INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONVENTION REFUGEE DEFINITION
IN THE CASE LAW

Legal Services
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
December 31, 2005
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KEY POINTS
Refugee Protection Division

INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVENTION REFUGEE DEFINITION IN THE CASE LAW

KEY POINTS

(Based on the December 31, 2005 paper)

Legal Services
Immigration and Refugee Board
December 31, 2005
Chapter 2

COUNTRY OF PERSECUTION

1. The claimant must establish that he or she is a Convention refugee from the country of his or her nationality (or the country of his former habitual residence, if the claimant is not recognized as a citizen of any country). Nationality means citizenship of a particular country. [section 2.1.]

   Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward,

2. If a claimant is a national of more than one country, the claimant must show that he or she is a Convention refugee with respect to all such countries. [section 2.1.1.]

   Ward, supra.

3. A claimant may be considered to be a national of a country where the evidence establishes that it is within his or her control to acquire the citizenship of a country: for example, where the application for citizenship is a mere formality and the authorities of that country do not have any discretion to refuse the application. Moreover, there must be a genuine connection or link with that country. [section 2.1.3.]

   Williams v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
   [2005] 3 F.C.R. 429 (F.C.A.); 2005 FCA 126

   Bouianova, Tatiana v. M.E.I.
   (F.C.T.D., no. 92-T-1437), Rothstein, June 11, 1993;

   Katkova, Lioudmila v. M.C.I.

4. There is some confusion in the case law of the Federal Court as to whether or not an adverse inference can be drawn from the failure to access possible protection or status in a third country, in cases where there is no automatic right to citizenship. [section 2.1.5.]

5. The concept “former habitual residence” is only relevant where the claimant is stateless, i.e. he or she does not have a country of nationality. [section 2.2.]

6. Former habitual residence implies a situation where a stateless person was admitted to a country with a view to enjoying a period of continuing residence of some duration. The claimant does not have to be legally able to return to a country of former habitual residence for it to be so described. The claimant must, however, have established a significant period of de facto residence in the country in question. [section 2.2.1.]

   Maarouf v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
7. Where the stateless claimant has more than one country of former habitual residence, he or she must show that, on a balance of probabilities he or she would suffer persecution in any country of former habitual residence, and that he or she cannot return to any of his or her other countries of former habitual residence. This test may be termed “any country plus the Ward factor”. [section 2.2.2.]


8. Statelessness per se does not give rise to a claim to refugee status: the claimant must demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution based on a Convention ground. [section 2.2.4.]

9. A denial of a right to return may constitute an act of persecution by the state; however, for it to be the basis of a claim, the refusal must be based on a Convention ground. [section 2.2.5.]

10. According to paragraph 101 of the UNHCR Handbook, stateless claimants need not avail themselves of state protection since there is no duty on the state to provide protection. The decisions of the Federal Court on this topic are not consistent. [section 2.2.6.]
Chapter 3

PERSECUTION

1. To be considered persecution, the mistreatment suffered or anticipated must be serious, i.e., it must constitute a key denial of a core human right. [section 3.1.1.1.]

   
   Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward,  

   Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),  

2. What constitutes a basic human right is determined by the international community, not by any one country. At the same time, in determining whether anticipated actions would constitute fundamental violations of basic human rights, it is acceptable to consider Canadian law. [section 3.1.1.1.]

   Chan, supra.

3. The second criterion is that, generally, the mistreatment must be repetitive and persistent. However, there should not be an “exaggerated emphasis” on the need for repetition and persistence. The RPD should analyze the quality of incidents in terms of whether they constitute “a fundamental violation of human dignity.” [section 3.1.1.2.]

   Rajudeen, Zahirdeen v. M.E.I.  

   Ranjha, Muhammad Zulfiq v. M.C.I.  

4. For the claim to succeed, the persecution must be linked to a Convention ground, in other words, there must be a nexus. [section 3.1.1.3.]

5. While most acts of persecution can be characterized as criminal, not all criminal acts constitute persecution. [section 3.1.1.4.]

   Cortez, Delmy Isabel v. S.S.C.  

6. It is not necessary, in order for persecution to exist, that the perpetrators of the harm belong to a certain category or hold a certain kind of position. In particular, persecution may exist even if state authorities are neither the immediate inflictors of the harm, nor complicit in the infliction. [section 3.1.1.5.]

   Ward, supra;  
   Chan, supra.
7. The claimant may be subject to a number of discriminatory or harassing acts. While these acts may individually not be serious enough to constitute persecution, they may cumulatively amount to persecution. [section 3.1.2.]

*Madelat, Firouzeh v. M.E.I., Mirzabeglui, Maryam v. M.E.I.*
(F.C.A., nos. A-537-89 and A-538-89),
MacGuigan, Mahoney, Linden, January 28, 1991.
Chapter 4

GROUNDS OF PERSECUTION

1. A claimant’s fear of persecution must be by reason of one of the five grounds enumerated in the definition of Convention refugee - race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group and political opinion. There must be a link between the fear of persecution and one of the five grounds. [section 4.1.]

    *Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward,*

2. When determining the applicable grounds, the relevant consideration is the perception of the persecutor. This perception need not necessarily conform to the claimant’s true beliefs. [section 4.1.]

    *Ward, supra.*

3. Freedom of religion includes the right to manifest the religion in public, or private, in teaching, practices, worship and observance. [section 4.4.]

    *Fosu, Monsieur Kwaku v. M.E.I.*

4. The meaning assigned to “particular social group” should take into account the general underlying themes of the defence of human rights and anti-discrimination that form the basis for international refugee protection. [section 4.5.]

    *Ward, supra.*

5. As a working rule to achieve the above result, the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward identified three possible categories of particular social groups:

   (i) Groups defined by an innate or unchangeable characteristic;

   (ii) Groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to their human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association; and

   (iii) Groups associated by a former voluntary status, unalterable due to its historic permanence. [section 4.5.]

    *Ward, supra.*
6. A particular social group cannot be defined solely by the fact that a group of persons are objects of persecution, since the Convention refugee definition requires that the persecution be “by reason of” one of the grounds. [section 4.5.]

Ward, supra.

7. In the context of the Convention refugee definition, political opinion is any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of state, government and policy may be engaged; however this does not mean that only political opinions regarding the state will be relevant. [section 4.6.]

Ward, supra; Klinko v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 3 F.C. 327 (C.A.)

8. The political opinion at issue need not have been expressed outright, it can be perceived or imputed. As well, it need not necessarily conform to the claimant’s true beliefs. What is relevant is the perception of the persecutor. [section 4.6.]

Ward, supra.

9. Victims of crime, corruption or vendettas may, in certain circumstances, establish a link between their fear of persecution and one of the five grounds in the definition. A link to political opinion will be established if the actual or perceived expression of the opinion involves matters in which the machinery of the state may be engaged. [section 4.7.]

Ward, supra; Klinko, supra.

10. The making of a public complaint about widespread corrupt conduct by government officials to a government authority, and thereafter, the complainant suffering persecution on this account, when the corrupt conduct is not officially sanctioned, condoned or supported by the state, constitutes an expression of political opinion and therefore there is nexus to a Convention refugee ground. However, an opinion expressed in opposition to a criminal organization will not provide a nexus on the basis of political opinion unless the disagreement is rooted in political conviction. [section 4.7.]

Ward, supra;

Klinko, supra.
Chapter 5

WELL-FOUNDED FEAR

1. The definition of Convention refugee is forward-looking, therefore the fear of persecution is to be assessed at the time of the examination of the claim to refugee status. [section 5.1.]

2. The claimant does not have to establish that he or she was persecuted in the past or that he or she would or will be persecuted in the future. [section 5.1.]


3. Claimants must establish their case on a balance of probabilities, but this does not mean they have to prove that persecution (on return) would be more likely than not. What they have to establish is that there are “good grounds” for fearing persecution. This may also be stated as a “reasonable” or even a “serious possibility” as opposed to a mere possibility that the claimant would be persecuted if returned to the country of origin. [section 5.2.]


4. The “standard of proof” and the “legal test to be met” must not be confused. The standard of proof refers to the standard the panel will apply in assessing the evidence adduced for the purpose of making factual findings, whereas the legal test is the test that is required to establish the refugee claim is well founded. [section 5.2.]


5. A claimant may have a subjective fear that he or she will be persecuted if returned to his or her country, but the fear must be assessed objectively in light of the situation in the country to determine whether it is well founded. [section 5.3.]


6. Generally, delay in making a claim for refugee protection or in leaving the country of persecution is not in itself a decisive factor, however it is a relevant and potentially important consideration. [section. 5.4.]


7. Delay may constitute sufficient grounds upon which to reject a claim where the delay is inordinate and there is no satisfactory explanation for it. [section 5.4.]
8. Delay may point to a lack of subjective fear of persecution, the reasoning being that someone who was truly fearful would claim refugee status at the first opportunity. Delay, or a failure to seek protection at the first opportunity may occur at various points in time: delay in leaving the country of persecution; failure to seek protection in other countries; delay in making a claim upon arrival in Canada. [section 5.4.]

9. Depending on the circumstances of the case, valid status in Canada can constitute a good reason for not claiming refugee protection immediately. [section 5.4.3.]

10. Return to the country of persecution may indicate that a well-founded fear of persecution is lacking where the claimant’s conduct is inconsistent with such a fear. [section 5.5.]
Chapter 6

PROTECTION

1. The responsibility to provide international protection only becomes engaged when national or state protection is unavailable to the claimant (international protection is surrogate). [section 6.1.1.]

   Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward,

2. In the case of multiple nationalities (citizenship), the claimant is expected to avail him or herself of the protection of all the countries of citizenship. [section 6.1.2.]

   Ward, supra.

3. The availability of national protection forms part of the analysis of whether the claimant’s fear is well founded. [section 6.1.3.]

   Ward, supra.

4. Two presumptions are at play in refugee determination: (a) if the fear of persecution is credible (legitimate) and there is an absence of state protection, one can presume that persecution will be likely and the fear well founded; (b) absent a complete breakdown of state apparatus, states are presumed to be capable of protecting their citizens. [section 6.1.5.]

   Ward, supra.

5. The claimant must approach his or her state for protection, if state protection might reasonably be forthcoming. [section 6.1.8.]

   Ward, supra.

6. The claimant has the burden of rebutting the presumption of state protection. In order for the presumption to be rebutted, and in order to establish the reasonableness of failing to approach the state, the claimant must present “clear and convincing proof” of the state’s inability to protect. [sections 6.1.5. and 6.1.8.]

   Ward, supra.

7. It is incorrect to use the criterion of “basis for protection” based on some comparative analysis with other countries as the legal test for state protection. The Board must address the issues of adequate and effective state protection. [section 6.1.9.]

   Pilliyan, Ponni v. M.C.I.
8. A guarantee of protection for all citizens at all times is not to be expected. Nor is perfect protection. Where a state is in effective control of its territory, has military, police and civil authority in place and makes serious efforts to protect its citizens, the mere fact that it is not always successful will not justify a claim that the state is not providing protection. [section 6.1.11.]

M.E.I. v. Villafranca, Ignacio

9. As regards the issue of internal flight alternative in relation to state inability or refusal to provide protection, if state policy restricts a claimant’s access to the whole of the state’s territory, then the failure to provide local protection can be seen as state failure to provide protection and not mere local failure. [section 6.1.11.]

Zhuravlyev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2000] 4 F.C. 3 (T.D.)

10. Protection must be from the state, not from non-state sources. The availability of protection from non-state sources may be relevant to the issue of the objective basis for the claim. [section 6.1.12.]

11. The more democratic the state's institutions, the more the claimant must have done to exhaust all the courses of action open to him or her. [sections 6.1.9. and 6.1.12.]

M.C.I. v. Kadenko, Ninal

12. Control of the claimant’s country may be divided – geographically or otherwise – among several de facto authorities. Protection from any one of these authorities, or from a combination of them, will suffice. [section 6.1.10.]

Zalzali v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),

13. According to paragraph 101 of the UNHCR Handbook, stateless claimants need not avail themselves of state protection since there is no duty on the state to provide protection. The decisions of the Federal Court on this topic are not consistent. [section 6.2.]
Chapter 7

CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND COMPELLING REASONS

1. A change in country conditions is relevant if it may help in determining whether or not there is, at the date of the hearing, a reasonable and objectively foreseeable possibility that the claimant will be persecuted in the event of return there. [section 7.1.]

   Yusuf, Sofia Mohamed v. M.E.I.

2. When a panel is weighing changed country conditions together with all the evidence, factors such as durability, effectiveness and substantiality are relevant. The more durable the changes are demonstrated to be, the heavier they will weigh against granting the claim. [section 7.1.2.]


3. While recent changes may be sufficient to remove the basis of the claimant’s fear of persecution, the Refugee Protection Division should not rely on or give much weight to changes that are short-lived, transitory, inchoate, tentative, inconsequential or otherwise ineffective in substance or implementation. [section 7.1.2.]

4. These considerations apply equally to cases where there has been a fundamental change in the claimant’s personal circumstances, even absent a change in the political situation in the country. [section 7.1.2.]

   Umana, Cesar Emilio Campos v. M.C.I.
   (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1434-02), Snider, April 2, 2003; 2003 FCT 393

5. Whether a change of circumstances is sufficient for a fear of persecution to be no longer well founded must be determined in relation to the basis of the particular claim. [section 7.1.2.]

   Rahman, Faizur v. M.E.I.

6. If a change in circumstances is to be relied on, the issue must be raised or notice must be given to the claimant but it is sufficient if “objective basis” is identified as an issue. [section 7.1.4.]
7. There is no obligation on the Refugee Protection Division to consider post-hearing evidence relating to changes in country conditions unless that evidence has been accepted by the panel before the panel renders a final decision on the claim. The Refugee Protection Division may, on its own motion, provide additional documents and reconvene a hearing into a claim that has not been concluded with a final decision to hear evidence relating to changes in country conditions. [section 7.1.5.]

8. The jurisprudence that has developed with respect to section 2(3) of the Immigration Act may be used as guidance in the interpretation of section 108(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. [section 7.2.1.]

   Isacko, Ali v. M.C.I.
   (F.C., no. IMM-9091-03), Pinard, June 28, 2004; 2004 FC 890.

9. The issue of compelling reasons, the exception found in section 2(3) of the former Immigration Act applies only where the claimant had a well-founded fear of persecution when he or she left his or her country of nationality and the reasons for the fear of persecution have ceased to exist. The RPD is not required to consider whether past persecution constitutes compelling reasons where it determines that the claimant was not a Convention refugee at the time of departure from the country of nationality. A similarly worded “compelling reasons” provision is found in section 108 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, and thus the same approach would prevail under the IRPA. The jurisprudence that has developed with respect to section 2(3) of the Immigration Act may be used as guidance in the interpretation of section 108(4) of the IRPA. [section 7.2.1.]

   Cihal, Pavla v. M.C.I.

10. In every case in which the RPD concludes that a claimant has suffered past persecution, but there has been a change of country conditions under section 2(2)(e), the RPD is obligated to consider whether the evidence presented establishes that there are “compelling reasons”. This obligation arises whether or not the claimant expressly invokes the exception. The evidentiary burden rests on the claimant to adduce the necessary evidence to establish entitlement to the benefit of the “compelling reasons” provision. It follows that where the RPD does not find that the claimant has suffered past persecution, or finds the claimant’s factual evidence not credible, or finds the claimant would have had an IFA, the compelling reasons exception does not apply and the RPD is under no obligation to consider the issue. [section 7.2.1. and 7.2.2.]

   M.C.I. v. Yamba, Yamba Odette Wa

   Brovina, Qefisere v. M.C.I.
   (F.C., no. IMM-2427-03), Layden-Stevenson, April 29, 2004; 2004 FC 635.
11. A claimant will be entitled to Convention refugee status based on compelling reasons if he or she has suffered such appalling past persecution that their experience alone is compelling reason not to return the claimant, even though he or she may not have any reason to fear further persecution. [section 7.2.3.]

   Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Obstoj,

12. The case law indicates that the threshold necessary to demonstrate “compelling reasons” is a high one. According to one line of authority, to establish compelling reasons, the claimant must have suffered from “atrocious” or “appalling” acts of persecution. Some Federal Court cases hold that Obstoj did not establish a test that requires the persecution to reach that level. According to Suleiman, the issue is whether, considering the totality of the situation, i.e., humanitarian grounds, unusual or exceptional circumstances, it would be wrong to reject the claim in the wake of a change of circumstances.

13. Evidence of continuing psychological after-effects is relevant to a determination of the issue but is not a separate requirement that has to be met. There is conflicting case law from the Federal Court as to whether persecution of a family member can of itself be sufficient to constitute compelling reasons. [sections 7.2.6 and 7.2.7.]

14. Past acts of torture and extreme acts of mental abuse, alone, in view of their gravity and seriousness, can be considered “compelling reasons” despite the fact that these acts have occurred many years before. [section 7.2.5.]

   Suleiman, supra.

15. A claimant may be a Convention refugee as a consequence of events which have occurred in his or her country of origin since his or her departure or as a result of activities of the claimant since leaving his or her country. In these circumstances, the claimant is said to have a sur place claim. [section 7.3.]

16. A key issue in sur place claims is whether such actions have come to the attention of the authorities of the claimant’s country of origin and how they are likely to be viewed by those authorities. While it is relevant to examine the motives underlying a claimant’s participation in activities against his government in Canada in order to determine the claimant’s subjective fear, it would be an error for the RPD to stop the analysis there as it is also necessary to examine whether or not the fear has an objective basis. [section 7.3.1.]

   Asfaw, Napoleon v. M.C.I.

17. Evidence of political activities in Canada should be considered by the panel whether or not the claimant specifically raises a sur place claim. [section 7.3.1.]
Chapter 8

INTERNAL FLIGHT ALTERNATIVE (IFA)

1. IFA arises when a claimant who has a well-founded fear of persecution in his or her home area of the country is not a Convention refugee because he or she has an internal flight alternative elsewhere in that country. [section 8.1.]


2. The test to be applied in determining whether there is an IFA is two-pronged:

   (i) “…the Board must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there is no serious possibility of the claimant being persecuted in the part of the country to which it finds an IFA exists.”

   (ii) Conditions in the part of the country considered to be an IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable, in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claimant, for him to seek refuge there. [section 8.1.]

   Rasaratnam, supra.

3. The second prong of the IFA test may be stated as follows: would it be unduly harsh to expect the claimant to move to another, less hostile part of the country before seeking refugee status abroad? Thirunavukkarasu sets a very high threshold for the “unreasonable test”. The hardship associated with dislocation and relocation is not the kind of undue hardship that renders an IFA unreasonable. There is a distinction between the reasonableness of an IFA and humanitarian and compassionate considerations. [section 8.2.]


4. The claimant cannot be required to encounter great physical danger or undergo undue hardship in travelling to the IFA or staying there. [section 8.2.]

5. To satisfy the notice requirement, the issue of IFA must be raised by the RPO, the panel or the Minister before or during the hearing. Once the issue is raised, the onus is on the claimant to show that he or she does not have an IFA. [section 8.3.]
I. Civil war

1. The claimant is not barred from being considered a Convention refugee by the mere fact that the circumstances which he or she relies upon derive from, or are related to, a civil war. Equally, the mere fact that a civil war is underway in the claimant’s country of origin, or that the claimant has a fear related to the civil war, is not sufficient to make the claimant a Convention refugee. [section 9.2.]

   Salibian v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 3 F.C. 250 (C.A.);

   IRB Chairperson’s Guidelines, “Civilian Non-Combatants Fearing Persecution in Civil War Situations”, March 7, 1996 (as continued under s. 159(1)(h) of IRPA).

2. Refugee claimants must establish a link between themselves and persecution for a Convention reason; they must be targeted for persecution in some way, either personally or collectively. [section 9.2.]


3. The issue is not a comparison between the claimant’s risk and the risk faced by other individuals or groups at risk for a Convention reason, but whether the claimant’s risk is a risk of sufficiently serious harm and is linked to a Convention reason as opposed to the general, indiscriminate consequences of civil war. [section 9.2.1.2.]

   IRB Chairperson’s Guidelines, “Civilian Non-Combatants Fearing Persecution in Civil War Situations”, March 7, 1996; (as continued under s. 159(1)(h) of IRPA.


II. Persecution vs. prosecution

1. The issue is to distinguish between a situation where a claimant has violated a law of general application and what he or she fears is prosecution and punishment for that violation and a situation where the violation relates to a law which is persecutory in either its application or its punishment. [section 9.3.1.]

2. As to whether there would be a nexus between application of the law to the claimant and a Convention ground, the following propositions are relevant:
(i) A presumption of neutrality attaches to any law of general application. The onus is on the claimant to show that there is adverse differentiation.

(ii) The law may be inherently non-neutral. The neutrality of the law is to be judged objectively.

(iii) It is the intent and any principal effect of the law of general application which must be considered, not the claimant’s motivation. If either the intent or a principal effect is to harm the rights of some person or category, then the law is not neutral. [section 9.3.2.]

\textit{Zolfagharkhani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 3 F.C. 540 (C.A.).}

3. Regarding the seriousness of harm, the following must be considered:

(i) Is the penalty disproportionate to either the objective of the law or the offence?

(ii) The means by which the law is enforced. “Brutality in furtherance of a legitimate end is still brutality.”

(iii) Is the prosecution and enforcement of the law within legal bounds? (section 9.3.2.)

\textit{Cheung v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 2 F.C. 314 (C.A.);
Chan, (dissenting opinion), supra.}

4. Certain emergency situations such as those which threaten national security or terrorism, may allow states to institute measures which, while violative of certain civil rights, may not amount to persecution. However, certain types of violations such as beatings and torture of suspects or other brutal treatment will more appropriately be termed persecution. (section 9.3.3.)

\textit{Cheung, supra;}

\textit{Thirunavukkarasu, supra.}
III. Exit laws

1. A person who, having been subjected to no persecution in the past, violates an exit law applicable to all citizens and thereby exposes him or herself to punishment for the violation, is not a Convention refugee. [section 9.3.5.]

   *Valentin v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] 3 F.C. 390 (C.A.)*.

2. Repercussions beyond the statutory sentence may suggest that the actions of the authorities are persecutory. [section 9.3.5.]

IV. Military service

1. It is not persecution for a country to have compulsory military service. [section 9.3.6.]


2. An aversion to military service or a fear of combat is not in itself sufficient to support a well-founded fear of persecution. [section 9.3.6.]


3. The Zolfagharkhani principles relating to laws of general application (noted above) apply to military-service situations. [sections 9.3.2. and 9.3.6.]

   *Zolfagharkhani, supra.*

4. Where the claimant invokes reasons of conscience for objecting to military service, it is necessary to determine whether the particular reasons are genuine and of sufficient significance. [section 9.3.6.]

5. A recent decision of the Federal Court of Appeal puts into question whether conscientious objection to military service can ever be considered to be a ground for claiming Convention refugee status, however, the judgment is a brief answer to a certified question without any analysis.


6. A claimant may object to serving in a particular conflict, or to the use of a particular category of weapon, rather than objecting to military service altogether, and may be found to be a Convention refugee if the military actions objected to are judged by the
international community to be contrary to basic rules of human conduct. [section 9.3.6.]

Zolfagharkhani, supra;

Circ v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),

7. In determining whether the claimant would face serious harm for failing to serve in the military, one must consider whether the claimant might be able to perform alternative service or obtain an exemption from service. One must also consider the harshness of the actual penalty for refusing to serve. [section 9.3.6.]

V. One-child policy

1. Forced or strongly coerced sterilization constitutes persecution, whether the victim is a woman or a man. Forced abortion also constitutes persecution. [section 9.3.7.]

Cheung, supra;

Lai, Quang v. M.E.I.

2. The applicable Convention grounds, depending on the circumstances of the case, may be membership in a particular social group, religion and/or political opinion. [sections 4.4., 4.5., 4.6. and 9.3.7.]

Cheung, supra;

Chan (SCC, dissenting opinion), supra.

VI. Religious or cultural mores

1. Restrictions upon women. [section 9.3.8.1.]

(i) Restrictions imposed upon the dress and conduct of women may, in certain circumstances, constitute persecution. The breach of those restrictions may be perceived as political opinion but a claim may also be based on membership in a particular social group.

(ii) Examples of gender-based persecution (based on religious or cultural mores) include female circumcision and being forced into a marriage.

2. Ahmadis from Pakistan. [section 9.3.8.2.]

There is case law which says that the mere existence of the laws targeting Ahmadis does not give an Ahmadi claimant good grounds for fearing persecution; however, the point is not altogether free from doubt. Some of the factors that have been considered
by the Courts are whether the claimant engaged or is likely to engage in any of the prohibited activities and the likelihood that the law will actually be enforced.

VII. Indirect Persecution and Family Unity

1. Indirect persecution (a concept premised on the assumption that family members are likely to suffer great harm, such as loss of the victim’s economic or social support, when their close relative is persecuted) does not constitute persecution within the definition of Convention refugee. For a claim to be successful there must be a personal nexus between the alleged persecution and a Convention ground. In certain circumstances the nexus will be membership in the particular social group “family”. [section 9.4.]

   Pour-Shariati, Dolat v. M.E.I.

2. The concept of “family unity” (included in the UNHCR Handbook) has been rejected in Canadian law. This concept holds that if the directly-affected person meets the criteria in the definition, then family members may be recognized as Convention refugees even if they do not meet individually the definition’s criteria. [section 9.4.]
Chapter 10

EXCLUSION CLAUSES

I. Article 1E

1. The Convention refugee definition does not apply to a person who is recognized by the authorities of a country in which he or she has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country. [section 10.1.]

   Article 1E of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Schedule to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (formerly the Immigration Act)

2. At a minimum, the claimant must be able to return to and remain in the putative Article 1E country before he or she may be excluded from the Convention refugee definition. It appears that the proper time for determining the existence of the right to return is the date of the application for admission to Canada. [section 10.1.1.]

   M.C.I. v. Mahdi, Roon Abdikarim

   M.C.I. v. Choovak, Mehrnaz

3. If the claimant has some sort of temporary status which must be renewed, or if the claimant does not have the right to return to the country of residence, the claimant should not be excluded under Article 1E. However, there is an onus on the claimant to renew their status in the putative Article 1E country, if it is renewable. Moreover, recognition of permanent resident status can exist without the right of re-entry. Once there is evidence of permanent residence, the onus shifts to the claimant to demonstrate why a re-entry visa cannot be obtained.

   Shamlou, Pasha v. M.C.I.

   Kamana, Jimmy v. M.C.I.

   Nepete, Firmino Domingos v. M.C.I.

4. In determining whether the claimant enjoys the rights and obligations of a national, the following criteria are useful:

   (i) the right to return to the country of residence,
   (ii) the right to work freely without restrictions,
   (iii) the right to study, and
full access to social services in the country of residence.

5. The case law is not clear as to what factors need to be considered to determine whether Article 1E applies. It would appear that determinations under Article 1E do not necessarily involve the strict consideration of all factors regarding residency, as the analysis depends on the particular nature of the case at hand and the rights which normally accrue to citizens in the country of residence. A person need not possess rights that are identical in every respect to those of a national of the country. [section 10.1.2.]

Juzbasevs, Rafaels v. M.C.I.  
(F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3415-00), McKeown March 30, 2001;  
Hamdan, Kadhom Abdul Hu v. M.C.I.  

6. The case law seems to suggest that the RPD can consider whether the claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason in the Article 1E country. This would include an assessment of the availability of state protection in that country. Before the RPD considers the issue of state protection with respect to a country other than the claimant’s country of nationality, the panel should make clear it is considering a potential exclusion under Article 1E. The decisions of the Federal Court on this topic are not consistent. [section 10.1.3.]

Kroon, Victor v. M.E.I.  
Mobarekeh, Fariba Farahmad v. M.C.I.  
(F.C., no. IMM-5995-03), Layden-Stevenson, August 11, 2004; 2004 FC 1102

II. Article 1F

1. If there are “serious reasons for considering” that a claimant has committed an Article 1F crime (crime against peace, war crime, crime against humanity, serious non-political crime, act contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations), he or she is excluded from the Convention refugee definition.

Article 1 F of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,  
Schedule to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (formerly the Immigration Act)

2. Article 1F(a) must be interpreted so as to include the international instruments concluded since its adoption. This would include the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as well as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. [section 10.2.]

Harb, Shahir v. M.C.I.  
3. The burden of establishing “serious reasons for considering” that Article 1F offences have been committed falls on the Minister, however the Minister does not have to be present at the hearing in order for the CRDD to consider exclusion. [section 10.5.]

   Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),

4. There is no requirement to balance the nature of the Article 1F crime with the degree of persecution feared. In fact, in \textit{Xie}, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the RPD is neither required nor allowed to balance the claimant’s crimes against the risk of torture. In fact the Court held that having found first that the claimant fell within the exclusion clauses, specifically Article 1F(b), the RPD exceeded its mandate when it went on to consider whether the claimant was at risk of torture. [sections 10.2.4. and 10.3.4.]

   \textit{M.C.I. v. Malouf, François}

   \textit{Xie v. Canada (Minister Of Citizenship And Immigration),}

5. For a crime to be a crime against humanity, it must be committed in a widespread, systematic fashion either during a civil or international war or in times of peace. (section 10.2.3.)

   \textit{Sivakumar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),}

6. A criminal act rises to the level of a crime against humanity where the following four elements are made out:

   (i) An enumerated proscribed act was committed (this involves showing that the accused committed the criminal act and had the requisite guilty state of mind for the underlying act);

   (ii) The act was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack;

   (iii) The attack was directed against any civilian population or any identifiable group of persons; and

   (iv) The person committing the proscribed act knew of the attack and knew or took the risk that his or her act comprised a part of the attack. [section 10.2.3.]

   \textit{Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),}

7. There may be circumstances where a claimant will invoke successfully certain defences, such as duress and superior orders, which absolve him or her from
responsibility and thus the claimant will not be excluded from refugee status. [section 10.2.5.]

8. Where a claimant has not in a “physical” sense committed an Article 1F(a) crime, he or she may be held responsible for the crime as an accomplice and thus be subject to being excluded. In order to find the claimant complicit, the CRDD must determine that the claimant had “personal and knowing participation”. [section 10.2.6.]

Ramirez, supra.

9. Mere membership in an organization principally directed to a limited brutal purpose does not automatically result in exclusion; the CRDD must first determine whether the claimant had knowledge of the crimes being committed by the members of the organization. [section 10.2.6.1.]

Ramirez, supra;


10. In determining whether an organization is “principally directed to a limited, brutal purpose,” the organization need not be one that engages solely and exclusively in acts of terrorism. [section 10.2.6.1.]


11. Article 1F(b) is not applicable to refugee claimants who have been convicted of a crime committed outside Canada and who have served their sentence prior to coming to Canada. [section 10.3.1.]

Chan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2000] 4 F.C. 390 (C.A.)

12. The determination as to whether a crime is “serious” depends on the nature of the crime committed. It cannot be assumed that a “serious” crime is automatically one in which a maximum sentence of 10 years or more could have been imposed. [section 10.3.1.]

Chan, supra.

13. A claimant can be excluded under Article 1 F(b) for purely economic crimes. [section 10.3.1.]

Xie, supra.

14. Article 1F(b) crimes are not limited to those crimes that are extraditable pursuant to a treaty. The reference to extraditable crimes in Pushpanathan (SCC) is merely an indication of the nature and seriousness of the crimes that may fall under 1F(b). [section 10.3.1.]

_Zrig v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)_,

15. In order for a crime to be characterized as “political”, thus falling outside the ambit of Article 1F(b) (serious non-political crimes), both aspects of a two-pronged test must be satisfied:

(i) the existence of a political disturbance related to a struggle to modify or abolish a government or government policy;

(ii) a rational nexus between the crime committed and the accomplishment of the political objective sought. [section 10.3.2.]


16. A very serious crime may be accepted as “political” if the regime against which it is committed is repressive and offers no scope for freedom of expression and the peaceful change of government or government policy. [section 10.3.2.]

_Gil, supra._

17. The principles of complicity by association laid down in _Sivakumar_ and _Bazargan_ may be applied to Article 1F(b). [section 10.3.3.]

_Zrig, supra._

18. The purpose of Article 1F(c) is to exclude those individuals responsible for serious, sustained or systematic violations of fundamental human rights which amount to persecution in a non-war situation. [section 10.4.]


19. The guiding principle is that where there is consensus in international law that particular acts constitute sufficiently serious and sustained violations of fundamental human rights as to amount to persecution, or are explicitly recognized as contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, then Article 1F(c) will be applicable. [section 10.4.]

_Pushpanathan, supra._
20. Two categories of acts fall within Article 1 F(c):

(i) where a widely accepted international agreement or United Nations resolution declares that the commission of certain acts is contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations;

(ii) those acts which a court is able, for itself, to characterize as serious, sustained and systematic violations of fundamental human rights constituting persecution. [section 10.4.]

*Pushpanathan, supra.*

21. The application of Article 1F(c) is not limited to persons in power. Non-state actors may fall within the provision. [section 10.4.]

*Pushpanathan, supra.*

22. Since the RPD has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions of law and fact, including questions of jurisdiction, non-participation of the Minister does not preclude an exclusion finding. [section 10.5.]

*Arica, Jose Domingo Malaga v. M.E.I.*


23. Once the RPD decides that a claimant is excluded, it has no jurisdiction to decide whether the person would be a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. It cannot balance the risk of harm against the excludable crimes.

*Xie, supra.*
# CHAPTER 1

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CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. FOREWORD

This paper discusses the definition of Convention refugee,\(^1\) which is incorporated into Canadian law by section 96 of the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (IRPA).\(^2\)

The interpretation of the Convention refugee definition is an ongoing process, of which the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), formerly the Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) is a major player, it being the body in Canada which adjudicates claims in the first instance. Some issues have been settled by the Courts, others remain unanswered. One of the difficulties in summarizing the basic principles in this area of the law is that many of the Court decisions are fact specific and do not establish general principles of law. We have also identified those areas in which the case law is conflicting or unsettled.

In this paper, we have attempted to identify those principles of law which are settled and to indicate how the Courts have applied those principles to some particular situations. In reading the cases themselves, we caution keeping in mind the need to distinguish between a case that sets out a legal principle and a case that applies the law to particular facts.

Reference will be made to the decisions of the Federal Court and Supreme Court of Canada which interpret the Convention refugee definition. Foreign case law and CRDD decisions are not generally included in this paper. Where applicable, reference is also made to the UNHCR Handbook,\(^3\) and to the relevant IRB Legal Services Commentaries, Preferred Position Papers and Chairperson’s Guidelines issued by the IRB.


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2  S.C. 2001, c. 27.

1.2. EXPLANATORY NOTES

(1) References to “the Court of Appeal” are references to the Federal Court of Appeal. Similarly, references to “the Trial Division” are references to the Federal Court - Trial Division.

(2) Each chapter includes a list, in alphabetical order, of all the cases referred to in the chapter, with appropriate page references.

(3) In order to facilitate searching for cases in the various IRB Legal Services libraries, we have adopted the following practice. For cases reported in reporting series such as the Immigration Law Reporter (Imm. L.R.), the Dominion Law Reports (D.L.R.), or the National Reporter (N.R.), we have included the unreported citation as well. However, since all the offices subscribe to the Federal Courts Reports (F.C.R.) (formerly known as the Canada Federal Court Reports (F.C.)) and the Supreme Court Reports (S.C.R.), the unreported citation is not included for cases reported in these two reporting series.

For example, Ward is reported in the Supreme Court Reports, the Dominion Law Reports and the Immigration Law Reporter, therefore, the citation for this case will read:

\[
\text{20 Imm. L.R. (2d) 85.}
\]

Valentin is reported in the Federal Court Reports, therefore, the citation for this case will read:

\[
\text{Valentin v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] 3 F.C. } \\
\text{390 (C.A.)}
\]

Villafranca is reported in the Immigration Law Reporter, therefore the citation for this case will read:

\[
\text{Décary, December 18, 1992. Reported: Canada (Minister of Employment and } \\
\text{Immigration) v. Villafranca (1992), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 130 (F.C.A.).}
\]

(4) Note that when citing a case in reasons, only the reported citation should be used.

(5) For cases added in the December 31, 2002 update, the neutral citations are included.
1.3. CONVENTION REFUGEE DEFINITION

1.3.1. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, s. 96 - meaning of “Convention refugee”

96. A Convention refugee is a person who by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion,

(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, is unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of each of those countries, or

(ii) not having a country of nationality, is outside their country of former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.

1.3.2. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Section 108(1) and (4) - cessation of refugee protection

108(1) A claim for refugee protection shall be rejected, and a person is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection, in any of the following circumstances;

(a) the person has voluntarily reavailed themself of the protection of their country of nationality;

(b) the person has voluntarily reacquires their nationality;

(c) the person has acquired a new nationality and enjoys the protection of the country of that new nationality;

(d) the person has voluntarily become re-established in the county that the person left, or remained outside of and in respect of which the person claimed refugee protection in Canada; or

(e) the reasons for which the person sought refugee protection have ceased to exist.

108(4) Paragraph 1(e) does not apply to a person who establishes that there are compelling reasons arising out of any previous persecution, torture, treatment or punishment for refusing to avail themselves of the protection of the country which they left, or outside of which they remained, due to such previous persecution, torture, treatment or punishment.
1.3.3. **Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, s. 98 – exclusion clauses**

98. A person referred to in section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection.

1.3.4. **Schedule to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act - exclusion clauses**

SECTIONS E AND F OF ARTICLE 1 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES

E. This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country.

F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:

(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;

(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee.

(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
1.4. GENERAL RULES OF INTERPRETATION

The Supreme Court of Canada has dealt with very few refugee cases, however, a case which raised a number of important issues and provided the Court with the opportunity to offer its unanimous interpretation of the definition of Convention refugee was Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward. While the Court did not deal with every aspect of the definition (for example, it did not deal with the exclusion clauses), it did provide us with a general framework of interpretation of its major components. The Court also commented extensively on the context in which refugee determination takes place and on the nature of Canada’s international obligations in this respect.

The following are the general principles enunciated in Ward.

### 1.4.1. Surrogate Protection

The rationale underlying the international refugee protection system is that national protection takes precedence over international protection. This “surrogate” or “substitute” protection will only come into play in certain situations where national protection is unavailable. The burden is on the claimant to establish a well-founded fear of persecution in all countries of which the claimant is a citizen.

### 1.4.2. Fear of Persecution For A Convention Reason

Inability of a state to protect its citizens will not be sufficient to engage international protection obligations. There must also be a fear of persecution for a Convention ground.

... the international role was qualified by built-in limitations. These restricting mechanisms reflect the fact that the international community did not intend to offer a haven for all suffering individuals. The need for “persecution” in order to warrant international protection, for example, results in the exclusion of such pleas as those of economic migrants, i.e., individuals in search of better living conditions, and those of victims of natural disasters, even when the home state is unable to provide assistance, although both of these cases might seem deserving of international sanctuary.

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5 The Supreme Court of Canada has more recently dealt with the issue of exclusion under Article 1 F(c) in Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982; (1998), 43 Imm. L.R. (2d) 117 (S.C.C.). For a discussion of all exclusion issues see Chapter 10.
6 Each principle will be discussed in more detail in later chapters of the paper.
7 Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 709.
8 Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 751.
9 Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 731-732.
1.4.3. Two Presumptions At Play In Refugee Determination

**Presumption 1:** If the fear of persecution is credible (the Court uses the word “legitimate”) and there is an absence of state protection, it is not a great leap “... to presume that persecution will be likely, and the fear well-founded.”¹⁰

Having established the existence of a fear and a state’s inability to assuage those fears, it is not assuming too much to say that the fear is well-founded. Of course, the persecution must be real - the presumption cannot be built on fictional events - but the well-foundedness of the fear can be established through the use of such a presumption.¹¹

**Presumption 2:** Except in situations where the state is in a state of complete breakdown, states must be presumed capable of protecting their citizens. This presumption can be rebutted by “clear and convincing” evidence of the state’s inability to protect.¹²

The danger that [presumption one] will operate too broadly is tempered by a requirement that clear and convincing proof of a state’s inability to protect must be advanced.¹³

1.4.4. State Complicity Not Required

“Whether the claimant is ‘unwilling’ or ‘unable’ to avail him- or herself of the protection of a country of nationality,¹⁴ state complicity in the persecution is irrelevant.”¹⁵

As long as [the] persecution is directed at the claimant on the basis of one of the enumerated grounds, I do not think the identity of the feared perpetrator of the persecution removes these cases from the scope of Canada’s international obligations in this area.¹⁶

1.4.5. Existence Of Fear Of Persecution

State involvement in the persecution, however, “... is relevant ... in the determination of whether a fear of persecution exists.”¹⁷

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¹⁰ Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 722.
¹¹ Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 722.
¹² Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 725-726.
¹³ Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 726.
¹⁴ With respect to the meaning of the terms “unable”, “unwilling” and “protection”, the Supreme Court of Canada adopts an interpretation of the Convention refugee definition that is consistent with paragraphs 98, 99 and 100 of the UNHCR Handbook. See Ward, supra, footnote 4 at 718.
¹⁵ Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 720.
¹⁶ Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 726.
¹⁷ Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 721.
1.4.6. Use Of Underlying Anti-Discrimination Law In Interpreting Particular Social Group

The Supreme Court of Canada, discussing the meaning of “particular social group” makes reference to the fact that “[u]nderlying the Convention is the international commitment to the assurance of basic human rights without discrimination.” The Court then quotes with approval from Goodwin-Gill and Hathaway and adopts the approach taken in international anti-discrimination law as an inspiration to interpreting the scope of the Convention grounds.

Underlying the Convention is the international community’s commitment to the assurance of basic human rights without discrimination ...

This theme outlines the boundaries of the objectives sought to be achieved and consented to by the delegates ...

... the enumeration of specific foundations upon which the fear of persecution may be based to qualify for international protection parallels the approach adopted in international anti-discrimination law...

The manner in which groups are distinguished for the purposes of discrimination law can thus appropriately be imported into this area of refugee law.

1.4.7. Broad and general interpretation of political opinion

The Supreme Court of Canada adopts the definition of political opinion offered by Goodwin Gill, namely, "any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of the state, government, and policy may be engaged" and adds two refinements: (1) that the political opinion at issue need not have been expressed outright; and (2) that the political opinion ascribed to the claimant by the persecutor need not necessarily conform to the claimant’s true beliefs.

1.4.8. Examiner To Consider The Relevant Grounds

The Court refers with approval to paragraph 66 of the UNHCR Handbook, which states that it is not the duty of the claimant to identify the reasons for the persecution but for the

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18 Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 733.
21 Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 734.
22 Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 733-5.
23 Supra, footnote 19.
24 Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 746.
25 Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 746.
26 Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 747.
examiner to decide whether the Convention definition is met, having regard to all the grounds set out therein.  

1.4.9. Perception Of Persecutor

With respect to the ground “political opinion”, the Court endorses the definition suggested by Goodwin-Gill, i.e., “any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of the state, government, and policy may be engaged” and adds two refinements:

a) “... the political opinion at issue need not have been expressed outright,” it can be imputed to the claimant;  
b) “the political opinion ascribed to the claimant and for which he or she fears persecution need not necessarily conform to the claimant’s true beliefs”. The issue must be approached from the perspective of the persecutor.

The following are general principles established by cases other than Ward and by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

1.4.10. Section 7 Of The Charter

Given the seriousness of the consequences of a decision rendered by the Refugee Division and the nature of the rights conferred when Convention refugee status is granted, the principles of fundamental justice, as enshrined in section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, must be duly respected.

Given the potential consequences for the [claimants] of a denial of [Convention refugee] status if they are in fact persons with a “well-founded fear of persecution”, it seems to me unthinkable that the Charter would not apply to entitle them to fundamental justice in the adjudication of their status.

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27 Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 745.  
28 Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 746.  
29 Ward, supra, footnote 4, at 747.  
30 Section 7 provides that  
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.  
32 Singh, ibid., at 210, per Wilson J.
1.4.11. All Elements Of The Definition Must Be Met

To be determined a Convention refugee, a claimant must establish that he or she meets all the elements of the definition. Some aspects of the definition have not received judicial interpretation. Where several interpretations are possible, in choosing the most appropriate one, the Refugee Protection Division should take into account section 3(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which lists the objectives of the Act with respect to refugees and section 3(3) which sets out how the Act is to be construed and applied.

1.4.12. Personal Targeting Not Required

The claimant does not have to establish personal targeting or persecution or that he or she was persecuted in the past or will be persecuted in the future.33

1.4.13. Standard Of Proof Is “Reasonable or Serious Possibility”

The standard of proof in refugee claims is a “reasonable” or “serious possibility” that the claimant would be persecuted if he or she returned to the country of origin.34


Section 3(3)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act states that the Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is a signatory.

33 Salibian v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 3 F.C. 250 (C.A.) at 258.
# CHAPTER 1

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CHAPTER 2

COUNTRY OF PERSECUTION

2.1. COUNTRY OF NATIONALITY

A claimant must establish that he or she is a Convention refugee from the country of their nationality. In this context, nationality means citizenship of a particular country. If the claimant has a country of nationality, the claim should be assessed only against that country and not against some other country where the claimant may have residency status.

2.1.1. Multiple Nationalities

If a claimant is a national of more than one country, the claimant must show that he or she is a Convention refugee with respect to all such countries. Section 96(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) specifically provides:

96. A Convention refugee is a person who …

(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those countries.

A refugee claimant must therefore prove that he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution in all countries of nationality before he or she can be conferred refugee status in Canada. Consequently, the RPD is not required to consider the fear of persecution or availability of protection in the second country of citizenship, once it has been determined that the claimant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution in the first.

1 Hanukashvili, Valeri v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1732-96), Pinard, March 27, 1997. The Supreme Court of Canada pointed out in R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597, at paragraph 42, that, although the terms “nationality” and “citizenship” are often used as if they were synonymous, the principle of nationality is much broader in scope than the legal status of citizenship.

2 Hurt v. Canada (Minister of Manpower and Immigration), [1978] 2 F.C. 340 (C.A.); Mensah-Bonsu, Mike Kwaku v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-919-93), Denault, May 5, 1994; Adereti, Adebayo Adeyinka v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9162-04), Dawson, September 14, 2005; 2005 FC 1263. This is subject to a possible exclusion issue arising under Article 1E of the Refugee Convention (see Chapter 10, section 10.1.). In Sayar, Ahmad Shah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2178-98), Sharlow, April 6, 1999, the Court held that since the CRDD found that the claimant was excluded under Article 1E, it did not need to determine whether he had a well-founded fear of persecution in his country of citizenship.

3 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. This provision is consistent with the interpretation of the Refugee Convention endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689; 20 Imm. L.R. (2d) 85. The former Immigration Act, S.C. 1992, c. 49, s.1, was amended in 1993 to add s. 2(1.1), a provision dealing specifically with “multiple nationalities”.


2.1.2. Establishing Nationality

Each state determines under its own laws who are its nationals. Nationality can be established by examining the relevant laws (constitution, citizenship legislation) and their interpretation (most authoritatively, by officials of the relevant government), and the state practice of the country in question. Possession of a national passport as well as birth in a country can create a rebuttable presumption that the claimant is a national.

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6 Article 1 of the Hague Convention of 1930 states:

It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality.

7 Hanukashvili, supra, footnote 1. See, however, Nur, Khadra Okiye v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6207-04), De Montigny, May 6, 2005; 2005 FC 636, where the Court stated that it is a matter of law. The Court also stated that since nationality is determined in accordance with the law of the country, it cannot be the subject of specialized knowledge.


9 Radic, Marija v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6805-93), McKeown, September 20, 1994; Aguero, Mirtha Marina Galdo v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4216-93), Richard, October 28, 1994. In Adar, Mohamoud Omar v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3623-96), Cullen, May 26, 1997, the Court held that, unless its validity is contested, a passport is evidence of citizenship. Thus the onus shifts to the claimant to prove that he or she is of a different citizenship than that indicated in the passport. In Lolua, Georgi v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9674-04, Blanchard, November 7, 2005; 2005 FC 1506, the Court discussed the applicability of this presumption in a case where the claimant’s passport stated that he was a citizen of the now defunct USSR; there was no evidence on the record to establish that since the dissolution of that country, citizens of the USSR are de facto citizens of Russia.

Having regard to paragraph 93 of the UNHCR Handbook, the Court held in Mathews, Marie Beatrice v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5338-02), O'Reilly, November 26, 2003; 2003 FC 1387, that a holder of a country’s passport is presumed to be a citizen of that country. In Chowdhury, Farzana v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1730-05), Teitelbaum, September 14, 2005; 2005 FC 1242, the Court held that it was an error to rely on paragraph 93 of the UNHCR Handbook to find that the applicant’s passport was genuine, despite her statement that it was fake. This provision deals with the presumption of the claimant’s nationality once a passport is deemed valid. It then goes on to discuss how to approach a situation where a claimant has a passport that they are claiming is valid but cannot be proven to be so.

It appears that, even if a passport may have been obtained irregularly, effective nationality can be established, provided that the country in question confers on the holder national status and all its attendant rights. See Zheng, Yan-Ying v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-332-96), Gibson, October 17, 1996. However, that case was distinguished in Hassan, Ali Abdi v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5440-98), Evans, September 7, 1999, where the Court noted that the Kenyan Immigration Department only stated that, on the basis of the official’s perusal of the file, the claimant appeared to be a citizen; accordingly, if the Kenyan authorities subsequently determine the claimant had not been entitled to a Kenyan passport because he was not a national (as he alleged), he could be deported from that country.

of that country. However, the claimant can adduce evidence that the passport is one of convenience\textsuperscript{11} or that he or she is not otherwise entitled to that country’s nationality.\textsuperscript{12} Recourse to paragraph 89 of the UNHCR Handbook\textsuperscript{13} is necessary only when a person’s nationality cannot be clearly established.\textsuperscript{14}

\subsection*{2.1.3. Right to Citizenship}

The term “countries of nationality”, in section 96(a) of IRPA, includes potential countries of nationality. Where citizenship in another country is available, a claimant is expected to make attempts to acquire it and will be denied refugee status if it is shown that it is within his or her power to acquire that other citizenship. Consequently, a person who is able to obtain citizenship in another country by complying with mere formalities is not entitled to avail themself of protection in Canada.\textsuperscript{15}


\textsuperscript{12} Schekotikhin, supra, footnote 8. See also Hassan, supra, footnote 9. If a claimant asserts that they lost or renounced their citizenship, the claimant must produce evidence to establish that. See Lagunda, Lillian v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3651-04), von Finckenstein, April 7, 2005; 2005 FC 467.

\textsuperscript{13} Paragraph 89 of the Handbook states in part:

\begin{quote}
There may, however, be uncertainty as to whether a person has a nationality. … Where his nationality cannot be clearly established, his refugee status should be determined in a similar manner to that of a stateless person, i.e. instead of the country of his nationality, the country of his former habitual residence will have to be taken into account.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{14} Kochergo, supra, footnote 8.

\textsuperscript{15} The following approach was recommended in \textit{Nationality and Statelessness: A Handbook for Parliamentarians}, a 2005 publication of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (at 10-11):

\begin{quote}
To be considered a national by operation of law means that an individual is automatically considered to be a citizen under the terms outlined in the State’s enacted legal instruments related to nationality or that the individual has been granted nationality through a decision made by the relevant authorities. Those instruments can be a Constitution, a Presidential decree, or a citizenship act. …
\end{quote}

Whenever an administrative procedure allows for discretion in granting citizenship, applicants for citizenship cannot be considered nationals until their applications have been completed and approved and the citizenship of that State is granted in accordance with the law. Individuals who have to apply for citizenship, and those the law outlines as being eligible to apply, but whose application are rejected, are not citizens of that State by operation of that State’s law.
In view of its importance and complexity, normally notice should be given before the hearing if multiple nationality is an issue, so as to avoid taking claimants by surprise and allow them an opportunity to obtain evidence relating to that matter.16

In the case of Bouianova, in the context of the break-up of the former Soviet Union, Justice Rothstein of the Trial Division stated:

In my view, the decision in Akl,17 is wide enough to encompass the situation of [a claimant] who, by reason of her place of birth, is entitled to be a citizen of a particular country, upon compliance with requirements that are mere formalities.

In my view the status of statelessness is not one that is optional for [a claimant]. The condition of not having a country of nationality must be one that is beyond the power of the [claimant] to control. Otherwise, a person could claim statelessness merely by renouncing his or her former citizenship.

In a series of decisions, the Trial Division has held that a claimant can be considered to be a national of a successor state18 (to the country of his or her former nationality), even if he or she does not reside in that successor state, where the evidence establishes that application for citizenship is a mere formality and the authorities of the successor state do not have any discretion to refuse the application.19

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16 El Rafih, Sleiman v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9634-04), Harrington, June 10, 2005; 2005 FC 831; Sumair, Ghani Abdul v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-341-05), Kelen, November 29, 2005; 2005 FC 1607. But see De Barros, Carlos Roberto v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1095-04), Kelen, February 2, 2005; 2005 FC 283, where the Court found that claimant was not taken by surprise or prejudiced in the circumstances of that case.

17 M.E.I. v. Akl, Adnan Omar (F.C.A., no. A-527-89), Urie, Mahoney, Desjardins, March 6, 1990. In Akl, the Court cited Ward, supra, footnote 3, and reiterated that a claimant must establish that he or she is unable or unwilling to avail him- or herself of all of his or her countries of nationality.

18 The dissolution of the U.S.S.R. resulted in the emergence of 15 new states. The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) is the “continuing state”, having continued to respect all international treaties of the former state (U.S.S.R.), and the remaining states are “successor states”. For the purpose of this paper, both the continuing state and the successor states will be referred to as “successor states”.

19 Tit, supra, footnote 8 (re Ukraine); Bouianova, supra, footnote 8 (re Russia); Zdanov, Igor v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-643-93), Rouleau, July 18, 1994 (re Russia, regardless of the fact that the claimant had not applied for Russian citizenship and had no desire to do so); Igumnov, Sergei v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6993-93), Rouleau, December 16, 1994 (re Russia, notwithstanding the existence of the propiska system, which the Court found not to be persecutory); Chipounov, Mikhail v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1704-94), Simpson, June 16, 1995 (re Russia); Avakova, Fatjama (Tatiana) v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-30-93), Reed, November 9, 1995 (re Russia); Kuzneceva, Svetlana v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2750-99), Pinard, May 17, 2000 (re Russia). Some CRDD decisions have been set aside on judicial review because the evidence did not support the conclusion that citizenship would be granted automatically or as of right, e.g., Schekotikhin, supra, footnote 8 (re Israel and Ukraine); Casetellanos v. Canada (Solicitor General), [1995] 2 F.C. 190 (T.D.) (re Ukraine); Solodjankin, Alexander v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-523-94), McGillis, January 12, 1995 (re Russia).
The Trial Division has also held, in non-successor state contexts, that a legal entitlement to citizenship by birth in a place (*jus soli*),\(^{20}\) through one’s parents or by descent (*jus sanguinis*),\(^{21}\) through marriage,\(^{22}\) or even through ancestry\(^{23}\) may also confer effective nationality. One cannot “choose” to be stateless in these circumstances.

Where the country of putative citizenship does not have the discretion to refuse the application for citizenship, the fact that some administrative formalities are required does not preclude the application of the principle that a claimant can be considered to be a national of that country even if he or she does not reside there.\(^{24}\)

The issue of right to citizenship was explored by the Federal Court of Appeal in *Williams*,\(^{25}\) where the Court considered the following certified question:

Does the expression “countries of nationality” of section 96 of the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* include a country where the claimant

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\(^{21}\) Desai, Abdul Samad v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5020-93), Muldoon, December 13, 1994 (in *obiter*); Martinez, Oscar v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-462-96), Gibson, June 6, 1996. In Canales, Katia Guillen v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1520-98), Cullen, June 11, 1999, the CRDD determined that the claimant had a right to citizenship in Honduras, over the claimant’s objections that she had no connection or physical link to Honduras, the country of her mother’s birth, and which she had never visited. The Court overturned the CRDD decision because it failed to consider whether the claimant had a well-founded fear of persecution with reference to Honduras.

\(^{22}\) Chavarria, supra, footnote 8, where the wife’s entitlement to Honduran citizenship, though dependent on her husband’s application for same, only required a *pro forma* application like her husband’s. This is contrasted with Beliakov, Alexandr v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2191-94), MacKay, February 8, 1996, where the wife had to do more than simply apply for Russian citizenship; a precondition was that her husband apply for and be granted citizenship which, *semble*, was not automatic in his case. In Zayatte, Genet Yousef v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2769-97), McGillis, May 14, 1998. Reported: *Zayatte v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)* (1998), 47 Imm. L.R. (2d) 152 (F.C.T.D.), an Ethiopian citizen had married a diplomat from Guinea and thus acquired a diplomatic passport from that country. By the time she made her refugee claim in Canada, she was divorced. Letters from the Guinean embassy indicated that she had lost her diplomatic passport but could retain Guinean nationality if she so wished. However, the embassy had failed to consider that under Guinean law, there was a two-year residency requirement in order to become a naturalized national, and the claimant had never resided in Guinea. The CRDD decision finding her to be a Guinean citizen was therefore overturned.


\(^{25}\) Williams v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 3 F.C.R. 429 (F.C.A.); 2005 FCA 126. The Federal Court of Appeal overturned Manzi, Williams v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4181-03), Pinard, April 6, 2004; 2004 FC 511, where the Federal Court had held that, since the claimant had to renounce his Rwandan citizenship in order to regain Ugandan citizenship, Uganda was not a country of nationality. In *Manzi*, the Court did not consider Chavarria, supra, footnote 8. In that case, the Federal Court found the claimant had a right to citizenship in Honduras, the country of his birth, notwithstanding the requirement to become domiciled in Honduras, state his intention to recover his Honduran nationality, and renounce his Salvadoran citizenship.
can obtain citizenship if, in order to obtain it, he must first renounce the citizenship of another country and he is not prepared to do so?

In answering the certified question in the affirmative, the Federal Court of Appeal approved the principle set out in *Bouianova*\(^\text{26}\) that refugee protection will be denied where it is shown that a claimant, at the time of the hearing, is entitled to acquire by mere formalities, the citizenship of a particular country with respect to which the claimant has no well-founded fear of persecution. Justice Décary then set out the appropriate test for determining whether there was a right to citizenship:

\[22\] I fully endorse the reasons for judgment of Rothstein J. [*in Bouianova*], and in particular the following passage at page 77:

> The condition of not having a country of nationality must be one that is beyond the power of the applicant to control.

The true test, in my view, is the following: if it is within the control of the applicant to acquire the citizenship of a country with respect to which he has no well-founded fear of persecution, the claim for refugee status will be denied. While words such as “acquisition of citizenship in a non-discretionary manner” or “by mere formalities” have been used, the test is better phrased in terms of “power within the control of the applicant” for it encompasses all sorts of situations, it prevents the introduction of a practice of “country shopping” which is incompatible with the “surrogate” dimension of international refugee protection recognized in *Ward* and it is not restricted, contrary to what counsel for the respondent has suggested, to mere technicalities such as filing appropriate documents. This “control” test also reflects the notion which is transparent in the definition of a refugee that the “unwillingness” of an applicant to take steps required from him to gain state protection is fatal to his refugee claim unless that unwillingness results from the very fear of persecution itself. Paragraph 106 of the *Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status* emphasizes the point that whenever “available, national protection takes precedence over international protection,” and the Supreme Court of Canada, in *Ward*, observed, at p. 752, that “[w]hen available, home state protection is a claimant’s sole option.”

\[23\] The principle enunciated by Rothstein J. in *Bouianova* was followed and applied ever since in Canada. Whether the citizenship of another country was obtained at birth, by naturalization or by State succession is of no consequence provided it is within the control of an applicant to obtain it.

The Court also noted that the claimant was not someone who, should he renounce his citizenship, would become stateless.

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\(^{26}\) *Bouianova, supra*, footnote 8.
2.1.3.1. Israel’s Law of Return

In Grygorian,27 the Trial Division found reasonable the CRDD’s decision holding that Israel’s Law of Return conferred a right to citizenship on a Russian-born claimant of Jewish origin who had never expressed an intention to immigrate to Israel and who had never resided there. The Court viewed this as an application of the principle in Bouianova.

The Grygorian decision was found not to be a binding precedent and was not followed in Katkova,28 where the Court again considered Israel’s Law of Return in the context of a Jewish citizen of Ukraine who did not wish to go to Israel. This factor was considered to be crucial given that the Law of Return stated that the desire to settle in Israel was a prerequisite to immigration. The Court also drew a distinction between potential rights and pre-existing status as a national of a particular country—that is, between potential as opposed to actual nationality, and stated that Ward (SCC) did not deal with potential nationality. Moreover, the Court was of the view that there had to be a genuine connection or link with the home state.29 Finally, the Court held that the Law of Return conferred a discretionary power on the Israeli Minister of the Interior to deny citizenship. The CRDD’s decision that Israel was a country of nationality for the claimant was overturned.

2.1.4. Effectiveness of Nationality

In Ward, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a valid claim against one country of nationality will not fail if the claimant is denied protection (e.g., by being denied admission) by another country of which he or she is a national.30 After citing Ward and James C. Hathaway’s The Law of Refugee Status,31 the Trial Division in Martinez,32 appeared to accept that there is a need to ensure that a state of citizenship accords effective, rather than merely formal nationality, as well as to assess any evidence impeaching that state’s protection against return to the country of persecution.

27 Grygorian, supra, footnote 23, at 55.
28 Katkova, Lioudmila v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3886-96), McKeown, May 2, 1997. Reported: Katkova v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1997), 40 Imm. L.R. (2d) 216 (F.C.T.D.). The Court certified a question regarding the Law of Return. See also CRDD T94-07106, Zimmer, Hope, November 13, 1996, where the claimant was found to express a desire to settle in Israel because she had applied to immigrate there before coming to Canada.
29 The term “genuine and effective link” was first enunciated in the Nottebohm case (International Court of Justice Reports, 1955, at 23), in the context of opposability between states, as a means of characterizing citizenship attribution which should be recognized at the international level. The concept, as extrapolated from that case and the nationality practice of states in general, has since been molded and shaped into a broader principle in international law. The concept of an ascertainable tie between the individual and a state is an important doctrine in the area of nationality law. This doctrine is based upon principles embodied in state practice, treaties, case law and general principles of law. The genuine and effective link between an individual and a state manifested by factors such as birth and/or descent, and often including habitual residence, is reflected to some degree in a majority of domestic nationality legislation.
30 Ward, supra, footnote 3, at 754 (S.C.R.).
32 Martinez, supra, footnote 21, at 5-6.
In *Fabiano*, the RPD did not consider the merits of the claim of an Argentinean national in relation to Argentina, because they determined he was entitled to Italian citizenship since his parents had emigrated to Argentina from Italy. There was no evidence to support a finding that the claimant could go to Italy and stay there long enough to make a citizenship claim. The claimant feared that, if he went back to Argentina, he would be killed long before he could obtain Italian citizenship, a process that was complex and would take a long time. The Federal Court remitted the matter back to the Board to consider what will happen to the claimant if he applies for Italian citizenship.

### 2.1.5. Failure to Access Possible Protection in a Third Country

There is some confusion in the case law of the Federal Court as to whether or not an adverse inference can be drawn from the failure to access possible protection or status in a third country, in cases where there is no automatic right to citizenship.

In *Basmenji*, the Court rejected the proposition that the claimant, an Iranian married to a Japanese national, should have attempted to claim some form of status while in Japan before making a refugee claim in Canada. A similar position was taken in *Priadkina*, where the Court stated that the claimants, Russian Jews from Kazakhstan, had no duty to seek refugee status in Russia or Israel before claiming in Canada.

However, in *Moudrak*, the Court held that the CRDD did not err in taking into account the failure of the claimant, a national of Ukraine of Polish descent, to investigate the possibility of acquiring Polish citizenship (which was not guaranteed) when she travelled to Poland: “the Board was perfectly entitled to find that this was inconsistent with a well-founded fear of persecution.” In *Osman*, the Court found that the CRDD’s emphasis on the claimant’s failure to return to the Philippines, where he had married and had two children, was in the context of his subjective fear and credibility and was not unreasonable. A similar finding was made in *Kombo*, where the CRDD challenged the claimant’s credibility and subjective fear because he had taken no action to secure international protection by registering with the UNHCR in Kenya, where he had resided for eleven years as a refugee from Somalia, had married a Kenyan citizen and had two Kenyan children.

On the other hand, in *Pavlov*, the Court held that the CRDD’s conclusion about the lack of credibility of the Russian Jewish claimants (who, according to the CRDD, “could have gone to Israel as full citizens … In the panel’s view, their failure to take advantage of this option is indicative of a lack of subjective fear”) was related to a misapprehension of the law: The CRDD

mysteriously assumed that the claimants were required to seek protection in Israel, which was not as of right and which the claimants did not wish to do, before applying for Convention refugee status in Canada. The Court cited Basmenji, but did not refer to Moudrak and Osman.

2.2. FORMER HABITUAL RESIDENCE – STATELESS PERSONS

A consideration of former habitual residence is only relevant where the claimant is stateless. A stateless person is someone who is not recognized by any country as a citizen. Section 96(b) of IRPA states:

96. A Convention refugee is a person who …

(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.

If the claimant is a citizen of the country in which he or she resided, the claim is properly assessed on the basis that the claimant has a country of nationality.

2.2.1. Principles and Criteria for Establishing Country of Former Habitual Residence

In the Maarouf decision, Justice Cullen of the Trial Division, after an extensive review of the legal principles and authorities, endorsed the following propositions:

In my view, the concept of “former habitual residence” seeks to establish a relationship to a state which is broadly comparable to that between a citizen and his or her country of nationality. Thus the term implies a situation where a stateless person was admitted to a given country with a view to continuing residence of some duration, without necessitating a minimum period of residence.

... a “country of former habitual residence” should not be limited to a country where the claimant initially feared persecution. Finally, the claimant does not have to be legally able to return to a country of former habitual residence as a denial of a right of return may in itself constitute an act of persecution by

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For the purpose of this Convention, the term “stateless person” means a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its laws.

Note that residency in a country may also be a relevant factor when considering exclusion under Article 1E of the Convention (see Chapter 10, section 10.1.).

41 Gadeliya, supra, footnote 8.

the state. The claimant must, however, have established a significant period
of *de facto* residence in the country in question.\(^43\)

The Trial Division has held, in a number of decisions, that a country may be a country of
former habitual residence even if the claimant is not legally able to return to that country.\(^44\)

A country can be a country of former habitual residence even though it is a successor state
to a larger country which the claimant left.\(^45\)

2.2.2. Multiple Countries of Former Habitual Residence

The Federal Court of Appeal in *Thabet*\(^46\) clarified the conflicting case law emanating from
the Trial Division\(^47\) regarding the country of reference in claims made by stateless persons who
have habitually resided in more than one country. The Court of Appeal answered the certified
question put to it as follows:

In order to be found to be a Convention refugee, a stateless person must show
that, on a balance of probabilities he or she would suffer persecution in any
country of former habitual residence, and that he or she cannot return to any
of his or her other countries of former habitual residence. (At 40.)

The Court of Appeal considered four options—the first country, the last one, all the
countries, or any of the countries—but rejected all of them. Instead it adopted as a test what it
termed “any country plus the *Ward* factor” as being consistent with the language of the
Convention refugee definition and the teachings of the Supreme Court of Canada in *Ward*.
Justice Linden expressed the Court’s ruling in another way in the reasons for judgment:

If it is likely that a person would be able to return to a country of former
habitual residence where he or she would be safe from persecution, that
person is not a refugee. This means that the claimant would bear the burden

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\(^{43}\) Maarouf, *ibid.*, at 739-740.


\(^{45}\) Lenyk, *Ostap v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7098-93), Tremblay-Lamer, October 14, 1994. Reported: *Lenyk v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)* (1994), 30 Imm. L.R. (2d) 151 (F.C.T.D.), where the claimants had left Ukraine when it was part of the U.S.S.R. Justice Tremblay-Lamer stated at 152: “The change of name of the country does not change the fact that it was the place where the [claimants] always resided prior to coming to Canada, and therefore it is their country of former habitual residence.”

\(^{46}\) *Thabet v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)*, [1998] 4 F.C. 21 (C.A); 48 Imm. L.R. (2d) 195 (F.C.A.).

… of showing on a balance of probabilities that he or she is unable or unwilling to return to any country of former habitual residence. (At 39.)

In effect, this means that if a stateless person has multiple countries of former habitual residence, the claim may be established by reference to any such country. However, if the claimant is able to return to any other country of former habitual residence, the claimant must, in order to establish the claim, also demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution there.

The Trial Division applied the principles of the Thabet decision in Elbarbari.\textsuperscript{48} Since the claimant could not return to any of the three countries in which he had formerly resided, the CRDD erred by not considering his fear of persecution in Iraq, after finding that the claimant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Egypt and the United States.

2.2.3. Nature of Ties to the Country

The Federal Court has not yet treated comprehensively the nature of the ties required for a country to constitute a country of former habitual residence in cases where there are two or more countries in which the claimant has resided. However, it is suggested that, at a minimum, the assessment include the factors mentioned in Maarouf, namely, whether the person was admitted into the country for the purpose of continuing residence of some duration (without necessitating a minimum period of residence), and whether there was a significant period of \textit{de facto} residence. On the other hand, there is no requirement that the claimant be legally able to return.

A country cannot qualify as a country of former habitual residence if the claimant never resided there.\textsuperscript{49}

In Kruchkov,\textsuperscript{50} the Trial Division held that the determination of one’s country of former habitual residence is a question of fact, not of law.


\textsuperscript{49} Kadoura, Mahmoud v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4835-02), Martineau, September 10, 2003; 2003 FC 1057. This was so even though the claimant, a stateless Palestinian born in the United Arab Emirates, had a travel and other documents issued by the Lebanese authorities. Although he had a right to reside in Lebanon, the claimant had never resided there. See also Salah, Mohammad v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6910-04), Snider, July 6, 2005; 2005 FC 944.

\textsuperscript{50} Kruchkov, Valeri v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5490-93), Tremblay-Lamer, August 29, 1994. This decision was followed in Tarakhan, Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1506-95), Denault, November 10, 1995, Reported: Tarakhan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 32 Imm. L.R. (2d) 83 (F.C.T.D), at 86. In that case, the Court upheld the CRDD’s decision that the only relevant country was Jordan, where the claimant, a stateless Palestinian, was born and resided until age 23; he then moved to different posts as directed by his employer, the PLO (1 year in Lebanon, 2 years in Yemen, and 5 years in Cyprus), before leaving for Holland where he made an unsuccessful refugee claim. In Thabet (T.D.), supra, footnote 47, the Trial Division upheld the CRDD’s decision that the claimant was a former habitual resident of the United States, since he had resided there for 11 years, first as a student, and then as a visitor and refugee claimant; while there, he married twice, held a social security card, and filed income tax returns. (The Court of Appeal overturned this decision on other grounds.) In Absee, Mrwan Mohamed v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1423-92), Rouleau, March 17, 1994, the claimant, a stateless Palestinian, was born in the Occupied Territories, moved to Jordan at age 6, and resided for short periods in Kuwait (on a temporary basis) and in the United States (illegally). The CRDD’s decision to assess the claim only against Jordan was upheld. In Alusta, Khahil.
2.2.4. Subsisting Well-Founded Fear of Persecution

Statelessness per se does not give rise to a claim to refugee status: the claimant must demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution based on a Convention ground. Alternatively, the claimant must be outside his or her country of former habitual residence for a Convention reason.

The requirement of having to demonstrate a subsisting well-founded fear of persecution, where the stateless claimant is unable to return to his or her country of former habitual residence, was not resolved by the Federal Court of Appeal. In Shahin, Justice Linden stated:

As for the legal issue of whether a stateless person needs to prove only an inability to return home, or whether a showing of a reasonable fear of persecution is also required, we do not feel we should try to resolve that matter at this stage of the proceeding, preferring instead to leave that matter to be dealt with by the new panel.

2.2.5. Evidence of Persecution for a Convention Reason

A denial of a right to return may, in appropriate circumstances, in itself constitute an act of persecution by the state. However, for it to be the basis of a claim, the refusal must be based...
on a Refugee Convention ground, and not be related simply to immigration laws of general application.\footnote{55}

In \textit{Thabet}, the Court of Appeal held that the CRDD had addressed that question adequately when it found that the claimant could not return to Kuwait because he lacked a valid residency permit.

A recent application to return to one’s country of former habitual residence is not a requirement: a claimant can rely on earlier unsuccessful attempts by family members as well as on documentary evidence.\footnote{57}

Having regard to paragraph 143 of the UNHCR \textit{Handbook}, an UNWRA document issued to a Palestinian refugee was found to be cogent, though not determinative evidence of refugeehood.\footnote{58} It is a reviewable error not to specifically consider a claimant’s UNWRA

\footnote{55}In \textit{Arafa}, supra, footnote 51, the claimant’s continued permission to remain in the United Arab Emirates, once he turned 18, was dependent upon the continuation of his education or obtaining a work permit and employment there; his last one-year authorization became invalidated when he resided outside the UAE for more than 6 months. For a similar fact situation, see also \textit{Kadoura}, supra, footnote 49, where the Court noted that the United Arab Emirate’s cancellation of, or failure to issue, a residence permit was not an act of persecution, but a direct consequence of the decision of the claimant, who chose to leave the UAE to come to Canada to study. Furthermore, the conditions imposed by the UAE (that the person have a work permit or be enrolled in full-time studies) had no nexus to any of the grounds set out in the Convention. The denial of a right of return was not for a Convention reason.

In \textit{Alusta}, supra, footnote 50, the condition for obtaining a Moroccan residence permit, namely proof of employment, was found to be unrelated to a Convention ground. In \textit{Altawil, Anwar Mohamed v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2365-95), Simpson, July 25, 1996, the claimant lost his residence status in Qatar, which was renewable every 6 months, because he failed to return in 1986 because of the war in Afghanistan where he was a student; the Court upheld the CRDD’s determination that he was not outside the country, nor had Qatar denied him reentry, because of a Convention reason. Simpson J. stated at 5-6: “... it seems to me that there must be something in the real circumstances which suggests persecutorial intent or conduct. Absent such evidence, I am not prepared to conclude that the Law, which is one of general application, is persecutorial in effect ....”. In \textit{Daghmash, Mohamed Hussein Moustapha v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4302-97), Lutfy, June 19, 1998, the Court upheld the CRDD’s conclusion that the claimant’s inability to return to Saudi Arabia was due to his not being able to obtain an employment sponsor, and not to his Palestinian background; the requirement of an employment contract to maintain one’s residency status is unrelated to the grounds in the definition of a Convention refugee. In \textit{Elastal, Mousa Hamed v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3425-97), Muldoon, March 10, 1999, the Court cited with approval the CRDD’s finding that the claimant’s lack of a right to return to the United States was not persecutory because, as an illegal resident, he never had the right to return there. In \textit{Salah}, supra, footnote 49, the RPD had considered the claimant’s reasons for leaving Egypt, and the fact that he had allowed his residency permit to lapse, and reasonably concluded that the claimant had not left or been denied re-entry into Egypt on a Convention ground. The claimant provided no evidence to support his conclusion that his inability to work in Egypt legally (he had worked there illegally for at least 3 years) amounted to persecution.

\footnote{56} \textit{Thabet} (C.A.), supra, footnote, 46, at 41.

\footnote{57} \textit{Shahin, supra}, footnote 53, at 2.

registration document when assessing a claim for refugee protection. It is a highly relevant document, provided the conditions that originally enabled qualification are shown to persist.

2.2.6. State Protection

As a general proposition, claimants are only required to seek the protection of countries in which they can claim citizenship, prior to making a refugee claim in Canada. However, as a practical matter, some decisions of the Board and Federal Court have considered what protection is available to the stateless person in the country where they allege persecution, in order to properly assess the well-foundedness of the alleged fear of persecution and that person’s need for surrogate protection.

The decisions of the Trial Division are not consistent on whether or not stateless claimants need to avail themselves of state protection. The UNHCR Handbook, in paragraph 101, states that “... [i]n the case of a stateless refugee, the question of ‘availment of protection’ of the country of his former habitual residence does not, of course, arise.”

In El Khatib, Justice McKeown agreed with this approach and stated:

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60 In Mohammadi, Seyed Ata v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1432-00), Lutfy, February 13, 2001; 2001 FCT 61, the Court found that a certificate issued by the UNHCR in 1994, which was valid for six months, recognizing the Iranian claimant as a refugee, was of little, if any, significance, to the determination of refugee status in 2000. In Castillo, Wilson Medina v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4982-03), Kelen, March 17, 2004; 2004 FC 410, the Court found that the RPD did not err by dismissing the relevance of the UNHCR recognition, in 1982, of the claimant as a Convention refugee based on his father’s recognition a year earlier. The RPD took into account the changed circumstances since that time, including the fact that the claimant returned to Colombia, his country of nationality, in 1995, without any problem.

61 Basmenji, supra, footnote 34; Adereti, supra, footnote 2.

62 El Khatib, supra, footnote 44, at 2. The Court agreed to certify the following question:

On a claim to Convention refugee status by a stateless person, is the “well-foundedness” analysis set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in [Ward] applicable, based as it is on the availability of state protection, or is it only applicable if the claimant is a citizen of the country in which he or she fears persecution?

The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal in El Khatib, declined to deal with the certified question because it was not determinative of the appeal. See M.C.I. v. El Khatib, Naif-El (F.C.A., no. A-592-94), Strayer, Robertson, McDonald, June 20, 1996.

In Tarakhan, supra, footnote 50, at 89, the Trial Division also held that where the claim is that of a stateless person, the claimant need only show that he or she is unable, or by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution, is unwilling to return to the country of former habitual residence. The claimant does not have to prove that the authorities of that country are unable or unwilling to protect him or her. One aspect the Court did not address is the requirement in Ward, supra, footnote 3, at 712, that the analysis of whether a well-
... the discussion and conclusions reached in Ward apply only to a citizen of a state, and not to stateless people. In my view the distinction between paragraphs 2(1)(a)(i) and 2(1)(a)(ii) of the [Immigration] Act is that the stateless person is not expected to avail himself of state protection when there is no duty on the state to provide such protection.

However, other Trial Division decisions have taken into account state protection that might be available to the claimant in their country of former habitual residence. For example, in Nizar, the Court was of the view that, even though states owe no duty of protection to non-nationals, “it is relevant for a stateless person, who has a country of former habitual residence, to demonstrate that de facto protection within that state, as a result of being resident there, is not likely to exist.” The Court reasoned that this matter was relevant to the well-foundedness of the claimant’s fear.

The Court of Appeal in Thabet, in the context of discussing whether a stateless claimant who has more than one country of former habitual residence must establish the claim with respect to one, some or all of the countries, had this to say about the issue of state protection:

… The definition takes into account the inherent difference between those persons who are nationals of a state, and therefore are owed protection, and those persons who are stateless and without recourse to state protection. Because of this distinction one cannot treat the two groups identically, even though one should seek to be as consistent as possible. (At 33.)

… If it is likely that a person would be able to return to a country of former habitual residence where he or she would be safe from persecution, that person is not a refugee. This means that the claimant would bear the burden … of showing on the balance of probabilities that he or she is unable or unwilling to return to any country of former habitual residence. (At 39.)

founded fear of persecution exists include a consideration of the state’s inability to protect. In Pachkov, Stanislav v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2340-98), Teitelbaum, January 8, 1999. Reported: Pachkov v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999), 49 Imm. L.R. (2d) 55 (F.C.T.D.), the Court held that the CRDD erred in imposing on the claimant, who was a stateless person, a duty to refute the presumption of state protection. See also Elastal, supra, footnote 55, to the same effect, which cited the Court of Appeal decision in Thabet (C.A.), supra, footnote 46, though that decision did not specifically rule on the issue.

Ward, supra, footnote 3, at 751.

The difference in language is retained in subsections 96(a) and (b) of IRPA: the former provision refers to “unwilling to avail” of the protection of the country of nationality, whereas the latter refers to “unwilling to return” to the country of former habitual residence.


Thabet (C.A.), supra, footnote 46, at 33 and 39.
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CHAPTER 3

3. PERSECUTION

3.1. GENERALLY

3.1.1. Definition

Like other terms in the Convention refugee definition, “persecution” is a word whose meaning is neither self-evident nor defined in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). Therefore, it has fallen to the courts to identify the boundaries of the word. Case-law has not only labelled specific behaviours as instances of persecution, but also has gone some distance toward identifying general hallmarks that must be present, or criteria that must be met, in order for actions or omissions to constitute persecution.

3.1.1.1. Serious Harm

First, to be considered persecution, the mistreatment suffered or anticipated must be serious. And in order to determine whether particular mistreatment would qualify as “serious”, one must examine:

1. what interest of the claimant might be harmed; and

2. to what extent the subsistence, enjoyment, expression or exercise of that interest might be compromised.

This approach has been approved by the courts, which have equated the notion of a serious compromising of interest with a key denial of a core human right. Thus, in Ward, the Supreme Court said as follows:

Underlying the Convention is the international community’s commitment to the assurance of basic human rights without discrimination. This is indicated in the preamble to the treaty as follows:

CONSIDERING that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights … have affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination.

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This theme ... provides an inherent limit to the cases embraced by the Convention. Hathaway, ... at p. 108, thus explains the impact of this general tone on the treaty on refugee law:

The dominant view, however, is that refugee law ought to concern itself with actions which deny human dignity in any key way and that the sustained or systemic denial of core human rights is the appropriate standard.

This theme sets the boundaries for many of the elements of the definition of Convention “refugee”. “Persecution”, for example, undefined in the Convention, has been ascribed the meaning of “sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection”; see Hathaway, ... at pp. 104-105. So too Goodwin-Gill, ... at p. 38 observes that “comprehensive analysis requires the general notion [of persecution] to be related to developments within the broad field of human rights”. This has recently been recognized by the Federal Court of Appeal in the Cheung case.3

In Chan,4 La Forest J. (in dissent) reiterated that “[t]he essential question is whether the persecution alleged by the claimant threatens his or her basic human rights in a fundamental way.” Mr. Justice La Forest also said:

These basic human rights are not to be considered from the subjective perspective of one country ... By very definition, such rights transcend subjective and parochial perspectives and extend beyond national boundaries. This does not mean, however, that recourse to the municipal law [i.e. domestic or internal law] of the admitting nation may not be made. For such municipal law may well animate a consideration of whether the alleged feared conduct fundamentally violates basic human rights.5

If the conduct does amount to persecution, there is no further requirement that the persecution be dramatic or appalling or horrendous,6 unless the issue in the case involves the application of section 108(4) of the IRPA (section 2(3) of the former Immigration Act) (see Chapter 7, section 7.2).

The requirement that the harm be serious has led to a distinction between persecution on the one hand, and discrimination or harassment on the other, with persecution being characterized

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3 Ward, ibid., at 733-734. See also Cheung v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 2 F.C. 314 (C.A.), at 324-5.
4 Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593, at 635.
5 Chan, ibid., at 635. The majority of the Court decided the case on other grounds and did not rule explicitly on this issue. For a more detailed discussion of the Chan judgment, see Chapter 9, section 9.3.7. With respect to considering Canadian standards or laws see Antonio, Pacato Joao v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1072-93), Nadon, September 27, 1994, at 11-12. See also the UNHCR Handbook, paragraph 60.
by the greater seriousness of the mistreatment which it involves.7 Discrimination and harassment are sometimes conceived of as being distinct from persecution; alternatively, some references to persecution and discrimination imply that persecution is a subset of discrimination; but in either case, what distinguishes persecution - whether from discrimination or non-persecutory discrimination - is the degree of seriousness of the harm. The Court of Appeal has observed that “the dividing line between persecution and discrimination or harassment is difficult to establish.”8 As to the particular susceptibilities of a given claimant, the Court in Nejad9 said the following:

The CRDD did recognize and the Court agrees that there may be certain circumstances in which the particular characteristics or circumstances of a claimant ... might affect the assessment of whether certain acts or treatments are persecutory. [To] ... the extent that an agent of persecution intentionally plays upon or exploits the fact that a person suffers from a particular frailty or condition in order to cause harm, an act not normally or inherently persecutorial, may be transformed into an act of persecution.

That is beautiful in theory, but who knows what is the intention of the persecutor? Who knows what is the particular knowledge of the persecutor? One must look at the act and the effect.10 And in this case, in particular, because of the old age of the applicants, it should have been more obvious to the CRDD panel that the effect upon them was that of persecution.

For additional material on the distinction between persecution and discrimination, see paragraph 54 of the UNHCR Handbook.

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8 Sagharichi, supra, footnote 1, at 2, per Marceau J.A. Even though the claimant may not be able to point to an individual episode of mistreatment which could be characterized as persecution, the claimant may still have experienced persecution or have good grounds for fearing persecution: see the discussion of cumulative acts in section 3.1.2. of this chapter, and the discussion of well-founded fear in Chapter 5.

9 Nejad, Hossein Hamedi v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2687-96), Muldoon, July 29, 1997, at 2. In the typescript of the Court’s reasons, the first portion of this passage is presented as though it were part of a quotation from Yusuf v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 629 (C.A.); however, the statements in question do not actually appear in that case, and seem instead to have been the words of Muldoon J. himself. On this same theme, see paragraphs 40 and 52 of the UNHCR Handbook.

10 Compare these lines with the affirmation in Ward, supra, footnote 2, at 747, that “[t]he examination of the circumstances should be approached from the perspective of the persecutor...”, and with the emphasis placed upon the intent of a law (which may be equated with the intent of the agent of persecution) by Zolfagharkhani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 3 F.C. 540 (C.A.), at 552, quoted in Chapter 9, section 9.3.2. (proposition 1). Compare also Zolfagharkhani’s assertion, at 552, that the neutrality of a law is to be judged objectively: see Chapter 9, section 9.3.2. (proposition 2).
3.1.1.2. Repetition and Persistence

A second criterion of persecution is that the inflicting of harm occurs with repetition or persistence, or in a systematic way. This requirement has been approved in Ward (quoting Hathaway).\(^ {11}\) It also derives from the Court of Appeal decision in Rajudeen,\(^ {12}\) which is much-cited on this point:

The definition of Convention refugee in the Immigration Act does not include a definition of “persecution”. Accordingly, ordinary dictionary definitions may be considered. The Living Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary defines “persecute” as:

“To harass or afflict with repeated acts of cruelty or annoyance; to afflict persistently, to afflict or punish because of particular opinions or adherence to a particular creed or mode of worship.”

The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary contains, inter alia, the following definitions of “persecution”:

“A particular course or period of systematic infliction of punishment directed against those holding a particular (religious belief); persistent injury or annoyance from any source.”

...[the evidence] establishes beyond doubt a lengthy period of systematic infliction of threats and of personal injury. The applicant was not mistreated because of civil unrest in Sri Lanka but because he was a Tamil and a Muslim.\(^ {13}\)

The Court of Appeal later provided something of an elaboration in Valentin:\(^ {14}\):

...it seems to me ... that an isolated sentence can only in very exceptional cases satisfy the element of repetition and relentlessness found at the heart of persecution (cf. Rajudeen...) ...\(^ {15}\)

\(^{11}\) Ward, supra, footnote 2, at 733-734. See excerpt reproduced at pages 1-2 of this chapter.


\(^{13}\) Rajudeen, ibid., at 133-134, per Heald J.A.

\(^{14}\) Valentin v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] 3 F.C. 390 (C.A.), at 396, per Marceau J.A.

\(^{15}\) See also Kadenko, Ninal v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-809-94), Tremblay-Lamer, June 9, 1995. Reported: Kadenko v. Canada (Solicitor General) (1995), 32 Imm. L.R. (2d) 275 (F.C.T.D.), rev’d M.C.I. v. Kadenko, Ninal (F.C.A., no. A-388-95), Décary, Hugessen, Chevalier, October 15, 1996, where the Trial Division, at 6, considered a dictionary definition of “isolated”, and concluded that, where repeated incidents of harassment, together with physical attacks, had occurred over the course of a year and a half, it was unreasonable to speak of “isolated” acts. (The Court of Appeal reversed the decision on the issue of state protection and did not deal with the persecution findings. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was denied without reasons on May 8, 1997, [1996] C.S.C.R. No. 612 (QL). In Ahmad, Rizwan v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7180-93), Teitelbaum, March 14, 1995, at paragraph 23, the Court distinguished between systematic events and ones that were only periodic.
Jurisprudence also recognizes that some sentences and forms of punishment of undue proportion by the state may be considered as persecution, such as in certain cases involving military evaders.16

These authorities notwithstanding, it would seem that persistence or repetition should not be regarded as a necessary element in all cases. Some forms of harm are unlikely to be inflicted repeatedly (e.g., female genital mutilation), or are simply incapable of being repeated (e.g., the killing of the claimant’s family as a form of retribution against the claimant); nevertheless, they are so severe that their characterization as persecution seems beyond dispute.17

In the case of Ranjha,18 the Court has further commented that there should not be an “exaggerated emphasis” on the need for repetition and persistence. Rather, the RPD should analyze the quality of incidents in terms of whether they constitute “a fundamental violation of human dignity”.

3.1.1.3. Nexus

For a claim to succeed, the definition of Convention refugee requires that the persecution be linked to a Convention ground. The Supreme Court of Canada noted in Ward that:

… the international community did not intend to offer a haven for all suffering individuals. The need for “persecution” in order to warrant international protection, for example, results in the exclusion of such pleas as those of economic migrants, i.e. individuals in search of better living conditions, and those of victims of natural disasters, even when the home state is unable to provide assistance. …19


17 In two decisions, the Trial Division certified questions regarding the need for persistence, the questions being almost identical in the two cases: Murugiah, Rahjendran v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. 92-A-6788), Noël, May 18, 1993, at 6; and Rajah, Jeyadevan v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. 92-A-7341), Joyal, September 27, 1993, at 5-6. In Rajah, the question was phrased thus: “Whether ‘persecution’ within the meaning of the Convention Refugee definition requires systematic and persistent acts or whether one or two violations of basic and inalienable rights such as forced labour or beatings while in police detention is enough to constitute ‘persecution’.” However, neither case was heard on appeal. The Federal Court of Appeal granted a motion to dismiss the appeal in Murugiah on April 4, 1997, on the grounds that the appeal was moot (F.C.A. File no. A-326-93). In Rajah, the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an application for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal (February 1, 1995).

Essentially the same question was proposed for certification in Muthuthevar, Muthiah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2095-95), Cullen, February 15, 1996. Cullen J., declining to certify, said at 5: “I think it is settled law that, in some instances, even a single transgression of the applicant’s human rights would amount to persecution.” See also Gutkovski, Alexander v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-746-94), Teitelbaum, April 6, 1995, where at 9, the Court noted: “…the events must be sufficiently serious or systematic to amount to a reasonable fear of persecution.” (emphasis in original). However, note the discussion in Chapter 9, section 9.3.3. regarding “Policing Methods, National Security and Preservation of Social Order”.


19 Ward, supra, footnote 2, at 732. See also the excerpt from Rajudeen, supra, footnote 12, reproduced in section 3.1.1.2. of this chapter. And see Karaseva, Tatiana v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4683-96), Teitelbaum,
Indirect persecution does not constitute persecution within the meaning of the definition of Convention refugee as there is no personal nexus between the claimant's alleged fear and a Convention ground. Accordingly, the Federal Court of Appeal in *Pour-Shariati* held, overruling *Bhatti*, a case recognizing the concept of indirect persecution, that:

We accordingly overrule Bhatti's recognition of the concept of indirect persecution as a principle of our refugee law. In the words of Nadon, J. in *Casetellanos v. Canada* (Solicitor General) (1994), 89 F.T.R. 1, 11, "since indirect persecution does not constitute persecution within the meaning of Convention refugee, a claim based on it should not be allowed." It seems to us that the concept of indirect persecution goes directly against the decision of this Court in *Rizkallah v. Canada*, A-606-90, decided 6 May 1992, [1992] F.C.J. No. 412, where it was held that there had to be a personal nexus between the claimant and the alleged persecution on one of the Convention grounds. One of these grounds is, of course, a "membership in a particular social group," a ground which allows for family concerns in an appropriate case.20

In *Granada*, the Court set out the only circumstances in which the family can be considered a particular social group as follows:

[16] The family can only be considered to be a social group in cases where there is evidence that the persecution is taking place against the family members as a social

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21 *Pour-Shariati, Dolat v. M.E.I.* (F.C.A., no. A-721-94), MacGuigan, Robertson, McDonald, June 10, 1997, at 4. Reported: *Pour-Shariati v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)* (1997), 39 Imm. L.R. (2d) 103 (F.C.A.). Followed in *Kanagalingam, Uthayakumari v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no IMM-566-98), Blais, February 10, 1999, where the Court held that the loss of the claimant's father, brother and fiancé at the time when the IPKF governed the security situation in the north of Sri Lanka, was indirect persecution and, therefore, not persecution within the meaning of the definition. The Trial Division certified the following question in *Gonzalez, Brenda Yojana v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1092-01), Dawson, March 27, 2002; 2002 FCT 345: “Can a refugee claim succeed on the basis of a well founded fear of persecution for reason of membership in a particular social group that is a family, if the family member who is the principal target of the persecution is not subject to persecution for a Convention reason?” The appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal [in *Gonzalez*] was discontinued on February 7, 2003 (F.C.A. File No. A-198-02). The concept of “indirect persecution” was considered in *Shen, Zhi Ming v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-313-03), Kelen, August 15, 2003; 2003 FC 983, at paragraph 14, where the Court held that “any persecution which the second child Canadian-born infant will experience in China is directly experienced by the parents, and is not ‘indirect persecution’.” For a more detailed discussion of the concept of “indirect persecution”, see Chapter 9, section 9.4.

group: [citations omitted]. However, membership in the social group formed by the family is not without limits, it requires some proof that the family in question is itself, as a group, the subject of reprisals and vengeance.…

3.1.1.4. Common Crime or Persecution?

Persecution has been distinguished from random and arbitrary violence\(^{23}\) and from suffering as a result of a criminal act or a personal vendetta.\(^{24}\) In a few of the cases where the claimant has been victimized by what might be characterized as a “common” crime, there has been some discussion of whether the mistreatment in question might qualify as “persecution”. The Trial Division has said that most acts of persecution can be characterized as criminal, but that in an individual case the Refugee Division (now Refugee Protection Division - RPD) may nevertheless distinguish between criminal acts and persecution.\(^{25}\) In the case of \textit{Alifanova},\(^ {26}\) the Court has further commented that while most acts of persecution are criminal in nature, not all criminal acts can be considered acts of persecution. It continues to give the following example: “Extortion is a criminal act. Threats of bodily harm is a criminal act. Because these criminal acts are made by Kazakhs against Russians does not make the act one of persecution.” Some of the cases in this area involve personal vendettas, or the misuse of official position, or the witnessing of criminal acts.

With respect to cases involving domestic abuse, the Court of Appeal in \textit{Mayers},\(^ {27}\) said that the Refugee Division might find domestic violence to be persecution, but in the circumstances of the case, the Court was not required to make that finding.\(^ {28}\) The Trial Division, in a number of cases has regarded domestic abuse as persecution.\(^ {29}\) The cases often intertwine the


\(^{24}\) See Chapter 4, section 4.7. See also \textit{Atwal, Mohinder Singh v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6769-98), Nadon, November 17, 1999, where the Court agreed with the CRDD that there was no nexus between the applicant's claim and a Convention ground as the alleged acts of persecution were the result of personal vengeance and not the result of the claimant's political opinions.


\(^{28}\) \textit{Mayers, ibid.}, at 169-170, per Mahoney J.A.

discussion of whether domestic violence constitutes persecution with the question of whether
victims of domestic violence constitute a particular social group. For example, in Resulaj, the
Court made the following observation:

Nothing prevents a woman from being both a victim of domestic violence and a
victim of crime. It is well established that a woman subject to domestic
violence constitute a particular social group entitled to convention refugee
protection. [Diluna; Narvaez]

Another earlier example is Aros, where the Court noted:

Accepting that the applicant suffered physical and psychological abuse at the
hands of her common law husband ..., the panel made no overriding error in
concluding she was not a member of a social group that faced persecution within
the definition...

In assessing claims based on criminal acts, it is suggested that members inquire whether
the harm is serious, whether there is a serious possibility of the harm’s occurring, whether the
harm is inflicted for a Convention reason, and whether state protection is available. The

32 See, for example, Ravji, Shahsultan Meghji v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-897-92), McGillis, August 4, 1994 (the
particular harm in question should have been considered by the Refugee Division in its assessment of
cumulative acts).
and 8; Chen, supra, footnote 7, at 5; and Karpounin, Maxim Nikolajevitch v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7368-
1994, where crime had befallen the claimant and police had refused to investigate unless bribed, the Court
indicated, at 2, that neither persecution nor nexus to a Convention ground was involved. See also Chapter 4,
been raped while in detention. The Refugee Division characterized her as a “random victim of violence”,
finding no nexus to a Convention ground (and also no well-foundedness), but the Court held that the
mistreatment “... was a direct consequence of her detention for political reasons” (at 2).

had exposed fraud perpetrated by state officials, and feared retaliation and prosecution. As in Rawji, the
Refugee Division had found both persecution and nexus to be lacking, and the Court upheld these findings.

For recent cases where the Court upheld the CRDD’s finding of no nexus based on criminality, see: Montoya,
(family targeted for kidnapping because of their wealth); Bencic, Eva v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3711-00),
Kelen, April 26, 2002; 2002 FCT 476 (persecution directly related to criminals seeking to extort money and
automobiles); and Yoli, Hernan Dario v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-399-02), Rouleau, December 30, 2002;
2002 FCT 1329 (claimant had evidence regarding perpetrators’ identity and criminal activities).

41, the Court held that a family or clan involved in a blood feud is not a particular social group, as such
revenge killings have nothing to do with the defence of human rights; to the contrary, they constitute a
violation of human rights: “Recognition of a social group on this basis would have the anomalous result of
accoding status to criminal activity, status because of what someone does rather than what someone is.”
finding of state protection must be made on the basis of the evidence before the panel rather than on mere speculation. See also Chapter 4, section 4.7.

3.1.1.5. Agent of Persecution

Serious human rights violations may in fact issue not only from higher authorities of the state, but also from subordinate state authorities, or from persons who are not attached to the government; and whichever is the case, the Convention may apply. In order to be categorized as persecution, the harm need not emanate from the state; and the state need not be involved or be complicit in the perpetration of the harm.

The fact that those who inflict mistreatment are schoolchildren and schoolyard bullies is not relevant to the question of whether the mistreatment amounts to persecution. Similarly, serious mistreatment inflicted by teenagers upon a minor claimant may not reasonably be regarded as mere pranks.

For more regarding the role of the state with respect to mistreatment of a claimant, see Chapter 6.

3.1.2. Cumulative Acts of Discrimination and/or Harassment

A given episode of mistreatment may constitute discrimination or harassment, yet not be serious enough to be regarded as persecution. Indeed, a finding of discrimination rather than persecution is within the jurisdiction of the RPD. Even so, acts of harassment, none amounting to persecution individually, may cumulatively constitute persecution. Where the claimant has experienced more than one incident of mistreatment, the Refugee Protection Division may err if

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36 Ward, supra, footnote 2, at 709, 717, 720-1; Chan, supra, footnote 4, per La Forest (dissenting) at 630.
it only looks at each incident separately. However, “it is insufficient for the RPD to simply state that it has considered the cumulative nature of the discriminatory acts”, without any further analysis. Moreover, the Court has also commented on the need to consider whether the repeated incidents of harassment in the past may lead to a serious possibility of persecution in the future.

It is appropriate to consider both the actions of the government against the individual claimant and the overall atmosphere created by the state’s intolerance.

See also paragraphs 53, 55, 67 and 201 of the UNHCR Handbook.

### 3.1.3. Forms of Persecution

#### 3.1.3.1. Some Judicial Observations

It is impossible to compile an exhaustive catalogue of forms of persecution. Furthermore, whether particular harm constitutes persecution may depend upon the facts of the individual case. Nevertheless, here are some of the more instructive observations that emerge from the case law. (NOTE: The statements which follow should be approached with caution. To obtain context and understand the statements fully, the reader should consult the cases on which they are based.)

♦ Torture, beatings and rape are prime examples of persecution.

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In Horvath, Karoly v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4335-99), MacKay, April 27, 2001, referring to Retnem, supra, footnote 41, the Court held that it was an error for the Board to fail to consider the cumulative effect of the treatment suffered by the claimants when that treatment was consistently accepted as being discriminatory and as indicative of serious problems facing Roma in Hungary. Horvath was cited with approval in Keninger, Erzsebet v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3096-00), Gibson, July 6, 2001.

Furthermore, in Bursuc, Cristinel v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5706-01), Dawson, September 11, 2002; 2002 FCT 957, the Court held that, in considering the cumulative effect of incidents, the CRDD must have regard to the whole of the evidence, and not just evidence after the culminating incident.


46 Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 3 F.C. 675; (1993), 20 Imm. L.R. (2d) 181 (C.A.), per Desjardins J.A. at 723, aff’d Chan (S.C.C.), supra, footnote 4. In Mendoza, Elizabeth Aurora Hauayek v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2997-94), Muldoon, January 24, 1996, at 4: the Court said that rape “... is a form of brutality especially utilizable for the humiliation and brutalization of women. It is not to be treated lightly ...”. In Arguello-Garcia, Jacobo Ignacio v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. 92-A-7335), McKeown, June 23, 1993. Reported: Arguello-Garcia v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 21 Imm. L.R. (2d) 285 (F.C.T.D.), at 287, sexual abuse was part of the persecution suffered by the male claimant. But see Cortez, supra, footnote 23, where the rape was found not to constitute persecution. See also Chapter 9, section 9.3.3. for further discussion of measures such as beating.
♦ The term “discrimination” is not adequate to describe behaviour which includes acts of violence and death threats.47

♦ Death threats may constitute persecution even if the persons making the threats refrain from carrying them out.48 Whether death threats do amount to acts of persecution depends upon the personal circumstances of the claimant.49

♦ When imposed for certain offences, the death penalty may not constitute persecution.50

♦ Forced or strongly coerced sterilization constitutes persecution, whether the victim is a woman51 or a man.52 Forced abortion also constitutes persecution.53

♦ Female circumcision is a “cruel and barbaric practice”, a “horrific torture”, and an “atrocious mutilation”.54

♦ For “persecution” to exist within the meaning of the definition, it is not necessary for the subject to have been deprived of his freedom.55

♦ There may be persecution even if there is no physical harm or mistreatment.56


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51 *Cheung*, supra, footnote 3, at 324, per Linden J.A.: “the forced sterilization of women is a fundamental violation of basic human rights. It violates Articles 3 and 5 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” With respect to sterilization and abortion, see Chapter 9, section 9.3.7., where the one-child policy in China is discussed.

52 *Chan* (S.C.C.), supra, footnote 4, per La Forest J. (dissenting) at 636. The majority in the Supreme Court did not expressly comment on the issue, although Mr. Justice Major appeared to assume that forced sterilization would indeed constitute persecution: see, for example, 658 and 672-673. See also *Chan* (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 46, per Heald J.A. at 686, and per Mahoney J.A. (dissenting) at 704.


Psychological violence may be an element in persecution.\(^{57}\)

The bringing of a trumped-up charge, and interference in the due process of law, may be aspects of persecutory treatment.\(^{58}\)

The fact that the claimant, along with all of his or her co-nationals, suffers curtailment of freedom of speech, in and of itself does not amount to persecution.\(^{59}\)

Barring one claimant from obtaining citizenship and from taking part in political activities, and barring a second claimant (a citizen) from voting and from otherwise participating in the political process, did not constitute persecution, where the claimants enjoyed numerous other rights.\(^{60}\)

Punishment for violation of a law concerning dress may constitute persecution.\(^{61}\) However, in recent case law, the Court has found that the punishment of lashing for improper dress in Saudi Arabia did not amount to persecution but rather prosecution.\(^{62}\)

Denial of a right of return may constitute an act of persecution.\(^{63}\)

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In two recent decisions dealing with a Turkish law banning the wearing of headscarves in government places or buildings, the Court distinguished both Namitabar (F.C.T.D.), supra, and Fathi-Rad, supra, as cases dealing with Iranian women who were obliged by Iranian law to wear the Chador: Kaya, Nurcan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5565-03), Harrington, January 14, 2004; 2004 FC 45, at paragraph 18; Aykut, Ibrahim v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5310-02), Gauthier, March 26, 2004; 2004 FC 466, at paragraph 40.


♦ Simple statelessness does not make one a Convention refugee.64

♦ Economic penalties may be an acceptable means of enforcing a state policy,65 where the claimant is not deprived of his or her right to earn a livelihood.66

♦ Where the state interferes substantially with the claimant’s ability to find work, the possibility of the claimant’s finding illegal employment is not an acceptable remedy.67

♦ Permanently depriving an educated professional of his or her accustomed occupation and limiting the person to farm and factory work constituted persecution.68

♦ By itself, confiscation of property is not sufficiently grave to constitute persecution.69

♦ Serious economic deprivations may be components of persecution.70

♦ Extortion may be one of the indicia of persecution, depending upon the reason for the extortion and the motivation of the claimant in paying.71

♦ A child who would experience hardships including deprivation of medical care, education opportunities, employment opportunities and food would suffer concerted and severe discrimination, amounting to persecution.72


65 Cheung, supra, footnote 3, at 323; Chan (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 46, at 688, per Heald J.A.; Lai, supra, footnote 53, at 3.


♦ Education is a basic human right and a nine-year-old claimant who could have avoided persecution only by refusing to go to school was deemed to be a Convention refugee.\(^73\)

♦ It is not an act of persecution to ban certain groups of children from attending public schools, if they are permitted to have their own schools.\(^74\)

♦ Forcing a woman into a marriage violates one of her basic human rights.\(^75\)

♦ An impediment to the claimant’s marrying in her homeland did not constitute persecution.\(^76\)

♦ Legal restrictions allowing certain categories of people to settle only in certain areas did not constitute persecution.\(^77\)

♦ A law which requires a person to forsake the principles or practices of his or her religion is patently persecutory, so long as the principles or practices in question are not unreasonable.\(^78\) Sanctions such as a short detention, fine or re-education term, which might have been imposed upon the claimant for practising his religion or belonging to a particular religious community, were serious measures of discrimination and constituted persecution.\(^79\)

\(^72\) Cheung, supra, footnote 3, at 325.


\(^75\) Vidhani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] 3 F.C. 60 (T.D.), at 65.


Similarly, in BC v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4840-02), Gibson, July 4, 2003; 2003 FC 826, the Court held that the denial to the claimant of the opportunity to secure re-employment as a high school teacher, in the absence of her abandonment of a particular religious practice, could amount to serious discrimination amounting to persecution. However, in two recent decisions, the Federal Court agreed with the RPD’s finding that the Turkish female claimant’s loss of employment in a public institution for wearing a headscarf did not constitute persecution. In Kaya, supra, footnote 59, at paragraph 13, the Court stated that “[l]aws must be considered in their social context.” In this case, the Court found that the Turkish law banning the wearing of any religious dress in government places or buildings was made in furtherance of the government’s secular policies. A similar result was reached in Aykut, supra, footnote 59. See also the discussion under “Restrictions upon Women” in Chapter 9, section 9.3.8.1.

♦ Injury to pride and political sensibilities did not amount to a violation of security of the person.  

♦ Lamentable rough treatment, involving detention and interrogation, in a country that is experiencing serious terrorist activity, does not of itself amount to persecution.

♦ Minor children who are expected to provide support for other family members, after been smuggled in Canada are not persecuted by their parents.

♦ The act of being illegally trafficked is not in itself persecution simply because the claimant is a minor.

80 Lin, supra, footnote 66, at 211.

81 Abouhalima, Sherif v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-835-97), Gibson, January 30, 1998. However, in Murugamoorthy, Rajarani v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4706-02), O’Reilly, September 29, 2003; 2003 FC 1114, at paragraph 6, the Court stated that whether short-term arrests for security reasons can be considered persecution depends upon the claimant’s particular circumstances, including factors such as the claimant’s age and prior experiences, relying upon Vellupillai, Selvaratnam v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2043-99), Gibson, March 9, 2000. In Kularatnam, Suhitha v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3530-03), Phelan, August 12, 2004; 2004 FC 1122, at paragraph 11, the Court set out other factors that could also be relevant, namely, the nature of the location and treatment during detention, and the manner of release from detention.

In Abu El Hof, Nimber v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1494-05), von Finckenstein, November 8, 2005; 2005 FC 1515, the Court upheld as reasonable the RPD’s conclusion that the claimant’s two short detentions and interrogation, although humiliating, could be viewed as necessary security measures, given the heightened security in Israel at the time. See also chapter 9, section 9.3.3.


83 In Zheng, Jin Dong v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2415-01), Martineau, April 19, 2002; 2002 FCT 448, the basis for this argument was that minors could not consent to being trafficked. The Court upheld the CRDD’s decision, where the panel assessed the issue of consent with regard to this particular minor claimant, relying upon Xiao, Mei Feng v. M.C.I., (F.C.T.D., no. IMM- 953-00), Muldoon, March 16, 2002; 2001 FCT 195.
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CHAPTER 4

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CHAPTER 4

4. GROUNDS OF PERSECUTION

4.1. GENERALLY

The definition of a Convention refugee states that a claimant’s fear of persecution must be “by reason of” one of the five enumerated grounds - that is race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group and political opinion. There must be a link between the fear of persecution and one of the five grounds.¹

It is for the Refugee Division to determine the ground, if any, applicable to the claimant’s fear of persecution.² This is consistent with the overall obligation of the Refugee Division to determine whether the claimant is a Convention refugee. If a claimant identifies the ground(s) which he or she thinks are applicable to the claim, the Refugee Division is not limited to considering only those grounds and must consider the grounds of the definition as raised by the evidence in making their determination. However, once the Refugee Division has found that the claimant’s fear of persecution is by reason of one of the grounds it is not necessary to go on to consider all of the other grounds.

When determining the applicable grounds, the relevant consideration is the perception of the persecutor. The persecutor may perceive that the claimant is a member of a certain race, nationality, religion, or particular social group or holds a certain political opinion and the claimant may face a reasonable chance of persecution because of that perception. This perception may not conform with the real situation.³

Reference should be made to the Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Update issued by the Chairperson pursuant to section 65(3) of the Immigration Act on November 25, 1996, for an analysis of the grounds as they relate to gender-related persecution.⁴


³ Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 747.

The fact that the motivation for the mistreatment is mixed (e.g., partly criminal, partly political) does not mean that a nexus cannot be established.  

4.2. RACE

There is currently no Federal Court jurisprudence that provides a detailed analysis of this ground of persecution. Reference should be made to the UNHCR *Handbook*, at paragraphs 68 to 70, for a description of this ground. According to the *Handbook*, “race ... has to be understood in its widest sense to include all kinds of ethnic groups that are referred to as ‘races’ in the common usage.” (paragraph 68)

The Court of Appeal has said that where race is one of the defining elements of a group to which the claimant belongs (and fears persecution on account of) then the ground of persecution is race. It is not necessary to look at other grounds.

4.3. NATIONALITY

This ground is discussed in the UNHCR *Handbook* at paragraphs 74 to 76. The *Handbook* points out that “nationality” in this case encompasses not only “citizenship” but it refers also to ethnic or linguistic groups. According to the *Handbook* this ground may overlap with race.

The Court in *Hanukashvili*, citing Lorne Waldman, noted the difference between “nationality” as a ground and “nationality” meaning citizenship. When used as one of the five grounds, “nationality” does not mean the same thing as “citizenship”; however it has the same meaning as citizenship for the purpose of subparagraph 2(1)(a)(i) of the *Immigration Act*.

4.4. RELIGION

Persecution by reason of a claimant’s religion may take many forms. Freedom of religion includes the right to manifest the religion in public, or private, in teaching, practice,

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5 See for example, *Zhu, Yong Liang v. M.E.I.* (F.C.A., no. A-1017-91), MacGuigan, Linden, Robertson, January 28, 1994, where the Court of Appeal concluded that the CRDD erred in setting up an opposition between friendship and political motivation as the motives of the claimant, who assisted in smuggling two students involved in the Chinese pro-democracy movement to Hong Kong primarily because of friendship. The motives were “mixed” rather than “conflicting”. It is sufficient if one of the motives is political. See also *Shahiraj, Narender Singh v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3427-00), McKeown, May 9, 2001.


7 *Hanukashvili, Valeri v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1732-96), Pinard, March 27, 1997. Although Israel did not recognize the claimants as having Jewish nationality, they were citizens of Israel and as such the CRDD had properly considered the claims as being against Israel, the country of nationality pursuant to section 2(1)(a)(i) of the Act.

8 In *Reul, Jose Alonso Najera v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-326-00), Gibson, October 2, 2000, the applicants were a husband and wife and their three children. They feared persecution by siblings of the husband, the
worship and observance.\textsuperscript{9} Religion itself can take different manifestations.\textsuperscript{10} As is the case with the other Convention refugee grounds, it is the perception of the persecutor that is relevant.\textsuperscript{11}

The Supreme Court of Canada, in the context of a Charter case involving freedom of religion, defined religion as follows:

\begin{quote}
Defined broadly, religion typically involves a particular and comprehensive system of faith and worship. Religion also tends to involve the belief in a divine, superhuman or controlling power. In essence, religion is about freely and deeply held personal convictions or beliefs connected to an individual’s spiritual faith and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{9} Fosu, Monsieur Kwaku v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-35-93), Denault, November 16, 1994. Reported: Fosu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 27 Imm. L.R. (2d) 95 (F.C.T.D.), at 97, where the Court adopted the Handbook’s interpretation of freedom of religion. See also Chabira, Brahim v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3165-93), Denault, February 2, 1994. Reported: Chabira v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 27 Imm. L.R. (2d) 75 (F.C.T.D.), where the claimant was persecuted for offending against his girlfriend’s Islamic mores; and Bediako, Isaac v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2701-94), Gibson, February 22, 1995, where the Court stated that giving public witness is a fundamental part of many religions and that the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Syndicat Northcrest (see below, footnote 12), expands the concept of public religious acts, not restricts it. The specific manner in which an individual gives effect to his/her religious beliefs is a valid consideration. In Saiedy, Abbas v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9198-04), Gauthier, October 6, 2005; 2005 FC 1367, the claimant’s evidence was that “group” practice is what Falun Gong prescribes for its practitioners. The Court stated that giving public witness is a fundamental part of many religions and that the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Syndicat Northcrest (see below, footnote 12), expands the concept of public religious acts, not restricts it. The specific manner in which an individual gives effect to his/her religious beliefs is a valid consideration. In Saiedy, Abbas v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9198-04), Gauthier, October 6, 2005; 2005 FC 1367, the claimant’s evidence was that “group” practice is what Falun Gong prescribes for its practitioners. The Court stated that the Board erred in finding that there was no nexus. The kidnapping and beating endured by the claimant were carried out by a religious group as a result of the religious beliefs of the claimant. However, in Oloyede, Bolaji v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2201-00), McKeown, March 28, 2001, the Court concluded that it was open on the evidence for the Board to determine that the claimant had been subjected to cult criminal activity rather than religious persecution. In this case, the claim was on grounds of membership in a particular social group, namely, children of cult groups who refuse to follow in their fathers’ footsteps. The claimant claimed that his life was at risk if he did not join the Vampire cult. The claimant also argued, without success, that he was a Christian and that if he returned to Nigeria he would be forced to engage in cult practices because he would not receive any state protection.

\textsuperscript{10} For example, in Nosakhare, Brown v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5023-00), Tremblay-Lamer, July 6, 2001, the claimant, who converted to Christianity in 1997, fled Nigeria because he did not want to belong to the Ogboni cult, as his father did. According to the claimant, the cult engages in human sacrifice and cannibalism. The Court concluded that the Board erred in finding that there was no nexus. The kidnapping and beating endured by the claimant were acts carried out by a religious group as a result of the religious beliefs of the claimant. However, in Oloyede, Bolaji v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2201-00), McKeown, March 28, 2001, the Court concluded that it was open on the evidence for the Board to determine that the claimant had been subjected to cult criminal activity rather than religious persecution. In this case, the claim was on grounds of membership in a particular social group, namely, children of cult groups who refuse to follow in their fathers’ footsteps. The claimant claimed that his life was at risk if he did not join the Vampire cult. The claimant also argued, without success, that he was a Christian and that if he returned to Nigeria he would be forced to engage in cult practices because he would not receive any state protection.

\textsuperscript{11} Yang, Hui Qing v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6057-00), Dubé, September 26, 2001. In this case, the claimant feared persecution by the authorities in China due to her adherence to Falun Gong beliefs and practices. The Court held that the CRDD should have found Falun Gong to be partly a religion and partly a particular social group. Applying the reasoning in Ward regarding political opinion, the Court held that if Falun Gong is considered by the government of China to be a religion, then it must be so for the purposes of this claim. A question was certified regarding the scope of the term “religion” used in the Convention refugee definition, however, it appears that no appeal was filed.
integraphically linked to one’s definition and spiritual fulfillment, the practices of which allow individuals to foster a connection with the divine or with the subject or object of that spiritual faith.12

The Federal Court Trial Division in Kassatkine13 considered the case of a religion which has public proselytizing as one of its tenets. In this case, proselytizing was contrary to the law. The Court stated:

A law which requires a minority of citizens to breach the principles of their religion . . . is patently persecutory. One might add, so long as these religious tenets are not unreasonable as, for example, exacting human sacrifice or the taking of prohibited drugs as a sacrament.14

There have been cases dealing with the issue of persecution of members of the Ahmadi religion in Pakistan and the application of Ordinance XX. For these cases and a discussion of the nature of the enforcement of Ordinance XX see Chapter 9, section 9.3.8.2.

The UNHCR Handbook can be referred to at paragraphs 71 to 73.

4.5. PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP

The Supreme Court of Canada in Ward provided an interpretative foundation for the meaning of the ground of “membership in a particular social group”. Mr. Justice LaForest stated as follows:

The meaning assigned to “particular social group” in the Act should take into account the general underlying themes of the defence of human rights and anti-discrimination that form the basis for the international refugee protection initiative.15

The Court further indicated that the tests proposed in Mayers,16 Cheung,17 and Matter of Acosta18 provided a “good working rule” to achieve the above-noted result and identified three possible categories of particular social groups that emerge from these tests:

1. Groups defined by an innate or unchangeable characteristic;

14 See also Syndicat Northcrest, supra, footnote 12, where the Supreme Court of Canada said (at 61) that: “No right, including freedom of religion is absolute.”
15 Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 739.
2. groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to their human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association; 19 and
3. groups associated by a former voluntary status, unalterable due to its historical permanence. 20

The Court went on to state:

The first category would embrace individuals fearing persecution on such bases as gender, linguistic background and sexual orientation, while the second would encompass, for example, human rights activists. The third branch is included more because of historical intentions, although it is also relevant to the anti-discrimination influences, in that one’s past is an immutable part of the person. 21

In setting out three possible categories of particular social groups, the Court made it clear that not all groups of persons will be within the Convention refugee definition. There are some groups from which the claimant can, and should be expected to, dissociate him- or herself because membership therein is not fundamental to the human dignity of the claimant. 22

A distinction must be drawn between a claimant who fears persecution because of what he or she does as an individual and a claimant who fears persecution because of his or her membership in a particular social group. It is the membership in the group which must be the cause of the persecution and not the individual activities of the claimant. 23 This is sometimes referred to as the “is versus does” distinction.

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19 In Yang, the claimant feared persecution by the authorities in China due to her adherence to Falun Gong beliefs and practices. The Court was of the view that Falun Gong would fall under the second category of “social group” in Ward, as members voluntarily associate themselves for reasons so fundamental to their human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association. On the other hand, in Manrique Galvan, Edgar Jacob v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-304-99), Lemieux, April 7, 2000, the claimant alleged to belong to a particular social group, namely the Emiliano Zapata group, an organization of taxi drivers, which the Refugee Division refused to recognize. After conducting an exhaustive review of the case law on the subject [including Matter of Acosta (Board of Immigration Appeals – United States) and Islam (House of Lords – England)], the Court concluded that the Refugee Division had properly assessed the case law in finding that the social group to which the principal applicant belonged did not correspond to any of the categories established in Ward, in particular the second category, on the ground that the right to work is fundamental but not necessarily the right to be a taxi driver in Mexico City.

20 Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 739.

21 Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 739.

22 Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 738. Thus the Court held, at 745, that an association, such as the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), that is committed to attaining political goals by any means, including violence, does not constitute a particular social group, as requiring its members to abandon this objective “does not amount to an abdication of their human dignity.”

23 Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 738-739. Thus the Court held, at 745, that although the claimant’s membership in INLA placed him in the circumstances that led to his fear, the fear itself was based on his action, not on his affiliation.
A particular social group cannot be defined solely by the fact that a group of persons are objects of persecution.\textsuperscript{24} The rationale for this proposition is that the Convention refugee definition requires that the persecution be “by reason of” one of the grounds, including particular social group.\textsuperscript{25}

Subsequent to the *Ward* decision, the Court of Appeal in *Chan*\textsuperscript{26} interpreted the three possible categories of particular social groups. The majority of the Court, in concurring judgments, held that the terms “voluntary association” and “voluntary status” referred to in *Ward* categories two and three (above) refer to active or formal association. The dissenting judgment disagreed with this interpretation.

*Chan* was then heard by the Supreme Court of Canada\textsuperscript{27} and the majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the claimant had failed to present evidence on the objective element as to the well-foundedness of his fear of persecution (forced sterilization).\textsuperscript{28} The majority did not address the issue of particular social group or whether there was an applicable ground in this case.\textsuperscript{29} The dissenting judgment by Mr. Justice LaForest, however, dealt extensively with the ground of particular social group. The minority’s comments on this issue carry considerable persuasive authority, inasmuch as they were not contradicted by the majority, and represent the views of a significant number of Supreme Court Justices. Mr. Justice LaForest (who wrote the judgment in *Ward*) clarified some of the issues which were raised in *Ward*:

1. The *Ward* decision enunciated a working rule and “not an unyielding deterministic approach to resolving whether a refugee claimant could be classified within a particular social

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\textsuperscript{24} *Ward*, supra, footnote 1, at 729-733. In *Mason, Rawlson v. S.S.C.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2503-94), Simpson, May 25, 1995, the claimant feared being killed by drug “thugs” because he opposed the drug trade, and informed and testified against his brother in criminal proceedings; the Court held that “persons of high moral fibre who opposed the drug trade” were not a particular social group as this was not a pre-existing group whose members were subsequently persecuted. See also footnotes 49 and 65; and *Marvin, Mejia Espinoza v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5033-93), Joyal, January 10, 1995, where the Court found, in the circumstances of that case, that reporting drug traffickers to the Costa Rican authorities was not an expression of political opinion. For further discussion of victims of criminality and nexus to the grounds, see Chapter 4, section 4.7. See also *Manrique Galvan, Edgar Jacob v. M.C.I.*, supra, footnote 19, where the Court noted that the concept of particular social group requires more than a mere association of individuals who have come together because of their victimization.

\textsuperscript{25} In *M.C.I. v. Lin, Chen* (F.C.A., no. A-3-01), Desjardins, Décary, Sexton, October 18, 2001, the Court, in answer to a certified question, held that the CRDD erred in law when it found that the minor claimant had a well-founded fear of persecution on the grounds that he was a member of a particular social group, “minor child of Chinese family who is expected to provide support for other family members”. There was no evidence to support the CRDD’s finding that the named group was targeted for persecution by parents or other agents of persecution. The claimant’s fear of persecution was not because he was under 18 and expected to provide support for his family. His fear was directed at the Chinese authorities and stemmed from the method chosen to leave China. See also *Xiao, Mei Feng v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-953-00), Muldoon, March 16, 2001.

\textsuperscript{26} *Chan* (C.A.), supra, footnote 1.

\textsuperscript{27} *Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)*, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593.

\textsuperscript{28} *Chan* (S.C.C.), ibid., at 672.

\textsuperscript{29} *Chan* (S.C.C.), supra, footnote 27, at 658 and 672.
group.” The paramount consideration in determining a particular social group is the “general underlying themes of the defence of human rights and anti-discrimination.”

2. The “is versus does” distinction was not intended to replace the Ward categories. There must be proper consideration of the context in which the claim arose.

3. With respect to category two of the Ward categories and the position taken by the Court of Appeal in Chan that this category required an active association between members of the group, Mr. Justice LaForest stated: “In order to avoid any confusion on this point let me state incontrovertibly that a refugee alleging membership in a particular social group does not have to be in voluntary association with other persons similar to him- or herself.”

Some examples of particular social groups identified by the jurisprudence are as follows:

1. the family;

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30 Chan (S.C.C.), supra, footnote 27, at 642.
31 Chan (S.C.C.), supra, footnote 27, at 642.
32 In Chan (S.C.C.), supra, footnote 27, at 643-644, Mr. Justice LaForest commented that having children can be classified as what one does rather than who one is. In context, however, having children makes a person a parent which is what one is.
33 Chan (S.C.C.), supra, footnote 27, at 644-645.

In Rodriguez, Ana Maria v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., IMM-4573-96), Heald, September 26, 1997, the claimant was threatened with harm because her husband was involved in the mafia’s drug related business. The Court held that the CRDD did not err in holding that the difficulties experienced by family members of those persecuted for non-Convention reasons if those difficulties are solely by reason of their connection with the principal target are not covered by the Convention. This rationale was followed in Klinko, Alexander v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2511-97), Rothstein, April 30, 1998, where the Court held that when the primary victim of persecution does not come within the Convention refugee definition, any derivative Convention refugee claim based on family group cannot be sustained (Klinko was overturned by the Federal Court of Appeal on other grounds: Klinko, Alexander v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., A-321-98), Létourneau, Nolin, Malone, February 22, 2000). In Granada, Armando Ramirez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-83-04), Martineau, December 21, 2004; 2004 FC 1766, the Court noted that the applicants had to establish that they were targeted for persecution either personally or collectively, that one cannot be deemed to be a refugee only because one has a relative who is being persecuted. In Macias, Laura Mena v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1040-04), Martineau, December 16, 2004; 2004 FC 1749, the Court noted that in order to consider immediate family as a particular social group, a claimant must only prove that there is a clear nexus between the persecution that is being levelled against one member of the family and that which is taking place against the claimant. In Tomov, Nikolay Haralam v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-10058-04), Mosley, November 9, 2005; 2005 FC 1527, the applicant, a citizen of Bulgaria, claimed refugee protection based on his membership in his common-law spouse’s Roma family and the assault he faced when he was in her company. The Court noted that family is a valid social group for the purposes of seeking protection. Here, there was a sufficient nexus between the Applicant’s claim and his wife’s persecution. The
2. homosexuals (sexual orientation);  
3. trade unions;  
4. the poor;  
5. wealthy persons or landlords were found by the Trial Division not to be particular social groups. The Court focused on the fact that these groups were no longer being persecuted although they had been in the past.

Board erred in requiring that the Applicant be personally targeted outside of his relationship. See also Asghar, Imran Mohammad v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8239-04), Blanchard, May 31, 2005; 2005 FC 768, and Zaidi, Syed Tabish Raza v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8779-04), Martineau, August 9, 2005; 2005 FC 1080, for the proposition that derivative refugee claims based on family group cannot be sustained when the primary victim of persecution does not come within the definition of a Convention refugee. With respect to the concept of indirect persecution, see also Chapter 9, section 9.4.


37 Sinora, Frensel v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. 93-A-334), Noël, July 3, 1993. Justice Noël noted that “[I]t is important to note that this group [the poor] has been recognized as a social group by the Federal Court of Appeal.” Unfortunately, there is no reference for the Court of Appeal decision but Justice Noël may have been referencing to Orelien v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1992] 1 F.C. 592, where the Court was dealing with a decision of the credible basis panel. The claim in question was based on membership in the group of “poor and disadvantaged people of Haiti.” The argument before the credible basis panel was that all Haitians outside Haiti have a credible basis for claiming to be refugees, not that all Haitians are refugees. The credible basis panel ruled that “it would be absurd to accept the proposition … that all Haitian are refugees, since this would offer international protection to both the victims and the perpetrators of the crimes…” The Court agreed that the tribunal misunderstood the argument: “With respect, it is not axiomatic that nationals of a country who have escaped that country may not have a well founded fear of persecution by reason of their nationality should they be returned.” However, the Court, per Mahoney J., also noted the following: “I am inclined to agree with [the panel] on this point: there is nothing to distinguish the applicant’s claim to be persecuted by reason of membership in that particular social group [the poor and disadvantaged] from their claim to be persecuted by reason of Haitian nationality itself.”


However, in Randhawa, Sarbjit v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2474-97), Campbell, February 2, 1998, it was held that “considering the extensive evidence of persecution of Sikhs in India the CRDD made an erroneous finding of fact in compartmentalizing the [claimant] as a Sikh from the fact that he is a prominent wealthy person”, and directed the Board to consider the claim on the basis of membership in the social group of “prominent wealthy Sikhs”.

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6. women subject to domestic abuse;  

7. women forced into marriage without their consent;  

8. women who have been subjected to exploitation resulting in the violation of the person and who, in consequence of the exploitation have been tried, convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.  

9. new citizens of Israel who are women recently arrived from elements of the former Soviet Union and who are not yet well integrated into Israeli society, despite the generous support offered by the Israeli government, who are lured into prostitution and threatened and exploited by individuals not connected to government, and who can demonstrate indifference to their plight by front-line authorities to whom they would normally be expected to turn for protection;  

39 In Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 731, the Court said: “The persecution in the ‘Cold War cases’ was imposed upon the capitalists not because of their contemporaneous activities but because of their past status as ascribed to them by the Communist leaders.” Thus, in Lai, Kai Ming v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-792-88), Marceau, Stone, Desjardins, September 18, 1989. Reported: Lai v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989), 8 Imm. L.R. (2d) 245 (F.C.A.), at 245-246, the Court implicitly accepted that “persons with capitalist backgrounds” constitute a particular social group in the context of China. In Karpounin, supra, footnote 38, however, the Court stated at 4: “… it does not necessarily follow that, merely because the historical underpinning of including the use of the term ‘particular social group’ as found in the Convention, was based on the desire to protect capitalists and independent businessmen fleeing Eastern Bloc persecution during the cold war, should it lead to the conclusion that the [claimant] in this case was persecuted for that very reason.” The CRDD had found that the claimant, an independent businessman, was targeted because of the size of his bank account and not because of his choice of occupation or the state of his conscience. See also Soberanis, Enrique Samayoa v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-401-96), Tremblay-Lamer, October 8, 1996, where “small business proprietors victimized by extortionists acting in concert with police authorities” was found not to be a particular social group.  

40 In Narvaez, supra, footnote 4, Mr. Justice McKeown referred extensively to Ward, supra, footnote 1 and to the IRB Chairperson’s Gender Guidelines in finding “women subject to domestic abuse in Ecuador” to constitute a particular social group; the judgment did not address the issue of whether the group can be defined by the persecution feared. (In Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 729-733, the Court rejected the notion that “particular social group” could be defined solely by the persecution feared, i.e., the common victimization.) The reasoning in Narvaez, supra, footnote 4, was explicitly adopted in the decision of Diluna, Roselene Edyr Soares v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3201-94), Gibson, March 14, 1995. Reported: Diluna v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1995), 29 Imm. L.R. (2d) 156 (F.C.T.D.), where the Court held that the CRDD erred in not finding that “women subject to domestic violence in Brazil” constitute a particular social group.  

41 Vidhani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] 3 F.C. 60 (T.D.), where the Court held that such women have suffered a violation of a basic human right (the right to enter freely into marriage) and would appear to fall within the first category identified in Ward, supra, footnote 1.  

42 Cen v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1996] 1 F.C. 310 (T.D.), at 319, where the Court stated the group “might be” so defined.  

10. women subject to circumcision; 44
11. persons subject to forced sterilization; 45
12. children of police officers who are anti-terrorist supporters; 46
13. former fellow municipal employees terrified and terrorized by what they know about the ruthless, criminal mayor; 47
14. educated women. 48
15. "law abiding citizens" was held not to be a particular social group. 49
16. persons suffering from mental illness. 50

44 Annan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] 3 F.C. 25 (T.D.), where the Court implicitly seemed to accept that the claim was grounded.

45 Cheung, supra, footnote 17, at 322, ("women in China who have one child and are faced with forced sterilization"). But note Liu, Ying Yang v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4316-94), Reed, May 16, 1995, where the Court found that the claimant had shown no subjective fear of persecution as a result of the threat of sterilization and there was no evidence she objected to the government policy. See also Chan (S.C.C.), supra, footnote 27, at 644-646, where La Forest J. (dissenting) formulates the group under Ward's second category (see section 4.5. of this Chapter), as an association or group resulting from a "common attempt by its members to exercise a fundamental human right" (at 646), namely, "the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children." (at 646). For further discussion of China's one child policy, see Chapter 9, section 9.3.7.


47 Reynoso, Edith Isabel Guardian v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2110-94), Muldoon, January 29, 1996. Mr. Justice Muldoon stated that the claimant's group was defined by an innate or unchangeable characteristic; the Court acknowledged that this characteristic was one acquired later in life.


49 Serrano, supra, footnote 34. The Court certified a question on this issue but no appeal was filed.

50 In Liaqat, Mohammad v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9550-04), Teitelbaum, June 23, 2005; 2005 FC 893, the Applicant had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and depression with psychotic features. In the context of the judicial review of a negative PRRA decision, the Applicant submitted that his mental illness was an innate and unchangeable characteristic, notwithstanding that its severity may fluctuate with treatment. The Minister appeared to concede that the Applicant was a member of a particular social group because of his mental illness and the Court was in agreement. In Jasiel, Tadeusz v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-564-05), Teitelbaum, September 13, 2005; 2005 FC 1234, the Applicant, a 50-year old citizen of Poland, premised his claim on the basis that he is a severe alcoholic who will relapse if returned to Poland, and be committed to a psychiatric hospital as a result of his condition. The Court agreed with the Board's finding that the Applicant had failed to establish a nexus between the Applicant's alcoholism and the Convention refugee grounds.
4.6. POLITICAL OPINION

A broad and general interpretation of political opinion is “any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of state, government, and policy may be engaged”. However, this does not mean that only political opinions regarding the state will be relevant. As noted in Chapter 3, there is no requirement that the agent of persecution be the state.

The Supreme Court of Canada in Ward stated that there are two refinements to political opinion within the context of the Convention refugee definition.

The first is that “the political opinion at issue need not have been expressed outright.” The Court recognized that the claimant may not always articulate his or her beliefs and that the political opinion will be perceived from the claimant’s actions or otherwise imputed to him or her.

The second refinement in Ward is that the “political opinion ascribed to the claimant” by the persecutor “need not necessarily conform to the claimant’s true beliefs.” In other words, the political opinion may not be correctly attributed to the claimant.

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51 Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 746. The word "engaged" was interpreted in Femenia, Guillermo v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3852-94), Simpson, October 30, 1995. The claimants asserted that their political opinion was that they opposed the existence of corrupt police and advocated their removal and prosecution. They argued that this was an opinion on a matter “in which the machinery of state, government and policy may be engaged.” Madam Justice Simpson concluded, that the state is “engaged” in the provision of police services, but not in the criminal conduct of corrupt officers. In her view, that was not conduct officially sanctioned, condoned or supported by the state and therefore, the claimants’ asserted political opinion did not come within the Ward, supra, footnote 1, characterization of political opinion. The Court of Appeal in Klinko, supra, footnote 34, rejected the approach followed by the Trial Division in Femenia as being too narrow an interpretation of Ward. The Court answered in the affirmative the following certified question:

Does the making of a public complaint about widespread corrupt conduct by customs and police officials to a regional governing authority, and thereafter, the complainant suffering persecution on this account, when the corrupt conduct is not officially sanctioned, condoned or supported by the state, constitute an expression of political opinion as that term is understood in the definition of Convention refugee in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration Act?

See also Berrueta, Jesus Alberto Arzola v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2303-95), Wetston, March 21, 1996, where the Court overturned the CRDD decision on the basis that the CRDD did not suitably analyze the facts to determine the issue of political opinion. With respect to corruption, the Court stated, at 2, that “[c]orruption is prevalent in some countries. To decry corruption, in some cases, is to strike at the core of such governments’ authority.” See also Zhu, Yong Qin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5678-00), Dawson, September 18, 2001.

52 Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 746.

53 Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 746. In Sopiqoti, Spiro v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5640-01), Martineau, January 29, 2003; 2003 FC 95, the Court held that the claimant’s statement that he had not had any political involvement and was not familiar with the political ideologies in his country did not exempt the panel from its obligation to consider whether the gestures he had made, such as refusing to fire on pro-democracy demonstrators, were considered to be political activities. Even if the agents of persecution acted out of personal or pecuniary motives, the CRDD had to determine whether the government authority had imputed a political opinion to the claimant.

54 Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 747.
The Supreme Court makes it clear that it is the perception of the persecutor which is relevant. The question to be answered is: does the agent of persecution consider the claimant’s conduct to be political or does it attribute political activities to him or her?55

The claimant does not have to belong to a political party56 nor does the claimant have to belong to a group that has an official title, office or status57 in order for there to be a determination that the claimant’s fear of persecution is by reason of political opinion. The relevant issue is the persecutor’s perception of the group and its activities, or of the individual and his or her activities.58

For a discussion of the ground of political opinion as it relates to laws of general application and, in particular, the dress code and military service (evasion/desertion) laws, see Chapter 9, sections 9.3.6 and 9.3.8.1.

4.7. VICTIMS OF CRIMINALITY AND NEXUS TO GROUNDS

In a number of cases, the Trial Division has held that victims of crime, corruption59 or vendettas60 generally cannot establish a link between their fear of persecution and one of the five grounds in the definition.61


58 Hilo, ibid., at 202-203 (re charitable group). See also Bohorquez, Gabriel Enriquez v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7078-93), McGillis, October 6, 1994 (re lottery ticket cooperative); Salvador (Bucheti), Sandra Elizabeth v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6560-93), Noel, October 27, 1994 (re witness to crime committed by paramilitary group); Marvin, supra, footnote 24, (re reporting of drug traffickers to authorities); Kwong, Kam Wang (Kwong, Kum Wun) v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3464-94), Cullen, May 1, 1995 (re defiance of one-child policy) - but compare Chan (C.A.), supra, footnote 1, at 693-696, per Heald J.A., and at 721-723, per Desjardins J.A.


However, these cases must be read with caution in light of the Federal Court of Appeal decision in *Klinko*, where the Court answered in the affirmative the following certified question:

claimant alleged that Mr. Arnulfo, a member of a notorious criminal gang, had perpetrated acts of violence against him because of his relationship with Ms. Ordonez. The CRDD concluded that there was no nexus and that the claim was based on a personal vendetta. The Court found that it was reasonably open to the Board to conclude that the cause of the violence against the claimant was the jealousy of a rival for the affections of Ms. Ordonez, not the fact that the claimant was a family member whom Mr. Arnulfo had subjected to gender-based violence.

61 In *Barrantes, Rodolfo v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-1142-04), Harrington, April 15, 2005; 2005 FC 518, the Applicants’ feared persecution by criminals who believed that the principal claimant was a police informant. The Court upheld the RPD’s finding that fear of persecution as a victim of organized crime and a fear of personal vengeance do not constitute a fear of persecution within the meaning of *IRPA*, s. 96. See also, *Prato, Jorge Luis Machado v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-10670-04), Pinard, August 12, 2005; 2005 FC 1088, where the Court upheld the Board’s conclusion that the applicant was really a victim of extortion which has no nexus to any of the grounds. In *Kang, Hardip Kaur v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-775-05), Martineau, August 17, 2005, the Applicant’s stated fear of her uncle, due to her refusal to sell him property, was found to arise as a result of her individual experience as a victim of crime rather than due to her membership in a particular social group (i.e., gender-related); consequently, no nexus existed.

62 *Klinko* (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 34. In *Fernandez De La Torre, Mario Guillermo v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3787-00), McKeown, May 9, 2001, the male claimant claimed a fear of persecution from Mexican criminal elements whose fraudulent activities he witnessed while working as a chauffeur for prominent anti-corruption figures. The Court found that the CRDD had reasonably distinguished *Klinko* (F.C.A.) in determining that no nexus existed, given that the male claimant had not himself actually denounced corruption. His verbal reports to his boss were therefore redundant since it was reasonable to expect that his boss, the head of the department, would have had a copy of these reports. The Board’s finding of “no nexus” was a reasonable one.

In *Zhu, Yong Qin v. M.C.I.*, supra, footnote 51, the claimant claimed to be a refugee *sur place*, because he gave information to the RCMP about Korean and Chinese individuals charged with human smuggling and feared repercussions by the snakeheads in China, notwithstanding the crackdown by the Chinese government against smugglers. The Court held that persons informing on criminal activity do not form a particular social group. However, “political opinion” should be given a broad interpretation and need not be expressed vis-à-vis the state. By asking only whether the claimant’s actions would be perceived by Chinese authorities as contrary to the authorities’ opinion and by limiting the perceived opinion to one which challenges the state apparatus, the CRDD construed “political opinion” too narrowly. The CRDD erred in its attempt to distinguish *Klinko* (F.C.A.). The CRDD must consider whether the government of China or its machinery “may be engaged” in human trafficking so as to provide the required nexus to a Convention ground.

In *Adewumi, Adegboyega Oluseyi v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1276-01), Dawson, March 7, 2002; 2002 FCT 258, the claimant was targeted by cult members after he delivered an anti-cult lecture at the University of Benin where he condemned cult activities and criticized the police force and government for non-prosecution of serious crimes. The CRDD concluded that what the claimant feared was criminal activity. In the Court’s view, since the claimant’s criticism extended to the police and the government, the CRDD erred in its conclusion that there was no nexus.

In *Yoli, Hernan Dario v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-399-02), Rouleau, December 30, 2002; 2002 FCT 1329, the Court agreed with the CRDD that the claimant was threatened by “Bocca” (a soccer fan club involved in criminal activities) not because of his political opinion but because he could reveal evidence of criminal activity to the authorities.
Does the making of a public complaint about widespread corrupt conduct by customs and police officials to a regional governing authority, and thereafter, the complainant suffering persecution on this account, when the corrupt conduct is not officially sanctioned, condoned or supported by the state, constitute an expression of political opinion as that term is understood in the definition of Convention refugee in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration Act?

The Court found that given the widespread government corruption in the Ukraine (“where the corrupt elements so permeate the government as to be part of its very fabric”), the claimant’s denunciation of the existing corruption constituted an expression of political opinion. In general, however, an opinion expressed in opposition to a criminal organization will not provide a nexus on the basis of political opinion unless the disagreement is rooted in political conviction.

Similarly, opposition to corruption or criminality is not a perceived political opinion unless it can be seen to challenge the state apparatus.

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63 Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 750, the Court stated that not just any dissent to any organization will unlock the gates of asylum; the disagreement has to be rooted in political conviction. In Suarez, Jairo Arango v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3246-95), Reed, July 29, 1996, the Court found there was no political content or motivation when the claimant informed on drug lords. A similar conclusion was reached in Munoz, Tarquino Oswaldo Padron v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1884-95), McKeown, February 22, 1996. See also discussion of Marvin, supra, footnote 24, and Femenia, supra, footnote 51. In La Hoz, Carmen Maria Zoeger v. M.C.I. and Magan, Miguel Luis Contreras v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5239-04), Blanchard, May 30, 2005; 2005 FC 762, the applicant's claim was based on his fear of being persecuted by two soldiers involved in drug trafficking whom he allegedly denounced. The applicant acted in accordance with his duties in the army and there was no evidence that he had acted out of political conviction. Nor was there any evidence that the denunciation was or could have been perceived as politically based. Since the applicant was a victim of criminal acts, he was not a member of a particular social group within the meaning of the Convention (Montchak, Klinko). In Lai, Cheong Sing v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-191-04), Malone, Richard, Sharlow, April 11, 2005; 2005 FCA 125, the applicant alleged that, because of his refusal to participate in a political intrigue, he had been wrongfully accused by the Chinese government of smuggling and bribery. The Court found that the Board correctly concluded that there was no nexus between the alleged crimes and any political motive; the motive was one of personal gain and the crimes should not be viewed as political.

64 See Klinko (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 34 and note that earlier cases need to be read with caution in light of this judgment. In Berrueta, supra, footnote 51, the claimant had denounced kingpins of a drug cartel and the CRDD had found this not to be an expression of political opinion. However, the Court found that, in some cases, to denounce corruption is to undermine a government’s authority where the corruption is pervasive throughout the state. Also in Diamanama, Nsimba v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1808-95), Reed, January 30, 1996, the claimant’s refusal to produce dresses for a corrupt government official was viewed as a challenge to the government’s authority; and in Bohorquez, supra, footnote 58, the claimant opposed the state lottery and faced threats by corrupt officials. The Court found that the claimant’s opposition to the lottery challenged vested political interests. See also Vassiliev, Anatoli Fedorov v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D. IMM-3443-96), Muldoon, July 4, 1997, where the Court found that the claimant's refusal to transfer bribes to Russian government officials and to launder money was an expression of political opinion.

In Mousavi-Samani, Nasrin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., IMM-4674-96), Heald, September 30, 1997, the court upheld the CRDD’s determination that any possible retaliation the claimant feared after making public a document detailing particulars of fraud committed at the bank where she worked and resulting in the conviction of most of the perpetrators, did not have a nexus to the definition. Exposing the fraud did not amount to a challenge to the regime’s authority to govern.

See also Mehrabani, Paryoosh Soljhou v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1798-97), Rothstein, April 3, 1998, where the Court upheld the CRDD finding that the claimant's fear of highly placed embezzlers whom he had exposed and against whom he had testified in court did not ground the claim in political opinion. Denouncing
A claimant’s exposure of corruption or opposition to crime will not generally place him or her in a particular social group. However, in some cases, the grounds of political opinion or particular social group can provide a nexus where the claimant fears persecution as a result of criminal activity.

In Kouril, Zdenek v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2627-02), Pinard, June 13, 2003; 2003 FCT 728, the Court distinguished Klinko on the basis that in Klinko, the political opinion expressed took the form of a denunciation of state officials’ corruption whereas in this case, the claimant had complained about a group of private citizens acting outside the law. Even under Ward’s broad definition of political opinion, the claimant’s complaint would not constitute an expression of political opinion, especially since the evidence before the Board was that corruption was not endemic in the Czech Republic. In Liang, Xiao Dong v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1286-03), Layden-Stevenson, December 19, 2003; 2003 FC 1501, the Court upheld the Board’s decision. The CRDD found that the claimant was a leader of organized crime and excluded him under Article 1 F(b). The Board found there was no nexus to political opinion as articulated in Klinko, as the claimant could not be perceived as opposing the government authorities. It was precisely because of a crackdown on criminality and corruption that the Chinese authorities had an interest in the claimant. In Asghar, Imran Mohammad v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8239-04), Blanchard, May 31, 2005; 2005 FC 768, The applicant, the son of a police officer involved in the fight against terrorism, had alleged that he feared persecution because of his family connections. The Court upheld the RPD’s finding of no nexus, indicating that although the term “political opinion” must be given a broad interpretation (Klinko, Zhu), the fact that the applicant’s father had arrested criminals and had testified against them is not an expression of a political opinion within the meaning of Ward.

In Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 745, the Court found that the claimant was not part of a social group since he was the target of highly individualized persecution due to what he did as an individual and not because of any group characteristics or association. This reasoning has been followed in Suarez, supra, footnote 63, and in Munoz, supra, footnote 63. In Munoz, the Court also found that exposing corruption is a laudable goal but not fundamental to the human dignity of the claimant and therefore does not place the claimant in a particular social group. See also Mason, supra, footnote 24; and Soberanis, supra, footnote 39.

In Valderrama, supra, footnote 64, counsel defined the claimant’s social group as “successful businessman opposed to corruption and unwilling to pay bribes”. The facts revealed that it is “successful businessmen” who are being targeted, regardless of their opposition to corruption. After considering Ward and Chan the Court held that there was no nexus between the targeted class and a Convention social group. See also Rangel Becerra, Yanira Esthel v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3550-97), Pinard, August 24, 1998.

65 In Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 745, the Court found that the claimant was not part of a social group since he was the target of highly individualized persecution due to what he did as an individual and not because of any group characteristics or association. This reasoning has been followed in Suarez, supra, footnote 63, and in Munoz, supra, footnote 63. In Munoz, the Court also found that exposing corruption is a laudable goal but not fundamental to the human dignity of the claimant and therefore does not place the claimant in a particular social group. See also Mason, supra, footnote 24; and Soberanis, supra, footnote 39.

In Valderrama, supra, footnote 64, counsel defined the claimant’s social group as “successful businessman opposed to corruption and unwilling to pay bribes”. The facts revealed that it is “successful businessmen” who are being targeted, regardless of their opposition to corruption. After considering Ward and Chan the Court held that there was no nexus between the targeted class and a Convention social group. See also Rangel Becerra, Yanira Esthel v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3550-97), Pinard, August 24, 1998.

66 Klinko (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 34. In Cen, supra, footnote 42, the claimant was sexually exploited by corrupt government officials. The Court found she belonged to a particular social group of women subject to exploitation and violation of security of the person. In Reynoso, supra, footnote 47, the claimant was the target of a corrupt mayor because she had uncovered his illegal activities. The Court held that her knowledge of the mayor’s corruption was an unchangeable characteristic that placed her in a category one social group. In Asghar, supra, footnote 64, the Applicant, the son of a police officer involved in the fight against terrorism, had alleged that he feared persecution because of his family connections. The Court upheld the RPD’s finding of no nexus indicating that as the motive of the agents of persecution was criminal and the fear of reprisals was motivated by vengeance or by the fact of being a victim of a criminal act, the Applicant did not belong to a particular social group as set out in Ward. See also Diamanama, supra, footnote 64, Berrueta, supra, footnote 51; and Bohorquez, supra, footnote 58.
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WELL-FOUNDED FEAR

5.1. GENERALLY

The definition of Convention refugee is forward-looking. It follows, therefore, that the fear of persecution is to be assessed at the time of the examination of the claim to refugee status.

The claimant must establish that the fear is reasonable, i.e. is justified considering the objective situation. In other words, the claimant must establish that his or her fear of persecution has a valid basis.

Most importantly, the claimant does not have to establish that he or she was persecuted in the past or that he or she would or will be persecuted in the future. Although evidence relating to a past fear of persecution can properly be the foundation of a present fear, there is no requirement to show past persecution to substantiate a claim for refugee status.

The mere existence of an oppressive law which is enforced only sporadically does not by itself show that all members of the group targeted by the law have good grounds for fearing persecution.

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In establishing whether a fear is well founded, the state’s ability to protect should be considered. The Supreme Court has held that: “The test is in part objective; if a state is able to protect the claimant, then his or her fear is not, objectively speaking, well-founded.”

5.2. TEST - STANDARD OF PROOF

Claimants must establish their case on a balance of probabilities, but this does not mean they have to prove that persecution would be more likely than not. The evidence must show only that there are “good grounds” for fearing persecution. In Li, the Federal Court of Appeal noted that the “standard of proof” and the “legal test to be met” must not be confused. The standard of proof refers to the standard the panel will apply in assessing the evidence adduced for the purpose of making factual findings, whereas the legal test is the test that is required to establish the refugee claim is well founded.

Courts have used various terms to describe this test - “reasonable chance”, and “reasonable” or even “serious” possibility, as opposed to a “mere” possibility.

The test for well-foundedness was further clarified in Ponniah, where Desjardins J.A. stated:

“Good grounds” or “reasonable chance” is defined in Adjei as occupying the field between upper and lower limits; it is less than a 50 per cent chance (i.e., a probability), but more than a minimal or mere possibility. There is no intermediate ground: what falls between the two limits is “good grounds”.

With regard to the standard of proof used to assess evidence, the Federal Court has held that certain phrasing in CRDD reasons, such as “we are not convinced” or “the claimant did not convince us”, implied overly exacting standards of proof.

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5.3. SUBJECTIVE FEAR AND OBJECTIVE BASIS

The subjective fear relates to the existence of a fear of persecution in the mind of the claimant. The objective basis requires that there be a valid basis for this fear.\(^\text{14}\) Claimants may have a subjective fear that they will be persecuted if returned to their country, but the fear must be assessed objectively in light of the situation in the country of which claimants are a national to determine whether it is well founded.\(^\text{15}\)

Both subjective fear and an objective basis for it are crucial elements. In Kamana,\(^\text{16}\) Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer held that the panel's finding that the claimant had not credibly established the subjective element was reasonable and that:

The lack of evidence going to the subjective element of the claim is a fatal flaw which in and of itself warrants dismissal of the claim, since both elements of the refugee definition – subjective and objective -- must be met.

This decision has been followed by a number of judges at the Trial Division\(^\text{17}\) despite an earlier decision by the Federal Court of Appeal which found that the soundness of rejecting a


In Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593, at 664 (paragraph 134), Major, J. stated: “The objective component of the test requires an examination of the ‘objective situation’ and the relevant factors include the conditions in the applicant’s country of origin and the laws in that country together with the manner in which they are applied ....”.


claim because of the absence of subjective fear in the presence of an objective basis for the fear, was “doubtful.” In *Yusuf*\(^{18}\) Hugessen J.A. stated:

> I find it hard to see in what circumstances it could be said that a person who, we must not forget, is by definition claiming refugee status could be right in fearing persecution and still be rejected because it is said that fear does not actually exist in his conscience.

The applicant in *Maqdassy*\(^{19}\) relied on *Yusuf* to argue that it might not be necessary to establish a subjective fear of persecution where an objective fear had been shown to exist. Justice Tremblay-Lamer disagreed, noting that *Yusuf* had been decided prior to *Ward*\(^{20}\), in which the Supreme Court made it clear that both components of the test were required. In *Geron*\(^{21}\), a case decided several months later, Mr. Justice Blanchard also referred to *Ward* as authority for finding that the lack of evidence going to the subjective element of the claim was a “fatal flaw”. Mr Justice Harrington also cited *Ward* when he held in *Nazir*\(^{22}\) that it was not necessary to decide whether certain findings were patently unreasonable because “even if there were grounds for an objective fear, there must also be a subjective fear of persecution.”

**5.3.1. Establishing the Subjective and Objective Elements**

A claimant’s mental condition should not normally be used to argue that he or she cannot establish a subjective fear.\(^{23}\)

The testimony of a trustworthy third party may make it possible to establish the objective aspect of the claimant’s fear; in other words, this third party can establish the objective probability of the fear alleged by the claimant.\(^{24}\)

In the *Amaniampong*\(^{25}\) decision, the Court of Appeal refused to set aside the CRDD’s decision which found credible objective evidence but found the claimant not credible with respect to the “subjective branch of the test”.

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\(^{22}\) *Nazir, Qaiser Mahmood v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-3857-04), Harrington, February 3, 2005; 2005 FC 168 at paragraph 4.

\(^{23}\) *Rosales, Carlos Guillermo Cabrera v. M.E.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. A-750-92), Rothstein, November 26, 1993. Reported: *Rosales v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)* (1993), 23 Imm. L.R. (2d) 100 (F.C.T.D.), at 105. The Court approved the withdrawal of Minister’s counsel’s submission that because of the applicant’s mental condition (post-traumatic stress disorder) he was unable to form a subjective fear at the time of the hearing and thus could not bring himself within the definition of a Convention refugee.

\(^{24}\) *Amaniampong*, supra, footnote 14.
In *Parada*, the Court found that if a claimant testifies that he fears for his life and there is evidence to reasonably support those fears, it is improper for the Refugee Division to reject that testimony out of hand without making a negative finding of credibility.

In *Seevaratnam*, the Court stated that where a claimant is found not credible (as opposed to a case where there is a total absence of credible and trustworthy evidence), the Board must still objectively assess the rest of the evidence and determine if the claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution.

5.4. DELAY

Delay in making a claim to refugee status is not in itself a decisive factor. However, it is a relevant, and potentially important consideration. In *Huerta*, Mr. Justice Létourneau wrote:

> The delay in making a claim to refugee status is not a decisive factor in itself. It is, however, a relevant element which the tribunal may take into account in assessing both the statements and the actions and deeds of a claimant.

In a series of recent decisions, a number of Federal Court judges have taken the view that *Huerta* enunciated a general principle, and that, although the presence of delay does not mandate the rejection of a claim as the claimant may have a reasonable explanation for the delay, nonetheless, delay may, in the right circumstances, constitute sufficient grounds upon which to reject a claim. That decision will ultimately depend on the facts of each claim.

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25 *Amaniampong*, supra, footnote 14, at 2. See also *Liu, Ying Yang v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4316-94), Reed, May 16, 1995, where the Court found, at 3, that it was not appropriate “to quash the CRDD’s decision in the light of [its] findings concerning the lack of evidence of subjective fear on the part of the female [claimant].”

26 *Parada, Felix Balmore v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. A-938-92), Cullen, March 6, 1995. Similarly, in *Hatami, Arezo v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2418-98), Lemieux, March 23, 2000, the Court held that the Board had no evidentiary basis on which to conclude that the claimant did not have a genuine subjective fear of persecution when her subjective fear was clearly established in her PIF and the Board had found her evidence credible.


29 *Huerta*, ibid., at 227.

30 The following Federal Court decisions, among others, have upheld RPD decisions rejecting claims because of inordinate delays in claiming refugee protection or return to the country of alleged persecution such as to negate a subjective fear: *Duarte, Augustina Castelanos v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6616-02), Kelen, August 21, 2003; 2003 FCT 988; *Rivera, Jesus Vargas v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-5826-02), Beaudry, November 5, 2003; 2003 FC 1292; *Espinosa, Roberto Pablo Hernandez v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-5667-02), Rouleau, November 12, 2003; 2003 FC 1324; *Sangha, Ajit Singh v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-1597-03), Pinard, December 19, 2003; 2003 FC 1488; *Akacha, Kamel v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-548-03), Pinard, December 19, 2003; 2003 FC 1489; *Emerance, Pembe Yodi v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-5546-02), Beaudry, January 19, 2004; 2004 FC 36. For a more
Delay may indicate a lack of subjective fear of persecution, the reasoning being that someone who was truly fearful would claim refugee status at the first opportunity. However, the reason for the delay must be examined in each case in order to determine whether or not the delay can be said to be truly indicative of a lack of subjective fear. Allegations that the claimant did not know it was possible to claim refugee status or that an agent advised him or her to come to Canada must be assessed for credibility and reasonableness in the claimant’s circumstances.

In *Diluna*, the Trial Division held, *in obiter*, that the Refugee Division should have considered a psychiatric assessment that supported the claimant’s assertion that she delayed seeking refugee status due to post-traumatic stress syndrome.

In *Beltran*, the Court found that the claimant had given a good explanation for delaying making a claim, and stated that the Board should have given reasons as to why it did not accept the explanation as valid.

In *Mejia*, the Board had found that the claimant had not left until some months after the issuance of her passport, and apparently inferred that she had not displayed appropriate panic. But the Court found that the Board had failed to squarely address whether it doubted her subjective fear, and failed to mention she had been in hiding.

In *El-Naem*, the Court found that it was unreasonable for the 19-year-old Syrian claimant to seek protection in Greece (where he had spent one year), given “all the circumstances”:

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31 *Castillejos, Jaoquin Torres v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1950-94), Cullen, December 20, 1994, where the Court stated, at 4, that delay points to a lack of subjective fear and does not relate to the objective basis of the claim.

32 *Tung*, supra, footnote 15, at 394: The Board erred in ignoring that the Chinese claimant, who was at all times in transit, provided reasons for selecting Canada as a safe haven over other countries he had considered with the assistance of his agent. In *Ahani, Rozbeh v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4985-93), MacKay, January 4, 1995, the CRDD’s conclusion that the claimant lacked a subjective fear for not having made a claim during the eight or nine days he travelled from Iran to Canada was found to be unreasonable. He had to travel through three countries after having made arrangements with a smuggler for travel to Canada. In *Williams, Debby v. S.S.C.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4244-94), Reed, June 30, 1995, the claimant did not know she was entitled to claim refugee status on the ground of spousal abuse.


It is too heavy a burden to place on a young person, impecunious and on his own, in a strange land with strange customs and language, and without family support, to assume he would inevitably act in a manner that reasonable persons, secure in Canada, might regard as the only rational manner.

In *Farahmandpour*, the Court held that the CRDD erred when it rejected the claim of a 78-year-old woman of the Baha’i faith, (whose two sons had successfully claimed refugee status at the Canadian embassy in Pakistan), on the basis of delay in leaving Iran and in claiming in Canada, as well as her failure to claim in Australia and the US. The CRDD erred in not considering the tragic situation she found herself in after the death of her husband and that the delays were explained by illness.

In *Papsouev*, the Court found that the Refugee Division unreasonably disregarded the claimants' explanations that they had incurred delays in obtaining passports and visas for their daughters. More importantly, in that case, the Court found that the panel had no grounds to reject, on the issue of delay, the evidence of a reputable lawyer and an officer of the Court.

In *Gabeyehu*, the Court noted that “[d]elay in making a claim can only be relevant from the date as of which [a claimant] begins to fear persecution.” The same principle was applied to a *sur place* claim in *Tang*. The Court agreed with the claimant’s counsel that reliance on the claimant’s delay in making a claim starting from the time the claimant arrived in Canada was misplaced, given that the claimant’s fear of persecution arose only afterwards. Therefore, “the date as of which he became aware that he would allegedly face persecution on return to China [was] the relevant date.”

Mr. Justice Gibson in *Yoganathan* followed the same reasoning of the Court of Appeal in *Hue*, a case also involving a seaman. The Court held that the CRDD erred in concluding that the claimant, a seaman, did not have a subjective fear of persecution as he had failed to claim refugee status at the first opportunity in other signatory countries: “The [claimant] had his ‘sailor’s papers’ and ‘a ship to sail on’. In the circumstances, he did not have to seek protection.”

The length of the delay is not in and of itself a determinative factor. In *Liblizadeh*, the Court quashed the decision of the CRDD when it found that there was no evidence before the panel that the claimant might have realistically applied for refugee status in Turkey, even though he was there 7 months, and in the US, where he was only in transit. With respect to claiming status in Canada, the claimant met with immigration authorities two days after arriving and was

given an appointment for three weeks later, at which time he filed his claim. And in Dcruze,\textsuperscript{44} the Court held that a delay of two years and six months between the claimant's departure and his application was "not extreme", and that his delay should not have been determinative of the matter; the Board should have examined the claim on its merits.

5.4.1. Delay in leaving the country of persecution

Delay, or a failure to seek protection at the first opportunity may occur at various points in time. For example, delay in leaving the country after the claimant has reason to fear persecution there is a relevant, though not determinative, consideration.\textsuperscript{45}

When a claim is based on a number of discriminatory or harassing incidents which culminate in an event which forces a person to leave his country, the issue of delay cannot be used as a significant factor to doubt that person’s subjective fear of persecution.\textsuperscript{46}

In Voyvodov,\textsuperscript{47} the Refugee Division had found that a claimant had failed to meet his burden because he had testified about only one incident, and then went on to express its concern about his delay in leaving the country. The Court said:

It is not reasonable to conclude that one applicant failed to establish his case on the basis of only one incident and to question the other applicant’s decision to remain in Bulgaria after having been physically abused for the first time in 1994. The tribunal appears to place the applicants in an impossible position. It implies that it does not believe Mr. Galev’s claim of persecution because he only experienced one alleged attack due to his sexual orientation. On the other hand, it finds that Mr. Voyvodov is not

\textsuperscript{44}Dcruze, Jacob Ranjit v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2910-98), Rouleau, June 17, 1999.


credible because he delayed seeking international protection after being initially attacked. This contradictory finding also requires the Court’s intervention.48

Even before the claimant leaves the country where he or she fears persecution, there are types of conduct that are normally associated with subjective fear. In a number of cases, adverse inferences were drawn from the claimant’s failure to go into hiding immediately after learning that he or she may be in danger.49

5.4.2. Failure to seek protection in other countries

The question of subjective fear is raised when a person voluntarily leaves a country where he or she could safely live or fails without valid reason to ask for protection in a country through which he or she has travelled.50 Failure to seek the protection of another country which

48 Ibid., paragraph 10.

See also Safakhoo, Masoud v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-455-96), Pinard, April 11, 1997, where an Iranian claimant had resided 5 years in France without asking for protection; and Bello, Salihou v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1771-96), Pinard, April 11, 1997, where in the case of a claimant who had returned to Cameroun on two occasions and had failed to claim refugee status in the 7½ years preceding his claim in Canada, the Court found it was not unreasonable for the CRDD to find that the claimant's actions were not consistent with those of a person with a subjective fear of persecution, and to make the further finding that the claimant's evidence was not credible; Madou, Nidhal Abderrah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-660-96), Denault, October 25, 1996, where the panel found a lack of subjective fear of persecution because the claimant had never claimed refugee status while he had been in Italy for 19 months and in the United States for 20 days.

See also Nguyen, Mai Huong v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2196-97), Rothstein, April 2, 1998, where the Court found the panel made no error in finding that the claimant had no subjective fear of persecution in Vietnam, having regard to her long delay in making a refugee claim, because she had left Vietnam in 1989 for the Soviet Union, stayed there until 1995, went to several countries and eventually came to Canada in April of 1995. And see Sokolov, Georgy Viktorov v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3853-97), Blais, September 16, 1998, where the CRDD was able to take into account the fact that the claimants had lived in the Czech Republic without claiming refugee status there; and Guzman, Jesus Ruby Hernandez v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3748-97), Rothstein, October 29, 1998, where the panel found, primarily based on the long delay in making claims (claimants had made no refugee claims over a three year period in Guatemala, Mexico, or the United States), that the claimants lacked a subjective fear. And in Skretyuk, Stefan et al. v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3240-
is also a signatory of the Convention\(^{51}\) may be a significant factor to consider with regard to subjective fear, but is not determinative.

There is no provision in the Convention that obliges refugee claimants to seek asylum in the first country they reach.\(^{52}\) However, there is a presumption that persons fleeing persecution will seek protection at the first opportunity, which would normally be in the first country they reach. The claimant’s explanation for not doing so must be considered in order to determine whether the claimant’s behaviour is evidence of a lack of subjective fear.

There are cases where Board decisions have been overturned due to failures to properly assess plausible and uncontradicted explanations for not seeking to remain or claim refugee status in various countries en route to Canada. For example, in *Owusu-Ansah* the Ghanaian claimant provided reasons why he could not have safely stayed in neighbouring Togo or Nigeria. In *Tung*\(^{53}\) the claimant provided reasons for selecting Canada as a safe haven over other countries he had considered with the assistance of his agent.

Leaving a country which has provided refuge and where a claimant has no fear of persecution is generally considered to be behaviour indicative of a lack of subjective fear. In *Shahpari*,\(^{54}\) the Court suggested, in *obiter*, that:

> Applicants should also remember that actions they themselves take which are intended to result in their not being able to return to a country which has already granted them Convention refugee status may well evidence an absence of the subjective fear of persecution in their original country from which they purport to be seeking refuge.

In *Bains*\(^{55}\), a claimant from India had applied for political asylum in England, but left after waiting five or six years without an answer because he heard that the British authorities were removing claimants awaiting status. The CRDD was justified in verifying the reasons the claimant gave for leaving England and its decision that the claimant lacked the subjective fear

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97), Dubé, June 4, 1998, the Court indicated that it was correct of the panel to have taken into account the behaviour of the applicants in failing to claim refugee status in two countries before arriving in Canada (“a claimant travelling through a country that is a signatory to the Convention must claim refugee status as soon as possible, or the claim may not be considered serious.”).

51 In *Ilie*, supra, footnote 50, at 3, the Court stated that the CRDD is entitled to take notice of the status of countries that are signatories to the Convention and may also assume that such countries will meet their obligation to implement the Convention within their own territory, unless evidence to the contrary is adduced. But see *Tung*, supra, footnote 15, where the claimant visited four countries en route to Canada. The Court pointed to the lack of evidence that any of the countries in question had ratified the Convention or Protocol and stated that although the Board was authorized to take notice of any facts that could be judicially noticed, it was wrong for the Board to have “speculated” that refugee protection was available in those countries.


53 *Tung*, supra, footnote 15.


was reasonable. The claimant’s decision to leave England did not demonstrate that his fear of being returned to India was well-founded.

In *Geron*\(^{56}\) the Board concluded that the claimants, citizens of the Philippines, were not credible and lacked subjective fear, as evidenced by the long delay before they claimed refugee status and the fact that they had valid residence permits for Italy but allowed them to lapse during the 18 months they remained in Canada prior to making their claims. The Court held that the Board had not erred in failing to consider the objective basis of the claim; it could be dismissed in the absence of any credible evidence to support the claimants’ subjective fear.

### 5.4.3. Delay in making a claim upon arrival in Canada

It is expected that, absent a good reason, a person with a genuine fear of persecution whose intention it is to seek refuge in Canada will do so immediately upon arrival.\(^{57}\)

In *Gyawali*,\(^{58}\) the Federal Court found that valid status in Canada could constitute a good reason for not claiming refugee protection immediately. The Court drew a parallel between the sailor on the ship whose contract expired, leaving him nowhere to go but home,\(^{59}\) and the claimant, who had a student visa and had also made an application for permanent residency in Canada. It was not until he could no longer pay for his studies that he feared having to return to his country. Both the sailor and the student left their countries fearing persecution and had found a safe place to stay, at least temporarily. Neither felt an immediate need to apply for refugee status. As soon as they found themselves at risk of being forced to return home, they filed claims for refugee protection.\(^{60}\)

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See also *Thomas, Arthurine Deniz v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4899-96), McGillis, February 19, 1998 (“the Board was entitled to consider in its assessment the applicant's lengthy delay in making her claim to refugee status.”); *Araya, Carolina Isabel Valenzuela v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3948-97), Gibson, September 4, 1998 (the claimants delayed making claims for five months), and *Leon, Hoimer Duban Sierra v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3650-97), Muldoon, October 23, 1998 (claimant delayed making his claim to refugee status for over five years because, he said, he feared deportation by the authorities since he was an illegal. The Court said: “It is incredible that he would believe that he could not make a refugee claim because he was an illegal, that he didn't have a Visa, or whatever. That is incredible. That he would wait five years in that belief, if the belief were true, is even more incredible.”).


59 *Hue, supra*, footnote 42.

60 Note, however, that in *Ahmad, Mahmood v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1012-01), Tremblay-Lamer, February 14, 2002; 2002 FCT 171, the Court upheld the Board’s rejection of a claim based largely on a two-year delay in claiming refugee status, while the claimant was on a student visa in Canada and then applied for permanent residency.
In the absence of any adverse credibility finding, the explanation that a claimant did not know that she could claim refugee status based on spousal abuse has successfully been used to refute findings that lengthy delays in claiming were due to an absence of subjective fear.61

5.5. RE-AVAILEMENT OF PROTECTION

Return to the country of nationality may indicate that a well-founded fear of persecution is lacking where the claimant’s conduct is inconsistent with such fear.62 Obtaining or renewing a passport or travel document,63 and leaving or emigrating through lawful channels may also indicate that a well-founded fear of persecution is lacking.64

It is proper for the Refugee Division, when considering the subjective element, to look at the fact that the claimant took allegedly self-endangering actions after making his or her claim, and to inquire into the claimant’s motivation.65 But if claimants give reasons why they returned to their country, clearly state that they did not re-avail of the protection of that country and assert not to have lost their subjective fear, absent an adverse finding of credibility, the Board would err in finding, on the basis of the purely circumstantial evidence of such returns, that the claimants had re-availed themselves of protection and did not have a subjective fear.66


62 Caballero, Fausto Ramon Reyes v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-266-91), Marceau (dissenting), Desjardins, Létourneau, May 13, 1993; Larue, Jacqueline Anne v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. 92-A-6666), Noël, May 13, 1993 (part of CRDD’s plausibility assessment); Abou El Joud, Mohamad Ali v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-21-93), Nadon, January 19, 1994; Bogus, supra, footnote 50; Zergani, Ahmad Jassemi v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-311-92), Heald, Stone, McDonald, April 12, 1994; Galdamez, Santo Peraza v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1544-94), McKeown, December 9, 1994 (claimant returned to home country after making refugee claim in Canada); Hoballah, Hassane v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3670-93), Joyal, January 10, 1995 (claimant returned a number of times to country of nationality); Tejani, Abdulkarim v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. 92-T-1306), Reed, June 2, 1993; Al-Kahtani, Naser Shaﬁ Mohammad v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2879-94), MacKay, March 13, 1996. In Ali, supra, footnote 45 the Court found that the CRDD’s conclusion that the claimants would not have returned to Sudan if they had a well-founded fear of persecution, was an inference that was reasonably open to the CRDD. But see Maldonado v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1980] 2 F.C. 302 (C.A.) at 304; and Parada, supra, footnote 26 (CRDD made no adverse credibility finding). See also Araya, supra, footnote 57. The principal claimant had returned to Chile and remained there for some nine weeks while she obtained the permission of the father of her child to remove the child from Chile. While the evidence regarding re-availment clearly indicated that it was for the sole purpose of allowing the mother to bring her son to Canada with her, the evidence did not go so far as to establish that other arrangements could not have been made so that the two claimants could have left Chile together when the mother first left.).

63 In Maldonado, supra, footnote 62, the Court pointed out that the Immigration Appeal Board ignored the fact that the claimant was able to obtain his passport (and exit papers) through his brother’s contacts with the government. In Jbel, Bouazza v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1058-92), Gibson, September 10, 1993, the fact that claimant had obtained a passport before the occurrence that motivated him to leave his country, was found not to be inconsistent with his decision to leave for the reason he stated.

64 Orelien v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 592 (C.A.). See also Bello, supra, footnote 50.


The Federal Court has held that it is an error to find a lack of subjective fear when the claimant was removed to his or her country, and thus did not return voluntarily.67

5.6. **SUR PLACE**68 CLAIMS AND WELL-FOUNDED FEAR

Mr. Justice Hugessen had occasion to examine the relevance of motive in cases where the claimants themselves were responsible for creating the circumstances leading to their *sur place* claims. In one case, he stated:

In my view, it has been the law for a very long time that a Convention refugee claimant must demonstrate both an objective and a subjective basis for his fear of persecution. It is my view that the case will be rare where there is an objective fear but not a subjective fear, but such cases may exist. In my view, it is certainly relevant to examine the motives underlying a claimant's participation in demonstrations such as this one in order to determine whether or not that claimant does have a subjective fear. The Board's examination of the motives was therefore not an irrelevant matter and the determination which they reached on that subject was one which was open to them on the evidence. It would I agree have been an error if the Board had stopped its examination at that point and had not also looked at whether or not the claimant had an objective fear but, they did not commit that error. The Board looked at the evidence with respect to the objective basis for the applicant's fear of return and found it not to be well-founded. That was a determination which was equally open to the Board on the evidence before it and I can take no issue with it.69

In a similar case, decided on the same date, he stated:

The argument is that it was irrelevant for the Board to examine the applicant's motives in acting as she did. In the view which I and other members of this Court have previously expressed, it is not irrelevant. The matter of motive goes to the genuineness or otherwise of the applicant's expressed subjective fear of persecution. That said, however, there is and must always be an intimate interplay between the subjective and objective elements of the fear of persecution which is central to the definition of convention refugee and, I have previously expressed the view that it would be an error for a Board to rely

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68 See the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, Geneva, September 1979, paragraphs 94-96. Paragraph 94 provides the following definition: “A person who was not a refugee when he left his country, but who becomes a refugee at a later date, is called a refugee “sur place”.” See also Chapter 7, section 7.3., *sur place* claims.

exclusively on its view that a claimant did not have a subjective fear of persecution without also examining the objective basis for that fear. The Board in this case, however, did not commit an error of that sort.\textsuperscript{70}

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CHAPTER 6

6. STATE PROTECTION

6.1. INTRODUCTION - GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The issue of state protection was extensively canvassed by the Supreme Court of Canada in *Ward*. The context for the discussion of this topic is the requirement in the definition of Convention refugee that the claimant be unable, or by reason of his or her fear of persecution, unwilling to avail him or herself of the protection of the country of nationality (citizenship). As indicated below, the state’s ability to protect the claimant is a crucial element in determining whether the fear of persecution is well founded, and as such, is not an independent element of the definition. The issue of state protection goes to the objective portion of the test of fear of persecution.

6.1.1. Surrogate Protection

The responsibility to provide international protection only becomes engaged when national or state protection is unavailable to the claimant (international protection as a surrogate).

6.1.2. Multiple Nationalities

In the case of multiple nationalities (citizenship), the claimant is normally expected to make inquiries or applications to ascertain whether or not he or she might avail him or herself of the protection of all the countries of nationality. The claimant need not literally approach the

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2 *M.C.I. v. Olah, Bernadett* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2763-01), McKeown, May 24, 2002; 2002 FCT 595. The Court noted that the relevant evidence to determine the issue of state protection would include the documentary evidence and the personal circumstances of the claimant. However, the claimant’s own subjective feelings on state protection would not be a relevant factor. See also *Judge, Gurwinder Kaur v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-5897-03), Snider, August 9, 2004; 2004 FC 1089, where the Court confirmed that the test for determining whether state protection might reasonably be forthcoming is an objective one.
3 *Ward*, supra, footnote 1, at 709. In *Madoui, Nidhal Abderrah v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-660-96), Denault, October 25, 1996, the claimant, who was from Algeria, had spent some time in Italy before coming to Canada. The CRDD held that the failure to claim refugee status in Italy showed a lack of subjective fear. Before the Court, the claimant relied on statistics showing that Italy rarely granted refugee status to claimants like him to argue that he had no obligation to seek the protection of a state which had shown itself unable to give it. The Court rejected the idea of a parallel based on *Ward*, between a state’s failure to protect its citizens and a state’s refusal to grant refugee status to certain claimants. “Before asserting that he had no chance of success either in seeking protection … [in Algeria …] or in claiming refugee status from the Italian authorities, it was still necessary for the [claimant] either to try do so, or as the Supreme Court stated in *Ward*, to establish the reasonableness of his failure to seek such protection.” (at 2).
other states for protection unless there is a reasonable expectation that protection will be forthcoming.4

6.1.3. Timing of Analysis

The state’s ability to protect, whether one is speaking of the claimant being “unable” or “unwilling”, must be considered at the stage of the analysis when one is examining whether the claimant’s fear is well-founded.

… The test is in part objective; if a state is able to protect the claimant, then his or her fear is not, objectively speaking, well-founded …

It is clear that the lynch-pin of the analysis is the state’s inability to protect: it is a crucial element in determining whether the claimant’s fear is well-founded, and thereby the objective reasonableness of his or her unwillingness to seek the protection of his or her state of nationality.5

A claimant who is not at risk does not need state protection and therefore, the issue need not be addressed.6

6.1.4. Unable or Unwilling - A Blurred Distinction - No Requirement for State Complicity

The distinction between “unable” (physically or literally unable) and “unwilling” (not wanting) has become blurred.7

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4 Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 724 and 754. As well, at 754, the Court stated that a valid claim against one country of nationality will not fail if the claimant is denied protection (for example, by being denied admittance) by another country of which he or she is a national.

5 Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 712 and 722. See also Miranda, Elmer Edgar Valencia v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2868-99), Muldoon, March 31, 1995, where the Court stated, at 23: “… the state’s inability to protect is a crucial element in determining whether the refugee claim is objectively well-founded. … the tribunal conducted a separate and distinct consideration of what should have been highly interwoven elements.” In Ahmed, Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2868-99), Pinard, May 17, 2000, the Court noted that lack of state protection is relevant after a nexus between the persecution suffered and a Convention ground is established. See also Mejia, Juana Ubaldina Garcia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. 4645-02), Tremblay-Lamer, October 10, 2003; 2003 FC 1180, where the Court again stated that the issue of state protection arises only if a nexus is established. Likewise, there is no need to consider state protection where the claimant fails to establish a subjective fear of persecution. See also Rivera, Jesus Vargas v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5824-02), Beaudry, November 5, 2003: 2003 FC 1292. See also Balogh: M.C.I. v. Balogh, Jozsef (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-982-01), Heneghan, November 6, 2001, where the Court stated that the issue of state protection does not exist independently of the inquiry into Convention refugee status. If there is no risk of persecution, the issue of state protection does not arise.

6 Muotoh, Ndukwe Christopher v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3330-05), Blais, November 25, 2005; 2005 FC 1599. However, if the claimant is at risk, it is not enough to analyze the existence of state protection generally. The Board must link the general findings to the specifics of the claimant: Ullah, Safi v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7814-04), Phelan, July 22,2005; 2005 FC 1018.

7 The Supreme Court of Canada essentially adopted paragraphs 98, 99 and 100 of the UNHCR Handbook as being an “entirely reasonable reading of the current definition” (Ward, at 718). These paragraphs read as follows:
Whether the claimant is “unwilling” or “unable” to avail him- or herself of the protection of a country of nationality, state complicity in the persecution is irrelevant. The distinction between these two branches of the “Convention refugee” definition resides in the party’s precluding resort to state protection: in the case of “inability”, protection is denied to the claimant, whereas when the claimant is “unwilling”, he or she opts not to approach the state by reasons of his or her fear on an enumerated basis. In either case, the state’s involvement, in the persecution is not a necessary consideration. This factor is relevant, rather in the determination of whether a fear of persecution exists.8

### 6.1.5. Presumptions

There are two presumptions at play in refugee determination:

**Presumption 1:** If the fear of persecution is credible (the Court uses the word “legitimate”) and there is an absence of state protection, it is not a great leap “… to presume that persecution will be likely, and the fear well-founded.”9 (emphasis in original)

Having established the existence of a fear and a state’s inability to assuage those fears, it is not assuming too much to say that the fear is well-founded. Of course, the persecution must be real - the presumption cannot be built on

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8 Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 720-721.

9 Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 722. See also Sandy, Theresa Charmaine v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-22-95), Reed, June 30, 1995, where the Court stated, at 2: “The presumption that persecution will be likely and fear well founded only arises from the establishment of a claimant’s subjective fear, ‘if there is an absence of state protection’ (see Ward, supra, footnote 1). That is, proof of the state’s inability to protect, or a presumption relating thereto, does not arise from a finding that the [claimant] has a subjective fear. The need to prove ‘state inability to protect’ is an additional requirement, and it relates to establishing the objective well-foundedness of the [claimant’s] subjective fear.” See also Olah, supra, footnote 2.
fictional events - but the well-foundedness of the fear can be established through the use of such a presumption.10 (emphasis in original)

**Presumption 2:** Except in situations where the state is in a state of complete breakdown, states must be presumed capable of protecting their citizens. This presumption can be rebutted by “clear and convincing” evidence of the state’s inability to protect.11

The danger that [presumption one] will operate too broadly is tempered by a requirement that clear and convincing proof of a state’s inability to protect must be advanced.12

6.1.6. **Inability to Protect - Nexus**

In *Badran*,13 the Court indicated that the “law does not require that the inability to protect be connected to a Convention reason.” Conversely, one may argue that even though the source of the persecution is not grounded in a Convention reason, a State’s failure to act (protect), if motivated by a Convention ground, can establish the nexus to the definition, i.e., the failure to protect for a Convention reason can in itself amount to persecutory treatment.

6.1.7. **Burden of Proof**

The claimant’s burden of presenting “clear and convincing” proof of the state’s inability to protect should not be an impossible burden.

… it would seem to defeat the purpose of international protection if a claimant would be required to risk his or her life seeking ineffective protection of a state, merely to demonstrate that ineffectiveness.14

The Trial Division in *Peralta*15 stated that a claimant is not required to show that he or she has exhausted all avenues of protection. Rather, the claimant has to show that he or she has taken all steps reasonable in the circumstances, taking into account the context of the country of origin in general, the steps taken and the claimant’s interactions with the authorities.

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10 Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 722.
11 Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 724-726.
12 Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 726.
14 Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 724. This principle was applied in Aramburo, Juan Carlos v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6782-93), Cullen, December 7, 1994 (re claimants from Argentina) and in *Lerer, Iakov v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7438-93), Cullen, January 5, 1995 (re Jewish claimants from Russia).
6.1.8. Obligation to Approach the State

A claimant is required to approach his or her state for protection in situations in which protection might reasonably be forthcoming.

… the claimant will not meet the definition of “Convention refugee” where it is objectively unreasonable for the claimant not to have sought the protection of his home authorities: otherwise, the claimant need not literally approach the state.\(^{16}\)

In other words, the claimant must show that it was reasonable for him or her not to seek state protection. However, a claimant is not required to risk his or her life seeking ineffective protection of a state, merely to demonstrate that ineffectiveness.\(^{17}\)

In *D'Mello*,\(^{18}\) the Court set aside the decision of the CRDD because the panel's analysis was inadequate with respect to the principle in *Ward* that a claimant should not be required to risk her life seeking ineffective state protection merely to prove the ineffectiveness. In this case, the [claimant's] fear did not rest on the lack of legislative and procedural framework in India to protect women abused by their husbands or agents of their husbands, but rather on the lack of police support to such women and the difficulty, given the lack of such support, in effectively taking advantage and having recourse to the existing legislative and procedural framework of state protection in India. (At paragraph 13).

Where agents of the state are themselves the source of persecution, and where the claimant’s credibility is not undermined, the presumption of state protection can be rebutted without exhausting every conceivable recourse in the country.\(^{19}\)

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\(^{16}\) *Ward*, supra, footnote 1, at 724. See also *Kogan, Meri v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7282-93), Noël, June 5, 1995, where the Court found that the CRDD could reasonably conclude that the authorities had not refused to protect the claimants given that the claimants had been unable to identify their attackers and had delayed in filing a complaint. See also *Carrillo, Marlene Sirias v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-4908-03), Snider, June 30, 2004, 2004 FC 944; and *Cascante, Maria Leila Bermudez v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-4343-03), Kelen, April 26, 2004; 2004 FC 603, where the Court agreed with the RPD that these Costa Rican claimants should have complained to the Ombudsman’s office. On the other hand, in *Medina, Blanca Patricia v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2322-94), Simpson, October 30, 1995, the Court held that the claimant’s failure to approach the state for protection was reasonable in that she had good reasons to believe that her assailants were state security agents. See also footnote 3. In *Farias, Carlos Humberto Gonzales v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3305-96), Lutfy, October 3, 1997, the Court stated that the CRDD erred in not specifying what additional steps the claimants should have taken to obtain state protection, especially when the agent of persecution was the state. See also *Quintero, Wilfredo Cruz v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3447-96), Campbell, June 6, 1997, where the CRDD erred in criticizing the Honduran claimant for not seeking state protection, where the agent of persecution was the National Investigations Authority (DNI).

\(^{17}\) *Ward*, supra, footnote 1, at 724.


6.1.9. Rebutting the Presumption of Protection

Absent an admission by the state that it is unable to protect (as was the case in Ward), a claimant can establish, with “clear and convincing evidence”, that state protection would not be reasonably forthcoming (thus rebutting the presumption) where:

(a) there is a complete breakdown of state apparatus, such as that recognized in Lebanon in Zalzali;\(^{21}\)

(b) there is evidence “…similarly situated individuals [were] let down by the state protection arrangements…,”\(^{22}\)

(c) there is evidence “…of past personal incidents in which state protection did not materialize.”\(^{23}\)

The Court refers to the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Satiacum\(^{24}\) and quotes with approval the following statement:

> In the absence of exceptional circumstances established by the claimant, it seems to me that in a Convention refugee hearing, as in an extradition hearing, Canadian tribunals have to assume a fair and independent judicial

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\(^{20}\) Some CRDD panels have suggested that the requirement to present “clear and convincing” evidence that the state is unable to protect has effectively raised the standard of proof set in Adjei v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] 2 F.C. 680 (C.A.), i.e., “serious possibility”. In Barkai, Alex v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6249-93), Gibson, September 27, 1994, counsel for the claimant raised this very issue and requested that a question be certified. Gibson J. refused to certify the suggested question and said “… I am satisfied that the analysis of Mr. Justice Laforest [sic] in Ward is clear on its face.” (at 12) The case law subsequent to Ward continues to apply the Adjei test. For a useful discussion of the meaning of the “clear and convincing” level of proof, see Xue, Jian Fei v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4477-99), Rothstein, October 23, 2000. In Nadeem, Choudhry Muhammad v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6320-00), McKown, November 15, 2001, the Court held that the CRDD did not err when it stated that the issue is not whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the police would not be reasonably forthcoming with a guarantee of effective protection but whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the police would not be reasonably forthcoming with serious efforts at protection. The onus is on the claimant to produce clear and convincing evidence that the police would not provide protection, not on the Board to provide proof that there will be state protection. In Ayisi-Nyarko, Isaac v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3671-03), O’Reilly, December 10, 2003; 2003 FC 1425, the claimant thought that making a police report would probably be ineffective because suspects were often released on bail and then would exact reprisals against their accusers. This evidence, however, was not sufficient to displace the presumption that states are willing and able to protect their citizens (Ward).

\(^{21}\) Zalzali v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] 3 F.C. 605 (C.A.), at 614; Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 725.

\(^{22}\) Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 725. For a case where the CRDD did not have proper regard for evidence of similarly situated individuals, see Sanshaku, Rexhep v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3086-99), Dawson, June 9, 2000.

\(^{23}\) Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 725. See also section 6.1.12. of this Chapter.

process in the foreign country. In the case of a non-democratic State, contrary evidence might be readily forthcoming, but in relation to a democracy like the United States contrary evidence might have to go to the extent of substantially impeaching, for example, the jury selection process in the relevant part of the country, or the independence or fair-mindedness of the judiciary itself.

In *Kadenko*, which is discussed later in section 6.1.12, the Court of Appeal noted that the burden of proof to establish absence of state protection is “directly proportional to the level of democracy in the state in question …”

It is incorrect to use the criterion of “basis for protection” based on some comparative analysis with other countries as the legal test for state protection. The Board must address the issues of adequate and effective state protection.

6.1.10. More Than One Authority in the Country

The Court of Appeal in *Zalzali* recognized that there may be several established authorities in a country which are each able to provide protection in the part of the country controlled by them.

The “country”, the “national government”, the “legitimate government”, the “nominal government” will probably vary depending on the circumstances and the evidence and it would be presumptuous to attempt to give a general definition. I will simply note here that I do not rule out the possibility that there may be several established authorities in the same country which are each able to provide protection in the part of the territory controlled by them, protection which may be adequate though not necessarily perfect.

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27 In *Piliyana, Ponni v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-5320-03), Phelan, May 28, 2004; 2004 FC 784, the Court set aside the RPD finding that "there is a basis for protection for senior citizens in Sri Lanka that is relatively comfortable for a Third World state".

28 *Zalzali*, supra, footnote 21.

In Chebli-Haj-Hassam, the Court of Appeal answered a certified question on this matter as follows:

In the circumstances where there is a legitimate government supported by the forces of another government and there is no difference in interest between the two governments in relation to a refugee claimant, the protection given to the claimant is adequate to establish an internal refuge.

In Choker, the Court appears to question the reasonableness of the CRDD conclusion that a Lebanese claimant could and should seek the protection of an invading army (the Court was considering whether the tribunal had applied the law on IFA correctly.)

6.1.11. Adequacy of Protection - Standard

One aspect of protection which was not discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward is the standard of protection that a country needs to offer its citizens. One standard suggested by the Federal Court of Appeal is “…adequate though not necessarily perfect”. This standard has been followed and applied in a large number of cases.

In Villafranca, the Court of Appeal, considering the claim of a Philippine policeman who feared a terrorist guerrilla group, again suggested that protection need not be perfect:

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30 Chebli-Haj-Hassam, Atef v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-191-95), Marceau, MacGuigan, Décary, May 28, 1996. Reported: Chebli-Haj-Hassam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 36 Imm. L.R. (2d) 112 (F.C.A.). See also Isufi, Arlind v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5631-02), Tremblay-Lamer, July 15, 2003; 2003 FC 880, where the Court considered the situation of a claimant from Kosovo and had this to say: “In the case at bar, there is no difference in interest between the UN forces and the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As such, the Board did not commit an error in determining that state protection was available to the applicant through non-state actors. ... The presence of UN forces is not evidence of a breakdown of the state apparatus in Yugoslavia or Kosovo. The UN forces and security police in Kosovo work in conjunction with the local Kosovo police service to maintain order.”


32 Zalzali, supra, footnote 21, at 615.

33 M.E.I. v. Villafranca, Ignacio (F.C.A., no. A-69-90), Hugessen, Marceau, Décary, December 18, 1992. Reported: Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Villafranca (1992), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 130 (F.C.A.). In Suxhaku, Rexhep v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3086-99), Dawson, June 9, 2000, the Court noted that for Villafranca to apply, one must find the state to be in effective control of its territory. In Nduwimana, Thierive v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1077-01), Lutfy, July 23, 2002; 2002 FCT 812, the Court noted that the CRDD introduced no novel test for state protection when, having concluded that the claimant had not displaced the presumption of state protection according to the principles in Villafranca, it noted that state protection, even where it is not one hundred percent effective, must be such that a claimant will not be exposed to a serious risk of persecution if returned to the country of origin. The Court cautions in Mohacsi, Janos v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1298-02), Martineau, April 11, 2003; 2003 FCT 429, that where there are doubts concerning the effectiveness of the means taken by the government to protect its citizens, the Board must conduct a “reality check” with the claimants’ own experiences. In two cases involving Costa Rica, the Court followed Villafranca and noted that offering a witness protection program or providing personal protection to every person who files a police complaint is unreasonable by the standards of any country: Alfaro, Oscar Luis Alfaro v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6905-03), O’Keefe, January 20, 2005; 2005 FC 92 and Arias Aguilar, Jennifer v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1000-05), Rouleau, November 9, 2005; 2005 FC 1519.
No government that makes any claim to democratic values or protection of human rights can guarantee the protection of all of its citizens at all times. Thus it is not enough for a claimant merely to show that his government has not always been effective at protecting persons in his particular situation. Terrorism in the name of one warped ideology or another is a scourge afflicting many societies today; its victims, however much they may merit our sympathy, do not become Convention refugees simply because their governments have been unable to suppress the evil. ... where a state is in effective control of its territory, has military, police and civil authority in place, and makes serious efforts to protect its citizens from terrorist activities, the mere fact that it is not always successful at doing so will not be enough to justify a claim that the victims of terrorism are unable to avail themselves of such protection.34

34 Villafranca, ibid., at 132-133. (It should be noted that the Court in Villafranca analyzed the issue of protection in the context of a democratic country. Quaere whether the same analysis would hold for a non-democratic country). It has been suggested that Villafranca is bad law in light of Ward, see for example, Waldman, L., Immigration Law and Practice, (Toronto: Butterworths Canada Ltd., 1992) paragraph 8.88, however, in Velarde-Alvarez, Jorge Luis v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-194-94), McKeown, February 9, 1995. Reported: Velarde-Alvarez v. Canada (Secretary of State) (1995), 27 Imm. L.R. (2d) 88 (F.C.T.D.), the Court stated, at 92, that Villafranca dealt with the problems of “unable” in a manner not inconsistent with Ward. Given that Villafranca was decided before Ward, Mr. Justice McKeown, agreed to certify the following question:

May evidence satisfy the threshold test of “clear and convincing confirmation” of a state’s inability to protect the refugee claimant where

1) there is no state of civil war, invasion or total collapse of internal order, and where

2) the government is otherwise in effective control of its territory, has military, police and civil authority in place, and has made serious efforts to protect its citizens? [Note: the Court of Appeal did not deal with this case]

In Karaseva, Tatiana v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4683-96), Teitelbaum, November 26, 1997, the claimant argued that Ward had overturned Villafranca, whereas the Minister contended the opposite relying on Starikov, Nicolai v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1200-95), Finard, 10 April 1996, where the court clearly considered that the principles in Ward and Villafranca can apply simultaneously. The Court did not specifically address these arguments but concluded as follows:

[28] After considering the evidence, I am satisfied that the applicants have not provided “clear and convincing proof” that the State [Kazakhstan] would not be able to protect them. It does not appear that the applicants could provide the police with sufficient evidence to mount a successful investigation. The police must be given adequate tools in order to investigate a crime and information as to the criminals is a key tool. Furthermore, from a reading of the transcript, I am satisfied the applicants did not take a concerned interest in the reporting or findings of the police.

Similarly, in Badoeva, Manana v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4925-99), Rouleau, November 29, 2000, the Court noted that the victim must be capable of providing the police with the information that is essential in order for an investigation to be conducted. In Milev, Dane v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1125-95), MacKay, June 28, 1996, the Court noted, at 5, that “[t]he fact that the state does not provide perfect protection is not, in itself, a basis for determining that the state is unwilling or unable to offer reasonable protection in the circumstances.” In Guirgas, Nabil v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2131-96), Jerome, August 20, 1997, the claimant, a Coptic Christian, feared the Islamic extremists. The Court noted that the state (Egypt) was intent on combating the extremists and had acted in that regard. In Ye, Xin Hao v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-276-01), O’Keefe, February 25, 2002; 2002 FCT 201, the Court upheld the CRDD finding that the claimant, who
There are a few cases from the Trial Division which take a broad view of protection. For example, in *Bobrik*, Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer, in considering the claims of a Jewish couple from Russia stated that:

… even when the state is willing to protect its citizens, a claimant will meet the criteria for refugee status if the protection being offered is ineffective. A state must actually provide protection, and not merely indicate a willingness to help. Where the evidence reveals that a claimant has experienced many incidents of harassment and/or discrimination without being effectively defended by the state, the presumption operates and it can be concluded that the state may be willing but unable to protect the claimant.

Mr. Justice Gibson, in *Smirnov*, stated that in his view, “… [Bobrik] sets too high a standard for state protection…”. He further indicated that:

Random assaults such as those suffered by the [claimants], where the assailants are unknown to the victim and there are no independent witnesses are also difficult to effectively investigate and protect against. In all such circumstances, even the most effective, well-resourced and highly motivated

had not complained to the anti-corruption office set up by the government to deal with complaints about corrupt officials, had not rebuted the presumption of the availability of state protection.

*Bobrik, Iouri v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5519-93), Tremblay-Lamer, September 16, 1994, at 4. See also *Howard-Dejo, Luis Fern v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. A-1179-92), Noël, February 2, 1995, where the Court noted that the evidence in the case did not demonstrate merely that the state (Peru) was not always successful in protecting the targets of terrorism but that the authorities were unable to offer protection proportionate to the threat. Also, *Freiberg, Valentina v. S.S.C.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3419-93), Tremblay-Lamer, May 27, 1994, where the Court concluded that the claimant “related two incidents in which she filed complaints with the police [in Israel] and in which state protection did not materialize … this evidence suffices to justify the [claimant’s] reluctance to seek protection from the state.” (at 6-7). *Freiberg* was not followed in *Fainshtain, Galine v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1012-95), Muldoon, June 17, 1996, QL [1996] F.C.J. No. 851, where Muldoon noted, at 5-6, that the case was distinguishable on its facts. “In that case, the police refused to intervene. Here, the police offered assistance. It was the principal [claimant] who either did not avail herself of those offers of assistance, or prevented the State from according her its protection by either not giving State authorities details of her plight, or by not reporting her plight to State authorities.” Other cases that appear to take a broad view of protection are *Alli, Lukman v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1984-01), O‘Keefe, April 26, 2002; 2002 FCT 479, a case dealing with ritual violence in Nigeria, where the Court stated that there is a difference between the state offering protection and the state engaging in police investigation and prosecution, and *Balogh, Rudolf v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6193-00), Lemieux, July 22, 2002; 2002 FCT 809, where the Court said that the willingness to address the situation of the Roma minority in Hungary cannot be equated to adequate state protection. For a contrasting analysis of state protection of Roma in Hungary, see *Horvath, Szuzsanna v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4001-01), Blanchard, November 22, 2002; 2002 FCT 1206, and *Jonas, Laszlo v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-2726-03), Mosley, August 4, 2004; 2004 FC 1066.

*Smirnov v. Canada (Secretary of State),* [1995] 1 F.C. 780 (T.D.), at 786. See also *Ferguson, Gloria v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5927-01), Noël, November 22, 2002: 2002 FCT 1212, where the Court stated that “[r]eality has to prevail and a test of whether the system is adequate considering the circumstances of the case should be applied.” For a case where the facts established that the attacks were not random but targeted, see *Badran, supra*, footnote 13. *Olah, supra*, footnote 2, is another case that favours the approach in *Smirnov*. The Court noted that the protection the claimant received from the acts of her abusive husband in Hungary was not much different than the protection she would have received in Canada. Another case where the Court held that the RPD set too high a standard for state protection is *M.C.I. v. Ortega, Alberto Sandova* (F.C., no. IMM-2910-03), O‘Keefe, October 20, 2004; 2004 FC 1463.
police forces will have difficulty providing effective protection. This Court should not impose on other states a standard of “effective” protection that police forces in our own country, regrettably, sometimes only aspire to.

In *James*, the Court noted that "a finding of adequate protection cannot flow from police assistance to leave the country that is unable to provide adequate protection."

In *Zhuravl'yev*, Mr. Justice Pelletier reviewed the authorities and drew the following conclusions:

[31] ... when the agent of persecution is not the state, the lack of state protection has to be assessed as a matter of state capacity to provide protection rather than from the perspective of whether the local apparatus provided protection in a given circumstance. Local failures to provide effective policing do not amount to lack of state protection. However, where the evidence, including the documentary evidence situates the individual claimant’s experience as part of a broader pattern of state inability or refusal to extend protection, then the absence of state protection is made out. The question of refusal to provide protection should be addressed on the same basis as the inability to provide protection. A local refusal to provide protection is not a state refusal in the absence of evidence of a broader state policy to not extend state protection to the target group … [the] refusal may not be overt; the state organs may justify their failure to act by reference to various factors which, in their view, would make any state action ineffective. It is for the CRDD to assess the *bona fides* of these assertions in the light of all the evidence.

[32] …[As regards] the issue of internal flight alternative in relation to state inability or refusal to provide protection, … if state policy restricts a claimant’s access to the whole of the state’s territory, then the failure to provide local protection can be seen to be as state failure to provide protection and not mere local failure

### 6.1.12. Source of Protection

Where the state is not the agent of persecution, the availability of state run or funded agencies capable of providing assistance is relevant for determining the existence of state protection.

The case law has been inconsistent on the question of whether the claimant needs to seek protection from sources other than the state. In *Thakur*, the Trial Division seems to say that the

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fact that civil rights groups are able to conduct investigations of alleged abuses is irrelevant to the question of protection.\(^{40}\)

A similar point was made in \textit{Risak},\(^{41}\) where the Court also considered the claimant’s obligation to pursue further legal remedies after initial complaints to the state’s authorities fail:

… the question is whether or not it was objectively reasonable to expect the [claimant] to have further sought the protection from the army and the police in Israel after having been so brutally rebuffed by the very authorities from whom citizens expect protection. There is nothing in our jurisprudence to the effect that in such situations the [claimant] has the further burden to seek assistance from human rights organizations or, ultimately, to launch an action in court against the government.

A related question is whether one can say that the state has failed to provide protection where the protection is denied by certain elements of the state, for example, individual police officers.\(^{42}\) In \textit{Kadenko},\(^{43}\) the Court of Appeal dealt with the following certified question:


\(^{41}\) \textit{Risak, Boris v. M.E.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6087-93), Dubé, October 24, 1994. Reported: \textit{Risak v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)} (1994), 25 Imm. L.R. (2d) 267 (F.C.T.D.), at 270. In \textit{Mendoza, Elizabeth Aurora Hauayek v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2997-94), Muldoon, January 24, 1996, at 6, the Court stated the test as follows: “It matters not that there were available human rights organizations [in Venezuela] to whom the [claimant] could have turned for help. The test is whether the [claimant] can look to his/her own government for protection.” The same approach was followed in \textit{Cuffy, Loferne Pauline v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3135-95), McKeown, October 16, 1996, at 3-4. In \textit{Mann, Satinder Pal Singh v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6554-00), Tremblay-Lamer, September 6, 2001, the Court was critical of the Board’s reasoning that would require the claimant to accept persecution from the police and wait to be falsely accused in order to benefit from the Court system and be exonerated years later. In \textit{Mohar, Elek v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-285-02), Tremblay-Lamer, October 16, 2002; 2002 FCT 1081, the Court held that the Board erred in imposing on the claimant the burden of seeking redress from agencies other than the police. See also \textit{Malik, Gurjit Singh v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1918-02), Tremblay-Lamer, April 17, 2003; 2003 FCT 453, where the Court stated that “… there is no obligation on an individual to seek counselling, legal advice, or assistance from human rights agencies if the police is unable to help.” The same approach is evident in \textit{Mohaci, Janos v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1298-02), Martineau, April 11, 2003; 2003 FCT 429. In contrast, in \textit{Nagy, Laszlo v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1467-01), Simpson, March 14, 2002; 2002 FCT 281, the Court agreed with the CRDD that the claimant should have approached the “Minorities Ombudsman” or complained about the police to the prosecutor’s investigative office. In \textit{Ivachtchenko, Artem v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4964-01), Lemieux, December 12, 2001; 2002 FCT 1291, the Court held that the CRDD erred in holding that the availability of a civil suit was an alternative to criminal prosecution in a case involving criminal assault.

\(^{42}\) See for example \textit{Varga, Attila Csaba v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3363-00), McKeown, May 18, 2001, where the Court held that a single incident where a police officer tells a claimant he got what he deserved would not be sufficient to show clear and convincing evidence that state protection was not available. See also \textit{De Baez, Maria Beatriz Arguello v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3208-02), Dawson, June 26, 2003; 2003 FCT 785, where the Court stated that “… the actions of some police officers does not obviate the need to seek protection from the authorities. Discrimination by some police officers is not sufficient proof of the state’s unwillingness to provide, or inability on the part of the applicants, to seek protection.” See also \textit{Antypov, Roksana v. M.C.I.} (F.C., no. IMM-4251-04), Kelen, November 15, 2004; 2004 FC 1589, where the Court, relying on \textit{Kadenko}, noted that
Where there has not been a complete breakdown of the government apparatus and where a State has political and judicial institutions capable of protecting its citizens, does the refusal by certain police officers to take action suffice to establish that that State in question is unable or unwilling to protect its nationals?

The Court answered the question in the negative:

Once it is assumed that the state (Israel in this case) has political and judicial institutions capable of protecting its citizens, it is clear that the refusal of certain police officers to take action cannot in itself make the state incapable of doing so. …

When the state in question is a democratic state … the claimant must do more than simply show that he or she went to see some members of the police force and that his or her efforts were unsuccessful. The burden of proof that rests on the claimant is, in a way, directly proportional to the level of democracy in the state in question: the more democratic the state’s institutions, the more the claimant must have done to exhaust all the courses of action open to him or her. (at 2-3)

The Trial Division has, in a number of decisions, accepted that the availability of protection from non-state sources may, nevertheless, be relevant to establishing an objective basis for the claim. 44

In Szucs, 45 the Court dismissed the judicial review application of the decision of the CRDD with respect to the claim of a Romani claimant from Hungary, and noted that:

the refusal of certain police officers to take action cannot, in itself, make the state incapable of doing so. To rebut the presumption of state protection, the claimant must do more than simply show that protection was sought from some policemen without success: 


43 M.C.I. v. Kadenko, Ninal (F.C.A), supra, footnote 26. See also Levkovicz, Ilia v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-599-94), Nadon, March 13, 1995; Vielma, Eduardo Enrique Pena v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-786-94), Rothstein, November 10, 1994, which deals with a situation where police were involved in actions against journalists (like the claimant) and the Court stated: “… it is at least questionable which state authorities the claimant could ask to protect him …” in those circumstances (at 3); and Machado, Hugo Ricardo Gonzalez v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7155-93), Rothstein, October 27, 1994.


45 Szucs, Sandor v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6248-99), Blais, October 3, 2000. In Virag, Istvan Pal v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2761-02), Simpson, June 2, 2003; 2003 FCT 698, the Court stated that Szucs is to be preferred to Molnar. See also Szovenyi, Gabor v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2817-02), O’Keefe, November 25, 2003; 2003 FC 1382 where the Court noted that there is a long line of cases that have found it reasonable for the Board to require claimants to exhaust avenues of protection and redress in addition to the police where it has been available.
… In determining the availability of state protection, the Board was also entitled to examine all reasonable steps the Applicant had taken in the circumstances to seek protection of his state of origin.

… The Board found that for more serious and persistent forms of discrimination like eviction from housing, persistent unemployment due to discrimination or other serious harm, there was a network of government and government sponsored organizations throughout Hungary which assist without charge those so threatened.

The evidence established that the applicant had never tried to seek help from either the Ombudsman, NGO’s or through minority self-government. I find that the Board, in requiring the Applicant to exhaust these avenues of protection in addition to police protection, was asking the Applicant to take reasonable steps to ensure his protection.

The adequacy of state protection cannot rest on the subjective fear of the claimant.

What is crucial to this case is that the Applicant made only two attempts to seek assistance, one of which was to police who had no local jurisdiction to deal with her complaint. She then formed the opinion that no other assistance would be forthcoming. This purely subjective view of the adequacy of Costa Rica state protection is not "direct, relevant and compelling" evidence of the inadequacy of state protection.46

6.2. STATELESS CLAIMANTS

As to whether stateless claimants need to avail themselves of state protection, the UNHCR Handbook, in paragraph 101 states that “…[i]n the case of a stateless refugee, the question of ‘availment of protection’ of the country of his former habitual residence does not, of course, arise…”

In El Khatib,47 Mr. Justice McKeown agreed with this approach and stated:

… the discussion and conclusions reached in Ward apply only to citizens of a state, and not to stateless people. In my view the distinction between paragraphs 2(1)(a)(i) and 2(1)(a)(ii) of the Act is that the stateless person is not expected to avail himself of state protection when there is no duty on the state to provide such protection.48

48 El Khatib, ibid., at 2. The Court agreed to certify the following question:

On a claim to Convention refugee status by a stateless person, is the “well-foundedness” analysis set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in [Ward] applicable, based as it is on the availability of state protection, or is it only applicable if the claimant is a citizen of the country in which he or she fears persecution?

The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal in El Khatib, declined to deal with the certified question because it was not determinative of the appeal. See M.C.I. v. El Khatib, Naif (F.C.A., no. A-592-94), Strayer,
However, other Trial Division decisions have taken into account state protection that might be available to the claimant in his country of former habitual residence.\textsuperscript{49} For example, in \textit{Nizar}\textsuperscript{50} the Court was of the view that, even though states owe no duty of protection to non-nationals, “it is relevant for a stateless person, who has a country of former habitual residence, to demonstrate that \textit{defacto} [sic] protection within that state, as a result of being resident there is not likely to exist.” The Court reasoned that this was relevant to the well-foundedness of the claimant’s fear.

The Federal Court of Appeal in \textit{Thabet}\textsuperscript{51} in the context of discussing whether a stateless claimant who has more than one country of former habitual residence must establish the claim with respect to one, some or all of the countries\textsuperscript{52}, had this to say about the issue of state protection:

\begin{quote}
... The definition takes into account the inherent difference between those persons who are nationals of a state, and therefore are owed protection, and those persons who are stateless and without recourse to state protection. Because of this distinction one cannot treat the two groups identically, even though one should seek to be as consistent as possible. (At 33).

... If it is likely that a person would be able to return to a country of former habitual residence where he or she would be safe from persecution, that person is not a refugee. This means that the claimant would bear the burden ... of showing on the balance of probabilities that he or she is unable or unwilling to return to any country of former habitual residence. (At 39).
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{52} See Chapter 2, section 2.2.2.
6.3. APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS

In analyzing the situation in Peru (on the basis of the evidence filed in the particular case), the Court of Appeal stated:

Isolated cases of persons having been victimized may not reverse the presumption. A state of profound unrest with ineffective protection for the claimant may, however, have reversed it.

The protection which is given to ordinary citizens may not be adequate for persons specifically targeted. Although the state is capable of protecting ordinary citizens, it may be incapable of protecting persons specifically targeted, and the latter may therefore have good grounds for fearing persecution.

The claimant may show that he or she is physically prevented from seeking state protection or that the state is prevented from giving the protection, where, for example, the state refuses to give protection, there is no government to turn to, or there is ineffective state protection.

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53 The examples are not exhaustive.

54 Mendivil, Luis Altamirano v. S.S.C. (F.C.A., no. A-132-93), Marceau, Stone, Desjardins, February 7, 1994. Reported: Mendivil v. Canada (Secretary of State) (1994), 23 Imm. L.R. (2d) 225 (F.C.A.), at 232, per Desjardins J.A. In Oblitas, Jorge v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2489-94), Muldoon, February 2, 1995, the Court goes so far as to say, at 9, that while the situation in Peru is not quite one of state breakdown (as in Zalzali, supra, footnote 21), it comes close. In the Court’s view, the claimants had proven that state protection was not reasonably forthcoming.

55 Mendivil, ibid., at 230. The case involved a claimant who had been specifically targeted by the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) in Peru. In Yanahida, Gustavo Angel Castro v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6019-93), Richard, October 13, 1994, on the other hand, the claimant failed to present “clear and convincing proof” that the state (Peru) was unable to protect him. The evidence of the claimant was that the protection of ordinary citizens was the lowest priority. The Court held, at 4, that “[i]n the absence of any additional evidence, I consider that the claimant has not discharged his burden.” (at 4) The state’s obligation to provide private (24-hour) protection to its citizens was considered, and found not to be determinative, in Baldizon-Ortegaray, German Jose v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. 92-T-1933), May 7, 1993. Reported: Baldizon-Ortegaray v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 20 Imm. L.R. (2d) 307 (F.C.T.D.), a pre-Ward case, at 311. See also Velarde-Alvarez, supra, footnote 34, at 91; Yaguna, Jose Stalin Rojas v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2468-94), Simpson, May 25, 1995, at 5; and Petit, Juan Daniel Ayllon v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1197-92), Rouleau, January 12, 1996, at 6.

56 M.E.I. v. Johan, Stephen (F.C.T.D., no. T-1389-92), Denault, February 9, 1993; Callejas, Ana Lucretia v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-48-93), Gibson, February 1, 1994. Reported: Callejas v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 23 Imm. L.R. (2d) 253 (F.C.T.D.), at 258-260; Kraitman, Vadim v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-88-94), Teitelbaum, July 5, 1994. Reported: Kraitman v. Canada (Secretary of State) (1994), 27 Imm. L.R. (2d) 283 (F.C.T.D.), where the evidence indicated that the police in Ukraine refused to investigate complaints made by Jews. The Court concluded, at 13, that “[t]his is clear indication that Jews were not being offered the protection of the state, that is, Jews could not go to the police for protection. The police may have the ability to offer protection but where it chooses not to, this is equivalent to saying it is unable to provide protection to the [claimants].” In another case dealing with a claimant from Colombia, Bohorquez, Gabriel Enriquez v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7078-93), McGillis, October 6, 1994, the Court found the conclusion of the CRDD that the claimant had failed to provide “clear and convincing proof” unreasonable: “The credible and uncontradicted evidence of the [claimant] established that he sought the help of various police and enforcement agencies on fifteen or twenty occasions. The [claimant] was
Where the agent of persecution acts on behalf of the state, the appropriate inquiry is under the “unwilling” branch of the definition.

While it may not be necessary to prove state complicity in certain situations, in this instance, the tribunal admitted that the persecuting agents were thugs of the ruling UNP. As such, the determination to be made is squarely within the “unwilling” branch of … the definition. Since the persecuting agent is the state or its actors, the appropriate inquiry is whether the [claimants’] unwillingness to seek the protection of Sri Lanka is based on a well-founded fear of persecution. The Board made a fundamental error when it stated that “it is also not satisfied that the state is either unable or unwilling to offer protection should the female claimant decide to seek such protection.” The question is not whether the state would be willing to protect, but whether the applicant is willing to seek the protection of the state. It is the well-foundedness of the [claimant’s] perspective regarding the state’s actions which is determinative.59

Where the claimant fears the army and the evidence establishes that the army is in control of the entire territory, particularly if the country is small, the claimant may be unable to seek the protection of the state.60

Where there is widespread violence and the state fails to take effective steps to curb it despite repeated promises to do so, it is unreasonable to conclude that a claimant could rely on that state for protection.61

In cases of domestic or sexual violence, where there is evidence that the government is taking steps to protect women, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed repeatedly told that nothing could be done to protect him and no investigation into the source of the threats or the attempted assassination was ever conducted.” (at 3).

57 Zalzali, supra, footnote 21. However, for the principle in Zalzali to apply, the claimant must demonstrate a prospective risk of persecution, thus, in Roble, Abdi Burale v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-1101-91), Heald, Stone, McDonald, April 25, 1994. Reported: Roble v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 169 N.R. 125 (F.C.A.), where the agent of persecution (the NSS in Somalia) was no longer a factor, the Court held that “…the inability of the state to protect the [claimant] is not, in itself, a sufficient basis for his claim.” (at 130).

58 Ward; supra, footnote 1, Surujpal, Khemraj v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-515-84), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, April 25, 1985. Reported: Surujpal v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1985), 60 N.R. 73 (F.C.A.); Rajudeen, Zahirdeen v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-1779-93), Heald, Hugessen, Stone (concurring), July 4, 1984. Reported: Rajudeen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1984), 55 N.R. 129 (F.C.A.). In a case involving Peru, Gonzales, Abel Guillerme Mayorga v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-117-93), Noël, February 25, 1994, the Court noted, at 3, that the evidence showed that the army had been infiltrated by the terrorists and that it was powerless against their attacks. In the circumstances, it was unreasonable for the CRDD to conclude “…that the [claimant] was likely to be given adequate protection.”


that these steps will be effective. Whether a request for protection is useless after a rape has occurred is not the issue, but rather whether the state is willing, able and disposed to protect a claimant in the face of such acts if she were to return. What is important is to analyze, not merely whether a legislative and procedural framework exists, but also whether the state, through the police and otherwise, was willing to effectively implement any such framework.

In deciding whether a claimant can count on the protection of the state, one must consider not only the state’s ability to protect, but also its willingness. While the Ghanian government had sometimes shown an intention to make female circumcision illegal, it was still tolerating the practice. On the other hand, in a case where the claimant feared ritual murder in Ghana, the Court noted that that practice was officially condemned by the government and that the claimant never sought the protection of the authorities nor showed that they had failed or refused to protect him.

In situations involving sectarian violence, the police may sometimes choose to offer only a passive response i.e., advise a claimant to refrain from lodging a complaint as that could ignite the situation even further. In *Hussain, Majeed v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2345-02), O’Reilly, April 8, 2003; 2003 FCT 406, in considering a claim from Pakistan, the Court noted that “…police intervention, in certain circumstances, can be counterproductive. Police authorities have to make choices, taking account of priorities, tactics and community relations. They may sometimes reasonably conclude that the better course is for them to stay out of certain events.”

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66 Mallam, Sanni Mohammad v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2780-96), Pinard, June 30, 1997. Contrast this with Alli, supra, footnote 35, where the Court stated that a finding by the CRDD that the police do investigate and prosecute incidents of ritual violence was different from the police offering protection to persons such as the claimant.
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CHAPTER 7

7. CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND COMPELLING REASONS

7.1. CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES

The question raised by a claim to refugee status is not whether the claimant had reasons to fear persecution in the past, but rather whether he or she now, at the time the claim is being decided, has good grounds to fear persecution in the future. That same test is applied in cases where there have been changes in country conditions: the onus does not shift in such cases, nor does the standard of proof which the claimant is required to meet differ.

7.1.1. Standard of Proof and Criteria

As in all other refugee claims heard by the Refugee Protection Division, the test of well-foundedness found in Adjei applies to claims involving an assessment of changed or changing country conditions.

The Trial Division generated a considerable body of case law in which divergent positions were taken on the applicability of the so-called “Hathaway test” in assessing claims where there

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1 Mileva v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] 3 F.C. 398 (C.A.) at 404, per Pratte J.A. Although this case concerned an initial (credible basis) hearing (since abolished by Bill C-86, which amended the Immigration Act), the principle is applicable to determinations by the Refugee Protection Division. See also M.E.I. v. Paszkowska, Malgorzata (F.C.A., no. A-724-90), Hugessen, MacGuigan, Décary, April 16, 1991. Reported: Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Paszkowska (1991), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 262 (F.C.A.).


4 In Stoyanov, Gueorgui Ivanov v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-206-91), Hugessen, Mahoney, Décary, April 26, 1993, at 2, Justice Hugessen, speaking for the Court, stated: “… when the [Refugee] Division has a refugee claim before it, it must apply the test stated by this Court in Adjei, and not … the test (assuming that it is different) that would apply to an application for loss of status (“cessation”) made by the Minister under s. 69.2.” Some decisions of the Trial Division, in the context of the debate on the “Hathaway test”, have taken the position that there may be a different (i.e., higher) standard of proof that is applied at a cessation hearing under section 69.2 of the Immigration Act, e.g., Villalita, Jairo Francisco Hidalgo v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1091-92), Reed, October 8, 1993; Magana, Douglas Ivan Ayala v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1670-92), Rothstein, November 10, 1993. Reported: Magana v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 22 Imm. L.R. (2d) 300 (F.C.T.D.). See, however, Youssef, Sawsan El-Cheikh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-990-98), Teitelbaum, March 29, 1999, which actually involved a cessation application, for a different view. See also M.C.I. v. Serhan, Jaafar (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-539-00), Dawson, September 19, 2001; 2001 FCT 1029, which held that the correct test on applications for cessation is whether changes occurred which rendered the previously established fear of persecution to be unfounded. Cessation of status (refugee protection) is now governed by section 108 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the provisions of which are essentially the same as those found in the former Immigration Act.
have been changes in country conditions since the claimant’s departure from his or her country of nationality.

The issue was clarified by the Court of Appeal in *Yusuf*, which explicitly rejected the notion that there is a separate legal test by which the changed circumstances must be measured. Justice Hugessen stated for the Court:

… the issue of so-called “changed circumstances” seems to be in danger of being elevated, wrongly in our view, into a question of law when it is, at bottom, simply one of fact. A change in the political situation in a claimant’s country of origin is only relevant if it may help in determining whether or not there is, at the date of the hearing, a reasonable and objectively foreseeable possibility that the claimant will be persecuted in the event of return there. That is an issue for factual determination and there is no separate legal “test” by which any alleged change in circumstances must be measured. The use of words such as “meaningful”, “effective” or “durable” is only helpful if one keeps clearly in mind that the only question, and therefore the only test, is that derived from the definition of Convention Refugee in s. 2 of the *Immigration* Act: does the claimant now have a well-founded fear of persecution?

In the subsequent decision of the Court of Appeal in *Rahman*, Justice Robertson elaborated on this issue:

This Court has previously held in *Yusuf* … that the issue of “changed circumstances” is essentially one of fact. Indeed, what is important is not so much the change as the actual circumstances existing in the claimant’s country of origin. The question is whether those circumstances support the

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5 See James C. Hathaway, *The Law of Refugee Status* (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991), pages 200-203. When discussing the cessation clause, which has been incorporated into section 108(1)(e) of the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* and was previously found in section 2(2)(e) of the *Immigration Act*, Professor Hathaway stated that the changes must be shown to be of (1) substantial political significance, (2) truly effective, and (3) durable. This is the so-called three-prong “Hathaway test” referred to in the jurisprudence.

6 *Yusuf*, *supra*, footnote 2, at 1-2 (unreported); at 12 (reported). There is, however, dicta in an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal that is potentially problematic. In *Ahmed, Ali v. M.E.I.* (F.C.A., no. A-89-92), Marceau, Desjardins, Décary, July 14, 1993. Reported: *Ahmed v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)* (1993), 156 N.R. 221 (F.C.A.), at 223-224, Marceau J.A. stated (in relation to the CRDD’s finding that with the change in government in Bangladesh, the claimant’s fear was no longer well founded), that this ground does not entail “a mere finding of fact drawn directly from the evidence … the evidence has to be interpreted and inferences must be drawn from it in relation to legal concepts and provisions of law. … the mere fact that there has been a change of government is clearly not in itself sufficient to meet the requirements of a change of circumstances which have rendered the genuine fear of a claimant unreasonable and hence without foundation.” *Ahmed* can be reconciled with *Yusuf* if one bears in mind that in *Ahmed*, the Court was relating the change to the objective basis of the claim (i.e., the *Adjei* test). Hence the view expressed in *Oduro, Ebenezer v. M.E.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-903-93), McKeown, December 24, 1993, at 3, that the Federal Court in *Ahmed* “has determined that the determination of change in circumstances is a mixed question of fact and law.”

claimant’s alleged well-founded fear of persecution. (emphasis in the original)

In *Alfarsy*, the Federal Court held that the question of whether the changes are effective and durable is a question of law to be reviewed on a standard of correctness, whereas the particular circumstances of the claimant are a question of fact to be reviewed on a standard of patent unreasonableness. However, in *Hussain*, the Federal Court referred to the Court of Appeal decision in *Yusuf* and found that the issue of “changed circumstances” is one of fact, not law. As well, the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in *Fernandopulle*, confirms that the question of changed country conditions is one of fact.

In *Fernandopulle*, the Federal Court had agreed to certify a question about whether the presumption found in paragraph 45 of the UNHCR *Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status* – namely, that once past persecution is shown, this creates a presumption of future persecution – is part of Canadian law. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and noted that such a presumption is inconsistent with Canadian jurisprudence. The Court further noted that “proof of past persecution ... may support a finding of fact the claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution in the future, but it will not necessarily do so.”

### 7.1.2. Application

It follows, from the foregoing, that changes that fall short of the criteria put forth by Professor Hathaway may also be relevant for an assessment of the claimant’s fear of persecution and should be weighed, in the balance, along with all the other relevant evidence in the claim.

In *Sukhraj Singh*, the Federal Court recognized that the documentary evidence in a particular case may not be unequivocal as to the political situation in a country, and even contradictory in certain areas. (It is up to the Refugee Protection Division to assess whether the evidence is sufficient to support its conclusion. In so doing, it can reasonably rely on evidence it

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13. *Villalta*, *supra*, footnote 4, at 7. The Court went on to hold that the Board need not engage in “the conceptual exercise of subtracting changed country conditions from their analysis, and then, after making that analysis, move on to assess the significance of changed country conditions.” See also *Barreto, Hugo Cesar Ghan v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3987-94), Wetsow, June 7, 1995, where the Court states at 9: “When the Board discusses change in country conditions, it does so as part of its determination of whether the [claimants’] fear was objectively well founded. In this regard, a change in country conditions is one factor, among others, which the Board is entitled to consider in its determination.”

considers most consistent with reality.) Moreover, improved country conditions may be found to be sufficient given the claimant’s circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that there are improvements yet to be achieved.15

The Trial Division, in Barreto,16 held that there is no statutory requirement that compels a consideration of section 2(2)(e) of the Immigration Act – now section 108(1)(e) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act – when assessing whether, in light of a change in country conditions, the claimant’s fear is objectively well founded. Moreover, a change in country conditions may be assessed not as an independent and overriding consideration, but as part of a blended assessment of well-foundedness along with other factors such as passage of time and lack of continued interest in the claimant by the agent of persecution.17

In Penate,18 a pre-Yusuf case, Justice Reed of the Trial Division provided the following guidance on the relevance of the “Hathaway criteria” in assessing the present well-foundedness of a claim:

… when a panel is weighing changed country conditions together with all the evidence in [a claimant’s] case, factors such as durability, effectiveness and substantiality are still relevant. The more durable the changes are demonstrated to be, the heavier they will weigh against granting the [claimant’s] claim. In addition, if a panel has in fact made a determination that status would have existed but for changed circumstances (that is, if it has voluntarily adopted that type of conceptual analysis) then a more rigorous assessment of the changed conditions following the criteria set out by Professor Hathaway will likely be appropriate.

In the following pre-Yusuf cases, where the claims would have been established but for the changes in country conditions, the dicta of the Court of Appeal indicate that a more rigorous evaluation of the effect of the changes was to be undertaken. In Ahmed,19 the Court referred to “a clear indication of a meaningful and effective change which is required to expunge the objective

16 Barreto, supra, footnote 13, at 7-9.
18 Penate v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 2 F.C. 79 (T.D.), at 95. As noted in Osei, Penate was decided before Yusuf (F.C.A.), and must be read in light of Justice Reed’s comments in Osei, Paul Kofi v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4893-93), Reed, June 13, 1997, where she stated that the Yusuf approach does not require the CRDD to engage in an analysis of the three elements listed in Hathaway’s test and reach a conclusion with respect to each of them. Rather the CRDD need only assess whether the changes, as a matter of fact, led to a conclusion than an objective basis to the claim no longer existed. See also in this regard Ayankojo, Isaac Olymuyiwa Olaoluwa v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. 3877-99), Reed, June 8, 2000. Along the same lines, in Nallbani, Ilir v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5935-98), MacKay, June 25, 1999, the Court stated: “I am not persuaded that the panel had to expressly find the change of circumstances was effective and lasting, rather it was sufficient to find, as it did, that the … claim was not established prospectively in light of the change in circumstances.” For a different focus see Vodopianov, Victor v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1539-92), Gibson, June 20, 1995.
19 Ahmed, supra, footnote 6, at 224, per Marceau J.A.
foundation of the … claim.” In Cuadra,\textsuperscript{20} the Court referred to “the requirement that the change be meaningful and effective enough to render the genuine fear of the [claimant] unreasonable and hence without foundation.”

The continued relevance of the “Hathaway factors” was underscored in the post-Yusuf case of Vodopianov,\textsuperscript{21} which overturned a CRDD decision as inadequate because there was no analysis of the meaningfulness, effectiveness and durability of the recent changes in that country.

Where the changes invoked relate to the personal circumstances of an individual for which that individual claimed refugee status, the Trial Division held (in the context of a cessation application) that the Minister does not have the burden of showing that the agent of persecution had changed and that the change was durable. It is sufficient that the Board be satisfied that the change of circumstances is significant and effective.\textsuperscript{22} A similar approach was taken by the Federal Court in Umana,\textsuperscript{23} where the Board rejected a claim for protection because the change in the claimant’s personal circumstances was meaningful and effective enough to render the claimant’s fear unreasonable and without foundation.

Although the Refugee Protection Division may find, in appropriate cases, that even recent changes are sufficient to remove the basis of the claimant’s fear of persecution,\textsuperscript{24} it should not

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\item \textsuperscript{21} Vodopianov, supra, footnote 18. See also Kazi, Feroz Adeel v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-850-97), Pinard, August 15, 1997. Reported: Kazi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1997), 40 Imm. L.R. (2d) 193 (F.C.T.D.), where the Court stated that the key consideration is whether the changes in the political situation are effective and durable, as opposed to merely transitory, and what, if any bearing, these changes have on the claimant’s specific situation. In Zdjelar, Damir v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5363-00), Gibson, July 26, 2001. Reported: Zdjelar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 4 F.C. 560 (T.D.), the Court found that the CRDD did not engage in an effective weighing of the evidence for and against changed country conditions in relation to the Hathaway criteria. See also Sahiti, Shqipe v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7198-04), Beaudry, March 15, 2005; 2005 FC 364, to the same effect. In Shahiti the Court relied on pre-Yusuf case law from the Trial Division and did not refer to the Court of Appeal decision in Yusuf.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Youssef, supra, footnote 4.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Umana, Cesar Emilio Campos v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1434-02), Snider, April 2, 2003; 2003 FCT 393.
\item \textsuperscript{24} In Rahman, Faizur v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-1244-91), Marceau, Desjardins, Létourneau, May 14, 1993, at 3, the ouster of President Ershad (in Bangladesh) followed by the electoral victory of the claimant’s party, in the view of Marceau J.A., “may, in themselves, recent though they have been, amount to a sufficient change of circumstances, given the basis of the fear on which the [claimant] relied.” However, in Ahmed, supra, footnote 6, at 224, Marceau J.A. cautioned that “the mere declarations of the new four-month old government that it favoured the establishment of law and order can hardly be seen, when the root of the [claimant’s] fear and the past record of the new government with respect to human rights violations are considered, as a clear indication of the meaningful and effective change which is required to expunge the objective foundation of the … claim.” On the other hand, when dealing with changes of longer duration, in Ofori, Beatrice v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3312-94), Gibson, March 14, 1995, the Court stated at 4: “Durability does not equate with permanence. … the concept of meaningful and effective change implies an element of durability, not in an absolute sense but in a comparative sense ….” The Court came to a similar conclusion in Castellanos, Julio Alfredo Vaquerano v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2082-94), Gibson, October 18, 1994. Reported: Castellanos v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1994), 30 Imm. L.R. (2d) 77 (F.C.T.D.), where Gibson J. stated at 80: “I know of no decision of this court that has adopted the position that changes must be: ‘… durable in the sense that there is no possible chance of a reversal in the future.’” Moreover, after conceding
\end{itemize}
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rely on or give much, if any, weight to changes that are short-lived, transitory, inchoate, tentative, inconsequential or otherwise ineffective in substance or implementation.\textsuperscript{25}

Finally, the case law is clear that the changes which are being relied on as removing the reasons for the claimant’s fear of persecution are not assessed in the abstract but for their impact on the claimant’s particular situation.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{7.1.3. Reasons and Assessment of Evidence}

The Court of Appeal pointed out in \textit{Ahmed},\textsuperscript{27} that it is not sufficient for the Board to simply state that a change has taken place (e.g. the declarations of a new government), “without more explanation to establish that the appropriate legal principles were applied.” Where the changes are very recent, the evidence must be subjected to a detailed analysis to determine whether this change is significant enough to eliminate the claimant’s fear.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{25} In \textit{Abarajithan, Paramsothy v. M.E.I.} (F.C.A., no. A-805-90), Stone, MacGuigan, Linden, January 28, 1992, the CRDD was found to have relied incorrectly on tentative changes in Sri Lanka (cooperation between the Tigers and the Sri Lankan Army). In \textit{Magana, supra}, footnote 4, at 303-304, the Court categorized the articles published before or at the time of the three-month-old peace accord in El Salvador as “preliminary, tentative indications of the effect of the changes … especially in light of contrary evidence … that the peace process was in danger and death squad activity continued.” In \textit{Agyakwah, Elizabeth Lorna v. M.E.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. A-7-93), McKeown, December 10, 1993, the CRDD was found to have erred in relying on the lifting of the ban on political parties just two days prior to the hearing where no change of government had occurred and the poor human rights record of the Ghanaian government was longstanding. In \textit{Antonio, Neto Xavier v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. A-472-92), Noël, January 27, 1995, the CRDD erroneously relied on tentative changes in Angola: the peace accord was only a few days old; the same regime was in power; elections were supposed to take place in 18 months; a previous accord had failed; the accord contained no guarantee for former enemies of the regime. In \textit{Chaudary, Imran Akram v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2048-94), Reed, May 4, 1995, the Court held, at 4, that the statement that “a greater possibility of stability” than existed previously did not carry “sufficient weight to counterbalance a finding that an objective basis would otherwise exist.” In \textit{Quaye, Sarah Adjoa v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3999-00), Tremblay-Lamer, May 23, 2001; 2001 FCT 518, the Court noted that “cultural and traditional norms [sic] do not change overnight,” and that “the mere enactment of new laws” may not be in itself sufficient to remove the objective basis of the claim. In \textit{Alfarsy, supra}, footnote 8, the Court stated that declarations of intent must be examined against the history of the conflict with a view to evaluating the likely permanence of the changes.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Faizur Rahman, supra}, footnote 24, at 2, per Marceau J.A.: “Whether a change of circumstances is sufficient for a fear of persecution to be no longer well-founded must naturally be determined in relation to the basis of and reasons for the fear relied on.” See also \textit{Boateng, Joseph Kwaku v. M.E.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. 92-A-6560), Noël, May 4, 1993, at 3.

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Ahmed, supra}, footnote 6, at 224, per Marceau J.A.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Kifoueti, Didier Borrone Bitemo v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-937-98), Tremblay-Lamer, February 11, 1999. In this case, as in \textit{Vodopianov, supra}, footnote 18, the changes were so recent that there was no evidence to indicate how the new regime would behave.
In the decision of Mohamed,29 Justice Denault of the Trial Division set out the following helpful checklist or approach:

… when making a finding on the issue of changes in circumstances the tribunal must, at least, turn its mind to the objective basis of the [claimant’s] fear of persecution, the alleged agents of persecution and the form or nature of the persecution feared in order to properly evaluate the effect of the change. This evaluation must relate to the particular circumstances of the [claimant] and the tribunal should provide a clear indication or explanation for its finding.

Although there is no requirement to cite every piece of evidence before it, the Refugee Protection Division’s reasons should demonstrate that it was not unduly selective, but rather has considered all of the relevant evidence, both that which supports a conclusion of changed country conditions and that which does not, in reaching its decision.30 Moreover, before arriving at a conclusion on the impact of the changes on the claim the Board should have received evidence that relates specifically to the basis of the claimant’s fear of persecution.31

### 7.1.4. Notice

The Trial Division has held that if a change in circumstances is to be relied on in the Board’s reasons, the issue must be raised or notice must be given at the hearing.32 However, in Alfarsy,33 the Federal Court held that there was no obligation on the Board to do more than indicate that objective basis was an issue, since claimants should be aware that the definition of a

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31 Doganian, Raft Charvarch v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-807-91), Husseinen, MacGuigan, Décary, April 26, 1993; Boateng. In Moz, Saul Mejia v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-54-93), Rothstein, November 12, 1993. Reported: Moz v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 23 Imm. L.R. (2d) 67 (F.C.T.D), the claim was referred back to the CRDD to obtain evidence relating to the treatment of army deserters in El Salvador. In Ansar, Iqbal v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4124-97), Campbell, July 22, 1998, the Court held that there was no evidence tendered to support the finding that, because the claimant was a member of the party newly brought to power, he would by that fact alone receive state protection. See also Vodopianov, supra, footnote 18, and Kifoueti, supra, footnote 28. In Alfarsy, supra, footnote 8, the Court held that if the legal action against the claimants was politically based, there is no reason to assume that they would be treated differently from other party members who had previously suffered persecution, legal harassment and incarceration.
33 Alfarsy, supra, footnote 8.
Convention refugee is forward looking and can present evidence at the time of the hearing that an objective basis existed because the changes were not effective and durable.

7.1.5. Post-Hearing Evidence

There is no obligation on the Refugee Protection Division to consider post-hearing evidence relating to changes in country conditions unless that evidence has been submitted by the claimant and accepted by the panel before the panel renders a final decision on the claim.

The Refugee Protection Division may, on its own motion, provide additional documents and reconvene a hearing into a claim that has not been concluded with a final decision, to hear evidence relating to changes in country conditions.

7.2. COMPELLING REASONS

7.2.1. Applicability

In the Obstoj decision, the Court of Appeal considered the issue of the applicability of the exception found in section 2(3) of the Immigration Act (“compelling reasons arising out of any past persecution for refusing to avail …”), and held that this provision can be properly considered by the Refugee Division in hearings under section 69.1 of that Act.

This principle continues to apply under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), where a similarly worded “compelling reasons” provision is found in section 108.

108. (1) A claim for refugee protection shall be rejected, and a person is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection, in any of the following circumstances: …

(e) the reasons for which the person sought refugee protection have ceased to exist. …

(4) Paragraph (1)(e) does not apply to a person who establishes that there are compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution, torture, treatment or punishment for refusing to avail themselves of the protection of the country

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35 See rule 37 of the Refugee Protection Division Rules and the Commentary to that rule regarding the requirements for submitting documents after the hearing has ended.


38 Although section 2(3) of the Immigration Act is framed as an exception to section 2(2)(e), there was no requirement for a formal determination of cessation of status in the context of a hearing under section 69.1 (as would be required in the context of a hearing under section 69.2 of that Act). The same can be said about section 108(4) of IRPA.
which they left, or outside of which they remained, due to such previous persecution, torture, treatment or punishment.

In Isacko,\(^{39}\) the Federal Court stated that section 108(4) of \textit{IRPA} is very similar to section 2(3) of the \textit{Immigration Act} and therefore, the jurisprudence that has developed with respect to section 2(3) of the former Act may be used as guidance in the interpretation of section 108(4) of \textit{IRPA}. (The difference between the two provisions is that, under \textit{IRPA}, “compelling reasons” may arise out of previous persecution, torture, treatment or punishment, while the \textit{Immigration Act} referred only to previous persecution.)

In order for the “compelling reasons” exception to apply the claimant does not need to show a \textit{subsisting} well-founded fear of persecution or an ongoing subjective fear of persecution.\(^{40}\)

The “compelling reasons” exception arises only when the reasons for which the person sought protection “have ceased to exist”. Therefore, there must be a change in circumstances to trigger the consideration of this exception.

In Cortez,\(^{41}\) the Trial Division held that the applicability of section 2(2)(e) and 2(3) of the \textit{Immigration Act} was dependent on a finding that the claimant had a well-founded fear of persecution when the person left his or her country of nationality. The reasons for one’s fear of persecution have to have ceased thereafter for the compelling reasons exception to be triggered.\(^{42}\)


\(^{40}\) In Obstoj, supra, footnote 37, at 748, Justice Hugessen stated that the exception applies, “…even though they may no longer have any reason to fear further persecution.” This interpretation was followed in Hassan, Nimo Ali v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-653-92), Rothstein, May 4, 1994. However, in Shahid, supra, footnote 39, the Court stated that “The claimant must have a subjective fear of persecution …”.


\(^{42}\) Hassan, Noor v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-831-90), Isaac, Heald, Mahoney, October 22, 1992. Reported: Hassan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 147 N.R. 317 (F.C.A.); Brovina, Qefsere v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2427-03), Layden-Stevenson, April 29, 2004; 2004 FC 635; Kalumba, Banza v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8673-04), Shore, May 17, 2005; 2005 FC 680. There is some confusion in the pre-\textit{Cihal} case law as to what point in time the claimant had to have met the requirements for Convention refugee. For example, in Singh, Gurmeet v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-75-95), Richard, July 4, 1995. Reported: Singh, (Gurmeet) v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 30 Imm. L.R. (2d) 226 (F.C.T.D.), at 230, the Court referred to the fact that the claimant “might at one time have been a Convention refugee” (emphasis added). The principle of alienage, i.e., a claimant must be outside his or her country of origin, would necessitate that the person met the requirements of refugeehood at the time of departure from his or her country of origin, and that there was a subsequent change in circumstances, before the panel could consider the compelling reasons exception. The existence of past persecution does not automatically trigger the need to consider the application of the exception.
This interpretation was adopted by the Court of Appeal in *Cihal*, where the Court confirmed that the CRDD was not required to consider whether past persecution constitutes compelling reasons under section 2(3) of the *Immigration Act*, where it determines that the claimant was not a Convention refugee at the time of departure from the country of nationality. The same approach would prevail under the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*.

In *Corrales*, the Trial Division held that since the CRDD never made a determination that the claimant was a Convention refugee, having found that state protection was available in her country, there was no need for it to consider compelling reasons. The exception does not apply where the Board determines that the claimant has not established that they were at risk. Thus, the “compelling reasons” exception need only be considered where the determination of the claim is based, in whole or part, on a change in country conditions.

In *Guzman*, the CRDD found, primarily based on the long delay in making their claims, that the claimants lacked a subjective fear. The Trial Division held that the fact that the CRDD then went on to consider changed country conditions, as an additional reason for which to reject the claim, did not eliminate or undermine its earlier finding that the claimants had no subjective fear of persecution. Justice Rothstein reasoned that:

paragraph 2(2)(e) and subsection 2(3) [of the *Immigration Act*, i.e., the “compelling reasons” exception] only come into play if there is a finding that the [claimant], at least at one time, were Convention refugees. I think this

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*Cihal, Pavla v. M.C.I.* (F.C.A., no. A-54-97), Stone, Evans, Malone, May 4, 2000. See also *M.C.I. v. Dolamore, Jessica Robyn* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4580-00), Blais, May 1, 2001; 2001 FCT 421, where the Court held that the CRDD erred in not examining the issue of state protection regarding the claimant’s objective fear before considering whether there was a change of circumstances (and compelling reasons). In *Adjibi, Marcelle v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2580-01), Dawson, May 8, 2002; 2002 FCT 525, the Court held that the CRDD erred in not considering whether section 2(3) of the *Immigration Act* applied to the minors’ claims, since the principal claimant had been found to be persecuted and the claims of all of the claimants were dismissed on the basis of changed country conditions.


*Ortiz, Ligia Ines Arias v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4416-01), Pinard, November 13, 2002; 2002 FCT 1163, the CRDD determined that the claimant had not established that she was in fact at risk from her former employer. Since there were no changed country conditions, the exception did not apply.

*In Kudar, Peter v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-2218-03), Layden-Stevenson, April 30, 2004; 2004 FC 648, the Court stated that:

…there may be situations where the board can be said to implicitly have found that a claimant was previously a refugee and, but for the changed country conditions, would still be a refugee. This is not such a case. The RPD found that police protection was available to Mr. Kudar. Thus, the board found that he was not a refugee. The changed country conditions do not apply. Nor does the exception of compelling reasons...

*Guzman, Jesus Ruby Hernandez v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3748-97), Rothstein, October 29, 1998. *Note:* A distinction needs to be drawn between a case where the evidence shows that there was a fundamental lack of subjective fear, as in *Guzman*, and a case where there was once a subjective fear and that fear no longer exists because of a change of circumstances. In the latter case, the claimant can still argue that there are compelling reasons not to return him or her to the country of past persecution.
includes a finding that at one time they would have met the definition of Convention refugee. In the present case, there is no such finding.

The “compelling reasons” exception does not arise where a claimant’s factual evidence is not believed. 48 Nor does it apply where the claimant has not established a nexus between the fear and one of the grounds contained in the Refugee Convention. 49 (The latter case was decided under the Immigration Act; IRPA now allows a claim to be based on the additional grounds set out in section 97(1) of that Act.)

A determination that the claimant had an internal flight alternative (IFA) when he left his or her country would preclude the application of the “compelling reasons” exception, since the person could not have been determined to be a Convention refugee. 50 In Moore, 51 the Trial Division held that the terms of reference for applying section 2(3) of the Immigration Act are changes in country conditions, and not changes in the personal circumstances of an individual claimant. The wording of that provision and section 108(1)(e) of IRPA, however, does not suggest that the changes are restricted to changes in country conditions.

7.2.2. Duty to Consider the “Compelling Reasons” Exception

In Yamba, 52 the Court of Appeal clarified the law in this area by stating that in every case in which the CRDD finds that a claimant has suffered past persecution, but there has been a change of country conditions under section 2(2)(e) of the Immigration Act, the CRDD is obligated to consider whether the evidence presented establishes that there are “compelling reasons”. This obligation arises whether or not the claimant expressly invokes section 2(3). Nevertheless, the evidentiary burden remains on the claimant to adduce the evidence necessary to establish that he or she is entitled to the benefit of that provision. The same principle would hold true with regard to section 108(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

It follows, therefore, that where the Board does not find that the claimant has suffered past persecution, it is under no obligation to consider the compelling reasons exception.


50 Sangha, Karamjit Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1555-98), Reed, September 8, 1998; Kalumba, supra, footnote 39. In Singh, Gurmeet v. M.C.I., supra, footnote 42, the Court held that, since the determination was based, in part, on a change of circumstances, the finding that the claimants had an IFA did not excuse the panel from considering the “compelling reasons” exception, given the past persecution and supporting medical report. In Rabbani, Sayed Moheyudee v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-236-96), Noël, January 16, 1997, the Court held that the CRDD had erred, for among other reasons, because its finding that the claimant had an IFA in Afghanistan was inconsistent with its implied finding that there must have been a fear of persecution throughout the country prior to the change of circumstances.


7.2.3. Meaning of “Compelling Reasons”

In Obstoj,\(^{53}\) Justice Hugessen of the Court of Appeal held that section 2(3) of the Immigration Act – now section 108(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act – should be read

as requiring Canadian authorities to give recognition of refugee status on humanitarian grounds to this special and limited category of persons, i.e. those who have suffered such appalling persecution that their experience alone is compelling reason not to return them, even though they may no longer have any reason to fear further persecution.

The phrase “appalling persecution” in this context harks back to paragraph 136 of the UNHCR Handbook, which states in part:

It [i.e., the “compelling reasons” exception] deals with the special situation where a person may have been subjected to very serious persecution in the past and not therefore cease to be a refugee, even if fundamental changes have occurred in his country of origin. … The exception, however, reflects a more general humanitarian principle, which could also be applied to refugees other than statutory refugees. It is frequently recognized that a person who—or whose family—has suffered under atrocious forms of persecution should not be expected to repatriate.

Justice Hugessen went on to state, in Obstoj (at 748), that “[t]he exceptional circumstances envisaged by subsection 2(3) [of the Immigration Act] must surely apply only to a tiny minority of present day claimants.”\(^{54}\)

The case law indicates that the threshold necessary to demonstrate “compelling reasons” is a high one. In Nimo Ali Hassan, Justice Rothstein stated:

While many refugee claimants might consider the persecution they have suffered to fit within the scope of subsection 2(3) [of the Immigration Act] it must be remembered that the nature of all persecution, by definition, involves death, physical harm or other penalties. Subsection 2(3), as it has been interpreted, only applies to extraordinary cases in which the persecution is relatively so exceptional, that even in the wake of changed circumstances, it would be wrong to return refugee claimants.\(^{55}\)

\(^{53}\) Obstoj, supra, footnote 37, at 748.

\(^{54}\) This caution was repeated in subsequent decisions of the Federal Court, e.g., Cortez, supra, footnote 41, at 2 (“in unusual circumstances”); Yusuf, supra, footnote 2, at 1-2 (“that very rare class of persons to whom this exceptional provision applies”).

\(^{55}\) Hassan, supra, footnote 40, at 5-6.
The issue as to whether “compelling reasons” exist in a given case is a question of fact. Each case must be assessed and decided on its own merits, based on the totality of the evidence. However, the delineation of the concept of “compelling reasons” is a question of law.

In Shahid, the Federal Court set out the relevant considerations for determining whether “compelling reasons” exist. The board, once it embarked upon the assessment of the applicant’s claim under subs. 2(3) [of the Immigration Act], had the duty to consider the level of atrocity of the acts inflicted upon the applicant, the repercussions upon his physical and mental state, and determine whether this experience alone constituted a compelling reason not to return him to his country.

7.2.4. Adequacy of Reasons for Decision

In Adjibi, the Trial Division stressed that the reasons given by the CRDD for concluding that section 2(3) of the Immigration Act does not apply must be adequate. In that case, the reasons of the CRDD were simply that there was “insufficient evidence” to warrant the application of section 2(3). The Court found that it was not clear what the panel meant when it spoke of “insufficient evidence”. Secondly, the panel must provide a sufficiently intelligible explanation as to why persecutory treatment does not constitute compelling reasons. (The claimant was found to have been raped repeatedly and was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.) This requires thorough consideration of the level of atrocity of the acts inflicted upon the claimant, the effect on her physical and mental state, and whether the experiences and their sequelae constitute a compelling reason not to return her to her country of origin.

The Refugee Protection Division is required to assess whether or not the nature of the persecution in a particular case before it constitutes “compelling reasons”, and it must explain why the torture, if so found, or other reprehensible treatment, does or does not meet the requirements of section 108(4) of IRPA. Thus, if the Board finds the treatment received by the

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58 Kotorri, Rubin v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1316-05), Beaudry, September 1, 2005; 2005 FC 1195. As such the Board has no specific expertise in this task.
59 Shahid, supra, footnote 39, at 138. This approach was cited with approval in Mandar, Kashmeer Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3450-99), Campbell, April 5, 2000; Adjibi, supra, footnote 43; and, in relation to IRPA, in Isacko, supra, footnote 39. In Shahid, the Court (at 136) also set out a summary of the state of the case law based on Arguello-Garcia, supra, footnote Error! Bookmark not defined., however some of those propositions, especially the second one (relating to ongoing subjective fear), are in doubt, as shown by the discussion earlier in the text of this chapter (section 7.2.1).
60 Adjibi, supra, footnote 43.
61 Shahid, supra, footnote 39.
claimant to be “revolting” or “vile and reprehensible”, as it did in Biakona,63 it should go on to state (which it failed to do in that case) why it concluded that the acts committed cannot be considered compelling reasons.

7.2.5. Level or Severity of Harm

The Federal Court jurisprudence is not consistent on the issue of whether the previous persecution (or treatment under section 97(1) of IRPA) must reach the level of being “atrocious” or “appalling” for the “compelling reasons” exception to apply. The standard imported by words such “atrocious” and “appalling” (this language is found in the Court of Appeal decision in Obstoj and the UNHCR Handbook) has been applied in numerous Federal Court decisions to describe the level of past persecution required for “compelling reasons”, for example, Arguello-Garcia, Hassan, Shahid, Nwazoor, Isacko, Saimir Kulla, among others. One case held that the words “appalling” and “atrocious” are proper interpretative aids to guide the Board (Adjibi). Another line of cases, however, has questioned whether the Obstoj decision established such a test or has held that it did not: Hasan Kulla, Dini, Elemah, Suleiman, Kotorri.

In Arguello-Garcia, in assessing the “objective factors” (i.e., the nature and severity of the claimant’s experiences), the Trial Division turned to dictionary definitions of “atrocious” and “appalling” for guidance on the issue of what may be considered sufficiently serious persecution to find “compelling reasons” 64

In Hasan Kulla,65 however, the Court held that the issue is not whether the claimant’s past experience could be characterized as “atrocious” and “appalling”, descriptions found in other jurisprudence, but rather, as Justice Reed stated in Dini:66 “If the person establishes there are compelling reasons arising out of any previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country that the person left.”

In a subsequent judicial review of Dini, it was argued that Justice Reed implicitly determined that under section 2(3) of the Immigration Act, the treatment might not have to reach the level of “appalling” or “atrocious”. The confusion in the case law of the Trial Division

63 Biakona, Leonie Bibomba v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1706-98), Teitelbaum, March 23, 1999. See also Suleiman, supra, footnote 57. In Kulla, Saimir v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6837-03), von Finckenstein, August 24, 2004; 2004 FC 1170, the Court upheld the Board’s finding that the incidents were merely “abhorrent” but not sufficiently atrocious or appalling to trigger the “compelling reasons” exception.


In this case, while I am persuaded that the panel’s conclusion is not adequately explained, having found the claimant’s past experience to be ‘cruel and harsh’ but not ‘atrocious’ and ‘appalling’, ultimately, in my opinion the panel did not address the issue that was raised.

regarding the issue of the proper test to assess “compelling reasons” led the Court to certify a question.67 Subsequently, in *Elemah*,68 the Trial Division held that *Obstoj* did not establish a test which necessitates that the persecution reach a level to qualify it as “atrocious” and “appalling”.

More recently, in *Adjibi*,69 the Trial Division concluded that it did not have to consider whether in every case the standard of “compelling reasons” is subsumed in an inquiry into prior “appalling” and “atrocious” persecution. In view of the evidence before the CRDD (the claimant had been raped repeatedly), the words “appalling” and “atrocious” were proper interpretative aids to guide the CRDD as to whether the evidence supported the claimant’s submission that compelling reasons existed not to return her to her country.

The issue arose again in *Suleiman*,70 where the Federal Court reiterated that section 104(8) of *IRPA* does not require a determination that the acts or situation be “atrocious” or “appalling”. The issue is whether, considering the totality of the situation, i.e., humanitarian grounds, unusual or exceptional circumstances, it would be wrong to reject the claim in the wake of a change of circumstances. Consideration should be given to the claimant’s age, cultural background and previous social experiences. Being resilient to adverse conditions will depend on a number of factors which differ from one individual to another. Past acts of torture and extreme acts of mental abuse, alone, in view of their gravity and seriousness, can be considered “compelling reasons” despite the fact that these acts have occurred many years before.

There does not appear to be support in the jurisprudence for the proposition, advanced in *Suleiman*, that where objectively the persecution may not be considered grave or serious enough alone, it may in the particular circumstances of the claimant, given his or her subjective state of mind, nevertheless give rise to compelling reasons.

7.2.6. Psychological After-Effects

Evidence – usually in the form of a medical report or psychological assessment – of present psychological and emotional suffering can be used to demonstrate that the claimant continues to suffer the effects of past persecution. Evidence of continuing psychological after-

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67 In *Dini, Majlinda v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2596-00), Gibson, March 22, 2001; 2001 FCT 217, the Court certified the following question:

In relation to a determination under s. 2(3) of the *Immigration Act*, does a finding of “compelling reasons” require a finding of “appalling” or “atrocious” past persecution?

The appeal in this case was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on May 21, 2002 because the appeal record was not filed on time.


69 *Adjibi, supra*, footnote 43.

70 *Suleiman, supra*, footnote 57 This decision was followed in *Kotorri, supra*, footnote 58.
effects, or its absence,\textsuperscript{71} is relevant to a determination of whether there are compelling reasons, however, the existence of such evidence is not a separate test that has to be met.

In Arguello-Garcia, the Federal Court stated that in considering the particular persecution experienced, as well as the reasons for it, the Board should also take into account the negative or psychological effect of past persecution.\textsuperscript{72} Since such evidence is supportive of the existence of compelling reasons, it should not be disregarded.

In Jiminez,\textsuperscript{73} Justice Rouleau held that the jurisprudence does not support that there is a further requirement of establishing continuing psychological after-effects of previous persecution, once there is evidence the claimant suffered “atrocious” or “appalling” acts of persecution. While evidence of continuing psychological after-effects is relevant to a determination of the issue, it is not a separate test that has to be met.

In Hinson,\textsuperscript{74} the Court stated: “The criteria to be considered are the psychological and emotional states of the claimant both at the time of the persecution and at the present time as a result of the persecution.” It then directed the CRDD to consider “the negative or psychological effects of past persecution as well as present psychological and emotional suffering as a result of past persecution.”

In Hitimana,\textsuperscript{75} although the claimant contended that the incidents he had experienced resulted in trauma (as a teenager, 5-7 years before his arrival in Canada, he witnessed the murder and disappearance of close family members in Rwanda), neither he nor an expert substantiated

\begin{footnotes}
\item[71] In Kazi, supra, footnote 21, the Court upheld a CRDD decision where the claimant did not provide evidence that he suffered continuing psychological after-effects of the previous persecution. See also Mongo, Parfait v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1005-98), Tremblay-Lamer, May 6, 1999.

\item[72] Arguello-Garcia, supra, footnote \textbf{Error! Bookmark not defined.}, at 289. See also Adaros-Serrano, Maria Macarena v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. 93-A-124), McKeown, September 31, 1993. Reported: Adaros-Serrano v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 22 Imm. L.R. (2d) 31 (F.C.T.D.), at 38, where the Court directed the CRDD to consider (at the rehearing of the claim) the fact that the claimant suffered from a post-traumatic stress disorder. See also Kulla, Saimir, supra, footnote 63.

\item[73] Jiminez, Wilfredo v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1718-98), Rouleau, January 25, 1999. Relying on the evidence presented, the CRDD had concluded that the claimant’s psychological state at the time of the hearing was premised on the severe brain injury he had suffered in Canada and possibly on contributing factors such as alcohol and drugs, and that, therefore, “there was insufficient evidence upon which to base a finding that the [claimant’s] experience of persecution in El Salvador was so exceptional that it causes ongoing suffering of the order experienced by the applicant in Arguello-Garcia, supra, footnote \textbf{Error! Bookmark not defined.}.” The Court found that the CRDD had erred in its approach and remitted the case back for a determination of whether or not the claimant’s experiences in El Salvador alone met the exceptional circumstances envisioned by section 2(3) of the Immigration Act.


\item[75] Hitimana, supra, footnote 56. In Gicu, supra, footnote \textbf{Error! Bookmark not defined.}, the Court noted that, given the claimant’s adaptability and resourcefulness, it was difficult to conclude he had suffered from a psychological trauma so severe that he continued to be affected by it nearly ten years after it had occurred. See also Isacko, supra, footnote 39, where the Court held that the Board did not err in its conclusion that the claimant had not proven that he suffered permanent psychological consequences of the level required for section 108(4) of IRPA.
\end{footnotes}
this statement. Moreover, as the claimant demonstrated that he could adapt well and was resourceful, it was not patently unreasonable to conclude that he was not suffering from any psychological trauma that constituted a compelling reason.

If the Refugee Protection Division accepts the claimant’s description of his or her treatment, and the medical and psychological reports are consistent with that description, a delay in seeking medical treatment does not appear to be a relevant factor.76

7.2.7. Persecution of Others and Other Factors

The Trial Division has also held that the CRDD (now the Refugee Protection Division) may take into account the experiences of family members in its assessment of “compelling reasons.”77 According to Velasquez, persecution of a family member can of itself be sufficient to constitute “compelling reasons”.78 However, the obiter comment in Velasquez was not followed in Saimir Kulla,79 where the Federal Court held that the claimant must suffer the mistreatment directly. The claimant may, however, rely on the mistreatment of family members in addition to his or her own mistreatment.

The subsistence of certain attitudes among the general population is not a necessary condition for the application of the provision.80 The generalized character of past persecution in a particular country should not serve as a bar to the application of the “compelling reasons” exception.81 A brief return to the country of alleged persecution does not necessarily preclude the application of the “compelling reasons” exception.82

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76 Igbalajobi, supra, footnote 62. In Hinson, supra, footnote 74, the Court held that it was improper to draw an adverse inference from the fact that the claimant delayed in obtaining a medical report, especially when the report in question diagnosed post-traumatic stress syndrome; nor does a delay in seeking psychological treatment in such a case mean that there was no adverse psychological effect.

77 Arguello-Garcia, supra, footnote Error! Bookmark not defined.


79 Kulla, Samir, supra, footnote 63.

80 Shahid, supra, footnote 39, at 138. This is so notwithstanding the following passage in paragraph 136 of the UNHCR Handbook: “It is frequently recognized that a person who—or whose family—has suffered under atrocious forms of persecution should not be expected to repatriate. Even though there may have been a change of régime in his country, this may not always produce a complete change in the attitude of the population, nor in view of his past experiences, in the mind of the refugee.”

81 Hitimana, supra, footnote 56; Suleiman, supra, footnote 57.

82 In Aragon, Luis Roberto v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4632-93), Nadon, August 12, 1994, the Court held that the CRDD had not properly considered the circumstances surrounding the claimant’s return to El Salvador
In Adjibi, the Trial Division held that the CRDD was not obliged to consider section 2(3) of the Immigration Act in respect of the incidents that took place when the claimant, a national of the Congo, resided in South Africa. Persecutory treatment in another country cannot justify a refusal to avail oneself of the protection of one’s home country. However, these events may exaggerate or amplify the effect of the persecutory conduct, and the Board must take refugee claimants as they are at the time of the hearing before the Board in order to determine whether the claimant should not be expected to repatriate. In this case, the CRDD would properly have had regard to the cumulative effect on the claimant of the events she experienced both in the Congo and South Africa.

7.3. **SUR PLACE CLAIMS**

A claimant may be a refugee as a consequence of events which have occurred in his or her country of origin since departure, or because of a significant intensification of pre-existing factors since departure from his or her country.

Claims may also be advanced based, in whole or part, on the activities of the claimant since leaving his or her country.

A tribunal is not required to deal with the issue of whether the claimant is a refugee *sur place* where it determines that the basis of the claim is not credible.

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(namely, to see his mother). The torture he experienced had also occurred during an earlier visit, but this too was held not to be a bar to invoking section 2(3) of the Immigration Act. But see Ahmed, Jawad v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6673-03), Mosley, August 5, 2004; 2004 FC 1076, where the Court upheld the Board’s finding that compelling reason did not exist, noting that the claimant’s voluntary return to his country was indicative of a lack of subjective fear.

83 Adjibi, supra, footnote 43.


In Biakona, supra, footnote 63, however, the Trial Division expressed the (unusual) view that “a refugee claimant cannot use as a reason for his or her fear of returning to his or her country of citizenship, the fact that while in Canada they were very active politically and thus should not be returned to his or her country of citizenship.”
7.3.1. Claimant’s Activities Abroad

According to paragraph 96 of the UNHCR Handbook, the key issues in cases based on the claimant’s activities since leaving his or her home country are “whether such actions may have come to the notice of the authorities of the person’s country of origin and how they are likely to be viewed by those authorities.” Even though a claimant’s actions subsequent to departure may have come to the attention of the authorities there, it may nevertheless be that, in the circumstances, those actions do not give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution.⁸⁸

In Wang,⁸⁹ the Trial Division held that a sur place could not be maintained in the absence of evidence that the making of the refugee claim had specifically come to the attention of the authorities of the claimant’s country of origin. The Court certified a question as to whether in a sur place claim, it is necessary for the claimant to prove (a) that the Canadian media reports came to the attention of the authorities of his or her country of origin, and (b) that the information in the media reports was sufficient to allow the authorities to identify the claimant.

In Ghribi,⁹⁰ the Court found the claimant’s testimony concerning the Canadian Minister’s public statements about Tunisian refugee claimants and the consequent response of the Tunisian authorities in Canada and in Tunisia to be highly speculative, and thus there was insufficient evidence to establish that they would have the alleged impact so as to support a claim of refugee sur place.

On the other hand, in Zhu,⁹¹ the Trial Division held that once the evidence established that the claimant’s information was given to counsel for the accused, and filed in evidence at a public trial in Canada and in publicly accessible court records, it was patently unreasonable for the CRDD to suggest that further evidence was required to establish that the information actually came to the attention of a potential agent of persecution in the claimant’s country of origin. In

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⁸⁸ In Vafaei, Farah Angiz v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1276-93), Nadon, February 2, 1994, the Court referred specifically to paragraph 96 of the UNHCR Handbook. See also André, Marie-Kettelie v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1444-92), Dubé, October 24, 1994, where the CRDD found that the claimant’s participation in a large pro-Aristide demonstration in Montreal was not likely to cause her problems in Haiti.

⁹⁰ Ghribi, supra, footnote 87.

⁹¹ Zhu, Yong Qin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5678-00), Dawson, September 18, 2001; 2001 FCT 1026. Reported: Zhu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 F.C. 379 (T.D.). The claimant, who arrived on a Korean vessel, had informed the RCMP about individuals later charged in Canada with offences relating to human smuggling and was subpoenaed to testify at their trial. He feared that if he returns to China he would be severely punished by the Chinese authorities and that the “snakeheads” in China seriously harm him, if not kill him.
the Court’s view, that is too high a requirement to establish more than a mere possibility of persecution.

Where claims are based on the claimant’s activities abroad, some decisions of the Trial Division have focused on the issue of the *bona fides* or motivation of the claimant and have found that the claimant did not have a subjective fear of persecution.92

On the other hand, in *Ngongo*,93 the Trial Division cited with approval the following passage from Professor Hathaway’s *The Law of Refugee Status*:

> It does not follow, however, that all persons whose activities abroad are not genuinely demonstrative of oppositional political opinion are outside the refugee definition. Even when it is evident that the voluntary statement or action was fraudulent in that it was prompted primarily by an intention to secure asylum, the consequential imputation to the claimant of a negative political opinion by authorities in her home state may nonetheless bring her within the scope of the Convention definition. Since refugee law is fundamentally concerned with the provision of protection against unconscionable state action, an assessment should be made of any potential harm to be faced upon return because of the fact of the non-genuine political activity engaged in while abroad.94

In *Asfaw*,95 the Trial Division held that while it is relevant to examine the motives underlying a claimant’s participation in demonstration against his government in Canada in order to determine whether the claimant has a subjective fear, it would be an error for the CRDD to stop the analysis there as it is also necessary to examine whether or not the fear has an objective basis.

In *Ghasemian*,96 the Federal Court held that, once the Board accepted that the claimant had converted to Christianity while in Canada and now risked severe punishment in Iran as an apostate, it had to consider whether the claimant would be viewed as an apostate regardless of the motive for her conversion. While it was open to the Board to reject her *sur place* claim on the basis of a lack of subjective fear, the Board misconstrued her evidence regarding her alleged lack of fear of reprisals and applied the wrong test by rejecting her claim on the basis that it was not made in good faith, i.e., she did not convert for a purely religious motive. The Court followed

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92 See *Said, Mohamed Ahmed v. M.E.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. 90-T-638), Teitelbaum, May 1, 1990, where the claimant continued to demonstrate against the Kenyan government after he had been ordered excluded from Canada; and *Herrera, Juan Blas Perez de Corcho v. M.E.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. A-615-92), Noël, October 19, 1993, where the claimant spoke out against the Cuban regime after claiming refugee status in Canada.


the reasoning of the English Court of Appeal in Danian,\textsuperscript{97} that opportunistic claimants are still protected under the Convention if they can establish a genuine and well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention ground.

With respect to exit laws, however, in Zandi,\textsuperscript{98} the Court followed Valentin\textsuperscript{99} in holding that a defector cannot gain legal status in Canada under IRPA by creating a “need for protection” under section 97 by freely, of their own accord and with no reason, making themselves liable to punishment by violating a law of general application in their home country about complying with exit laws. (For a discussion of this topic see Chapter 9 – section 9.3.5. Exit Laws.)

Evidence of political activities in Canada should be considered by the panel whether or not the claimant specifically raises a \textit{sur place} claim.\textsuperscript{100} However, where the decision is under reserve, the onus is on the claimant to request a reconvening of the hearing (before a final decision on the claim has been rendered) in order to consider the impact that any newly alleged \textit{sur place} basis to the claim might have.\textsuperscript{101}

\begin{flushleft}
\textbf{7.3.2. Changes in Country Conditions or Claimant’s Personal Circumstances}
\end{flushleft}

The fact that the claimant’s departure from his or her homeland may have been perfectly legal is not relevant when considering a \textit{sur place} possibility. What is required is an assessment of the situation in the country of origin after the claimant left it.\textsuperscript{102}

In Tang,\textsuperscript{103} the Trial Division pointed out that, in the case of a \textit{sur place} claim, the relevant date to assess a delay in making a refugee claim is the date as of which the claimant became aware that he or she would allegedly face persecution on return to the country of nationality, and not the date on which the claimant arrived in Canada.

In Makala,\textsuperscript{104} the Trial Division considered the applicability of paragraph 82 of the UNHCR \textit{Handbook}, which states:

\begin{quote}
There may, however, also be situations in which the applicant has not given any expression to his opinions. Due to the strength of his convictions, however, it may be reasonable to assume that his opinions will sooner or later
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{97} Danian v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1999] E.W.J. No. 5459 online: QL.
\item \textsuperscript{98} Zandi, Reza v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4168-03), Kelen, March 17, 2004; 2004 FC 411.
\item \textsuperscript{99} Valentin v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] 3 F.C. 390 (C.A.).
\item \textsuperscript{102} Ghazizadeh, supra, footnote 85, at 1-2 (unreported).
\end{footnotes}
find expression and that the applicant will, as a result, come into conflict with the authorities. Where this can reasonably be assumed, the applicant can be considered to have fear of persecution for reason of political opinion.

The Court found that the CRDD’s erroneous finding that the claimant was not politically involved while in Congo may have impacted on its appreciation of the strength of the claimant’s political convictions and potential actions against the government upon return to Congo.

In Nthoubanza, on the other hand, the Trial Division upheld the CRDD’s finding that there was no evidence that the claimant would reasonably be likely to become a human rights activist or to express his political opinion if he returned to his country, given that he had not been a human rights or political activist under the previous regime.

A claimant may become a refugee *sur place* by virtue of the actions of Canadian authorities in that person’s home country.

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CHAPTER 8

8. INTERNAL FLIGHT ALTERNATIVE (IFA)

8.1. GENERALLY

The question of whether an IFA exists is an integral part of the Convention refugee definition. It arises when a claimant who otherwise meets all the elements of the Convention refugee definition in his or her home area of the country nevertheless is not a Convention refugee because the person has an IFA elsewhere in that country. The key concepts concerning IFA come from two cases: Rasaratnam and Thirunavukkarasu. From these cases it is clear that the test to be applied in determining whether there is an IFA is two-pronged.

(1) “... the Board must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there is no serious possibility of the claimant being persecuted in the part of the country to which it finds an IFA exists.”

(2) Moreover, conditions in the part of the country considered to be an IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable, in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claimant, for him to seek refuge there.

Both prongs must be satisfied for a finding that the claimant has an IFA.

The Court of Appeal in Kanagaratnam, was of the view that the determination of whether a claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution in his or her home area of the country is not a prerequisite to the consideration of an IFA.

The relationship between IFA, change of circumstances and the applicability of “compelling reasons” was considered by the Trial Division, and the Court concluded that where an IFA applies to a claimant, that person is not and never could have been a Convention refugee.

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2 Ibid.
4 Rasaratnam, supra, footnote 1 at 710.
5 Ibid., at 709 and 711.
Accordingly, he or she could not cease to be a Convention refugee on the basis of a change of circumstances.

8.2. TWO-PRONGED TEST

The second prong of the IFA test may be stated as follows: would it be unduly harsh to expect the claimant to move to another, less hostile part of the country before seeking refugee status abroad?8 The test is an objective one: is it objectively reasonable to expect the claimant to seek safety in a different part of the country? Thirunavukkarasu9 sets a very high threshold for what makes an IFA unreasonable in all the circumstances. The hardship associated with dislocation and relocation is not the kind of undue hardship that renders an IFA unreasonable.10

An IFA cannot be speculative or theoretical only; it must be a realistic, attainable option. The claimant cannot be required to encounter great physical danger or to undergo undue hardship in travelling there or staying there.11 However, it is not enough for the claimant to say that he or she does not like the weather there, or that he or she has no friends or relatives there, or that he or she may not be able to find suitable work there.12

A distinction must be maintained between the reasonableness of an IFA and humanitarian and compassionate considerations. The fact that a claimant might be better off in Canada, physically, economically and emotionally than in a safe place in his own country is not a factor to consider in assessing the reasonableness of the IFA.13

8.3. NOTICE - BURDEN OF PROOF

Two other general principles that emerge from Rasaratnam and Thirunavukkarasu concern notice and burden of proof. With respect to notice, the issue of IFA must be raised by the Refugee Claims Officer (now Refugee Protection Officer), the panel or the Minister (before or during the hearing). The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) does not automatically put claimants on notice that IFA is an issue in the claim. The principles regarding fair notice expressed in Rasaratnam and Thirunavukkarasu are still relevant under IRPA.14

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8 Thirunavukkarasu, supra, footnote 3, at 596-599.
9 Ibid.
11 Thirunavukkarasu, supra, footnote 3, at 596-599. In applying the principle set out in Thirunavukkarasu that the IFA must be an area that is realistically attainable, the Court in Playasova, Liudmila Fedor v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3931-02), Martineau, July 18, 2003; 2003 FC 901 stated that the failure of the RPD to consider that the claimant could only relocate to the IFA if she had the means to pay bribes to obtain a propiska was an error. In Dubravac, Petar v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-839-94), Rothstein, February 1, 1995. Reported: Dubravac v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 29 Imm. L.R. (2d) 55 (F.C.T.D.), where the claimant’s hometown had been surrounded by opposing Serbian forces, the Court commented that they “would not be required to go from their hometown to the safe zone of Croatia, but … from wherever they were relanded upon being sent back.”
12 Thirunavukkarasu, supra, footnote 3, at 596-599.
13 Ranganathan, supra, footnote 10, at 8.
It is a breach of natural justice to tell the claimant that IFA is not an issue and then, later, make a contrary finding on that issue. Extensive questioning during the hearing on the subject of IFA can be sufficient notice. With respect to burden of proof, once the issue is raised, the onus is on the claimant to show that he or she does not have an IFA.

Even though the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, the Board cannot base a finding that there is an IFA, in the absence of sufficient evidence, solely on the basis that the claimant has not fulfilled the onus of proof. A finding of IFA must be based on a distinct evaluation of a region for that purpose taking into account the claimant’s identity. It cannot be inferred from earlier findings of fact unconnected to the issue of an IFA.

There is some debate as to whether a specific location or region must be identified as the potential IFA.

8.4. STANDARD OF REVIEW

IFA is a question of fact and therefore, the standard of review to be applied by the Federal Court to internal flight alternative findings by the RPD is patent unreasonableness.
8.5. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE TWO-PRONGED TEST

The abundance of case law on the topic of IFA basically concerns the interpretation and application of the two-pronged test. Some factors are relevant to both prongs of the test, some are relevant to one or the other prong.

8.5.1. Fear of Persecution

On the issue of whether there is a serious possibility of persecution in the potential IFA, the considerations are basically the same as when making this determination with respect to the claimant’s home area of the country. However, there are some specific points concerning this issue and IFA that are noteworthy:

(a) In determining whether there is an objective basis for fearing persecution in the IFA, the Refugee Division must consider the personal circumstances of the claimant, and not just general evidence concerning other persons who live there.\(^{21}\)

(b) The Refugee Division must consider the circumstances of those persons in the IFA who are situated similarly to the claimant.\(^{22}\)

(c) In assessing the particular circumstances of the claimant, the Refugee Division may consider the condition of family members who have sought refuge in the IFA.\(^{23}\)

(d) The nature and the agents of the persecution feared ought to suggest that the persecution would be confined to particular areas of the country.\(^{24}\) The fact, however, that the agents


of persecution are the central authority in the country does not prevent a finding that there is an IFA.25

(e) If an individual had to remain in hiding to avoid problems, this would not be evidence of an IFA.26

(f) According to the Trial Division, the presence of close relatives in the putative IFA, and the duration of previous residence and past employment there, may have a bearing on “whether or not it is ‘objectively reasonable’ for the claimant to live in … [the IFA] without fear of persecution”, rather than being matters merely of personal comfort or convenience.27

(g) There is some lack of clarity concerning how the concept of cumulative harassment or cumulative grounds applies in the consideration of IFA.28 In Karthikesu, the Court appears to find that experiences in the non-IFA area do not form part of a cumulative assessment when considering the IFA area. In Balasubramaniam, however, the Court suggests that depending on the CRDD’s other findings “… it [the CRDD] may or may

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Saini has been distinguished in Singh, Sucha v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. 93-A-91), Dubé, June 23, 1993, where the Court held that the CRDD’s conclusion that an IFA existed because there was not a nation-wide campaign against the claimant’s ethnic group did not satisfy the criteria for finding an IFA as established in Rasaratnam, supra, footnote 1.


28 Karthikesu, supra, footnote 25; Balasubramaniam, supra, footnote 25.
not have to consider the question of the cumulative effect of all the incidents that occurred to the applicant at the hands of the Sri Lankan armed forces to determine whether these, together with the likelihood of continuing harassment at the hands of the authorities, might constitute persecution on a cumulative basis.”(emphasis added). This statement seems to suggest that experiences in the non-IFA area can form part of a cumulative assessment when considering the IFA area.

(h) Large urban areas cannot be assumed to be an IFA by virtue of their population size alone.29

(i) A determination regarding nexus is equally important in the assessment of whether an IFA exists in a given case.30

8.5.2. Reasonable in All the Circumstances

Regarding the issue of “reasonable in all the circumstances”, the Court of Appeal has stated that the circumstances must be relevant to the IFA question. They cannot be catalogued in the abstract. They will vary from case to case.31 However, whether certain factors are relevant to the determination of whether a given IFA would be "objectively reasonable" is an issue that transcends the particular facts of a given case. Therefore, the appropriate standard of review is "correctness" in cases where the issue is what factors the CRDD considers in assessing an IFA.32 The Federal Court has provided the following general guidance:

(a) The test is a flexible one that takes into account the particular situation of the claimant and the particular country involved.33 The evidence, before the Refugee Division, of circumstances in the IFA must be more than general information and must be relevant to the claimant’s specific circumstances.34


30 In Gomez, Mario Alonso Martinez v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5501-97), Teitelbaum, December 11, 1998, the CRDD found that the claimant had a well-founded fear of persecution in Puerto Vallarta because of the illegal actions of the police in brutalizing him, rather than because of his membership in a particular social group as a result of his homosexuality. In allowing the application for judicial review, the Court highlighted the fact that, in determining the availability of an IFA, the tribunal must first link the claimant's claim to one of the enumerated grounds in the definition of a Convention refugee.

31 Sharbdeen, supra, footnote 24, at 301-2.


33 See for example: Thirunavukkarasu, supra, footnote 3, at 597; Rasaratnam, supra, footnote 1, at 711; Fernando, supra, footnote 26, at 1; Abubakar, supra, footnote 21, at 4-5; Megag, Sahra Abdilahi v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-822-92), Rothstein, December 10, 1993, at 3; Chkiaou, Dimitri v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no., IMM-266-94), Cullen, March 7, 1995, and Sanno, supra, footnote 29, at 5-8. In Yoganathan, Kandasamy v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3588-97), Gibson, April 20, 1998, the Court noted that, in assessing the reasonableness of the IFA, the CRDD must look at the personal circumstances of the claimant and it is insufficient to simply assess whether the claimant fits the "most at risk profile."

There must be some discussion of the regional conditions which would make an IFA reasonable.\(^{35}\)

The presence or absence of family in the IFA is a factor in assessing reasonableness,\(^{36}\) especially in the case of minor claimants.\(^{37}\) However, the absence of relatives in an IFA would have to jeopardize the safety of a claimant before that factor would make an IFA unreasonable.\(^{38}\)

A destroyed infrastructure and economy in the IFA, and the stability or instability of the government that is in place there, are relevant factors.\(^{39}\) Instability alone is not the test of reasonableness,\(^{40}\) nor is a disintegrating infrastructure.\(^{41}\)

An IFA is not reasonable if it requires the perpetuation of human rights abuses.\(^{42}\)

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More than the mere absence of relatives is needed in order to make an IFA unreasonable. In *Ramachanthran, Thenmoli v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no., IMM-3606-02), Russell, May 18, 2003; 2003 FC 673, the Court found that the failure of the RPD to consider the impact on the claimant of returning to the IFA without her minor son, because the latter had been found to be a Convention refugee, was a reviewable error.


*Megag, supra*, footnote 33, at 3.

(f) Hardship in accessing the IFA must be assessed.\[^{43}\]

(g) There is no onus on a claimant to personally test the viability of an IFA before seeking protection in Canada.\[^{44}\]

Dealing with specific cases, the Court has indicated it is appropriate for the CRDD to consider, in various ways, factors such as: the claimant’s age,\[^{45}\] appearance (including gender), religion, political profile,\[^{46}\] the employment situation,\[^{47}\] the type of residence available, the ability to speak the language, the ability to raise a family,\[^{48}\] the crime rate, the physical and financial barriers,\[^{49}\] the composition of the “family” unit (it appears this may also go to fear of persecution),\[^{50}\] previous residence in the IFA area,\[^{51}\] familiarity with the IFA area, the capacity of

\[^{42}\] *Mimica, Milanka v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3014-95), Rothstein, June 19, 1996, the claimant could only find accommodation in the IFA if current residents were expelled because of their ethnicity.

\[^{43}\] In *Hashmat, Suhil v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2331-96), Teitelbaum, May 9, 1997, the claimant could only access the IFA in northern Afghanistan by going through the neighbouring state of Uzbekistan. The Court found it unreasonable for the panel to conclude, without any evidence, that the claimant would be allowed to cross the border. The Court also noted that the *Immigration Act* would not allow removal to a country that is not the claimant’s country of birth, nationality or former residence. See also *Dirshe, Safi Mohamud v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2124-96), Cullen, July 2, 1997, where the Court noted that a real possibility of rape while trying to get to the IFA makes it an unreasonable option. In fact, in *Hashmat, supra*, footnote 43 the Court found there to be undue hardship in reaching the IFA because the claimant’s wife and child, who were not claimants, would have to travel with him to reach the IFA and there was evidence of widespread rape of women and children making that journey.


\[^{45}\] *Gabriel, Joseph Gnanpragasam v. M.E.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3776-93), Wetston, May 25, 1994; *Krishnapillai, Arumugam v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5724-93), Reed, December 2, 1994; *Sahota, Amrik Singh v. M.E.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3313-93), McKeown, June 3, 1994, the young age of the claimant was held to be a factor with respect to which the Convention on the Rights of the Child ought to be considered. See also *Osman, Yassin Yussuf v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1667-96), Campbell, April 9, 1997, where young age (17) of claimant should have been considered in assessing reasonableness of IFA where he had no close family; *Nithiananathan, Krishnapillai v. M.E.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-36-97), Muldoon, October 21, 1997, repeated bribery demands to get out of detention may make IFA unduly harsh for an elderly claimant living alone.


\[^{50}\] *Vyramuthu, Sannugarajah v. S.G.C.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6277-93), Rouleau, January 26, 1995, one of the family members was found not to have an IFA; *Nadesalingam, Mahalingam v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5711-93), Muldoon, December 13, 1994, a family with young children is more vulnerable in seeking an IFA.

the claimant to re-establish him or herself, whether there is a similar group located in the IFA area, race or ethnicity of the claimant (this may also go to fear of persecution), having a registration card, being registered with the police, ability to move from one residence to another (e.g. legal restrictions), and the health and financial situation of the claimant.

Other factors identified by the Court as being relevant to a determination of this issue include the claimant’s business and social contacts in the potential IFA area; and medical and psychological reports that provide objective evidence that it would be “unduly harsh” to expect a claimant to move to a potential IFA area.

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53 Hasnain, supra, footnote 16; Somasundaram, Sivapackieswary v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6030-93), Cullen, September 21, 1994, the Court appears to consider under reasonableness such factors as extortion, threats, flight of all family members, concern regarding the police (although these issues are traditionally considered as going to persecution).


55 Chkiaou, supra, footnote 33.


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CHAPTER 9

9. PARTICULAR SITUATIONS

9.1. INTRODUCTION

This Chapter explores situations where more than one element of the Convention refugee definition is involved. At issue is not only whether what the claimant faces is persecution, but also whether there is a nexus to one of the Convention refugee grounds. The situations can be complex and difficult to analyze: the key is to identify what requirements are imposed by each element and to discern which circumstances in the situation go to which element.

9.2. CIVIL WAR OR OTHER PREVALENT CONFLICT

The core of the case law in this area consists of two decisions from the Court of Appeal. The first of these is Salibian,1 which sets out four general principles:2

It can be said in light of earlier decisions by this Court on claims to Convention refugee status that

(1) the applicant does not have to show that he had himself been persecuted or would himself be persecuted in the future;3

(2) the applicant can show that the fear he had resulted not from reprehensible acts committed or likely to be committed directly against him but from reprehensible acts committed or likely to be committed against members of a group to which he belonged;

(3) a situation of civil war in a given country is not an obstacle to a claim provided the fear felt is not that felt indiscriminately by all citizens as a consequence of the civil war, but that felt by the applicant himself, by a group with which he is associated, or, even, by all citizens on account of a risk of persecution based on one of the reasons stated in the definition; and

(4) the fear felt is that of a reasonable possibility that the applicant will be persecuted if he returns to his country of origin ....

The Court goes on to adopt the following description of the applicable law (provided by Professor Hathaway):4

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1 Salibian v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 3 F.C. 250 (C.A.).
2 Salibian, ibid., at 258, per Décary J.A.
In sum, while modern refugee law is concerned to recognize the protection needs of particular claimants, the best evidence that an individual faces a serious chance of persecution is usually the treatment afforded similarly situated persons in the country of origin. In the context of claims derived from situations of generalized oppression, therefore, the issue is not whether the claimant is more at risk than anyone else in her country, but rather whether the broadly based harassment or abuse is sufficiently serious to substantiate a claim to refugee status. If persons like the applicant may face serious harm for which the state is accountable, and if that risk is grounded in their civil or political status, then she is properly considered to be a Convention refugee.

The second of the leading precedents is the very brief decision in *Rizkallah*, where the Court of Appeal said:

To succeed, refugee claimants must establish a link between themselves and persecution for a Convention reason. In other words, they must be targeted for persecution in some way, either personally or collectively.

... the evidence, as presented to us, falls short of establishing that Christians in the claimant’s Lebanese village were collectively targeted in some way different from the general victims of the tragic and many-sided civil war.

Since *Salibian* and *Rizkallah*, there have been several additional Federal Court rulings in cases involving civil war. Most of these subsequent decisions have emanated from the Trial Division; a number have cited, and purported to apply, *Salibian* and/or *Rizkallah*; none has taken issue with *Salibian* or *Rizkallah*. Neither expressly nor by implication do these later cases yield much in the way of additional, clear principles.

One further principle which has emerged is that a claimant’s membership in one of the two groups involved in a two-sided conflict does not by itself establish that the claimant is a Convention refugee.

### 9.2.1. Two Approaches: Comparative and Non-Comparative

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6 *Rizkallah*, ibid., at 1-2, per MacGuigan J.A.


8 Reference should be made to the Guidelines on Civilian Non-Combatants Fearing Persecution in Civil War Situations, issued by the IRB Chairperson pursuant to section 65(3) of the Immigration Act, on March 7, 1996, as continued in effect by the Chairperson on June 28, 2002 under the authority found in section 159(1)(h) of...
9.2.1.1. Background

The case law seems to suggest that, in considering whether there is a nexus between the harm feared and a Convention ground, the judges are taking two different approaches to civil war claims and to the application of *Salibian* and *Rizkallah*.

It will be noted that in *Rizkallah*, the claim was seen as deficient because those constituting the claimant’s group were not “collectively targeted in some way different from the general victims of the … civil war.” Furthermore, *Salibian* contains the proviso that, in order for a claim to succeed, the claimant’s fear must not be “that felt indiscriminately by all citizens as a consequence of the civil war”. In some cases where these or similar phrases have been invoked, it appears that the Trial Division has seen this language as authority for adopting a comparative approach, which involves comparing the claimant’s predicament with the circumstances of other persons in the same country, and requiring that the claimant’s predicament be worse than the predicaments of other people.  

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the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*. Note that the comparative approach is not recommended in the Chairperson’s Guidelines.


Many if not most civil war situations are racially or ethnically based. If racially motivated attacks in civil war circumstances constitute a ground for convention refugee status, then, all individuals on either side of the conflict will qualify. The passages quoted by the Board from [paragraph 164 of] the United Nations Handbook … indicates that this is not the purpose of the 1951 Convention.


In *Ali, Shayasta-Ameer v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3404-95), McKeown, October 30, 1996. Reported: *Ali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)* (1996), 36 Imm. L.R. (2d) 34 (F.C.T.D.), the Trial Division certified the following question: “Are refugee claimants excluded from the definition of Convention refugee if all groups in their country, including the group of which they are members, are both victims and perpetrators of human rights violations in the context of civil war?” See, infra, footnote 20.

10 Requiring a worse predicament might mean any one of several things. To succeed, a claimant might have to establish: (i) that the claimant’s level of risk is greater than the risk level of persons in other groups, or (ii) that the claimant’s risk level is greater than the risk level of other persons in the claimant’s own group; or (iii) that the claimant is at risk of suffering harm greater than that which threatens others.

Regarding (i), see: *Siad, supra*, footnote 9, at 9 and 10-11; *Omar, Saleiman Ahmed v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. A-1615-92), McKeown, February 7, 1996, at 2; but see *Janjicek, Davorin v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2242-94), Richard, March 28, 1995, where the parties consented to an order which “remitted [the matter] for a new hearing on the basis that a Convention refugee claimant need not establish that her or his ethnic group is at greater risk than members of other ethnic groups, in accordance with … *Salibian v. M.E.I.*”

In other cases, the Court of Appeal and the Trial Division have taken the position that a claimant who belongs to a group\textsuperscript{11} which is at risk of attack by some second group may qualify as a Convention refugee - and, in particular, has the requisite nexus - even if persons other than the claimant and groups other than the claimant’s group are also at risk of attack by the same or different attackers.

There have also been cases in which the evidence was simply inadequate to make out a claim, regardless of which approach might have been used.\textsuperscript{12} And there have been cases in which the Court relied on the fact that the specific claimant possessed particular risk factors, might have been personally targeted, and might have faced a particularly elevated level of risk.\textsuperscript{13} It must also be acknowledged that, where several cases are concerned, it is not really possible to say with certainty what was the basis of the Court’s disposition, which elements of the Refugee Division’s analysis the Court endorsed or rejected, and what propositions may properly be inferred from the Court’s disposition.\textsuperscript{14}

According to the non-comparative approach,\textsuperscript{15} a claim which arises in a context of widespread violence must meet the same conditions as any other claim. The content of those conditions is no different for such a claim, nor is the claim subject to extra requirements or disqualifications. Thus, under this approach, the Refugee Protection Division would consider:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Serious harm: whether the treatment that the claimant anticipates would amount to serious harm. The question is whether the harm which this particular claimant might experience is serious, not whether the claimant is at risk of harm greater than that to which some other group, or some other person in the claimant’s own group, might be subjected.
  \item Risk of harm: whether there is a reasonable chance that the claimant would experience the apprehended harm. The issue is not whether this particular claimant carries a degree of risk greater than that which attaches to some other person or
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{11} The claimant’s group must be one which is definable in terms of a Convention characteristic.


\textsuperscript{13} For example: \textit{Ali, Hassan Isse, supra, footnote 10}, at 7-8; and \textit{Hotaki, Khalilullah v. M.E.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6659-93), Gibson, November 22, 1994, at 4.


\textsuperscript{15} Recommended in the Chairperson’s \textit{Guidelines, supra, footnote 8}, at 7.
group.

- Nexus. The presence of a nexus is determined upon the anticipated infliction of harm upon the claimant and one of the Convention grounds. It is a matter of identifying the particular source(s) or perpetrator(s) who would inflict harm upon this particular claimant, and determining whether that perpetrator’s reason for inflicting harm would tally with one of the grounds. The claimant is not to be disqualified because other persons in the claimant’s group or in different groups might also be targeted for similar reasons. Nor is a non-combatant claimant to be fixed with some sort of “collective guilt” because combatant members of the claimant’s group are inflicting harm on members of other groups.

A requirement that the claimant be in a predicament which is worse than the circumstances of fellow nationals may be difficult to reconcile with certain passages in Salibian and Rizkallah and with the terms of the Convention refugee definition. Such a requirement seems to have little if any support in post-Rizkallah decisions from the Court of Appeal, and may be at odds with those decisions. The passages in Salibian and Rizkallah which have sometimes been referred to when engaging in a hardship comparison contain a measure of vagueness; certainly they are not substitutes for an element-by-element analysis of a claim, nor do they negate Salibian’s assertion that a claimant is not barred from succeeding because his or her problems have arisen in the context of a civil war.

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16 Salibian, supra, footnote 1, points out that there may be a nexus in a civil war context. Rizkallah, supra, footnote 5, may be seen as adding to Salibian little more than a reminder that nexus may also be absent in such a situation. Simple political instability does not make for a well-founded fear of persecution: Megag, Sahra Abdilahi v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-822-92), Rothstein, December 10, 1993, at 2. See also Ezeta, Octavio Alberto del Busto v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2021-95), Cullen, February 15, 1996, at 3-4, where the claimant’s difficulties were a result of the unsettled and dangerous political climate in Peru, rather than being linked to a Convention ground.

17 In Khalib, Amina Ahmed v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-656-92), MacKay, March 30, 1994. Reported: Khalib v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 24 Imm. L.R. (2d) 149 (F.C.T.D.), the claimants’ home area, in which the claimants’ Issaq clan predominated, had been sown with mines by the former Somali government, allegedly with the intention of harming Issaqs. Many mines remained, and the claimants feared injury. The Refugee Division held that the danger was one faced indiscriminately by all people in the area; and in upholding the decision, the Court noted that while Issaqs may have been the majority, the danger was nevertheless faced by all.

18 Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 at 747, per La Forest J., “The examination of the circumstances should be approached from the perspective of the persecutor, since that is determinative in inciting the persecution.”

9.2.1.2. **The Non-Comparative Approach is the Legal and Preferred Test**

In *Ali, Shaysta-Ameer*, the Court of Appeal affirmed that the proper test for persecution in a civil war context is the non-comparative approach set out in the *Salibian* and *Rizkallah* cases and advocated in the Chairperson's Guidelines, *Civilian Non-Combatants Fearing Persecution in Civil War Situations*. The Court cited, with approval, the following passages from the Guidelines:

Non-comparative Approach

The non-comparative approach to the assessment of a claim is the approach advocated in these Guidelines. This approach is more in accord with the third principle set out in *Salibian*, the decisions of the Court of Appeal in *Rizkallah* and *Hersi, Nur Dirie*, as well as the wording of the Convention refugee definition. With this approach, instead of an emphasis on comparing the level of risk of persecution between the claimant and other individuals (including individuals in the claimant's own group) or other groups, the Court examines the claimant's particular situation, and that of her group, in a manner similar to any other claim for Convention refugee status.

The issue is not a comparison between the claimant's risk and the risk faced by other individuals or groups at risk for a Convention reason, but whether the claimant's risk is a risk of sufficiently serious harm and is linked to a Convention reason as opposed to the general, indiscriminate consequences of civil war. A claimant should not be labelled as a "general victim" of civil war without full analysis of her personal circumstances and that of any group to which she may belong. Using a non-comparative approach results in a focusing of attention on whether the claimant's fear of persecution is by reason of a Convention ground. (footnotes omitted)

9.3. **PROSECUTION, OR PERSECUTION FOR A CONVENTION REASON?**

9.3.1. **Limits to Acceptable Legislation and Enforcement**

Any state is entitled to have, and to enact, laws which will contribute to the better, safer, more just functioning of the national community and its government. And any state is entitled to impose penalties upon those who break its laws. However, from the standpoint of international human rights law, there is a line over which the state cannot legitimately step. To determine whether the state has limited itself to its proper sphere or has overstepped, the Refugee Protection Division must be mindful of the distinction between two kinds of cases: (a) cases in which the treatment foreseen for the claimant would be punishment for nothing other than the breach of a law that does not violate human rights, and does not adversely differentiate on a Convention ground, either on its face or in its application; and (b) cases in which the claimant’s actions might

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21 *Supra*, footnote 8.
contravene a law of his homeland, but in which the law’s terms or its anticipated enforcement might infringe upon human rights and adversely differentiate.

### 9.3.2. Laws of General Application

The Federal Court has dealt at some length with questions relating to “laws of general application.” This term refers to a law which, on its face, applies to a country’s entire population, without differentiation; and the term is not properly employed if the law in question targets only some subset of the population. For a time, the leading decision on this topic was Musial; however, in the more recent case of Zolfagharkhani, the Court of Appeal examined the theme in greater depth and provided interpretation of Musial. Therefore, Zolfagharkhani must now be regarded as pre-eminent. Musial should be used with caution, and only after taking Zolfagharkhani into account.

In Zolfagharkhani, the Court rejected the proposition that, so long as the action taken by a government against a claimant is the enforcement of “an ordinary law of general application”, the government is necessarily engaging in prosecution and not persecution. In a dictatorial or totalitarian state, any ordinary law of general application may well be an act of political oppression.

The Court of Appeal in Zolfagharkhani set forth “some general propositions relating to the status of an ordinary law of general application in determining the question of persecution”:

1. The statutory definition of Convention refugee makes the intent (or any

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22 Fathi-Rad, Farideh v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2438-93), McGillis, April 13, 1994, at 4. See also Namitabar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 2 F.C. 42 (T.D.), at 46. Compare Altawil, Anwar Mohamed v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2365-95), Simpson, July 25, 1996. In Canada (Secretary of State) v. Namitabar (F.C.A., no. A-709-93), Décary, Hugessen, Desjardins, October 28, 1996, the Court overturned the Trial Division on the basis that the CRDD credibility findings were not ambiguous. With respect to the issue of wearing veils in Iran, the Court was of the view that “the Refugee Division may have expressed itself incorrectly [but] that has no importance in the case at bar since the female [claimant] voluntarily complied with the clothing code and did not even display reluctance to do so...”

23 Musial v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1982] 1 F.C. 290 (C.A.). Speaking for the majority at 294, Pratte J. said:

A person who is punished for having violated an ordinary law of general application, is punished for the offence he has committed, not for the political opinions that may have induced him to commit it. … [A] person who has violated the laws of his country of origin by evading ordinary military service, and who merely fears prosecution and punishment for that offence in accordance with those laws, cannot be said to fear persecution for his political opinions even if he was prompted to commit that offence by his political beliefs.


25 Zolfagharkhani, ibid., at 549. See also Fathi-Rad, supra, footnote 22, at 4.


27 Zolfagharkhani, supra, footnote 24, at 552. These propositions have been cited with regularity in subsequent decisions dealing with conscientious objection to military service. See section 9.3.6., infra.
principal effect\textsuperscript{28} of an ordinary law of general application, rather than the motivation of the claimant, relevant to the existence of persecution\textsuperscript{29}

(2) But the neutrality of an ordinary law of general application, \textit{vis-à-vis} the five grounds for refugee status, must be judged objectively by Canadian tribunals and courts when required.\textsuperscript{30}

(3) In such consideration, an ordinary law of general application, even in non-democratic societies, should ... be given a presumption of validity and neutrality, and the onus should be on a claimant, as is generally the case in refugee cases, to show that the laws are either inherently or for some other reason persecutory.\textsuperscript{31}

(4) It will not be enough for the claimant to show that a particular regime is generally oppressive but rather that the law in question is persecutory in relation to a Convention ground.

Seriousness of harm is another issue which has been addressed in connection with laws of general application. It is quite possible that a law or policy of general application may well be violative of basic human rights.\textsuperscript{32} Also, in \textit{Cheung} it was decided that a law of general

\textsuperscript{28} In \textit{Cheung v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)}, [1993] 2 F.C. 314 (C.A.), at 319, Linden J.A. said that the Refugee Division “wrongly required that a ‘persecutory intent’ be present, whereas a ‘persecutory effect’ suffices.”

\textsuperscript{29} Compare \textit{Suleman, Adams v. M.E.I.} (F.C.A., no. A-1297-91), Desjardins, Décary, Létourneau, May 5, 1994, where the Court, without referring to any authority, stated, at 2:

We are not certain that ... the Refugee Division analysed the claimant’s acts in the context in which he committed them, and that it considered the question of whether his acts, although illegal, did not have a political connotation or were not committed for political reasons or in a political context that could then found a reasonable fear of persecution based on political opinion, whether real or imputed by the agent of persecution.


\textsuperscript{30} See \textit{Zhu, Yong Liang v. M.E.I.} (F.C.A., no. A-1017-91), MacGuigan, Linden, Robertson, January 28, 1994, at 2-3. In \textit{Daghighi, Malek v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. A-64-93), Reed, November 16, 1995, the Refugee Division held that the Iranian claimant had simply run afoul of “laws or a policy of general application founded on fundamentalist principles of Islamic law”. But evidence indicated that the claimant had incurred the authorities’ displeasure for Western tendencies and unacceptable religious views, and that he had been obliged to undergo religious instruction. The Court rejected the conclusion that his difficulties were not related to a Convention ground.

In \textit{Chan} (F.C.A.), Mr. Justice Heald ruled that punishment for breach of a government policy is not punishment for political opinion if the breach will be perceived by the authorities not as a challenge to their authority but only as a breach of a law: \textit{Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)}, [1993] 3 F.C. 675, at 695; (1993), 20 Imm. L.R. (2d) 181 (C.A.). See also: \textit{Barima v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)}, [1994] 1 F.C. 30 (T.D.), at 37; \textit{Liang, Zhai Kui v. M.E.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2487-93), Denault, November 2, 1993, at 3.


\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)}, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593, per La Forest J. (dissenting) at 632.
application may be persecutory where the penalty is disproportionate to the objective of the law, regardless of the authorities’ intent:

… if the punishment or treatment under a law of general application is so Draconian as to be completely disproportionate to the objective of the law, it may be viewed as persecutory. This is so regardless of whether the intent of the punishment or treatment is persecution. Cloaking persecution with a veneer of legality does not render it less persecutory. Brutality in furtherance of a legitimate end is still brutality.33

In Chan (S.C.C.), Mr. Justice La Forest approved the comments of Linden J.A. regarding “state authority arguments” (as they were called by La Forest J.).34 And La Forest J. provided his own observations with respect to the “legitimate end” idea:

... I do not in general consider it appropriate for courts to make implicit or explicit pronouncements on the validity of another nation’s social policies. In the present case, the full extent of the Chinese population policy is unknown in this country and undue speculation as to its legitimacy serves no purpose. Whether the Chinese government decides to curb its population is an internal matter for that government to decide. Indeed, there are undoubtedly appropriate and acceptable means of achieving the objectives of its policy that are not in violation of basic human rights. However, when the means employed place broadly protected and well understood basic human rights under international law such as the security of the person in jeopardy, the boundary between acceptable means of achieving a legitimate policy and persecution will have been crossed. It is at this point that Canadian judicial bodies may pronounce on the validity of the means by which a social policy may be implemented in an individual case by either granting or denying Convention refugee status ... [Emphasis added.]35

(The distinction between the authorities’ objective and their means of achieving it is discussed further in section 9.3.3. of this chapter.)

Furthermore, a penalty which is disproportionate to the offence may constitute persecution.36 When imposed for certain offences, the death penalty may not constitute

33 Cheung, supra, footnote 28, at 323, per Linden J.A. See also Fathi-Rad, supra, footnote 22, at 4-5. Compare Chan (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 30, at 724, per Desjardins J.A.

34 Chan (S.C.C.), supra, footnote 32, per La Forest J. (dissenting) at 634.

35 Chan (S.C.C.), ibid., per La Forest J. (dissenting) at 631.

36 Namitabar (T.D.), supra, footnote 22; Rodriguez-Hernandez, Severino Carlos v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. A-19-93), Wetston, January 10, 1994, at 4; Denis, Juan Carlos Olivera v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4920-93), Nadon, February 18, 1994, at 4, Fathi-Rad, supra, footnote 22, at 4-5. In Namitabar (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 22, the Court overturned the Trial Division on the basis that the CRDD credibility findings were not ambiguous. With respect to the issue of wearing veils in Iran, the Court was of the view that “the Refugee Division may have expressed itself incorrectly [but] that has no importance in the case at bar since the female [claimant] voluntarily complied with the clothing code and did not even display reluctance to do so…” See also Rabbani, Faridah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2032-96), McGillis, June 3, 1997.
persecution.\(^{37}\)

If the Refugee Protection Division applies the term “law of general application”, it must be careful to include within this characterization only what is actually authorized by the law in question. Where a given policy constitutes a law of general application, a particular sanction used to enforce that policy may not be a law of general application.\(^{38}\) And even if such a law does figure in the claim, the Division certainly must not disregard measures which are beyond the law. Where there is evidence of extra-judicial punishment or (other) lack of due legal process, consideration must not be limited to the actual legislation itself.\(^{39}\) Indeed, perversions in the application of the law, such as the bringing of a trumped-up charge, and interference in the due process of law, may be aspects of persecutory treatment.\(^{40}\) In one instance, the Court of Appeal has said that pursuit of a claimant for refusing to carry out a government order will constitute mere prosecution only if the order was a “valid” one, and not one that was “illegal” or with “no legal foundation”.\(^{41}\)


An enactment may itself allow for denial of due process, thereby increasing the chances that persecution will occur; see, for example, Balasingham, Satchithananthan v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2469-94), Rothstein, February 17, 1995, at 2-3.

In M.E.I. v. Satiacum, Robert (F.C.A., no. A-554-87), Urie, Mahoney, MacGuigan, June 16, 1989. Reported: Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Satiacum (1989), 99 N.R. 171 (F.C.A.), the Court held that the claimant’s fear of extra-judicial punishment, which was based partly on alleged irregularities in prosecution, was not well founded. Furthermore, the Court stated, at 9, that “… Canadian tribunals have to assume a fair and independent judicial process in the foreign country. In the case of a non-democratic State contrary evidence might be readily forthcoming, but in relation to a democracy like the United States contrary evidence might have to go to the extent of substantially impeaching … [some key element of the judicial system].” See also page 11.

\(^{40}\) Kicheva, Zorka v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-625-92), Denault, December 23, 1993, at 2. The fact of prosecution might conceivably be objectionable where it would entail the claimant’s being prosecuted a second time for an offence already dealt with conclusively (i.e., a situation of “double jeopardy”), however, see Chu, supra, footnote 37, especially at 4.

If enforcement of the law against the claimant would proceed in accordance with due process, and if the sanctions for violating a particular law are not serious, the situation is not one of persecution.42

9.3.3. Policing Methods, National Security and Preservation of Social Order

In some situations, the argument for the acceptability of state actions may rely not on the presence of any particular authorizing law (if any), but instead on the idea that those actions were aimed at the preservation of social order, against dangers such as crime and terrorism. Indeed, the actions in question, rather than being approved by law, may be of very doubtful legality.

In this context as well, the courts have grappled with the question of whether harmful conduct may be excused by the purpose which prompts the authorities to engage in the conduct.43 In the first place, the above-quoted statement from Cheung - that “[b]rutality in furtherance of a legitimate end is still brutality”44 - is again apposite. It is not rendered less relevant by the fact that the brutality is perpetrated without the screen, or superficial legitimation, of an authorizing law. Moreover, in Thirunavukkarasu,45 a later decision dealing more directly with the notion of preserving the social order, the Court of Appeal ruled that “beatings of suspects can never be considered ‘perfectly legitimate investigations’ [into criminal or terrorist activities], however dangerous the suspects are thought to be.”46 The Court also affirmed that

… the state of emergency in Sri Lanka cannot justify the arbitrary arrest and detention as well as beatings and torture of an innocent civilian at the hands of the very government from whom the claimant is supposed to be seeking safety.47

It is inappropriate to dismiss mistreatment on the theory that, by transgressing the law, the claimant forfeited any right to complain about any treatment that was meted out to him or her in response. Rather than stating simply that the claimant could not expect to receive the authorities’ approval for committing illegal acts, the Refugee Protection Division must determine whether the treatment suffered by the claimant constituted persecution in the circumstances.48

In a number of cases, the Trial Division has applied reasoning of the kind that was

42 Drozdov, supra, footnote 31, at 5.
43 In the case of a claimant with links to, for example, an organization which uses violence to achieve political ends, it may be appropriate to consider whether Article 1F applies.
44 Cheung, supra, footnote 28, at 323, per Linden J.A.
46 Thirunavukkarasu, ibid., at 600, per Linden J.A.
47 Thirunavukkarasu, ibid., at 601, per Linden J.A
subscribed to in Cheung and Thirunavukkarasu. However, there have also been cases in which such reasoning has not been applied by the Trial Division. In some of these latter cases, the Trial Division judgments appear to contradict the letter and spirit of the opinions from the Court of Appeal.

According to the Trial Division, national security and peace and order are valid social objectives of any state, and temporary derogation of civil rights in an emergency does not necessarily amount to persecution. In this regard, before finding mistreatment to be non-persecutory because there is an emergency, the Refugee Protection Division should consider several matters: Is there indeed an emergency? Is the particular right that is being violated a derogable right, or is it non-derogable? If the right is derogable, what is the nature of the particular emergency, what is the extent of the particular derogation, and is there a logical nexus between the emergency and the derogation?

The Trial Division has said that short-term detentions for the purpose of preventing disruptions or dealing with terrorism do not constitute persecution. It may also be proper to

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51 Alfred, Rayappu v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1466-93), MacKay, April 7, 1994, at 5: “The tribunal did not assess the physical mistreatment of the applicant by Colombo police in terms of persecution. Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [,...] Articles 7 and 4 make clear that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment even in times of public emergency.” See also Kanapathypillai, Indrarajan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3724-96), Heald, July 11, 1997, at 3.

52 Alfred, supra, footnote 51, at 3.

53 Mahalingam, Paramalingam v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. A-79-93), Joyal, November 2, 1993, at 6; Naguleswaran, supra, footnote 50, at 5-6. But see Bragagnini-Ore, Gianina Evelyn v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2243-93), Pinard, February 4, 1994, at 2. While the statement “Short detentions for the purpose of preventing disruption or dealing with terrorism do not constitute persecution” may be generally true, the CRDD must take into account the special circumstances of the claimant, in particular his age and, given that age, the impact of his prior experiences as forecasted in a psychological report. See also Vellupillai, Selvaratnam v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2043-99), Gibson, March 9, 2000, and Murugamoorthy, Rajarani v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4706-02), O’Reilly, September 29, 2003; 2003 FC 1114, where the Court agreed that, while in general
conclude that some forms of violence, including beatings, do not amount to persecution in the circumstances of a particular case, even though they are reprehensible and violative of human rights;\textsuperscript{55} for example, the mistreatment may not have been repetitive or sufficiently severe,\textsuperscript{56} and there may be no prospect of its being repetitive or sufficiently severe in the future. However, given Cheung, and Thirunavukkarasu, the Refugee Protection Division should be cautious about deeming violent conduct to be non-persecutory.\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{9.3.4. Enforcement and Serious Possibility}

Even if the evidence speaks of some harm that would qualify as serious, the Refugee Protection Division must consider whether there is a serious possibility that the harm will actually come to pass. A statute which outlaws the claimant’s conduct or characteristic may be in existence, and it may provide for unconscionably severe punishment for that conduct or characteristic, but this does not necessarily mean there is a serious possibility that the punishment will be inflicted on the claimant. The Supreme Court has emphasized that, in a determination as to whether the claimant’s fear is objectively well founded, the relevant factors include the laws in the claimant’s homeland, together with the manner in which they are applied. In this connection, the Court cited paragraph 43 of the UNHCR Handbook.\textsuperscript{58} Enforcement measures may vary from area to area within a country, and if this is the case, “the reasonableness of a fear of persecution depends, \textit{inter alia}, on the practices of the relevant local authority”.\textsuperscript{59}

A pattern of non-enforcement might imply that there is less than a serious possibility.\textsuperscript{60}
9.3.5. Exit Laws

Some countries have laws which impose restrictions on travel abroad. Such laws may make it an offence to depart without prior permission (illegal departure), or to stay abroad beyond some stipulated period (overstay), or to visit certain countries. Where such laws exist, generally sanctions for breaching them are also on the books. In some instances there may, in addition, be provision for extending the authorized travel period before it ends, or for obtaining retroactive authorization of travels that were not approved in advance.

In Valentin, Marceau J.A. spoke to those situations in which “the claimant may face criminal sanctions in his or her own country for leaving the territory without authorization or for remaining abroad longer than his or her exit visa allowed.” His Lordship stated:

Counsel then challenged the Board’s rejection of the argument based on the existence of section 109 of the Czech Criminal Code [the exit law] and the fear of imprisonment that the section aroused in the claimants … [C]ounsel recalled that there was one school of thought … [which was] prepared to admit that the mere fear of punishment under a provision such as section 109 … could amount to a well-founded fear of persecution and provide valid grounds for a refugee claim. We know that some supporters of this theory argue a sort of presumption that the authorities of the national State will automatically and inevitably interpret the decision of their fellow-citizen to leave the country without authorization, or to remain abroad beyond the time provided, as evidence of political opposition. Counsel acknowledged that this is an extreme position, which the vast majority of commentators rejected, and did not urge its acceptance per se …


More generally, note Torres, Alejandro Rodriguez v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-503-94), Simpson, February 1, 1995 (reasons signed April 26, 1995), at 4-5: “In my view, refugee claims are not to be considered on a theoretical level which ignores the realities of the evidence. … [The Refugee Division] was entitled to make a practical assessment of the possibility of the Applicant facing future persecution.”


62 There may be an overstay law which applies to all residents of a country or to all of the country’s citizens, and which provides for penalties of fine or incarceration. Alternatively, a law may provide that a non-citizen resident (including a stateless resident) who travels abroad must return and report periodically, and that failure to do so will result in the loss of resident status and the right to return: e.g. Altawil, supra, footnote 22.


64 Valentin, supra, footnote 60, at 392.

65 Valentin, supra, footnote 60, at 394-396.
Neither the international Convention nor our Act, which is based on it, as I understand it, had in mind the protection of people who, having been subjected to no persecution to date, themselves created a cause to fear persecution by freely, of their own accord and with no reason, making themselves liable to punishment for violating a criminal law of general application. I would add … that the idea does not appear to me even to be supported by the fact that the transgression was motivated by some dissatisfaction of a political nature …, because it seems to me, first, that an isolated sentence can only in very exceptional cases satisfy the elements of repetition and relentlessness found at the heart of persecution\(^{66}\) …, but particularly because the direct relationship that is required between the sentence incurred and imposed and the offender’s political opinion does not exist.

However, where the claimant has violated an exit law, the decision to punish the claimant for that infraction, or to impose a certain degree of punishment, might be due to some characteristic of the claimant such as his political record.\(^{67}\) Repercussions beyond the statutory sentence may suggest that the actions of the authorities are persecutory.\(^{68}\)

**9.3.6. Military Service: Conscientious Objection, Evasion, Desertion**

The claimant’s problems may be connected with a disinclination to serve in the military. Either the claimant entered the military and left it without authorization (i.e., the claimant deserted);\(^{69}\) or the claimant was ordered to report for service, but refused to report or refused to be inducted; or the claimant has not yet received a call-up, but anticipates that the order will be forthcoming and does not wish to comply.

The courts have established some very basic points of departure for the analysis of such claims. Thus, conscientious objectors and army deserters are not automatically included in the Convention refugee definition, nor is a person precluded from being a Convention refugee because the person is a conscientious objector or deserter.\(^{70}\) It is not persecution for a country to have compulsory military service.\(^{71}\) An aversion to military service or a fear of combat is not in

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\(^{68}\) *Castaneda, supra*, footnote 26, at 4-5 (Cuba). See also *Moslim, supra*, footnote 39. In *Chow, Wing Sheung v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. A-1476-92), McKeown, March 26, 1996, at 3, the Court noted that the Refugee Division had found that neither the maximum prescribed penalty nor the penalties actually imposed were harsh.

\(^{69}\) For an example of a situation which was found not to constitute desertion, see *Nejad, supra*, footnote 60, at 3.

\(^{70}\) *Musial, supra*, footnote 23, at 292-293, per Thurlow C.J.

itself sufficient to justify a fear of persecution.\textsuperscript{72}

Proceeding to a more detailed analysis of the claim, the Refugee Protection Division must consider whether the circumstances disclose a nexus between the treatment feared and one of the Convention grounds. \textit{Zolfagharkhani}\textsuperscript{73} is the leading case with respect to nexus (and other factors) in military-service situations.\textsuperscript{74} The principles quoted from that case earlier on\textsuperscript{75} should be referred to for guidance when determining whether the claimant’s difficulties regarding service should be ascribed to a Convention ground, or instead should be considered punishment for a violation of a law of general application.

However, as an aside from \textit{Zolfagharkhani}, the most recent decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in \textit{Ates}\textsuperscript{76} has put into question whether conscientious objection to military service can ever be considered to be a ground for claiming Convention refugee status.\textsuperscript{77} The Court answered, without any analysis, the following certified question in the negative:

\begin{quote}
In a country where military service is compulsory, and there is no alternative thereto, do repeated prosecutions and incarcerations of a conscientious objector for the offence of refusing to do his military service, constitute persecution based on a Convention refugee ground?"
\end{quote}

\textit{Zolfagharkhani} indicates that it is not the claimant’s motivation for refusing to serve which is relevant, but rather the intent or principal effect of the conscription law.\textsuperscript{78} In accordance with this guideline, one must ask whether the reaction of the authorities to the claimant’s refusal to serve would be a function of some Convention attribute which the claimant has, or would be perceived by the authorities as having (a political opinion often being the likeliest possibility).\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Garcia, Marvin Balmory Salvador v. S.S.C.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2521-93), Pinard, February 4, 1994. See also \textit{Barisic, supra}, footnote 9, at 4, where the claimant avoided conscription into the Croatian army because he did not wish to kill people with whom he had lived. The Court said that the Refugee Division was entitled to conclude that his motives were those shared by all reluctant combatants. In \textit{Haoua, Mehdi v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-698-99), Nadon, February 21, 2000, the Court stated at para. 16 “… I also note that military service does not, in itself, constitute persecution. Rather, the Applicant’s claim hinged on the fear that he would be forced to commit atrocities if he were drafted. If there is no evidence of atrocities, as there was none in this case, there is no evidence of persecution.”

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Zolfagharkhani, supra}, footnote 24.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Musial, supra}, footnote 23, also dealt with military service but \textit{Zolfagharkhani, supra}, footnote 24 has replaced \textit{Musial} as the chief authority not only with respect to the more encompassing topic of laws of general application, but also with respect to this particular example of such laws. See Chapter 9, section 9.3.2.

\textsuperscript{75} See Chapter 9, section 9.3.2.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Ates, Erkan v. M.C.I.} (F.C.A., no. A-592-04), Linden, Nadon, Sharlow, October 5, 2005; 2005 FCA 322 [Appeal from \textit{Ates, Erkan v. M.C.I.} (F.C., no. IMM-150-04), Harrington, September 27, 2004; 2004 FC 1316]; leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed without costs March 30, 2006 (31246).

\textsuperscript{77} Note that the decision of the Court only dealt with the Convention refugee claim with no consideration of whether the claimant might have a successful claim under s. 97 of the \textit{Immigration and Refugee Protection Act} (person in need of protection). Section 97 is beyond the purview of this paper.

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Zolfagharkhani, supra}, footnote 24, at 550 and 552.

\textsuperscript{79} See \textit{Blagoev, Stoycho Borissov v. M.E.I.} (F.C.A., no. A-827-91), Heald, Desjardins, Linden, July 19, 1994, at 2, where the Court was of the view that the claimant, a deserter, had not established that the applicable law,
Even where the claimant has no strong convictions which should be permitted to interfere with the claimant’s serving, his refusal might be regarded by the authorities as an indication of an opinion which is frowned upon by them.

However, it would seem that the motivation of the claimant has not been completely discarded as a factor in claims concerning military service, although the cases do not make clear to which element or elements (nexus, serious harm) it may relate, and exactly how it should be worked into the consideration of a particular element. In Zolfagharkhani itself, the Court of Appeal focused on the claimant’s reason of conscience for not wishing to serve, and laid considerable emphasis on the fact that the particular combat technique to which the claimant objected was abhorred by the international community; but the Court did not provide much explanation as to how such attending to the claimant’s reason of conscience was to be reconciled with the view that the claimant’s motivation is not relevant.\textsuperscript{80} Furthermore, in subsequent decisions, the Trial Division has repeatedly considered the claimant’s conscience, as well as the attitude of the international community to operations criticized by the claimant. Reliance has even been placed explicitly upon the “applicant’s motive”.\textsuperscript{81} The reader should bear in mind these ambiguities in the case law when reviewing the following observations on reasons-of-conscience claims.\textsuperscript{82}

When addressing a case in which the claimant invokes reasons of conscience for his aversion to performing military service, the Refugee Protection Division must decide whether the particular reasons adduced are of sufficient significance.

As a sidebar to this issue, there is some debate - and some confusion - about the meaning of the term “conscientious objector”. In Popov, the Trial Division indicated that, “in the usual sense”, this term applied to a person who “was a pacifist or was against war and all militarism on the grounds of principle, either religious or philosophical.”\textsuperscript{83} It may be correct to reserve this particular term for persons who are opposed to all militarism; but at the same time, it must be appreciated that what is important for the determination of a claim is not whether this particular label fits.

The important question is whether a claimant’s reason of conscience will be sufficiently significant only if it entails an opposition to all militarism (or is otherwise broad in scope). In

\textsuperscript{80} Zolfagharkhani, supra, footnote 24, at 553-556.


\textsuperscript{82} See also paragraphs 170 to 174 of the UNHCR Handbook.

\textsuperscript{83} Popov, supra, footnote 71, at 244. See also Tkachenko, Alexander v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-802-94), McKeown, March 27, 1995, at 4.
Zolfagharkhani, the Court of Appeal indicated that a claimant’s objection may be entitled to respect even if it is more specific: where the claimant did not object to military service in general or to the particular conflict, but was opposed to the use of a particular category of weapon (namely, chemical weapons), the Court found his objection to be reasonable and valid.84 Similarly, the Trial Division has held that a claimant may object to serving in a particular conflict, rather than objecting to military service altogether, and may still be a Convention refugee.85

This is not to say that any narrow or limited objection of conscience will suffice. The objection may be regarded as sufficiently serious if the military actions objected to are judged by the international community to be contrary to basic rules of human conduct.86 However, a military’s operations are not to be characterized as contravening international standards if there are only isolated violations of those standards. Instead, there must be offending military activity by the military forces which is condoned in a general way by the state.87

The serious harm that is a requisite for persecution may be found in the forcing of the claimant to perform military service; where reasons of conscience are involved, there is also a violation of the claimant’s freedom of conscience; where military actions violate international standards, the claimant might be forced into association with the wrongdoing.88 One must also bear in mind that some conscription activities may be extra-legal, and may therefore lack any basis for claiming to constitute legitimate exercises of state authority. An organization may have de facto authority and an ability to coerce persons into performing military service, yet not be a

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84 Zolfagharkhani, supra, footnote 24, at 553-555.
85 Ciric v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 2 F.C. 65 (T.D.). In Hophany, Parviz v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-802-92), Jerome, July 19, 1994, at 3-4 there appears what might be a statement to the contrary. However, the exact meaning of the statement is uncertain and, in any event, the views expressed by the Court of Appeal in Zolfagharkhani, supra, footnote 24 - which was not mentioned in Hophany - must take precedence.
86 Zolfagharkhani, supra, footnote 24, at 555. See also: Diab, supra, footnote 41, at 3 (possible crimes against humanity); and Ciric, supra, footnote 85, at 74-8. It is not enough for the claimant to show that a particular conflict has been condemned by the international community; it must also be the case that his refusal to participate was based on the condemnation: Sladoljev, supra, footnote 81, at 4. And there must be a reasonable chance that the claimant would indeed be required to participate in the objectionable operations: Zolfagharkhani, supra, footnote 24, at 547-548; Velickovic, Slobodan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4394-94), Richard, May 11, 1995, at 2 and 3.

Pronouncements from organizations such as Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch, and the Red Cross may constitute condemnation by the world community; condemnation by the United Nations is not necessary: Ciric, supra, footnote 85, at 75.


87 Popov, supra, footnote 71, at 245. There must be a probability, and not merely a possibility, that the military will engage in the offending activity: Hashi, Haweya Abdimur v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2597-96), Muldoon, July 31, 1997, at 5, alluding to page 555 of Zolfagharkhani.
88 Zolfagharkhani, supra, footnote 24, at 555.
legitimate government, and have no right to conscript.\(^89\)

If a call-up for military service would not necessarily result in the claimant’s being compelled to perform military service, the injury to the claimant’s interests is less, and the legitimacy of the demands placed on the claimant by the state looms large. Therefore, where objections of conscience may enable the claimant to obtain an exemption from service, or assignment to alternative service (i.e., non-military service, or non-combat service, or service outside a particular theatre of operations), the conscription law may not be inherently persecutory.\(^90\)

Nor is there persecution if the penalties for refusing to serve are not harsh,\(^91\) except perhaps where the refusal to serve occurs in the context of a military operation condemned as contrary to basic rules of human conduct.\(^92\) The Refugee Protection Division must consider the actual practice in the treatment of deserters, and not just the penalty prescribed by law.\(^93\)

Somewhat akin to the idea that the claimant would not be persecuted if he would not be forced into military activity is the notion that the Refugee Protection Division should not endorse an objection to compulsory military service in the country of reference if the claimant chose to immigrate to that country, knowing that compulsory service existed there.\(^94\)

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\(^89\) Diab, supra, footnote 41, at 2-3.


\(^91\) Frid, ibid., at 3. See also Baranchook, Peter v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-876-95), Tremblay-Lamer, December 20, 1995; and Moskvitchev, Vitali v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-70-95), Dubé, December 21, 1995, where the Court upheld decisions of Post-Claim Determination Officers (PCDOs). In Baranchook, at 4, the PCDO compared the Israeli penalty for refusing to serve with international standards, and concluded that the penalty was neither excessive nor draconian. In Moskvitchev, at 3, the PCDO found that a sentence of six months to five years for draft evasion in Moldova would not be inhuman [sic] or extreme. [Section 2(1) of the Immigration Regulations speaks of “inhumane treatment” and “extreme sanctions”.]

\(^92\) In Al-Maisri, supra, footnote 86, the claimant had deserted from an army which was participating in an operation condemned as contrary to basic rules of human conduct, and the Court noted that “the punishment for desertion which would likely be visited upon the [claimant] …, whatever that punishment might be, would amount to persecution.” (at 3, emphasis added).


\(^94\) Talman, supra, footnote 90; Kogan, Meri v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7282-93), Noël, June 5, 1995, at 5 and 7. The operative idea seems to be that the claimant should be considered bound by his own voluntary decision. However, the fact that the claimant chose to immigrate despite knowing of compulsory service might also raise a question as to the strength (or even genuineness) of his conviction.

On the other hand, see Agranovski, Vladislav v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2709-95), Tremblay-Lamer, July 3, 1996, at 5: at the time of immigrating to Israel, the claimant had known that there was compulsory military service, and the Refugee Division therefore did not believe he had reasons of principle for refusing to serve; however, the Court overturned this conclusion, noting that the claimant had been brought to the country as a minor by his parents, and that he had thought he would be able to avail himself of alternative service.
9.3.7. One-Child Policy of China

The People’s Republic of China has a policy which, subject to exceptions, restricts each couple to having one child. A variety of sanctions are used in attempts to secure compliance with the policy.\(^{95}\)

The Canadian courts have generated three leading decisions regarding this matter. In the earliest of the three, \textit{Cheung},\(^{96}\) the Court of Appeal declared the claimants to be Convention refugees: they were a woman who was facing forced sterilization, and her minor daughter who had been born in violation of the policy. \textit{Cheung} was a unanimous decision of three judges.

Next came the Court of Appeal’s decision in \textit{Chan},\(^{97}\) where the majority found against a man who was allegedly facing forced sterilization. Two judges (Heald and Desjardins, JJ.A.) constituted the majority; the third (Mahoney J.A.), who had also been part of the bench in \textit{Cheung}, dissented. Each of the three Court of Appeal judges in \textit{Chan} produced a separate set of reasons, and there were significant differences even between the two majority decisions. It should be noted that the Supreme Court’s ruling in \textit{Ward}\(^{98}\) came out after \textit{Cheung} but before \textit{Chan} (F.C.A.). The Court of Appeal in \textit{Chan} considered both \textit{Cheung} and \textit{Ward}.

\textit{Chan} (F.C.A.) was appealed, yielding the third of the principal authorities, the decision of the Supreme Court in \textit{Chan}.\(^{99}\) Again there was a split decision: by a four-to-three majority, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Refugee Division, and found against the appellant (claimant).

The crux of the judgment of the Supreme Court majority (per Major J.) was that the evidence was inadequate to make out the claimant’s allegations - notably, his allegation that there was a serious possibility he would be physically coerced into undergoing sterilization. Apart from recording views expressed by the Court of Appeal in \textit{Chan} (including views concerning \textit{Cheung} and \textit{Ward}), Mr. Justice Major declined to discuss, or rule on, certain legal issues which had occupied that lower court in this case: e.g., whether forced sterilization constitutes persecution; whether the claim involved a particular social group; and whether the claimant’s having a second child was to be construed as an act which expressed a political opinion (or an act which would be perceived by the authorities as the expression of a political opinion).

The Supreme Court’s dissenting minority (per La Forest J.) had a different appreciation of the evidence, and would have left it to the Refugee Division to perform a further assessment of

\(^{95}\) In both \textit{Cheung v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)}, [1993] 2 F.C. 314 (C.A.) at 220-221 and \textit{Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)}, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593 at paragraph 118, it was recognized that the fear of persecution under China’s one-child policy is largely dependent on the practices of the relevant local authority. A review of the documentary evidence in \textit{Shen, Zhi Ming v. M.C.I.} (F.C., no. IMM-313-03), Kelen, August 15, 2003; 2003 FC 983 indicated that this was still the case at the time of the hearing.

\(^{96}\) \textit{Cheung, supra}, footnote 28.

\(^{97}\) \textit{Chan (F.C.A.)}, supra, footnote 30.

\(^{98}\) \textit{Ward, supra}, footnote 18.

\(^{99}\) \textit{Chan (S.C.C.)}, supra, footnote 32.
the evidence; however, in finding that the appeal should be allowed, the minority also addressed some of the legal issues which the majority had bypassed. The minority’s comments on these issues carry considerable persuasive authority, inasmuch as they were not contradicted by the majority, and represent the views of a significant number of Supreme Court justices; furthermore, insofar as these comments are an explanation of the Ward decision, it must be noted that the explanation was provided by the author of that decision, Mr. Justice La Forest.

Further particulars of these three leading decisions are set forth in the material that follows.

* * *

In the context of claims involving the one-child policy, the Court of Appeal has reiterated that all elements of the Convention refugee definition must be present. Thus, it has been noted that, where the claim concerns the breach of a valid policy, abhorrence of the penalty, or the presence of a well-founded fear of persecution, does not justify a finding that the claimant is a Convention refugee; it is also necessary that the punishment be for a Convention reason. Conversely, if a link to a Convention ground is established, the claimant must still show that he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution.

On the issue of serious harm, both in Cheung and in Chan (F.C.A.) it was held that the anticipated mistreatment qualified. Thus, forced or strongly coerced sterilization constitutes persecution, whether the victim is a woman or a man. In Cheung, Linden J.A. explained this

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100 Chan (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 30 at 690, 692-693 and 696, per Heald J.A.

101 Cheung, supra, footnote 28, at 322. See also Chan (S.C.C.), supra, footnote 32, per Major J. at 657. The Supreme Court noted that, for the claim to succeed, evidence must show both that there is a subjective fear and that the fear is “objectively well-founded” (per Major J., at 659). According to the Court, the evidence did not establish a serious possibility that certain harm would be inflicted - i.e., did not establish an objective basis (per Major J., at 666). The Court also had doubts as to whether subjective fear was made out (per Major J., at 664).

102 “Physical compulsion is not the only mechanism for forcing a person to do something which they would not of their own free choice choose to do”: Liu, Ying Yang v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4316-94), Reed, May 16, 1995, at 3. The claimant had been subjected to “incredible pressure”: her work unit, and she herself and her husband, would have incurred fines if she had had a second child; also, on two occasions a member of the work unit had accompanied her to a hospital where she was to undergo sterilization. Such pressure amounts to “forcing”, as does denying a person 80% of his salary (at 2-3).

Compare Chan (S.C.C), supra, footnote 32, per Major J., at 667: “… the [claimant] failed to provide … evidence to substantiate his claim that the pressure from the Chinese authorities to submit to sterilization would extend beyond psychological and financial pressure to actual physical coercion.” It is unclear whether Mr. Justice Major (i) was of the view that psychological and financial pressure could not constitute forcing (and could not constitute persecution), or (ii) was simply focusing upon the specific allegation made by the appellant (namely, that he would be physically coerced), or (iii) did not think the particular psychological and financial pressures confronting this claimant would be severe enough to constitute persecution. Interpretation (i) might be a dubious one, given that Major J. did not clearly assert this view, and did not present a discussion of the issue.

103 Cheung, supra, footnote 28, at 322-325.

104 Chan (S.C.C.), supra, footnote 32, per La Forest J. (dissenting) at 636. The majority in the Supreme Court did not expressly comment on the issue, although Mr. Justice Major appeared to assume that forced sterilization
conclusion as follows:\textsuperscript{105}

Even if forced sterilization were accepted as a law of general application, that fact would not necessarily prevent a claim to Convention refugee status. Under certain circumstances, the operation of a law of general application can constitute persecution. In \textit{Padilla} ..., the Court held that a Board must consider extra-judicial penalties which might be imposed. Similarly, in our case, the appellant’s fear is not simply that she may be exposed to the economic penalties authorized by China’s one child policy. That may be acceptable. Rather, the [claimant], in this case, genuinely fears forced sterilization; her fear extends beyond the consequences of the law of general application to include extraordinary treatment in her case that does not normally flow from that law … Furthermore, if the punishment or treatment under a law of general application is so Draconian as to be completely disproportionate to the objective of the law, it may be viewed as persecutory. This is so regardless of whether the intent of the punishment or treatment is persecution. Cloaking persecution with a veneer of legality does not render it less persecutory. Brutality in furtherance of a legitimate end is still brutality.

The forced sterilization of women is a fundamental violation of basic human rights … The forced sterilization of a woman is a serious and totally unacceptable violation of her security of the person. Forced sterilization subjects a woman to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment… I have no doubt, then, that the threat of forced sterilization can ground a fear of persecution within the meaning of Convention refugee under the \textit{Immigration Act}.

In \textit{Chan} (S.C.C.), Mr. Justice La Forest, in dissent, stated:

... [W]hatever technique is employed, it is utterly beyond dispute that forced sterilization is in essence an inhuman and degrading treatment involving bodily mutilation, and constitutes the very type of fundamental violation of basic human rights that is the concern of refugee law.\textsuperscript{106}

The Trial Division has held that forced abortion, being an invasion of a woman’s body, is equivalent to or worse than forced sterilization and, accordingly, constitutes persecution.\textsuperscript{107}

Regarding the requirement that the fear of persecution be well founded, the Trial Division observed that the issue was not whether the female claimant had been forced to undergo an abortion in the past, but instead whether there was a reasonable chance she would be forced to


\textsuperscript{106}Chan (S.C.C.), \textit{supra}, footnote 32, per La Forest J. (dissenting) at 636.

undergo one if returned to China.\textsuperscript{108}

Nexus was the principal area of disagreement between \textit{Cheung} and \textit{Chan} (F.C.A.). The two cases offered quite different views on the issue of whether the feared sterilization would be inflicted by reason of a Convention ground. \textit{Cheung} held that there was a targeted social group,\textsuperscript{109} the majority in \textit{Chan} (F.C.A.) found otherwise.\textsuperscript{110} Speaking for the majority in \textit{Chan} (S.C.C.), Mr. Justice Major chose not to address the question of whether the case involved a particular social group.\textsuperscript{111} However, La Forest J. (dissenting) held that “[p]ersons such as the appellant, if persecuted on the basis of having had more than one child, would be able to allege membership in a particular social group”.\textsuperscript{112} Please refer to Chapter 4 for a fuller description of the views of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding particular social group.

Political opinion is another ground which might be invoked with respect to the one-child policy. However, in \textit{Chan} (F.C.A.), Heald J.A. ruled that the authorities’ reaction to the claimant’s non-compliance would not be by reason of political opinion;\textsuperscript{113} and Desjardins J.A. was apparently inclined toward the same conclusion.\textsuperscript{114}

In \textit{Cheng}, while the claimant pointed to a social group (“those who violated Chinese government family planning policy”), religion also figured in the story. The claimant was a Roman Catholic, and it had been his religious beliefs that had prompted him to oppose the policy.\textsuperscript{115}

\textbf{9.3.8. Religious or Cultural Mores}

\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Lai, ibid.}, at 3. In \textit{Liu, supra}, footnote 102, the Court noted there was no evidence that the adult claimants, who had a second child while in Canada, still objected to the family planning policy or methods of the Chinese government; on this basis, the Court held that evidence of subjective fear was lacking (at 3-4). See also \textit{Cheng, Kin Ping v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-176-97), Tremblay-Lamer, October 8, 1997, at page 2: the male claimant had no reason to fear persecution for violation of the family planning policy, since his wife had already been sterilized (following the birth of one child and a subsequent forced abortion).

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Cheung, supra}, footnote 28, at 322.

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Chan} (F.C.A.), \textit{supra}, footnote 30, per Heald J.A. at 690-3, and per Desjardins J.A. at 716-21. In his dissent, Mahoney J.A. rejected one delineation of a particular social group, but accepted another, at 705.

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Chan} (S.C.C.), \textit{supra}, footnote 32, per Major J. at 658 and 673.

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Chan} (S.C.C.), \textit{supra}, footnote 32, per La Forest J. (dissenting) at 646.

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Chan} (F.C.A.), \textit{supra}, footnote 30, at 693-696, per Heald J.A.


When \textit{Chan} came before the Supreme Court, both the majority and the minority declined to decide whether the claimant’s action of having a second child “was sufficiently expressive of a political opinion to independently found a refugee claim”: per Major J., at 672; per La Forest J. (dissenting), at 648-649. Mr. Justice La Forest thought the evidence pointed to other possible connections to political opinion (at 647-8). However, His Lordship’s broaching of these possibilities and his reading of the evidence were disapproved of by Mr. Justice Major (at 671-2).

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Cheng, supra}, footnote 108 at page 2.
Every society has limits on what it regards as acceptable behaviour. In some countries, the norms of the society (or the norms laid down by some ruling group) may be more constraining than elsewhere. The norms may interfere with the exercise of human rights, and may impose limitations on certain categories of people - categories which may be defined by Convention-protected characteristics. These restrictions may be entrenched in law, and may be backed up by coercive action and penalties. A claimant who transgresses the conventions of his or her homeland (and perhaps, at the same time, violates the law) may be at risk of serious harm.

When dealing with the norms of other societies, the Refugee Protection Division should bear in mind that an application of the Convention refugee definition involves measuring the claimant’s situation, and any actions visited upon the claimant, against human rights standards which are international (and which may sometimes be interpreted by reference to Canadian law). It is not appropriate simply to defer to the notions of propriety favoured by the majority or the rulers in the claimant’s homeland. In this regard, reference should be made to Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1.1.16

Among the claims which concern societal norms are those of women who face restrictions associated with religion or tradition, and those of Ahmadis from Pakistan.

9.3.8.1. Restrictions upon Women

Regarding the seriousness of harm, the Trial Division has termed female circumcision a “cruel and barbaric practice”, a “horrific torture”, and an “atrocious mutilation”.117

In Namitabar, the Trial Division held that punishment under an Iranian law requiring women to wear the chador may constitute persecution. The Court noted that the penalty would be inflicted without procedural guarantees, and that the penalty was disproportionate to the offence.118 In Fathi-Rad, another case involving the Iranian dress code, the Trial Division found that the treatment accorded the claimant for purely minor infractions of the Islamic dress code in Iran was completely disproportionate to the objective of the law.119 On the other hand, in

116 Also see the reference to Daghighi in footnote 30, above.
118 Namitabar (T.D.), supra, footnote 22, at 47. In Namitabar (F.C.A.), the Court overturned the Trial Division on the basis that the CRDD credibility findings were not ambiguous. With respect to the issue of wearing veils in Iran, the Court was of the view that "the Refugee Division may have expressed itself incorrectly [but] that has no importance in the case at bar since the female [claimant] voluntarily complied with the clothing code and did not even display reluctance to do so...”
119 Fathi-Rad, supra, footnote 22, at 4-5. In Rabbani, supra, footnote 36, the Refugee Division had concluded that a violation of Iran’s Islamic dress code could not form the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution. It had noted the dress conventions applicable to various groups elsewhere, had indicated that such conventions did not involve violations of basic human rights, and had said that the same was true of the Iranian dress code. The Court observed (at page 2) that, in making these comparisons, the Refugee Division had “... ignored, failed to appreciate or trivialized the persecutory aspects of the Islamic dress code ...” Furthermore, the Refugee Division had failed to acknowledge documentary evidence regarding the penalties for failure to comply with the code.
Hazarat, the Trial Division upheld a finding that restrictions imposed on women by laws and practices under the Mujahadeen government in Afghanistan (including restrictions concerning dress, movement outside the home, travel, education and work) amounted to discrimination only, not persecution.

In Vidhani, the claim of an Asian, Moslem woman from Kenya derived from the fact that her father had arranged a marriage for her. She did not wish to marry the man in question, and feared that this man would abuse her if they did marry. She also feared being abused by her father if she refused to marry and being sexually attacked by the police if she complained to them. The Trial Division stated that women who are forced into marriages have had a basic human right violated. It also referred to the possibility that persecution might be found in: (i) the claimant’s being forced into a marriage; (ii) spousal abuse; (iii) abuse by the father; and (iv) the reaction of the police.

In Ameri, the claimant, a woman who disliked the Iranian dress code, urged that women were victims of the means by which the code was enforced. In response, the Trial Division said:

There was not evidence that her activities and commitments or beliefs would challenge the policies and laws of Iran, if she were to return, in a manner that might result in retributive action by the state that would constitute persecution. Her expressed fear was thus found not to be objectively based. I am not persuaded that the tribunal’s conclusion on this aspect of her claim was unreasonable.

In the same vein, or in a very similar vein, was the Pour case. There it was argued that all women residents in a state who disagree with gender-specific discriminatory rules, such as the Iranian dress code for women, suffer from persecution. The Trial Division observed that this proposition went substantially beyond its decisions in Namitabar and Fathi-Rad, which concerned women who had engaged in a series of acts of defiance and had suffered punishments as a result.

124 Ameri, ibid., at 9.
126 Namitabar (T.D.), supra, footnote 22. In Namitabar (F.C.A.), the Court overturned the Trial Division on the basis that the CRDD credibility findings were not ambiguous. With respect to the issue of wearing veils in Iran, the Court was of the view that "the Refugee Division may have expressed itself incorrectly [but] that has no importance in the case at bar since the female [claimant] voluntarily complied with the clothing code and did not even display reluctance to do so..."
127 Fathi-Rad, supra, footnote 22.
This would appear to mean that a claim will fail if the claimant has not demonstrated, via past conduct, a readiness to assert some right and thereby express dissent (or if the claimant’s dissenting conduct has not resulted in mistreatment of the claimant). On the other hand, the Court has also considered it improper to effectively require that the claimant buy peace for herself by refraining from the exercise, or acquiescing in the denial, of one of her basic rights.128

Regarding nexus, the Trial Division has said that a law which specifically targets the manner in which women dress may not properly be characterized as a law of general application which applies to all citizens.129 A woman’s breach of a dress code may be perceived as a display of opposition to a theocratic regime.130

Two recent cases have dealt with a woman’s breach of a dress code in a democratic, secular state. A Turkish law bans the wearing of headscarves in government places or buildings. In Sicak,131 the Board rejected a claim based on religion and membership in a particular social group, namely, women wearing the headscarf in Turkey. The Board did not believe that the claimant was involved in any protest nor that she was arrested or mistreated by the police, and found a lack of subjective fear and no persecution within the meaning of section 96 of IRPA. Without specifically referring to section 97 of IRPA the Board analyzed (and the Court appears to have agreed with the analysis) the objective basis of the claim. The Board noted that:

(a) 98% of the Turkish population is Muslim;

(b) the principle of secularism as it is applied in Turkey, was established 60 years ago;

(c) the law banning headscarves in public was upheld by the Turkish Constitutional Court and the European Human Rights Commission upheld this ruling;

(d) Turkey is a democracy with free elections;

and concluded that the claimant did not face persecution but prosecution for a violation of a law

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128 Ali, Shaysta-Ameer, supra, footnote 9, at 2. One of the claimants was a nine-year-old girl who could have avoided persecution only by refusing to go to school, and thus forsaking the basic human right to an education. The Court considered her to be a Convention refugee. In a rather different context, the Court again indicated that the Refugee Division must not expect a claimant to buy peace for herself with an unconscionable self-denial (namely, continuing to lie about her lack of religious inclinations): Kazkan, Shahrokh Saeedi v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1313-96), Rothstein, March 20, 1997, at 2-3.

129 Fathi-Rad, supra, footnote 22, at 4. See also Namitabar, supra, footnote 22, at 46.

130 Namitabar (T.D.), ibid., at 49. In Fathi-Rad, supra, footnote 22, the Convention ground invoked for the part of the claim pertaining to the dress code appears to have been membership in a particular social group; the social group in question was not expressly named in the Court’s reasons. In Namitabar (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 22, the Court overturned the Trial Division on the basis that the CRDD credibility findings were not ambiguous. With respect to the issue of wearing veils in Iran, the Court was of the view that "the Refugee Division may have expressed itself incorrectly [but] that has no importance in the case at bar since the female [claimant] voluntarily complied with the clothing code and did not even display reluctance to do so..."

of general application.

The Court in *Kaya*\(^{132}\) was consistent with *Sicak*. In referring to the information contained in point (c) above, the Court noted that “[l]aws must be considered in their social context”. Mrs. Kaya is entitled to practice her religion in public, and to wear her Hejab (headscarf) in public. *Namitabar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)*, [1994] 2 F.C. 42 (T.D.) and *Fathi-Rad, Farideh v. S.S.C.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2438-93), McGillis, April 13, 1994 both deal with Iranian women who were obliged by Iranian Law to wear the Chador. “It would be simple, but wrong, to say that the right of Iranian women not to wear the Chador and the right of Turkish women to wear the Hejab everywhere is a manifestation of the same fundamental right”\(^{133}\).

*Kaya* was cited with approval in *Ayikut*.\(^{134}\) The Court noted, in *obiter*, that the Turkish law applies to all forms of religious dress or insignia including beards, cloaks, turbans, fez, caps, veils, and headscarves…. “In fact, there is evidence that, insofar as medical or university cards are concerned, the requirement for a photograph showing one’s full face is definitely applied to men wearing beards.” (para. 41).

In *Vidhani*, the Trial Division found that the claimant belonged to a particular social group consisting of women forced into arranged marriages without their consent. It also referred to another alleged particular social group: “Asian women in Kenya”. The Court observed that *Ward*’s category (1) (groups defined by an innate or unchangeable characteristic) seemed applicable to the claimant’s circumstances.\(^{135}\)

In *Ali*, *Shaysta-Ameer*, the Refugee Division held that an adult claimant belonged to a group consisting of educated women. The Trial Division apparently considered her nine-year-old daughter to be a member of the same - or a similar - group.\(^{136}\)

In *Annan*, a Christian woman was faced with the possibility of being forcibly circumcised by “Moslem fanatics”, at the instigation of a Moslem man who wished to marry her. The claimant cited religion as the basis for her difficulties\(^{137}\) and the Court held that the Refugee Division had erred in rejecting her claim, but the Court did not discuss the nexus issue.

With respect to state protection, in *Annan* the Court found that the claimant could not count on state protection against forcible circumcision: one must consider not only the state’s ability to protect but also its willingness; and while the Ghanaian government had sometimes

\(^{132}\) *Kaya, Bedirhan Mustafa v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-5565-03), Harrington, January 14, 2004; 2004 FC 45.

\(^{133}\) *Kaya, supra*, footnote 132, para. 18.

\(^{134}\) *Ayikut, Ibrahim v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-5310-02), Gauthier, March 26, 2004; 2004 FC 466, at para. 40. See also *Karaguduk, Abdulgafur v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-2695-03), Henegan, July 5, 2004; 2004 FC 958, where the Court affirmed the decision of the Pre-Removal Risk Assessment Officer who “found that although the Principal Applicant’s daughter experienced discrimination as a result of wearing headscarves, this discrimination did not amount of persecution.” (para. 6).

\(^{135}\) *Vidhani, supra*, footnote 121, at 64-65 and 67. See also *Gwanzura, supra*, footnote 122, at 2.

\(^{136}\) *Ali, Shaysta-Ameer, supra*, footnote 9, at 1-2.

\(^{137}\) *Annan, supra*, footnote 117. See also *Gwanzura, supra*, at 2.
shown an intention to make female circumcision illegal, it had not yet done this, it was still tolerating the practice, and pious vows were not reassuring. The Court also noted that the claimant would be returning to Ghana alone, as she had been unable to locate her parents.138

For additional guidance regarding claims by women who transgress conventions of their homelands, see Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution.139

9.3.8.2. Ahmadi from Pakistan

In Pakistan, legislation prohibits persons belonging to the Ahmadi religious group from engaging in certain activities (activities connected with the practice of their religion or with their religious identification), and establishes penalties for violations of the prohibitions. One of the statutes concerned is known as Ordinance XX.

The Trial Division has said that mere existence of an oppressive law (Ordinance XX) which is enforced only sporadically does not by itself show that all members of the group targeted by the law (Ahmadis) have good grounds for fearing persecution.140

In Ahmad, Masroor,141 the claimant had wished to argue before the Refugee Division that, given the nature of Ordinance XX, the simple existence of that law meant the claimant was persecuted. The Court acknowledged that it would be proper for the claimant to put forward such an argument (although, based on an evidentiary consideration, the Court also cast some doubt on the argument’s ability to succeed).

In Rehan,142 the Refugee Division agreed with the following statement, taken from the judgment of the English Court of Appeal in Ahmad and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department143:

... It has been accepted by ... the Secretary of State, that the Ordinance, by itself, was well capable of being regarded as discrimination against all members of the Ahmadi sect; but in my judgment the proposition that it was by itself capable of making the appellants liable to persecution simply by virtue of being members of the sect is quite unsustainable. The only members of the sect potentially liable to persecution would be those who proposed to act in contravention of its provisions. Nothing in the Ordinance

138 Annan, ibid., at 31. The issue of state protection was touched upon in Vidhani, supra, footnote 121 as well, at 66-67. The Court found that the Refugee Division had not dealt adequately with the issue, and in particular with the claimant’s explanation for not having sought police assistance.

139 Guidelines issued by the Chairperson pursuant to section 65(3) of the Immigration Act, updated November 25, 1996, as continued in effect by the Chairperson on June 28, 2002 under the authority found in section 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.


prevented persons from holding the belief of the sect, without engaging in any of the specified prohibited activities.

... It was apparent to the Secretary of State ... that most Ahmadis live ordinary lives, untroubled by the Government despite the existence of the Ordinance. In my judgment he would have been fully entitled to assume that if the appellants, on returning to Pakistan, would intend to disobey the Ordinance and such intention constituted the reason, or a predominant reason, for their stated fear, they would have said so ...

It would appear that the Trial Division held that it was reasonably open to the Refugee Division to rely on this analysis, but stopped short of holding that the analysis was correct. Furthermore, the Trial Division indicated that if the applicant had stated or demonstrated an intention to violate Ordinance XX, and if his past conduct had been consistent with this intention, he might very well have established a claim.

In Ahmed, the Trial Division observed that “... the Federal Court of Canada has not yet clearly decided whether the discriminatory laws of Pakistan are indeed persecutory in relation to Ahmadis. It has preferred to adopt a case-by-case analysis of refugee claimants’ prospective fears of persecution.” (Footnote omitted.) In the Trial Division, the Minister conceded that the Refugee Division had erred in finding that the episodes of mistreatment experienced by the claimant did not constitute past persecution; however, the Trial Division upheld the further conclusion that there was no reasonable chance of persecution.

In Mehmood, the Trial Division found that the Refugee Division had erred in restricting its analysis to whether or not the claimant was a registered or official member of the Ahmadi religion. On the basis of the evidence before it, the Refugee Division was required to determine whether or not the claimant had a well-founded fear of persecution arising from the perception that he was a member of the Lahori Ahmadi religion.

9.4. INDIRECT PERSECUTION AND FAMILY UNITY

The concept of “indirect persecution” was described by Mr. Justice Jerome in Bhatti as

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144 Rehan, supra, footnote 142: see in particular the bottom of page 4, the top of page 5, and page 6.
145 Rehan, ibid., at 6, and also at 5.
The concept of indirect persecution is premised on the assumption that family members are likely to suffer great harm when their close relatives are persecuted. This harm may manifest itself in many ways ranging from the loss of the victim’s economic and social support to the psychological trauma associated with witnessing the suffering of loved ones.

The theory is based on a recognition of the broader harm caused by persecutory acts. By recognizing that family members of persecuted persons may themselves be victims of persecution, the theory allows the granting of status to those who might otherwise be unable to individually prove a well-founded fear of persecution.

However, in Pour-Shariati, Mr. Justice Rothstein said that “the Bhatti approach to indirect persecution unjustifiably broadens the Convention refugee basis for admission to Canada, to include persons who do not have a well-founded fear of persecution in their own right.”149 Furthermore, in Casetellanos, Mr. Justice Nadon noted that...

Nadon J. went on to hold that “indirect persecution does not constitute persecution within the meaning of the definition of Convention refugee.”151

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149 Pour-Shariati, supra, footnote 148, at 772-3. Rothstein J. certified a question as to whether indirect persecution constitutes a basis for a claim.


151 Casetellanos, ibid., at 207. See also Vyramuthu, Sanmugarajah v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6277-93), Rouleau, January 26, 1995, at 4. On the other hand, in Nina, Razvan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-725-92), Cullen, November 24, 1994, the Court, at 9, seems to have considered the mistreatment of the child, who was kidnapped in order to put pressure on his father, to be persecution of the father. In Hashmat, Suhil v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2331-96), Teitelbaum, May 9, 1997, Mr. Justice Teitelbaum noted (at pages 4-5) that earlier cases had rejected the principle of indirect persecution. However, he indicated that, where the Refugee Division was dealing with “the separate issue” of whether the claimant would undergo undue hardship in journeying to a potential internal refuge (this issue being a subset of the “reasonableness” branch of the IFA
The Court of Appeal has now dealt with and dismissed the appeal in *Pour-Shariati*,\(^{152}\) and in so doing it has squarely rejected the concept of indirect persecution that was articulated in *Bhatti*:

We accordingly overrule *Bhatti*’s recognition of the concept of indirect persecution as a principle of our refugee law. In the words of Nadon, J. in *Casetellanos* ..., “since indirect persecution does not constitute persecution within the meaning of Convention refugee, a claim based on it should not be allowed.” It seems to us that the concept of indirect persecution goes directly against the decision of this Court in *Rizkallah* ..., where it was held that there had to be a personal nexus between the claimant and the alleged persecution on one of the Convention refugee grounds. One of these grounds is, of course, a “membership in a particular social group,” a ground which allows for family concerns in on [sic] appropriate case.\(^{153}\)

Following *Pour-Shariati*, Muldoon, J. rejected the concept of indirect persecution in *Cetinkaya*\(^{154}\) and held, on the facts in that case, that there had to be a nexus between the claimant and the general situation in his country, Turkey, regarding members of the PKK. He stated as follows:

> [25] ... While certain members of the PKK may face persecution, it is for the [claimant] to demonstrate that he falls within that class of individuals who may face persecution. It is not sufficient to adduce evidence that members of the PKK are being persecuted without providing the necessary link between the [claimant's] activities and the persecution feared. Even in the situation of a perceived political opinion, a link must be made between the applicant and the political opinion which may be attributed to him.

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\(^{153}\) An appropriate case was found in *Tomov, Nikolay Harabam v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-10058-04), Mosley, November 9, 2005; 2005 FC 1527. The Court held that it is not enough to point to the persecution suffered by family members if it is unlikely to affect the claimant directly. Here, as a result of his common-law relationship with his Roma spouse, the claimant would be directly at risk as long as they remain together in a marital relationship.

A claim based on indirect persecution may be distinguished from one based on the principle of “family unity”. That principle is discussed in paragraphs 182 to 185 of the UNHCR *Handbook*. The family-unity claimant does not attempt to satisfy the definition’s persecution requirement by pointing to side-effects. Instead, he or she takes the position that if

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155 A claim based on indirect persecution may also be distinguished from a claim based on (direct) persecution by reason of membership in a particular social group which consists of a certain family. In *Kaprolova, Elena v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-388-97), Teitelbaum, September 25, 1997, judicial review was granted because the Refugee Division had mistaken a social-group claim for an indirect-persecution claim. See also Chapter 4, section 4.5 (in particular footnote 26).
the directly-attacked individual meets all criteria of the Convention refugee definition, a family member may be recognized as a Convention refugee regardless of whether the family member meets the definition’s criteria (i.e., has a well-founded fear of persecution). This is a position which has been rejected as being without foundation in Canadian law.\textsuperscript{156}


Some cases apparently see little difference between the notion of indirect persecution and the principle of family unity: see \textit{Pour-Shariati, supra}, footnote 148, 772-774, and \textit{Rafizade, supra}, footnote 148, at 5-6. But note that since “family” may constitute a particular social group (see Chapter 4), a relative who is targeted, albeit as a secondary object of the persecutor’s animosity, may base his or her claim on direct persecution by reason of membership in a particular social group.
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10. EXCLUSION CLAUSES

10.1. ARTICLE 1E

Article 1E of the Refugee Convention has been considered by the Federal Court in a number of cases. The interpretation of this provision is still evolving and it is not as clear as one would hope.

For this ground of exclusion to operate, a person must have already been recognized as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of nationality of the country in which he or she has taken up residence.1

10.1.1. Ability to Return and Remain

At a minimum, the claimant must be able to return to, and remain in,2 the putative Article 1E country before this provision can be invoked to exclude the claimant from protection under the Refugee Convention. The provision is not limited to a consideration of those countries in which the claimant took up residence as a refugee.3

In Madhi,4 in the context of a vacation application before the CRDD, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against the decision of the Trial Division which overturned the CRDD’s decision to vacate the claimant’s status. In doing so, the Court of Appeal held that the real question that had to be determined was whether the claimant was, when she applied for admission to Canada, a person who was still recognized by the competent authorities of the putative Article 1E country as a permanent resident of that country. That issue was to be decided on a balance of probabilities. In that case, after becoming a permanent resident of the United States, the claimant had returned to Somalia, her country of nationality, and thereby renounced

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1 In Dawlatly, George Elias George v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3607-97), Tremblay-Lamer, June 16, 1998, the claimant, a citizen of Sudan, was eligible for temporary resident status in Greece, a country where he had never resided, because of his marriage to a Greek national. The Court held that the CRDD erred in excluding the claimant under Article 1E on the ground that he should have sought asylum in Greece.


4 Mahdi (F.C.A), supra, footnote 2, at 6. This decision does not answer clearly the question of whether a refugee claimant can be excluded under Article 1E when this person voluntarily abandons a country where the person had most of the rights and privileges of a national. As for what evidence regarding this matter may be considered by the RPD at a vacation hearing, see Coomaraswamy, Ranjan v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-104-01), Rothstein, Sexton, Evans, April 26, 2002; 2002 FCA 153. Reported: Coomaraswamy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 4 F.C. 501 (C.A.).
her U.S. status. The Court of Appeal noted that this was not a case where the claimant had voluntarily renounced the protection of one country in order to seek refuge elsewhere, and held that she was not precluded from later claiming Convention refugee status in Canada.

As for the standard of proof required to meet the test of “on a balance of probabilities,” the Court of Appeal in Mahdi instructed the CRDD to take into account any “serious possibility” that the American authorities would no longer recognize the claimant as a permanent resident and would, for that reason, deny her the right to return to the United States.5

In Wassiq,6 the Trial Division pointed out that the correct test is whether the putative Article 1E country recognizes the claimant’s right to return there, even if his or her travel documents have expired, and not whether in international law, or from Canada’s perspective, that country has formal or legal responsibility for the claimant.

In Agha,7 the Trial Division concluded that the claimant, an Iranian national, had not adduced any evidence showing that he no longer had status in the United States, aside from the suggestion that he might lose his status because of his extended absence since 1985 and the voluntary departure order he received in 1995 when he was there on his way to Canada. According to an INS official, loss of status due to an extended absence was not automatic and the claimant continued to be a permanent resident until a US immigration judge determined otherwise.

The issue of the operative time for assessing the claimant’s right to return to the country of residence was addressed in Choovak, where the Federal Court cited with approval the statement of the Court of Appeal in Mahdi, and concluded:

[40] … the [claimant’s] status when she claimed refugee status was that her permanent resident status was active and valid at the time, and that she enjoyed the “basic rights” identified in Shamlou. Any subsequent change of status at the date of the hearing and the underlying reasons for this change should be considered when assessing whether the [claimant] demonstrated why she should nevertheless not be excluded from the refugee definition. The fact that the [claimant] caused its [sic] permanent resident status to expire by the time of the hearing of her refugee claim cannot avail to her benefit.8

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6 Wassiq, Pashtoon v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2283-95), Rothstein, April 10, 1996, at 6-7. Reported: Wassiq v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 33 Imm. L.R. (2d) 238 (F.C.T.D.), at 242. The Court also opined, at 240, that the relevant time for consideration of the validity and subsistence of a travel document is the time of the hearing before the CRDD, whereas the Court of Appeal in Mahdi, supra, footnote 2, at 6, referred to the time the claimant applied for admission to Canada, and the Trial Division referred, at 315, to the date of the vacation hearing. The issue of the relevant date was not, however, squarely before the Court of Appeal and is not discussed in its reasons for judgment.
In *Manoharan*, the Federal Court clarified the application of the *Mahdi* and *Choovak* decisions. In that case, the claimant was a Sri Lankan–born citizen who had resided in Germany from 1985 to 1999. He then traveled to Canada with his mother, escaping abuse at the hands of his father. The Court stated that the issue of the relevant date for determining exclusion under Article 1E had not been explicitly addressed by the Federal Court, and then considered the issue.

[28] The evidence before the Court indicates that, when the [claimant] applied for admission to Canada, to paraphrase the words of article 1E of the *Convention*, he was a person who was recognized by the competent authorities of Germany as having the rights and obligations attached to the possession of the nationality of Germany. That being said, I do not read the words of the *Mahdi* decision as being absolute. I prefer an interpretation of those words that reflects the rationale provided by Justice Rouleau in the *Choovak* decision. While article 1E should be read in a manner that precludes the abuse of “jurisdiction shopping”, it should also be read, in the words of Justice Rouleau, “… in a more purposive light so as to provide safe-haven to those who genuinely need it …”. Such a reading is consistent with the first objective stated in subsection 3(2) of the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*, which provides that among the objectives of that Act with respect to refugees [is] “… to recognize that the refugee program is in the first instance about saving lives and offering protection to the displaced and persecuted”. That objective was not a stated objective of Canadian Refugee law at the time of either the *Mahdi* or *Choovak* decisions, nor was it the law of Canada at the time of the “exclusion” decision in favour of the Respondent and his mother that is here sought to be reviewed.

The Court held that, on the very particular facts of this case, the decision not to exclude the claimant was correct, in that Germany was not a safe-haven for him since the choices there were really to rely on his father who had been abusive towards him or to strike out on his own at age 15.

Another variation on this issue is the decision in *Hibo Farah Mohamed*. The claimants

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*M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1327-02), Pinard, February 26, 2003; 2003 FCT 223, appears to be confusing. In that case, the Court upheld the CRDD’s decision to exclude the claimant, a citizen of Rwanda, under Article 1E. Notwithstanding the fact that the claimant had obtained her residency card by way of a bribe to a representative of the authorities of Cameroon, the Court held that the CRDD did not err in finding that this document was authentic and official. The Court found that the claimant had lost her right of return to Cameroon when she left her country on forged documents, without an exit visa and by staying outside of Cameroon for over 12 consecutive months. She thus would have been denied entry to Cameroon and a renewal of her residency card, and did not have the right to return to Cameroon when she appeared at the point of entry in Canada. The Court determined that the panel’s decision regarding the lack of fear was reasonable, given that it was the claimant’s own fault she had lost her right to return to Cameroon. Moreover, the CRDD was justified in concluding that it was not reasonable for the claimant not to have an exit visa as required by Cameroon law, and that she could not then rely on the lack of a right to return as a means of arguing that the exclusion clause should not be applied.


made refugee claims in Sweden, left for Canada while their claims were still pending, and were granted permanent residence status in Sweden one month later. The Trial Division upheld the CRDD’s exclusion finding. In that case, the relevant time to determine if the claimants had status elsewhere was at the time of the hearing, and not when the refugee claims were made. Although the Swedish permanent residence certificate had to be periodically renewed, there was no evidence that permanent residence in Sweden was subject to some form of arbitrary cancellation.

In some cases, the Federal Court has focused on the tentative nature of the claimant’s status in the country where they have resided. If the claimant has some sort of temporary status which must be renewed, and which may be cancelled, or if the claimant does not have the right to be return, Article 1E may not be applicable.11

The Federal Court took a rigorous approach to this issue in Choezom.12 The claimant, who was born in India of Tibetan parents, was considered to be a citizen of China. As a Tibetan resident of India, she was issued a Registration Certificate (RC), which was renewed annually. When she travelled to the United States for the purposes of study and employment (she resided there from 1994 to 2003), she was issued an Identity Certificate (IC), which she continued to renew periodically. The RPD determined that the claimant had a right of return to India, that Indian authorities would issue her a RC for Tibetans upon return to India, and that she would not be at risk of being deported to Tibet. The RPD took into account the fact that the claimant and her parents, who continued to reside in India, had no difficulties in returning to India after travelling abroad. The Court held that the RPD had erred in excluding the claimant under Article 1E. To return to reside in India, the claimant must obtain a NORI (No Objection to Return to India), a valid IC and a visa. The requirement for annual RCs, ICs, visas, NORIs and the prohibition to visit certain locations within India are all antithetical to the “basic rights of status

11 In Olschewski, Alexander Nadirovich v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1424-92), McGillis, October 20, 1993, although the claimants could re-apply for Ukrainian citizenship, their applications would be dealt with on a “case-by-case” basis and it was not clear that they would be able to return to their country of birth. In M.C.I. v. Mohamud, Layla Ali (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4899-94), Rothstein, May 19, 1995, the Court noted that the permit given to the Somali claimant by the Italian authorities, which was renewable annually, “does not give her rights analogous to Italian nationals. While the [claimant] had many rights, such as the right to work and travel in, and leave and return to Italy, she did not have the right to remain in Italy once the war was over and conditions [in Somalia] returned to normal.” While Justice Rothstein was “not prepared to say that section E of Article 1 of the Convention means that a person … must have rights that are identical in every respect to those of a national,” it did, in his view, “mean that an important right such as the right to remain (in the absence of unusual circumstances such as a criminal conviction) must be afforded.” In Kanesharan, Vijeyaratnam v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-269-96), Heald, September 23, 1996. Reported: Kanesharan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 36 Imm. L.R. (2d) 185 (F.C.T.D.), although the Sri Lankan claimant had been given extended permission to remain in the United Kingdom, the Court found that the CRDD erred in excluding him because the UK Home Office reserved the right to remove persons to their country of nationality “should the prevailing circumstances change significantly in a positive manner”, and their eligibility to remain in the UK indefinitely after seven years was not a certainty. The “tentative and conditional language” used by the Home Office did not entitle the CRDD to conclude as it did. See also Hurt v. Canada (Minister of Manpower and Immigration) [1978] 2 F.C. 340 (C.A.), at 343, where the claimant, a Polish national, was advised by the German authorities that his temporary visa, which was soon due to expire, would not be renewed and that he would be deported.

as nationals”. All of these rights are not permanent and their renewal is at the discretion of the Indian government. The fact that there is no evidence that the Indian government has so far refused to issue RCs, ICs, visas or NORIs does not mean that it has given up the right to do so. Tibetan residents of India do not enjoy the same basic rights of status as Indian citizens enjoy.

### 10.1.1.1. Onus to Renew Status

The case of *Shamlou*, as well as other decisions of the Federal Court, indicate that there is an onus on the claimant to renew their status in the putative Article 1E country, if it is renewable. Moreover, recognition of permanent resident status can exist without the right of re-entry.14

In *Shahpari*, the claimant, an Iranian citizen, moved to France in 1984. In 1991, she acquired permanent residence and was issued a *carte de résident*, valid to 2001. In 1993, she returned to Iran, but in 1994, came back to France, and two months later came to Canada. At her CRDD hearing in 1997, her exist/re-entry visa for France had expired, but the panel found that Article 1E applied because that visa could be renewed. The Trial Division held that: (1) the onus is on the Minister in Article 1E cases, but once *prima facie* evidence is adduced, the onus shifts to the claimant to demonstrate why, having destroyed her *carte de résident*, she could not apply for a new one; and (2) that the evidence before the panel reasonably allowed it to conclude that the visa could be renewed.

Justice Rothstein also added:

> [Claimants] should also remember that actions they themselves take which are intended to result in their not being able to return to a country which has already granted them Convention refugee status may well evidence an absence of the subjective fear of persecution in their original country from which they purport to be seeking refuge.

In summary, the Federal Court has held that, once there is *prima facie* evidence that Article 1E applies, the onus shifts to the claimant to demonstrate why:

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• their travel document cannot be renewed;\footnote{Shamlou, supra, footnote 13.}
• their (destroyed or lost) residency card cannot be re-issued;\footnote{Shahpari, supra, footnote 15.}
• a re-entry visa cannot be obtained;\footnote{Sharphari, supra, footnote 15; Nepete, supra, footnote 15.}
• their residency status cannot be renewed.\footnote{Kamana, supra, footnote 15; Hassanzadeh, supra, footnote 15.}

10.1.2. Rights and Obligations of a National

It does not appear that, for Article 1E to apply, a person must have the rights that are identical in every respect to those of a national of the country where the person has taken residence.

In determining whether the claimant falls within the ambit of Article 1E, the Trial Division in Kroon\footnote{Kroon, supra, footnote 3, at 167.} endorsed a consideration of the basic rights to which the claimant is entitled under the constitution and the laws of the putative Article 1E country and a comparison of those with the rights acknowledged for that country’s nationals. The Court stated:

Here, the tribunal … sought to assess whether the [claimant] would be recognized under the Estonian Constitution and its laws as having basic rights and obligations which attach to nationals of that country. It found, with some important exceptions, that was the case and that in certain key respects the [claimant] would enjoy, in Estonia, a status comparable to that of Estonian nationals and consistent with international conventions and treaties relating to rights and obligations of individuals. In particular, it found … that the [claimant] could be expected to be restored to his rights of residency in Estonia as a registered non-citizen, upon his return, that within a reasonable time he would be entitled to apply for citizenship and in the meantime had a right to remain there with rights similar to most of those enjoyed by citizens.\footnote{Kroon, supra, footnote 3, at 167.}

The Court found this approach to be reasonable and one supported by legal writers such as Grahl-Madsen and Hathaway.\footnote{Kroon, supra, footnote 3, at 168. See Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, (Leyden: A W. Sijthoff, 1966), Volume 1, pages 269-270, and James C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991), pages 211-214.}
The Trial Division, in *Shamlou*, accepted as “an accurate statement of the law” the following four criteria that the Board should follow in undertaking an analysis of the “basic rights” enjoyed by a claimant, as outlined by Lorne Waldman in *Immigration Law and Practice*:

(a) the right to return to the country of residence;
(b) the right to work freely without restrictions;
(c) the right to study, and
(d) full access to social services in the country of residence.

If the claimant has some sort of temporary status which must be renewed, and which could be cancelled, or if the claimant does not have the right to return to the country of residence, clearly the claimant should not be excluded under Art. 1E.

The Court was satisfied the CRDD had come to a reasonable conclusion in determining that the claimant, an Iranian who had become a permanent resident of Mexico, enjoyed substantially the same rights as Mexican nationals, even if he had chosen not to renew his Mexican travel documents (there was some evidence they were no longer renewable after his absence of more than three years) and not to wait for his Mexican citizenship status to be formalized. Although not entitled to vote, these rights included the ability to leave, re-enter and reside anywhere in the country, access to free health care, the right to purchase and own property, and the ability to seek, obtain and change employment. Furthermore, the Mexican authorities had at no time attempted to return him to Iran and there was no allegation of persecution in Mexico.

It does not appear that determinations under Article 1E necessarily entail a rigid consideration of all of the criteria identified in the *Shamlou* case. In *Hamdan*, the Trial Division stated as follows:

It is not necessary to comment on whether the criteria laid out in *Shamlou* must all be satisfied for exclusion under Article 1(E), or whether other criteria may be relevant in some cases. The relevant criteria will change depending on the rights which normally accrue to citizens in the country of residence subject to scrutiny.

In *Juzbasevs*, the Trial Division noted that the case law is not clear as to what factors need to be considered. It would appear that determinations under Article 1E do not necessarily

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23 *Shamlou*, supra, footnote 13, at 152.
24 (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992), vol. 1, §8.218 at 8.204-8.205 (Issue 17/2/97).
25 *Shamlou*, supra, footnote 13, at 142.
27 *Juzbasevs*, supra, footnote 15.
involve a strict consideration of all factors regarding residency, as the analysis depends on the particular nature of the case at hand. International standards and practices may allow a state to limit government employment, political participation (such as the right to vote, the right to hold office), and some property rights to nationals. In Latvia, the country in question, certain professions were also closed to non-nationals, but this did not negate the application of Article 1E.

In Kamana, the claimant had acquired refugee status in Burundi. The evidence indicated that refugee status in Burundi included the right not to be deported from that country. Except for the right to vote, he had the same rights as did Burundi citizens, namely, the right to education and to work. The Court therefore upheld the CRDD’s decision that Article 1E applied.

10.1.3. Fear of Persecution in the Article 1E Country

A number of decisions of the Federal Court suggest that the RPD can determine whether the claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason in the Article 1E country, and, in appropriate cases, whether protection is available to the claimant in that country.

The first case dealing explicitly with the matter is Kroon. In that case, the Trial Division stated that if a claimant were found to enjoy the rights and obligations of a national,

… that would ordinarily be the end of the matter, for his claim is then excluded from consideration as a refugee claim.

Earlier in the Kroon judgment, Justice MacKay, in commenting on the purpose of Article 1E, seemed to suggest that if a claimant faced a threat of persecution in the putative Article 1E country, then that country would not be an Article 1E country.

In my view, the purpose of Article 1E is to support regular immigration laws of countries in the international community, and within the Immigration Act of this country to support the purposes of that Act and the policies it seeks to legislate, by limiting refugee claims to those who clearly face the threat of persecution. If A faces such a threat in his own country, but is living in another country, with or without refugee status, and there faces no threat of persecution for Convention reasons, or put another way, A enjoys the same rights of status as nationals of the second country, the function of Article 1E is to exclude that person as a potential refugee claimant in a third country.

28 Kamana, supra, footnote 15.

29 Kroon, supra, footnote 3, at 168. The Court upheld the finding of the CRDD that the claimant enjoyed the rights and obligations of a national of Estonia but disagreed with its decision to nevertheless consider the merits of the claim against Estonia after having determined Estonia to be an Article 1E country.

30 Kroon, supra, footnote 3, at 167-168. Quaere whether there is an internal contradiction in the judgment or whether MacKay J. might be simply suggesting that in considering whether a country is in fact an Article 1E country, the Board should consider whether the claimant faces a threat of persecution there (as opposed to considering the issue of persecution after determining the country to be an Article 1E country). See also Shamlou, supra, footnote 13, at 142, where the Court notes that both the CRDD, in its reasons, and the respondent, in his arguments, referred to the lack of persecution in Mexico (the Article 1E country) as one of the factors taken into consideration in concluding that the claimant enjoyed most of the rights and obligations of a national in that country. The Court itself does not list this factor in its conclusions, at 151-152, however, it
A case that dealt implicitly with the issue of whether the CRDD should consider whether the claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution in the Article 1E country was Olschewski.\(^{31}\) There, the CRDD had determined that the claimant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Israel and, in the alternative, that he enjoyed the rights and obligations of a national in Ukraine (and was thus excluded) and, furthermore, that his fear of persecution in Ukraine was not well founded. The Court disagreed with all the findings of the CRDD and perhaps, by considering the issue of a well-founded fear of persecution in Ukraine, implicitly agreed that the CRDD could in fact assess a claim against the Article 1E country. As the Court put it,

Accordingly … the Article [1E] would not appear to apply. Alternatively, even if I am wrong in concluding that the Article does not apply, I am nevertheless of the opinion that the Board erred in the articulation of its reasons in support of its conclusion that the [claimants] failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution in Ukraine on the basis of religion.\(^{32}\)

In Feimi,\(^{33}\) the Trial Division dealt with an Albanian national who had moved to Greece to escape a blood feud. There he was accepted as “an undocumented resident” on the island of Hydra. Although there was no specific reference to Article 1E, in upholding the negative CRDD decision, the Court focused on adequacy of state protection in Greece. In the Court’s view, no evidence was presented to indicate the police system was such that Greece could not have offered the claimant protection.

In Choovak,\(^{34}\) the Trial Division held that the CRDD erred in not turning its mind to the specific claim made by the claimant, an Iranian national, against Germany, where she was given asylum and had a special temporary residence status before coming to Canada. In Zhao,\(^{35}\) the Federal Court held that the RPD had properly assessed the availability of state protection from a criminal gang in Brazil, where the claimant, a Chinese national, had permanent residence status.

A different approach was taken in Adereti,\(^{36}\) where the Federal Court upheld the RPD’s decision that the claimant, a Nigerian national, did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Nigeria. Given that the claimant had no legal status as a citizen in Brazil, where he had resided, the Court held that there was no obligation to assess whether adequate state protection existed for

\(^{31}\) Olschewski, supra, footnote 11.

\(^{32}\) Olschewski, supra, footnote 11, at 11.


\(^{34}\) M.C.I. v. Choovak, supra, footnote 8. See also Nepete, supra, footnote 14, where the Court upheld the CRDD’s finding that the claimant, an Angolan national, did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution in his country of residence (the Czech Republic). A similar approach was taken by the Court in Juzbasevs, supra, footnote 15.


him there. The Court noted that claimants must only seek the protection of countries in which they can claim citizenship.

In *Mobarekeh*, the Federal Court held that before the Board considers the issue of state protection with respect to a country other than the claimant’s country of nationality, the panel should make clear the basis for considering that issue. As indicated earlier, the issue of availability of state protection may be relevant to the assessment of the what rights the claimant enjoys in the putative Article 1E country, and whether there were valid reasons for the claimant to leave the country of residence and seek international protection.

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ARTICLE 1F

10.2. ARTICLE 1F(a): Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity\(^{38}\)

In order to define Article 1F(a) crimes, reference must be had to the international instruments\(^{39}\) that deal with these crimes. The international instrument most frequently used to define these crimes is the *Charter of the International Military Tribunal*.\(^{40}\) Article 1F(a) must also be interpreted so as to include the international instruments concluded since its adoption. This would include the *Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda*\(^{41}\) and the *Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*\(^{42}\) as well as the *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*\(^{43}\).

10.2.1. Crimes Against Peace

Since a crime against peace historically may only be committed in the context of an international war, there have been no Federal Court or CRDD decisions involving this aspect of the exclusion clause.

10.2.2. War Crimes

Numerous international instruments may be referred to when defining these crimes, including the *Charter of the International Military Tribunal*, the *Geneva Conventions* and the *Additional Protocol*.

In *Ramirez*,\(^{44}\) the Court of Appeal noted that crimes committed during the civil war in El

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\(^{39}\) See Annex VI of the UNHCR Handbook for a partial list of applicable international instruments.


Salvador were either war crimes or crimes against humanity.

The Supreme Court of Canada in Finta\textsuperscript{45} set out the requisite mens rea (mental state) and actus reus (physical element) of a war crime or a crime against humanity under section 7(3.71) of the Canadian Criminal Code. The Court did not consider Article 1F(a). In the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Mugesera\textsuperscript{46}, the Court said that “insofar as Finta suggested that discriminatory intent was required for all crimes against humanity…it should no longer be followed on this point.”\textsuperscript{47}

10.2.3. Crimes Against Humanity

Crimes against humanity may be committed during a war - civil or international - as well as in times of peace.\textsuperscript{48} The crime must be committed in a “widespread systematic fashion”.\textsuperscript{49}

In addition, when “barbarous cruelty” is an additional component of kidnapping, unlawful confinement, robbery and manslaughter, such offences can achieve the level of crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{50}

The Supreme Court of Canada, in Mugesera,\textsuperscript{51} found that a criminal act rises to the level of a crime against humanity when the following four elements are made out:

(i) An enumerated proscribed act was committed (this involves showing that the accused committed the criminal act and had the requisite guilty state of


\textsuperscript{46} Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40; [2005] S.C.J. No. 39

\textsuperscript{47} Discriminatory intent is only required for crimes against humanity that take the form of persecution. See Mugesera, supra, footnote 46, at paragraph 44.


\textsuperscript{49} Sivakumar, supra, footnote 48, at 443. See also Suliman, Shakir Mohamed v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2829-96), McGillis, June 13, 1997, which held that when determining whether certain activities of the police constitute crimes against humanity, the CRDD must consider whether the victims of the police abuse were “...members of a group which has been targeted systematically and in a widespread manner.”

\textsuperscript{50} Finta, supra, footnote 45. In Wajid, Rham v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1706-99), Pelletier, May 25, 2000 the Court held that “not every domestic crime and act of violence may be considered a crime against humanity.

\textsuperscript{51} Mugesera, supra, footnote 46.
mind for the underlying act); 

(ii)  The act was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack; 

(iii) The attack was directed against any civilian population or any identifiable 
group of persons; and 

(iv) The person committing the proscribed act knew of the attack and knew or 
took the risk that his or her act comprised a part of that attack.

The Supreme Court of Canada found that the criminal act of “persecution” could be one 
of the underlying acts, which, in appropriate circumstances, may constitute a crime against 
humanity. Persecution as a crime against humanity must constitute a gross or blatant denial on 
discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in international customary or treaty 
law. As far as the requisite mental element for persecution, the Court determined that a person 
must have intended to commit the persecutory acts and must have committed them with 
discriminatory intent. The requirement for discriminatory intent applies only to the criminal act 
of persecution and is not a requirement with respect to other forms of crimes against humanity, 
like murder.52

Additionally, a single act may constitute a crime against humanity as long as the attack it 
forms a part of is widespread or systematic and is directed against a civilian population.53  Also, 
the civilian population must be the primary object of the attack and not merely a collateral victim 
of it. The term population suggests that the attack is directed against a relatively large group of 
people who share distinctive features and therefore identifies them as targets of the attack.54  As 
regards the requisite mental element of a crime against humanity, the Supreme Court of Canada 
found the following:

…the person committing the act need only be cognizant of the link between 
his or her act and the attack. The person need not intend that the act be 
directed against the targeted population, and motive is irrelevant once 
knowledge of the attack has been established together with knowledge that 
the act forms a part of the attack or with recklessness in this regard…Even if 
the person’s motive is purely personal, the act may be a crime against 
humanity if the relevant knowledge is made out.55

The perpetrator of a crime against humanity may be an individual acting independently of 
a State, especially those involved in paramilitary or armed revolutionary movements, or a person 
acting in conjunction with the authorities of a State.56

52 Mugesera, supra, footnote 46. 
53 Mugesera, supra, footnote 46, at 70. The Court noted at page 73 that “the existence of a widespread or 
systematic attack helps to ensure that purely personal crimes do not fall within the scope of provisions 
regarding crimes against humanity.” 
54 Mugesera, supra, footnote 46, at 72. 
55 Mugesera, supra, footnote 46, at 76. 
56 Sivakumar, supra, footnote 48, at 444.
It is crucial that the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), in making a decision to exclude under Article 1F(a), provide findings of fact as to specific crimes against humanity which the claimant is alleged to have committed. The RPD (formerly the CRDD) should make findings as to: acts committed by the immediate perpetrators; the claimant’s knowledge of the acts; his sharing in the purpose of the acts; and whether the acts constituted crimes against humanity.57

10.2.4. Balancing

There is no requirement to balance the nature of the Article 1F(a) crime with the degree of persecution feared.58

10.2.5. Defences

There may be circumstances where a claimant will invoke successfully certain defences which absolve him or her from criminal responsibility and thus he or she will not be excluded from refugee status, despite the claimant’s commission of a war crime or crime against humanity.

10.2.5.1. Duress

The defence of duress may be used to justify participation in certain offences providing the perpetrator was in danger of imminent harm,59 the evil threatened him or her was on balance greater than or equal to the evil which he or she inflicted on the victim60 and he or she was not

57 Sivakumar, supra, footnote 48, at 449; Cardenas, Roberto Andres Poblete v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. 93-A-171), Jerome, February 4, 1994. Reported: Cardenas v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 23 Imm. L.R. (2d) 244 (F.C.T.D.), at 251-252. In Cibaric, Ivan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1078-95), Noël, December 18, 1995, the Court found that the claimant’s participation in certain actions during the war in the former Yugoslavia were reasonably characterized by the Refugee Division as crimes against humanity and as actions which were a regular part of the army’s operation. In Bagri, Syed Safdar Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4211-00), Lutfy, October 9, 2001, the Court set aside the exclusion decision of the CRDD because the panel had not stated what specific crimes the claimant was complicit in and had not questioned him about the specific crimes. See also M.C.I. v. Muto, Antonio-Nesland (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-518-01), Tremblay-Lamer, March 6, 2002; 2002 FCT 256, where the Court held that a description of the acts committed by the organization is essential to determine the degree of participation or complicity of an individual in those acts. In Sungu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2003] 3 F.C. 192 (T.D.); 2002 FCT 1207, the Court affirmed that Mobutu’s regime was engaged in torture and had committed international crimes, namely crimes against humanity.


59 Ramirez, supra, footnote 44, at 327-328. In Asgathedom, Yoseph v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5406-00), Blais, August 30, 2001, the Court upheld the finding of duress as it agreed there was an imminent, real and inevitable threat to the claimant’s life if he deserted the army or disobeyed an order. It further found that the law does not function at the level of heroism and does not require a person to desert or disobey an order at the risk of his life. In Bermudez, Ivan Antonio v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-233-04), Phelan, February 24, 2005; 2005 FC 286 the Court did not uphold the finding of exclusion as the panel failed to consider the defence of duress.

60 Ramirez, supra, footnote 44, at 328.
responsible for his own predicament.  

10.2.5.2. Superior Orders

A claimant may raise the defence that he or she was ordered to commit the offence by his military superior and that under military law, such orders must be obeyed. The Supreme Court of Canada in Finta, citing numerous international law decisions, held that this defence will not be successful if the military order was “manifestly unlawful” or “patently and obviously wrong”, in other words, if it “offends the conscience of every reasonable, right thinking person”.  

If this defence is raised in conjunction with the defence of duress, in that the claimant feared punishment if he or she disobeyed the order, then the principles relating to the defence of duress would apply.

10.2.5.3. Military Necessity

A claimant may raise the defence that the military action carried out was justified by the general circumstances of battle. However, if the deaths of innocent civilians are as a result of intentional, deliberate and unjustified acts of killing, such acts may constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity.  

10.2.5.4. Remorse

Remorse is immaterial in determining the culpability of a perpetrator of a war crime or a crime against humanity.

10.2.6. Complicity

Where a claimant has not in a “physical” sense committed a crime, but has aided,
instigated or counselled a perpetrator in the commission of a war crime or crime against humanity, he or she may, as an accomplice, be held responsible for the crime and thus subject to being excluded from the refugee definition. An accomplice is as culpable as the principal perpetrator. When determining the culpability of a claimant who has had a prior association with a group responsible for excludable crimes, regard should be had to the following factors: method of recruitment; nature of the organization; the claimant’s rank; knowledge of atrocities; opportunity to leave the organization and period of time spent in the organization.

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65 Moreno v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 298 (C.A.), at 320; Penate v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 2 F.C. 79 (T.D.), at 84. In Pushpanathan, Velupillai v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4427-01), Blais, September 3, 2002; 2002 FCT 867, the Court upheld the findings of the CRDD to exclude the claimant under Articles 1F(a) and (e) for crimes against humanity and complicity in terrorist activities associated with the LTTE. The Court found that the CRDD did not err in concluding that the LTTE was a terrorist organization with a limited and brutal purpose and, although there was a lack of evidence of specific harm that came about due to the claimant’s involvement with the LTTE, the claimant financed the LTTE through drug trafficking in Canada and therefore was complicit in the crimes against humanity committed by the LTTE. In Lai, Li Min v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1849-04), Simpson, February 8, 2005; 2005 FC 179 the Court upheld the exclusion of the claimant who, as an office manager of Family Planning in China, had forced a seven-month pregnant women to have an abortion pursuant to a state policy of forcible abortion, which is a crime against humanity.

66 Bahamin, Fardin v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-115-92), Hugessen, MacGuigan, Linden, June 20, 1994. Reported: Bahamin v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 171 N.R. 79 (F.C.A.). In M.C.I. v. Nagra, Harjinderpal Singh (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5534-98), Rouleau, October 27, 1999, the Court upheld the decision of the CRDD that the claimant should not be found complicit because he was unaware of the violence of the group in which he was a member. In Sifuentes Salazar, Gerardo Florentino et al. v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-977-98), Tremblay-Lamer, April 16, 1999, the Court did not uphold the exclusion of the claimant as the evidence did not reveal that the claimant had knowledge of the crimes committed. In Musansi, Clara Lussikila v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5470-99), Pinard, January 23, 2001, the Court was of the view that there was not sufficient evidence establishing the complicity of the claimant. In Alvan, Riad Mushen Abou v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1582-02), O’Keefe, January 31, 2003; 2003 FCT 109 the exclusion of the claimant, a former member of the South Lebanese Army (the SLA), was overturned because the CRDD failed to consider the issue of “common purpose”. In Abbas, Redha Abdul Amir v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6488-02), Pinard, January 9, 2004; 2004 FC 17, the Court upheld the findings of the RPD that the claimant was complicit in the crimes against humanity committed by the regime in Iraq because for 22 years the claimant held positions of trust within the Iraqi government. He had knowledge of certain ongoing and regular acts constituting crimes against humanity and never took any measures to prevent these acts or to dissociate himself from these activities. Similarly, in Omar, Idleh Djama v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2452-03), Pinard, June 17, 2004; 2004 FC 861, the RPD’s decision to exclude was upheld as the claimant had been an ambassador abroad for the regime in Djibouti during a period of repression and persecution of the civilian population. The claimant had occupied the highest position in the most important mission abroad, had knowledge of the crimes committed by his government and had never tried to dissociate himself from these crimes. However, the decision to exclude was not upheld in Safiarov, Hasan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4718-03), O’Reilly, July 21, 2004; 2004 FC 1009, as there was no evidence of knowing participation in serious crimes. The Court found that the RPD could not assume, based solely on the claimant’s long-time, low-ranking membership in the police, that he was a party to crimes against humanity. In Fabela, Veronica Maria v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7282-04), Beaudry, July 25, 2005; 2005 FC 1026 the Court upheld the exclusion of a former police officer from Mexico and found that an organization does not need to have an official plan or policy for a finding of crimes against humanity. As long as the perpetration of crimes are committed in a widespread and systematic fashion by a specific group, then the requirements have been met. The Court also noted the six important factors in determining exclusion (the method of recruitment, the claimant's position and rank in the organization, the nature of the organization, the knowledge of atrocities, the length of time in the organization and the opportunity to leave the organization).
The Court of Appeal held in Ramirez that “no one can commit international offences without personal and knowing participation”.67

In Solomon,68 the Court referred the case back for rehearing as the claimant had been a member of an organization whose actions may have ultimately resulted in the mistreatment of others; although the claimant was found not to have engaged in acts of violence, he might have been excluded through association. In contrast, in Ledezma69 the Court found that the CRDD erred in its conclusion that the claimant, a member of the military, was an accomplice to crimes against humanity as the evidence revealed it was the police, not the military who was responsible for the abuses.

### 10.2.6.1. Mere Membership in an Organization

In Ramirez the Court of Appeal stated:

… mere membership in an organization which from time to time commits international offences in not normally sufficient for exclusion from refugee status.70 (emphasis added)

In contrast the Court held that:

… where an organization is principally directed to a limited, brutal purpose, such as a secret police activity, mere membership may by necessity involve

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67 Ramirez, supra, footnote 44, at 317. See also Cardenas, supra, footnote 57, where the Court set aside the decision of the CRDD because it erroneously inculpated the claimant in the crimes against humanity committed by a faction of the claimant’s organization of which the claimant was not a member. As the Court pointed out in M.C.I. v. Bazargan, Mohammad Hassan (F.C.A., no. A-400-95), Marceau, Décary, Chevalier, September 18, 1996, “personal and knowing participation” can be direct or indirect, and does not require formal membership in the group concerned. One need not be a member of a group in order to be an accomplice to its acts. In M.C.I. v. Sumaida, Hussein Ali (F.C.A., no. A-800-95), Létourneau, Strayer, Noël, January 7, 2000, the Court stated that there was no requirement that a claimant be linked to specific crimes as the actual perpetrator or that crimes against humanity committed by an organization be necessarily and directly attributable to specific acts or omissions of a claimant. See also Albuja, Jorge Ernesto Echeverria v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3562-99), Pinard, October 23, 2000. In M.C.I. v. Maan, Akash Deep Singh (F.C., no. IMM-2003-05), Martineau, December 9, 2005; 2005 FC 1682 the Court found that the RPD erred in excusing the claimant from any personal and knowing participation in the militant group, Babbar Khalsa, in India, because he was a minor at the time. The Court noted that what counts is not the age of the claimant but the degree of his “personal and knowing participation” in crimes. For an interesting discussion of whether a minor can be found described under s. 34 (f) of IRPA (membership in a terrorist organization), see Poshteh, Piran Ahmadi v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no., A-207-04), Rothstein, Noël, Malone, March 4, 2005; 2005 FCA 85.


69 Ledezma, Jorge Ernesto Paniagua v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3785-96), Simpson, December 1, 1997. In Sungu supra, footnote 57 the Court found that the panel had applied an inappropriate principle in finding complicity in that there was no evidence the claimant shared in the common purpose in the perpetration of crimes by the Mobutu regime.

70 Ramirez, supra, footnote 44, at 317. The Court held in M.C.I. v. Tshienda, Mulumba Freddy (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3984-01), O’Keefe, March 27, 2003; 2003 FCT 360 that it was open to the CRDD not to exclude the claimant since he was a civilian employee at city hall in the Democratic Republic of Congo and did not work for the police or the military.
personal and knowing participation in persecutorial acts.\footnote{Ramirez, supra, footnote 44, at 317. In Balta, Dragomir v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2459-94), Wetson, January 27, 1995, at 5. Reported: Balta v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 27 Imm. L.R. (2d) 226 (F.C.T.D.), the Court disagreed with the conclusion of the CRDD that the national army in question was a “terrorist organization” and therefore principally directed to a limited, brutal purpose. In Shakarabi, Seyed Hassan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1371-97), Teitelbaum, April 1, 1998, the Court concluded that the Shah’s secret police, the Savak, was an organization principally directed to a limited brutal purpose even though it was also involved in domestic and foreign security. As an informant for this organization the claimant was found to be complicit in the abuses. In Imama, Lofjul Bofaya v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-118-01), Tremblay-Lamer, November 6, 2001, the Court agreed that the evidence left no doubt that the many violent acts committed by the Mobutu regime met the definition of crimes against humanity and the claimant was complicit through association. However, in Yogo, Gbenge v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4151-99), Hansen, April 26, 2001, the finding of exclusion was not upheld because the panel failed to highlight the evidence on which it based its characterization of the organization as one principally directed to a limited, brutal purpose, even though the claimant had been in the service of the Mobutu regime. In upholding the CRDD decision in Hovaiz, Hoshyar v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2012-01), Pinard, August 29, 2002; 2002 FCT 908, the Court held the fact that the claimant asserted before the CRDD that he had altered his participation in the Patriotic Union Kurdistan (PUK) after learning of an attempted assassination by that group does not remedy his continued participation in the organization. In Harb, supra, footnote 43, the CRDD did not err in concluding that the South Lebanese Army (SLA) is an organization with a limited, brutal purpose. In Chowdhury, Mohammad Salah v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5041-02), Blanchard, June 13, 2003; 2003 FCT 744 the Court found that the Awami League (AL) is not an organization that is principally directed to a limited brutal purpose. Therefore, the claimant’s membership in the AL did not necessarily make him a knowing participant in persecutorial acts. Similarly, in Ruiz, Mario Roberto Cirilo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4644-02), Tremblay-Lamer, October 10, 2003; 2003 FC 1177 the Court found that the panel did not have enough evidence to determine that the Peruvian Navy was an organization directed to a limited, brutal purpose. In Bukumba, Madeleine Mangadu v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3088-03), von Finckenstein, January 22, 2004; 2004 FC 93, the Court upheld the exclusion of the claimant because as an employee of the CSE in the Democratic Republic of Congo she had not been merely a member of an organization which from time to time committed international offences. Rather, she had been a long-time employee who had agreed voluntarily to collect information on people and reported directly to the head of the CSE. In Rocha, Guifo Elmer Viviano v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4312-03), O’Keefe, February 25, 2005: 2005 FC 304 the Court upheld the exclusion of the claimant who as a captain in the Peruvian army, was complicit in the crimes against humanity committed as a continuous and regular part of its operation. The Court did not uphold the decision in M.C.I. and Sol. Gen. v. Farah, Abdulcadir Abdu (F.C., no. IMM-1187-05), Campbell, September 22, 2005; 2005 FC 1300, even though the claimant had held the rank of major, since the RPD did not address the issue of the Somali Army from 1974 to 1989 as an organization dedicated to a limited brutal purpose. In Sadakah, Jadallah v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-882-05), Blanchard, November 3, 2005; 2005 FC 1494 the RPD incorrectly concluded that the Lebanese Forces was an organization with a limited and brutal purpose. Therefore the findings on exclusion were not upheld. The Court made the same finding in Catal, Ibaddullah v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-102-05), Kelen, November 9, 2005; 2005 FC 1517 and held that the RPD erred in finding that the Turkish Gendarme was an organization with a limited brutal purpose and therefore did not uphold the exclusion of the claimant. In M.C.I. v. Kahn, Masud Akhtar (F.C., no. IMM-4350-04), Gauthier, June 23, 2005 the Court upheld the RPD’s decision not to exclude the claimant, a former military officer in the Sachal Rangers in the Pakistani army. The Court emphasized that it is not the law that anyone who is more than a mere onlooker therefore has knowledge of crimes against humanity and will be considered an accomplice, only that depending on the circumstances, one could be an accomplice.}
engages solely and exclusively in acts of terrorism.\textsuperscript{72} The Court held that:

\ldots where there is no evidence that political objectives can be separated from militaristic activities, an organization could still be found to have a limited, brutal purpose. There is no evidence to suggest that the LTTE’s terrorist activities can be separated from other objectives it may have. The LTTE resorts to terrorist methods to reach their objectives and this suggests that the LTTE is an organization with a brutal and limited purpose.\textsuperscript{73}

Membership in these organizations, does not automatically result in exclusion; the CRDD must determine whether the claimant had knowledge of the crimes being committed by the members of the organization.\textsuperscript{74} There is a “presumption of complicity” when the claimant was a

\textsuperscript{72} Pushpanathan, Veluppillai v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4427-01), Blais, September 3, 2002; 2002 FCT 867. In Herrera, Rasmussen Torres v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3749-04), Campbell, April 7, 2005; 2005 FC 464 the Court did not uphold the exclusion of the claimant, a part-time reservist and recruitment officer with the Colombian army. While the Court acknowledged the crimes against humanity committed by the Colombian army during the time the claimant was in the army, it was an error to characterize that army as an “organization that is principally directed to a limited, brutal purpose.” In contrast, in Diasonama, Lino v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5754-04), Noël, June 27, 2005; 2005 FC 888 the Court agreed that the ANR, as a matter of policy of Kabila’s regime, was an organization with a limited and brutal purpose and therefore the exclusion of the claimant was upheld as an accomplice in the crimes. In Zoeger La Hoz, Carmen Maria v. M.C.I. and Contreras Magon, Miguel Luis v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5239-04), Blanchard, May 30, 2005; 2005 FC 762 the Court found that it was an error to exclude the claimant solely for his membership in the Peruvian army, as he testified that he had no knowledge of a number of crimes committed by the army. The Court stated that mere membership in an organization that is a legitimate institution, is responsible for defending the country of Peru, and is recognized by that country’s Constitution does not suffice to establish that a person is an accomplice or an accomplice by association, unless the organization has a limited, brutal purpose. For a similar decision, see Collins, Nelson Pineda v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-10257-03, de Montigny, May 24, 2005; 2005 FC 732 where the Court did not uphold the exclusion of a claimant who had reached the rank of second sergeant in the Mexican army. Also in Valere, Nixon v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8674-04), Mactavish, April 19, 2005; 2005 FC 524 the Court did not uphold the exclusion of the claimant, a junior ranked officer in the Haitian National Police (HNP), because although human rights violations by members of the HNP had been continuous and regular, the RP D had not found the HNP was an organization with a limited brutal purpose. In Bedoya, Juan Carlos Sanchez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-592-05), Hughes, August 10, 2005; 2005 FC 1092 the Court did not uphold the exclusion of the claimant, a former member of the Special Forces #1 unit and of the Palace Brigade of the Colombian army. The army as a whole was not found by the RP D to have a limited, brutal purpose and therefore the RP D was incorrect in stating that activity of the army in general could be attributed to the claimant. Similarly, in M.C.I. v. Perez de Leon, Neptali Elin (F.C., no. IMM-887-05), Noël, September 6, 2005; 2005 FC 1208 the Court did not uphold the exclusion of a former member of the presidential guard in the Guatemalan army because the RP D failed to decide the issue of whether the Guatemalan army was an organization with a limited, brutal purpose. The Court noted that this explicit qualification is essential to assessing the claimant’s participation in and knowledge of the organization’s activities. In Antonio, Manuel Joao v. Sol. Gen. (F.C., no. IMM-6490-04), Snider, December 16, 2005; 2005 FC 1700 the Court upheld the finding of the RP D that the Angolan army was an organization with a limited, brutal purpose during the period of civil war in which the claimant served in the army. While the claimant suggested that the legitimate purpose of the army was that of national defence, the RP D correctly determined that during that time period the army’s activities were directly at defeating UNITA and terrorizing the citizens of Angola.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{73} Pushpanathan, supra, footnote 72, at paragraph 40.

\textsuperscript{74} Saridag, Ahmet v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5691-93), McKeown, October 5, 1994, at 4. The issue of knowledge may be a matter of credibility. See Zamora, Miguel Angel v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-771-91), Stone, Létourneau, Robertson, July 5, 1994 where the Court upheld the decision of the CRDD to reject the claimant’s
member of such a group whereby

… it can generally be assumed that its members intentionally and voluntarily joined and remained in the group for the common purpose of actively adding their personal efforts to the group’s cause.75

This presumption is clearly rebuttable. 

10.2.6.2. Presence at the Scene

The Court of Appeal has held that “mere presence at the scene of an offence is not enough to qualify as personal and knowing participation”, unless the onlooker has an intrinsic connection with the persecuting group. The Court concluded that

… complicity rests in such cases … on the existence of a shared common

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76 Saridag, supra, footnote 74, at 4. In Balta, supra, footnote 71, the Court did not uphold the decision of the CRDD that there was sufficient evidence that the claimant had sufficient knowledge or personal participation. See also Aden ibid., and Sumaida, supra, footnote 48. In Mankoto, Vicky Keboulu v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4455-04, Tremblay-Lamer, February 25, 2005; 2005 FC 294 the exclusion of the claimant, who had been a magistrate (in the DRC), was not upheld as there was no evidence that the claimant knew about the crimes committed by the regime.

77 Ramirez, supra, footnote 44, at 317.

78 Ramirez, supra, footnote 44, at 317.
purpose and the knowledge that all of the parties in question may have of it.\(^\text{79}\)

(emphasis added)

The culpability of a claimant was rejected where the claimant, shortly after being forcibly recruited, had witnessed on only one occasion, the torture of a prisoner.\(^\text{80}\) In that case, however, the claimant had had no prior knowledge of the acts to be perpetrated.

10.2.6.3. Rounding Up of Dissidents

A claimant’s activities in rounding up suspects may constitute personal involvement in the commission of any offences that follow providing the claimant had knowledge that such atrocities were being committed.\(^\text{81}\)

10.2.6.4. Responsibility of Superiors

In Sivakumar the Court of Appeal held that “a commander may be responsible for international crimes committed by those under his command, but only if there is knowledge or reason to know about them.”\(^\text{82}\) In addition,

the closer one is to being a leader rather than an ordinary member, the more likely it is that an inference will be drawn that one knew of the crime and shared the organization’s purpose in committing that crime.\(^\text{83}\)

In Mohammad,\(^\text{84}\) the Court held that the claimant was complicit in Article 1F(a) crimes since, as prison director, he knew or should have known of the crimes committed against

\(^{79}\) Ramirez, supra, footnote 44, at 318. See also Alza, Julian Ulises v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3657-94), MacKay, March 26, 1996, and Kudjoe, Rommel v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5129-97), Pinard, December 4, 1998 where the Court held that the claimant was not an “innocent bystander” given his knowledge of the human rights abuses (in Ghana) and the fact he continued to work for the organization even after gaining this knowledge. In Loordu, Joseph Kennedy v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1258-00), Campbell, January 25, 2001, the Court found that the claimant was merely at the scene of persecutorial acts but this presence was not coupled with being an associate of the principal offenders, therefore, there was no sharing in the common purpose of the persecutorial acts. In El-Hasbani, Georges Youssef v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3891-00), Muldoon, August 17, 2001, the exclusion of the claimant for his past employment with the South Lebanon Army was not upheld as the claimant, rather than being complicit in crimes against humanity, had actually risked his own life and safety to make the territory safe for civilians.

\(^{80}\) Moreno, supra, footnote 65, at 323. A claimant is under no obligation to prevent acts of torture being perpetrated by others.

\(^{81}\) Ramirez, supra, footnote 44, at 324. In Gutierrez, Luis Eduardo v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2170-93), MacKay, October 11, 1994, at 11. Reported: Gutierrez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 30 Imm. L.R. (2d) 106 (F.C.T.D.), the claimant was found complicit because he know that his work in transporting detainees led to the persecution of individuals. Similarly in Rasuli, supra, footnote 48, the claimant was excluded because he informed on individuals to an organization known for its commission of crimes against humanity.

\(^{82}\) Sivakumar, supra, footnote 48, at 439.

\(^{83}\) Sivakumar, supra, footnote 48, at 440.

prisoners.
10.3. ARTICLE 1 F(b): Serious Non-Political Crimes

10.3.1. "Serious Crimes"

In *Brzezinski*, the Trial Division considered for the first time what is meant by "serious crime" within the context of Article 1 F(b). In this case the claimants acknowledged that they supported their family by stealing, namely shoplifting, both before and after coming to Canada. While the convictions in Canada are not relevant as they were not committed "outside the country of refuge", the Court, after a review of the *travaux preparatoires*, held that the intention of the Convention was not to exclude persons who committed minor crimes, even "an accumulation of petty crimes." Thus, while shoplifting was recognized by the Court as being a serious social problem, it was not a "serious" crime within the meaning of Article 1 F(b), despite evidence of the claimant's recidivism. The Court certified two questions involving the concept of habitual involvement in crimes but the appeal was not pursued.

In *Xie* the Federal Court of Appeal upheld the finding of the Federal Court, and concluded that a claimant can be excluded from refugee protection by the RPD for a purely economic offence.

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85 *Brzezinski, Jan v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1333-97), Lutfy, July 9, 1998. In *Taleb, Ali et al. v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. 1449-98), Tremblay-Lamer, May 18, 1999 the Court found that the offence of attempted kidnapping is punishable by a maximum of 14 years imprisonment and therefore is a "serious" offence within the meaning of Article 1F(b). In *Chan, San Tong v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2154-98), MacKay, April 23, 1999 the Court found that a conviction in the United States for using a communication facility to facilitate trafficking in a substantial volume of narcotics was a "serious" offence. In *Nyari, Istvan v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6551-00), Kelen, September 18, 2002; 2002 FCT 979, the Court found that the CRDD was entitled to find that the claimant’s escape from prison while he was serving a twenty-month sentence for causing bodily harm was not a “serious crime” in the context of 1F(b). In *Sharma, Gunanidhi v. M.C.I.* (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1668-02), Noël, March 10, 2003; 2003 FCT 289 the Court upheld the finding of the Refugee Division that armed robbery was a "serious" non-political crime. In *Xie, Rou Lan v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM-923-03), Kelen, September 4, 2003; 2003 FCT 1023 the Court held that an economic crime not involving any violence can be a 1F(b) crime. In this case the claimant had been charged with embezzling the equivalent of 1.4 million Canadian dollars. In *Liang, Xiao Dong v. M.C.I.* (F.C., no. IMM–1286-03), Layden-Stevenson, December 19, 2003; 2003 FC 1501 the exclusion under 1F(b) of the claimant was upheld. He had been arrested in Canada on an Interpol warrant for conspiracy to commit murder, leading a criminal organization and being involved in a corruption scandal.

International kidnapping of a child constitutes a serious non-political crime.\(^{87}\)

A misdemeanour probably lacks the requisite seriousness to be considered under Article 1F(b).\(^{88}\)

Article 1F(b) is not applicable to refugee claimants who have been convicted of a crime committed outside Canada and who have served their sentence prior to coming to Canada.\(^{89}\)

However, the Federal Court of Appeal in Zrig\(^{90}\) refused to limit Article 1F(b) to crimes that are extraditable pursuant to a treaty. Rather, it interpreted the reference to extraditable crimes in Pushpanathan as an indication of the nature and seriousness of the crimes that may fall under 1F(b).

The Federal Court of Appeal in Chan made the following obiter comments with respect to determining the “seriousness” of a crime:

… had the appellant engaged in similar conduct in Canada, he would have been convicted of an offence such as drug trafficking for which a maximum prison term of ten years or more could have been imposed. In other words, for present purposes I will presume, without deciding, that a serious non-political crime is to be equated with one in which a maximum sentence of ten years or more could have been imposed had the crime been committed in Canada.\(^{91}\) (emphasis added)

Given these obiter remarks it cannot be assumed that a “serious” non-political crime is automatically one in which a maximum sentence of 10 years or more could have been imposed. Rather, this determination depends on the nature of the crime committed; there must be a close examination of the acts committed by the claimant.

10.3.2. "Non-Political Crimes"

The Court of Appeal has held that in order for a crime to be characterized as political, and thus to fall outside the ambit of Article 1F(b), it must meet a two-pronged “incidence” test which requires first, the existence of a political disturbance related to a struggle to modify or abolish either a government or a government policy; and second, a rational nexus between the crime


\(^{90}\) Zrig v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] 3 F.C. 761 (C.A.); 2003 FCA 178. Thus, the exclusion of the claimant in Jafri, Syed Musrafa Abbas v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6276-02), Kelen, August 18, 2003; 2003 FC 984 for the crime of murder was upheld even though the Pakistani government was not seeking the extradition of the claimant.

\(^{91}\) Chan, supra, footnote 89.
committed and the potential accomplishment of the political objective sought.\textsuperscript{92}

The Court of Appeal considered and rejected the notion of balancing the seriousness of the persecution the claimant is likely to suffer against the gravity of the crime he committed.

One final point. Another panel of this Court has already rejected the suggestion made by a number of authors that paragraph 1F(a) requires a kind of proportionality test which would weigh the persecution likely to be suffered by the refugee claimant against the gravity of this crime. Whether or not such a test may be appropriate for paragraph 1F(b) seems to me to be even more problematical. As I have already indicated, the claimant to whom the exclusion clause applies is \textit{ex hypothesi} in danger of persecution; the crime which he has committed is by definition “serious” and will therefore carry with it a heavy penalty which at a minimum will entail a lengthy term of imprisonment and may well include death. This country is apparently prepared to extradite criminals to face the death penalty and, at least for a crime of the nature of that which the [claimant] has admitted committing, I can see no reason why we should take any different attitude to a refugee claimant. It is not in the public interest that this country should become a safe haven for mass bombers.\textsuperscript{93} (footnotes omitted)

Proportionality is a factor in the characterization of a crime. The gravity of the crime committed to effect change must be commensurate with the degree of repressiveness of the government in question for the crime to be considered a political one.

Where it is appropriate to use a proportionality test under Article 1F(b) is in the weighing of the gravity of the crime as part of the process of determining if we should brand it as “political”. A very serious crime, such as murder, may be accepted as political if the regime against which it is committed is repressive and offers no scope for freedom of expression and the peaceful change of government or government policy. Under such a

\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Gil v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)}, [1995] 1 F.C. 508 (C.A.) at 528-529 and 533. Mr. Justice Hugessen followed the evolution of the incidence test in British extradition case law, added some elements of American and other foreign jurisprudence, to form a composite test which he applied to the case at bar. It is by looking at the elements of the decisions which he underlined for emphasis and the terms of his final analysis at 532 that one can deduce the formulation of the test. In \textit{Zrig, Mohamed v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-601-00), Tremblay-Lamer, September 24, 2001, the Court found that the act in question was so barbaric and atrocious it was difficult to describe it as a political crime. Applying the “incidence test” the Court concluded that despite the repressive nature of the government in place, the act of violence was totally out of proportion to any legitimate political objective. Similarly in \textit{Vergara, Marco Vinicio Marchant v. M.C.I.} (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1818-00), Pinard, May 15, 2001, the Court upheld the finding of the CRDD that the crimes in question were “non-political crimes” as there was no relationship between the sabotage and armed robbery directed at civilians with risk of death, and the political objective. In \textit{A.C. v. M.C.I.} (F.C., IMM-4678-02), Russell, December 19, 2003; 2003 FC 1500 the Court held that the brutal and systematic killing of the President’s family cannot be considered proportional to the objective of removing a hated political figure. See also the Court of Appeal decision in \textit{Lai, supra}, footnote 86, paragraphs 62-64.

\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Gil}, ibid., at 534-5. A subsequent decision of the Trial Division took the opposite view, without referring to this precedent; see \textit{Malouf v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)}, [1995] 1 F.C. 537 (T.D.), at 556-557, but note that the Federal Court of Appeal stated in \textit{Malouf, supra}, footnote 58, that paragraph (b) of Article 1F should receive no different treatment than paragraphs (a) and (c). None of them requires the Refugee Division to balance the seriousness of the claimant’s conduct against the alleged fear of persecution.
regime the claimant might be found to have had no other option to bring about political change. On the other hand, if the regime is a liberal democracy with constitutional guarantees of free speech and expression (assuming that such a regime could ever produce a genuine refugee) it is very difficult to think of any crime, let alone a serious one, which we would consider to be acceptable method of political action. To put the matter in concrete terms, the plotters against Hitler might have been able to claim refugee status; the assassin of John F. Kennedy could never do so.\textsuperscript{94}

A plea of guilty to a charge of possession for the purpose of trafficking and trafficking in cocaine constitutes a sound basis for having serious reasons for considering that a person has committed a serious non-political crime.\textsuperscript{95}

The words “admission to that country as a refugee” refer to the admission into Canada of a person intending to claim recognition as a Convention refugee.\textsuperscript{96}

10.3.3. Complicity

In \textit{Zrig},\textsuperscript{97} the Trial Division agreed with the CRDD that the claimant, because of his important involvement in the movement, could not have been unaware that acts of violence were taking place and that he was complicit in serious non-political crimes. The Court certified the following question:

Are the rules laid down by the Federal Court of Appeal in \textit{Sivakumar} … on complicity by association for purposes of implementing art. 1F(a) of the \textit{United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees}, applicable for purposes of an exclusion under 1F(b) of the said Convention?

The Federal Court of Appeal in \textit{Zrig}\textsuperscript{98} answered the certified question in the affirmative and held that neither \textit{Ward} nor \textit{Pushpanathan} precluded the application to Article 1F(b) of the principles of complicity by association laid down in \textit{Sivakumar} and \textit{Bazargan}.

10.3.4. Balancing

In \textit{Xie},\textsuperscript{99} the Federal Court of Appeal held that the RPD is neither required nor allowed to balance the claimant’s crimes against the risk of torture. In fact the Court held that having found

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Gil}, supra, footnote 92, at 535.
\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Malouf}, supra, footnote 93, at 551.
\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Malouf}, supra, footnote 93, at 553.
\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Supra}, footnote 92.
\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Xie}, supra, footnote 86.
\textsuperscript{99} \textit{Ibid}. See also \textit{Ivanov, Nikola Vladov v. M.C.I.} (F.C., no. IMM-2942-04), Snider, September 2, 2004, where the Court concluded that the RPD was not required to balance the potential harm awaiting the applicant against the seriousness of his offence.
first that the claimant fell within the exclusion clauses, specifically Article 1F(b), the RPD exceeded its mandate when it went on to consider whether the claimant was at risk of torture.

10.3.4. “Serious Reasons for Considering”

The existence of a valid warrant issued by a foreign country, in the absence of allegations that the charges are trumped up, may satisfy the standard of proof in Article 1F(b), namely “serious reasons for considering.” If a claimant alleges that the charges against him were fabricated, the RPD must first determine the credibility of the allegations before relying on the warrant as a basis for Article 1F(b). In addition, if a claimant alleges a serious flaw in the judicial process in the country where he faced prosecution, the RPD must consider whether the lack of due process had an impact on the claimant’s convictions.101

10.4. ARTICLE 1F(C): Acts Contrary To The Purposes And Principles Of The United Nations

On June 4, 1998 the Supreme Court of Canada released the decision in Pushpanathan102 overturning the decision by the Federal Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court of Canada found no indication in international law that drug trafficking on any scale is to be considered contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations103 and thus is not subject to exclusion under Article 1F(c).

Mr. Justice Bastarache, writing on behalf of the majority, held that:

... the purpose of Article 1F(c) can be characterized in the following terms: to exclude those individuals responsible for serious, sustained or systemic violations of fundamental human rights which amount to persecution in a non-war setting.104

The Court noted that in dealing with Article 1 F(c),

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100 Qazi, Musawar Hussain v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9182-04), von Finckenstein, September 2, 2005; 2005 FC 1204.
103 Ibid, at 1032.
104 Ibid, at 1029.
The guiding principle is that where there is consensus in international law that particular acts constitute sufficiently serious and sustained violations of fundamental human rights as to amount to persecution, or are explicitly recognized as contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, then Article 1 F(c) will be applicable.\(^\text{105}\)

The Court set out two categories of acts which fall within this exclusion clause. The first category is:

... where a widely accepted international agreement or United Nations resolution declares that the commission of certain acts is contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.\(^\text{106}\)

Enforced disappearances, torture and international terrorism were examples offered by the Court as falling in the first category as corresponding international instruments exist which specifically designate such acts as being contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.\(^\text{107}\) The Court noted that "other sources of international law may be relevant in a court's determination of whether an act falls within 1F(c)" and noted that "determinations by the International Court of Justice may be compelling."\(^\text{108}\)

The second category of acts which fall within the scope of Article 1F(c) are:

those which a court is able, for itself, to characterize as serious, sustained and systemic violations of fundamental human rights constituting persecution.\(^\text{109}\)

This second category was also described by the Court as including any act whereby an international instrument has indicated it is a violation of fundamental human rights.\(^\text{110}\)

\(^{105}\) Pushpanathan, supra, footnote 102, at 1030. In Szekely, Attila v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6032-98), Teitelbaum, December 15, 1999, the Court upheld the exclusion of a claimant under Article 1F(c) who, while acting as an informer for the Romanian secret police (la Securitate), had been part of an organization that committed serious, sustained and systematic violations of fundamental human rights constituting persecution.

\(^{106}\) Pushpanathan, supra, footnote 102, at 1030. In Bitaraf, Babak v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1609-03), Phelan, June 23, 2004; 2004 FC 898, the Court found that the RPD erred when it followed the approach used for Article 1F(a) rather than for Article 1F(c) and failed to identify which purposes and principles of the United Nations were at issue.

\(^{107}\) Pushpanathan, supra, footnote 102, at 1030. In El Hayek, Youssef Ayoub v. M.C.I. and Boulos, Laurett v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9356-04), Pinard, June 17, 2005; 2005 FC 835 the Court upheld the finding of the RPD that the claimant was a part of the Kataebs and the Lebanese Forces and as a result of his knowledge of the crimes committed, he was complicit in crimes against humanity and acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

\(^{108}\) Pushpanathan, supra, footnote 102, at 1032.

\(^{109}\) Ibid, at 1032.

\(^{110}\) Ibid, at 1035.
As a result, the Court determined that "conspiring to traffic in a narcotic is not a violation of Article 1F(c)."\textsuperscript{111}

Even though international trafficking in drugs is an extremely serious problem that the United Nations has taken extraordinary measures to eradicate, in the absence of clear indications that the international community recognizes drug trafficking as a sufficiently serious and sustained violation of fundamental human rights so as to amount to persecution, either through a specific designation as an act contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations (the first category), or through international instruments which otherwise indicate that trafficking is a serious violation of fundamental human rights (the second category) individuals should not be deprived of the essential protections contained in the Convention for having committed those acts.\textsuperscript{112}

The Court also noted that exclusion under Article 1F(c) is not limited to persons in positions of power and indicated that non-state actors may fall within the provision.\textsuperscript{113}

The Federal Court of Appeal had ruled in \textit{Pushpanathan}\textsuperscript{114} and in \textit{Malouf}\textsuperscript{115} that the CRDD is not required to balance the seriousness of the claimant's conduct against the alleged fear of persecution when considering any of the paragraphs of Article 1F. Since the Supreme Court of Canada did not comment on this aspect of the exclusion clauses, the dicta as regards the balancing can still be considered as good law. Nothing in the decision of the Supreme Court in \textit{Pushpanathan} suggests that the Court intended to overrule or modify this point of law.

\textbf{10.4.1. Complicity}

In \textit{Bazargan},\textsuperscript{116} the Court of Appeal, citing MacGuigan J.A. in \textit{Ramirez}, adopted the position that personal and knowing participation in persecutorial acts is the only criterion to be applied in order to determine if a claimant is guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Formal membership in an organization whose members are guilty of such acts is not a prerequisite to the application of Article 1F(c).

\begin{quote}
It is not working within an organization that makes someone an accomplice to the organization’s activities, but knowingly contributing to those activities in anyway or making them possible whether from within or from outside the organization.\textsuperscript{117}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Ibid}, at 1035. \\
\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Ibid}, at 1035. \\
\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Ibid}, at 1031. \\
\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)}, [1996] 2 F.C. 49 (C.A.). \\
\textsuperscript{115} Gonzalez, supra, footnote 58. \\
\textsuperscript{116} Bazargan, supra, footnote 67. \\
\textsuperscript{117} Bazargan, supra, footnote 67, at 4.
\end{flushleft}
Whether Article 1F(a), 1F(b) or 1F(c) is involved, the same principles regarding complicity apply (see Chapter 10, section 10.2.6.)

10.5. BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF

The burden of establishing serious reasons for considering that international offences have been committed falls on the Government.

Aside from avoiding the proving of a negative by a claimant, this also squares with the onus under paragraph 19(1)(j) of the Immigration Act, according to which it is the Government that must establish that it has reasonable grounds for excluding claimants. For all these reasons, the Canadian approach requires that the burden of proof be on the Government, as well as being on a basis of less than the balance of probabilities.

The Minister does not have to be present at the hearing in order for the Refugee Division to consider exclusion clauses.

The interpretation of “serious reasons for considering” has established the standard of proof at less than the balance of probabilities. The Federal Court of Appeal in Moreno and Sivakumar elaborated on the standard it had earlier enunciated:

In Ramirez, … this Court canvassed this aspect of refugee law and

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118 In Bazargan, supra, footnote 67, where complicity was an issue in the application of Article 1F(c), the Court of Appeal relied on several decisions where complicity was dealt with in the context of Article 1F(a), namely, Ramirez, supra, footnote 44; Gutierrez, supra, footnote 81; Sivakumar, supra, footnote 48; and Moreno, supra, footnote 65.

119 Ramirez, supra, footnote 44, at 314. Bazargan, supra, footnote 67, at 4: The Minister does not have to prove the respondent’s guilt. He merely has to show - and the burden of proof resting on him is less than the balance of probabilities - that there are serious reasons for considering that the respondent is guilty.

120 Although this principle was clear from the case law even before the decision in Arica, Jose Domingo Malaga v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-153-92), Stone, Robertson, McDonald, May 3, 1995. Reported: Arica v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1995), 182 N.R. 34 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused: (1995), 198 N.R. 239 (S.C.C.), the Court of Appeal therein unequivocally stated: “The fact that the Minister does not participate in the hearing, either because he does not wish to do so or because he is not entitled to notice under Rule 9(3), does not alter the right of the Board to render a decision on the issue of exclusion.” (At 6, unreported). See also Ashari, Morteza Asna v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5205-97), Reed, August 21, 1998. The Federal Court of Appeal in Ashari, Morteza Asna v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-525-98), Decary, Robertson, Noël, October 26, 1999, confirmed the decision of the Trial Division. In Alwan, Riad Mushen Abou v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8204-03), Layden-Stevenson, June 2, 2004; 2004 FC 807, the Court concluded that since the RPD has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions of law and fact, including questions of jurisdiction, non-participation of the Minister does not preclude an exclusion finding. However, in Kanya, Kennedy Lofty v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2778-05), Rouleau, December 9, 2005; 2005 FC 1677 in the unusual circumstances of the case, the Court found that the RPD breached procedural fairness by not notifying the Minister in a timely fashion that there was a possibility that Article 1F(b) would apply.

121 In Moreno, supra, footnote 65, at 309, Mr. Justice Robertson wrote: “However, it may well be that in strict legal theory the exclusion clause should be construed as erecting a threshold test to be met by the Minister rather than prescribing a standard of proof per se.”

122 Ramirez, supra, footnote 44, at 311-4.
concluded that the standard was one well below that required under either the criminal law ("beyond a reasonable doubt") or the civil law ("on a balance of probabilities" or "preponderance of evidence").\textsuperscript{123}

In \textit{Ramirez} … MacGuigan J.A. stated that serious reasons for considering constitutes an intelligible standard on its own which need not be assimilated to the reasonable standard in section 19 of the \textit{Immigration Act}. This conclusion was echoed by Mr. Justice Robertson in \textit{Moreno}, … although Robertson, J.A. indicated, that for practical purposes, there was no difference between the standards. I agree that there is little, if any difference of meaning between the two formulations of the standard. Both of these standards require something more than suspicion or conjecture, but something less than the balance of probabilities.\textsuperscript{124}

The Court also added that it “is universally accepted that the applicability of the exclusion clause does not depend on whether a claimant has been charged or convicted of the acts set out in the Convention.”\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Moreno}, supra, footnote 65, at 308.

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Sivakumar, supra}, footnote 48, at 445. In \textit{Pushpanathan, supra}, footnote 65 the Trial Division held that the Supreme Court of Canada decision in \textit{Pushpanathan} did not increase the standard of proof for exclusion.

\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Moreno, supra}, footnote 65, at 308.
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