the small FNL faction led by Jean Bosco Sindayigaya, which did not sign the ceasefire agreement.

DPKO 20 December 2006:
“A new United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), authorized by Security Council resolution 1719 earlier this year, will continue the process of peace consolidation and be in charge of coordinating the United Nations system’s activities in Burundi for an initial period of one year.”

The mandate of BINUB is extended until 31 December 2008 (UNSC, 19 December 2007).

See also:
Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 31 Aug 2006
A technical analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - a case study from Burundi [Internet]


- Peace Building Commission approved in December 2007 a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation

UNSC 18 December 2006, para.22:
“Significant progress has been made in the establishment of peacebuilding coordination mechanisms between the Government and the United Nations. On 7 November, the Government created an Inter-Ministerial Peacebuilding Steering Committee, which will work with the United Nations, within the framework of an initial joint mechanism, in preparing the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission and the peacebuilding priority plan to be submitted to the Peacebuilding Fund. The inaugural meeting of the Government-United Nations joint mechanism was held on 16 November [2006], followed by several sessions at the policy and working levels. As a result, a common understanding was reached on the steps to be taken by the Government, with United Nations support, to secure resources from the Peacebuilding Fund. Progress was also made in developing the Government’s presentation to the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission. The mission of the Peacebuilding Support Office to Burundi in mid-November [2006] and the meetings it had with the United Nations and the Government’s Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee contributed significantly to this process.”

UNGA 5 December 2007:
“With a long-awaited conflict-recovery and development strategy for Burundi now in place, the Peacebuilding Commission today approved a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation -- both locally and in New York -- in priority areas
such as justice and security sector reform, generating jobs and making radical improvements to governance.

Meeting in its special “Burundi Configuration”, the Commission adopted the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism (MTM) of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. That Framework -- in place since June -- is the country-led integrated peacebuilding strategy now guiding the engagement and dialogue between Bujumbura, the United Nations and other international partners.

The Framework identified key objectives, major challenges and threats to peace, especially the implementation of a stagnant ceasefire agreement between Burundi and the National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL). Promoting inclusive growth, employment, transparency and human rights were among its other top priorities.”

See also:
Brookings Institution, 13 March 2008, The Role of Civil Society in Ending Displacement and Peacebuilding, by Elizabeth Ferris [Internet]

United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI), 12 Dec 2006 [Link below]

Peacebuilding Commission holds day-long discussion on Burundi, agrees on fund’s use to bolster government’s priority plan [Internet]

Challenges facing Burundi, requiring international help, indicated at country-specific meetings of Peacebuilding Commission [Internet]

Burundi government signs Nairobi pact including protocol on IDPs (December 2006)

MONUC 18 December 2006:
"With the signing of the Nairobi pact this Friday December 15 2006 by DRC, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, it paves the way for security, stability and development in the region, after years of conflict.

Many African state leaders, including DRC president Joseph Kabila were in Nairobi Kenya for the two day summit that will go a long way to bringing the region out of the vicious cycle of humanitarian disaster, poverty, and repeated conflict.[…]

The Great Lakes pact includes a $225 million security action plan to disarm rebel groups in Eastern DRC, and along border areas in Sudan, Kenya and Uganda.[…]

Ms. Besida Tonwe, the Head of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in Central and East Africa, said that the conference was a long process of consultations in helping the Great Lakes Region to reconcile, rehabilitate, and reconstruct their societies in a politically delicate process.

'It is also a process which in the future will continue to require financial support from the donor community and coherent assistance from the humanitarian community. It is now of utmost importance that there is a follow-up on the national implementation of the legal protocols adopted with the pact,' she said.
"The three protocols on humanitarian and social issues addressing sexual violence against women and children, property rights of returning persons, and the protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), are of the utmost importance," she concluded.

**IDMC 14 December 2006:**

"The Pact is a culmination of more than four years of regional negotiations among States. It contains a package of measures which promises to enhance the lives of the forcibly displaced, including a regional protocol on protection and assistance for internally displaced, which when signed, will be the first legally binding regional instrument specifically dealing with IDPs anywhere in the world. A regional protocol on property rights of returning populations, and protocols which address some of the root causes of flight in the Great Lakes are also key elements of the Pact."

**Arusha Accords: Challenges of implementing Protocol IV (2005)**

- Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development

**ISS 27 May 2005:**

"Aside from calling for a cessation to violent conflict, the Arusha Accords [Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 28 August 2000]. provide comprehensive recommendations for stabilising and rehabilitating a highly polarised Burundian nation. The agreement is composed of five protocols each dedicated to a particular theme intended to move the process from peace-making to peace-building. These themes consist of an outline of the nature of the conflict; democracy and good governance; peace and security; reconstruction and development; and guarantees on the implementation of the agreement.

Importantly, the accords acknowledge that the Burundian ‘conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions… and stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power.’

Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development. It is therefore the ‘litmus test’ against which the performance of the transitional government (and other actors) as it relates to Arusha’s recommendations can be assessed.

**Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Refugees and Sinistrés**

The main conclusion and recommendations of Protocol IV states that:

"Through the Burundi Peace Negotiations at Arusha it has been possible to assess how seriously the political and ethnic crisis that has torn Burundi apart since independence has affected Burundian society. Hundreds of thousands of Burundians are refugees, some of them for more than 25 years.

Hundreds of thousands more are forced to live in camps where conditions are appalling…. All Burundians are aware that a lasting peace is impossible so long as a definitive solution is not found to the problem of refugees and sinistrés. Likewise, peace is impossible so long as the country’s wealth is not shared equitably. Burundi cannot help the sinistrés rebuild destroyed property and restore its economy without the assistance of the international community."

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The UN concluded that there was a strong indication that the FLN had not acted alone in the massacre of Congolese refugees (2004-2005)

- One year of after the Gatumba massacre, those responsible remain free

IRIN 5 Jan 2005:
“The FNL claimed responsibility for a massacre in August of 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees at Gatumba transit camp on the Burundian side of the border with the DRC. The UN is continuing to investigate whether armed groups on the DRC side of the border, which are aligned to FNL, also took part.”

UNSC 15 November 2004:
“As requested by the Security Council by its presidential statement of 15 August 2004 (S/PRST/2004/30), ONUB, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights conducted a joint investigation into the massacre on 13 August of 152 Congolese refugees at the Gatumba refugee camp, located close to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The results of the investigation were transmitted to the Council by my letter to the President of the Council dated 15 October (S/2004/821). Despite extensive investigation, there is no clear evidence of who organized, carried out and financed that gross atrocity. The FNL (Rwasa) claim of responsibility has been supported by witness statements and led United Nations investigators to believe that the group did, indeed, participate in the attack. There is however, a strong indication that FNL (Rwasa) did not act alone. Unfortunately, the dearth of verifiable information and limited cooperation by the Burundian authorities hampered the formulation of a definitive report. A national investigation is still ongoing.”

AI 18 August 2005:
“On the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre, which took place in August 2004, Amnesty International calls on the forthcoming government of Burundi and the international community to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.

‘The new government should undertake to set up an independent and impartial body to investigate this and other massacres and those found to be responsible should be held to account,’ Amnesty International said today.

During the night of 13 August 2004, the refugee camp of Gatumba, located near the Congolese border, was attacked by an armed group. More than 160 Congolese refugees, predominantly children and women members of the Banyamulenge ethnic group from South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (DRC), were deliberately and systematically killed. On 14 August, the Palipehutu-FNL (Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu -- Forces nationales de libération) claimed responsibility for the killings. The same day, the governments of Burundi and Rwanda and delegates of the Banyamulenge communities accused Congolese and Rwandese armed political groups based in the DRC of involvement in the massacre. According to UN investigators, evidence of the presence of ‘other groups’ was credible, but they were not able to categorically identify them.

Human rights organizations and the United Nations have strongly condemned this massacre and called for an independent, impartial and comprehensive investigation. Given the alleged involvement of armed political groups based in the DRC, there was concern that the killing could lead to a military intervention in the DRC by Burundi and Rwanda. Such an intervention could have led to further human rights abuses in the DRC.
Since then, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Burundian authorities have moved a few refugees to the Mwaro province, farther away from the border, others have returned to the DRC, while many others have moved to Bujumbura. So far, despite the indication from the Burundian Minister of Justice that the national investigation into the Gatumba massacre was completed, the United Nations Operations in Burundi stressed in a recent statement that, ‘no investigation report has been issued by the government [of Burundi] and the authors of the attack remain free’.”

See also United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 13 Aug 2005
Burundi: Statement on the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre [Internet]

Causes of displacement


United Nations Resident Coordinator System for Burundi 1998, p. 5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronology of Population Movements</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>An estimated 200,000 Burundians flee from progroms and communal violence; many seek refuge in Tanzania, where most remain to this day.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>To escape the violence that broke out following the assassination of President Ndadaye, nearly 200,000 people leave the hills to seek protection in sites grouped around military posts. A vast majority are still there.</td>
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<td>1994-1996</td>
<td>The escalation of the civil conflict sparks massive population movements; the northwestern province of Cibitoke, sandwiched between the rebel bases in the mountainous Kibira forest and in neighboring Kivu, is particularly unstable. Large numbers seek refuge in neighboring Zaire (150,000) and Tanzania (250,000). Up to 400,000 congregate in sites inside the country.</td>
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<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>In the wake of the conquest of Zaire by the Kabila-led alliance, most of the refugees in Kivu return to Burundi, where they swell the numbers living in the displaced camps on the north-western provinces, particularly Cibitoke.</td>
</tr>
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<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>As a military strategy to regain control of rebel-held territory, the authorities forcibly regroup 250,000 civilians in Karuzi, Kanyanza and Muramvya provinces. Nearly all of them return home by the end of 1997, but the policy of controlled population movements continues to be implemented in other, more short-term forms elsewhere in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>Following the loss of their bases in the Kivu, the rebels regroup in Tanzania, and the main theatre of operations shifts to the southwest, along the ridge of the Nile-Congo watershed that is the main conduit into and out of the country for guerrilla groups. The ensuing destabilization leads to large scale displacement to new sites, again mainly along the main tarmac roads of the western plain, not only</td>
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in Makamba and Bururi provinces but also as far as north as Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>As the military gradually established control in certain areas, the authorities begin to dismantle the big sites near main roads or major towns and create smaller, decentralized sites grouped around advanced military positions in the hills (Cibitoke, parts of Bururi, Bubanza). Elsewhere, short-term regroupment operations continue to be implemented in response to localized destabilization (Bujumbura Rural).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Nearly all the sites in Cibitoke province, for so long the most unstable part of the country, are dismantled by June and the people return to their hills. At almost the same time, the crisis in neighboring Congo produces an influx of some eleven thousand people, which continues up to present.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Causes of internal displacement: an analysis by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (1998)

- Pervasive psychology of "flee or be killed" is a lasting legacy of the 1972 massacres and the 1993 upheavals
- Displacement has also been used as a deliberate goal of violence since 1993
- Massive retaliation by the armed forces
- Suspicion towards the displaced population creates more displacement
- Use of violence and displacement as a way to achieve political or economical objectives

USCR 1998a, pp. 32-33:

"A history of massacres has taught the people of Burundi, regardless of their ethnicity, that their personal survival hinges on their ability to flee and seek a safer place temporarily. For many peasant Burundians, the lesson of the past is that violence can erupt suddenly and can rapidly become all-encompassing. It is a lesson handed down from generation to generation. Some of the underlying causes of internal displacement in Burundi follow:

First, a pervasive psychology of 'flee or be killed' has become the lasting legacy of the 1972 slaughter and the 1993 upheaval. The 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda has reinforced the psychology of flight in Burundi.

Second, the smaller massacres that have occurred almost daily since 1994 serve to validate the historical lessons of fear and mistrust. Fear is also ingrained that large number of Burundians have learned to flee their homes not only in reaction to danger but also in anticipation of it.

Third, much of Burundi's displacement since 1993 has been caused by "ethnic cleansing." Displacement is no longer merely as accidental by-product of violence; it has become a deliberate goal of violence.

Fourth, both ethnic groups of Burundi regard themselves as vulnerable. The sense of vulnerability has become an important part of the self-identity. Hutu are demographically dominant but see themselves as vulnerable to the political and military power of Tutsi. Tutsi are politically and militarily powerful but view themselves as vulnerable to the demographic dominance of Hutu. Members of both ethnic groups regard themselves as victims, despite the fact that many massacres in Burundian history have been largely one-sided.

Fifth, a pattern is evident in many violent eruptions over the decades: regardless of how violence begins, there is almost always massive retaliation against the Hutu by the Tutsi-dominated
military. As a result, many Hutu instinctively flee at the mere sight of soldiers or at the distant sound of their vehicles. The country's forces of order, unfortunately, create new disorder and displacement – deliberately in some cases, inadvertently in others.

Sixth, population displacement in Burundi often exacerbates rather than alleviates the conflict. Uprooted Burundians of one ethnic group are often regarded as dangerous by members of the other ethnic group. The military suspects that many internally displaced Hutu are rebels. Many Hutu suspect that camps of displaced Tutsi are bases for militia activity. There is some truth to these mutual suspicions. The result is that displacement at times begets more violence, causing still more people to flee. In short – at least in Burundi – displacement causes more displacement.

These are only partial explanations of the population displacement in Burundi, of course. This review of Burundi's history indicates that some actors create violence and displacement as a way to achieve political control by force that they are unable to achieve or maintain through nonviolent means. Some elements in Burundi create violence and displacement for the economic rewards it brings them through banditry, confiscation of property, and skimming of relief aid. Still other Burundians commits violence and force displacement based on pure fear or hate, reinforced by decades of grievances, real or imagined."


- 1996: government policy to move civilian populations into "regroupment" camps
- 1997: end of the large-scale, long-term "regroupment" policy
- 1998: short-term forced movement of populations continues, particularly in unstable western provinces
- Since September 1999, over 350,000 people were forcibly moved by government forces to 53 regroupment camps to deprive insurgent groups of local support
- Government explained that regroupment camps were established to protect civilians from the rebels
- Dismantlement of regroupment camps was precondition to peace negotiations and camps were dismantled by mid-2000

**USCR 2000 "regroupment"**

"Burundian authorities have pursued two waves of forced population relocation, or regroupment. The first regroupment wave occurred during 1996-98 when the government moved at least a quarter-million Hutu into 50 camps scattered throughout the country. Some observers estimated that up to 800,000 persons lived in the regroupment camps at that time. Most regroupment sites closed during 1998, allowing occupants to return home."

**HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":**


"In July and August 1999, the rebels launched increasingly frequent and damaging raids in and around Bujumbura, killing dozens of civilians as well as some soldiers. The army retaliated with attacks that killed more than one hundred civilians as well as combatants and the government tightened an existing curfew. These measures failed to satisfy Tutsi extremists in Bujumbura who demanded more drastic action to protect the city and to repress the rebellion. With rumors circulating of a possible coup and of violence being organized by extremists, the government decided to impose a policy of regroupment on most of Bujumbura-rural, particularly on areas inhabited largely by Hutu and near the city."

**HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":**
“In mid-1999, it [the government] had revived the regroupment policy in parts of southeastern Burundi before deciding to extend it to the area of the capital in September.”

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"The Tutsi-dominated government of Burundi, combating rebellions among the Hutu majority, began forcing civilians in the area around the capital into so-called "protection sites" or "regroupment camps" beginning in late September 1999. Burundian authorities claimed the measure was intended to protect the civilians, most of them Hutu, from attack by the rebel National Liberation Forces (Forces Nationales pour la Libération, FNL) who were becoming increasingly well-entrenched in the area. In fact, they meant to deprive the FNL of support from local people who helped them, sometimes willingly, sometimes under duress. By removing civilian support, the authorities hoped to isolate the FNL and thus reduce its increasingly frequent attacks on the capital. They hoped also to quiet Tutsi extremists who accused them of weakness in confronting the rebel threat."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"By the end of 1999, authorities had obliged some 80 percent of the population of the province of Bujumbura-rural-some 350,000 people-to live in fifty-three camps. Although regroupment helped reduce attacks on the capital city, rebels remained firmly established in rural areas. They simply shifted from one place to another when attacked by the army, which had insufficient troops available to control the whole region at the same time. Rebels continued to live off the crops of local people and even to inhabit the houses of those forced to live in the camps.

USCR 2000, "Regroupment":
"The country included at least three types of internal displacement: up to 200,000 people, primarily rural Tutsi, who have lived for six years in designated camps protected by government soldiers and thousands, who have become displaced in the countryside or at makeshift sites for varying lengths of time; and nearly 350,000 Hutu whom the government required to live in so-called 'regroupment' camps."


USCR 2000, "Regroupment":
"Government authorities argued that the camps were a temporary measure to protect civilians from attack and deprive rebel groups of food and lodging in rural areas. Burundian officials urged international humanitarian organizations to provide food, water, sanitation, and medical care to the sites. Burundian President Pierre Buyoya visited several sites in October [1999] and stated that conditions there were better than portrayed by aid agencies. The regroupment camps were 'no dramatic situation,’ he assured."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"The international community severely criticized the policy of regroupment. In January 2000, the Burundian government promised to begin closing the camps but it made little progress in doing so until early June. At that time, rebel leaders made closing the camps a precondition for peace negotiations and former South African President Nelson Mandela, facilitator for the negotiations, condemned the regroupment sites as 'concentration camps.' Under this pressure, President Pierre Buyoya agreed that everyone in the camps would be allowed to return home by the end of July."

*For an analysis on how forced displacement in 2000 of 350,000 civilians was carried out in violation of international law, including the Un Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, see HRW June 2000 "Violation of international law & Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" [link below]*
Fighting between FNL and army displaced thousands in Bujumbura Rural (2004-2008)

- Combatants of FNL fought so called FNL “dissidents”, causing displacement in October 2007
- FNL is the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government
- Population displacement reduced in 2005 compared to 2003-2004
- Little population displacement in 2006, but the populations of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural, have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL

IRIN 23 April 2008:
“...The resumption of violence in and around Bujumbura is causing panic in the country. Outside the capital, residents spend their nights in the bush for fear of being attacked, as the death toll rose to 33.
A bomb destroyed part of the Vatican embassy compound and a dining hall in the Kiriri University campus on 22 April [2008].

"...We call on the army to remove its heavy arms from our campus," a student said, reacting to the installation of rocket launchers aimed at rebuffing attacks by the rebel FNL.
On 18 April, attacks were launched on military positions in Gihosha, Kanyosha, Kamenge and Musaga areas."

NRC, May 2008:
In April 2008 serious violations of the 6 September 2006 ceasefire between the Burundian Army (FDN) and the rebel group Palipehutu-FNL (FNL) occurred. The most reported events took place in the capital city, Bujumbura, where three attacks took place on April 17, 18 and 22. Violence sprung in several provinces around the country (Bujumbura Rurale, Bubanza, Cibitoke and Kayanza), but Bujumbura Rurale province has been the most affected province, witnessing displacements of population. [...]

At the peak of displacement it was reported that there were:
- 4,050 households displaced in Isale commune or 20,100 people out of 83,000 inhabitants concentrated mostly in 6 sites in the centre of the commune, Rushubi on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 5,102 households displaced in Muyira and Kirombwe, both at Kanyosha commune on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 4,305 households displaced in Kabezi centre in three different sites on May 7 (data Kabezi local administration).
- 3,166 households displaced in Gitaza centre and 1,100 in Rutongo, both at Muhuta commune (data Muhuta local administration).
- And fewer numbers of IDPs registered in Bugarama, Mutambu and Nyabiraba communes (several hundreds of households)."

IRIN, 25 October 2007:
“...Fighters of Burundi’s last active rebel group have for the second time in one week attacked a position occupied by a break-away faction, forcing villagers to flee their homes, a senior military official said.
The evening raid by combatants of the Front National de Liberation (FNL), led by Agathon Rwasa, took place on 24 October [2007] evening on a site where the so-called FNL "dissidents" have gathered in Gakungwe village of Kabezi commune in Bujumbura Rural province.

It forced hundreds of people from surrounding villages to run away as the army sent reinforcements to the area to guard the splinter faction's settlement, residents said.

"There has indeed been such an attack and the heavy exchange of gunfire was heard," deputy army chief of staff Major General Godefroid Niyuhire told IRIN on 25 October. There were, however, no casualties during the attack, he said.

The "dissidents" say they fought with Rwasa for the FNL, but Rwasa's supporters have denied their claims and accused the government of creating a faction within the FNL. Rwasa has said these men, who intend to join the country's peace process, are not even party to a 2006 ceasefire agreement signed between the government and the FNL.

OCHA 23 June 2005:
"Population displacement due to insecurity and armed conflict reduced markedly in the first months of the year [2005] and as compared to the period 2003-2004. Populations in the province of Bujumbura rural, where recurrent waves of displacement had taken place throughout 2004, are gradually resettling and returning to zones of origin and no sizeable population movements were registered in the first semester of the year."

IRIN 4 January 2005:
"Thousands of civilians have been displaced following fierce fighting on Saturday in Burundi's western province of Bujumbura Rural. The internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not received aid, the governor of the province, Ignace Ntawembarira, said.

Fighting was reported in the communes of Isale, Nyabiraba and Kanyosha, east of the capital, Bujumbura, between the rebel faction Forces nationales de libération (FNL) of Agathon Rwasa, and a coalition of the Burundian army and troops loyal to Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the former largest rebel faction in the country, the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces de defense pour la democratie (CNDD-FDD)."

UNSC 27 October 2006:
"In the period under review [August 2005-September 2006], the security situation was characterized by renewed clashes between FDN and FNL, mainly in the north-western provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural. The populations of these provinces have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL. In 2006, 107 cases of attacks and looting by FNL were reported."

Fighting between government and FLN troops causes the displacement of thousands in Bubanza Province (2008)

- FNL - the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government – caused displacement at the end of 2007

IRIN 14 January 2008:
“About 1,400 families (8,400 people) displaced in Musigati commune in the northwestern province of Bubanza, following fighting between government forces and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), desperately need help, according to local officials.

Laurent Kagamba, adviser to the Musigati administrator, said that since the simultaneous attacks on three military positions on 28 December [2007] and another on 9 January [2008] in the same commune, residents had fled their homes. Some sought refuge in Musigati parish, others at Musigati and Kabere trade centres, as well as Busiga coffee factory, he said.”

IRIN 10 September 2007:
“Residents of 700 households, or about 4,000 people, have fled their homes in the northwest Burundi province of Bubanza following raids by suspected members of the country's last active rebel group, a government official said.

‘For the time being, security is not good at all. Some residents have been beaten, while others have had their property looted,’ the governor of Bubanza, Pascal Nyabenda, told IRIN.'

He said Forces nationales de libération (FNL) fighters had raided homes in Bubanza from their hideouts in the nearby Kibira and Rukoko forests. Those displaced were spending the nights in the compound of a local parish, venturing out for a few hours during the day to work in their fields, Nyabenda said.”

For information on displacement by fighting between government and FNL troops in Bubanza Province in previous years, see:
ITEKA, 9 August 2006, Burundi: Des personnes armées et des combattants du Palipehutu_Fnl mènent des attaues répétées dans certaines communes de Bubanza
ITEKA, 24 August 2005, Burundi: Des déplacés de guerre en commune Musigati sans assistance [Link below]
IRIN, 14 June 2005, Burundi: Thousands displaced in Bubanza [Link below]

Some of the Burundian refugees expelled from Tanzania have no house or land (2006)

UN 30 November 2006:
Over 3,000 Burundians who had found refuge in Tanzania were forced to return in 2006: “Many new arrivals report others being forced to leave and the 3,000 who have come back so far, only seem to be the tip of the iceberg. Nobody knows for sure how many Burundians live in Tanzania without having regularized their stay, but most estimate around 150,000 persons. This will remain a key challenge in 2007, especially since the new arrivals need assistance and in particular so-called sans addresses like Elias, who hopes that “the Burundian Government can find us a plot of land where I can build a house and send my children to school.”"

NRC November 2006:
“Since June 2006, Tanzania has been implementing a national plan for the repatriation of refugees from Tanzania. In this framework, persons without refugee status or any other legal status in Tanzania have been forcibly removed from Tanzania. This year, more than 4000 Burundians have been expelled from Tanzania, mainly from Ngara district towards Muyinga province.”

See also:
UNHCR, 23 Oct 2006, Growing numbers of Burundians return home from the DRC [Internet]
Other causes of displacement

Tens of thousands were displaced due to floods (2007)

- Since November 2006, close to 300,000 people were affected by the heavy floods

IRIN 9 February 2007:

Les pluies diluviennes qui tombent depuis novembre 2006 ont détruit les cultures et infrastructures de plusieurs régions, obligeant le gouvernement à mettre en place un fonds de solidarité pour venir en aide aux déplacés victimes des inondations dans les provinces de Muyinga, Kirundo, Cankuzo, Karuzi, Kayanza, Ngozi et Muyinga. »

IRIN 15 January 2007:
"Thousands of people in northwestern Burundi, displaced after days of heavy rainfall, urgently need relief aid, officials said on Monday.

"The rains have rendered more than 3,000 residents homeless," said Prosper Banzambe, the chief of Gatumba Zone, one of the affected areas in Mitumbuzi Commune, Bujumbura Rural Province.

He said the displaced, some of whom had sought shelter in a local church, needed food and other non-food aid such as blankets, jerry cans, soap and mosquito nets.

The rains, which pounded the area at the weekend, destroyed at least 500 homes. The flooding of the nearby River Kiziba contributed to the houses’ collapse.

Banzambe expressed concern that the continuing rains could cause more damage in Gatumba and appealed for a temporary shelter for the displaced.

He urged humanitarian organisations to help the displaced, saying the local administration was unable to “adequately meet their needs”.[…]

On 4 January [2007], the government set up a national solidarity fund to support people affected by floods in seven provinces. In a decree, President Pierre Nkurunziza declared the provinces of Kayanza in the north, Muramvya and Karuzi in the central part of the country, Ruyigi in the east, and Bubanza and Cibitoke in the northwest, as "hunger-stricken following floods”.

He also announced the establishment of the solidarity fund, to which every Burundian must contribute for four months from the end of January.”

AFP 16 January 2007:
“Heavy rains pounding Burundi’s capital and outlying areas have killed at least four people and left about 23,000 homeless since the downpours began last month, officials said Tuesday."
They said the situation was "catastrophic" after the floods destroyed farmlands, sparking fears of food shortages and disease outbreaks in the tiny central African nation emerging from more than a decade of civil strife.

**Famine in north and east causes internal displacement (2005-2006)**

- Many of the people who flee due to food insecurity are newly repatriated refugees

**OCHA 16 January 2005:**

"[R]esidents of Northern provinces continue to flee inside and outside Burundi due to food insecurity. As of 14 January [2005], a joint visit conducted by OCHA Ruyigi sub office and the provincial administration authorities confirmed the presence in Kabuyenge IDP site, in Gisuru Commune, of 63 families who fled Busoni and Bugabira communes (Kirundo Province) in search of food. OCHA, in collaboration with the administration authorities convened a meeting with humanitarian actors in the province to discuss an emergency response."

**OCHA 23 June 2005:**

"Cycles of drought periods, loss of staple crops, poor yields during three consecutive agriculture seasons and fragile nutritional conditions were particularly important in the northern Burundian provinces, which were also affected by waves of population movements both internal and across the border into Rwanda."

**OCHA 5 March 2005:**

"Despite food aid distributed by WFP and partners, the food security situation remains disconcerting mainly in Northern and Eastern provinces. Continuous internal and cross-border displacement of the population continues to be part of the coping strategies. Around 7,900 Burundian asylum seekers were reported in Tanzania. Meanwhile, 131 internally displaced persons were registered in Cankuzo coming from Kirundo. However, many more internal movements remain unrecorded."

**ITEKA 21 February 2006:**

"La plupart de ces migrants sont de nouveaux rapatriés qui n'ont pas eu où s'installer. Ils sont en train de migrer à la quête de quoi manger. Malheureusement, la population de la province de Cankuzo a également faim et ne peut pas les aider. Les prix des vivres montent chaque jour."
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Conflict and displacement: background and development

Ethnic background and pre-colonial times

- Total population: 7.1 million
- Composite population comprising Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%) and Batwa (1%)(colonial census)
- Numerous interrelations between the ethnic groups (marriage, language, common monarchy)
- The Batwa are most likely the most ancient ethnic group in Burundi but they are marginalized in Burundi society

AFP 25 February 2005:
"GEOGRAPHY: Landlocked in central Africa, bounded by Rwanda in the north, Tanzania to the east and south, and the vast Democratic Republic of Congo to the west. One of the smallest states on the African continent, Burundi covers 27,834 square kilometers (10,747 square miles).

- POPULATION: 7.1 million, of which around 85 percent are Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi. The remaining one percent of the population are pygmies called Twas. One of the most densely populated African countries.

- CAPITAL: Bujumbura (population 300,000)

- LANGUAGES: Kirundi (national), French (administrative), Swahili (local)

- RELIGION: Christian (70 percent); Animist (15 percent); Muslim (15 percent)."

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 15-17:
"Burundi is situated in Central Africa, along Lake Tanganyika and shares borders with Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. [...] According to statistics dating back to the 1930s, 85 per cent of the population are Hutu, 14 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Batwa. The Hutu are considered to originate from Chad and the Niger, while the Tutsi, of Nilo-ethiopian origin, are thought to come from eastern Africa. The Batwa originate from the Congo Basin (Pygmies). This breakdown does not take into account the Ganwa (those of princely origin), nor a handful of other immigrant communities, nor those of mixed origins (mixed marriages having been common in the past). [...] It also does not take into account the fact that within both groups there existed historically rankings of status nor that passage from one group to another, for instance becoming Tutsi from Hutu or Ganwa, was also possible. The Burundians all speak the same language, Kirundi, which is both the national and the official language. Other languages, as provided for in the Constitution, are also spoken. [...] Despite ethnic differences, the Burundians live intermingled on the thousands of hills of the country without distinction on account of ethnicity. They are therefore inextricably bound to one another and cannot contemplate any notions of separation.

Although settlements have always been mixed, society in Burundi [...] was built along a 'class' and 'caste' system. [...] While their distinctions were not rigidly determined along 'ethnic' or 'tribal' lines, [...] there was significant correlation between class and ethnicity, with the Tutsis associated with the upper class and the Hutus with the lower class. This did not mean that all Tutsis were
upper class nor all Hutus lower class. Both class and the ethnic correlations were also dynamic. A Hutu could rise economically and socially and become a 'Tutsi'.

Hutu and Tutsi relationships were in the past cemented by their shared loyalty to common institutions. Kingship was such an institution; patron-client ties constituted another powerful socio-political institution. Patrons were expected to offer protection and gifts in exchange for services and offerings in kind. As social and political roles that once gave meaning and cohesion to membership in the community vanished, the use of the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' with ethnic connotations became more rigid. [...] Today the use of the term 'Hutu' describes an ethnic group which is poorer and powerless, whereas the Tutsi, especially the Hima (a Tutsi subgroup), are the pre-eminent power holders. [...] Nevertheless, the impression should not be created that the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' are figments as the "official truth" during the Bagaza period (1976-1987) would have it. This stance restricted discussion on the underlying problems of ethnicity and expression of ethnic differences without solving them."

CHR 19 March 2001, para. 100:
"La situation de la minorité twa mérite une attention particulière que malheureusement elle ne reçoit pas toujours. Les Twas sont sans doute le noyau le plus ancien de la population burundaise, comme dans d'autres pays des Grands Lacs; ils constituent aujourd'hui environ 1 % de la population."

Colonial rule and military regimes (1899-1992)
- 1962: Burundi becomes independent
- 25 years of a Tutsi dominated military dictatorship
- The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power
- 1980: creation of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu) by activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community in refugee camps in Tanzania

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 19-24:
"The transition from traditional power structures to 'modern' politics has by no means been an easy one. Two Ganwa (princely) dynasties continued fighting for control during the era of the colonial Powers, (first Germany from 1889 to 1918, then Belgium until 1962) as they had done during the pre-colonial era. The Party of Unity and National Progress (Uprona) was dominated by the Ganwa Bezi, while the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was led by the Ganwa Batare. In the legislative elections of September 1961 Uprona won, with Prince Rwagasoré as Prime Minister designate. A month later, however, Rwagasoré was assassinated. The political game switched from Ganwa to Hutu and Tutsi hands for the first time.

Burundi gained its independence from Belgium in July 1962. Until 1966 the crown continued to stabilize the situation. Violent incidents erupted after the elections in 1966, following which the Prime Minister, Michel Micombero, a Tutsi of the Hima group from Bururi, [...] overthrew the monarchy and declared a republic, concentrating power in the army. The National Assembly was dissolved and later replaced with a committee of officers, which, by 1971, was made up of 24 Tutsi and 3 Hutu, and Uprona was declared the sole party. Serious intra-Tutsi rivalries for power emerged. At this time Hutu were already being systematically purged from the army. The transition from a Ganwa-run kingdom to a Tutsi-dominated military dictatorship to the exclusion of Hutus caused more violence. For the next 25 years Tutsi factions fought over control, turning the Hutu into scapegoats whenever the Hutu would rise up and demand more equitable power-
sharing. On the other hand, whenever efforts towards power-sharing were made, extremists from both groups would resort to violence, to delay or cancel them.

Massacres had taken place in 1965 and 1967, but the most serious ones took place in 1972 triggered by Hutu militants from the Burundian refugee community in Tanzania. Hundreds if not thousands of Tutsi were killed and there is widespread fear that what had happened to Rwanda’s Tutsi, namely, systematic subjection and extermination, would happen to them too. The Tutsi retaliation and repression that followed were instant. The first victims were Hutus with education: secondary school and university students, teachers, nurses, doctors, priests, pastors, drivers, headmasters, businessmen, shopkeepers, civil servants, bank clerks, professors. Most Hutu families lost members. Hutu widows moved to the city outskirts when their houses were seized by Tutsi. Many Tutsis also fled. Many left the interior, where they felt frightened among Hutu neighbours, and moved to Bujumbura to fill the many jobs now vacant. Others rushed to occupy the flat, fertile, palm-oil-producing strip of lake shore south of Bujumbura, after the flight of very many Hutu who had been living there. Reports have spoken of genocidal acts and of hundreds of thousands of Hutus killed. […]

These events had great reverberations in Burundi; yet, nothing was ever done about the massacres. There has never been an official inquiry into them, an accounting, or any effort to bring to justice those responsible for the killings. Thereafter there was no question of Hutus entering the army, and many refused to send their children to school, fearing they were exposing them to a future massacre. Those at school had no role models. The educated, competent, urbane were all Tutsi. That there was a "lost" Hutu generation is still evident today in the political life of the country.

There was little power-sharing following the massacres, even after Micombero was overthrown by his deputy chief of staff, Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, also a Hima (Tutsi subgroup). There were no massacres during Bagaza’s 11-year rule and many refugees returned home. Bagaza reportedly hoped development would push his country through the ethnic deadlock. Observers note that he engaged in a series of reforms, without, however, addressing the ethnic issue. […] All provincial governors were Tutsi and most judges, university and school teachers, magistrates and heads of hospitals were Tutsi too. Uprona remained a Tutsi party and its members were the ones to benefit mostly from Bagaza’s management of the economy. In the last years of the Bagaza regime corruption and nepotism reportedly flourished. […] In the meantime, in 1980 activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community formed the Palipehutu, or the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People, in refugee camps in Tanzania. Bagaza was himself deposed in 1987 by a group of army officers and a cousin of his and nephew of Micombero, Major Pierre Buyoya, became President.

In August 1988 frustrated Hutu hopes for an improvement were at the root of hundreds of ethnic killings. Thousands were killed. This time the regions most affected were Ntega commune in Kirundo province and Marangara commune in Ngozi province, both bordering Rwanda. Palipehutu members from Rwanda had been infiltrating into Burundi and sporadic fights were taking place until Hutus turned against the Tutsi community, many of them Rwandan refugees. The army pursued those assumed responsible (although it is unclear how much resistance these people who had no guns put up against the soldiers) […] and in the next eight days it reportedly killed large numbers of civilians, including women and children. More than 60,000 people poured into Rwanda across the swamps and the Akanyaru river. Others took refuge within Burundi in swamp areas. The massacres were surprising even to the Burundians. Hutu had to face the fact that the army was still prepared to use maximum force and Tutsi that Hutu could still massacre many Tutsi before soldiers reached the scene."
“Despite the popular conception of the conflict as a Hutu-Tutsi struggle, most scholars agree that the protracted conflict is structural in nature, though articulated in ethnic terms. The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power.’ Governance practices by successive regimes galvanized political power and state control in the hands of a small elite group within the Tutsi community from particular parts of the country, who have since sustained their hold on power through repressive policies. Efforts by the Tutsi elite to retain political control and associated patronage networks, and violent counter-strategies of the Hutu political and armed groups have precipitated ethnic massacres and retaliatory radicalism marked by acts of genocide.”

Civil war and Peace Process in Burundi (1993-2008)

- 1993: Assassination of elected President Ndadaye triggers large-scale inter-ethnic violence
- 1996: Coup installs President Buyoya; sanctions imposed by neighbouring countries
- Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi signed in August 2000
- 2005: signing of ceasefire agreement between FNL and government; adoption of new constitution
- Local, legislative and presidential elections was held in various phases in 2005
- Security sector was profoundly restructured and the army is now ethnically balanced (2006)
- Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and FRODEBU – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence (2006)
- As of April 2008: the FNL had withdrawn

AFP 1 June 2005, factfile:
“The civil war begun in 1993 has killed an estimated 300,000 people.[…] Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu president, elected in June 1993, was assassinated on October 21 of the same year during a failed coup organized by Tutsi military officers.

His successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira -- another Hutu -- was killed in April 1994 at the same time as then Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana died under suspicious circumstances when his plane was shot down over Kigali, sparking the genocide of up to a million Tutsis and Hutu moderates in Rwanda. Ntaryamira's successor, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, also a Hutu, was overthrown in a non-violent coup in July 1996, and [Pierre " Buyoya returned to power. In 1998, Buyoya reformed the constitution to create a transition government and began peace talks with Hutu and Tutsi opposition groups.

In August 2000 a peace agreement including a power-sharing deal was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, but the two main armed rebel groups refused to participate in the talks. Civil war continued to rage.

In November 2001, Buyoya took over as transitional leader for a period of 18 months, seconded by a Hutu vice-president whose signature is required on all presidential texts pertaining to security and the armed forces.
A 26-member power-sharing government was also sworn in to oversee the three-year transition. Buyoya was succeeded at the head of the transition government in May 2003 by his vice president Domitien Ndayizeye, who is seconded by a Tutsi, Alphonse Marie Kadage.

A ceasefire agreement was signed in December 2002 by the government and the main Hutu rebel movement, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), which finally entered government in November 2003.

A second Hutu armed group, the National Liberation Forces (FNL), finally signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on May 15, but the details of how this be implemented have still not yet been resolved.

A new constitution was adopted at the end of February, aimed at bringing about a peaceful democracy and ending the reign of the Tutsie tribe in power. Opposition has been voiced only by Tutsis concerned at losing too much power."

**HRW 4 November 2005:**

"Elections in 2005 were the final chapter in the transitional process established by the Arusha Accords of 2000. In the intervening period a government including the Hutudominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu), the Tutsi-dominated National Unity and Progress Party (Uprona), and a number of smaller parties ruled the country. In late 2003 this government signed the Pretoria Protocol making peace with the CNDDFDD and starting the process of integrating the former rebels into the army and the administration."

*For more detailed information on 1993 events, see "Profile in displacement" (Report of the Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, 28 November 1994), paras. 29-36) [External link]*

**ICG 30 November 2006:**

"In elections held between June and August 2005, the voters of Burundi elected their first democratic government since 1993. This marked an end to the transitional government established by the Arusha Agreement in 2001. The mainly Hutu former rebels of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), led by Pierre Nkurunziza, won a resounding victory and hold 58 per cent of the seats in parliament and 57 per cent in the communal councils, as well as twelve of the twenty government ministries. Nkurunziza was inaugurated as president on 26 August 2005.

The elections radically reconfigured politics. Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence. In the run-up to the elections, rebel forces were integrated into the national army, police and intelligence service. For the first time in Burundian history, these forces were ethnically balanced. Nkurunziza’s government faced considerable challenges. Foremost was the process of transforming the CNDDFDD from a rebel movement into a democratic political party in power – one whose members had little civil administration experience. The government had to reconstruct an economy devastated by more than a decade of civil war and economic embargo, during which per capita income fell by 35 per cent and the number of people living below the poverty line doubled. During its first year it also had to deal with security problems in the capital and surrounding provinces caused by the remaining rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL. Unfortunately, the government’s response to these challenges has increasingly manifested itself in disregard for the rule of law."

**UNSC 28 November 2007:**
The signing of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the armed group Palipehutu-Forces nationales de libération (FNL) led by Agathon Rwasa on 7 September 2006 was a decisive step in the peace process in Burundi. However, its implementation remains difficult owing to persisting disagreements among the parties. The Agreement, which was the outcome of determined efforts of regional States united under the auspices of the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, addresses a number of issues including the integration of FNL ex-combatants into the Burundian National Defence Forces (FDN) and security forces, the participation of FNL elements in the institutions of the country and the rapid demobilization and reintegration of children associated with this armed group into their respective families and communities. Under the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism was established to oversee the demobilization of FNL combatants.

The signing of the Agreement was followed at first by a significant improvement in the security situation, characterized notably by a decrease both in the number of abuses perpetrated by armed groups and in the number of alleged FNL militants arrested by the National Defence Forces and the National Police of Burundi.

PBC, 19 March 2008:
“[T]he Palipehutu-FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. In response, a Political Directorate had been established to assist the Mechanism in efforts to regain FNL's participation.”

IRIN, 14 January 2008:
“The FNL, the last rebel movement still active in Burundi, has resumed fighting government forces, especially in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza, where it is most active.

Though the movement signed a ceasefire accord with the government in September 2006, it has not been fully implemented. The joint verification and monitoring mechanism, which oversees its implementation, suspended activities in July 2007 after the FNL delegates walked out of talks over security concerns. They have since been accusing the facilitator, South African safety minister Charles Nqakula, of bias.”

ISS 3 April 2008:
“After intense diplomatic pressure from regional governments and the international community Burundi’s last rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL, has been brought back to the negotiating table that drew up a new roadmap designed to end the standoff by the end of June 2008. This breakthrough was reached in a February 23 meeting in Cape Town, South Africa. The meeting was attended by special envoys to Burundi from Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa, as well as representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.

The Cape Town meeting had been called to save the Burundi peace process after the FNL withdrew from its implementation, alleging bias on the part of the facilitator, South Africa’s Security Minister Charles Nqakula. To help address this challenge Minister Nqakula has followed the example of other peace processes by establishing a Group of Special Envoys for Burundi (GSEB), representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.”

Delrue August 2006:
“The success of Burundi’s transition to peace hinges on how its new government (elected in August 2005 and headed by former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza) and the international community deal with such post- displacement issues as land and property claims, reconciliation and transitional justice.
The link between displacement, return, reconciliation and successful transition towards a consolidated peace is frequently either underestimated or neglected by the international community."

For a comprehensive analysis of the political situation in Burundi, see

HRW, 12 March 2008:
"Several opposition politicians have been threatened and targeted for violence during the last 18 months. Njomukunda, then second vice-president of the republic, fled Burundi in September 2006 after issuing a letter critical of the government; she returned in March 2007. Five parliamentarians from the opposition party Front for Democracy in Burundi (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi, Frodebu) and from a dissident wing of the CNDD-FDD, including Mpawenayo, were targeted in a set of grenade attacks in August 2007 that injured several bystanders. Pancrace Cimpaye, Frodebu spokesperson, was detained after suggesting the ruling party bore responsibility for the August attacks; after being released, he briefly left the country. In February 2008, a local Frodebu official was killed, while another was seriously injured in a grenade attack which killed his wife and child."

See also:
IRIN, BURUNDI: Government of consensus formed, 15 November 2007 [Internet]

ICG, 28 August 2007, Burundi: Finalising peace with the FNL [Internet]


Secretary-General welcomes signing of Burundi ceasefire agreement, United Nations Secretary General, 8 September 2006 [Internet]

Progress in regard to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (2005-2008)

- Reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression
- About 5,000 UN peacekeepers were in Burundi from June 2004 to the end of 2006, to monitor the country's transition to democracy, with South Africa contributing the majority of troops.
- The new Burundian government saw the peacekeepers as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible (2006)
- A new UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) continued the process of peace consolidation and of coordinating the UN system’s activities in Burundi from 2007

ISS 13 October 2006:
"In Burundi, reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, signed in August 2000 by 17 political parties, the National
Assembly and the government and the 2003 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Burundi and the principal rebel group, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), do include important provisions on the organization, structure, mandates and composition of postconflict security forces that will act professionally and apolitically, adhere to human rights norms, and provide defence and security to all Burundians.[…]

Although the Arusha Accords were signed in August 2000, the implementation of the security sector reform process they articulate was largely delayed until 2003, mainly because of continued warfare throughout most of Burundi. Indeed, the most active rebel movements in the field were marginalized throughout the Arusha negotiations and were thus not signatories to the Accord. Accordingly, it was not until the signing of a ceasefire between the government and the main rebel group – the CNDD-FDD – in 2003 that the reform process was set in motion. By July 2006, however, the reform of the defence and security forces had reached an advanced stage and had achieved most of its structural objectives (i.e. the integration of several armed groups into a single military and single police force), despite various financial- and material-related challenges.

The process of integrating the former rebel groups and the FAB into a new national defence force, the Forces de Défense Nationale (FDN), has been completed – largely to the satisfaction of the government and international donors – despite its late start due to disagreements on the definition of combatant and on the harmonization of rank between the rebel movements and the regular army.[…]

Despite this progress, a preliminary assessment of the reform of the FDN and the PNB and progress in the domain of social and economic reintegration and re-insertion of former combatants suggests that serious challenges remain in these critical areas. The local media frequently report human rights violations perpetrated by on-duty military or police or by demobilized combatants.”

Tufts University 30 July 2006:
“The new Burundian government saw ONUB as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible. This perception was aggravated by two unfortunate choices made by leaders of the UN mission: to support Frodebu and former President Ndayizeye during the electoral campaign and proposing to coordinate the transition from humanitarian aid to development through a “Partners Council” deliberating without the government.”

UNSC 18 December 2006:
“Meanwhile, as delays in the start of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants have continued, criminal activities against the population, reportedly committed by FNL combatants, have increased since late October. Skirmishes between the national security forces and alleged FNL combatants and detentions of FNL elements and supporters have reportedly resumed in the north-western provinces. FNL recruitment, including of youths, has also been reported, particularly in Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural provinces.[…]

Once deployed, the AU special task force would therefore be expected to assume the responsibilities that were allocated to ONUB under the ceasefire agreement, namely: (a) protection of designated assembly areas for FNL combatants; (b) provision of engineering, logistical and administrative support for the establishment of the assembly areas; (c) disarmament of combatants; (d) storage of weapons collected from the disarmament process and their subsequent destruction; (e) transportation of disarmed FNL combatants from assembly areas to the designated demobilization centre or integration facilities of the National Defence Forces; and (f) protection of the demobilization centres. […]
Further delays in the agreement’s implementation, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants, are likely to lead to more friction between these combatants and the population and the national security services. In addition, there was an increase in localized conflicts involving the small FNL faction led by Jean Bosco Sindayigaya, which did not sign the ceasefire agreement.”

DPKO 20 December 2006:
“A new United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), authorized by Security Council resolution 1719 earlier this year, will continue the process of peace consolidation and be in charge of coordinating the United Nations system’s activities in Burundi for an initial period of one year.”

The mandate of BINUB is extended until 31 December 2008 (UNSC, 19 December 2007).

See also:
Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 31 Aug 2006
A technical analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - a case study from Burundi [Internet]


- Peace Building Commission approved in December 2007 a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation

UNSC 18 December 2006, para.22:
“Significant progress has been made in the establishment of peacebuilding coordination mechanisms between the Government and the United Nations. On 7 November, the Government created an Inter-Ministerial Peacebuilding Steering Committee, which will work with the United Nations, within the framework of an initial joint mechanism, in preparing the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission and the peacebuilding priority plan to be submitted to the Peacebuilding Fund. The inaugural meeting of the Government-United Nations joint mechanism was held on 16 November [2006], followed by several sessions at the policy and working levels. As a result, a common understanding was reached on the steps to be taken by the Government, with United Nations support, to secure resources from the Peacebuilding Fund. Progress was also made in developing the Government’s presentation to the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission. The mission of the Peacebuilding Support Office to Burundi in mid-November [2006] and the meetings it had with the United Nations and the Government’s Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee contributed significantly to this process.”

UNGA 5 December 2007:
“With a long-awaited conflict-recovery and development strategy for Burundi now in place, the Peacebuilding Commission today approved a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation -- both locally and in New York -- in priority areas
such as justice and security sector reform, generating jobs and making radical improvements to governance.

Meeting in its special “Burundi Configuration”, the Commission adopted the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism (MTM) of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. That Framework – in place since June – is the country-led integrated peacebuilding strategy now guiding the engagement and dialogue between Bujumbura, the United Nations and other international partners.

The Framework identified key objectives, major challenges and threats to peace, especially the implementation of a stagnant ceasefire agreement between Burundi and the National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL). Promoting inclusive growth, employment, transparency and human rights were among its other top priorities.”

See also:
Brookings Institution, 13 March 2008, The Role of Civil Society in Ending Displacement and Peacebuilding, by Elizabeth Ferris [Internet]

United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI), 12 Dec 2006 [Link below]

Peacebuilding Commission holds day-long discussion on Burundi, agrees on fund’s use to bolster government’s priority plan [Internet]

Challenges facing Burundi, requiring international help, indicated at country-specific meetings of Peacebuilding Commission [Internet]

Burundi government signs Nairobi pact including protocol on IDPs (December 2006)

MONUC 18 December 2006:
“With the signing of the Nairobi pact this Friday December 15 2006 by DRC, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, it paves the way for security, stability and development in the region, after years of conflict.

Many African state leaders, including DRC president Joseph Kabila were in Nairobi Kenya for the two day summit that will go a long way to bringing the region out of the vicious cycle of humanitarian disaster, poverty, and repeated conflict.[…]

The Great Lakes pact includes a $225 million security action plan to disarm rebel groups in Eastern DRC, and along border areas in Sudan, Kenya and Uganda.[…]

Ms. Besida Tonwe, the Head of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in Central and East Africa, said that the conference was a long process of consultations in helping the Great Lakes Region to reconcile, rehabilitate, and reconstruct their societies in a politically delicate process.

‘It is also a process which in the future will continue to require financial support from the donor community and coherent assistance from the humanitarian community. It is now of utmost importance that there is a follow-up on the national implementation of the legal protocols adopted with the pact,’ she said.
‘The three protocols on humanitarian and social issues addressing sexual violence against women and children, property rights of returning persons, and the protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), are of the utmost importance,’ she concluded.”

IDMC 14 December 2006:
“The Pact is a culmination of more than four years of regional negotiations among States. It contains a package of measures which promises to enhance the lives of the forcibly displaced, including a regional protocol on protection and assistance for internally displaced, which when signed, will be the first legally binding regional instrument specifically dealing with IDPs anywhere in the world. A regional protocol on property rights of returning populations, and protocols which address some of the root causes of flight in the Great Lakes are also key elements of the Pact.”


- Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development

ISS 27 May 2005:
“Aside from calling for a cessation to violent conflict, the Arusha Accords [Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 28 August 2000]. provide comprehensive recommendations for stabilising and rehabilitating a highly polarised Burundian nation. The agreement is composed of five protocols each dedicated to a particular theme intended to move the process from peace-making to peace-building. These themes consist of an outline of the nature of the conflict; democracy and good governance; peace and security; reconstruction and development; and guarantees on the implementation of the agreement.

Importantly, the accords acknowledge that the Burundian ‘conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions… and stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power.’

Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development. It is therefore the ‘litmus test’ against which the performance of the transitional government (and other actors) as it relates to Arusha’s recommendations can be assessed.

Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Refugees and Sinistrés
The main conclusion and recommendations of Protocol IV states that:

‘Through the Burundi Peace Negotiations at Arusha it has been possible to assess how seriously the political and ethnic crisis that has torn Burundi apart since independence has affected Burundian society. Hundreds of thousands of Burundians are refugees, some of them for more than 25 years.

Hundreds of thousands more are forced to live in camps where conditions are appalling…. All Burundians are aware that a lasting peace is impossible so long as a definitive solution is not found to the problem of refugees and sinistrés. Likewise, peace is impossible so long as the country’s wealth is not shared equitably. Burundi cannot help the sinistrés rebuild destroyed property and restore its economy without the assistance of the international community.’”
The UN concluded that there was a strong indication that the FLN had not acted alone in the massacre of Congolese refugees (2004-2005)

- One year of after the Gatumba massacre, those responsible remain free

IRIN 5 Jan 2005:
“The FNL claimed responsibility for a massacre in August of 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees at Gatumba transit camp on the Burundi side of the border with the DRC. The UN is continuing to investigate whether armed groups on the DRC side of the border, which are aligned to FNL, also took part.”

UNSC 15 November 2004:
“As requested by the Security Council by its presidential statement of 15 August 2004 (S/PRST/2004/30), ONUB, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights conducted a joint investigation into the massacre on 13 August of 152 Congolese refugees at the Gatumba refugee camp, located close to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The results of the investigation were transmitted to the Council by my letter to the President of the Council dated 15 October (S/2004/821). Despite extensive investigation, there is no clear evidence of who organized, carried out and financed that gross atrocity. The FNL (Rwasa) claim of responsibility has been supported by witness statements and led United Nations investigators to believe that the group did, indeed, participate in the attack. There is however, a strong indication that FNL (Rwasa) did not act alone. Unfortunately, the dearth of verifiable information and limited cooperation by the Burundian authorities hampered the formulation of a definitive report. A national investigation is still ongoing.”

AI 18 August 2005:
“On the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre, which took place in August 2004, Amnesty International calls on the forthcoming government of Burundi and the international community to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.

‘The new government should undertake to set up an independent and impartial body to investigate this and other massacres and those found to be responsible should be held to account,’ Amnesty International said today.

During the night of 13 August 2004, the refugee camp of Gatumba, located near the Congolese border, was attacked by an armed group. More than 160 Congolese refugees, predominantly children and women members of the Banyamulenge ethnic group from South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (DRC), were deliberately and systematically killed. On 14 August, the Palipehutu-FNL (Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu -- Forces nationales de libération) claimed responsibility for the killings. The same day, the governments of Burundi and Rwanda and delegates of the Banyamulenge communities accused Congolese and Rwandese armed political groups based in the DRC of involvement in the massacre. According to UN investigators, evidence of the presence of ‘other groups’ was credible, but they were not able to categorically identify them.

Human rights organizations and the United Nations have strongly condemned this massacre and called for an independent, impartial and comprehensive investigation. Given the alleged involvement of armed political groups based in the DRC, there was concern that the killing could lead to a military intervention in the DRC by Burundi and Rwanda. Such an intervention could have led to further human rights abuses in the DRC.
Since then, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Burundian authorities have moved a few refugees to the Mwaro province, farther away from the border, others have returned to the DRC, while many others have moved to Bujumbura. So far, despite the indication from the Burundian Minister of Justice that the national investigation into the Gatumba massacre was completed, the United Nations Operations in Burundi stressed in a recent statement that, ‘no investigation report has been issued by the government [of Burundi] and the authors of the attack remain free’.

See also United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 13 Aug 2005
Burundi: Statement on the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre [Internet]

Causes of displacement


United Nations Resident Coordinator System for Burundi 1998, p. 5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronology of Population Movements</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>An estimated 200,000 Burundians flee from progroms and communal violence; many seek refuge in Tanzania, where most remain to this day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>To escape the violence that broke out following the assassination of President Ndadaye, nearly 200,000 people leave the hills to seek protection in sites grouped around military posts. A vast majority are still there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1996</td>
<td>The escalation of the civil conflict sparks massive population movements; the northwestern province of Cibitoke, sandwiched between the rebel bases in the mountainous Kibira forest and in neighboring Kivu, is particularly unstable. Large numbers seek refuge in neighboring Zaire (150,000) and Tanzania (250,000). Up to 400,000 congregate in sites inside the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>In the wake of the conquest of Zaire by the Kabila-led alliance, most of the refugees in Kivu return to Burundi, where they swell the numbers living in the displaced camps on the north-western provinces, particularly Cibitoke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>As a military strategy to regain control of rebel-held territory, the authorities forcibly regroup 250,000 civilians in Karuzi, Kanyanza and Muramvya provinces. Nearly all of them return home by the end of 1997, but the policy of controlled population movements continues to be implemented in other, more short-term forms elsewhere in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>Following the loss of their bases in the Kivu, the rebels regroup in Tanzania, and the main theatre of operations shifts to the southwest, along the ridge of the Nile-Congo watershed that is the main conduit into and out of the country for guerrilla groups. The ensuing destabilization leads to large scale displacement to new sites, again mainly along the main tarmac roads of the western plain, not only...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in Makamba and Bururi provinces but also as far as north as Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza.

1997-1998

As the military gradually established control in certain areas, the authorities begin to dismantle the big sites near main roads or major towns and create smaller, decentralized sites grouped around advanced military positions in the hills (Cibitoke, parts of Bururi, Bubanza). Elsewhere, short-term regroupment operations continue to be implemented in response to localized destabilization (Bujumbura Rural)

1998

Nearly all the sites in Cibitoke province, for so long the most unstable part of the country, are dismantled by June and the people return to their hills. At almost the same time, the crisis in neighboring Congo produces an influx of some eleven thousand people, which continues up to present.

Causes of internal displacement: an analysis by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (1998)

- Pervasive psychology of "flee or be killed" is a lasting legacy of the 1972 massacres and the 1993 upheavals
- Displacement has also been used as a deliberate goal of violence since 1993
- Massive retaliation by the armed forces
- Suspicion towards the displaced population creates more displacement
- Use of violence and displacement as a way to achieve political or economical objectives

USCR 1998a, pp. 32-33:
"A history of massacres has taught the people of Burundi, regardless of their ethnicity, that their personal survival hinges on their ability to flee and seek a safer place temporarily. For many peasant Burundians, the lesson of the past is that violence can erupt suddenly and can rapidly become all-encompassing. It is a lesson handed down from generation to generation. Some of the underlying causes of internal displacement in Burundi follow:
First, a pervasive psychology of 'flee or be killed' has become the lasting legacy of the 1972 slaughter and the 1993 upheaval. The 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda has reinforced the psychology of flight in Burundi.
Second, the smaller massacres that have occurred almost daily since 1994 serve to validate the historical lessons of fear and mistrust. Fear is also ingrained that large number of Burundians have learned to flee their homes not only in reaction to danger but also in anticipation of it.
Third, much of Burundi's displacement since 1993 has been caused by «ethnic cleansing.» Displacement is no longer merely as accidental by-product of violence; it has become a deliberate goal of violence.
Fourth, both ethnic groups of Burundi regard themselves as vulnerable. The sense of vulnerability has become an important part of the self-identity. Hutu are demographically dominant but see themselves as vulnerable to the political and military power of Tutsi. Tutsi are politically and militarily powerful but view themselves as vulnerable to the demographic dominance of Hutu. Members of both ethnic groups regard themselves as victims, despite the fact that many massacres in Burundian history have been largely one-sided.
Fifth, a pattern is evident in many violent eruptions over the decades: regardless of how violence begins, there is almost always massive retaliation against the Hutu by the Tutsi-dominated
military. As a result, many Hutu instinctively flee at the mere sight of soldiers or at the distant sound of their vehicles. The country's forces of order, unfortunately, create new disorder and displacement – deliberately in some cases, inadvertently in others.

Sixth, population displacement in Burundi often exacerbates rather than alleviates the conflict. Uprooted Burundians of one ethnic group are often regarded as dangerous by members of the other ethnic group. The military suspects that many internally displaced Hutu are rebels. Many Hutu suspect that camps of displaced Tutsi are bases for militia activity. There is some truth to these mutual suspicions. The result is that displacement at times begets more violence, causing still more people to flee. In short – at least in Burundi – displacement causes more displacement.

These are only partial explanations of the population displacement in Burundi, of course. This review of Burundi's history indicates that some actors create violence and displacement as a way to achieve political control by force that they are unable to achieve or maintain through nonviolent means. Some elements in Burundi create violence and displacement for the economic rewards it brings them through banditry, confiscation of property, and skimming of relief aid. Still other Burundians commits violence and force displacement based on pure fear or hate, reinforced by decades of grievances, real or imagined."


- 1996: government policy to move civilian populations into "regroupment" camps
- 1997: end of the large-scale, long-term "regroupment" policy
- 1998: short-term forced movement of populations continues, particularly in unstable western provinces
- Since September 1999, over 350,000 people were forcibly moved by government forces to 53 regroupment camps to deprive insurgent groups of local support
- Government explained that regroupment camps were established to protect civilians from the rebels
- Dismantlement of regroupment camps was precondition to peace negotiations and camps were dismantled by mid-2000

USCR 2000 "regroupment"

"Burundian authorities have pursued two waves of forced population relocation, or regroupment. The first regroupment wave occurred during 1996-98 when the government moved at least a quarter-million Hutu into 50 camps scattered throughout the country. Some observers estimated that up to 800,000 persons lived in the regroupment camps at that time. Most regroupment sites closed during 1998, allowing occupants to return home."

HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":

Renewed Regroupment (1999-2000)

"In July and August 1999, the rebels launched increasingly frequent and damaging raids in and around Bujumbura, killing dozens of civilians as well as some soldiers. The army retaliated with attacks that killed more than one hundred civilians as well as combatants and the government tightened an existing curfew. These measures failed to satisfy Tutsi extremists in Bujumbura who demanded more drastic action to protect the city and to repress the rebellion. With rumors circulating of a possible coup and of violence being organized by extremists, the government decided to impose a policy of regroupment on most of Bujumbura-rural, particularly on areas inhabited largely by Hutu and near the city."

HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":
In mid-1999, it [the government] had revived the regroupment policy in parts of southeastern Burundi before deciding to extend it to the area of the capital in September.

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"The Tutsi-dominated government of Burundi, combating rebellions among the Hutu majority, began forcing civilians in the area around the capital into so-called "protection sites" or "regroupment camps" beginning in late September 1999. Burundian authorities claimed the measure was intended to protect the civilians, most of them Hutu, from attack by the rebel National Liberation Forces (Forces Nationales pour la Libération, FNL) who were becoming increasingly well-entrenched in the area. In fact, they meant to deprive the FNL of support from local people who helped them, sometimes willingly, sometimes under duress. By removing civilian support, the authorities hoped to isolate the FNL and thus reduce its increasingly frequent attacks on the capital. They hoped also to quiet Tutsi extremists who accused them of weakness in confronting the rebel threat."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"By the end of 1999, authorities had obliged some 80 percent of the population of the province of Bujumbura-rural-some 350,000 people-to live in fifty-three camps. Although regroupment helped reduce attacks on the capital city, rebels remained firmly established in rural areas. They simply shifted from one place to another when attacked by the army, which had insufficient troops available to control the whole region at the same time. Rebels continued to live off the crops of local people and even to inhabit the houses of those forced to live in the camps.

USCR 2000, "Regroupment":
"The country included at least three types of internal displacement: up to 200,000 people, primarily rural Tutsi, who have lived for six years in designated camps protected by government soldiers and thousands, who have become displaced in the countryside or at makeshift sites for varying lengths of time; and nearly 350,000 Hutu whom the government required to live in so-called 'regroupment' camps."

Dismantlement of regroupment camps (2000)

USCR 2000, "Regroupment":
"Government authorities argued that the camps were a temporary measure to protect civilians from attack and deprive rebel groups of food and lodging in rural areas. Burundian officials urged international humanitarian organizations to provide food, water, sanitation, and medical care to the sites. Burundian President Pierre Buyoya visited several sites in October [1999] and stated that conditions there were better than portrayed by aid agencies. The regroupment camps were 'no dramatic situation,' he assured."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"The international community severely criticized the policy of regroupment. In January 2000, the Burundian government promised to begin closing the camps but it made little progress in doing so until early June. At that time, rebel leaders made closing the camps a precondition for peace negotiations and former South African President Nelson Mandela, facilitator for the negotiations, condemned the regroupment sites as 'concentration camps.' Under this pressure, President Pierre Buyoya agreed that everyone in the camps would be allowed to return home by the end of July."

For an analysis on how forced displacement in 2000 of 350,000 civilians was carried out in violation of international law, including the Un Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, see HRW June 2000 "Violation of international law & Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" [link below]
See also "Policy of the international humanitarian community regarding provision assistance in the context of forced relocation (1999-2000)" [Internal link]

Fighting between FNL and army displaced thousands in Bujumbura Rural (2004-2008)

- Combatants of FNL fought so called FNL "dissidents", causing displacement in October 2007
- FNL is the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government
- Population displacement reduced in 2005 compared to 2003-2004
- Little population displacement in 2006, but the populations of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural, have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL

IRIN 23 April 2008:
"The resumption of violence in and around Bujumbura is causing panic in the country. Outside the capital, residents spend their nights in the bush for fear of being attacked, as the death toll rose to 33.
A bomb destroyed part of the Vatican embassy compound and a dining hall in the Kiriri University campus on 22 April [2008].

"We call on the army to remove its heavy arms from our campus," a student said, reacting to the installation of rocket launchers aimed at rebuffing attacks by the rebel FNL.
On 18 April, attacks were launched on military positions in Gihosha, Kanyosha, Kamenge and Musaga areas."

NRC, May 2008:
In April 2008 serious violations of the 6 September 2006 ceasefire between the Burundian Army (FDN) and the rebel group Palipehutu-FNL (FNL) occurred. The most reported events took place in the capital city, Bujumbura, where three attacks took place on April 17, 18 and 22. Violence sprung in several provinces around the country (Bujumbura Rurale, Bubanza, Cibitoke and Kayanza), but Bujumbura Rurale province has been the most affected province, witnessing displacements of population.[...]

At the peak of displacement it was reported that there were:
- 4,050 households displaced in Isale commune or 20,100 people out of 83,000 inhabitants concentrated mostly in 6 sites in the centre of the commune, Rushubi on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 5,102 households displaced in Muyira and Kirombwe, both at Kanyosha commune on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 4,305 households displaced in Kabezi centre in three different sites on May 7 (data Kabezi local administration).
- 3,166 households displaced in Gitaza centre and 1,100 in Rutongo, both at Muhuta commune (data Muhuta local administration).
- And fewer numbers of IDPs registered in Bugarama, Mutambu and Nyabiraba communes (several hundreds of households)."

IRIN, 25 October 2007:
"Fighters of Burundi's last active rebel group have for the second time in one week attacked a position occupied by a break-away faction, forcing villagers to flee their homes, a senior military official said."
The evening raid by combatants of the Front National de Liberation (FNL), led by Agathon Rwasa, took place on 24 October [2007] evening on a site where the so-called FNL "dissidents" have gathered in Gakungwe village of Kabezi commune in Bujumbura Rural province.

It forced hundreds of people from surrounding villages to run away as the army sent reinforcements to the area to guard the splinter faction's settlement, residents said.

"There has indeed been such an attack and the heavy exchange of gunfire was heard," deputy army chief of staff Major General Godefroid Niyuhire told IRIN on 25 October. There were, however, no casualties during the attack, he said.

The "dissidents" say they fought with Rwasa for the FNL, but Rwasa's supporters have denied their claims and accused the government of creating a faction within the FNL. Rwasa has said these men, who intend to join the country's peace process, are not even party to a 2006 ceasefire agreement signed between the government and the FNL.”

OCHA 23 June 2005:
“Population displacement due to insecurity and armed conflict reduced markedly in the first months of the year [2005] and as compared to the period 2003-2004. Populations in the province of Bujumbura rural, where recurrent waves of displacement had taken place throughout 2004, are gradually resettling and returning to zones of origin and no sizeable population movements were registered in the first semester of the year.”

IRIN 4 January 2005:
“Thousands of civilians have been displaced following fierce fighting on Saturday in Burundi's western province of Bujumbura Rural.

The internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not received aid, the governor of the province, Ignace Ntawembarira, said.

Fighting was reported in the communes of Isale, Nyabiraba and Kanyosha, east of the capital, Bujumbura, between the rebel faction Forces nationales de libération (FNL) of Agathon Rwasa, and a coalition of the Burundian army and troops loyal to Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the former largest rebel faction in the country, the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces de defense pour la democratie (CNDD-FDD).”

UNSC 27 October 2006:
“In the period under review [August 2005-September 2006], the security situation was characterized by renewed clashes between FDN and FNL, mainly in the north-western provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural. The populations of these provinces have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL. In 2006, 107 cases of attacks and looting by FNL were reported.”

Fighting between government and FLN troops causes the displacement of thousands in Bubanza Province (2008)

- FNL - the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government – caused displacement at the end of 2007

IRIN 14 January 2008:
“About 1,400 families (8,400 people) displaced in Musigati commune in the northwestern province of Bubanza, following fighting between government forces and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), desperately need help, according to local officials.

Laurent Kagamba, adviser to the Musigati administrator, said that since the simultaneous attacks on three military positions on 28 December [2007] and another on 9 January [2008] in the same commune, residents had fled their homes. Some sought refuge in Musigati parish, others at Musigati and Kabere trade centres, as well as Busiga coffee factory, he said.”

IRIN 10 September 2007:
“Residents of 700 households, or about 4,000 people, have fled their homes in the northwest Burundi province of Bubanza following raids by suspected members of the country's last active rebel group, a government official said.

‘For the time being, security is not good at all. Some residents have been beaten, while others have had their property looted,’ the governor of Bubanza, Pascal Nyabenda, told IRIN.’

He said Forces nationales de libération (FNL) fighters had raided homes in Bubanza from their hideouts in the nearby Kibira and Rukoko forests. Those displaced were spending the nights in the compound of a local parish, venturing out for a few hours during the day to work in their fields, Nyabenda said."

For information on displacement by fighting between government and FNL troops in Bubanza Province in previous years, see:
ITEKA, 9 August 2006, Burundi: Des perennes armées et des combattants du Palipehutu_Fnl mènent des attaues répétées dans certaines communes de Bubanza
ITEKA, 24 August 2005, Burundi: Des déplacés de guerre en commune Musigati sans assistance [Link below]
IRIN, 14 June 2005, Burundi: Thousands displaced in Bubanza [Link below]

Some of the Burundian refugees expelled from Tanzania have no house or land (2006)

UN 30 November 2006:
Over 3,000 Burundians who had found refuge in Tanzania were forced to return in 2006: “Many new arrivals report others being forced to leave and the 3,000 who have come back so far, only seem to be the tip of the iceberg. Nobody knows for sure how many Burundians live in Tanzania without having regularized their stay, but most estimate around 150,000 persons. This will remain a key challenge in 2007, especially since the new arrivals need assistance and in particular so-called sans addresses like Elias, who hopes that “the Burundian Government can find us a plot of land where I can build a house and send my children to school.”"

NRC November 2006:
“Since June 2006, Tanzania has been implementing a national plan for the repatriation of refugees from Tanzania. In this framework, persons without refugee status or any other legal status in Tanzania have been forcibly removed from Tanzania. This year, more than 4000 Burundians have been expelled from Tanzania, mainly from Ngara district towards Muyinga province.”

See also:
UNHCR, 23 Oct 2006, Growing numbers of Burundians return home from the DRC [Internet]
Other causes of displacement

Tens of thousands were displaced due to floods (2007)

- Since November 2006, close to 300,000 people were affected by the heavy floods

IRIN 9 February 2007:

Les pluies diluviennes qui tombent depuis novembre 2006 ont détruit les cultures et infrastructures de plusieurs régions, obligeant le gouvernement à mettre en place un fonds de solidarité pour venir en aide aux déplacés victimes des inondations dans les provinces de Muyinga, Kirundo, Cankuzo, Karuzi, Kayanza, Ngozi et Muyinga. »

IRIN 15 January 2007:
“Thousands of people in northwestern Burundi, displaced after days of heavy rainfall, urgently need relief aid, officials said on Monday.

"The rains have rendered more than 3,000 residents homeless," said Prosper Banzambe, the chief of Gatumba Zone, one of the affected areas in Mitumbuzi Commune, Bujumbura Rural Province.

He said the displaced, some of whom had sought shelter in a local church, needed food and other non-food aid such as blankets, jerry cans, soap and mosquito nets.

The rains, which pounded the area at the weekend, destroyed at least 500 homes. The flooding of the nearby River Kiziba contributed to the houses’ collapse.

Banzambe expressed concern that the continuing rains could cause more damage in Gatumba and appealed for a temporary shelter for the displaced.

He urged humanitarian organisations to help the displaced, saying the local administration was unable to "adequately meet their needs".[…]

On 4 January [2007], the government set up a national solidarity fund to support people affected by floods in seven provinces. In a decree, President Pierre Nkurunziza declared the provinces of Kayanza in the north, Muramvya and Karuzi in the central part of the country, Ruyigi in the east, and Bubanza and Cibitoke in the northwest, as "hunger-stricken following floods”.

He also announced the establishment of the solidarity fund, to which every Burundian must contribute for four months from the end of January.”

AFP 16 January 2007:
“Heavy rains pounding Burundi's capital and outlying areas have killed at least four people and left about 23,000 homeless since the downpours began last month, officials said Tuesday."
They said the situation was "catastrophic" after the floods destroyed farmlands, sparking fears of food shortages and disease outbreaks in the tiny central African nation emerging from more than a decade of civil strife."

Famine in north and east causes internal displacement (2005-2006)

- Many of the people who flee due to food insecurity are newly repatriated refugees

OCHA 16 January 2005:
"[R]esidents of Northern provinces continue to flee inside and outside Burundi due to food insecurity. As of 14 January [2005], a joint visit conducted by OCHA Ruyigi sub office and the provincial administration authorities confirmed the presence in Kabuyenge IDP site, in Gisuru Commune, of 63 families who fled Busoni and Bugabira communes (Kirundo Province) in search of food. OCHA, in collaboration with the administration authorities convened a meeting with humanitarian actors in the province to discuss an emergency response."

OCHA 23 June 2005:
"Cycles of drought periods, loss of staple crops, poor yields during three consecutive agriculture seasons and fragile nutritional conditions were particularly important in the northern Burundian provinces, which were also affected by waves of population movements both internal and across the border into Rwanda."

OCHA 5 March 2005:
"Despite food aid distributed by WFP and partners, the food security situation remains disconcerting mainly in Northern and Eastern provinces. Continuous internal and cross-border displacement of the population continues to be part of the coping strategies. Around 7,900 Burundian asylum seekers were reported in Tanzania. Meanwhile, 131 internally displaced persons were registered in Cankuzo coming from Kirundo. However, many more internal movements remain unrecorded."

ITEKA 21 February 2006:
"La plupart de ces migrants sont de nouveaux rapatriés qui n'ont pas eu où s'installer. Ils sont en train de migrer à la quête de quoi manger. Malheureusement, la population de la province de Cankuzo a également faim et ne peut pas les aider. Les prix des vivres montent chaque jour."
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Conflict and displacement: background and development

Ethnic background and pre-colonial times

- Total population: 7.1 million
- Composite population comprising Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%) and Batwa (1%)(colonial census)
- Numerous interrelations between the ethnic groups (marriage, language, common monarchy)
- The Batwa are most likely the most ancient ethnic group in Burundi but they are marginalized in Burundi society

AFP 25 February 2005:
"GEOGRAPHY: Landlocked in central Africa, bounded by Rwanda in the north, Tanzania to the east and south, and the vast Democratic Republic of Congo to the west. One of the smallest states on the African continent, Burundi covers 27,834 square kilometers (10,747 square miles).

- POPULATION: 7.1 million, of which around 85 percent are Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi. The remaining one percent of the population are pygmies called Twas. One of the most densely populated African countries.

- CAPITAL: Bujumbura (population 300,000)

- LANGUAGES: Kirundi (national), French (administrative), Swahili (local)

- RELIGION: Christian (70 percent); Animist (15 percent); Muslim (15 percent)."

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 15-17:
"Burundi is situated in Central Africa, along Lake Tanganyika and shares borders with Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. [...] According to statistics dating back to the 1930s, 85 per cent of the population are Hutu, 14 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Batwa. The Hutu are considered to originate from Chad and the Niger, while the Tutsi, of Nilo-ethiopian origin, are thought to come from eastern Africa. The Batwa originate from the Congo Basin (Pygmies). This breakdown does not take into account the Ganwa (those of princely origin), nor a handful of other immigrant communities, nor those of mixed origins (mixed marriages having been common in the past). [...] It also does not take into account the fact that within both groups there existed historically rankings of status nor that passage from one group to another, for instance becoming Tutsi from Hutu or Ganwa, was also possible. The Burundians all speak the same language, Kirundi, which is both the national and the official language. Other languages, as provided for in the Constitution, are also spoken. [...] Despite ethnic differences, the Burundians live intermingled on the thousands of hills of the country without distinction on account of ethnicity. They are therefore inextricably bound to one another and cannot contemplate any notions of separation.

Although settlements have always been mixed, society in Burundi [...] was built along a ‘class’ and ‘caste’ system. [...] While their distinctions were not rigidly determined along ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ lines, [...] there was significant correlation between class and ethnicity, with the Tutsis associated with the upper class and the Hutus with the lower class. This did not mean that all Tutsis were
upper class nor all Hutus lower class. Both class and the ethnic correlations were also dynamic. A Hutu could rise economically and socially and become a "Tutsi".

Hutu and Tutsi relationships were in the past cemented by their shared loyalty to common institutions. Kingship was such an institution; patron-client ties constituted another powerful socio-political institution. Patrons were expected to offer protection and gifts in exchange for services and offerings in kind. As social and political roles that once gave meaning and cohesion to membership in the community vanished, the use of the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' with ethnic connotations became more rigid. [...] Today the use of the term 'Hutu' describes an ethnic group which is poorer and powerless, whereas the Tutsi, especially the Hima (a Tutsi subgroup), are the pre-eminent power holders. [...] Nevertheless, the impression should not be created that the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' are figments as the "official truth" during the Bagaza period (1976-1987) would have it. This stance restricted discussion on the underlying problems of ethnicity and expression of ethnic differences without solving them."

CHR 19 March 2001, para. 100:
"La situation de la minorité twa mérite une attention particulière que malheureusement elle ne reçoit pas toujours. Les Twas sont sans doute le noyau le plus ancien de la population burundaise, comme dans d'autres pays des Grands Lacs; ils constituent aujourd'hui environ 1 % de la population."

Colonial rule and military regimes (1899-1992)

- 1962: Burundi becomes independent
- 25 years of a Tutsi dominated military dictatorship
- The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power
- 1980: creation of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu) by activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community in refugee camps in Tanzania

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 19-24:
"The transition from traditional power structures to 'modern' politics has by no means been an easy one. Two Ganwa (princely) dynasties continued fighting for control during the era of the colonial Powers, (first Germany from 1889 to 1918, then Belgium until 1962) as they had done during the pre-colonial era. The Party of Unity and National Progress (Uprona) was dominated by the Ganwa Bezi, while the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was led by the Ganwa Batare. In the legislative elections of September 1961 Uprona won, with Prince Rwagasoré as Prime Minister designate. A month later, however, Rwagasoré was assassinated. The political game switched from Ganwa to Hutu and Tutsi hands for the first time.

Burundi gained its independence from Belgium in July 1962. Until 1966 the crown continued to stabilize the situation. Violent incidents erupted after the elections in 1966, following which the Prime Minister, Michel Micombero, a Tutsi of the Hima group from Bururi, [...] overthrew the monarchy and declared a republic, concentrating power in the army. The National Assembly was dissolved and later replaced with a committee of officers, which, by 1971, was made up of 24 Tutsi and 3 Hutu, and Uprona was declared the sole party. Serious intra-Tutsi rivalries for power emerged. At this time Hutu were already being systematically purged from the army. The transition from a Ganwa-run kingdom to a Tutsi-dominated military dictatorship to the exclusion of Hutus caused more violence. For the next 25 years Tutsi factions fought over control, turning the Hutu into scapegoats whenever the Hutu would rise up and demand more equitable power-
sharing. On the other hand, whenever efforts towards power-sharing were made, extremists from both groups would resort to violence, to delay or cancel them.

Massacres had taken place in 1965 and 1967, but the most serious ones took place in 1972 triggered by Hutu militants from the Burundian refugee community in Tanzania. Hundreds if not thousands of Tutsi were killed and there is widespread fear that what had happened to Rwanda’s Tutsi, namely, systematic subjection and extermination, would happen to them too. The Tutsi retaliation and repression that followed were instant. The first victims were Hutus with education: secondary school and university students, teachers, nurses, doctors, priests, pastors, drivers, headmasters, businessmen, shopkeepers, civil servants, bank clerks, professors. Most Hutu families lost members. Hutu widows moved to the city outskirts when their houses were seized by Tutsi. Many Tutsis also fled. Many left the interior, where they felt frightened among Hutu neighbours, and moved to Bujumbura to fill the many jobs now vacant. Others rushed to occupy the flat, fertile, palm-oil-producing strip of lake shore south of Bujumbura, after the flight of very many Hutu who had been living there. Reports have spoken of genocidal acts and of hundreds of thousands of Hutus killed. […]

These events had great reverberations in Burundi; yet, nothing was ever done about the massacres. There has never been an official inquiry into them, an accounting, or any effort to bring to justice those responsible for the killings. Thereafter there was no question of Hutus entering the army, and many refused to send their children to school, fearing they were exposing them to a future massacre. Those at school had no role models. The educated, competent, urbane were all Tutsi. That there was a "lost" Hutu generation is still evident today in the political life of the country.

There was little power-sharing following the massacres, even after Micombero was overthrown by his deputy chief of staff, Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, also a Hima (Tutsi subgroup). There were no massacres during Bagaza’s 11-year rule and many refugees returned home. Bagaza reportedly hoped development would push his country through the ethnic deadlock. Observers note that he engaged in a series of reforms, without, however, addressing the ethnic issue. […] All provincial governors were Tutsi and most judges, university and school teachers, magistrates and heads of hospitals were Tutsi too. Uprona remained a Tutsi party and its members were the ones to benefit mostly from Bagaza’s management of the economy. In the last years of the Bagaza regime corruption and nepotism reportedly flourished. […] In the meantime, in 1980 activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community formed the Palipehutu, or the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People, in refugee camps in Tanzania. Bagaza was himself deposed in 1987 by a group of army officers and a cousin of his and nephew of Micombero, Major Pierre Buyoya, became President.

In August 1988 frustrated Hutu hopes for an improvement were at the root of hundreds of ethnic killings. Thousands were killed. This time the regions most affected were Ntega commune in Kirundo province and Marangara commune in Ngozi province, both bordering Rwanda. Palipehutu members from Rwanda had been infiltrating into Burundi and sporadic fights were taking place until Hutus turned against the Tutsi community, many of them Rwandan refugees. The army pursued those assumed responsible (although it is unclear how much resistance these people who had no guns put up against the soldiers) […] and in the next eight days it reportedly killed large numbers of civilians, including women and children. More than 60,000 people poured into Rwanda across the swamps and the Akanyaru river. Others took refuge within Burundi in swamp areas. The massacres were surprising even to the Burundians. Hutu had to face the fact that the army was still prepared to use maximum force and Tutsi that Hutu could still massacre many Tutsi before soldiers reached the scene."

**ACTS 30 September 2004:**
“Despite the popular conception of the conflict as a Hutu-Tutsi struggle, most scholars agree that the protracted conflict is structural in nature, though articulated in ethnic terms. The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power.’ Governance practices by successive regimes galvanized political power and state control in the hands of a small elite group within the Tutsi community from particular parts of the country, who have since sustained their hold on power through repressive policies. Efforts by the Tutsi elite to retain political control and associated patronage networks, and violent counter-strategies of the Hutu political and armed groups have precipitated ethnic massacres and retaliatory radicalism marked by acts of genocide.”

Civil war and Peace Process in Burundi (1993-2008)

- 1993: Assassination of elected President Ndadaye triggers large-scale inter-ethnic violence
- 1996: Coup installs President Buyoya; sanctions imposed by neighbouring countries
- Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi signed in August 2000
- 2005: signing of ceasefire agreement between FNL and government; adoption of new constitution
- Local, legislative and presidential elections was held in various phases in 2005
- Security sector was profoundly restructured and the army is now ethnically balanced (2006)
- Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and FRODEBU – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence (2006) As of April 2008: the FNL had withdrawn
- from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement

AFP 1 June 2005, factfile:
“The civil war begun in 1993 has killed an estimated 300,000 people.[…]

Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu president, elected in June 1993, was assassinated on October 21 of the same year during a failed coup organized by Tutsi military officers.

His successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira -- another Hutu -- was killed in April 1994 at the same time as then Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana died under suspicious circumstances when his plane was shot down over Kigali, sparking the genocide of up to a million Tutsis and Hutu moderates in Rwanda.
Ntaryamira's successor, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, also a Hutu, was overthrown in a non-violent coup in July 1996, and [Pierre " Buyoya returned to power. In 1998, Buyoya reformed the constitution to create a transition government and began peace talks with Hutu and Tutsi opposition groups.

In August 2000 a peace agreement including a power-sharing deal was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, but the two main armed rebel groups refused to participate in the talks. Civil war continued to rage.

In November 2001, Buyoya took over as transitional leader for a period of 18 months, seconded by a Hutu vice-president whose signature is required on all presidential texts pertaining to security and the armed forces.
A 26-member power-sharing government was also sworn in to oversee the three-year transition. Buyoya was succeeded at the head of the transition government in May 2003 by his vice president Domitien Ndayizeye, who is seconded by a Tutsi, Alphonse Marie Kadage.

A ceasefire agreement was signed in December 2002 by the government and the main Hutu rebel movement, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), which finally entered government in November 2003.

A second Hutu armed group, the National Liberation Forces (FNL), finally signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on May 15, but the details of how this be implemented have still not yet been resolved.

A new constitution was adopted at the end of February, aimed at bringing about a peaceful democracy and ending the reign of the Tutsie tribe in power. Opposition has been voiced only by Tutsis concerned at losing too much power.

**HRW 4 November 2005:**

“Elections in 2005 were the final chapter in the transitional process established by the Arusha Accords of 2000. In the intervening period a government including the Hutu-dominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu), the Tutsi-dominated National Unity and Progress Party (Uprona), and a number of smaller parties ruled the country. In late 2003 this government signed the Pretoria Protocol making peace with the CNDDFDD and starting the process of integrating the former rebels into the army and the administration.”

For more detailed information on 1993 events, see “Profile in displacement” (Report of the Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, 28 November 1994), paras. 29-36) [External link]

**ICG 30 November 2006:**

“In elections held between June and August 2005, the voters of Burundi elected their first democratic government since 1993. This marked an end to the transitional government established by the Arusha Agreement in 2001. The mainly Hutu former rebels of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), led by Pierre Nkurunziza, won a resounding victory and hold 58 per cent of the seats in parliament and 57 per cent in the communal councils, as well as twelve of the twenty government ministries. Nkurunziza was inaugurated as president on 26 August 2005.

The elections radically reconfigured politics. Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence. In the run-up to the elections, rebel forces were integrated into the national army, police and intelligence service. For the first time in Burundian history, these forces were ethnically balanced. Nkurunziza’s government faced considerable challenges. Foremost was the process of transforming the CNDDFDD from a rebel movement into a democratic political party in power – one whose members had little civil administration experience. The government had to reconstruct an economy devastated by more than a decade of civil war and economic embargo, during which per capita income fell by 35 per cent and the number of people living below the poverty line doubled. During its first year it also had to deal with security problems in the capital and surrounding provinces caused by the remaining rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL. Unfortunately, the government’s response to these challenges has increasingly manifested itself in disregard for the rule of law.”

**UNSC 28 November 2007:**
“The signing of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the armed group Palipehutu-Forces nationales de libération (FNL) led by Agathon Rwasa on 7 September 2006 was a decisive step in the peace process in Burundi. However, its implementation remains difficult owing to persisting disagreements among the parties. The Agreement, which was the outcome of determined efforts of regional States united under the auspices of the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, addresses a number of issues including the integration of FNL ex-combatants into the Burundian National Defence Forces (FDN) and security forces, the participation of FNL elements in the institutions of the country and the rapid demobilization and reintegration of children associated with this armed group into their respective families and communities. Under the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism was established to oversee the demobilization of FNL combatants.

The signing of the Agreement was followed at first by a significant improvement in the security situation, characterized notably by a decrease both in the number of abuses perpetrated by armed groups and in the number of alleged FNL militants arrested by the National Defence Forces and the National Police of Burundi.”

PBC, 19 March 2008:
“[T]he Palipehutu-FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. In response, a Political Directorate had been established to assist the Mechanism in efforts to regain FNL's participation.”

IRIN, 14 January 2008:
“The FNL, the last rebel movement still active in Burundi, has resumed fighting government forces, especially in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza, where it is most active.

Though the movement signed a ceasefire accord with the government in September 2006, it has not been fully implemented. The joint verification and monitoring mechanism, which oversees its implementation, suspended activities in July 2007 after the FNL delegates walked out of talks over security concerns. They have since been accusing the facilitator, South African safety minister Charles Nqakula, of bias.”

ISS 3 April 2008:
“Af er intense diplomatic pressure from regional governments and the international community Burundi’s last rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL, has been brought back to the negotiating table that drew up a new roadmap designed to end the standoff by the end of June 2008. This breakthrough was reached in a February 23 meeting in Cape Town, South Africa. The meeting was attended by special envoys to Burundi from Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa, as well as representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.

The Cape Town meeting had been called to save the Burundi peace process after the FNL withdrew from its implementation, alleging bias on the part of the facilitator, South Africa’s Security Minister Charles Nqakula. To help address this challenge Minister Nqakula has followed the example of other peace processes by establishing a Group of Special Envoys for Burundi (GSEB), representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.”

Delrue August 2006:
“The success of Burundi’s transition to peace hinges on how its new government (elected in August 2005 and headed by former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza) and the international community deal with such post- displacement issues as land and property claims, reconciliation and transitional justice.
The link between displacement, return, reconciliation and successful transition towards a consolidated peace is frequently either underestimated or neglected by the international community.

For a comprehensive analysis of the political situation in Burundi, see

HRW, 12 March 2008:
“Several opposition politicians have been threatened and targeted for violence during the last 18 months. Njomukunda, then second vice-president of the republic, fled Burundi in September 2006 after issuing a letter critical of the government; she returned in March 2007. Five parliamentarians from the opposition party Front for Democracy in Burundi (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi, Frodebu) and from a dissident wing of the CNDD-FDD, including Mpawenayo, were targeted in a set of grenade attacks in August 2007 that injured several bystanders. Pancrace Cimpaye, Frodebu spokesperson, was detained after suggesting the ruling party bore responsibility for the August attacks; after being released, he briefly left the country. In February 2008, a local Frodebu official was killed, while another was seriously injured in a grenade attack which killed his wife and child.”

See also:
IRIN, BURUNDI: Government of consensus formed, 15 November 2007 [Internet]

ICG, 28 August 2007, Burundi: Finalising peace with the FNL [Internet]


Secretary-General welcomes signing of Burundi ceasefire agreement, United Nations Secretary General, 8 September 2006 [Internet]

Progress in regard to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (2005-2008)

- Reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression
- About 5,000 UN peacekeepers were in Burundi from June 2004 to the end of 2006, to monitor the country's transition to democracy, with South Africa contributing the majority of troops.
- The new Burundian government saw the peacekeepers as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible (2006)
- A new UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) continued the process of peace consolidation and of coordinating the UN system’s activities in Burundi from 2007

ISS 13 October 2006:
"In Burundi, reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, signed in August 2000 by 17 political parties, the National
Assembly and the government and the 2003 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Burundi and the principal rebel group, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), do include important provisions on the organization, structure, mandates and composition of postconflict security forces that will act professionally and apolitically, adhere to human rights norms, and provide defence and security to all Burundians.[…]

Although the Arusha Accords were signed in August 2000, the implementation of the security sector reform process they articulate was largely delayed until 2003, mainly because of continued warfare throughout most of Burundi. Indeed, the most active rebel movements in the field were marginalized throughout the Arusha negotiations and were thus not signatories to the Accord. Accordingly, it was not until the signing of a ceasefire between the government and the main rebel group – the CNDD-FDD – in 2003 that the reform process was set in motion. By July 2006, however, the reform of the defence and security forces had reached an advanced stage and had achieved most of its structural objectives (i.e. the integration of several armed groups into a single military and single police force), despite various financial- and material-related challenges.

The process of integrating the former rebel groups and the FAB into a new national defence force, the Forces de Défense Nationale (FDN), has been completed – largely to the satisfaction of the government and international donors – despite its late start due to disagreements on the definition of combatant and on the harmonization of rank between the rebel movements and the regular army.[…]

Despite this progress, a preliminary assessment of the reform of the FDN and the PNB and progress in the domain of social and economic reintegration and re-insertion of former combatants suggests that serious challenges remain in these critical areas. The local media frequently report human rights violations perpetrated by on-duty military or police or by demobilized combatants.

Tufts University 30 July 2006:
“The new Burundian government saw ONUB as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible. This perception was aggravated by two unfortunate choices made by leaders of the UN mission: to support Frodebu and former President Ndayizeye during the electoral campaign and proposing to coordinate the transition from humanitarian aid to development through a “Partners Council” deliberating without the government.”

UNSC 18 December 2006:
“Meanwhile, as delays in the start of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants have continued, criminal activities against the population, reportedly committed by FNL combatants, have increased since late October. Skirmishes between the national security forces and alleged FNL combatants and detentions of FNL elements and supporters have reportedly resumed in the north-western provinces. FNL recruitment, including of youths, has also been reported, particularly in Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural provinces.[…]

Once deployed, the AU special task force would therefore be expected to assume the responsibilities that were allocated to ONUB under the ceasefire agreement, namely: (a) protection of designated assembly areas for FNL combatants; (b) provision of engineering, logistical and administrative support for the establishment of the assembly areas; (c) disarmament of combatants; (d) storage of weapons collected from the disarmament process and their subsequent destruction; (e) transportation of disarmed FNL combatants from assembly areas to the designated demobilization centre or integration facilities of the National Defence Forces; and (f) protection of the demobilization centres. […]
Further delays in the agreement’s implementation, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants, are likely to lead to more friction between these combatants and the population and the national security services. In addition, there was an increase in localized conflicts involving the small FNL faction led by Jean Bosco Sindayigaya, which did not sign the ceasefire agreement.

DPKO 20 December 2006:
“A new United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), authorized by Security Council resolution 1719 earlier this year, will continue the process of peace consolidation and be in charge of coordinating the United Nations system’s activities in Burundi for an initial period of one year.”

The mandate of BINUB is extended until 31 December 2008 (UNSC, 19 December 2007).

See also:
Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 31 Aug 2006
A technical analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - a case study from Burundi [Internet]


• Peace Building Commission approved in December 2007 a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation

UNSC 18 December 2006, para.22:
“Significant progress has been made in the establishment of peacebuilding coordination mechanisms between the Government and the United Nations. On 7 November, the Government created an Inter-Ministerial Peacebuilding Steering Committee, which will work with the United Nations, within the framework of an initial joint mechanism, in preparing the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission and the peacebuilding priority plan to be submitted to the Peacebuilding Fund. The inaugural meeting of the Government-United Nations joint mechanism was held on 16 November [2006], followed by several sessions at the policy and working levels. As a result, a common understanding was reached on the steps to be taken by the Government, with United Nations support, to secure resources from the Peacebuilding Fund. Progress was also made in developing the Government's presentation to the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission. The mission of the Peacebuilding Support Office to Burundi in mid-November [2006] and the meetings it had with the United Nations and the Government's Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee contributed significantly to this process.”

UNGA 5 December 2007:
“With a long-awaited conflict-recovery and development strategy for Burundi now in place, the Peacebuilding Commission today approved a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation -- both locally and in New York -- in priority areas
such as justice and security sector reform, generating jobs and making radical improvements to governance.

Meeting in its special “Burundi Configuration”, the Commission adopted the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism (MTM) of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. That Framework -- in place since June -- is the country-led integrated peacebuilding strategy now guiding the engagement and dialogue between Bujumbura, the United Nations and other international partners.

The Framework identified key objectives, major challenges and threats to peace, especially the implementation of a stagnant ceasefire agreement between Burundi and the National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL). Promoting inclusive growth, employment, transparency and human rights were among its other top priorities.”

See also:
Brookings Institution, 13 March 2008, The Role of Civil Society in Ending Displacement and Peacebuilding, by Elizabeth Ferris [Internet]

United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI), 12 Dec 2006 [Link below]

Peacebuilding Commission holds day-long discussion on Burundi, agrees on fund’s use to bolster government’s priority plan [Internet]

Challenges facing Burundi, requiring international help, indicated at country-specific meetings of Peacebuilding Commission [Internet]

Burundi government signs Nairobi pact including protocol on IDPs (December 2006)

MONUC 18 December 2006:
“With the signing of the Nairobi pact this Friday December 15 2006 by DRC, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, it paves the way for security, stability and development in the region, after years of conflict.

Many African state leaders, including DRC president Joseph Kabila were in Nairobi Kenya for the two day summit that will go a long way to bringing the region out of the vicious cycle of humanitarian disaster, poverty, and repeated conflict.[…]

The Great Lakes pact includes a $225 million security action plan to disarm rebel groups in Eastern DRC, and along border areas in Sudan, Kenya and Uganda.[…]

Ms. Besida Tonwe, the Head of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in Central and East Africa, said that the conference was a long process of consultations in helping the Great Lakes Region to reconcile, rehabilitate, and reconstruct their societies in a politically delicate process.

‘It is also a process which in the future will continue to require financial support from the donor community and coherent assistance from the humanitarian community. It is now of utmost importance that there is a follow-up on the national implementation of the legal protocols adopted with the pact,’ she said.
‘The three protocols on humanitarian and social issues addressing sexual violence against women and children, property rights of returning persons, and the protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), are of the utmost importance,’ she concluded.”

**IDMC 14 December 2006:**
“The Pact is a culmination of more than four years of regional negotiations among States. It contains a package of measures which promises to enhance the lives of the forcibly displaced, including a regional protocol on protection and assistance for internally displaced, which when signed, will be the first legally binding regional instrument specifically dealing with IDPs anywhere in the world. A regional protocol on property rights of returning populations, and protocols which address some of the root causes of flight in the Great Lakes are also key elements of the Pact.”

**Arusha Accords: Challenges of implementing Protocol IV (2005)**

- Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development

**ISS 27 May 2005:**
“Aside from calling for a cessation to violent conflict, the Arusha Accords [Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 28 August 2000]. provide comprehensive recommendations for stabilising and rehabilitating a highly polarised Burundian nation. The agreement is composed of five protocols each dedicated to a particular theme intended to move the process from peace-making to peace-building. These themes consist of an outline of the nature of the conflict; democracy and good governance; peace and security; reconstruction and development; and guarantees on the implementation of the agreement.

Importantly, the accords acknowledge that the Burundian ‘conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions... and stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power.’

Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development. It is therefore the ‘litmus test’ against which the performance of the transitional government (and other actors) as it relates to Arusha’s recommendations can be assessed.

**Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Refugees and Sinistrés**
The main conclusion and recommendations of Protocol IV states that:

‘Through the Burundi Peace Negotiations at Arusha it has been possible to assess how seriously the political and ethnic crisis that has torn Burundi apart since independence has affected Burundian society. Hundreds of thousands of Burundians are refugees, some of them for more than 25 years.

Hundreds of thousands more are forced to live in camps where conditions are appalling.... All Burundians are aware that a lasting peace is impossible so long as a definitive solution is not found to the problem of refugees and sinistrés. Likewise, peace is impossible so long as the country’s wealth is not shared equitably. Burundi cannot help the sinistrés rebuild destroyed property and restore its economy without the assistance of the international community.’"
The UN concluded that there was a strong indication that the FLN had not acted alone in the massacre of Congolese refugees (2004-2005)

- One year of after the Gatumba massacre, those responsible remain free

IRIN 5 Jan 2005:
“The FNL claimed responsibility for a massacre in August of 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees at Gatumba transit camp on the Burundi side of the border with the DRC. The UN is continuing to investigate whether armed groups on the DRC side of the border, which are aligned to FNL, also took part.”

UNSC 15 November 2004:
“As requested by the Security Council by its presidential statement of 15 August 2004 (S/PRST/2004/30), ONUB, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights conducted a joint investigation into the massacre on 13 August of 152 Congolese refugees at the Gatumba refugee camp, located close to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The results of the investigation were transmitted to the Council by my letter to the President of the Council dated 15 October (S/2004/821). Despite extensive investigation, there is no clear evidence of who organized, carried out and financed that gross atrocity. The FNL (Rwasa) claim of responsibility has been supported by witness statements and led United Nations investigators to believe that the group did, indeed, participate in the attack. There is however, a strong indication that FNL (Rwasa) did not act alone. Unfortunately, the dearth of verifiable information and limited cooperation by the Burundian authorities hampered the formulation of a definitive report. A national investigation is still ongoing.”

AI 18 August 2005:
“On the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre, which took place in August 2004, Amnesty International calls on the forthcoming government of Burundi and the international community to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.

‘The new government should undertake to set up an independent and impartial body to investigate this and other massacres and those found to be responsible should be held to account,’ Amnesty International said today.

During the night of 13 August 2004, the refugee camp of Gatumba, located near the Congolese border, was attacked by an armed group. More than 160 Congolese refugees, predominantly children and women members of the Banyamulenge ethnic group from South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (DRC), were deliberately and systematically killed. On 14 August, the Palipehutu-FNL (Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu -- Forces nationales de libération) claimed responsibility for the killings. The same day, the governments of Burundi and Rwanda and delegates of the Banyamulenge communities accused Congolese and Rwandese armed political groups based in the DRC of involvement in the massacre. According to UN investigators, evidence of the presence of ‘other groups’ was credible, but they were not able to categorically identify them.

Human rights organizations and the United Nations have strongly condemned this massacre and called for an independent, impartial and comprehensive investigation. Given the alleged involvement of armed political groups based in the DRC, there was concern that the killing could lead to a military intervention in the DRC by Burundi and Rwanda. Such an intervention could have led to further human rights abuses in the DRC.
Since then, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Burundian authorities have moved a few refugees to the Mwaro province, farther away from the border, others have returned to the DRC, while many others have moved to Bujumbura. So far, despite the indication from the Burundian Minister of Justice that the national investigation into the Gatumba massacre was completed, the United Nations Operations in Burundi stressed in a recent statement that, 'no investigation report has been issued by the government [of Burundi] and the authors of the attack remain free'.

See also United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 13 Aug 2005
Burundi: Statement on the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre [Internet]

Causes of displacement


United Nations Resident Coordinator System for Burundi 1998, p. 5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronology of Population Movements</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>An estimated 200,000 Burundians flee from programs and communal violence; many seek refuge in Tanzania, where most remain to this day.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>To escape the violence that broke out following the assassination of President Ndadaye, nearly 200,000 people leave the hills to seek protection in sites grouped around military posts. A vast majority are still there.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994-1996</td>
<td>The escalation of the civil conflict sparks massive population movements; the northwestern province of Cibitoke, sandwiched between the rebel bases in the mountainous Kibira forest and in neighboring Kivu, is particularly unstable. Large numbers seek refuge in neighboring Zaire (150,000) and Tanzania (250,000). Up to 400,000 congregate in sites inside the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>In the wake of the conquest of Zaire by the Kabila-led alliance, most of the refugees in Kivu return to Burundi, where they swell the numbers living in the displaced camps on the north-western provinces, particularly Cibitoke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>As a military strategy to regain control of rebel-held territory, the authorities forcibly regroup 250,000 civilians in Karuzi, Kanyanza and Muramvya provinces. Nearly all of them return home by the end of 1997, but the policy of controlled population movements continues to be implemented in other, more short-term forms elsewhere in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>Following the loss of their bases in the Kivu, the rebels regroup in Tanzania, and the main theatre of operations shifts to the southwest, along the ridge of the Nile-Congo watershed that is the main conduit into and out of the country for guerrilla groups. The ensuing destabilization leads to large scale displacement to new sites, again mainly along the main tarmac roads of the western plain, not only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in Makamba and Bururi provinces but also as far as north as Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza.

| 1997-1998 | As the military gradually established control in certain areas, the authorities begin to dismantle the big sites near main roads or major towns and create smaller, decentralized sites grouped around advanced military positions in the hills (Cibitoke, parts of Bururi, Bubanza). Elsewhere, short-term regroupment operations continue to be implemented in response to localized destabilization (Bujumbura Rural) |
| 1998 | Nearly all the sites in Cibitoke province, for so long the most unstable part of the country, are dismantled by June and the people return to their hills. At almost the same time, the crisis in neighboring Congo produces an influx of some eleven thousand people, which continues up to present. |

**Causes of internal displacement: an analysis by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (1998)**

- Pervasive psychology of "flee or be killed" is a lasting legacy of the 1972 massacres and the 1993 upheavals
- Displacement has also been used as a deliberate goal of violence since 1993
- Massive retaliation by the armed forces
- Suspicion towards the displaced population creates more displacement
- Use of violence and displacement as a way to achieve political or economical objectives

**USCR 1998a, pp. 32-33:**

*A history of massacres has taught the people of Burundi, regardless of their ethnicity, that their personal survival hinges on their ability to flee and seek a safer place temporarily. For many peasant Burundians, the lesson of the past is that violence can erupt suddenly and can rapidly become all-encompassing. It is a lesson handed down from generation to generation. Some of the underlying causes of internal displacement in Burundi follow:

First, a pervasive psychology of 'flee or be killed' has become the lasting legacy of the 1972 slaughter and the 1993 upheaval. The 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda has reinforced the psychology of flight in Burundi.

Second, the smaller massacres that have occurred almost daily since 1994 serve to validate the historical lessons of fear and mistrust. Fear is also ingrained that large number of Burundians have learned to flee their homes not only in reaction to danger but also in anticipation of it.

Third, much of Burundi's displacement since 1993 has been caused by «ethnic cleansing.» Displacement is no longer merely as accidental by-product of violence; it has become a deliberate goal of violence.

Fourth, both ethnic groups of Burundi regard themselves as vulnerable. The sense of vulnerability has become an important part of the self-identity. Hutu are demographically dominant but see themselves as vulnerable to the political and military power of Tutsi. Tutsi are politically and militarily powerful but view themselves as vulnerable to the demographic dominance of Hutu. Members of both ethnic groups regard themselves as victims, despite the fact that many massacres in Burundian history have been largely one-sided.

Fifth, a pattern is evident in many violent eruptions over the decades: regardless of how violence begins, there is almost always massive retaliation against the Hutu by the Tutsi-dominated
military. As a result, many Hutu instinctively flee at the mere sight of soldiers or at the distant sound of their vehicles. The country's forces of order, unfortunately, create new disorder and displacement – deliberately in some cases, inadvertently in others.

Sixth, population displacement in Burundi often exacerbates rather than alleviates the conflict. Uprooted Burundians of one ethnic group are often regarded as dangerous by members of the other ethnic group. The military suspects that many internally displaced Hutu are rebels. Many Hutu suspect that camps of displaced Tutsi are bases for militia activity. There is some truth to these mutual suspicions. The result is that displacement at times begets more violence, causing still more people to flee. In short – at least in Burundi – displacement causes more displacement.

These are only partial explanations of the population displacement in Burundi, of course. This review of Burundi's history indicates that some actors create violence and displacement as a way to achieve political control by force that they are unable to achieve or maintain through nonviolent means. Some elements in Burundi create violence and displacement for the economic rewards it brings them through banditry, confiscation of property, and skimming of relief aid. Still other Burundians commits violence and force displacement based on pure fear or hate, reinforced by decades of grievances, real or imagined."


- 1996: government policy to move civilian populations into "regroupment" camps
- 1997: end of the large-scale, long-term "regroupment" policy
- 1998: short-term forced movement of populations continues, particularly in unstable western provinces
- Since September 1999, over 350,000 people were forcibly moved by government forces to 53 regroupment camps to deprive insurgent groups of local support
- Government explained that regroupment camps were established to protect civilians from the rebels
- Dismantlement of regroupment camps was precondition to peace negotiations and camps were dismantled by mid-2000

**USCR 2000 "regroupment"**

"Burundian authorities have pursued two waves of forced population relocation, or regroupment. The first regroupment wave occurred during 1996-98 when the government moved at least a quarter-million Hutu into 50 camps scattered throughout the country. Some observers estimated that up to 800,000 persons lived in the regroupment camps at that time. Most regroupment sites closed during 1998, allowing occupants to return home."

**HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":**


"In July and August 1999, the rebels launched increasingly frequent and damaging raids in and around Bujumbura, killing dozens of civilians as well as some soldiers. The army retaliated with attacks that killed more than one hundred civilians as well as combatants and the government tightened an existing curfew. These measures failed to satisfy Tutsi extremists in Bujumbura who demanded more drastic action to protect the city and to repress the rebellion. With rumors circulating of a possible coup and of violence being organized by extremists, the government decided to impose a policy of regroupment on most of Bujumbura-rural, particularly on areas inhabited largely by Hutu and near the city."

**HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":**
"In mid-1999, it [the government] had revived the regroupment policy in parts of southeastern Burundi before deciding to extend it to the area of the capital in September."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"The Tutsi-dominated government of Burundi, combating rebellions among the Hutu majority, began forcing civilians in the area around the capital into so-called "protection sites" or "regroupment camps" beginning in late September 1999. Burundian authorities claimed the measure was intended to protect the civilians, most of them Hutu, from attack by the rebel National Liberation Forces (Forces Nationales pour la Libération, FNL) who were becoming increasingly well-entrenched in the area. In fact, they meant to deprive the FNL of support from local people who helped them, sometimes willingly, sometimes under duress. By removing civilian support, the authorities hoped to isolate the FNL and thus reduce its increasingly frequent attacks on the capital. They hoped also to quiet Tutsi extremists who accused them of weakness in confronting the rebel threat."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"By the end of 1999, authorities had obliged some 80 percent of the population of the province of Bujumbura-rural-some 350,000 people-to live in fifty-three camps. Although regroupment helped reduce attacks on the capital city, rebels remained firmly established in rural areas. They simply shifted from one place to another when attacked by the army, which had insufficient troops available to control the whole region at the same time. Rebels continued to live off the crops of local people and even to inhabit the houses of those forced to live in the camps."

USCR 2000, "Regroupment":
"The country included at least three types of internal displacement: up to 200,000 people, primarily rural Tutsi, who have lived for six years in designated camps protected by government soldiers and thousands, who have become displaced in the countryside or at makeshift sites for varying lengths of time; and nearly 350,000 Hutu whom the government required to live in so-called 'regroupment' camps."

Dismantlement of regroupment camps (2000)

USCR 2000, "Regroupment":
"Government authorities argued that the camps were a temporary measure to protect civilians from attack and deprive rebel groups of food and lodging in rural areas. Burundian officials urged international humanitarian organizations to provide food, water, sanitation, and medical care to the sites. Burundian President Pierre Buyoya visited several sites in October [1999] and stated that conditions there were better than portrayed by aid agencies. The regroupment camps were 'no dramatic situation,' he assured."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"The international community severely criticized the policy of regroupment. In January 2000, the Burundian government promised to begin closing the camps but it made little progress in doing so until early June. At that time, rebel leaders made closing the camps a precondition for peace negotiations and former South African President Nelson Mandela, facilitator for the negotiations, condemned the regroupment sites as 'concentration camps.' Under this pressure, President Pierre Buyoya agreed that everyone in the camps would be allowed to return home by the end of July."

*For an analysis on how forced displacement in 2000 of 350,000 civilians was carried out in violation of international law, including the Un Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, see HRW June 2000 "Violation of international law & Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" [link below]*
Fighting between FNL and army displaced thousands in Bujumbura Rural (2004-2008)

- Combatants of FNL fought so called FNL “dissidents”, causing displacement in October 2007
- FNL is the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government
- Population displacement reduced in 2005 compared to 2003-2004
- Little population displacement in 2006, but the populations of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural, have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL

IRIN 23 April 2008:
“The resumption of violence in and around Bujumbura is causing panic in the country. Outside the capital, residents spend their nights in the bush for fear of being attacked, as the death toll rose to 33.
A bomb destroyed part of the Vatican embassy compound and a dining hall in the Kiriri University campus on 22 April [2008].

“We call on the army to remove its heavy arms from our campus,” a student said, reacting to the installation of rocket launchers aimed at rebuffing attacks by the rebel FNL. On 18 April, attacks were launched on military positions in Gihosha, Kanyosha, Kamenge and Musaga areas.”

NRC, May 2008:
In April 2008 serious violations of the 6 September 2006 ceasefire between the Burundian Army (FDN) and the rebel group Palipehutu-FNL (FNL) occurred. The most reported events took place in the capital city, Bujumbura, where three attacks took place on April 17, 18 and 22. Violence sprung in several provinces around the country (Bujumbura Rurale, Bubanza, Cibitoke and Kayanza), but Bujumbura Rurale province has been the most affected province, witnessing displacements of population.[...]

At the peak of displacement it was reported that there were:
- 4,050 households displaced in Isale commune or 20,100 people out of 83,000 inhabitants concentrated mostly in 6 sites in the centre of the commune, Rushubi on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 5,102 households displaced in Muyira and Kirombwe, both at Kanyosha commune on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 4,305 households displaced in Kabezi centre in three different sites on May 7 (data Kabezi local administration).
- 3,166 households displaced in Gitaza centre and 1,100 in Rutongo, both at Muhuta commune (data Muhuta local administration).
- And fewer numbers of IDPs registered in Bugarama, Mutambu and Nyabiraba communes (several hundreds of households)."

IRIN, 25 October 2007:
“Fighters of Burundi’s last active rebel group have for the second time in one week attacked a position occupied by a break-away faction, forcing villagers to flee their homes, a senior military official said.
The evening raid by combatants of the Front National de Liberation (FNL), led by Agathon Rwasa, took place on 24 October [2007] evening on a site where the so-called FNL "dissidents" have gathered in Gakungwe village of Kabezi commune in Bujumbura Rural province.

It forced hundreds of people from surrounding villages to run away as the army sent reinforcements to the area to guard the splinter faction's settlement, residents said.

"There has indeed been such an attack and the heavy exchange of gunfire was heard," deputy army chief of staff Major General Godefroid Niyuhire told IRIN on 25 October. There were, however, no casualties during the attack, he said.

The "dissidents" say they fought with Rwasa for the FNL, but Rwasa's supporters have denied their claims and accused the government of creating a faction within the FNL. Rwasa has said these men, who intend to join the country's peace process, are not even party to a 2006 ceasefire agreement signed between the government and the FNL.”

**OCHA 23 June 2005:**

“Population displacement due to insecurity and armed conflict reduced markedly in the first months of the year [2005] and as compared to the period 2003-2004. Populations in the province of Bujumbura rural, where recurrent waves of displacement had taken place throughout 2004, are gradually resettling and returning to zones of origin and no sizeable population movements were registered in the first semester of the year.”

**IRIN 4 January 2005:**

“Thousands of civilians have been displaced following fierce fighting on Saturday in Burundi's western province of Bujumbura Rural.

The internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not received aid, the governor of the province, Ignace Ntawembarira, said.

Fighting was reported in the communes of Isale, Nyabiraba and Kanyosha, east of the capital, Bujumbura, between the rebel faction Forces nationales de libération (FNL) of Agathon Rwasa, and a coalition of the Burundian army and troops loyal to Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the former largest rebel faction in the country, the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces de defense pour la democratie (CNDD-FDD).”

**UNSC 27 October 2006:**

“In the period under review [August 2005-September 2006], the security situation was characterized by renewed clashes between FDN and FNL, mainly in the north-western provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural. The populations of these provinces have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL. In 2006, 107 cases of attacks and looting by FNL were reported.”

**Fighting between government and FLN troops causes the displacement of thousands in Bubanza Province (2008)**

- FNL - the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government – caused displacement at the end of 2007

**IRIN 14 January 2008:**
“About 1,400 families (8,400 people) displaced in Musigati commune in the northwestern province of Bubanza, following fighting between government forces and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), desperately need help, according to local officials.

Laurent Kagamba, adviser to the Musigati administrator, said that since the simultaneous attacks on three military positions on 28 December [2007] and another on 9 January [2008] in the same commune, residents had fled their homes. Some sought refuge in Musigati parish, others at Musigati and Kabere trade centres, as well as Busiga coffee factory, he said.”

IRIN 10 September 2007:
“Residents of 700 households, or about 4,000 people, have fled their homes in the northwest Burundi province of Bubanza following raids by suspected members of the country's last active rebel group, a government official said.

'For the time being, security is not good at all. Some residents have been beaten, while others have had their property looted,' the governor of Bubanza, Pascal Nyabenda, told IRIN.'

He said Forces nationales de libération (FNL) fighters had raided homes in Bubanza from their hideouts in the nearby Kibira and Rukoko forests. Those displaced were spending the nights in the compound of a local parish, venturing out for a few hours during the day to work in their fields, Nyabenda said.”

For information on displacement by fighting between government and FNL troops in Bubanza Province in previous years, see:
ITEKA, 9 August 2006, Burundi: Des personnes armées et des combattants du Palipehutu_Fnl mènent des attaues répétées dans certaines communes de Bubanza
ITEKA, 24 August 2005, Burundi: Des déplacés de guerre en commune Musigati sans assistance [Link below]
IRIN, 14 June 2005, Burundi: Thousands displaced in Bubanza [Link below]

Some of the Burundian refugees expelled from Tanzania have no house or land (2006)

UN 30 November 2006:
Over 3,000 Burundians who had found refuge in Tanzania were forced to return in 2006: "Many new arrivals report others being forced to leave and the 3,000 who have come back so far, only seem to be the tip of the iceberg. Nobody knows for sure how many Burundians live in Tanzania without having regularized their stay, but most estimate around 150,000 persons. This will remain a key challenge in 2007, especially since the new arrivals need assistance and in particular so-called sans addresses like Elias, who hopes that “the Burundian Government can find us a plot of land where I can build a house and send my children to school.”"

NRC November 2006:
"Since June 2006, Tanzania has been implementing a national plan for the repatriation of refugees from Tanzania. In this framework, persons without refugee status or any other legal status in Tanzania have been forcibly removed from Tanzania. This year, more than 4000 Burundians have been expelled from Tanzania, mainly from Ngara district towards Muyinga province."

See also:
UNHCR, 23 Oct 2006, Growing numbers of Burundians return home from the DRC [Internet]
Other causes of displacement

Tens of thousands were displaced due to floods (2007)

- Since November 2006, close to 300,000 people were affected by the heavy floods

IRIN 9 February 2007:

Les pluies diluviennes qui tombent depuis novembre 2006 ont détruit les cultures et infrastructures de plusieurs régions, obligeant le gouvernement à mettre en place un fonds de solidarité pour venir en aide aux déplacés victimes des inondations dans les provinces de Muyinga, Kirundo, Cankuzo, Karuzi, Kayanza, Ngozi et Muyinga. »

IRIN 15 January 2007:
“Thousands of people in northwestern Burundi, displaced after days of heavy rainfall, urgently need relief aid, officials said on Monday.

"The rains have rendered more than 3,000 residents homeless," said Prosper Banzambe, the chief of Gatumba Zone, one of the affected areas in Mitumbuzi Commune, Bujumbura Rural Province.

He said the displaced, some of whom had sought shelter in a local church, needed food and other non-food aid such as blankets, jerry cans, soap and mosquito nets.

The rains, which pounded the area at the weekend, destroyed at least 500 homes. The flooding of the nearby River Kiziba contributed to the houses’ collapse.

Banzambe expressed concern that the continuing rains could cause more damage in Gatumba and appealed for a temporary shelter for the displaced.

He urged humanitarian organisations to help the displaced, saying the local administration was unable to "adequately meet their needs".[…]

On 4 January [2007], the government set up a national solidarity fund to support people affected by floods in seven provinces. In a decree, President Pierre Nkurunziza declared the provinces of Kayanza in the north, Muramvya and Karuzi in the central part of the country, Ruyigi in the east, and Bubanza and Cibitoke in the northwest, as "hunger-stricken following floods".

He also announced the establishment of the solidarity fund, to which every Burundian must contribute for four months from the end of January.”

AFP 16 January 2007:
“Heavy rains pounding Burundi’s capital and outlying areas have killed at least four people and left about 23,000 homeless since the downpours began last month, officials said Tuesday.
They said the situation was "catastrophic" after the floods destroyed farmlands, sparking fears of food shortages and disease outbreaks in the tiny central African nation emerging from more than a decade of civil strife."

Famine in north and east causes internal displacement (2005-2006)

- Many of the people who flee due to food insecurity are newly repatriated refugees

OCHA 16 January 2005:
“[R]esidents of Northern provinces continue to flee inside and outside Burundi due to food insecurity. As of 14 January [2005], a joint visit conducted by OCHA Ruyigi sub office and the provincial administration authorities confirmed the presence in Kabuyenye IDP site, in Gisuru Commune, of 63 families who fled Busoni and Bugabira communes (Kirundo Province) in search of food. OCHA, in collaboration with the administration authorities convened a meeting with humanitarian actors in the province to discuss an emergency response.”

OCHA 23 June 2005:
“Cycles of drought periods, loss of staple crops, poor yields during three consecutive agriculture seasons and fragile nutritional conditions were particularly important in the northern Burundian provinces, which were also affected by waves of population movements both internal and across the border into Rwanda.”

OCHA 5 March 2005:
“Despite food aid distributed by WFP and partners, the food security situation remains disconcerting mainly in Northern and Eastern provinces. Continuous internal and cross-border displacement of the population continues to be part of the coping strategies. Around 7,900 Burundian asylum seekers were reported in Tanzania. Meanwhile, 131 internally displaced persons were registered in Cankuzo coming from Kirundo. However, many more internal movements remain unrecorded.”

ITEKA 21 February 2006:
“La plupart de ces migrants sont de nouveaux rapatriés qui n'ont pas eu où s'installer. Ils sont en train de migrer à la quête de quoi manger. Malheureusement, la population de la province de Cankuzo a également faim et ne peut pas les aider. Les prix des vivres montent chaque jour.”
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Conflict and displacement: background and development

Ethnic background and pre-colonial times

- Total population: 7.1 million
- Composite population comprising Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%) and Batwa (1%)(colonial census)
- Numerous interrelations between the ethnic groups (marriage, language, common monarchy)
- The Batwa are most likely the most ancient ethnic group in Burundi but they are marginalized in Burundi society

AFP 25 February 2005:
“GEOGRAPHY: Landlocked in central Africa, bounded by Rwanda in the north, Tanzania to the east and south, and the vast Democratic Republic of Congo to the west. One of the smallest states on the African continent, Burundi covers 27,834 square kilometers (10,747 square miles).

- POPULATION: 7.1 million, of which around 85 percent are Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi. The remaining one percent of the population are pygmies called Twas. One of the most densely populated African countries.

- CAPITAL: Bujumbura (population 300,000)

- LANGUAGES: Kirundi (national), French (administrative), Swahili (local)

- RELIGION: Christian (70 percent); Animist (15 percent); Muslim (15 percent).”

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 15-17:
"Burundi is situated in Central Africa, along Lake Tanganyika and shares borders with Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. […] According to statistics dating back to the 1930s, 85 per cent of the population are Hutu, 14 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Batwa. The Hutu are considered to originate from Chad and the Niger, while the Tutsi, of Nilo-ethiopian origin, are thought to come from eastern Africa. The Batwa originate from the Congo Basin (Pygmies). This breakdown does not take into account the Ganwa (those of princely origin), nor a handful of other immigrant communities, nor those of mixed origins (mixed marriages having been common in the past). […] It also does not take into account the fact that within both groups there existed historically rankings of status nor that passage from one group to another, for instance becoming Tutsi from Hutu or Ganwa, was also possible. The Burundians all speak the same language, Kirundi, which is both the national and the official language. Other languages, as provided for in the Constitution, are also spoken. […] Despite ethnic differences, the Burundians live intermingled on the thousands of hills of the country without distinction on account of ethnicity. They are therefore inextricably bound to one another and cannot contemplate any notions of separation.

Although settlements have always been mixed, society in Burundi […] was built along a ‘class’ and ‘caste’ system. […] While their distinctions were not rigidly determined along ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ lines, […] there was significant correlation between class and ethnicity, with the Tutsis associated with the upper class and the Hutus with the lower class. This did not mean that all Tutsis were
upper class nor all Hutus lower class. Both class and the ethnic correlations were also dynamic. A Hutu could rise economically and socially and become a 'Tutsi'.

Hutu and Tutsi relationships were in the past cemented by their shared loyalty to common institutions. Kingship was such an institution; patron-client ties constituted another powerful socio-political institution. Patrons were expected to offer protection and gifts in exchange for services and offerings in kind. As social and political roles that once gave meaning and cohesion to membership in the community vanished, the use of the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' with ethnic connotations became more rigid. [...] Today the use of the term 'Hutu' describes an ethnic group which is poorer and powerless, whereas the Tutsi, especially the Hima (a Tutsi subgroup), are the pre-eminent power holders. [...] Nevertheless, the impression should not be created that the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' are figments as the "official truth" during the Bagaza period (1976-1987) would have it. This stance restricted discussion on the underlying problems of ethnicity and expression of ethnic differences without solving them."

CHR 19 March 2001, para. 100:
"La situation de la minorité twa mérite une attention particulière que malheureusement elle ne reçoit pas toujours. Les Twas sont sans doute le noyau le plus ancien de la population burundaise, comme dans d'autres pays des Grands Lacs; ils constituent aujourd'hui environ 1 % de la population."

Colonial rule and military regimes (1899-1992)

- 1962: Burundi becomes independent
- 25 years of a Tutsi dominated military dictatorship
- The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power
- 1980: creation of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu) by activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community in refugee camps in Tanzania

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 19-24:
"The transition from traditional power structures to 'modern' politics has by no means been an easy one. Two Ganwa (princely) dynasties continued fighting for control during the era of the colonial Powers, (first Germany from 1889 to 1918, then Belgium until 1962) as they had done during the pre-colonial era. The Party of Unity and National Progress (Uprona) was dominated by the Ganwa Bezi, while the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was led by the Ganwa Batare. In the legislative elections of September 1961 Uprona won, with Prince Rwagasoré as Prime Minister designate. A month later, however, Rwagaseré was assassinated. The political game switched from Ganwa to Hutu and Tutsi hands for the first time.

Burundi gained its independence from Belgium in July 1962. Until 1966 the crown continued to stabilize the situation. Violent incidents erupted after the elections in 1966, following which the Prime Minister, Michel Micombero, a Tutsi of the Hima group from Bururi, [...] overthrew the monarchy and declared a republic, concentrating power in the army. The National Assembly was dissolved and later replaced with a committee of officers, which, by 1971, was made up of 24 Tutsi and 3 Hutu, and Uprona was declared the sole party. Serious intra-Tutsi rivalries for power emerged. At this time Hutu were already being systematically purged from the army. The transition from a Ganwa-run kingdom to a Tutsi-dominated military dictatorship to the exclusion of Hutus caused more violence. For the next 25 years Tutsi factions fought over control, turning the Hutu into scapegoats whenever the Hutu would rise up and demand more equitable power-
sharing. On the other hand, whenever efforts towards power-sharing were made, extremists from both groups would resort to violence, to delay or cancel them.

Massacres had taken place in 1965 and 1967, but the most serious ones took place in 1972 triggered by Hutu militants from the Burundian refugee community in Tanzania. Hundreds if not thousands of Tutsi were killed and there is widespread fear that what had happened to Rwanda's Tutsi, namely, systematic subjection and extermination, would happen to them too. The Tutsi retaliation and repression that followed were instant. The first victims were Hutus with education: secondary school and university students, teachers, nurses, doctors, priests, pastors, drivers, headmasters, businessmen, shopkeepers, civil servants, bank clerks, professors. Most Hutu families lost members. Hutu widows moved to the city outskirts when their houses were seized by Tutsi. Many Tutsis also fled. Many left the interior, where they felt frightened among Hutu neighbours, and moved to Bujumbura to fill the many jobs now vacant. Others rushed to occupy the flat, fertile, palm-oil-producing strip of lake shore south of Bujumbura, after the flight of very many Hutu who had been living there. Reports have spoken of genocidal acts and of hundreds of thousands of Hutus killed. […]

These events had great reverberations in Burundi; yet, nothing was ever done about the massacres. There has never been an official inquiry into them, an accounting, or any effort to bring to justice those responsible for the killings. Thereafter there was no question of Hutus entering the army, and many refused to send their children to school, fearing they were exposing them to a future massacre. Those at school had no role models. The educated, competent, urban were all Tutsi. That there was a "lost" Hutu generation is still evident today in the political life of the country.

There was little power-sharing following the massacres, even after Micombero was overthrown by his deputy chief of staff, Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, also a Hima (Tutsi subgroup). There were no massacres during Bagaza's 11-year rule and many refugees returned home. Bagaza reportedly hoped development would push his country through the ethnic deadlock. Observers note that he engaged in a series of reforms, without, however, addressing the ethnic issue. […] All provincial governors were Tutsi and most judges, university and school teachers, magistrates and heads of hospitals were Tutsi too. Upron'a remained a Tutsi party and its members were the ones to benefit mostly from Bagaza's management of the economy. In the last years of the Bagaza regime corruption and nepotism reportedly flourished. […] In the meantime, in 1980 activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community formed the Palipehutu, or the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People, in refugee camps in Tanzania. Bagaza was himself deposed in 1987 by a group of army officers and a cousin of his and nephew of Micombero, Major Pierre Buyoya, became President.

In August 1988 frustrated Hutu hopes for an improvement were at the root of hundreds of ethnic killings. Thousands were killed. This time the regions most affected were Ntenga commune in Kirundo province and Marangara commune in Ngozi province, both bordering Rwanda. Palipehutu members from Rwanda had been infiltrating into Burundi and sporadic fights were taking place until Hutus turned against the Tutsi community, many of them Rwandan refugees. The army pursued those assumed responsible (although it is unclear how much resistance these people who had no guns put up against the soldiers) […] and in the next eight days it reportedly killed large numbers of civilians, including women and children. More than 60,000 people poured into Rwanda across the swamps and the Akanyaru river. Others took refuge within Burundi in swamp areas. The massacres were surprising even to the Burundians. Hutu had to face the fact that the army was still prepared to use maximum force and Tutsi that Hutu could still massacre many Tutsi before soldiers reached the scene."

**ACTS 30 September 2004:**
“Despite the popular conception of the conflict as a Hutu-Tutsi struggle, most scholars agree that the protracted conflict is structural in nature, though articulated in ethnic terms. The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power.’ Governance practices by successive regimes galvanized political power and state control in the hands of a small elite group within the Tutsi community from particular parts of the country, who have since sustained their hold on power through repressive policies. Efforts by the Tutsi elite to retain political control and associated patronage networks, and violent counter-strategies of the Hutu political and armed groups have precipitated ethnic massacres and retaliatory radicalism marked by acts of genocide.”

Civil war and Peace Process in Burundi (1993-2008)

- 1993: Assassination of elected President Ndadaye triggers large-scale inter-ethnic violence
- 1996: Coup installs President Buyoya; sanctions imposed by neighbouring countries
- Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi signed in August 2000
- 2005: signing of ceasefire agreement between FNL and government; adoption of new constitution
- Local, legislative and presidential elections was held in various phases in 2005
- Security sector was profoundly restructured and the army is now ethnically balanced (2006)
- Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and FRODEBU – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence (2006)
- As of April 2008: the FNL had withdrawn

AFP 1 June 2005, factfile:
“...The civil war begun in 1993 has killed an estimated 300,000 people.[...]

Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu president, elected in June 1993, was assassinated on October 21 of the same year during a failed coup organized by Tutsi military officers.

His successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira -- another Hutu -- was killed in April 1994 at the same time as then Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana died under suspicious circumstances when his plane was shot down over Kigali, sparking the genocide of up to a million Tutsis and Hutu moderates in Rwanda.

Ntaryamira's successor, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, also a Hutu, was overthrown in a non-violent coup in July 1996, and [Pierre "Buyoya returned to power.

In 1998, Buyoya reformed the constitution to create a transition government and began peace talks with Hutu and Tutsi opposition groups.

In August 2000 a peace agreement including a power-sharing deal was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, but the two main armed rebel groups refused to participate in the talks. Civil war continued to rage.

In November 2001, Buyoya took over as transitional leader for a period of 18 months, seconded by a Hutu vice-president whose signature is required on all presidential texts pertaining to security and the armed forces.
A 26-member power-sharing government was also sworn in to oversee the three-year transition. Buyoya was succeeded at the head of the transition government in May 2003 by his vice president Domitien Ndayizeye, who is seconded by a Tutsi, Alphonse Marie Kadage.

A ceasefire agreement was signed in December 2002 by the government and the main Hutu rebel movement, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), which finally entered government in November 2003.

A second Hutu armed group, the National Liberation Forces (FNL), finally signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on May 15, but the details of how this be implemented have still not yet been resolved.

A new constitution was adopted at the end of February, aimed at bringing about a peaceful democracy and ending the reign of the Tutsie tribe in power. Opposition has been voiced only by Tutsis concerned at losing too much power.”

**HRW 4 November 2005:**
“Elections in 2005 were the final chapter in the transitional process established by the Arusha Accords of 2000. In the intervening period a government including the Hutudominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu), the Tutsi-dominated National Unity and Progress Party (Uprona), and a number of smaller parties ruled the country. In late 2003 this government signed the Pretoria Protocol making peace with the CNDDFDD and starting the process of integrating the former rebels into the army and the administration.”

For more detailed information on 1993 events, see “Profile in displacement” (Report of the Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, 28 November 1994), paras. 29-36) [External link]

**ICG 30 November 2006:**
“In elections held between June and August 2005, the voters of Burundi elected their first democratic government since 1993. This marked an end to the transitional government established by the Arusha Agreement in 2001. The mainly Hutu former rebels of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), led by Pierre Nkurunziza, won a resounding victory and hold 58 per cent of the seats in parliament and 57 per cent in the communal councils, as well as twelve of the twenty government ministries. Nkurunziza was inaugurated as president on 26 August 2005.

The elections radically reconfigured politics. Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence. In the run-up to the elections, rebel forces were integrated into the national army, police and intelligence service. For the fist time in Burundian history, these forces were ethnically balanced. Nkurunziza’s government faced considerable challenges. Foremost was the process of transforming the CNDDFDD from a rebel movement into a democratic political party in power – one whose members had little civil administration experience. The government had to reconstruct an economy devastated by more than a decade of civil war and economic embargo, during which per capita income fell by 35 per cent and the number of people living below the poverty line doubled. During its first year it also had to deal with security problems in the capital and surrounding provinces caused by the remaining rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL. Unfortunately, the government’s response to these challenges has increasingly manifested itself in disregard for the rule of law.”

**UNSC 28 November 2007:**
"The signing of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the armed group Palipehutu-Forces nationales de libération (FNL) led by Agathon Rwasa on 7 September 2006 was a decisive step in the peace process in Burundi. However, its implementation remains difficult owing to persisting disagreements among the parties. The Agreement, which was the outcome of determined efforts of regional States united under the auspices of the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, addresses a number of issues including the integration of FNL ex-combatants into the Burundian National Defence Forces (FDN) and security forces, the participation of FNL elements in the institutions of the country and the rapid demobilization and reintegration of children associated with this armed group into their respective families and communities. Under the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism was established to oversee the demobilization of FNL combatants.

The signing of the Agreement was followed at first by a significant improvement in the security situation, characterized notably by a decrease both in the number of abuses perpetrated by armed groups and in the number of alleged FNL militants arrested by the National Defence Forces and the National Police of Burundi.”

PBC, 19 March 2008:
"[T]he Palipehutu-FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. In response, a Political Directorate had been established to assist the Mechanism in efforts to regain FNL's participation.”

IRIN, 14 January 2008:
"The FNL, the last rebel movement still active in Burundi, has resumed fighting government forces, especially in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza, where it is most active.

Though the movement signed a ceasefire accord with the government in September 2006, it has not been fully implemented. The joint verification and monitoring mechanism, which oversees its implementation, suspended activities in July 2007 after the FNL delegates walked out of talks over security concerns. They have since been accusing the facilitator, South African safety minister Charles Nqakula, of bias.”

ISS 3 April 2008:
"After intense diplomatic pressure from regional governments and the international community Burundi’s last rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL, has been brought back to the negotiating table that drew up a new roadmap designed to end the standoff by the end of June 2008. This breakthrough was reached in a February 23 meeting in Cape Town, South Africa. The meeting was attended by special envoys to Burundi from Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa, as well as representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.

The Cape Town meeting had been called to save the Burundi peace process after the FNL withdrew from its implementation, alleging bias on the part of the facilitator, South Africa’s Security Minister Charles Nqakula. To help address this challenge Minister Nqakula has followed the example of other peace processes by establishing a Group of Special Envoys for Burundi (GSEB), representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.”

Delrue August 2006:
"The success of Burundi’s transition to peace hinges on how its new government (elected in August 2005 and headed by former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza) and the international community deal with such post- displacement issues as land and property claims, reconciliation and transitional justice."
The link between displacement, return, reconciliation and successful transition towards a consolidated peace is frequently either underestimated or neglected by the international community.

For a comprehensive analysis of the political situation in Burundi, see

HRW, 12 March 2008:
“Several opposition politicians have been threatened and targeted for violence during the last 18 months. Nzomukunda, then second vice-president of the republic, fled Burundi in September 2006 after issuing a letter critical of the government; she returned in March 2007. Five parliamentarians from the opposition party Front for Democracy in Burundi (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi, Frodebu) and from a dissident wing of the CNDD-FDD, including Mpawenayo, were targeted in a set of grenade attacks in August 2007 that injured several bystanders. Pancrace Cimpaye, Frodebu spokesperson, was detained after suggesting the ruling party bore responsibility for the August attacks; after being released, he briefly left the country. In February 2008, a local Frodebu official was killed, while another was seriously injured in a grenade attack which killed his wife and child.”

See also:
IRIN, BURUNDI: Government of consensus formed, 15 November 2007 [Internet]
ICG, 28 August 2007, Burundi: Finalising peace with the FNL [Internet]
Secretary-General welcomes signing of Burundi ceasefire agreement, United Nations Secretary General, 8 September 2006 [Internet]

Progress in regard to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (2005-2008)

- Reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression
- About 5,000 UN peacekeepers were in Burundi from June 2004 to the end of 2006, to monitor the country's transition to democracy, with South Africa contributing the majority of troops.
- The new Burundian government saw the peacekeepers as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible (2006)
- A new UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) continued the process of peace consolidation and of coordinating the UN system’s activities in Burundi from 2007

ISS 13 October 2006:
“In Burundi, reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, signed in August 2000 by 17 political parties, the National
Assembly and the government and the 2003 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Burundi and the principal rebel group, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), do include important provisions on the organization, structure, mandates and composition of postconflict security forces that will act professionally and apolitically, adhere to human rights norms, and provide defence and security to all Burundians.[…]

Although the Arusha Accords were signed in August 2000, the implementation of the security sector reform process they articulate was largely delayed until 2003, mainly because of continued warfare throughout most of Burundi. Indeed, the most active rebel movements in the field were marginalized throughout the Arusha negotiations and were thus not signatories to the Accord. Accordingly, it was not until the signing of a ceasefire between the government and the main rebel group – the CNDD-FDD – in 2003 that the reform process was set in motion. By July 2006, however, the reform of the defence and security forces had reached an advanced stage and had achieved most of its structural objectives (i.e. the integration of several armed groups into a single military and single police force), despite various financial- and material-related challenges.

The process of integrating the former rebel groups and the FAB into a new national defence force, the Forces de Défense Nationale (FDN), has been completed – largely to the satisfaction of the government and international donors – despite its late start due to disagreements on the definition of combatant and on the harmonization of rank between the rebel movements and the regular army.[…]

Despite this progress, a preliminary assessment of the reform of the FDN and the PNB and progress in the domain of social and economic reintegration and re-insertion of former combatants suggests that serious challenges remain in these critical areas. The local media frequently report human rights violations perpetrated by on-duty military or police or by demobilized combatants.

**Tufts University 30 July 2006:**

“The new Burundian government saw ONUB as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible. This perception was aggravated by two unfortunate choices made by leaders of the UN mission: to support Frodebu and former President Ndayizeye during the electoral campaign and proposing to coordinate the transition from humanitarian aid to development through a “Partners Council” deliberating without the government.”

**UNSC 18 December 2006:**

“Meanwhile, as delays in the start of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants have continued, criminal activities against the population, reportedly committed by FNL combatants, have increased since late October. Skirmishes between the national security forces and alleged FNL combatants and detentions of FNL elements and supporters have reportedly resumed in the north-western provinces. FNL recruitment, including of youths, has also been reported, particularly in Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural provinces.[…]

Once deployed, the AU special task force would therefore be expected to assume the responsibilities that were allocated to ONUB under the ceasefire agreement, namely: (a) protection of designated assembly areas for FNL combatants; (b) provision of engineering, logistical and administrative support for the establishment of the assembly areas; (c) disarmament of combatants; (d) storage of weapons collected from the disarmament process and their subsequent destruction; (e) transportation of disarmed FNL combatants from assembly areas to the designated demobilization centre or integration facilities of the National Defence Forces; and (f) protection of the demobilization centres. […]
Further delays in the agreement’s implementation, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants, are likely to lead to more friction between these combatants and the population and the national security services. In addition, there was an increase in localized conflicts involving the small FNL faction led by Jean Bosco Sindayigaya, which did not sign the ceasefire agreement.”

DPKO 20 December 2006:
“A new United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), authorized by Security Council resolution 1719 earlier this year, will continue the process of peace consolidation and be in charge of coordinating the United Nations system’s activities in Burundi for an initial period of one year.”

The mandate of BINUB is extended until 31 December 2008 (UNSC, 19 December 2007).

See also:
Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 31 Aug 2006
A technical analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - a case study from Burundi [Internet]


- Peace Building Commission approved in December 2007 a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation

UNSC 18 December 2006, para.22:
“Significant progress has been made in the establishment of peacebuilding coordination mechanisms between the Government and the United Nations. On 7 November, the Government created an Inter-Ministerial Peacebuilding Steering Committee, which will work with the United Nations, within the framework of an initial joint mechanism, in preparing the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission and the peacebuilding priority plan to be submitted to the Peacebuilding Fund. The inaugural meeting of the Government-United Nations joint mechanism was held on 16 November [2006], followed by several sessions at the policy and working levels. As a result, a common understanding was reached on the steps to be taken by the Government, with United Nations support, to secure resources from the Peacebuilding Fund. Progress was also made in developing the Government’s presentation to the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission. The mission of the Peacebuilding Support Office to Burundi in mid-November [2006] and the meetings it had with the United Nations and the Government’s Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee contributed significantly to this process.”

UNGA 5 December 2007:
“With a long-awaited conflict-recovery and development strategy for Burundi now in place, the Peacebuilding Commission today approved a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation -- both locally and in New York -- in priority areas
such as justice and security sector reform, generating jobs and making radical improvements to governance.

Meeting in its special “Burundi Configuration”, the Commission adopted the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism (MTM) of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. That Framework -- in place since June -- is the country-led integrated peacebuilding strategy now guiding the engagement and dialogue between Bujumbura, the United Nations and other international partners.

The Framework identified key objectives, major challenges and threats to peace, especially the implementation of a stagnant ceasefire agreement between Burundi and the National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL). Promoting inclusive growth, employment, transparency and human rights were among its other top priorities.”

See also:
Brookings Institution, 13 March 2008, The Role of Civil Society in Ending Displacement and Peacebuilding, by Elizabeth Ferris [Internet]

United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI), 12 Dec 2006 [Link below]

Peacebuilding Commission holds day-long discussion on Burundi, agrees on fund’s use to bolster government’s priority plan [Internet]

Challenges facing Burundi, requiring international help, indicated at country-specific meetings of Peacebuilding Commission [Internet]

Burundi government signs Nairobi pact including protocol on IDPs (December 2006)

MONUC 18 December 2006:
"With the signing of the Nairobi pact this Friday December 15 2006 by DRC, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, it paves the way for security, stability and development in the region, after years of conflict.

Many African state leaders, including DRC president Joseph Kabila were in Nairobi Kenya for the two day summit that will go a long way to bringing the region out of the vicious cycle of humanitarian disaster, poverty, and repeated conflict.[…]

The Great Lakes pact includes a $225 million security action plan to disarm rebel groups in Eastern DRC, and along border areas in Sudan, Kenya and Uganda.[…]

Ms. Besida Tonwe, the Head of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in Central and East Africa, said that the conference was a long process of consultations in helping the Great Lakes Region to reconcile, rehabilitate, and reconstruct their societies in a politically delicate process.

‘It is also a process which in the future will continue to require financial support from the donor community and coherent assistance from the humanitarian community. It is now of utmost importance that there is a follow-up on the national implementation of the legal protocols adopted with the pact,’ she said.
‘The three protocols on humanitarian and social issues addressing sexual violence against women and children, property rights of returning persons, and the protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), are of the utmost importance,’ she concluded.”

IDMC 14 December 2006:
“The Pact is a culmination of more than four years of regional negotiations among States. It contains a package of measures which promises to enhance the lives of the forcibly displaced, including a regional protocol on protection and assistance for internally displaced, which when signed, will be the first legally binding regional instrument specifically dealing with IDPs anywhere in the world. A regional protocol on property rights of returning populations, and protocols which address some of the root causes of flight in the Great Lakes are also key elements of the Pact.”


- Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development

ISS 27 May 2005:
“Aside from calling for a cessation to violent conflict, the Arusha Accords [Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 28 August 2000]. provide comprehensive recommendations for stabilising and rehabilitating a highly polarised Burundian nation. The agreement is composed of five protocols each dedicated to a particular theme intended to move the process from peace-making to peace-building. These themes consist of an outline of the nature of the conflict; democracy and good governance; peace and security; reconstruction and development; and guarantees on the implementation of the agreement.

Importantly, the accords acknowledge that the Burundian ‘conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions... and stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power.’

Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development. It is therefore the ‘litmus test’ against which the performance of the transitional government (and other actors) as it relates to Arusha’s recommendations can be assessed.

Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Refugees and Sinistrés
The main conclusion and recommendations of Protocol IV states that:

‘Through the Burundi Peace Negotiations at Arusha it has been possible to assess how seriously the political and ethnic crisis that has torn Burundi apart since independence has affected Burundian society. Hundreds of thousands of Burundians are refugees, some of them for more than 25 years.

Hundreds of thousands more are forced to live in camps where conditions are appalling…. All Burundians are aware that a lasting peace is impossible so long as a definitive solution is not found to the problem of refugees and sinistrés. Likewise, peace is impossible so long as the country’s wealth is not shared equitably. Burundi cannot help the sinistrés rebuild destroyed property and restore its economy without the assistance of the international community.’"
The UN concluded that there was a strong indication that the FLN had not acted alone in the massacre of Congolese refugees (2004-2005)

- One year of after the Gatumba massacre, those responsible remain free

**IRIN 5 Jan 2005:**
“The FNL claimed responsibility for a massacre in August of 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees at Gatumba transit camp on the Burundi side of the border with the DRC. The UN is continuing to investigate whether armed groups on the DRC side of the border, which are aligned to FNL, also took part.”

**UNSC 15 November 2004:**
“As requested by the Security Council by its presidential statement of 15 August 2004 (S/PRST/2004/30), ONUB, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights conducted a joint investigation into the massacre on 13 August of 152 Congolese refugees at the Gatumba refugee camp, located close to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The results of the investigation were transmitted to the Council by my letter to the President of the Council dated 15 October (S/2004/821). Despite extensive investigation, there is no clear evidence of who organized, carried out and financed that gross atrocity. The FNL (Rwasa) claim of responsibility has been supported by witness statements and led United Nations investigators to believe that the group did, indeed, participate in the attack. There is however, a strong indication that FNL (Rwasa) did not act alone. Unfortunately, the dearth of verifiable information and limited cooperation by the Burundian authorities hampered the formulation of a definitive report. A national investigation is still ongoing.”

**AI 18 August 2005:**
“On the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre, which took place in August 2004, Amnesty International calls on the forthcoming government of Burundi and the international community to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.

‘The new government should undertake to set up an independent and impartial body to investigate this and other massacres and those found to be responsible should be held to account,’ Amnesty International said today.

During the night of 13 August 2004, the refugee camp of Gatumba, located near the Congolese border, was attacked by an armed group. More than 160 Congolese refugees, predominantly children and women members of the Banyamulenge ethnic group from South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (DRC), were deliberately and systematically killed. On 14 August, the Palipehutu-FNL (Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu -- Forces nationales de libération) claimed responsibility for the killings. The same day, the governments of Burundi and Rwanda and delegates of the Banyamulenge communities accused Congolese and Rwandese armed political groups based in the DRC of involvement in the massacre. According to UN investigators, evidence of the presence of ‘other groups’ was credible, but they were not able to categorically identify them.

Human rights organizations and the United Nations have strongly condemned this massacre and called for an independent, impartial and comprehensive investigation. Given the alleged involvement of armed political groups based in the DRC, there was concern that the killing could lead to a military intervention in the DRC by Burundi and Rwanda. Such an intervention could have led to further human rights abuses in the DRC.
Since then, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Burundian authorities have moved a few refugees to the Mwaro province, farther away from the border, others have returned to the DRC, while many others have moved to Bujumbura. So far, despite the indication from the Burundian Minister of Justice that the national investigation into the Gatumba massacre was completed, the United Nations Operations in Burundi stressed in a recent statement that, 'no investigation report has been issued by the government [of Burundi] and the authors of the attack remain free'.

See also United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 13 Aug 2005
Burundi: Statement on the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre [Internet]

Causes of displacement


United Nations Resident Coordinator System for Burundi 1998, p. 5:

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<td>An estimated 200,000 Burundians flee from progroms and communal violence; many seek refuge in Tanzania, where most remain to this day.</td>
<td>To escape the violence that broke out following the assassination of President Ndadaye, nearly 200,000 people leave the hills to seek protection in sites grouped around military posts. A vast majority are still there.</td>
<td>The escalation of the civil conflict sparks massive population movements; the northwestern province of Cibitoke, sandwiched between the rebel bases in the mountainous Kibira forest and in neighboring Kivu, is particularly unstable. Large numbers seek refuge in neighboring Zaire (150,000) and Tanzania (250,000). Up to 400,000 congregate in sites inside the country.</td>
<td>In the wake of the conquest of Zaire by the Kabila-led alliance, most of the refugees in Kivu return to Burundi, where they swell the numbers living in the displaced camps on the north-western provinces, particularly Cibitoke.</td>
<td>As a military strategy to regain control of rebel-held territory, the authorities forcibly regroup 250,000 civilians in Karuzi, Kanyanza and Muramvya provinces. Nearly all of them return home by the end of 1997, but the policy of controlled population movements continues to be implemented in other, more short-term forms elsewhere in the country.</td>
<td>Following the loss of their bases in the Kivu, the rebels regroup in Tanzania, and the main theatre of operations shifts to the southwest, along the ridge of the Nile-Congo watershed that is the main conduit into and out of the country for guerrilla groups. The ensuing destabilization leads to large scale displacement to new sites, again mainly along the main tarmac roads of the western plain, not only</td>
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<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>As the military gradually established control in certain areas, the authorities begin to dismantle the big sites near main roads or major towns and create smaller, decentralized sites grouped around advanced military positions in the hills (Cibitoke, parts of Bururi, Bubanza). Elsewhere, short-term regroupment operations continue to be implemented in response to localized destabilization (Bujumbura Rural)</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>Nearly all the sites in Cibitoke province, for so long the most unstable part of the country, are dismantled by June and the people return to their hills. At almost the same time, the crisis in neighboring Congo produces an influx of some eleven thousand people, which continues up to present.</td>
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Causes of internal displacement: an analysis by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (1998)

- Pervasive psychology of "flee or be killed" is a lasting legacy of the 1972 massacres and the 1993 upheavals
- Displacement has also been used as a deliberate goal of violence since 1993
- Massive retaliation by the armed forces
- Suspicion towards the displaced population creates more displacement
- Use of violence and displacement as a way to achieve political or economical objectives

USCR 1998a, pp. 32-33:
"A history of massacres has taught the people of Burundi, regardless of their ethnicity, that their personal survival hinges on their ability to flee and seek a safer place temporarily. For many peasant Burundians, the lesson of the past is that violence can erupt suddenly and can rapidly become all-encompassing. It is a lesson handed down from generation to generation. Some of the underlying causes of internal displacement in Burundi follow:

First, a pervasive psychology of 'flee or be killed' has become the lasting legacy of the 1972 slaughter and the 1993 upheaval. The 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda has reinforced the psychology of flight in Burundi.

Second, the smaller massacres that have occurred almost daily since 1994 serve to validate the historical lessons of fear and mistrust. Fear is also ingrained that large number of Burundians have learned to flee their homes not only in reaction to danger but also in anticipation of it.

Third, much of Burundi's displacement since 1993 has been caused by «ethnic cleansing.» Displacement is no longer merely as accidental by-product of violence; it has become a deliberate goal of violence.

Fourth, both ethnic groups of Burundi regard themselves as vulnerable. The sense of vulnerability has become an important part of the self-identity. Hutu are demographically dominant but see themselves as vulnerable to the political and military power of Tutsi. Tutsi are politically and militarily powerful but view themselves as vulnerable to the demographic dominance of Hutu. Members of both ethnic groups regard themselves as victims, despite the fact that many massacres in Burundian history have been largely one-sided.

Fifth, a pattern is evident in many violent eruptions over the decades: regardless of how violence begins, there is almost always massive retaliation against the Hutu by the Tutsi-dominated
military. As a result, many Hutu instinctively flee at the mere sight of soldiers or at the distant sound of their vehicles. The country's forces of order, unfortunately, create new disorder and displacement – deliberately in some cases, inadvertently in others.

Sixth, population displacement in Burundi often exacerbates rather than alleviates the conflict. Uprooted Burundians of one ethnic group are often regarded as dangerous by members of the other ethnic group. The military suspects that many internally displaced Hutu are rebels. Many Hutu suspect that camps of displaced Tutsi are bases for militia activity. There is some truth to these mutual suspicions. The result is that displacement at times begets more violence, causing still more people to flee. In short – at least in Burundi – displacement causes more displacement.

These are only partial explanations of the population displacement in Burundi, of course. This review of Burundi’s history indicates that some actors create violence and displacement as a way to achieve political control by force that they are unable to achieve or maintain through nonviolent means. Some elements in Burundi create violence and displacement for the economic rewards it brings them through banditry, confiscation of property, and skimming of relief aid. Still other Burundians commits violence and force displacement based on pure fear or hate, reinforced by decades of grievances, real or imagined.”


- 1996: government policy to move civilian populations into "regroupment" camps
- 1997: end of the large-scale, long-term "regroupment" policy
- 1998: short-term forced movement of populations continues, particularly in unstable western provinces
- Since September 1999, over 350,000 people were forcibly moved by government forces to 53 regroupment camps to deprive insurgent groups of local support
- Government explained that regroupment camps were established to protect civilians from the rebels
- Dismantlement of regroupment camps was precondition to peace negotiations and camps were dismantled by mid-2000

USCR 2000 "regroupment"
"Burundian authorities have pursued two waves of forced population relocation, or regroupment. The first regroupment wave occurred during 1996-98 when the government moved at least a quarter-million Hutu into 50 camps scattered throughout the country. Some observers estimated that up to 800,000 persons lived in the regroupment camps at that time. Most regroupment sites closed during 1998, allowing occupants to return home."

HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":
Renewed Regroupment (1999-2000)
"In July and August 1999, the rebels launched increasingly frequent and damaging raids in and around Bujumbura, killing dozens of civilians as well as some soldiers. The army retaliated with attacks that killed more than one hundred civilians as well as combatants and the government tightened an existing curfew. These measures failed to satisfy Tutsi extremists in Bujumbura who demanded more drastic action to protect the city and to repress the rebellion. With rumors circulating of a possible coup and of violence being organized by extremists, the government decided to impose a policy of regroupment on most of Bujumbura-rural, particularly on areas inhabited largely by Hutu and near the city."

HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":
"In mid-1999, it [the government] had revived the regroupment policy in parts of southeastern Burundi before deciding to extend it to the area of the capital in September."

**HRW June 2000, "Summary":**
"The Tutsi-dominated government of Burundi, combating rebellions among the Hutu majority, began forcing civilians in the area around the capital into so-called "protection sites" or "regroupment camps" beginning in late September 1999. Burundian authorities claimed the measure was intended to protect the civilians, most of them Hutu, from attack by the rebel National Liberation Forces (Forces Nationales pour la Libération, FNL) who were becoming increasingly well-entrenched in the area. In fact, they meant to deprive the FNL of support from local people who helped them, sometimes willingly, sometimes under duress. By removing civilian support, the authorities hoped to isolate the FNL and thus reduce its increasingly frequent attacks on the capital. They hoped also to quiet Tutsi extremists who accused them of weakness in confronting the rebel threat."

**HRW June 2000, "Summary":**
"By the end of 1999, authorities had obliged some 80 percent of the population of the province of Bujumbura-rural-some 350,000 people-to live in fifty-three camps. Although regroupment helped reduce attacks on the capital city, rebels remained firmly established in rural areas. They simply shifted from one place to another when attacked by the army, which had insufficient troops available to control the whole region at the same time. Rebels continued to live off the crops of local people and even to inhabit the houses of those forced to live in the camps.

**USCR 2000, "Regroupment":**
"The country included at least three types of internal displacement: up to 200,000 people, primarily rural Tutsi, who have lived for six years in designated camps protected by government soldiers and thousands, who have become displaced in the countryside or at makeshift sites for varying lengths of time; and nearly 350,000 Hutu whom the government required to live in so-called 'regroupment' camps."


**USCR 2000, "Regroupment":**
"Government authorities argued that the camps were a temporary measure to protect civilians from attack and deprive rebel groups of food and lodging in rural areas. Burundian officials urged international humanitarian organizations to provide food, water, sanitation, and medical care to the sites. Burundian President Pierre Buyoya visited several sites in October [1999] and stated that conditions there were better than portrayed by aid agencies. The regroupment camps were 'no dramatic situation,' he assured."

**HRW June 2000, "Summary":**
"The international community severely criticized the policy of regroupment. In January 2000, the Burundian government promised to begin closing the camps but it made little progress in doing so until early June. At that time, rebel leaders made closing the camps a precondition for peace negotiations and former South African President Nelson Mandela, facilitator for the negotiations, condemned the regroupment sites as 'concentration camps.' Under this pressure, President Pierre Buyoya agreed that everyone in the camps would be allowed to return home by the end of July."

_For an analysis on how forced displacement in 2000 of 350,000 civilians was carried out in violation of international law, including the Un Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, see HRW June 2000 "Violation of international law & Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" [link below]_
See also "Policy of the international humanitarian community regarding provision assistance in the context of forced relocation (1999-2000)" [Internal link]

Fighting between FNL and army displaced thousands in Bujumbura Rural (2004-2008)

- Combatants of FNL fought so called FNL "dissidents", causing displacement in October 2007
- FNL is the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government
- Population displacement reduced in 2005 compared to 2003-2004
- Little population displacement in 2006, but the populations of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural, have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL

IRIN 23 April 2008:
“The resumption of violence in and around Bujumbura is causing panic in the country. Outside the capital, residents spend their nights in the bush for fear of being attacked, as the death toll rose to 33.
A bomb destroyed part of the Vatican embassy compound and a dining hall in the Kiriri University campus on 22 April [2008].

“We call on the army to remove its heavy arms from our campus,” a student said, reacting to the installation of rocket launchers aimed at rebuffing attacks by the rebel FNL.
On 18 April, attacks were launched on military positions in Gihosha, Kanyosha, Kamenge and Musaga areas.”

NRC, May 2008:
In April 2008 serious violations of the 6 September 2006 ceasefire between the Burundian Army (FDN) and the rebel group Palipehutu-FNL (FNL) occurred. The most reported events took place in the capital city, Bujumbura, where three attacks took place on April 17, 18 and 22. Violence sprung in several provinces around the country (Bujumbura Rurale, Bubanza, Cibitoke and Kayanza), but Bujumbura Rurale province has been the most affected province, witnessing displacements of population.[...]

At the peak of displacement it was reported that there were:
- 4,050 households displaced in Isale commune or 20,100 people out of 83,000 inhabitants concentrated mostly in 6 sites in the centre of the commune, Rushubi on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 5,102 households displaced in Muyira and Kirombwe, both at Kanyosha commune on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 4,305 households displaced in Kabezi centre in three different sites on May 7 (data Kabezi local administration).
- 3,166 households displaced in Gitaza centre and 1,100 in Rutongo, both at Muhuta commune (data Muhuta local administration).
- And fewer numbers of IDPs registered in Bugarama, Mutambu and Nyabiraba communes (several hundreds of households)."

IRIN, 25 October 2007:
“Fighters of Burundi’s last active rebel group have for the second time in one week attacked a position occupied by a break-away faction, forcing villagers to flee their homes, a senior military official said.
The evening raid by combatants of the Front National de Liberation (FNL), led by Agathon Rwasa, took place on 24 October [2007] evening on a site where the so-called FNL "dissidents" have gathered in Gakungwe village of Kabezi commune in Bujumbura Rural province.

It forced hundreds of people from surrounding villages to run away as the army sent reinforcements to the area to guard the splinter faction's settlement, residents said.

"There has indeed been such an attack and the heavy exchange of gunfire was heard," deputy army chief of staff Major General Godefroid Niyuhire told IRIN on 25 October. There were, however, no casualties during the attack, he said.

The "dissidents" say they fought with Rwasa for the FNL, but Rwasa's supporters have denied their claims and accused the government of creating a faction within the FNL. Rwasa has said these men, who intend to join the country's peace process, are not even party to a 2006 ceasefire agreement signed between the government and the FNL."

**OCHA 23 June 2005:**
"Population displacement due to insecurity and armed conflict reduced markedly in the first months of the year [2005] and as compared to the period 2003-2004. Populations in the province of Bujumbura rural, where recurrent waves of displacement had taken place throughout 2004, are gradually resettling and returning to zones of origin and no sizeable population movements were registered in the first semester of the year."

**IRIN 4 January 2005:**
"Thousands of civilians have been displaced following fierce fighting on Saturday in Burundi's western province of Bujumbura Rural.

The internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not received aid, the governor of the province, Ignace Ntawembarira, said.

Fighting was reported in the communes of Isale, Nyabiraba and Kanyosha, east of the capital, Bujumbura, between the rebel faction Forces nationales de libération (FNL) of Agathon Rwasa, and a coalition of the Burundian army and troops loyal to Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the former largest rebel faction in the country, the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces de defense pour la democratie (CNDD-FDD)."

**UNSC 27 October 2006:**
"In the period under review [August 2005-September 2006], the security situation was characterized by renewed clashes between FDN and FNL, mainly in the north-western provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural. The populations of these provinces have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL. In 2006, 107 cases of attacks and looting by FNL were reported."

**Fighting between government and FLN troops causes the displacement of thousands in Bubanza Province (2008)**

- FNL - the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government – caused displacement at the end of 2007

**IRIN 14 January 2008:**
“About 1,400 families (8,400 people) displaced in Musigati commune in the northwestern province of Bubanza, following fighting between government forces and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), desperately need help, according to local officials.

Laurent Kagamba, adviser to the Musigati administrator, said that since the simultaneous attacks on three military positions on 28 December [2007] and another on 9 January [2008] in the same commune, residents had fled their homes. Some sought refuge in Musigati parish, others at Musigati and Kabere trade centres, as well as Busiga coffee factory, he said.”

IRIN 10 September 2007:
“Residents of 700 households, or about 4,000 people, have fled their homes in the northwest Burundi province of Bubanza following raids by suspected members of the country's last active rebel group, a government official said.

‘For the time being, security is not good at all. Some residents have been beaten, while others have had their property looted,' the governor of Bubanza, Pascal Nyabenda, told IRIN.'

He said Forces nationales de libération (FNL) fighters had raided homes in Bubanza from their hideouts in the nearby Kibira and Rukoko forests. Those displaced were spending the nights in the compound of a local parish, venturing out for a few hours during the day to work in their fields, Nyabenda said.”

For information on displacement by fighting between government and FNL troops in Bubanza Province in previous years, see:
ITEKA, 9 August 2006, Burundi: Des personnes armées et des combattants du Palipehutu_Fnl mènent des attaques répétées dans certaines communes de Bubanza
ITEKA, 24 August 2005, Burundi: Des déplacés de guerre en commune Musigati sans assistance [Link below]
IRIN, 14 June 2005, Burundi: Thousands displaced in Bubanza [Link below]

Some of the Burundian refugees expelled from Tanzania have no house or land (2006)

UN 30 November 2006:
Over 3,000 Burundians who had found refuge in Tanzania were forced to return in 2006: "Many new arrivals report others being forced to leave and the 3,000 who have come back so far, only seem to be the tip of the iceberg. Nobody knows for sure how many Burundians live in Tanzania without having regularized their stay, but most estimate around 150,000 persons. This will remain a key challenge in 2007, especially since the new arrivals need assistance and in particular so-called sans adresses like Elias, who hopes that “the Burundian Government can find us a plot of land where I can build a house and send my children to school.”"

NRC November 2006:
“Since June 2006, Tanzania has been implementing a national plan for the repatriation of refugees from Tanzania. In this framework, persons without refugee status or any other legal status in Tanzania have been forcibly removed from Tanzania. This year, more than 4000 Burundians have been expelled from Tanzania, mainly from Ngara district towards Muyinga province.”

See also:
UNHCR, 23 Oct 2006, Growing numbers of Burundians return home from the DRC [Internet]
Other causes of displacement

Tens of thousands were displaced due to floods (2007)

- Since November 2006, close to 300,000 people were affected by the heavy floods

IRIN 9 February 2007:

Les pluies diluvienes qui tombent depuis novembre 2006 ont détruit les cultures et infrastructures de plusieurs régions, obligeant le gouvernement à mettre en place un fonds de solidarité pour venir en aide aux déplacés victimes des inondations dans les provinces de Muyinga, Kirundo, Cankuzo, Karuzi, Kayanza, Ngozi et Muyinga. »

IRIN 15 January 2007:
"Thousands of people in northwestern Burundi, displaced after days of heavy rainfall, urgently need relief aid, officials said on Monday.

"The rains have rendered more than 3,000 residents homeless," said Prosper Banzambe, the chief of Gatumba Zone, one of the affected areas in Mitumbuzi Commune, Bujumbura Rural Province.

He said the displaced, some of whom had sought shelter in a local church, needed food and other non-food aid such as blankets, jerry cans, soap and mosquito nets.

The rains, which pounded the area at the weekend, destroyed at least 500 homes. The flooding of the nearby River Kiziba contributed to the houses' collapse.

Banzambe expressed concern that the continuing rains could cause more damage in Gatumba and appealed for a temporary shelter for the displaced.

He urged humanitarian organisations to help the displaced, saying the local administration was unable to "adequately meet their needs".[…]

On 4 January [2007], the government set up a national solidarity fund to support people affected by floods in seven provinces. In a decree, President Pierre Nkurunziza declared the provinces of Kayanza in the north, Muramvya and Karuzi in the central part of the country, Ruyigi in the east, and Bubanza and Cibitoke in the northwest, as "hunger-stricken following floods".

He also announced the establishment of the solidarity fund, to which every Burundian must contribute for four months from the end of January."

AFP 16 January 2007:
"Heavy rains pounding Burundi's capital and outlying areas have killed at least four people and left about 23,000 homeless since the downpours began last month, officials said Tuesday.
They said the situation was “catastrophic” after the floods destroyed farmlands, sparking fears of food shortages and disease outbreaks in the tiny central African nation emerging from more than a decade of civil strife.”

Famine in north and east causes internal displacement (2005-2006)

- Many of the people who flee due to food insecurity are newly repatriated refugees

**OCHA 16 January 2005:**
“[R]esidents of Northern provinces continue to flee inside and outside Burundi due to food insecurity. As of 14 January [2005], a joint visit conducted by OCHA Ruyigi sub office and the provincial administration authorities confirmed the presence in Kabuyenje IDP site, in Gisuru Commune, of 63 families who fled Busoni and Bugabira communes (Kirundo Province) in search of food. OCHA, in collaboration with the administration authorities convened a meeting with humanitarian actors in the province to discuss an emergency response.”

**OCHA 23 June 2005:**
“Cycles of drought periods, loss of staple crops, poor yields during three consecutive agriculture seasons and fragile nutritional conditions were particularly important in the northern Burundian provinces, which were also affected by waves of population movements both internal and across the border into Rwanda.”

**OCHA 5 March 2005:**
“Despite food aid distributed by WFP and partners, the food security situation remains disconcerting mainly in Northern and Eastern provinces. Continuous internal and cross-border displacement of the population continues to be part of the coping strategies. Around 7,900 Burundian asylum seekers were reported in Tanzania. Meanwhile, 131 internally displaced persons were registered in Cankuzo coming from Kirundo. However, many more internal movements remain unrecorded.”

**ITEKA 21 February 2006:**
“La plupart de ces migrants sont de nouveaux rapatriés qui n'ont pas eu où s'installer. Ils sont en train de migrer à la quête de quoi manger. Malheureusement, la population de la province de Cankuzo a également faim et ne peut pas les aider. Les prix des vivres montent chaque jour.”
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Conflict and displacement: background and development

Ethnic background and pre-colonial times

- Total population: 7.1 million
- Composite population comprising Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%) and Batwa (1%)(colonial census)
- Numerous interrelations between the ethnic groups (marriage, language, common monarchy)
- The Batwa are most likely the most ancient ethnic group in Burundi but they are marginalized in Burundi society

AFP 25 February 2005:
"GEOGRAPHY: Landlocked in central Africa, bounded by Rwanda in the north, Tanzania to the east and south, and the vast Democratic Republic of Congo to the west. One of the smallest states on the African continent, Burundi covers 27,834 square kilometers (10,747 square miles).

- POPULATION: 7.1 million, of which around 85 percent are Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi. The remaining one percent of the population are pygmies called Twas. One of the most densely populated African countries.

- CAPITAL: Bujumbura (population 300,000)

- LANGUAGES: Kirundi (national), French (administrative), Swahili (local)

- RELIGION: Christian (70 percent); Animist (15 percent); Muslim (15 percent)."

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 15-17:
"Burundi is situated in Central Africa, along Lake Tanganyika and shares borders with Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. [...] According to statistics dating back to the 1930s, 85 per cent of the population are Hutu, 14 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Batwa. The Hutu are considered to originate from Chad and the Niger, while the Tutsi, of Nilo-ethiopian origin, are thought to come from eastern Africa. The Batwa originate from the Congo Basin (Pygmies). This breakdown does not take into account the Ganwa (those of princely origin), nor a handful of other immigrant communities, nor those of mixed origins (mixed marriages having been common in the past). [...] It also does not take into account the fact that within both groups there existed historically rankings of status nor that passage from one group to another, for instance becoming Tutsi from Hutu or Ganwa, was also possible. The Burundians all speak the same language, Kirundi, which is both the national and the official language. Other languages, as provided for in the Constitution, are also spoken. [...] Despite ethnic differences, the Burundians live intermingled on the thousands of hills of the country without distinction on account of ethnicity. They are therefore inextricably bound to one another and cannot contemplate any notions of separation.

Although settlements have always been mixed, society in Burundi [...] was built along a 'class' and 'caste' system. [...] While their distinctions were not rigidly determined along 'ethnic' or 'tribal' lines, [...] there was significant correlation between class and ethnicity, with the Tutsis associated with the upper class and the Hutus with the lower class. This did not mean that all Tutsis were
upper class nor all Hutus lower class. Both class and the ethnic correlations were also dynamic. A Hutu could rise economically and socially and become a 'Tutsi'.

Hutu and Tutsi relationships were in the past cemented by their shared loyalty to common institutions. Kingship was such an institution; patron-client ties constituted another powerful socio-political institution. Patrons were expected to offer protection and gifts in exchange for services and offerings in kind. As social and political roles that once gave meaning and cohesion to membership in the community vanished, the use of the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' with ethnic connotations became more rigid. [...] Today the use of the term 'Hutu' describes an ethnic group which is poorer and powerless, whereas the Tutsi, especially the Hima (a Tutsi subgroup), are the pre-eminent power holders. [...] Nevertheless, the impression should not be created that the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' are figments as the "official truth" during the Bagaza period (1976-1987) would have it. This stance restricted discussion on the underlying problems of ethnicity and expression of ethnic differences without solving them."

CHR 19 March 2001, para. 100:
"La situation de la minorité twa mérite une attention particulière que malheureusement elle ne reçoit pas toujours. Les Twas sont sans doute le noyau le plus ancien de la population burundaise, comme dans d'autres pays des Grands Lacs; ils constituent aujourd'hui environ 1 % de la population."

Colonial rule and military regimes (1899-1992)

- 1962: Burundi becomes independent
- 25 years of a Tutsi dominated military dictatorship
- The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power
- 1980: creation of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu) by activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community in refugee camps in Tanzania

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 19-24:
"The transition from traditional power structures to 'modern' politics has by no means been an easy one. Two Ganwa (princely) dynasties continued fighting for control during the era of the colonial Powers, (first Germany from 1889 to 1918, then Belgium until 1962) as they had done during the pre-colonial era. The Party of Unity and National Progress (Uprona) was dominated by the Ganwa Bezi, while the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was led by the Ganwa Batare. In the legislative elections of September 1961 Uprona won, with Prince Rwagasoré as Prime Minister designate. A month later, however, Rwagasoré was assassinated. The political game switched from Ganwa to Hutu and Tutsi hands for the first time.

Burundi gained its independence from Belgium in July 1962. Until 1966 the crown continued to stabilize the situation. Violent incidents erupted after the elections in 1966, following which the Prime Minister, Michel Micombero, a Tutsi of the Hima group from Bururi, [...] overthrew the monarchy and declared a republic, concentrating power in the army. The National Assembly was dissolved and later replaced with a committee of officers, which, by 1971, was made up of 24 Tutsi and 3 Hutu, and Uprona was declared the sole party. Serious intra-Tutsi rivalries for power emerged. At this time Hutu were already being systematically purged from the army. The transition from a Ganwa-run kingdom to a Tutsi-dominated military dictatorship to the exclusion of Hutus caused more violence. For the next 25 years Tutsi factions fought over control, turning the Hutu into scapegoats whenever the Hutu would rise up and demand more equitable power-
sharing. On the other hand, whenever efforts towards power-sharing were made, extremists from both groups would resort to violence, to delay or cancel them.

Massacres had taken place in 1965 and 1967, but the most serious ones took place in 1972 triggered by Hutu militants from the Burundian refugee community in Tanzania. Hundreds if not thousands of Tutsi were killed and there is widespread fear that what had happened to Rwanda’s Tutsi, namely, systematic subjection and extermination, would happen to them too. The Tutsi retaliation and repression that followed were instant. The first victims were Hutus with education: secondary school and university students, teachers, nurses, doctors, priests, pastors, drivers, headmasters, businessmen, shopkeepers, civil servants, bank clerks, professors. Most Hutu families lost members. Hutu widows moved to the city outskirts when their houses were seized by Tutsi. Many Tutsis also fled. Many left the interior, where they felt frightened among Hutu neighbours, and moved to Bujumbura to fill the many jobs now vacant. Others rushed to occupy the flat, fertile, palm-oil-producing strip of lake shore south of Bujumbura, after the flight of very many Hutu who had been living there. Reports have spoken of genocidal acts and of hundreds of thousands of Hutus killed. […]

These events had great reverberations in Burundi; yet, nothing was ever done about the massacres. There has never been an official inquiry into them, an accounting, or any effort to bring to justice those responsible for the killings. Thereafter there was no question of Hutus entering the army, and many refused to send their children to school, fearing they were exposing them to a future massacre. Those at school had no role models. The educated, competent, urbane were all Tutsi. That there was a "lost" Hutu generation is still evident today in the political life of the country.

There was little power-sharing following the massacres, even after Micombero was overthrown by his deputy chief of staff, Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, also a Hima (Tutsi subgroup). There were no massacres during Bagaza's 11-year rule and many refugees returned home. Bagaza reportedly hoped development would push his country through the ethnic deadlock. Observers note that he engaged in a series of reforms, without, however, addressing the ethnic issue. […] All provincial governors were Tutsi and most judges, university and school teachers, magistrates and heads of hospitals were Tutsi too. Uprona remained a Tutsi party and its members were the ones to benefit mostly from Bagaza's management of the economy. In the last years of the Bagaza regime corruption and nepotism reportedly flourished. […] In the meantime, in 1980 activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community formed the Palipehutu, or the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People, in refugee camps in Tanzania. Bagaza was himself deposed in 1987 by a group of army officers and a cousin of his and nephew of Micombero, Major Pierre Buyoya, became President.

In August 1988 frustrated Hutu hopes for an improvement were at the root of hundreds of ethnic killings. Thousands were killed. This time the regions most affected were Ntega commune in Kirundo province and Marangara commune in Ngozi province, both bordering Rwanda. Palipehutu members from Rwanda had been infiltrating into Burundi and sporadic fights were taking place until Hutus turned against the Tutsi community, many of them Rwandan refugees. The army pursued those assumed responsible (although it is unclear how much resistance these people who had no guns put up against the soldiers) […] and in the next eight days it reportedly killed large numbers of civilians, including women and children. More than 60,000 people poured into Rwanda across the swamps and the Akanyaru river. Others took refuge within Burundi in swamp areas. The massacres were surprising even to the Burundians. Hutu had to face the fact that the army was still prepared to use maximum force and Tutsi that Hutu could still massacre many Tutsi before soldiers reached the scene.

ACTS 30 September 2004:
“Despite the popular conception of the conflict as a Hutu-Tutsi struggle, most scholars agree that the protracted conflict is structural in nature, though articulated in ethnic terms. The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power.’ Governance practices by successive regimes galvanized political power and state control in the hands of a small elite group within the Tutsi community from particular parts of the country, who have since sustained their hold on power through repressive policies. Efforts by the Tutsi elite to retain political control and associated patronage networks, and violent counter-strategies of the Hutu political and armed groups have precipitated ethnic massacres and retaliatory radicalism marked by acts of genocide.”

Civil war and Peace Process in Burundi (1993-2008)

- 1993: Assassination of elected President Ndadaye triggers large-scale inter-ethnic violence
- 1996: Coup installs President Buyoya; sanctions imposed by neighbouring countries
- Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi signed in August 2000
- 2005: signing of ceasefire agreement between FNL and government; adoption of new constitution
- Local, legislative and presidential elections was held in various phases in 2005
- Security sector was profoundly restructured and the army is now ethnically balanced (2006)
- Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and FRODEBU – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence (2006)
- As of April 2008: the FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement

AFP 1 June 2005, factfile:
“*The civil war begun in 1993 has killed an estimated 300,000 people.*[...]

Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu president, elected in June 1993, was assassinated on October 21 of the same year during a failed coup organized by Tutsi military officers.

His successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira -- another Hutu -- was killed in April 1994 at the same time as then Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana died under suspicious circumstances when his plane was shot down over Kigali, sparking the genocide of up to a million Tutsis and Hutu moderates in Rwanda.

Ntaryamira's successor, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, also a Hutu, was overthrown in a non-violent coup in July 1996, and [Pierre " Buyoya returned to power.

In 1998, Buyoya reformed the constitution to create a transition government and began peace talks with Hutu and Tutsi opposition groups.

In August 2000 a peace agreement including a power-sharing deal was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, but the two main armed rebel groups refused to participate in the talks. Civil war continued to rage.

In November 2001, Buyoya took over as transitional leader for a period of 18 months, seconded by a Hutu vice-president whose signature is required on all presidential texts pertaining to security and the armed forces.
A 26-member power-sharing government was also sworn in to oversee the three-year transition. Buyoya was succeeded at the head of the transition government in May 2003 by his vice president Domitien Ndayizeye, who is seconded by a Tutsi, Alphonse Marie Kadage.

A ceasefire agreement was signed in December 2002 by the government and the main Hutu rebel movement, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), which finally entered government in November 2003.

A second Hutu armed group, the National Liberation Forces (FNL), finally signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on May 15, but the details of how this be implemented have still not yet been resolved.

A new constitution was adopted at the end of February, aimed at bringing about a peaceful democracy and ending the reign of the Tutsie tribe in power. Opposition has been voiced only by Tutsis concerned at losing too much power.

**HRW 4 November 2005:**
“Elections in 2005 were the final chapter in the transitional process established by the Arusha Accords of 2000. In the intervening period a government including the Hutu-dominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu), the Tutsi-dominated National Unity and Progress Party (Uprona), and a number of smaller parties ruled the country. In late 2003 this government signed the Pretoria Protocol making peace with the CNDDFDD and starting the process of integrating the former rebels into the army and the administration.”

For more detailed information on 1993 events, see “Profile in displacement” (Report of the Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, 28 November 1994), paras. 29-36) [External link]

**ICG 30 November 2006:**
“In elections held between June and August 2005, the voters of Burundi elected their first democratic government since 1993. This marked an end to the transitional government established by the Arusha Agreement in 2001. The mainly Hutu former rebels of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), led by Pierre Nkurunziza, won a resounding victory and hold 58 per cent of the seats in parliament and 57 per cent in the communal councils, as well as twelve of the twenty government ministries. Nkurunziza was inaugurated as president on 26 August 2005.

The elections radically reconfigured politics. Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence. In the run-up to the elections, rebel forces were integrated into the national army, police and intelligence service. For the fist time in Burundian history, these forces were ethnically balanced. Nkurunziza’s government faced considerable challenges. Foremost was the process of transforming the CNDDFDD from a rebel movement into a democratic political party in power – one whose members had little civil administration experience. The government had to reconstruct an economy devastated by more than a decade of civil war and economic embargo, during which per capita income fell by 35 per cent and the number of people living below the poverty line doubled. During its first year it also had to deal with security problems in the capital and surrounding provinces caused by the remaining rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL. Unfortunately, the government’s response to these challenges has increasingly manifested itself in disregard for the rule of law.”

**UNSC 28 November 2007:**
The signing of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the armed group Palipehutu-Forces nationales de libération (FNL) led by Agathon Rwasa on 7 September 2006 was a decisive step in the peace process in Burundi. However, its implementation remains difficult owing to persisting disagreements among the parties. The Agreement, which was the outcome of determined efforts of regional States united under the auspices of the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, addresses a number of issues including the integration of FNL ex-combatants into the Burundian National Defence Forces (FDN) and security forces, the participation of FNL elements in the institutions of the country and the rapid demobilization and reintegration of children associated with this armed group into their respective families and communities. Under the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism was established to oversee the demobilization of FNL combatants.

The signing of the Agreement was followed at first by a significant improvement in the security situation, characterized notably by a decrease both in the number of abuses perpetrated by armed groups and in the number of alleged FNL militants arrested by the National Defence Forces and the National Police of Burundi.

PBC, 19 March 2008:
"[T]he Palipehutu-FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. In response, a Political Directorate had been established to assist the Mechanism in efforts to regain FNL's participation."

IRIN, 14 January 2008:
"The FNL, the last rebel movement still active in Burundi, has resumed fighting government forces, especially in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza, where it is most active.

Though the movement signed a ceasefire accord with the government in September 2006, it has not been fully implemented. The joint verification and monitoring mechanism, which oversees its implementation, suspended activities in July 2007 after the FNL delegates walked out of talks over security concerns. They have since been accusing the facilitator, South African safety minister Charles Nqakula, of bias."

ISS 3 April 2008:
"After intense diplomatic pressure from regional governments and the international community Burundi’s last rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL, has been brought back to the negotiating table that drew up a new roadmap designed to end the standoff by the end of June 2008. This breakthrough was reached in a February 23 meeting in Cape Town, South Africa. The meeting was attended by special envoys to Burundi from Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa, as well as representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.

The Cape Town meeting had been called to save the Burundi peace process after the FNL withdrew from its implementation, alleging bias on the part of the facilitator, South Africa’s Security Minister Charles Nqakula. To help address this challenge Minister Nqakula has followed the example of other peace processes by establishing a Group of Special Envoys for Burundi (GSEB), representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations."

Delrue August 2006:
"The success of Burundi’s transition to peace hinges on how its new government (elected in August 2005 and headed by former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza) and the international community deal with such post-displacement issues as land and property claims, reconciliation and transitional justice."
The link between displacement, return, reconciliation and successful transition towards a consolidated peace is frequently either underestimated or neglected by the international community."

For a comprehensive analysis of the political situation in Burundi, see

HRW, 12 March 2008:
“Several opposition politicians have been threatened and targeted for violence during the last 18 months. Nizomukunda, then second vice-president of the republic, fled Burundi in September 2006 after issuing a letter critical of the government; she returned in March 2007. Five parliamentarians from the opposition party Front for Democracy in Burundi (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi, Frodebu) and from a dissident wing of the CNDD-FDD, including Mpawenayo, were targeted in a set of grenade attacks in August 2007 that injured several bystanders. Pancrace Cimpaye, Frodebu spokesperson, was detained after suggesting the ruling party bore responsibility for the August attacks; after being released, he briefly left the country. In February 2008, a local Frodebu official was killed, while another was seriously injured in a grenade attack which killed his wife and child.”

See also:
IRIN, BURUNDI: Government of consensus formed, 15 November 2007 [Internet]

ICG, 28 August 2007, Burundi: Finalising peace with the FNL [Internet]


Secretary-General welcomes signing of Burundi ceasefire agreement, United Nations Secretary General, 8 September 2006 [Internet]

Progress in regard to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (2005-2008)

- Reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression
- About 5,000 UN peacekeepers were in Burundi from June 2004 to the end of 2006, to monitor the country's transition to democracy, with South Africa contributing the majority of troops.
- The new Burundian government saw the peacekeepers as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible (2006)
- A new UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) continued the process of peace consolidation and of coordinating the UN system’s activities in Burundi from 2007

ISS 13 October 2006:
"In Burundi, reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, signed in August 2000 by 17 political parties, the National
Assembly and the government and the 2003 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Burundi and the principal rebel group, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), do include important provisions on the organization, structure, mandates and composition of postconflict security forces that will act professionally and apolitically, adhere to human rights norms, and provide defence and security to all Burundians.[…]

Although the Arusha Accords were signed in August 2000, the implementation of the security sector reform process they articulate was largely delayed until 2003, mainly because of continued warfare throughout most of Burundi. Indeed, the most active rebel movements in the field were marginalized throughout the Arusha negotiations and were thus not signatories to the Accord. Accordingly, it was not until the signing of a ceasefire between the government and the main rebel group – the CNDD-FDD – in 2003 that the reform process was set in motion. By July 2006, however, the reform of the defence and security forces had reached an advanced stage and had achieved most of its structural objectives (i.e. the integration of several armed groups into a single military and single police force), despite various financial- and material-related challenges.

The process of integrating the former rebel groups and the FAB into a new national defence force, the Forces de Défense Nationale (FDN), has been completed – largely to the satisfaction of the government and international donors – despite its late start due to disagreements on the definition of combatant and on the harmonization of rank between the rebel movements and the regular army.[…]

Despite this progress, a preliminary assessment of the reform of the FDN and the PNB and progress in the domain of social and economic reintegration and re-insertion of former combatants suggests that serious challenges remain in these critical areas. The local media frequently report human rights violations perpetrated by on-duty military or police or by demobilized combatants.

Tufts University 30 July 2006:
“The new Burundian government saw ONUB as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible. This perception was aggravated by two unfortunate choices made by leaders of the UN mission: to support Frodebu and former President Ndayizeye during the electoral campaign and proposing to coordinate the transition from humanitarian aid to development through a “Partners Council” deliberating without the government.”

UNSC 18 December 2006:
“Meanwhile, as delays in the start of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants have continued, criminal activities against the population, reportedly committed by FNL combatants, have increased since late October. Skirmishes between the national security forces and alleged FNL combatants and detentions of FNL elements and supporters have reportedly resumed in the north-western provinces. FNL recruitment, including of youths, has also been reported, particularly in Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural provinces.[…]

Once deployed, the AU special task force would therefore be expected to assume the responsibilities that were allocated to ONUB under the ceasefire agreement, namely: (a) protection of designated assembly areas for FNL combatants; (b) provision of engineering, logistical and administrative support for the establishment of the assembly areas; (c) disarmament of combatants; (d) storage of weapons collected from the disarmament process and their subsequent destruction; (e) transportation of disarmed FNL combatants from assembly areas to the designated demobilization centre or integration facilities of the National Defence Forces; and (f) protection of the demobilization centres. […]
Further delays in the agreement’s implementation, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegation of FNL combatants, are likely to lead to more friction between these combatants and the population and the national security services. In addition, there was an increase in localized conflicts involving the small FNL faction led by Jean Bosco Sindayigaya, which did not sign the ceasefire agreement.”

DPKO 20 December 2006:
“A new United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), authorized by Security Council resolution 1719 earlier this year, will continue the process of peace consolidation and be in charge of coordinating the United Nations system’s activities in Burundi for an initial period of one year.”

The mandate of BINUB is extended until 31 December 2008 (UNSC, 19 December 2007).

See also:
Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 31 Aug 2006
A technical analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - a case study from Burundi [Internet]


- Peace Building Commission approved in December 2007 a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation

UNSC 18 December 2006, para.22:
“Significant progress has been made in the establishment of peacebuilding coordination mechanisms between the Government and the United Nations. On 7 November, the Government created an Inter-Ministerial Peacebuilding Steering Committee, which will work with the United Nations, within the framework of an initial joint mechanism, in preparing the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission and the peacebuilding priority plan to be submitted to the Peacebuilding Fund. The inaugural meeting of the Government-United Nations joint mechanism was held on 16 November [2006], followed by several sessions at the policy and working levels. As a result, a common understanding was reached on the steps to be taken by the Government, with United Nations support, to secure resources from the Peacebuilding Fund. Progress was also made in developing the Government’s presentation to the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission. The mission of the Peacebuilding Support Office to Burundi in mid-November [2006] and the meetings it had with the United Nations and the Government’s Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee contributed significantly to this process.”

UNGA 5 December 2007:
“With a long-awaited conflict-recovery and development strategy for Burundi now in place, the Peacebuilding Commission today approved a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation -- both locally and in New York -- in priority areas
such as justice and security sector reform, generating jobs and making radical improvements to governance.

Meeting in its special “Burundi Configuration”, the Commission adopted the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism (MTM) of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. That Framework -- in place since June -- is the country-led integrated peacebuilding strategy now guiding the engagement and dialogue between Bujumbura, the United Nations and other international partners.

The Framework identified key objectives, major challenges and threats to peace, especially the implementation of a stagnant ceasefire agreement between Burundi and the National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL). Promoting inclusive growth, employment, transparency and human rights were among its other top priorities.”

See also:
Brookings Institution, 13 March 2008, The Role of Civil Society in Ending Displacement and Peacebuilding, by Elizabeth Ferris [Internet]

United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI), 12 Dec 2006 [Link below]

Peacebuilding Commission holds day-long discussion on Burundi, agrees on fund’s use to bolster government’s priority plan [Internet]

Challenges facing Burundi, requiring international help, indicated at country-specific meetings of Peacebuilding Commission [Internet]

Burundi government signs Nairobi pact including protocol on IDPs (December 2006)

MONUC 18 December 2006:
“With the signing of the Nairobi pact this Friday December 15 2006 by DRC, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, it paves the way for security, stability and development in the region, after years of conflict.

Many African state leaders, including DRC president Joseph Kabila were in Nairobi Kenya for the two day summit that will go a long way to bringing the region out of the vicious cycle of humanitarian disaster, poverty, and repeated conflict.[…]

The Great Lakes pact includes a $225 million security action plan to disarm rebel groups in Eastern DRC, and along border areas in Sudan, Kenya and Uganda.[…]

Ms. Besida Tonwe, the Head of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in Central and East Africa, said that the conference was a long process of consultations in helping the Great Lakes Region to reconcile, rehabilitate, and reconstruct their societies in a politically delicate process.

‘It is also a process which in the future will continue to require financial support from the donor community and coherent assistance from the humanitarian community. It is now of utmost importance that there is a follow-up on the national implementation of the legal protocols adopted with the pact,’ she said.
‘The three protocols on humanitarian and social issues addressing sexual violence against women and children, property rights of returning persons, and the protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), are of the utmost importance,’ she concluded.

IDMC 14 December 2006:
“The Pact is a culmination of more than four years of regional negotiations among States. It contains a package of measures which promises to enhance the lives of the forcibly displaced, including a regional protocol on protection and assistance for internally displaced, which when signed, will be the first legally binding regional instrument specifically dealing with IDPs anywhere in the world. A regional protocol on property rights of returning populations, and protocols which address some of the root causes of flight in the Great Lakes are also key elements of the Pact.”


- Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development

ISS 27 May 2005:
“Aside from calling for a cessation to violent conflict, the Arusha Accords [Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 28 August 2000]. provide comprehensive recommendations for stabilising and rehabilitating a highly polarised Burundian nation. The agreement is composed of five protocols each dedicated to a particular theme intended to move the process from peace-making to peace-building. These themes consist of an outline of the nature of the conflict; democracy and good governance; peace and security; reconstruction and development; and guarantees on the implementation of the agreement.

Importantly, the accords acknowledge that the Burundian ‘conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions… and stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power.’

Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development. It is therefore the ‘litmus test’ against which the performance of the transitional government (and other actors) as it relates to Arusha’s recommendations can be assessed.

Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Refugees and Sinistrés
The main conclusion and recommendations of Protocol IV states that:

“Through the Burundi Peace Negotiations at Arusha it has been possible to assess how seriously the political and ethnic crisis that has torn Burundi apart since independence has affected Burundian society. Hundreds of thousands of Burundians are refugees, some of them for more than 25 years.

Hundreds of thousands more are forced to live in camps where conditions are appalling…. All Burundians are aware that a lasting peace is impossible so long as a definitive solution is not found to the problem of refugees and sinistrés. Likewise, peace is impossible so long as the country’s wealth is not shared equitably. Burundi cannot help the sinistrés rebuild destroyed property and restore its economy without the assistance of the international community.”
The UN concluded that there was a strong indication that the FLN had not acted alone in the massacre of Congolese refugees (2004-2005)

- One year of after the Gatumba massacre, those responsible remain free

IRIN 5 Jan 2005:
“The FNL claimed responsibility for a massacre in August of 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees at Gatumba transit camp on the Burundi side of the border with the DRC. The UN is continuing to investigate whether armed groups on the DRC side of the border, which are aligned to FNL, also took part.”

UNSC 15 November 2004:
“As requested by the Security Council by its presidential statement of 15 August 2004 (S/PRST/2004/30), ONUB, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights conducted a joint investigation into the massacre on 13 August of 152 Congolese refugees at the Gatumba refugee camp, located close to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The results of the investigation were transmitted to the Council by my letter to the President of the Council dated 15 October (S/2004/821). Despite extensive investigation, there is no clear evidence of who organized, carried out and financed that gross atrocity. The FNL (Rwasa) claim of responsibility has been supported by witness statements and led United Nations investigators to believe that the group did, indeed, participate in the attack. There is however, a strong indication that FNL (Rwasa) did not act alone. Unfortunately, the dearth of verifiable information and limited cooperation by the Burundian authorities hampered the formulation of a definitive report. A national investigation is still ongoing.”

AI 18 August 2005:
“On the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre, which took place in August 2004, Amnesty International calls on the forthcoming government of Burundi and the international community to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.

‘The new government should undertake to set up an independent and impartial body to investigate this and other massacres and those found to be responsible should be held to account,’ Amnesty International said today.

During the night of 13 August 2004, the refugee camp of Gatumba, located near the Congolese border, was attacked by an armed group. More than 160 Congolese refugees, predominantly children and women members of the Banyamulenge ethnic group from South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (DRC), were deliberately and systematically killed. On 14 August, the Palipehutu-FNL (Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu -- Forces nationales de libération) claimed responsibility for the killings. The same day, the governments of Burundi and Rwanda and delegates of the Banyamulenge communities accused Congolese and Rwandese armed political groups based in the DRC of involvement in the massacre. According to UN investigators, evidence of the presence of ‘other groups’ was credible, but they were not able to categorically identify them.

Human rights organizations and the United Nations have strongly condemned this massacre and called for an independent, impartial and comprehensive investigation. Given the alleged involvement of armed political groups based in the DRC, there was concern that the killing could lead to a military intervention in the DRC by Burundi and Rwanda. Such an intervention could have led to further human rights abuses in the DRC.
Since then, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Burundian authorities have moved a few refugees to the Mwaro province, farther away from the border, others have returned to the DRC, while many others have moved to Bujumbura. So far, despite the indication from the Burundian Minister of Justice that the national investigation into the Gatumba massacre was completed, the United Nations Operations in Burundi stressed in a recent statement that, "no investigation report has been issued by the government [of Burundi] and the authors of the attack remain free."

See also United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 13 Aug 2005
Burundi: Statement on the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre [Internet]

Causes of displacement


United Nations Resident Coordinator System for Burundi 1998, p. 5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronology of Population Movements</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>An estimated 200,000 Burundians flee from programs and communal violence; many seek refuge in Tanzania, where most remain to this day.</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>To escape the violence that broke out following the assassination of President Ndadaye, nearly 200,000 people leave the hills to seek protection in sites grouped around military posts. A vast majority are still there.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1994-1996</td>
<td>The escalation of the civil conflict sparks massive population movements; the northwestern province of Cibitoke, sandwiched between the rebel bases in the mountainous Kibira forest and in neighboring Kivu, is particularly unstable. Large numbers seek refuge in neighboring Zaire (150,000) and Tanzania (250,000). Up to 400,000 congregate in sites inside the country.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>In the wake of the conquest of Zaire by the Kabila-led alliance, most of the refugees in Kivu return to Burundi, where they swell the numbers living in the displaced camps on the north-western provinces, particularly Cibitoke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>As a military strategy to regain control of rebel-held territory, the authorities forcibly regroup 250,000 civilians in Karuzi, Kanyanza and Muramvya provinces. Nearly all of them return home by the end of 1997, but the policy of controlled population movements continues to be implemented in other, more short-term forms elsewhere in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>Following the loss of their bases in the Kivu, the rebels regroup in Tanzania, and the main theatre of operations shifts to the southwest, along the ridge of the Nile-Congo watershed that is the main conduit into and out of the country for guerrilla groups. The ensuing destabilization leads to large scale displacement to new sites, again mainly along the main tarmac roads of the western plain, not only</td>
</tr>
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in Makamba and Bururi provinces but also as far as north as Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza.

1997-1998

As the military gradually established control in certain areas, the authorities begin to dismantle the big sites near main roads or major towns and create smaller, decentralized sites grouped around advanced military positions in the hills (Cibitoke, parts of Bururi, Bubanza). Elsewhere, short-term regroupment operations continue to be implemented in response to localized destabilization (Bujumbura Rural).

1998

Nearly all the sites in Cibitoke province, for so long the most unstable part of the country, are dismantled by June and the people return to their hills. At almost the same time, the crisis in neighboring Congo produces an influx of some eleven thousand people, which continues up to present.

Causes of internal displacement: an analysis by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (1998)

- Pervasive psychology of "flee or be killed" is a lasting legacy of the 1972 massacres and the 1993 upheavals
- Displacement has also been used as a deliberate goal of violence since 1993
- Massive retaliation by the armed forces
- Suspicion towards the displaced population creates more displacement
- Use of violence and displacement as a way to achieve political or economical objectives

USCR 1998a, pp. 32-33:

"A history of massacres has taught the people of Burundi, regardless of their ethnicity, that their personal survival hinges on their ability to flee and seek a safer place temporarily. For many peasant Burundians, the lesson of the past is that violence can erupt suddenly and can rapidly become all-encompassing. It is a lesson handed down from generation to generation. Some of the underlying causes of internal displacement in Burundi follow:

First, a pervasive psychology of 'flee or be killed' has become the lasting legacy of the 1972 slaughter and the 1993 upheaval. The 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda has reinforced the psychology of flight in Burundi.

Second, the smaller massacres that have occurred almost daily since 1994 serve to validate the historical lessons of fear and mistrust. Fear is also ingrained that large number of Burundians have learned to flee their homes not only in reaction to danger but also in anticipation of it.

Third, much of Burundi's displacement since 1993 has been caused by «ethnic cleansing.» Displacement is no longer merely as accidental by-product of violence; it has become a deliberate goal of violence.

Fourth, both ethnic groups of Burundi regard themselves as vulnerable. The sense of vulnerability has become an important part of the self-identity. Hutu are demographically dominant but see themselves as vulnerable to the political and military power of Tutsi. Tutsi are politically and militarily powerful but view themselves as vulnerable to the demographic dominance of Hutu. Members of both ethnic groups regard themselves as victims, despite the fact that many massacres in Burundian history have been largely one-sided.

Fifth, a pattern is evident in many violent eruptions over the decades: regardless of how violence begins, there is almost always massive retaliation against the Hutu by the Tutsi-dominated
military. As a result, many Hutu instinctively flee at the mere sight of soldiers or at the distant sound of their vehicles. The country's forces of order, unfortunately, create new disorder and displacement – deliberately in some cases, inadvertently in others.

Sixth, population displacement in Burundi often exacerbates rather than alleviates the conflict. Uprooted Burundians of one ethnic group are often regarded as dangerous by members of the other ethnic group. The military suspects that many internally displaced Hutu are rebels. Many Hutu suspect that camps of displaced Tutsi are bases for militia activity. There is some truth to these mutual suspicions. The result is that displacement at times begets more violence, causing still more people to flee. In short – at least in Burundi – displacement causes more displacement.

These are only partial explanations of the population displacement in Burundi, of course. This review of Burundi's history indicates that some actors create violence and displacement as a way to achieve political control by force that they are unable to achieve or maintain through nonviolent means. Some elements in Burundi create violence and displacement for the economic rewards it brings them through banditry, confiscation of property, and skimming of relief aid. Still other Burundians commits violence and force displacement based on pure fear or hate, reinforced by decades of grievances, real or imagined."


- 1996: government policy to move civilian populations into "regroupment" camps
- 1997: end of the large-scale, long-term "regroupment" policy
- 1998: short-term forced movement of populations continues, particularly in unstable western provinces
- Since September 1999, over 350,000 people were forcibly moved by government forces to 53 regroupment camps to deprive insurgent groups of local support
- Government explained that regroupment camps were established to protect civilians from the rebels
- Dismantlement of regroupment camps was precondition to peace negotiations and camps were dismantled by mid-2000

**USCR 2000 "regroupment"**

"Burundian authorities have pursued two waves of forced population relocation, or regroupment. The first regroupment wave occurred during 1996-98 when the government moved at least a quarter-million Hutu into 50 camps scattered throughout the country. Some observers estimated that up to 800,000 persons lived in the regroupment camps at that time. Most regroupment sites closed during 1998, allowing occupants to return home."

**HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":**


"In July and August 1999, the rebels launched increasingly frequent and damaging raids in and around Bujumbura, killing dozens of civilians as well as some soldiers. The army retaliated with attacks that killed more than one hundred civilians as well as combatants and the government tightened an existing curfew. These measures failed to satisfy Tutsi extremists in Bujumbura who demanded more drastic action to protect the city and to repress the rebellion. With rumors circulating of a possible coup and of violence being organized by extremists, the government decided to impose a policy of regroupment on most of Bujumbura-rural, particularly on areas inhabited largely by Hutu and near the city."

**HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":**
"In mid-1999, it [the government] had revived the regroupment policy in parts of southeastern Burundi before deciding to extend it to the area of the capital in September."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"The Tutsi-dominated government of Burundi, combating rebellions among the Hutu majority, began forcing civilians in the area around the capital into so-called "protection sites" or "regroupment camps" beginning in late September 1999. Burundian authorities claimed the measure was intended to protect the civilians, most of them Hutu, from attack by the rebel National Liberation Forces (Forces Nationales pour la Libération, FNL) who were becoming increasingly well-entrenched in the area. In fact, they meant to deprive the FNL of support from local people who helped them, sometimes willingly, sometimes under duress. By removing civilian support, the authorities hoped to isolate the FNL and thus reduce its increasingly frequent attacks on the capital. They hoped also to quiet Tutsi extremists who accused them of weakness in confronting the rebel threat."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"By the end of 1999, authorities had obliged some 80 percent of the population of the province of Bujumbura-rural-some 350,000 people-to live in fifty-three camps. Although regroupment helped reduce attacks on the capital city, rebels remained firmly established in rural areas. They simply shifted from one place to another when attacked by the army, which had insufficient troops available to control the whole region at the same time. Rebels continued to live off the crops of local people and even to inhabit the houses of those forced to live in the camps."

USCR 2000, "Regroupment":
"The country included at least three types of internal displacement: up to 200,000 people, primarily rural Tutsi, who have lived for six years in designated camps protected by government soldiers and thousands, who have become displaced in the countryside or at makeshift sites for varying lengths of time; and nearly 350,000 Hutu whom the government required to live in so-called 'regroupment' camps."

Dismantlement of regroupment camps (2000)

USCR 2000, "Regroupment":
"Government authorities argued that the camps were a temporary measure to protect civilians from attack and deprive rebel groups of food and lodging in rural areas. Burundian officials urged international humanitarian organizations to provide food, water, sanitation, and medical care to the sites. Burundian President Pierre Buyoya visited several sites in October [1999] and stated that conditions there were better than portrayed by aid agencies. The regroupment camps were 'no dramatic situation,' he assured."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"The international community severely criticized the policy of regroupment. In January 2000, the Burundian government promised to begin closing the camps but it made little progress in doing so until early June. At that time, rebel leaders made closing the camps a precondition for peace negotiations and former South African President Nelson Mandela, facilitator for the negotiations, condemned the regroupment sites as 'concentration camps.' Under this pressure, President Pierre Buyoya agreed that everyone in the camps would be allowed to return home by the end of July."

For an analysis on how forced displacement in 2000 of 350,000 civilians was carried out in violation of international law, including the Un Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, see HRW June 2000 "Violation of international law & Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" [link below]
Fighting between FNL and army displaced thousands in Bujumbura Rural (2004-2008)

- Combatants of FNL fought so called FNL “dissidents”, causing displacement in October 2007
- FNL is the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government
- Population displacement reduced in 2005 compared to 2003-2004
- Little population displacement in 2006, but the populations of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural, have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL

IRIN 23 April 2008:
“The resumption of violence in and around Bujumbura is causing panic in the country. Outside the capital, residents spend their nights in the bush for fear of being attacked, as the death toll rose to 33.
A bomb destroyed part of the Vatican embassy compound and a dining hall in the Kiriri University campus on 22 April [2008].

“We call on the army to remove its heavy arms from our campus,” a student said, reacting to the installation of rocket launchers aimed at rebuffing attacks by the rebel FNL. On 18 April, attacks were launched on military positions in Gihosha, Kanyosha, Kamenge and Musaga areas.”

NRC, May 2008:
In April 2008 serious violations of the 6 September 2006 ceasefire between the Burundian Army (FDN) and the rebel group Palipehutu-FNL (FNL) occurred. The most reported events took place in the capital city, Bujumbura, where three attacks took place on April 17, 18 and 22. Violence sprung in several provinces around the country (Bujumbura Rurale, Bubanza, Cibitoke and Kayanza), but Bujumbura Rurale province has been the most affected province, witnessing displacements of population.[...]

At the peak of displacement it was reported that there were:
- 4,050 households displaced in Isale commune or 20,100 people out of 83,000 inhabitants concentrated mostly in 6 sites in the centre of the commune, Rushubi on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 5,102 households displaced in Muyira and Kirombwe, both at Kanyosha commune on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 4,305 households displaced in Kabezi centre in three different sites on May 7 (data Kabezi local administration).
- 3,166 households displaced in Gitaza centre and 1,100 in Rutongo, both at Muhuta commune (data Muhuta local administration).
- And fewer numbers of IDPs registered in Bugarama, Mutambu and Nyabiraba communes (several hundreds of households)."

IRIN, 25 October 2007:
“Fighters of Burundil's last active rebel group have for the second time in one week attacked a position occupied by a break-away faction, forcing villagers to flee their homes, a senior military official said.
The evening raid by combatants of the Front National de Liberation (FNL), led by Agathon Rwasa, took place on 24 October [2007] evening on a site where the so-called FNL "dissidents" have gathered in Gakungwe village of Kabezi commune in Bujumbura Rural province.

It forced hundreds of people from surrounding villages to run away as the army sent reinforcements to the area to guard the splinter faction's settlement, residents said.

"There has indeed been such an attack and the heavy exchange of gunfire was heard," deputy army chief of staff Major General Godefroid Niyuhire told IRIN on 25 October. There were, however, no casualties during the attack, he said.

The "dissidents" say they fought with Rwasa for the FNL, but Rwasa's supporters have denied their claims and accused the government of creating a faction within the FNL. Rwasa has said these men, who intend to join the country's peace process, are not even party to a 2006 ceasefire agreement signed between the government and the FNL."

**OCHA 23 June 2005:**
"Population displacement due to insecurity and armed conflict reduced markedly in the first months of the year [2005] and as compared to the period 2003-2004. Populations in the province of Bujumbura rural, where recurrent waves of displacement had taken place throughout 2004, are gradually resettling and returning to zones of origin and no sizeable population movements were registered in the first semester of the year."

**IRIN 4 January 2005:**
"Thousands of civilians have been displaced following fierce fighting on Saturday in Burundi's western province of Bujumbura Rural.

The internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not received aid, the governor of the province, Ignace Ntawembarira, said.

Fighting was reported in the communes of Isale, Nyabiraba and Kanyosha, east of the capital, Bujumbura, between the rebel faction Forces nationales de libération (FNL) of Agathon Rwasa, and a coalition of the Burundian army and troops loyal to Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the former largest rebel faction in the country, the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces de defense pour la democratie (CNDD-FDD)."

**UNSC 27 October 2006:**
"In the period under review [August 2005-September 2006], the security situation was characterized by renewed clashes between FDN and FNL, mainly in the north-western provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural. The populations of these provinces have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL. In 2006, 107 cases of attacks and looting by FNL were reported."

**Fighting between government and FLN troops causes the displacement of thousands in Bubanza Province (2008)**

- FNL - the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government – caused displacement at the end of 2007

**IRIN 14 January 2008:**
“About 1,400 families (8,400 people) displaced in Musigati commune in the northwestern province of Bubanza, following fighting between government forces and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), desperately need help, according to local officials.

Laurent Kagamba, adviser to the Musigati administrator, said that since the simultaneous attacks on three military positions on 28 December [2007] and another on 9 January [2008] in the same commune, residents had fled their homes. Some sought refuge in Musigati parish, others at Musigati and Kabere trade centres, as well as Busiga coffee factory, he said."

IRIN 10 September 2007:
“Residents of 700 households, or about 4,000 people, have fled their homes in the northwest Burundi province of Bubanza following raids by suspected members of the country's last active rebel group, a government official said.

‘For the time being, security is not good at all. Some residents have been beaten, while others have had their property looted,’ the governor of Bubanza, Pascal Nyabenda, told IRIN.’

He said Forces nationales de libération (FNL) fighters had raided homes in Bubanza from their hideouts in the nearby Kibira and Rukoko forests. Those displaced were spending the nights in the compound of a local parish, venturing out for a few hours during the day to work in their fields, Nyabenda said."

For information on displacement by fighting between government and FNL troops in Bubanza Province in previous years, see:
ITEKA, 9 August 2006, Burundi: Des personnes armées et des combattants du Palipehutu_Fnl mènent des attaues répétées dans certaines communes de Bubanza
ITEKA, 24 August 2005, Burundi: Des déplacés de guerre en commune Musigati sans assistance [Link below]
IRIN, 14 June 2005, Burundi: Thousands displaced in Bubanza [Link below]

Some of the Burundian refugees expelled from Tanzania have no house or land (2006)

UN 30 November 2006:
Over 3,000 Burundians who had found refuge in Tanzania were forced to return in 2006: "Many new arrivals report others being forced to leave and the 3,000 who have come back so far, only seem to be the tip of the iceberg. Nobody knows for sure how many Burundians live in Tanzania without having regularized their stay, but most estimate around 150,000 persons. This will remain a key challenge in 2007, especially since the new arrivals need assistance and in particular so-called sans addresses like Elias, who hopes that “the Burundian Government can find us a plot of land where I can build a house and send my children to school.”"

NRC November 2006:
"Since June 2006, Tanzania has been implementing a national plan for the repatriation of refugees from Tanzania. In this framework, persons without refugee status or any other legal status in Tanzania have been forcibly removed from Tanzania. This year, more than 4000 Burundians have been expelled from Tanzania, mainly from Ngara district towards Muyinga province."

See also:
UNHCR, 23 Oct 2006, Growing numbers of Burundians return home from the DRC [Internet]
Other causes of displacement

Tens of thousands were displaced due to floods (2007)

- Since November 2006, close to 300,000 people were affected by the heavy floods

IRIN 9 February 2007:

Les pluies diluviennes qui tombent depuis novembre 2006 ont détruit les cultures et infrastructures de plusieurs régions, obligeant le gouvernement à mettre en place un fonds de solidarité pour venir en aide aux déplacés victimes des inondations dans les provinces de Muyinga, Kirundo, Cankuzo, Karuzi, Kayanza, Ngozi et Muyinga. »

IRIN 15 January 2007:
“Thousands of people in northwestern Burundi, displaced after days of heavy rainfall, urgently need relief aid, officials said on Monday.

"The rains have rendered more than 3,000 residents homeless," said Prosper Banzambe, the chief of Gatumba Zone, one of the affected areas in Mitumbuzi Commune, Bujumbura Rural Province.

He said the displaced, some of whom had sought shelter in a local church, needed food and other non-food aid such as blankets, jerry cans, soap and mosquito nets.

The rains, which pounded the area at the weekend, destroyed at least 500 homes. The flooding of the nearby River Kiziba contributed to the houses’ collapse.

Banzambe expressed concern that the continuing rains could cause more damage in Gatumba and appealed for a temporary shelter for the displaced.

He urged humanitarian organisations to help the displaced, saying the local administration was unable to "adequately meet their needs".[…]

On 4 January [2007], the government set up a national solidarity fund to support people affected by floods in seven provinces. In a decree, President Pierre Nkurunziza declared the provinces of Kayanza in the north, Muramvya and Karuzi in the central part of the country, Ruyigi in the east, and Bubanza and Cibitoke in the northwest, as "hunger-stricken following floods".

He also announced the establishment of the solidarity fund, to which every Burundian must contribute for four months from the end of January.”

AFP 16 January 2007:
“Heavy rains pounding Burundi’s capital and outlying areas have killed at least four people and left about 23,000 homeless since the downpours began last month, officials said Tuesday."
They said the situation was "catastrophic" after the floods destroyed farmlands, sparking fears of food shortages and disease outbreaks in the tiny central African nation emerging from more than a decade of civil strife."

Famine in north and east causes internal displacement (2005-2006)

- Many of the people who flee due to food insecurity are newly repatriated refugees

**OCHA 16 January 2005:**

"[R]esidents of Northern provinces continue to flee inside and outside Burundi due to food insecurity. As of 14 January [2005], a joint visit conducted by OCHA Ruyigi sub office and the provincial administration authorities confirmed the presence in Kabuyenge IDP site, in Gisuru Commune, of 63 families who fled Busoni and Bugabira communes (Kirundo Province) in search of food. OCHA, in collaboration with the administration authorities convened a meeting with humanitarian actors in the province to discuss an emergency response."

**OCHA 23 June 2005:**

"Cycles of drought periods, loss of staple crops, poor yields during three consecutive agriculture seasons and fragile nutritional conditions were particularly important in the northern Burundian provinces, which were also affected by waves of population movements both internal and across the border into Rwanda."

**OCHA 5 March 2005:**

"Despite food aid distributed by WFP and partners, the food security situation remains disconcerting mainly in Northern and Eastern provinces. Continuous internal and cross-border displacement of the population continues to be part of the coping strategies. Around 7,900 Burundian asylum seekers were reported in Tanzania. Meanwhile, 131 internally displaced persons were registered in Cankuzo coming from Kirundo. However, many more internal movements remain unrecorded."

**ITEKA 21 February 2006:**

"La plupart de ces migrants sont de nouveaux rapatriés qui n'ont pas eu où s'installer. Ils sont en train de migrer à la quête de quoi manger. Malheureusement, la population de la province de Cankuzo a également faim et ne peut pas les aider. Les prix des vivres montent chaque jour."
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Conflict and displacement: background and development

Ethnic background and pre-colonial times

- Total population: 7.1 million
- Composite population comprising Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%) and Batwa (1%)(colonial census)
- Numerous interrelations between the ethnic groups (marriage, language, common monarchy)
- The Batwa are most likely the most ancient ethnic group in Burundi but they are marginalized in Burundi society

AFP 25 February 2005:

"GEOGRAPHY: Landlocked in central Africa, bounded by Rwanda in the north, Tanzania to the east and south, and the vast Democratic Republic of Congo to the west. One of the smallest states on the African continent, Burundi covers 27,834 square kilometers (10,747 square miles).

- POPULATION: 7.1 million, of which around 85 percent are Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi. The remaining one percent of the population are pygmies called Twas. One of the most densely populated African countries.

- CAPITAL: Bujumbura (population 300,000)

- LANGUAGES: Kirundi (national), French (administrative), Swahili (local)

- RELIGION: Christian (70 percent); Animist (15 percent); Muslim (15 percent)."

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 15-17:

"Burundi is situated in Central Africa, along Lake Tanganyika and shares borders with Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. [...] According to statistics dating back to the 1930s, 85 per cent of the population are Hutu, 14 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Batwa. The Hutu are considered to originate from Chad and the Niger, while the Tutsi, of Nilo-ethiopian origin, are thought to come from eastern Africa. The Batwa originate from the Congo Basin (Pygmies). This breakdown does not take into account the Ganwa (those of princely origin), nor a handful of other immigrant communities, nor those of mixed origins (mixed marriages having been common in the past). [...] It also does not take into account the fact that within both groups there existed historically rankings of status nor that passage from one group to another, for instance becoming Tutsi from Hutu or Ganwa, was also possible. The Burundians all speak the same language, Kirundi, which is both the national and the official language. Other languages, as provided for in the Constitution, are also spoken. [...] Despite ethnic differences, the Burundians live intermingled on the thousands of hills of the country without distinction on account of ethnicity. They are therefore inextricably bound to one another and cannot contemplate any notions of separation.

Although settlements have always been mixed, society in Burundi [...] was built along a 'class' and 'caste' system. [...] While their distinctions were not rigidly determined along 'ethnic' or 'tribal' lines, [...] there was significant correlation between class and ethnicity, with the Tutsis associated with the upper class and the Hutus with the lower class. This did not mean that all Tutsis were
upper class nor all Hutus lower class. Both class and the ethnic correlations were also dynamic. A Hutu could rise economically and socially and become a 'Tutsi'.

Hutu and Tutsi relationships were in the past cemented by their shared loyalty to common institutions. Kingship was such an institution; patron-client ties constituted another powerful socio-political institution. Patrons were expected to offer protection and gifts in exchange for services and offerings in kind. As social and political roles that once gave meaning and cohesion to membership in the community vanished, the use of the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' with ethnic connotations became more rigid. [...] Today the use of the term 'Hutu' describes an ethnic group which is poorer and powerless, whereas the Tutsi, especially the Hima (a Tutsi subgroup), are the pre-eminent power holders. [...] Nevertheless, the impression should not be created that the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' are figments as the "official truth" during the Bagaza period (1976-1987) would have it. This stance restricted discussion on the underlying problems of ethnicity and expression of ethnic differences without solving them."

CHR 19 March 2001, para. 100:
"La situation de la minorité twa mérite une attention particulière que malheureusement elle ne reçoit pas toujours. Les Twas sont sans doute le noyau le plus ancien de la population burundaise, comme dans d'autres pays des Grands Lacs; ils constituent aujourd'hui environ 1 % de la population. "

Colonial rule and military regimes (1899-1992)

- 1962: Burundi becomes independent
- 25 years of a Tutsi dominated military dictatorship
- The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power
- 1980: creation of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHU) by activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community in refugee camps in Tanzania

UN Commission on Human Rights 28 November 1994, paras. 19-24:
"The transition from traditional power structures to 'modern' politics has by no means been an easy one. Two Ganwa (princely) dynasties continued fighting for control during the era of the colonial Powers, (first Germany from 1889 to 1918, then Belgium until 1962) as they had done during the pre-colonial era. The Party of Unity and National Progress (Uprona) was dominated by the Ganwa Bezi, while the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was led by the Ganwa Batare. In the legislative elections of September 1961 Uprona won, with Prince Rwagasore as Prime Minister designate. A month later, however, Rwagasore was assassinated. The political game switched from Ganwa to Hutu and Tutsi hands for the first time.

Burundi gained its independence from Belgium in July 1962. Until 1966 the crown continued to stabilize the situation. Violent incidents erupted after the elections in 1966, following which the Prime Minister, Michel Micombero, a Hutu of the Hima group from Bururi, [...] overthrew the monarchy and declared a republic, concentrating power in the army. The National Assembly was dissolved and later replaced with a committee of officers, which, by 1971, was made up of 24 Tutsi and 3 Hutu, and Uprona was declared the sole party. Serious intra-Tutsi rivalries for power emerged. At this time Hutu were already being systematically purged from the army. The transition from a Ganwa-run kingdom to a Tutsi-dominated military dictatorship to the exclusion of Hutus caused more violence. For the next 25 years Tutsi factions fought over control, turning the Hutu into scapegoats whenever the Hutu would rise up and demand more equitable power-
sharing. On the other hand, whenever efforts towards power-sharing were made, extremists from both groups would resort to violence, to delay or cancel them.

Massacres had taken place in 1965 and 1967, but the most serious ones took place in 1972 triggered by Hutu militants from the Burundian refugee community in Tanzania. Hundreds if not thousands of Tutsi were killed and there is widespread fear that what had happened to Rwanda's Tutsi, namely, systematic subjection and extermination, would happen to them too. The Tutsi retaliation and repression that followed were instant. The first victims were Hutus with education: secondary school and university students, teachers, nurses, doctors, priests, pastors, drivers, headmasters, businessmen, shopkeepers, civil servants, bank clerks, professors. Most Hutu families lost members. Hutu widows moved to the city outskirts when their houses were seized by Tutsi. Many Tutsis also fled. Many left the interior, where they felt frightened among Hutu neighbours, and moved to Bujumbura to fill the many jobs now vacant. Others rushed to occupy the flat, fertile, palm-oil-producing strip of lake shore south of Bujumbura, after the flight of very many Hutu who had been living there. Reports have spoken of genocidal acts and of hundreds of thousands of Hutus killed. […]

These events had great reverberations in Burundi; yet, nothing was ever done about the massacres. There has never been an official inquiry into them, an accounting, or any effort to bring to justice those responsible for the killings. Thereafter there was no question of Hutus entering the army, and many refused to send their children to school, fearing they were exposing them to a future massacre. Those at school had no role models. The educated, competent, urbane were all Tutsi. That there was a "lost" Hutu generation is still evident today in the political life of the country.

There was little power-sharing following the massacres, even after Micombero was overthrown by his deputy chief of staff, Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, also a Hima (Tutsi subgroup). There were no massacres during Bagaza's 11-year rule and many refugees returned home. Bagaza reportedly hoped development would push his country through the ethnic deadlock. Observers note that he engaged in a series of reforms, without, however, addressing the ethnic issue. […] All provincial governors were Tutsi and most judges, university and school teachers, magistrates and heads of hospitals were Tutsi too. Uprona remained a Tutsi party and its members were the ones to benefit mostly from Bagaza's management of the economy. In the last years of the Bagaza regime corruption and nepotism reportedly flourished. […] In the meantime, in 1980 activists from the Burundian Hutu refugee community formed the Palipehutu, or the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People, in refugee camps in Tanzania. Bagaza was himself deposed in 1987 by a group of army officers and a cousin of his and nephew of Micombero, Major Pierre Buyoya, became President.

In August 1988 frustrated Hutu hopes for an improvement were at the root of hundreds of ethnic killings. Thousands were killed. This time the regions most affected were Ntega commune in Kirundo province and Marangara commune in Ngozi province, both bordering Rwanda. Palipehutu members from Rwanda had been infiltrating into Burundi and sporadic fights were taking place until Hutus turned against the Tutsi community, many of them Rwandan refugees. The army pursued those assumed responsible (although it is unclear how much resistance these people who had no guns put up against the soldiers) […] and in the next eight days it reportedly killed large numbers of civilians, including women and children. More than 60,000 people poured into Rwanda across the swamps and the Akanyaru river. Others took refuge within Burundi in swamp areas. The massacres were surprising even to the Burundians. Hutu had to face the fact that the army was still prepared to use maximum force and Tutsi that Hutu could still massacre many Tutsi before soldiers reached the scene."

ACTS 30 September 2004:
“Despite the popular conception of the conflict as a Hutu-Tutsi struggle, most scholars agree that the protracted conflict is structural in nature, though articulated in ethnic terms. The roots of the conflict lie in unequal distribution of economic resources and political power.” Governance practices by successive regimes galvanized political power and state control in the hands of a small elite group within the Tutsi community from particular parts of the country, who have since sustained their hold on power through repressive policies. Efforts by the Tutsi elite to retain political control and associated patronage networks, and violent counter-strategies of the Hutu political and armed groups have precipitated ethnic massacres and retaliatory radicalism marked by acts of genocide.”

Civil war and Peace Process in Burundi (1993-2008)

- 1993: Assassination of elected President Ndadaye triggers large-scale inter-ethnic violence
- 1996: Coup installs President Buyoya; sanctions imposed by neighbouring countries
- Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi signed in August 2000
- 2005: signing of ceasefire agreement between FNL and government; adoption of new constitution
- Local, legislative and presidential elections was held in various phases in 2005
- Security sector was profoundly restructured and the army is now ethnically balanced (2006)
- Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and FRODEBU – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence (2006)
- from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement

AFP 1 June 2005, factfile:

“The civil war begun in 1993 has killed an estimated 300,000 people.[…]

Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu president, elected in June 1993, was assassinated on October 21 of the same year during a failed coup organized by Tutsi military officers.

His successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira -- another Hutu -- was killed in April 1994 at the same time as then Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana died under suspicious circumstances when his plane was shot down over Kigali, sparking the genocide of up to a million Tutsis and Hutu moderates in Rwanda.

Ntaryamira's successor, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, also a Hutu, was overthrown in a non-violent coup in July 1996, and [Pierre “ Buyoya returned to power.

In 1998, Buyoya reformed the constitution to create a transition government and began peace talks with Hutu and Tutsi opposition groups.

In August 2000 a peace agreement including a power-sharing deal was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, but the two main armed rebel groups refused to participate in the talks. Civil war continued to rage.

In November 2001, Buyoya took over as transitional leader for a period of 18 months, seconded by a Hutu vice-president whose signature is required on all presidential texts pertaining to security and the armed forces.
A 26-member power-sharing government was also sworn in to oversee the three-year transition. Buyoya was succeeded at the head of the transition government in May 2003 by his vice president Domitien Ndayizeye, who is seconded by a Tutsi, Alphonse Marie Kadage.

A ceasefire agreement was signed in December 2002 by the government and the main Hutu rebel movement, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), which finally entered government in November 2003.

A second Hutu armed group, the National Liberation Forces (FNL), finally signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on May 15, but the details of how this be implemented have still not yet been resolved.

A new constitution was adopted at the end of February, aimed at bringing about a peaceful democracy and ending the reign of the Tutsie tribe in power. Opposition has been voiced only by Tutsis concerned at losing too much power.”

HRW 4 November 2005:
"Elections in 2005 were the final chapter in the transitional process established by the Arusha Accords of 2000. In the intervening period a government including the Hutu-dominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu), the Tutsi-dominated National Unity and Progress Party (Uprona), and a number of smaller parties ruled the country. In late 2003 this government signed the Pretoria Protocol making peace with the CNDDFDD and starting the process of integrating the former rebels into the army and the administration."

For more detailed information on 1993 events, see “Profile in displacement” (Report of the Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, 28 November 1994), paras. 29-36) [External link]

ICG 30 November 2006:
"In elections held between June and August 2005, the voters of Burundi elected their first democratic government since 1993. This marked an end to the transitional government established by the Arusha Agreement in 2001. The mainly Hutu former rebels of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), led by Pierre Nkurunziza, won a resounding victory and hold 58 per cent of the seats in parliament and 57 per cent in the communal councils, as well as twelve of the twenty government ministries. Nkurunziza was inaugurated as president on 26 August 2005.

The elections radically reconfigured politics. Old tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDDFDD and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by violence. In the run-up to the elections, rebel forces were integrated into the national army, police and intelligence service. For the fist time in Burundian history, these forces were ethnically balanced. Nkurunziza’s government faced considerable challenges. Foremost was the process of transforming the CNDDFDD from a rebel movement into a democratic political party in power – one whose members had little civil administration experience. The government had to reconstruct an economy devastated by more than a decade of civil war and economic embargo, during which per capita income fell by 35 per cent and the number of people living below the poverty line doubled. During its first year it also had to deal with security problems in the capital and surrounding provinces caused by the remaining rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL. Unfortunately, the government’s response to these challenges has increasingly manifested itself in disregard for the rule of law.”

UNSC 28 November 2007:
“The signing of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the armed group Palipehutu-Forces nationales de libération (FNL) led by Agathon Rwasa on 7 September 2006 was a decisive step in the peace process in Burundi. However, its implementation remains difficult owing to persisting disagreements among the parties. The Agreement, which was the outcome of determined efforts of regional States united under the auspices of the Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi, addresses a number of issues including the integration of FNL ex-combatants into the Burundian National Defence Forces (FDN) and security forces, the participation of FNL elements in the institutions of the country and the rapid demobilization and reintegration of children associated with this armed group into their respective families and communities. Under the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism was established to oversee the demobilization of FNL combatants.

The signing of the Agreement was followed at first by a significant improvement in the security situation, characterized notably by a decrease both in the number of abuses perpetrated by armed groups and in the number of alleged FNL militants arrested by the National Defence Forces and the National Police of Burundi.”

PBC, 19 March 2008:
“[T]he Palipehutu-FNL had withdrawn from the 2007 Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism established to implement the 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. In response, a Political Directorate had been established to assist the Mechanism in efforts to regain FNL's participation.”

IRIN, 14 January 2008:
“The FNL, the last rebel movement still active in Burundi, has resumed fighting government forces, especially in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza, where it is most active.

Though the movement signed a ceasefire accord with the government in September 2006, it has not been fully implemented. The joint verification and monitoring mechanism, which oversees its implementation, suspended activities in July 2007 after the FNL delegates walked out of talks over security concerns. They have since been accusing the facilitator, South African safety minister Charles Nqakula, of bias.”

ISS 3 April 2008:
“After intense diplomatic pressure from regional governments and the international community Burundi’s last rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL, has been brought back to the negotiating table that drew up a new roadmap designed to end the standoff by the end of June 2008. This breakthrough was reached in a February 23 meeting in Cape Town, South Africa. The meeting was attended by special envoys to Burundi from Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa, as well as representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.

The Cape Town meeting had been called to save the Burundi peace process after the FNL withdrew from its implementation, alleging bias on the part of the facilitator, South Africa’s Security Minister Charles Nqakula. To help address this challenge Minister Nqakula has followed the example of other peace processes by establishing a Group of Special Envoys for Burundi (GSEB), representatives of the African Union, the European Union, the United States of America and the United Nations.”

Delrue August 2006:
“The success of Burundi’s transition to peace hinges on how its new government (elected in August 2005 and headed by former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza) and the international community deal with such post-displacement issues as land and property claims, reconciliation and transitional justice.
The link between displacement, return, reconciliation and successful transition towards a consolidated peace is frequently either underestimated or neglected by the international community."

For a comprehensive analysis of the political situation in Burundi, see Swiss Peace Foundation, 25 Oct 2006 FAST Country Risk Profile Burundi: Burundi's endangered transition [Internet]

HRW, 12 March 2008:
“Several opposition politicians have been threatened and targeted for violence during the last 18 months. Nkomukunda, then second vice-president of the republic, fled Burundi in September 2006 after issuing a letter critical of the government; she returned in March 2007. Five parliamentarians from the opposition party Front for Democracy in Burundi (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi, Frodebu) and from a dissident wing of the CNDD-FDD, including Mpawenayo, were targeted in a set of grenade attacks in August 2007 that injured several bystanders. Pancrace Cimpaye, Frodebu spokesperson, was detained after suggesting the ruling party bore responsibility for the August attacks; after being released, he briefly left the country. In February 2008, a local Frodebu official was killed, while another was seriously injured in a grenade attack which killed his wife and child.”

See also:
IRIN, BURUNDI: Government of consensus formed, 15 November 2007 [Internet]

ICG, 28 August 2007, Burundi: Finalising peace with the FNL [Internet]


Secretary-General welcomes signing of Burundi ceasefire agreement, United Nations Secretary General, 8 September 2006 [Internet]

Progress in regard to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (2005-2008)

- Reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression
- About 5,000 UN peacekeepers were in Burundi from June 2004 to the end of 2006, to monitor the country's transition to democracy, with South Africa contributing the majority of troops.
- The new Burundian government saw the peacekeepers as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible (2006)
- A new UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) continued the process of peace consolidation and of coordinating the UN system’s activities in Burundi from 2007

ISS 13 October 2006:
"In Burundi, reform of the security sector – particularly the military and the police – has been central to the conflict and its resolution because the security institutions have been historically responsible for large scale human rights abuses and widespread political repression. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, signed in August 2000 by 17 political parties, the National
Assembly and the government and the 2003 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Burundi and the principal rebel group, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), do include important provisions on the organization, structure, mandates and composition of postconflict security forces that will act professionally and apolitically, adhere to human rights norms, and provide defence and security to all Burundians.[…]

Although the Arusha Accords were signed in August 2000, the implementation of the security sector reform process they articulate was largely delayed until 2003, mainly because of continued warfare throughout most of Burundi. Indeed, the most active rebel movements in the field were marginalized throughout the Arusha negotiations and were thus not signatories to the Accord. Accordingly, it was not until the signing of a ceasefire between the government and the main rebel group – the CNDD-FDD – in 2003 that the reform process was set in motion. By July 2006, however, the reform of the defence and security forces had reached an advanced stage and had achieved most of its structural objectives (i.e. the integration of several armed groups into a single military and single police force), despite various financial- and material-related challenges.

The process of integrating the former rebel groups and the FAB into a new national defence force, the Forces de Défense Nationale (FDN), has been completed – largely to the satisfaction of the government and international donors – despite its late start due to disagreements on the definition of combatant and on the harmonization of rank between the rebel movements and the regular army.[…]

Despite this progress, a preliminary assessment of the reform of the FDN and the PNB and progress in the domain of social and economic reintegration and re-insertion of former combatants suggests that serious challenges remain in these critical areas. The local media frequently report human rights violations perpetrated by on-duty military or police or by demobilized combatants.

**Tufts University 30 July 2006:**
“The new Burundian government saw ONUB as an occupation force, one that should leave the country as soon as possible. This perception was aggravated by two unfortunate choices made by leaders of the UN mission: to support Frodebu and former President Ndayizeye during the electoral campaign and proposing to coordinate the transition from humanitarian aid to development through a “Partners Council” deliberating without the government.”

**UNSC 18 December 2006:**
“Meanwhile, as delays in the start of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants have continued, criminal activities against the population, reportedly committed by FNL combatants, have increased since late October. Skirmishes between the national security forces and alleged FNL combatants and detentions of FNL elements and supporters have reportedly resumed in the north-western provinces. FNL recruitment, including of youths, has also been reported, particularly in Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural provinces.[…]

Once deployed, the AU special task force would therefore be expected to assume the responsibilities that were allocated to ONUB under the ceasefire agreement, namely: (a) protection of designated assembly areas for FNL combatants; (b) provision of engineering, logistical and administrative support for the establishment of the assembly areas; (c) disarmament of combatants; (d) storage of weapons collected from the disarmament process and their subsequent destruction; (e) transportation of disarmed FNL combatants from assembly areas to the designated demobilization centre or integration facilities of the National Defence Forces; and (f) protection of the demobilization centres. […]
Further delays in the agreement’s implementation, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants, are likely to lead to more friction between these combatants and the population and the national security services. In addition, there was an increase in localized conflicts involving the small FNL faction led by Jean Bosco Sindayigaya, which did not sign the ceasefire agreement.

**DPKO 20 December 2006:**
“A new United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), authorized by Security Council resolution 1719 earlier this year, will continue the process of peace consolidation and be in charge of coordinating the United Nations system’s activities in Burundi for an initial period of one year.”

The mandate of BINUB is extended until 31 December 2008 (UNSC, 19 December 2007).

See also:
Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 31 Aug 2006
A technical analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - a case study from Burundi


**Peace Building Commission and Burundi (2006-2008)**

- Peace Building Commission approved in December 2007 a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation

**UNSC 18 December 2006, para.22:**
“Significant progress has been made in the establishment of peacebuilding coordination mechanisms between the Government and the United Nations. On 7 November, the Government created an Inter-Ministerial Peacebuilding Steering Committee, which will work with the United Nations, within the framework of an initial joint mechanism, in preparing the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission and the peacebuilding priority plan to be submitted to the Peacebuilding Fund. The inaugural meeting of the Government-United Nations joint mechanism was held on 16 November [2006], followed by several sessions at the policy and working levels. As a result, a common understanding was reached on the steps to be taken by the Government, with United Nations support, to secure resources from the Peacebuilding Fund. Progress was also made in developing the Government’s presentation to the December meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission. The mission of the Peacebuilding Support Office to Burundi in mid-November [2006] and the meetings it had with the United Nations and the Government’s Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee contributed significantly to this process.”

**UNGA 5 December 2007:**
“With a long-awaited conflict-recovery and development strategy for Burundi now in place, the Peacebuilding Commission today approved a jointly developed monitoring mechanism to regularly review progress in its implementation -- both locally and in New York -- in priority areas
such as justice and security sector reform, generating jobs and making radical improvements to governance.

Meeting in its special “Burundi Configuration”, the Commission adopted the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism (MTM) of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. That Framework -- in place since June -- is the country-led integrated peacebuilding strategy now guiding the engagement and dialogue between Bujumbura, the United Nations and other international partners.

The Framework identified key objectives, major challenges and threats to peace, especially the implementation of a stagnant ceasefire agreement between Burundi and the National Liberation Forces (Pulipetutu-FNL). Promoting inclusive growth, employment, transparency and human rights were among its other top priorities.”

See also:
Brookings Institution, 13 March 2008, The Role of Civil Society in Ending Displacement and Peacebuilding, by Elizabeth Ferris [Internet]

United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI), 12 Dec 2006 [Link below]

Peacebuilding Commission holds day-long discussion on Burundi, agrees on fund’s use to bolster government’s priority plan [Internet]

Challenges facing Burundi, requiring international help, indicated at country-specific meetings of Peacebuilding Commission [Internet]

Burundi government signs Nairobi pact including protocol on IDPs (December 2006)

MONUC 18 December 2006:
“With the signing of the Nairobi pact this Friday December 15 2006 by DRC, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, it paves the way for security, stability and development in the region, after years of conflict.

Many African state leaders, including DRC president Joseph Kabila were in Nairobi Kenya for the two day summit that will go a long way to bringing the region out of the vicious cycle of humanitarian disaster, poverty, and repeated conflict.[…]

The Great Lakes pact includes a $225 million security action plan to disarm rebel groups in Eastern DRC, and along border areas in Sudan, Kenya and Uganda.[…]

Ms. Besida Tonwe, the Head of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in Central and East Africa, said that the conference was a long process of consultations in helping the Great Lakes Region to reconcile, rehabilitate, and reconstruct their societies in a politically delicate process.

‘It is also a process which in the future will continue to require financial support from the donor community and coherent assistance from the humanitarian community. It is now of utmost importance that there is a follow-up on the national implementation of the legal protocols adopted with the pact,’ she said.
‘The three protocols on humanitarian and social issues addressing sexual violence against women and children, property rights of returning persons, and the protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), are of the utmost importance,’ she concluded.”

IDMC 14 December 2006:
“The Pact is a culmination of more than four years of regional negotiations among States. It contains a package of measures which promises to enhance the lives of the forcibly displaced, including a regional protocol on protection and assistance for internally displaced, which when signed, will be the first legally binding regional instrument specifically dealing with IDPs anywhere in the world. A regional protocol on property rights of returning populations, and protocols which address some of the root causes of flight in the Great Lakes are also key elements of the Pact.”


- Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development

ISS 27 May 2005:
“Aside from calling for a cessation to violent conflict, the Arusha Accords [Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 28 August 2000]. provide comprehensive recommendations for stabilising and rehabilitating a highly polarised Burundian nation. The agreement is composed of five protocols each dedicated to a particular theme intended to move the process from peace-making to peace-building. These themes consist of an outline of the nature of the conflict; democracy and good governance; peace and security; reconstruction and development; and guarantees on the implementation of the agreement.

Importantly, the accords acknowledge that the Burundian ‘conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions… and stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power.’

Protocol IV is divided into three chapters that focus on the rehabilitation and resettlement of sinistrés, physical and political reconstruction and, finally, economic and social development. It is therefore the ‘litmus test’ against which the performance of the transitional government (and other actors) as it relates to Arusha’s recommendations can be assessed.

Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Refugees and Sinistrés
The main conclusion and recommendations of Protocol IV states that:

‘Through the Burundi Peace Negotiations at Arusha it has been possible to assess how seriously the political and ethnic crisis that has torn Burundi apart since independence has affected Burundian society. Hundreds of thousands of Burundians are refugees, some of them for more than 25 years.

Hundreds of thousands more are forced to live in camps where conditions are appalling…. All Burundians are aware that a lasting peace is impossible so long as a definitive solution is not found to the problem of refugees and sinistrés. Likewise, peace is impossible so long as the country’s wealth is not shared equitably. Burundi cannot help the sinistrés rebuild destroyed property and restore its economy without the assistance of the international community.’“
The UN concluded that there was a strong indication that the FLN had not acted alone in the massacre of Congolese refugees (2004-2005)

- One year of after the Gatumba massacre, those responsible remain free

**IRIN 5 Jan 2005:**
“The FNL claimed responsibility for a massacre in August of 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees at Gatumba transit camp on the Burundi side of the border with the DRC. The UN is continuing to investigate whether armed groups on the DRC side of the border, which are aligned to FNL, also took part.”

**UNSC 15 November 2004:**
“As requested by the Security Council by its presidential statement of 15 August 2004 (S/PRST/2004/30), ONUB, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights conducted a joint investigation into the massacre on 13 August of 152 Congolese refugees at the Gatumba refugee camp, located close to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The results of the investigation were transmitted to the Council by my letter to the President of the Council dated 15 October (S/2004/821). Despite extensive investigation, there is no clear evidence of who organized, carried out and financed that gross atrocity. The FNL (Rwasa) claim of responsibility has been supported by witness statements and led United Nations investigators to believe that the group did, indeed, participate in the attack. There is however, a strong indication that FNL (Rwasa) did not act alone. Unfortunately, the dearth of verifiable information and limited cooperation by the Burundian authorities hampered the formulation of a definitive report. A national investigation is still ongoing.”

**AI 18 August 2005:**
“On the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre, which took place in August 2004, Amnesty International calls on the forthcoming government of Burundi and the international community to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.

‘The new government should undertake to set up an independent and impartial body to investigate this and other massacres and those found to be responsible should be held to account,’ Amnesty International said today.

During the night of 13 August 2004, the refugee camp of Gatumba, located near the Congolese border, was attacked by an armed group. More than 160 Congolese refugees, predominantly children and women members of the Banyamulenge ethnic group from South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (DRC), were deliberately and systematically killed. On 14 August, the Palipehutu-FNL (Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu -- Forces nationales de libération) claimed responsibility for the killings. The same day, the governments of Burundi and Rwanda and delegates of the Banyamulenge communities accused Congolese and Rwandese armed political groups based in the DRC of involvement in the massacre. According to UN investigators, evidence of the presence of ‘other groups’ was credible, but they were not able to categorically identify them.

Human rights organizations and the United Nations have strongly condemned this massacre and called for an independent, impartial and comprehensive investigation. Given the alleged involvement of armed political groups based in the DRC, there was concern that the killing could lead to a military intervention in the DRC by Burundi and Rwanda. Such an intervention could have led to further human rights abuses in the DRC.
Since then, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Burundian authorities have moved a few refugees to the Mwaro province, farther away from the border, others have returned to the DRC, while many others have moved to Bujumbura. So far, despite the indication from the Burundian Minister of Justice that the national investigation into the Gatumba massacre was completed, the United Nations Operations in Burundi stressed in a recent statement that, 'no investigation report has been issued by the government [of Burundi] and the authors of the attack remain free'.

See also United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 13 Aug 2005
Burundi: Statement on the anniversary of the Gatumba massacre [Internet]

Causes of displacement


United Nations Resident Coordinator System for Burundi 1998, p. 5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronology of Population Movements</th>
<th>An estimated 200,000 Burundians flee from programs and communal violence; many seek refuge in Tanzania, where most remain to this day.</th>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>To escape the violence that broke out following the assassination of President Ndadaye, nearly 200,000 people leave the hills to seek protection in sites grouped around military posts. A vast majority are still there.</td>
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<td>1994-1996</td>
<td>The escalation of the civil conflict sparks massive population movements; the northwestern province of Cibitoke, sandwiched between the rebel bases in the mountainous Kibira forest and in neighboring Kivu, is particularly unstable. Large numbers seek refuge in neighboring Zaire (150,000) and Tanzania (250,000). Up to 400,000 congregate in sites inside the country.</td>
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<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>In the wake of the conquest of Zaire by the Kabila-led alliance, most of the refugees in Kivu return to Burundi, where they swell the numbers living in the displaced camps on the north-western provinces, particularly Cibitoke.</td>
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<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>As a military strategy to regain control of rebel-held territory, the authorities forcibly regroup 250,000 civilians in Karuzi, Kanyanza and Muramvya provinces. Nearly all of them return home by the end of 1997, but the policy of controlled population movements continues to be implemented in other, more short-term forms elsewhere in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>Following the loss of their bases in the Kivu, the rebels regroup in Tanzania, and the main theatre of operations shifts to the southwest, along the ridge of the Nile-Congo watershed that is the main conduit into and out of the country for guerrilla groups. The ensuing destabilization leads to large scale displacement to new sites, again mainly along the main tarmac roads of the western plain, not only</td>
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in Makamba and Bururi provinces but also as far as north as Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>As the military gradually established control in certain areas, the authorities began to dismantle the big sites near main roads or major towns and create smaller, decentralized sites grouped around advanced military positions in the hills (Cibitoke, parts of Bururi, Bubanza). Elsewhere, short-term regroupment operations continue to be implemented in response to localized destabilization (Bujumbura Rural).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Nearly all the sites in Cibitoke province, for so long the most unstable part of the country, are dismantled by June and the people return to their hills. At almost the same time, the crisis in neighboring Congo produces an influx of some eleven thousand people, which continues up to present.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Causes of internal displacement: an analysis by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (1998)

- Pervasive psychology of "flee or be killed" is a lasting legacy of the 1972 massacres and the 1993 upheavals
- Displacement has also been used as a deliberate goal of violence since 1993
- Massive retaliation by the armed forces
- Suspicion towards the displaced population creates more displacement
- Use of violence and displacement as a way to achieve political or economical objectives

USCR 1998a, pp. 32-33:
“A history of massacres has taught the people of Burundi, regardless of their ethnicity, that their personal survival hinges on their ability to flee and seek a safer place temporarily. For many peasant Burundians, the lesson of the past is that violence can erupt suddenly and can rapidly become all-encompassing. It is a lesson handed down from generation to generation. Some of the underlying causes of internal displacement in Burundi follow:

First, a pervasive psychology of ‘flee or be killed’ has become the lasting legacy of the 1972 slaughter and the 1993 upheaval. The 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda has reinforced the psychology of flight in Burundi.

Second, the smaller massacres that have occurred almost daily since 1994 serve to validate the historical lessons of fear and mistrust. Fear is also ingrained that large number of Burundians have learned to flee their homes not only in reaction to danger but also in anticipation of it.

Third, much of Burundi’s displacement since 1993 has been caused by «ethnic cleansing.» Displacement is no longer merely as accidental by-product of violence; it has become a deliberate goal of violence.

Fourth, both ethnic groups of Burundi regard themselves as vulnerable. The sense of vulnerability has become an important part of the self-identity. Hutu are demographically dominant but see themselves as vulnerable to the political and military power of Tutsi. Tutsi are politically and militarily powerful but view themselves as vulnerable to the demographic dominance of Hutu. Members of both ethnic groups regard themselves as victims, despite the fact that many massacres in Burundian history have been largely one-sided.

Fifth, a pattern is evident in many violent eruptions over the decades: regardless of how violence begins, there is almost always massive retaliation against the Hutu by the Tutsi-dominated
military. As a result, many Hutu instinctively flee at the mere sight of soldiers or at the distant sound of their vehicles. The country's forces of order, unfortunately, create new disorder and displacement – deliberately in some cases, inadvertently in others.

Sixth, population displacement in Burundi often exacerbates rather than alleviates the conflict. Uprooted Burundians of one ethnic group are often regarded as dangerous by members of the other ethnic group. The military suspects that many internally displaced Hutu are rebels. Many Hutu suspect that camps of displaced Tutsi are bases for militia activity. There is some truth to these mutual suspicions. The result is that displacement at times begets more violence, causing still more people to flee. In short – at least in Burundi – displacement causes more displacement.

These are only partial explanations of the population displacement in Burundi, of course. This review of Burundi’s history indicates that some actors create violence and displacement as a way to achieve political control by force that they are unable to achieve or maintain through nonviolent means. Some elements in Burundi create violence and displacement for the economic rewards it brings them through banditry, confiscation of property, and skimming of relief aid. Still other Burundians commits violence and force displacement based on pure fear or hate, reinforced by decades of grievances, real or imagined."


- 1996: government policy to move civilian populations into "regroupment" camps
- 1997: end of the large-scale, long-term "regroupment" policy
- 1998: short-term forced movement of populations continues, particularly in unstable western provinces
- Since September 1999, over 350,000 people were forcibly moved by government forces to 53 regroupment camps to deprive insurgent groups of local support
- Government explained that regroupment camps were established to protect civilians from the rebels
- Dismantlement of regroupment camps was precondition to peace negotiations and camps were dismantled by mid-2000

**USCR 2000 "regroupment"**

"Burundian authorities have pursued two waves of forced population relocation, or regroupment. The first regroupment wave occurred during 1996-98 when the government moved at least a quarter-million Hutu into 50 camps scattered throughout the country. Some observers estimated that up to 800,000 persons lived in the regroupment camps at that time. Most regroupment sites closed during 1998, allowing occupants to return home."

**HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":**

*Renewed Regroupment (1999-2000)*

"In July and August 1999, the rebels launched increasingly frequent and damaging raids in and around Bujumbura, killing dozens of civilians as well as some soldiers. The army retaliated with attacks that killed more than one hundred civilians as well as combatants and the government tightened an existing curfew. These measures failed to satisfy Tutsi extremists in Bujumbura who demanded more drastic action to protect the city and to repress the rebellion. With rumors circulating of a possible coup and of violence being organized by extremists, the government decided to impose a policy of regroupment on most of Bujumbura-rural, particularly on areas inhabited largely by Hutu and near the city."

**HRW June 2000, "Regrouping":**
"In mid-1999, it [the government] had revived the regroupment policy in parts of southeastern Burundi before deciding to extend it to the area of the capital in September."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"The Tutsi-dominated government of Burundi, combating rebellions among the Hutu majority, began forcing civilians in the area around the capital into so-called "protection sites" or "regroupment camps" beginning in late September 1999. Burundian authorities claimed the measure was intended to protect the civilians, most of them Hutu, from attack by the rebel National Liberation Forces (Forces Nationales pour la Libération, FNL) who were becoming increasingly well-entrenched in the area. In fact, they meant to deprive the FNL of support from local people who helped them, sometimes willingly, sometimes under duress. By removing civilian support, the authorities hoped to isolate the FNL and thus reduce its increasingly frequent attacks on the capital. They hoped also to quiet Tutsi extremists who accused them of weakness in confronting the rebel threat."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"By the end of 1999, authorities had obliged some 80 percent of the population of the province of Bujumbura-rural-some 350,000 people-to live in fifty-three camps. Although regroupment helped reduce attacks on the capital city, rebels remained firmly established in rural areas. They simply shifted from one place to another when attacked by the army, which had insufficient troops available to control the whole region at the same time. Rebels continued to live off the crops of local people and even to inhabit the houses of those forced to live in the camps.

USCR 2000, "Regroupment":
"The country included at least three types of internal displacement: up to 200,000 people, primarily rural Tutsi, who have lived for six years in designated camps protected by government soldiers and thousands, who have become displaced in the countryside or at makeshift sites for varying lengths of time; and nearly 350,000 Hutu whom the government required to live in so-called 'regroupment' camps."

Dismantlement of regroupment camps (2000)

USCR 2000, "Regroupment":
"Government authorities argued that the camps were a temporary measure to protect civilians from attack and deprive rebel groups of food and lodging in rural areas. Burundian officials urged international humanitarian organizations to provide food, water, sanitation, and medical care to the sites. Burundian President Pierre Buyoya visited several sites in October [1999] and stated that conditions there were better than portrayed by aid agencies. The regroupment camps were 'no dramatic situation,' he assured."

HRW June 2000, "Summary":
"The international community severely criticized the policy of regroupment. In January 2000, the Burundian government promised to begin closing the camps but it made little progress in doing so until early June. At that time, rebel leaders made closing the camps a precondition for peace negotiations and former South African President Nelson Mandela, facilitator for the negotiations, condemned the regroupment sites as 'concentration camps.' Under this pressure, President Pierre Buyoya agreed that everyone in the camps would be allowed to return home by the end of July."

For an analysis on how forced displacement in 2000 of 350,000 civilians was carried out in violation of international law, including the Un Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, see HRW June 2000 "Violation of international law & Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" [link below]
See also "Policy of the international humanitarian community regarding provision assistance in the context of forced relocation (1999-2000)" [Internal link]

Fighting between FNL and army displaced thousands in Bujumbura Rural (2004-2008)

- Combatants of FNL fought so called FNL "dissidents", causing displacement in October 2007
- FNL is the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government
- Population displacement reduced in 2005 compared to 2003-2004
- Little population displacement in 2006, but the populations of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural, have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL

IRIN 23 April 2008:
"The resumption of violence in and around Bujumbura is causing panic in the country. Outside the capital, residents spend their nights in the bush for fear of being attacked, as the death toll rose to 33.
A bomb destroyed part of the Vatican embassy compound and a dining hall in the Kiriri University campus on 22 April [2008].

"We call on the army to remove its heavy arms from our campus," a student said, reacting to the installation of rocket launchers aimed at rebuffing attacks by the rebel FNL.
On 18 April, attacks were launched on military positions in Gihosha, Kanyosha, Kamenge and Musaga areas."

NRC, May 2008:
In April 2008 serious violations of the 6 September 2006 ceasefire between the Burundian Army (FDN) and the rebel group Palipehutu-FNL (FNL) occurred. The most reported events took place in the capital city, Bujumbura, where three attacks took place on April 17, 18 and 22. Violence sprung in several provinces around the country (Bujumbura Rurale, Bubanza, Cibitoke and Kayanza), but Bujumbura Rurale province has been the most affected province, witnessing displacements of population.[...]

At the peak of displacement it was reported that there were:
- 4,050 households displaced in Isale commune or 20,100 people out of 83,000 inhabitants concentrated mostly in 6 sites in the centre of the commune, Rushubi on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 5,102 households displaced in Muyira and Kirombwe, both at Kanyosha commune on May 2 (data Burundian Red Cross).
- 4,305 households displaced in Kabezi centre in three different sites on May 7 (data Kabezi local administration).
- 3,166 households displaced in Gitaza centre and 1,100 in Rutongo, both at Muhuta commune (data Muhuta local administration).
- And fewer numbers of IDPs registered in Bugarama, Mutambu and Nyabiraba communes (several hundreds of households)."

IRIN, 25 October 2007:
"Fighters of Burundi’s last active rebel group have for the second time in one week attacked a position occupied by a break-away faction, forcing villagers to flee their homes, a senior military official said."
The evening raid by combatants of the Front National de Liberation (FNL), led by Agathon Rwasa, took place on 24 October [2007] evening on a site where the so-called FNL "dissidents" have gathered in Gakungwe village of Kabezi commune in Bujumbura Rural province.

It forced hundreds of people from surrounding villages to run away as the army sent reinforcements to the area to guard the splinter faction’s settlement, residents said.

"There has indeed been such an attack and the heavy exchange of gunfire was heard," deputy army chief of staff Major General Godefroid Niyuhire told IRIN on 25 October. There were, however, no casualties during the attack, he said.

The "dissidents" say they fought with Rwasa for the FNL, but Rwasa’s supporters have denied their claims and accused the government of creating a faction within the FNL. Rwasa has said these men, who intend to join the country’s peace process, are not even party to a 2006 ceasefire agreement signed between the government and the FNL.”

**OCHA 23 June 2005:**
“Population displacement due to insecurity and armed conflict reduced markedly in the first months of the year [2005] and as compared to the period 2003-2004. Populations in the province of Bujumbura rural, where recurrent waves of displacement had taken place throughout 2004, are gradually resettling and returning to zones of origin and no sizeable population movements were registered in the first semester of the year.”

**IRIN 4 January 2005:**
“Thousands of civilians have been displaced following fierce fighting on Saturday in Burundi’s western province of Bujumbura Rural.

The internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not received aid, the governor of the province, Ignace Ntawembarira, said.

Fighting was reported in the communes of Isale, Nyabiraba and Kanyosha, east of the capital, Bujumbura, between the rebel faction Forces nationales de libération (FNL) of Agathon Rwasa, and a coalition of the Burundian army and troops loyal to Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the former largest rebel faction in the country, the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces de defense pour la democratie (CNDD-FDD).”

**UNSC 27 October 2006:**
“In the period under review [August 2005-September 2006], the security situation was characterized by renewed clashes between FDN and FNL, mainly in the north-western provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural. The populations of these provinces have suffered armed attacks, looting and destruction of homes, property and livestock at the hands of FNL. In 2006, 107 cases of attacks and looting by FNL were reported.”

**Fighting between government and FLN troops causes the displacement of thousands in Bubanza Province (2008)**

- FNL - the only rebel group which has not made peace with the government – caused displacement at the end of 2007

**IRIN 14 January 2008:**
“About 1,400 families (8,400 people) displaced in Musigati commune in the northwestern province of Bubanza, following fighting between government forces and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), desperately need help, according to local officials.

Laurent Kagamba, adviser to the Musigati administrator, said that since the simultaneous attacks on three military positions on 28 December [2007] and another on 9 January [2008] in the same commune, residents had fled their homes. Some sought refuge in Musigati parish, others at Musigati and Kabere trade centres, as well as Busiga coffee factory, he said.”

IRIN 10 September 2007:
“Residents of 700 households, or about 4,000 people, have fled their homes in the northwest Burundi province of Bubanza following raids by suspected members of the country's last active rebel group, a government official said.

‘For the time being, security is not good at all. Some residents have been beaten, while others have had their property looted,’ the governor of Bubanza, Pascal Nyabenda, told IRIN.’

He said Forces nationales de libération (FNL) fighters had raided homes in Bubanza from their hideouts in the nearby Kibira and Rukoko forests. Those displaced were spending the nights in the compound of a local parish, venturing out for a few hours during the day to work in their fields, Nyabenda said.”

For information on displacement by fighting between government and FNL troops in Bubanza Province in previous years, see:
ITEKA, 9 August 2006, Burundi: Des personnes armées et des combattants du Palipehutu_Fnl mènent des attaques répétées dans certaines communes de Bubanza
ITEKA, 24 August 2005, Burundi: Des déplacés de guerre en commune Musigati sans assistance [Link below]
IRIN, 14 June 2005, Burundi: Thousands displaced in Bubanza [Link below]

Some of the Burundian refugees expelled from Tanzania have no house or land (2006)

UN 30 November 2006:
Over 3,000 Burundians who had found refuge in Tanzania were forced to return in 2006: “Many new arrivals report others being forced to leave and the 3,000 who have come back so far, only seem to be the tip of the iceberg. Nobody knows for sure how many Burundians live in Tanzania without having regularized their stay, but most estimate around 150,000 persons. This will remain a key challenge in 2007, especially since the new arrivals need assistance and in particular so-called sans addresses like Elias, who hopes that “the Burundian Government can find us a plot of land where I can build a house and send my children to school.”"

NRC November 2006:
“Since June 2006, Tanzania has been implementing a national plan for the repatriation of refugees from Tanzania. In this framework, persons without refugee status or any other legal status in Tanzania have been forcibly removed from Tanzania. This year, more than 4000 Burundians have been expelled from Tanzania, mainly from Ngara district towards Muyinga province.”

See also:
UNHCR, 23 Oct 2006, Growing numbers of Burundians return home from the DRC [Internet]
Other causes of displacement

Tens of thousands were displaced due to floods (2007)

- Since November 2006, close to 300,000 people were affected by the heavy floods

IRIN 9 February 2007:

Les pluies diluvienes qui tombent depuis novembre 2006 ont détruit les cultures et infrastructures de plusieurs régions, obligeant le gouvernement à mettre en place un fonds de solidarité pour venir en aide aux déplacés victimes des inondations dans les provinces de Muyinga, Kirundo, Cankuzo, Karuzi, Kayanza, Ngozi et Muyinga. »

IRIN 15 January 2007:
"Thousands of people in northwestern Burundi, displaced after days of heavy rainfall, urgently need relief aid, officials said on Monday.

"The rains have rendered more than 3,000 residents homeless," said Prosper Banzambe, the chief of Gatumba Zone, one of the affected areas in Mitumbuzi Commune, Bujumbura Rural Province.

He said the displaced, some of whom had sought shelter in a local church, needed food and other non-food aid such as blankets, jerry cans, soap and mosquito nets.

The rains, which pounded the area at the weekend, destroyed at least 500 homes. The flooding of the nearby River Kiziba contributed to the houses’ collapse.

Banzambe expressed concern that the continuing rains could cause more damage in Gatumba and appealed for a temporary shelter for the displaced.

He urged humanitarian organisations to help the displaced, saying the local administration was unable to "adequately meet their needs". […]

On 4 January [2007], the government set up a national solidarity fund to support people affected by floods in seven provinces. In a decree, President Pierre Nkurunziza declared the provinces of Kayanza in the north, Muramvya and Karuzi in the central part of the country, Ruyigi in the east, and Bubanza and Cibitoke in the northwest, as "hunger-stricken following floods".

He also announced the establishment of the solidarity fund, to which every Burundian must contribute for four months from the end of January."

AFP 16 January 2007:
"Heavy rains pounding Burundi’s capital and outlying areas have killed at least four people and left about 23,000 homeless since the downpours began last month, officials said Tuesday."
They said the situation was "catastrophic" after the floods destroyed farmlands, sparking fears of food shortages and disease outbreaks in the tiny central African nation emerging from more than a decade of civil strife.”

Famine in north and east causes internal displacement (2005-2006)

• Many of the people who flee due to food insecurity are newly repatriated refugees

**OCHA 16 January 2005:**
“[R]esidents of Northern provinces continue to flee inside and outside Burundi due to food insecurity. As of 14 January [2005], a joint visit conducted by OCHA Ruyigi sub office and the provincial administration authorities confirmed the presence in Kabuyenge IDP site, in Gisuru Commune, of 63 families who fled Busoni and Bugabira communes (Kirundo Province) in search of food. OCHA, in collaboration with the administration authorities convened a meeting with humanitarian actors in the province to discuss an emergency response.”

**OCHA 23 June 2005:**
“Cycles of drought periods, loss of staple crops, poor yields during three consecutive agriculture seasons and fragile nutritional conditions were particularly important in the northern Burundian provinces, which were also affected by waves of population movements both internal and across the border into Rwanda.”

**OCHA 5 March 2005:**
“Despite food aid distributed by WFP and partners, the food security situation remains disconcerting mainly in Northern and Eastern provinces. Continuous internal and cross-border displacement of the population continues to be part of the coping strategies. Around 7,900 Burundian asylum seekers were reported in Tanzania. Meanwhile, 131 internally displaced persons were registered in Cankuzo coming from Kirundo. However, many more internal movements remain unrecorded.”

**ITEKA 21 February 2006:**
“La plupart de ces migrants sont de nouveaux rapatriés qui n’ont pas eu où s’installer. Ils sont en train de migrer à la quête de quoi manger. Malheureusement, la population de la province de Cankuzo a également faim et ne peut pas les aider. Les prix des vivres montent chaque jour.”
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