



# Security Council

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## Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur

### I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraphs 6, 13 and 16 of Security Council resolution 1556 (2004), paragraph 15 of resolution 1564 (2004), paragraph 17 of resolution 1574 (2004) and paragraph 12 of resolution 1590 (2005). It covers the period from early January through July 2007. Some of the aspects of the situation in Darfur were covered in the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the hybrid operation in Darfur (S/2007/307/Rev.1), issued on 5 June.

### II. Insecurity in Darfur

2. In recent months, the overall security situation in Darfur has been characterized by continual violence and insecurity. The nature of that insecurity, however, differed in the three states of the region. Western Darfur suffered from cross-border tensions between Chad and the Sudan, including direct hostilities in early April. Northern Darfur remained heavily affected by the conflict between the Government of the Sudan and the Darfur Peace Agreement non-signatory factions, particularly in the areas north of El Fasher and in Jebel Marra, while in Southern Darfur persistent tribal conflict also continued to result in violent attacks. In a disturbing development, elements of the two signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement, namely the Government of the Sudan and the Minni Minawi faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), clashed on several occasions in March. The most significant security development of the reporting period, however, was the increasing violence against the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), as well as the broader United Nations and international non-governmental organization community in Darfur.

3. I am deeply saddened to inform the Council that the United Nations lost its first peacekeeper in Darfur on 25 May, when Lieutenant Colonel Ehab Nazih, an Egyptian military officer deployed to Darfur as part of the United Nations light support package, was murdered at his residence in El Fasher. The exact circumstances of the attack are still under investigation; however, it is known that late in the evening on 25 May, three armed men broke into the private house shared by Lieutenant Colonel Nazih and seven other UNMIS military, police and civilian



staff, and took money and valuables from the occupants before shooting Lieutenant Colonel Nazih. He was rushed to the AMIS level II hospital, where he was pronounced dead on 26 May 2007. I wish to extend my deepest condolences to the family of Lieutenant Colonel Nazih as well as to the Government of Egypt, and to salute a peacekeeper who perished in the service of peace.

4. The UNMIS Coordinator in El Fasher, with the cooperation of the UNMIS Force Commander and the Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat, is overseeing efforts to ensure a thorough investigation and tightened security measures for the safety of United Nations personnel.

5. In addition to the killing of Lieutenant Colonel Nazih, numerous attacks were launched against AMIS personnel during the reporting period, leaving a total of 11 peacekeepers dead. On 1 February, an AMIS staff member was shot dead by unknown men outside the Kasab camp for internally displaced persons in Kutum, Northern Darfur. Three AMIS soldiers were killed in an attack on 5 March at an SLA-Minawi checkpoint in Gereida, Southern Darfur. On 31 March in Northern Darfur, a helicopter transporting a senior AMIS delegation, including the AMIS Deputy Force Commander, was shot at in the general area of Kurni, which is controlled by the Abdul Wahid faction of the SLM (SLM-Wahid). Furthermore, five AMIS peacekeepers were killed in an attack by SLA-Minawi forces on 1 April while guarding the water point in Umm Barru, Northern Darfur. On 10 April, an AMIS soldier died of injuries sustained in an attack by unidentified gunmen near Sortony, Northern Darfur. Four days later, on 14 April, the body of an AMIS officer was found near AMIS headquarters in El Fasher, his car having apparently been stolen. In addition, a total of 25 vehicles belonging to AMIS and its contractor, Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), have been carjacked since the beginning of the year, and an AMIS officer who was abducted on 10 December 2006 is still missing.

6. Additionally, AMIS continues to face serious impediments to the performance of its functions. On 27 May, for instance, the United Nations assisted AMIS in negotiating the release of one of its helicopters, which had been impounded by members of the national security force while on a reconnaissance flight in Umm Hosh, Western Darfur. There have been also impediments of a bureaucratic and administrative nature.

7. The humanitarian community in Darfur is also increasingly subject to violence. The incidents are too numerous to list, but a summary indicates the gravity of the situation: between January and mid-June 2007, 61 humanitarian vehicles were carjacked, 69 staff were temporarily abducted and 37 convoys were ambushed and looted, with assaults and injuries increasingly common during those ambushes. A particularly egregious incident occurred in Nyala in January, when five United Nations staff members, three AMIS personnel and 13 non-governmental organization workers were arrested and detained by Government security forces on charges of misconduct. All were physically assaulted, and one female staff member was sexually assaulted. To date, none of the officials involved in the incident has been brought to justice. Such incidents are seriously affecting the ability of humanitarian organizations to provide assistance.

8. There have also been disturbing reports of indiscriminate attacks causing civilian casualties. Earlier in 2007, the Government of the Sudan carried out several aerial bombardments of non-signatory strongholds in Northern and Southern Darfur, including Bamina; in Bahia in Western Darfur; and in Anka, Umm Rai and Birdik

(Northern Darfur). Bombings were also carried out in the areas of Wadi Korma and Ein Siro in Northern Darfur, killing two civilians in addition to a large number of sheep, cattle and camels. In an interview with the BBC Arabic Service on 23 January, Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir confirmed that aerial bombardments against the non-signatories had taken place, but contended that rebel strongholds had been targeted, not civilians.

9. A lull in the Government's aerial bombardments followed, lasting until 19 April, but was broken by Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) bombing raids in Northern Darfur. Between 19 April and 3 May, there were 13 days of confirmed bombardments of rebel positions by SAF. Several of those were in the Umm Rai area in Northern Darfur, at a time when the non-signatory factions of the SLA had extended invitations to the international community to attend a planned commanders' conference at that location. On 29 April, rebel factions near Umm Rai shot down an SAF Mi-24 attack helicopter. One pilot died in the crash and another is still being held by the rebels. The Government of the Sudan confirmed the incident, but stated that the helicopter had been on a reconnaissance mission. On 28 May, a Government of the Sudan Antonov aeroplane conducted aerial reconnaissance over Umm Hosh, Anka and Umm Rai in Western Darfur. One day later, on 29 May, SAF conducted air strikes on the village of Wakhaim, asserting that they were acting in self-defence in reaction to the rebel groups' meeting to develop plans to attack the Government.

10. Ground attacks against civilian villages have also occurred on several occasions over the past few months. On 10 February, armed militiamen attacked approximately 20 people near Bala Firash (Western Darfur), killing 6 and injuring 7. On 13 February, armed militias attacked Fanga Shouk (Northern Darfur), considered an SLM-Wahid stronghold. The fighting resulted in 20 civilian casualties and the looting of around 2,000 heads of cattle. On 18 March, armed militiamen attacked Aro Sharo (Western Darfur). Three civilians were killed in the course of the attack and a large number of livestock was stolen.

11. The reporting period was also marked by a resurgence of intertribal clashes, predominantly between Rizeigat (primarily farmers) and Tarjem (primarily cattle herders) in Southern Darfur, which claimed hundreds of lives. Following severe clashes in January, fighting between the two tribes persisted in February and March. In late March, Tarjem representatives peacefully demonstrated in Nyala against the continuous attacks by Rizeigat. Large groups from both sides have been reported in the area since the incident.

12. To a lesser extent, fighting among other tribal groups also occurred. In January, the Habaniya tribe clashed with the Fallata, and on 4 February, two Arab tribes, the Mahaliya and the Jalul, clashed around the Kabkabiya area of Northern Darfur. The Zaghawa tribe, which is supported by the SLM-Minawi group, battled with the Mima and Maaliya tribes between January and April. In a related incident, on 12 March SLM-Minawi soldiers attacked Maaliya tribesmen in Al Muturwad, Southern Darfur. Ten civilians were killed in the fighting, and 14 others were injured. On 26 April, some 300 armed tribesmen attacked internally displaced persons in the Argo and Dabanera camps near Tawilla, Northern Darfur, committing acts of looting, physical assault and kidnapping.

13. In March 2007, tension and violence increased between Government forces and elements of Darfur Peace Agreement signatory SLM-Minawi on three separate

occasions in both Northern and Southern Darfur. The most serious incident, however, took place on 24 March, when a gun battle erupted in Omdurman (Khartoum) in which nine people were killed, including eight SLM-Minawi members and one senior Government police officer.

14. In another incident, on 19 March, Government police officers and SAF soldiers exchanged fire in Nertiti (Western Darfur), which reportedly resulted in the death of several civilians. On the same day, a Government police vehicle was ambushed by suspected armed militiamen near Sirba (Western Darfur). In the course of the attack, eight policemen were seriously wounded, one policeman went missing, and several weapons, including a heavy machine gun, were stolen.

15. During the reporting period, tension also persisted between Chad and the Sudan. There were almost no attacks across the Chad-Sudan border in the first two months of 2007, but on 31 March Arab militia groups operating from Chadian territory attacked the two Sudanese villages of Tuiro and Moreina, located in Western Darfur close to the Chadian border. The attacks claimed the lives of about 300 persons, including civilians and internally displaced persons. About 8,000 people are said to have fled the area. On 9 April, Chadian and Sudanese forces clashed directly for the first time, when the Chadian National Armed Forces entered Sudanese territory in pursuit of Chadian armed opposition groups that had launched an attack into Chad. Sixteen SAF soldiers were killed. The following day, the Government of Chad apologized for what were described as “unintentional clashes”, and media reports indicated a similar reaction from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan, who expressed his country’s “determination” to seek a peaceful solution to the incident. Nevertheless, relations between Chad and the Sudan remained tense throughout April. Clearly, the incident resulted in a build-up of forces on both sides of the border.

16. Since the signing of the Riyadh agreement on 3 May, tensions between the Sudan and Chad appear to have decreased somewhat. In the last two weeks of May, more than 1,000 Sudanese rebels reportedly crossed into the Sudan from Chad following an ultimatum issued by President Deby for their withdrawal from Chadian territory under the terms of the Riyadh agreement. In addition, under the agreement, both countries have pledged to adhere to the provisions of the 8 February 2006 Tripoli Agreement and all subsequent agreements, including on the establishment of the joint military and security committee. Since June, the Government of Chad and leaders of the main rebel groups have been engaged in talks.

### **III. Human rights and protection**

17. Human rights abuses continued in various forms during the reporting period. Among the major areas of concern were the aerial attacks on villages by Government aircraft, which are described above; attacks against internally displaced persons in and around camps; and sexual and gender-based violence against girls and women.

18. According to many reports, the aerial attacks on villages in Western and Northern Darfur were indiscriminate, as they failed to distinguish between military and civilian objects and used disproportionate means of warfare. The attacks on Umm Rai, located in Northern Darfur, which witnesses reported to UNMIS human

rights monitors, resulted in civilian casualties; the destruction of houses, a school and other property; and the death of livestock.

19. Carrying out even the most basic daily tasks poses a serious security risk for most of the civilian population in Darfur. Whether in camps for internally displaced persons or in villages, men, women and children are under constant threat of arbitrary arrest, attack, rape and murder by armed groups. Relations between internally displaced persons in the Abu Shouk camp (Northern Darfur) and the local police deteriorated in the beginning of the year, when internally displaced youths seized the weapons of the police after the latter had attempted to take away their mobile telephones. In response, the police arrested the camp's tribal elders and 94 internally displaced persons. The detainees were subsequently released, but five of them were again detained by the authorities in February and held for almost a month without charges being brought. On 17 February, two armed men dressed in military fatigues entered the Krinding II camp for internally displaced persons, outside El Geneina, Western Darfur, and burned a shelter. When one of the persons present protested, he was fatally shot in the head.

20. On 4 March, SLM-Minawi soldiers and members of the National Intelligence and Security Service fired at each other in the Kalma (Southern Darfur) camp, killing one internally displaced person and injuring two others. On 18 March, a leader was shot and injured by unidentified gunmen at the Hassa Hissa (Western Darfur) camp. In Western Darfur, on 3 April, a group of three armed men in green military-style uniforms opened fire in the Kondobe market, killing two civilians, including a 17-year-old boy, and injuring four others. In Southern Darfur, on 4 April, three female internally displaced persons were attacked and beaten by armed militia 10 kilometres east of the Sheria camp for internally displaced persons. One of the women was able to flee and reported the incident to other persons in the camp, but the other two were abducted by the men. A group of internally displaced persons went to search for the women and were fired at: one woman was killed and three others were severely injured. The two abducted women were later released.

21. During the reporting period, the female population of Darfur continued to be the target of systematic sexual and gender-based violence. In a single camp for internally displaced persons in Western Darfur, Massalit women and girls between the ages of 15 and 60 were involved in at least eight different reported incidents of sexual and gender-based violence between late January and early March 2007; in February alone, nine female internally displaced persons, including two girls under the age of 10, were raped in six separate incidents in various parts of Darfur, usually near camps for internally displaced persons; and, in a 14 April incident, a 10-year-old girl was physically assaulted and raped by an armed man on the outskirts of the Hamadiya camp in Zalingei (Western Darfur) while collecting firewood outside the camp with seven other women.

22. There were also reports that the SLM-Abul Gassim faction attempted to recruit adolescents in Menawashi and Mershing (Southern Darfur) in January. Villagers raised the issue with SAF, which ordered that all recruitment be stopped. SLM-Abul Gassim attempts to forcibly recruit adolescents in another camp also met with strong protests by residents. Those actions prompted many families and adolescents to flee Menawashi, Mershing and Dhuma to avoid recruitment. Despite SAF intervention, no significant return to the area has been witnessed to date.

#### **IV. Humanitarian situation**

23. I remain extremely concerned about the effects of the conflict on the civilian population, as the attacks and insecurity described in the present report continue to trigger civilian displacement. More than 150,000 people have been newly displaced since the beginning of the year. Those fleeing their villages are mostly seeking refuge in camps for internally displaced persons that in many cases are at or near capacity. That is the case in El Fasher (Northern Darfur), Zalingei (Western Darfur) and Nyala and Kass (Southern Darfur). The ongoing influx is further straining available resources and in some areas humanitarian indicators are once again deteriorating. A recent survey carried out at Otash camp (Southern Darfur) during the reporting period revealed a malnutrition rate above 15 per cent — the emergency threshold — with the highest rates among the newcomers.

24. I am also very concerned about the impact of the insecurity on the ability of the United Nations to deliver humanitarian assistance. Attacks on aid workers and their assets occur almost on a daily basis. In recent months, bombardments and general insecurity in North Darfur have forced humanitarian organizations to relocate their staff from several areas within the region. An estimated 83,000 internally displaced persons and conflict-affected residents in Tawilla and Tawilla Rural have lost access to medical support, while 200,000 beneficiaries are affected by the indefinite suspension of food distributions in Dar Zaghawa, Umm Baru, Birmaza and Hashaba. The relocation of humanitarian personnel from Sirba and Abu Soroug to Geneina (Western Darfur) has left some 50,000 conflict-affected people temporarily without any humanitarian assistance. It is estimated that 566,000 of the 4.2 million conflict-affected persons in Darfur are currently cut off from humanitarian assistance.

25. Despite those daunting challenges, the humanitarian community has, by resorting to creative solutions, returned to many areas that were previously inaccessible. Newly accessed areas include eastern Jebel Marra, Thur and Umm Dukhum. The polio vaccination campaign of 26 to 28 March also reached many areas that had been previously inaccessible. In Goldo (Western Darfur), 14,422 children under 5 years of age were immunized for the first time.

26. Between 21 and 27 March, the new Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, John Holmes, made his first trip to the Sudan. After meeting senior Government officials and non-governmental organization and donor representatives, and travelling to Darfur and Juba, he concluded his visit with the 28 March signing of the joint humanitarian communiqué by the Government of the Sudan and the United Nations. The communiqué details various measures to facilitate continued and timely assistance to the beneficiary population in Darfur and stipulates the establishment of a high-level committee and a tripartite joint technical committee to ensure the agreement's full implementation. The committees are made up of representatives of the Government of the Sudan, the United Nations and international non-governmental organizations.

27. To date, the high-level committee has met three times and has visited several field locations in Darfur, to ensure that the new procedures are followed at the field level. Notable progress in the implementation of the communiqué has been achieved, which has eased some of the considerable bureaucratic impediments created by the Sudanese Government that humanitarian organizations had

experienced from January through March. Nevertheless, humanitarian organizations continue to encounter some administrative obstacles, including with regard to access to beneficiaries, hiring of national staff and the implementation of projects to address the issues of the protection of civilians and of sexual and gender-based violence. Close monitoring of the implementation of the communiqué will be essential in the coming months.

## **V. Implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement**

28. At the same time, some movement has been registered in the implementation of elements of the Darfur Peace Agreement, signed on 5 May 2006 in Abuja. Signatory movement representatives have been incorporated into newly created local governments, and the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority has been established. However, there remains keen dissatisfaction among the signatories of the Declaration of Commitment over allocation of posts as part of power-sharing arrangements.

29. The Transitional Darfur Regional Authority was officially inaugurated at a ceremony held on 24 April in Khartoum, which was followed by another ceremony in El Fasher. It is chaired by Minni Minawi, Senior Assistant to the President of the Sudan, with the Governors of the three states of Darfur serving as his deputies. There is concern, however, that the institution does not have the logistical support or the resources necessary to make it an effective and functioning body, and also that it is currently insufficiently representative of the people of Darfur. In addition, the relationship between the Chairperson of the Regional Authority and existing government structures in the three Darfur states requires clarification.

30. While some elements of the Darfur Peace Agreement appear to be gaining momentum, serious concerns have been raised over the selective implementation of power-sharing provisions, which has exacerbated the security situation in some areas. By adding six new localities, the local bureaucracy has stretched its meagre resources even thinner on the ground. Representatives of the signatory movements are also pointing to other critical aspects of the Agreement that have not been implemented, such as Janjaweed disarmament and full implementation of the security arrangements.

31. At the same time, progress has been made in mobilizing support for the political process, with the objective of making the Darfur Peace Agreement more inclusive while building consensus for the urgent deployment of a United Nations-African Union force on the ground, as envisaged in the joint African Union-United Nations report on the hybrid operation in Darfur (S/2007/307/Rev.1).

32. The African Union and United Nations Special Envoys for Darfur, Salim Ahmed Salim and Jan Eliasson, conducted three joint missions to the Sudan/Darfur and to the region (from 12 to 17 February; 23 to 29 March; and 6 to 10 May) during which they consulted with high-level Government officials, including President Al-Bashir, First Vice-President Salva Kiir and Senior Assistant to the President Minni Minawi, as well as other stakeholders, representatives of factions that are non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement (including field commanders), civil society, opposition political parties, tribal leaders and internally displaced persons. The consultations were aimed at mobilizing support for an African Union/United Nations-led political process and at seeking views on how to make the Agreement

more inclusive. During those initial consultations, all the parties consulted, including the Government of the Sudan, agreed that there could be no military solution to the crisis in Darfur and that a political solution was the only way forward to a lasting peace. Both the Government and the other parties largely accepted the fact that the support base for the Darfur Peace Agreement needed to be broadened so as to ensure its ownership by the people of Darfur, while acknowledging that the Agreement could not be renegotiated in its entirety. Within that framework, those consulted agreed to cooperate with the efforts of the Special Envoys. There are, however, still areas of divergence, as some leaders of the non-signatory movements refuse to accept the Agreement as a basis for renewed negotiations.

33. On behalf of the United Nations and the African Union, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Darfur, Jan Eliasson, travelled to Asmara on 22 March to discuss with the Eritrean President, Isaias Afwerki, how to harmonize the joint African Union-United Nations mediation effort with the Eritrean initiative on Darfur. Special Envoy Eliasson travelled to Chad, also on behalf of both Envoys, to solicit the Chadian authorities' support for the African Union/United Nations-led political process and for meetings with some non-signatories.

34. On 28 and 29 April, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya hosted a high-level meeting in Tripoli on the political process in Darfur. All key regional and international players participated, including the Sudan, Chad, Egypt, Eritrea and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, as well as the five permanent members of the Security Council. The Tripoli Consensus, which was adopted at that meeting, reaffirmed the importance of a comprehensive and sustainable political solution to the Darfur crisis and stressed the need for all national, regional and international peace initiatives to converge under African Union-United Nations leadership. It also urged the parties to accelerate preparations for negotiations, warned that those who obstructed the political process would have to bear the consequences, and encouraged the Special Envoys to intensify consultations and finalize their road map on a strategy and timeline for renewed negotiations.

35. On 8 June, the joint African Union-United Nations road map for the Darfur political process was finalized. It consists of three phases: convergence of initiatives and consultations; pre-negotiations; and negotiations. As a point of departure for the implementation of the road map, the African Union and the United Nations expect all parties to declare their serious commitment to achieving a political solution to the Darfur crisis, creating a security environment in Darfur conducive to negotiations, participating in and committing to the outcome of the negotiation effort, and ceasing all hostilities immediately.

36. Meanwhile, the African Union-United Nations Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) has been expanded to support the work of the Special Envoys. As part of that strengthening, Pekka Haavisto (Finland) was appointed Senior Adviser to Special Envoy Eliasson early in June. He will be based primarily in the Sudan and the region and will assist in preparing the ground for the renewed negotiations.

37. On 15 and 16 July, the second international meeting on Darfur was convened in Tripoli by African Union and United Nations Special Envoys Salim and Eliasson. In its final communiqué, participants noted that the initial convergence phase of the road map had ended and endorsed the beginning of the pre-negotiation phase. The Special Envoys also proposed to convene a meeting from 3 to 5 August with leading personalities of the non-signatory movements in Arusha, United Republic of



Tanzania, in an effort to facilitate preparations for negotiations. That proposal was welcomed unequivocally. In addition, it was agreed at the meeting that invitations for the new round of negotiations should be issued by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General before the end of August 2007, requesting the Special Envoys to consult widely with all relevant stakeholders on the most appropriate date and venue for the talks.

38. At the same time, the African Union-led Preparatory Committee for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC), inaugurated in November 2006, has made efforts to pave the way towards the projected DDDC. In the course of the reporting period, the Chairperson of the DDDC Preparatory Committee, who assumed charge earlier this year, completed a first round of consultations at the community level with stakeholders in Nyala (Southern Darfur), El Fasher (Northern Darfur), Zalingei and El Geneina (Western Darfur). A broad range of Darfurian stakeholders, including representatives of civil society, the native administration, political parties, Darfur Peace Agreement signatory and non-signatory factions, as well as internally displaced persons, have been consulted, with a view to identifying their main interests and concerns related to the conflict.

## **VI. United Nations support for the African Union Mission in the Sudan**

39. The Tripartite Mechanism established to facilitate the speedy implementation of the United Nations light support package to AMIS has continued to meet regularly since its inception last December. At its 10th meeting, held in April, the Mechanism received an update on the progress achieved so far in the implementation of the light support package.

40. With respect to that package, of a total of 184 personnel, 154 have been deployed to the Sudan. That number includes 83 military officers, 34 police officers and 37 civilian staff members. With respect to equipment, the main outstanding items are 36 armed personnel carriers. During the reporting period, the deployment of military and civilian personnel to Darfur has been hampered by continued insecurity and the scarcity of office and living accommodation that meet United Nations security standards. However, the construction of an additional 110 residential units for light package staff is expected to be completed soon, which will help to expedite deployment.

41. The heavy support package will entail the deployment of military, police and mission support personnel and equipment, as well as civilian staff to provide support in a range of areas, including civil affairs, humanitarian liaison, public information and support for the Darfur political process. Details of the package were communicated to the Government of the Sudan by the Secretary-General and the African Union Commission Chairperson in identical letters addressed to President Al-Bashir in January 2007.

42. In his response, dated 6 March 2007, President Al-Bashir expressed reservations and requested clarification with regard to some aspects of the package, and proposed that further discussions take place to address them. In order to provide clarity on those issues, a high-level African Union-United Nations team held a consultative briefing on 9 April in Addis Ababa with representatives of the

Government of the Sudan. Comprehensive clarifications were provided by the African Union and the United Nations on the heavy support package as well as on the observations raised by the Government. On 16 April, the Government of the Sudan gave its agreement to the full heavy support package, the cost of which is estimated to be \$287.9 million.

43. In addition to the urgently needed contribution by Member States of troops and police, deploying the heavy package will also require the agreement of the Government of the Sudan on land and water drilling in Darfur and its cooperation in clearing essential items currently held in Port Sudan; the deployment of two additional AMIS battalions with the equipment necessary to ensure protection for African Union and United Nations personnel; and the restructuring of AMIS from eight to three sectors. Deploying the heavy package will also require the immediate support of international partners for the expansion of seven AMIS camps to accommodate the deployment of the two additional AMIS battalions. Implementation teams have been established by the United Nations in Khartoum and El Fasher to expedite the deployment of the heavy package.

44. A budget of \$68.6 million has been provided to the heavy support package by drawing from UNMIS resources to cater for expenses up to June 2007. I anticipate that almost all of the allocated resources will be directed towards the acquisition of assets that will be required to implement the heavy support package.

45. The United Nations and the African Union have agreed on troop contributors for all 11 military units included in the heavy package. As agreed, we have given preference to African troop contributors wherever possible, and, in our effort to proceed with full transparency, we have submitted to the Government of the Sudan a list of the selected troop-contributing countries and the units that they will be providing.

46. With respect to the police component of the heavy support package, 47 police-contributing countries have committed individual officers. As agreed, the United Nations will aim to ensure that the majority of those officers come from African Member States. Additionally, in close consultation with the African Union, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has selected Bangladesh, Nigeria and Pakistan to provide three formed police units to the heavy support package. As with the troop-contributing countries, the Secretariat has informed the Government of the Sudan of the selection.

## **VII. African Union-United Nations hybrid operation**

47. Deliberations on the hybrid operation between the African Union and the United Nations began in Addis Ababa early in 2007. On the basis of those deliberations, a joint report was finalized detailing all aspects of the hybrid operation. As the Council will recall, I subsequently transmitted the joint report on the hybrid operation in Darfur (S/2007/307/Rev.1) to the Security Council on 5 June 2007. The report was also forwarded to President Al-Bashir through identical letters from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and from me on the same day.

48. As with the heavy support package, the United Nations and the African Union jointly provided a technical briefing to the Government of the Sudan on the hybrid

operation. The briefing, which took place on 11 and 12 June, provided the Government delegation with comprehensive clarifications on the hybrid operation, as detailed in the joint report. The consultations took place in a constructive atmosphere, and the Government delegation agreed to the deployment of the hybrid operation. President Al-Bashir confirmed his Government's acceptance of the hybrid operation during the 17 June visit of the Security Council to Khartoum.

49. It is also important to note that, in addition to accepting the hybrid operation, the Government delegation reconfirmed the need for an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire accompanied by an inclusive political process. I welcome this in view of the fact that a solution to the crisis in Darfur will require concerted action on both the peacekeeping and political tracks. While the Government delegation accepted the hybrid, it also outlined concerns and expressed the hope that the Council would take those concerns into account when developing a resolution authorizing the operation.

50. Now that the Government of the Sudan has reached agreement regarding the deployment of the hybrid operation, it will be important for the Council to provide a mandate for the operation as soon as possible. At its 79th meeting, on 22 June 2007, the African Union Peace and Security Council issued a communiqué authorizing the hybrid operation, which included elements for a mandate based on the joint African Union-United Nations report on the hybrid. A financial addendum (S/2007/307/Rev.1/Add.1) to the hybrid report with detailed cost estimates for the hybrid operation was issued on 5 July 2007. Given the complexity, magnitude and unique nature of this operation, it may be necessary to consider the establishment of another senior management post in addition to those reflected in the hybrid report (S/2007/307/Rev.1), at the level of Assistant Secretary-General, to manage all administrative and financial aspects of this enormous operation.

51. On 29 June, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations convened a meeting with potential troop- and police-contributing countries for the hybrid operation. As the United Nations continues to seek contributions for this massive undertaking, we will do our utmost to maintain the African character of the operation while also ensuring that all troops deployed are sufficiently equipped and up to United Nations standards in order to enable them to operate in such a challenging environment.

52. In order to ensure strong leadership in Darfur prior to the deployment of the hybrid operation, the African Union and the United Nations have appointed Rodolphe Adada, who has been the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo since 1997, as the Joint Special Representative of the African Union and the United Nations for Darfur. Prior to the deployment of the hybrid operation, he will be the Head of AMIS. I have been in regular contact with the Joint Special Representative, who arrived in Khartoum on 4 July. The African Union has also appointed General Martin Agwai of Nigeria as the Force Commander of AMIS, with the understanding that he will be the Force Commander of the hybrid operation when it replaces AMIS. General Agwai, who was most recently the Nigerian Chief of Defence and who has significant United Nations experience, arrived in El Fasher in the second half of July.

53. During my consultations with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on 13 July in New York, I welcomed the fact that the Government of the Sudan agreed with African Union-United Nations plans for the hybrid operation, and I noted the high expectations of the Security Council that an effective

deployment would occur rapidly. I also stressed the importance of progress towards holding peace negotiations in late August or early September and the need for increased emphasis by the international community on development issues in Darfur. In our discussion, the Chairperson shared his view that a comprehensive ceasefire was within reach and stressed the importance of ensuring that those who would not join the African Union-United Nations led peace process faced serious consequences. The Chairperson and I further agreed on the importance of Security Council unity in supporting the authorization and implementation of the hybrid operation. We also agreed on the need for rapid progress in the implementation of the hybrid operation in Darfur, including, as immediate priorities, United Nations-African Union agreement on deployment plans and timelines, senior management, mission structure and personnel generation. These operational plans will be further developed by the United Nations and the African Union during a joint planning session to be held in Addis Ababa early in August.

## **VII. Observations**

54. While the situation in Darfur remains very precarious, I am encouraged by the Government's agreement to the deployment of the hybrid operation. I intend to move forward expeditiously, in full cooperation with the African Union, with the implementation of this crucial peacekeeping initiative. The successful deployment of the hybrid operation will very much depend on the Government's cooperation and assistance, especially with regard to the provision of adequate land, permission to drill for water and the timely clearance of critical mission-support items through customs. In addition to the provision of critical support by the Government of the Sudan and the full deployment of the heavy support package, the international community should also work together towards finalizing the process of force generation within 30 days of the authorization of the mandate and deploying the headquarters and management elements of the hybrid operation as soon as possible. It will be vital to transfer authority from AMIS to the hybrid operation as soon as effective operating capability and command and control structures are on the ground.

55. Meanwhile, I am very concerned about the continuing violence and insecurity in Darfur. Although the humanitarian communities strive to provide protection and assistance to those affected by the conflict, violence against civilians has continued. This is especially true for girls and women, who are victims of widespread violence, including systematic rape. It is imperative that all those involved be brought to justice, and I call on the Sudanese authorities to review their national laws and judicial procedures to ensure that they adequately address the deplorable violence against girls and women.

56. I reiterate my deep concern over the bombing by the Government of the Sudan of areas in Northern and Western Darfur. While the number of aerial bombardments by SAF decreased in February and March, they resumed in April and May. In addition, ground attacks by SAF and associated armed militias continued. Those indiscriminate attacks have brought death, displacement and prolonged suffering to Darfuri civilians. As I have noted on several occasions, as long as hostilities continue in Darfur, efforts to reach a political settlement and achieve durable peace will not succeed. It is imperative that the Government and all parties take effective steps to cease hostilities and act on their commitment to uphold the ceasefire

without delay. At the same time, inter- and intra-tribal clashes, which have exacerbated the already fragile security and humanitarian situation since the beginning of the year, need to be urgently addressed.

57. Humanitarian organizations have been forced to curtail some of their programming owing to the continuing insecurity. That has led to the deterioration of the living conditions of the millions of conflict-affected people who depend on humanitarian agencies for their survival. I appeal to all parties to abide by the ceasefire in order to allow humanitarian organizations to carry out their mission of bringing succour to the war-ravaged population.

58. In a positive development, following the signing on 28 March of the joint humanitarian communiqué on humanitarian assistance in Darfur, cooperation between humanitarian organizations and the authorities with regard to facilitating humanitarian operations has significantly improved. Joint mechanisms established to ensure the full implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement have been functioning successfully. I hope that the cooperation of the Sudan will continue to improve the operating environments for the United Nations and other organizations.

59. In addition, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive development strategy, supported by the Sudanese and the international community, to complement ongoing mediation and peacekeeping efforts. It is critical to mobilize support for recovery and rehabilitation in Darfur, especially with regard to the availability of water for the general population. I intend to explore that possibility with a view to alleviating the suffering of the population.

60. I am also extremely concerned that UNMIS and AMIS peacekeepers and United Nations and non-governmental organization aid personnel have increasingly become the target of violent attacks. Such attacks against African Union, United Nations and non-governmental organization personnel deployed in Darfur constitute serious violations of international law and of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. I therefore call on all parties to respect the status of both organizations and to create an environment that enables those staff members to deliver life-saving assistance and help bring stability to Darfur. I also urge the Government of the Sudan and the movements to take the appropriate measures, in their respective areas of control, to identify those responsible for the attacks on AMIS and UNMIS personnel and to hold them accountable.

61. Meanwhile, with regard to the political process, my Special Envoy for Darfur continues to work with his African Union counterpart, Salim Ahmed Salim, to engage signatories and non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement, as well as other stakeholders, in the process of finding a political solution to the conflict. That process has included three joint missions to the Sudan and several trips to the region to meet with the leaders of Chad, Egypt, Eritrea and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya as well as the 8 June issuance of a road map regarding the peace process in Darfur.

62. I was particularly encouraged by the outcome of the second international meeting on Darfur — a follow-up to the April Tripoli meeting — convened by the Special Envoys on 15 and 16 July in Tripoli in order to take stock of the progress made regarding implementation of the road map. The meeting noted that the first phase of the road map had been concluded, endorsed the beginning of the pre-negotiation phase and agreed that invitations for the projected peace talks should be issued before the end of August 2007.

63. I am appreciative of the initiative taken by Member States to bring renewed energy and commitment to the international community's efforts to take forward the process of resolving the Darfur crisis. In that context, the meeting of the Enlarged Contact Group for Darfur convened by France on 25 June gave additional momentum to African Union-United Nations efforts to reinvigorate the political process and strengthen peacekeeping in Darfur, and it focused international attention on the critical humanitarian situation and prospects for Darfur's reconstruction. I would like to acknowledge President Sarkozy and Foreign Minister Kouchner for having convened that timely meeting on the way forward in addressing the situation in Darfur. It demonstrated the international community's strong commitment to the resolution of that deteriorating crisis.

64. The coming weeks and months will be a crucial period in the quest for peace in Darfur. Joint African Union-United Nations efforts to achieve a political solution will gain momentum as the Special Envoys make every effort to commence negotiations. Meanwhile, implementation of the forthcoming Security Council resolution on the hybrid operation will be a major litmus test of the political will of all involved, including the parties, whose actions will be closely monitored by the international community.

65. As we enter this critical phase, it is essential that work on all four tracks of international engagement in Darfur continue in earnest. There must be substantial progress towards a political settlement and concrete action to strengthen peacekeeping through the hybrid operation. We must also ensure that the massive humanitarian assistance programme continues to sustain millions of people in Darfur. Finally, recovery, development and rehabilitation strategies must be put in place to ensure that these critical longer-term considerations are addressed.

66. This four-track strategy will require the full and sustained commitment of the international community. I count on the active support of all stakeholders as we continue to respond to the enormous challenges of restoring peace and prosperity to Darfur.

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